Book Reviews


This edited volume uncovers the way local discourses on the rights of minorities and indigenous people in the Arab world appeal to, reinterpret or reject both local traditions and the global discourse. The aim is to shed light on regional and global debates about diversity, democracy and prospects for multiculturalism. Ultimately, the book intends to answer the question: ‘Can minority politics serve as a vehicle for a more general transformative politics, supporting a broader culture of democracy and human rights and challenging older authoritarian, clientelistic, or patriarchal political tendencies’ in the Arab World (p. 6)?

The introductory chapter provides the rationale for the book, which is not to catalogue laws and policies adopted in relation to minorities in the Arab world (widely covered in the existing literature) but to understand cultural frames and assumptions that shape the debate around this issue in the region. A historical preamble to the discussion of minorities in the Arab world, concise but comprehensive and rich in bibliographical references, highlights the way nation-building and minority rights are deeply intertwined in the Middle East. However, because of colonial and postcolonial legacies, they have been perceived as mutually exclusive. Moreover, while acknowledging that the burden of history complicates struggles for minority rights, the editors reject the notion of ‘Arab exceptionalism’.

The volume is well organised in two parts. Part I offers an overview of historical perspectives (chapters 2 and 3) and theoretical insights (chapters 4 and 5). The chapters in this section, dense with information and skilfully written by the respective authors, are arranged in a coherent and logical order. The slight overlap on the emergence of the nation-state in the Middle East, the conceptualisation and categorisation of minorities in the region among these chapters and with the introduction is acceptable since this allows each chapter to be read as a self-contained unit. Chapters 4 and 5, respectively on models and methods on offer to manage diversity in the region and on the relevance of liberal multiculturalism for non-Arab minorities in the Arab world and for the management of relations with Arab minorities in the liberal democratic West, propose valuable alternative models to deal with the issue of minority rights both in the region and in the West.

Part II provides a small but interesting sample of case studies which offer insights into less-known minorities in the Arab world shifting the focus from religious minorities (on which there exist a vast literature) to those minorities which identify as a distinct national group or indigenous people and are relatively unexplored, in so doing offering an original contribution to the literature on the subject. Indeed, while covering the well-known case of the Kurds in combination with that of Sudanese Christians (chapter 10), the chapters also address the Western Sahara dispute (chapters 6) and the cases of Amazigh berbers in Algeria (chapters 7), Arab Israelis (chapters 9), Assyrian-Chaldeans in Iraq (chapters 11), as well as the case of a minority, migrant workers in the UAE, who are discriminated on the basis of their socio-economic status, i.e. poverty, rather than on their ethnicity (chapters 8).
Based on the small sample of case studies presented in the volume, the editors conclude that the evidence to date is not encouraging and that ‘we are very far from achieving consensus or convergence on appropriate models for managing diversity in the Arab world’ (p. 24). The minority issue remains a taboo topic in most Arab countries, and the mobilisation of minorities is met with scepticism and resistance when not repression. Those cases of accommodations of minorities exemplify the way minority rights have been used to strengthen authoritarianism rather than as a vehicle for change.

The volume, overall very informative and thought provoking, could have benefited from a conclusive chapter to recapitulate the issues emerged across the volume and to elaborate further on one of the original goals of the book – look at the interaction between global and local discourses in the Middle East to understand how the former can be adapted to reflect experiences and needs of the region, so to create openings for more pluralistic conceptions of nationhood and citizenship in the Arab world. Instead, the book concludes with an unconvincing chapter on the emergence of a new political discourse in the region around democracy, civil liberties and human rights centred on the analysis of the Arab Charter on Human Rights. While this political discourse has been developing since the 1990s, to this day, it remains mere window-dressing of regimes that made of international documents a dead letter.

Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the Arab World will be of use to students and researchers with an interest in Middle East politics, human rights, ethnic and nationalism studies, international relations, political theory, and political philosophy.

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This book examines commonalities and differences in Chinese and Russian national identities from the 19th to the 21st centuries. It highlights the sources and nature of the countries’ present antagonism towards the West and assesses the probable future of their bilateral relations. The author has five aims: to compare the countries, to analyse their relations, to enrich national identity studies, to ‘revive and redirect comparative communist studies’ in terms of the lingering effects of communist identity on present identity, and to contribute to the international relations literature that focuses on national identity rather than national interests (p. 1). His approach is to compare the countries’ national identities using a six-dimensional framework, comprising ideology (the ideological dimension); history (the temporal dimension); politics, economics and culture (the sectoral dimension); internal organisation (the vertical dimension); relations among states (the horizontal dimension); and intensity (the intensity dimension). China and Russia are chosen for comparative study because ‘these countries, which perceived themselves as the true center of communism and considered it their messianic mission to inculcate this ideology unwaveringly at home and spread it incessantly abroad, have persistently sought to transform their national identities’ (p. 6).

