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The Discursive Construction of Identity: The case of Oromo in Ethiopia

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Declaration

I, Yosef Tadesse Ayele, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature………………………………..

Date:
Abstract

Identity politics in Ethiopia is not a recent phenomenon. It has been one of the major mobilizing factor in the entire modern history. However, the institutionalization and the establishment of the issue in the policy and legal documents of the nation has started in 1991 when the current government: EPRDF, came to power.

The insurgent TPLF went in to the jungle in 1974 to fight, what they perceived ‘Amhara domination’ and to liberate the people of Tigray from such subjugation. In the struggle, by forming a collation with other ethno nationalists from Amhara, Oromo and the other people in the south, formed EPRDF and succeeded to topple Derg from power. Then, for the first time in modern history of the nation a federal form of government established in 1995 FDRE constitution. By this constitution the nation is divided in to nine autonomous regions and two city administrations based on language and ethnic identity. Since then, identity politics and the debate over federalism vis-à-vis the extent of the regions autonomy is in hike.

Recently when the federal government announce a ‘master plan’ to extend the territory of the capital city, Addis Ababa in to Oromia region, a public protest swamped the whole region of Oromia that claimed more than 200 lives. Hence this study is interested to investigate the discursive construction of Oromo identity, by the Oromo elites and to what extent does this discursive constructions letter exhibited in the international media coverage of this Oromo protest.

Accordingly, by analysing the international media texts on the one hand and articles written by the Oromo elites on the other, this study argues that, the international media coverage on the current Oromo protest is relied on the marginalized Oromo discourse of the Oromo elites. Further, this discursive construction of the media texts is deeply embedded on the wider social practice of Ethnic politics and Federalism in Ethiopia.

Key words: Oromo, Abyssinia, Ethiopia, Oromo Protest, Identity, discourse analysis, Ideology.
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Chapter One

Introduction

The last quarter of a century in many respects Ethiopia has witnessed a very significant socio-political change. The pseudo Socialist Military Junta: Derg, overthrown by the coalition forces of Albanian Model Socialist insurgent: TPLF and EPLF, which lead to peaceful secession of Eritrea hitherto end of the 30 years’ civil war and the creation of new Ethiopia as a home of nation nationalities and peoples. The multi ethnic nation that in its entire modern history has been ruled under strict policy of centralization; using Amharic language and Orthodox Christianity as a pillar, is then reconceptualise as a unison of, almost semi-independent 9 states and two self-autonomous cities administrations under [legally] weak Federal government. Even though, Identity politics in Ethiopia had been started way back from EPRDF, the institutionalization and framing of this discourse within the government policies and legal documents made it, deservedly, its legacy. Consequently, since then the issue of ethnic identity is one of the major mobilizing factor and a main cause of conflict too.

Just recently when the Federal government launch an integrated master plan of Addis Ababa city with the neighbouring small towns of Oromia state, a wave of public protest also known as ‘Oromo Protest’ engulfed the region. As of to date [March 2016], according to Human Rights Watch, claimed a life of more 200 people (Human Rights Watch, 2016), which obviously denied by the federal government. But aside atrocious human right violation of the government in handling the issue, the fact that the protest is orchestrated and staged only within the State of Oromia once again lit a discussion over the discourse and ramification of ethnic identity politics in Ethiopia.

Thus, the main goal of this study is to establish a relationship, by using discourse analysis both as a method and theory, how the narratives of Oromo identity with in the Oromo elites: using OSA1 journals [1993-2012] as a point of departure, is (un)wittingly represented Oromo within the Ethiopian society at large. And then, to what extent does those discursive constructions of the elites and its representation of Oromo people are letter manifested on the international media coverage of the current Oromo protest and what social relationships are over and under stated to what ideological underpinning.

I have chosen to analyse the discursive construction of identity from the angle of Oromo elites’ because, in a country like Ethiopia where 83% of its population is traditionally agrarian, with alarming illiteracy rate and very low internet penetration, the role of the elite in shaping the construction of discourses and its representation is super influential.

Thus I hope this study will shade a light about the essence and ambiguities of the current Oromo protest by taking a closer look to the publications of OSA over the years and the narration of Oromo protest by