In Part 1, the author discusses Chinese and Russian national identity prior to the communist transition in each country. He then examines national identity in the communist period, culminating in the regimes of Gorbachev and Deng.
chapters are dedicated to the analysis of Russian and Chinese identity from 1990 to the present. The last chapter in Part 1 introduces the concept of a ‘Communist Great Power (Transition 1) National Identity Syndrome’, in contrast to the ‘East Asian National Identity Syndrome’ the author analysed in previous works. The point of this chapter is to emphasise the lingering effects of communist national identity on these countries’ postcommunist national identities. In Part 2, emphasis shifts to assessing national identity gaps and overlaps in bilateral relations in and after the communist period. Each chapter begins with a brief introduction to the general theme, followed by specific sections for each of the six dimensions of national identity.

An exemplary passage summarises the role of national identity on contemporary bilateral relations: ‘On ideology, Putin and Xi are both vigorously boosting the legacy of socialism and anti-imperialism. This narrows the two nations’ identity gap . . . On history, criticism of past US behaviour, especially in the Cold War, is intensifying even as mutual criticism is kept in check, driving the two states closer together. On the sectoral dimension, civilizational arguments against the West only keep being strengthened . . . On the vertical dimension, Putin and Xi are toughening their positions, widening the gap with the United States, not with each other . . . Although national identity keeps intensifying, the case for Sino-Russian coordination is not being undermined’ (p. 275).

Readers interested in the author’s notion of national identity will not find the justification for his framework sufficiently elaborated in this work and should thus consult his earlier writings. However, the notion of a national identity transition is introduced and discussed. National identity transition implies that ‘national identity is more complex and subject to greater manipulation than the dichotomous logic used to predict a sudden, drastic transformation’; that ‘communism can be disaggregated, opening the way for hybrid forms of identity’; and that ‘adoption of various so-called universal elements of identity poses challenges everywhere, especially in countries furthest removed from them, as people find it hard to reconcile enduring features of their prior identity with anticipated elements of a new one’ (p. 174).

This book will be useful reading for those who have studied either Chinese or Russian national identity as an important force in world affairs today but are less familiar with the opposite member of the pair. Scholars of constructivism in international relations will benefit from the information provided, though others may be unconvinced of the explanatory role of identity, the more so since the author does little to situate his method and analysis in the literature on international relations. Important questions, such as the relation between national interest and national identity, are under-theorised, as is the unit of analysis, the nation (p. 275–6). Discussion of specific ideological systems is lacking: There is little, for instance, about neo-Eurasianism and nothing on Putin’s specific invocations of Solovyov, Berdaev and other Russian philosophers.

On the whole, the book contributes significantly to an understanding of contemporary anti-liberalism in international relations. On the heels of Vladimir Putin’s October 2014 Valdai speech on the theme ‘The World Order: New Rules or a Game Without Rules?’ and the ‘new Cold War’ between Russia and the West, with China supporting Russia for reasons this book explains, any insight into the dynamics of international anti-Westernism is welcome.

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To this reviewer, one of the majority of contemporary Japanese who have never participated in a full tea ceremony with rudimentary knowledge of what chanoyu is all about, *Making Tea, Making Japan* is first and foremost a site of discoveries. Through the combination of detailed ethnographical research about the tea ceremony in contemporary Japan and literature survey of history and sociology of tea ceremony, Surak has revealed a lot about the chanoyu world including the postwar development of iemoto system, something my own mother detested so much that I was not forced into learning chanoyu or any other ‘traditional’ forms of art while growing up. As a consequence, I grew up with negative attitudes to any iemoto system regarding it as an authoritarian, money-making machine, and it remained mystery why so many people wanted to follow the system and burnt their money. I now know, thanks to Surak’s detailed explanation, what a resilient system it is, and it has almost won my respect – not as a bearer of Japanese cultural essence but as a resilient form of social organisation. And here is the point: The tea ceremony has survived till now as the embodiment of the ‘essence’ of Japanese culture, hence Japaneseness, not because of its inherent values but because of people and organisations who have carried it till now. This is where the idea of ‘nation-work’ becomes relevant.

In situating her ethnographical work on the tea ceremony in Japan within the study of nationalism, Surak focuses on the relationship between what could be termed as the ‘everyday/banal’ approach to nationhood and the more established, ‘history of great men’ type of approach to nationalism. *Making Tea, Making Japan* is an attempt to bridge the gap between the study of nationalism, typically pursued as a historical enquiry focusing on one major event, and the study of nationhood which focuses on how daily routine produces and maintains nationhood through ethnographical methods. As her tool of investigation, Surak has chosen the idea of ‘nation-work’: ‘Nation-work is a material condition both of nationalism, as a movement or ideology, and of nationness, as a form of collective existence’ (p. 3). In other words, the volume is designed to investigate tea ceremony both as part of Japanese nationalism as a movement/ideology and as a form of Japanese collective existence. The aim is pursued by a multi-faceted study of the tea ceremony: Chapter 1 offers the phenomenology of the tea ceremony as performance; chapter 2 investigates the history of the tea ceremony; chapter 3 studies the social organisation and institution of chanoyu in postwar Japan, the iemoto system; chapter 4 provides an ethnographical study of the ways in which the tea ceremony is practiced in contemporary Japan; and finally, chapter 5 examines the use of the tea ceremony in the media space. By investigating different aspects of the tea ceremony as a form of nation-work, Surak illustrates the ways in which the tea ceremony has been made to represent Japaneseness and the Japaneseness it has come to represent.

While ethnographical chapters are full of fascinating details, from my point of view as a researcher of nationalism, chapters 2 and 3 have caught most of my attention. As with so many other ‘Japanese traditional things’, tea and the custom of tea drinking arrived from China. However, as seen in so many cases such as Buddhism, which originated from India and came to Japan through China and Korea, which nonetheless developed some forms which are now regarded as quintessentially Japanese (zen and a variety of pure land Buddhism), the tea ceremony as we know it is of the Japanese origin: Although those practiced it in the 1500s and for most of following three
centuries were not very conscious, the tea ceremony was something different from what
was practiced in China, and with the birth of the Meiji state, it quickly assumed the
mantle of Japaneseness as the embodiment of Japanese aesthetics in the onslaught of
western influence. By the 1930s, its status was elevated to the essence of Japanese spirit
by a number of entrepreneur intellectuals and state officials. What is remarkable about
the tea ceremony is that while it was firmly linked to militarism of the 1930s and 1940s,
it survived the postwar occupation and reforms by virtue of being ‘cultural’; the tea
ceremony, or the iemoto system which had sustained it institutionally, adapted to the
change of the tune of Japan being a demilitarised and cultured country quickly. In the
postwar nihonjinron literature, the tea ceremony typically occupies the centre stage as
the essence of Japaneseness be it the stillness, attention to the other and a spirit of
harmony. Surak shows this development was largely facilitated by the iemoto system
which was driven by the need for its survival and commercial gain, thus de-reifying the
nationness found in the tea ceremony. The tea ceremony is regarded to represent
Japaneseness because people and institutions surrounding it have made it so, and the
Japaneseness thus represented in the tea ceremony is a response to what is going on in
the world, which is in the state of flux.

This is a fine reflection on nationalism drawing from detailed ethnographical
research. Perhaps not the most efficient manner to conduct research in this age of
external research funding, but it is a fine example of unhurried scholarship.

ATSUKO ICHIJO

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Ingo Trauschweizer and Steven M. Miner (eds.), Failed States and Fragile Societies: A
New World Disorder? Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014, 224pp. £35.00 (hbk).

This edited volume brings together scholars and policy-makers investigating so-called
state failure or fragile states and external interventions. It is primarily a book aimed for
policy discussions and academic debates on causes of and solutions to ‘state failure’.
The basis for this book stems from a particular Western and Weberian notion of the
state’s monopoly of violence that is being questioned in the post-Cold War and post
9–11 age. The turmoil in many parts of the world today, such as the eruption of civil
war in Syria, is something that the authors are seeking responses to. Two contributions
are the aim of this book. First is the responsibility of ‘the global community’
(Trauschweizer, p. vii) to intervene and protect people on the basis of human rights.
The second, and related, is the establishment of legitimacy and stability as outsiders
when it comes to these interventions in terms of timing and means (e.g. use of force).
Here, the issue of alternative sources of legitimacy for both state and society need to be
considered, according to Trauschweizer (ibid).

In chapter 1, Carmen and Samy (p. 4) suggest the term state fragility rather than
failure as the former incorporates a broader measure of state performance over time
and space as well as relative to other states. The statistical measure they are using is
called the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy and incorporates a definition of
fragility as state performance in institutions, functions and political processes com-
pared with the ideal of sovereign states as found in theory and international law. Other
authors (Curp, House and Carter) evaluate cases of historic and more recent interven-
tions, e.g. Bosnia, to contemporary cases such as the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle
East as well as the future of war (Felbab-Brown). Rotberg (chapter 6), well known for

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his work on ‘when states fail’, makes a further classification of so-called odious nation-states (p. 119). He claims that these are ‘outlaw nations, mostly near-failed, failed, or collapsed states’ (ibid) that attacks their own people and generally disrespect human rights and civil liberties. The countries Rotberg discusses are North-Korea, Turkmenistan, Burma, Zimbabwe, Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The international response to these ‘odious nation-states’ or those at the verge includes a discussion on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statue, the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC), none of which are consistent tools for the population under threat. Finally, Menkhaus (chapter 7) offers a closer look into the ‘extraordinary political drama’ (p. 142) of Somalia.

The value of this book is its contribution to the urgent need for questioning and responding to mass violence that is currently affecting millions of people around the world where the state either is unable to protect or are causing considerable harm to its citizens. The contributors to this volume, however, seem consistently pessimistic in their outlook, which is not surprising considering the current state of affairs in responses to mass violence in places such as Syria. For instance, Curp (p. 38–40) challenges the very idea that the US, NATO, EU and UN are able to intervene adequately given their experience in European places such as Bosnia. Another value in this book is the references to and use of more historical examples to avoid ahistorical assumptions of modern liberal values in the West as a given phenomenon. House’s chapter (chapter 3) is a good example of situating and discussing origins and debates regarding asymmetrical warfare or insurgency. Also, Menkhaus’ contribution on Somalia is an interesting contribution to Somali agents’ internal responses to the absence of a formal, central government.

However, and though there are interesting discussions in this edited volume, the authors generally fail to respond to the considerable critique of ‘state failure’ assumptions. Examples of this critique relates to the Othering of states (e.g. Jonathan Hill), the failure of scholars’ conceptual understanding of states rather than state failure per se (e.g. Christian Lund) and the inability to look beyond the Western experience of statehood (e.g. Tobias Hagmann and Didier Peclard). For instance, the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (Carmen and Samy) includes a range of different indicators for state fragility, but it is less clear in its relevance in critical academic literature such as the ones mentioned. It is also rather unfair to lump together regimes as different as Fidel Castro’s Cuba and Pol Pot’s Cambodia (Rotberg, p. 120).

In sum, the edited volume works perhaps best for policy-makers interested in gaining an overview of different debates regarding state failure and interventions: past, present and future. It works less well, however, for critical academic debates on the same topic.

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This book consists of 12 chapters, each devoted to one historian, flanked by a short introduction and even shorter conclusion. ‘British’ is accurate: Hume was a Scot and Churchill arguably Anglo-American. However, conjoined with ‘national identity’, it is
misleading as these historians write *English* history. In part, this is because they rarely stray beyond the Union of 1707. Freeman and Stubbs were medieval historians. Lingard and Froude are considered as historians of the Reformation, Samuel Gardiner and Catherine Macaulay of the 17th century. Hume’s long-run and Thomas Macaulay’s much shorter-run histories end in 1688. Hallam gets to George II, but the authors only consider his work to 1702. Trevelyan’s specialist period is the 18th century, but only one of his books describes its history as ‘British’. Churchill promises a broader focus on the ‘English-speaking peoples’, but the only territory given detailed treatment apart from England is the USA. Green comes well in to the 19th century, but it is the *English* people whose history he writes. When Celtic parts of the British Isles are mentioned by these historians, it is usually as backward fringes, whose incorporation under English rule represents progress.

The idea of progress might be a way of capturing some unifying quality in these histories, embodied in Herbert Butterfield’s notion of the ‘Whig’ approach to history. The history of England is one of material and moral progress towards the present; past events and persons are evaluated in terms of how they contributed towards or inhibited such progress. This history is seen as exceptional, a model for the rest of the world, whether exported by empire or inspiring imitation. To move beyond smug generalities, such historians must identify the elements – political institutions or economic arrangements or the morals and manners of social groups or the deeds of exceptional individuals – that constitute the forces of progress and provide an empirically grounded narrative of how they develop.

However, as the authors make clear, the term ‘Whig’ if used precisely does not work for many of these historians and, if used more broadly, becomes meaningless. Take the key concept of progress. Thomas Macaulay is the most clear and consistent. He presents continuity as progress with the analogy of the growth of a rude boy into a refined man. He is clear that the English of his own time are not only better-off and more secure than their ancestors, but they are also kinder to each other and animals. In any battle between ‘ancients and moderns’, Macaulay has no doubt the moderns win hands down. By contrast, Trevelyan detested industrialisation and large cities, thought life was better under Queen Anne, and judged a largely illiterate population more in tune with its world than the unruly, semi-literate, half-educated workers of his time. Freeman waxed lyrical about the virtues of the free Anglo-Saxon ‘mark’ and condemned the Norman despotism imposed in 1066, even if eventually assimilated into Anglo-Saxon ways. So we have linear progress for Macaulay, linear decline for Trevelyan and ‘punctuated progress’ for Freeman. Of course, if progress involves conflict with forces of reaction, one must expect moments when the latter gets the upper hand.

However, these historians differed on what was progressive and what retrograde. Freeman saw 1066 as regress, Churchill as helping civilise a cluster of barbarians. Froude viewed Henry VIII and his key officials positively; Lingard, the one Catholic historian here, naturally disagreed. They also disagreed on how to explain change. Was the Reformation imposed from above on an essentially Catholic population? Yes, according to both Lingard and Froude. No, according to Green who saw popular religiosity contributing to the success of Protestantism.

The main focus of interest also varies. The relationship between ruler and people, usually framed as that between monarch and parliament, was central to ‘constitutional’ history and is arguably the hallmark of the Whig approach. Stubbs asserted that its laws and political institutions must be at the heart of any English history. Green
retorted that national history must focus on ‘the nation itself’. Others emphasised the battle against foreign threats and thus made military history central: Froude, the defeat of the Spanish Armada; Churchill and Trevelyan the deeds of the first Duke of Marlborough (as Churchill wrote this study in the 1930s, a Whig historian might well see it as preparation for his own finest hour: Churchill as the Duke, Hitler as Louis XIV).

They disagreed on what were the moving forces in the conflict between progress and reaction. Froude and Churchill were in thrall to Thomas Carlyle’s great men (plus the odd woman), whether as heroes or villains. Hume stressed the rise of commercial society as a crucial condition for the growth of representative government. Freeman’s ‘hero’ is the Aryan or Germanic or Teutonic race. (The range of words suggests the uncertainty of concept.) Stubbs believed in divine providence, though whether this worked impersonally through race or heroes or commerce or was largely a matter of chance is less clear, even if Stubbs discounted miraculous intervention.

Brundage and Consgrove bring out many other differences such as ‘amateur’ against ‘professional’, generalist against specialist, populariser against academic – overlapping but not identical distinctions. Their accounts are clear, well-documented and, like their historians, largely descriptive.

I find convincing their argument that the ‘Whig’ concept is not what unifies these historians but could wish they had explored this question further. I find a certain unity by contrasting them with the accounts offered by historians of ‘other nations’. They all assumed that English history has an objective unity which can be portrayed in narrative form. This remains a powerful idea to the present, even when challenged by calls for a less ‘insular’ or a more analytic approach, for a stress on multiculturalism or using history to develop skills, all questions raised in the debates over a national school history curriculum.

This notion of an objective unity is such a truism that it is strengthened even, perhaps especially, when mocked. It is a shame the book does not include a chapter on 1066 and All That by Sellars and Yeats. Brundage and Cosgrove raise but do not consider further the question of how far the various historical accounts may have shaped the way the ‘English’ see their history. The two obvious routes are through popular readership, such as that enjoyed by Thomas Macaulay, Green, Trevelyan and Churchill, and through textbooks used in schools. 1066 and All That is about what (some) school children dimly remember and misunderstand from such textbooks. Underlying their chronicles of the deeds of good and bad kings and the manners of their deaths is the clear sense that this presents us with the spine of English history.

One looks in vain for any such clear sense as the foundation of any other long-range national history. (France is one possible exception though, if I had time, I would argue not.) For example, a revised, multi-volume textbook publication on 19th century German history spends one book exploring the meaning of the very notion of ‘19th century German history’ (Jürgen Kocka, Das lange 19.Jahrhundert: Gebhardt Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte: Vol 13, Stuttgart, 2001). And that is leaving aside all the other volumes which consider German history before and after the 19th century! Each book of an equivalent multi-volume history of the ‘whole’ history of England starts with the same short preface by John Roberts, the general editor, which makes it clear that the ‘institutional core’ of this history is that of the English monarchy and its successor, the Crown in Parliament. (See, for example, K. Theodore Hoppen, The Mid-Victorian Generation 1846–1886, in the series ‘The New Oxford History of England’, Oxford, 1998, page vii.) English history is state history. However, the English
state is treated as a fact – better rendered by words such as government, crown and parliament – rather than an instance of an abstract concept. This is what enables English historians to move so easily from ‘government’ to ‘society’, from centre to locality, seen as complementary rather than opposed. It also makes it possible to yoke together those two very different concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ as if they were one. Green has the great merit that he explicitly posed the question of how far the history of English government could be equated with the history of ‘the nation itself’. He did not manage to answer the question. It may well be unanswerable. What gives English history its ‘identity’, in the sense of a population of a definite place whose actions and organisations endure over generations, is its state, not its nation.

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This is a very important book. For years, apologists for, members and supporters of the BUF claimed either that it was never truly anti-Semitic, or that it was forced to adopt anti-Semitism by outside forces (namely aggressive Jewish opposition) or adopted anti-Semitism for cynical reasons, hoping for political gains. Whatever the truth of the matter, the image of the BUF having adopted anti-Semitism as a form of self-defence found its way into mainstream historiography. Since the publication of Robert Skidelsky’s over-sympathetic biography of Oswald Mosley, historians have tended to follow a narrative set out by this work (and by Mosley himself), which argued that the leader of the BUF adopted anti-Semitism in response to organised hostility from the Jews towards him and his movement.

In his book, Tilles brings evidence to the contrary. Basing his thesis on an analysis of BUF publications, Tilles shows us that an anti-Jewish outlook was evident throughout the BUF’s history, although naturally there were differences in emphasis depending on the time and the place. Tilles proves that those Jews who were involved in active opposition towards the BUF represented but a small minority from among the British anti-fascist movement and that their participation in these activities, especially between 1932 and 1934, was hugely exaggerated by the Blackshirts in order to justify their official adoption of anti-Semitism. British Jews did nonetheless significantly influence the development of the Blackshirt movement and certainly were not merely passive victims of fascism. Their confronting the BUF was not, however, the principal cause of the BUF’s official switch to radical anti-Semitism.

Tilles also shows that the image of 1930s Britain, especially of London’s East End, as an arena for violent conflict between Jews and fascists is illusory. In fact, very few Jews were involved in early opposition towards the BUF, and even at the peak of the BUF’s anti-Semitic campaign, the majority of Jews avoided violent activities, except as a last resort.

In the second part of the book, Tilles provides us with a clear and balanced explanation of the differences between the younger and more left wing-oriented Jews and the older, official representatives of the Jewish community and their efforts to fight anti-Semitism. Furthermore, in doing this, he demolishes another long-standing view that the official Jewish response was careful, irresolute and cautious in comparison with the more confrontational response of Jewish workers and members of the Communist
Party of Great Britain. The significance of this section of the book lies in research of recently released and hitherto unavailable papers from the Jewish Board of Deputies, currently held by the Wiener Library in London.

What I believe is missing from the work, however, is both a broader approach and a more detailed local study. For example, we learn very little about BUF anti-Semitism outside London’s East End, Leeds and Manchester. What about other areas? It would have been particularly interesting to explore the use of anti-Semitism in Birmingham and its impact on the movement’s fortunes in that area. While Tilles mentions J. D. Brewer’s book in his bibliography, he does not use the same author’s article on the BUF’s anti-Semitism in Birmingham (Brewer 1984) This latter article is interesting and insightful but is also over 30 years old. Tilles could have made great use of it in his own research and could have provided us with new information and fresh insights on the subject. Similarly, we are left wondering about the BUF’s use of anti-Semitism in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, where the local context was different from that in England. Were there indeed any anti-Semitic BUF campaigns outside of England at all?

There are one or two careless mistakes in the book (e.g. Richard Griffiths’ (1998) book is listed in the bibliography as having been written by Roger Griffin), but these are small faults which do not in way detract from an overall highly positive impression of the book.

At a time when there might appear to be little left to say about the BUF, Tilles brings something new to one of the most important discussions within British fascist studies. The work is well researched and well written, and the arguments are convincing and have far-reaching implications. The book not only provides the most detailed account of the BUF’s anti-Semitism and of Jewish responses to it to date but also demolishes two long-standing views: First, Tilles brought the evidence that the Jewish opposition played no part in adoption of anti-Semitism by BUF, and second, he demonstrated that the official Jewish representatives were not as timid in comparison with the Jewish workers or Communist Party of Great Britain as previously thought. It is always comforting to read a contribution to fascist studies that challenges long-held prejudices, and this timely book does exactly that.

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Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth–Century Southeastern Europe is the latest contribution to a series of a book Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Thought that were published by Fordham University Press under the series editorship of George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle, Pananikalou, both professors in Orthodox Theology and consisted of 10 books including this one. The book that was edited by Lucian N. Leustean, who is also author of the first and fifth chapters and the postscript, gathers together six articles by five scholars.

In the first chapter, Fucian Leustean briefly summarises advent of the independent Orthodox churches on case-by-case basis. By doing so, he enables readers to understand both parallels and differences in advent and development of the autocephalous
Orthodox churches of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania. Consequently, subjugation of the national churches to the nation states and their utilisation in construction of nations and nation states are common features in Southeastern Europe countries, which were discussed in the volume. He, however, reminds that it was demand for autocephalous church that paved the way to the territorial independence movement in Bulgaria, whereas foundation of national churches had to wait until territorial independence is secured in other cases that were discussed in the volume.

Paschalis Kitromilides, in second chapter, discusses mainly about two controversial topics in the 19th century history of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. First, Kitromilides opposes to widely held argument that the Patriarchate’s reaction towards modern ideas and institutions of the West was stably negative. He maintains that the Patriarchate was receptive towards products of the modernisation and quick to employ them in education of the Orthodox parish. Second, he asserts that the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople’s persistency about use of Greek language aimed to sign its status within the Orthodoxy’s cultural traditions, and therefore, it is wrong to see it as an agent of Greek nationalism and hold condemning for employing contemplative Hellenisation policies towards Orthodox Slavs in the Balkans. He acknowledges Greek nationalism started to influence especially younger priests, and the Patriarchate co-operated with Greek Kingdom against Bulgarian claims on Ottoman Macedonia from 1870s onwards. He, however, still maintains that the Patriarchate did not develop a particular hostility against Bulgaria. To him, it was the Patriarchates’ understanding of intra-ethnic Orthodox congregate and ecumenical status that made it to oppose all Balkan nationalism, inevitably including Bulgarian nationalism.

In third chapter, Dimitris Stamapolous assesses that foundation of the autocephalous Church of Greece should be understood, at great extent if not completely, within the frame of European Big Powers’ power play in newly founded Greek Kingdom. That is, France and Britain considered an independent Greek Church necessary to detach Greece from Russia which defended unity of the Orthodox flock in the interest of its pan-Orthodox foreign policy.

Bojan Aleksov, in the fourth chapter, rightfully argues that first Serbian uprising of 1804 started against unjust and abusive rule of the local Ottoman lords. It was more nationally conscious Serbs of the Hapsburg Empire, and the spread of the ideas of French revolution gradually transformed the rebellion to a nationalist struggle, he reveals. Furthermore, Aleksov reminds that although Serbs were the first Orthodox population of the Balkans that rose up against Ottoman Empire, bad shape of the secular education, prevailing of regionalism over sense of unity and political and ecclesiastical divisions undermined the nation building process.

Leustean, who is also an author of the introductory first chapter, contends that in line with other Balkan countries, the Church of Romania basically functioned as state institution and was intensively employed in creation of the Romanian national identity. He also reveals that Romanian historiography like portrayed the church as defender and preserver of the Romanian national identity prior to the independence. Obviously, this discourse is also in consonance with general trend in Balkan historiography.

In the sixth and final article, Daniela Kalkandjieva, evidently contradicts Kitromilides’s arguments over the Patriarchate, its alleged efforts to Hellenise the Balkan Orthodoxy. Kalkandjieva maintains that the Patriarchate deliberately employed Greek-speaking church hierarchy and therefore (a) afflicted Bulgarian religious elite and (b) transformed the religious cultures of the Bulgarians. She, furthermore, emphasises that Bulgarian nationalists recognised the Patriarchate as a direct
threat to Bulgarian national identity and agent of Greek nationalism. That Bulgarian church independence movement, which was energised by foundation of Autocephalous Church of Greece in 1833, had to struggle against alliance between Greece and the Patriarchate should be an irony of history.

The book includes endnote bibliographies for each section, brief bios of the contributors and a detailed index in addition to six articles (and a postscript). The volume strongly suggested for scholars of the nationalism studies and the Balkan studies as well as common readers who are interested in knowing more than simplistic argument that the religion fuels hatreds and violence, and causes wars in Balkans and in the world generally.

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Since the end of the Rwandan genocide, researchers have attempted to theorise the roots of this conflict. Elisabeth King’s book *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda* contributes to this literature by analysing the role of a specific state institution in the leading of the genocide: the education system. While the academic literature tends to focus on the socio-structural and psychocultural conditions at the core of this conflict, this book attempts to provide a deeper analysis by exploring how the education system actually shaped these conditions. Drawing on document analysis, semi-structured interviews and comparative historical analysis, King provides an in-depth analysis of the role of education in forging the conditions for the genocide.

In chapter 1, King designs her theoretical framework in which education is understood as an institution that can contribute to both conflict and peacebuilding. Conditions present in the education system – such as horizontal equality/inequalities, exclusive/inclusive identities, stigmatisation, reconciliation, critical thinking skills, and interactions and continuums – are all analysed. King then argues that in the case of Rwanda, the education system actually contributed to the ethnic violence.

The book’s main contribution is indeed chapters 2 and 3, which provide an analysis of the role of the formal education system in contributing to the socio-structural and psychocultural factors identified by King as core to ethnic violence. Chapter 2 focuses on the colonial period leading to the 1959 Revolution, and chapter 3 engages with the formal education found in Rwanda in the postindependence period to 1994. Both chapters share the same general argument that the education system and its content reinforced the ethnic divisions between Hutus and Tutsis, and contributed to conditions that were used to mobilise the masses both during the 1959 revolution and the 1994 genocide. Taking an instrumentalist approach, King agrees with the existing literature that says that the political and economical factors of the time were at the core of the ethnic tensions and that elites used and manipulated ethnicity to mobilise the masses for ethnic violence. She however suggests that these accounts do not successfully explain the foundations that allowed this mass scale mobilisation and that the education system is precisely one of these social locations that solidified the conditions of horizontal inequalities, exclusive identities and stigmatisation that allowed ethnic mobilisation. Both chapters also clearly demonstrate how formal education combined
with political, economical and social conditions can contribute to ethnic politics ranging from discrimination to violence.

Moreover, King explains how the inequalities faced in accessing education also followed gender and class divides. In addition, by re-introducing Kinyarwanda as the language of education in the primary schools and keeping French for the secondary schools, it ensured that only a certain sub-group of the Rwandan population was able to be educated in French in the decades leading to the genocide. However, by only interviewing individuals speaking French or English in her study, King inevitably ignores the voices and perceptions of those individuals excluded from higher education. In these cases, informal education such as community teaching would have certainly played a part in their understanding of the ethnic divides found in the Rwandan nation, and an analysis of these informal sources of community teaching would have provided a broader understanding of the role that education, both formal and informal, played in fostering the social-structural and psychocultural factors at the core of the Rwandan genocide.

Finally, King argues in chapter 4 that while important progress has been achieved by the Rwandan government in terms of access and quality of education since 1994, this institution somewhat remains a social location of division and exclusion. For example, King suggests that the presence of an official narrative that alienates Hutu experiences of the genocide and the financial support for Tutsi survivors of the genocide to access secondary schools can create resentment and exclusion instead of the desired policy of national unity. Again, while this is not the focus of this book, an analysis of informal education through the Ingando, where the official narrative of the genocide is actively taught, would have well complemented King’s analysis here. Chapter 5 then locates Rwanda in the broader context of postconflict societies, providing lessons and examples from other case studies.

To summarise, King provides a sophisticated analysis of the role that the education system can play in fostering both conflict and peacebuilding using the example of the Rwandan genocide. This book will surely benefit scholars and practitioners in the field of conflict and peacebuilding studies, as well as education specialists. Moreover, as Rwanda is currently discussing the introduction of genocide teaching in the school curriculum, it is hoped that the policy-makers involved in this decision will have the chance to read this important study by Elisabeth King.

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References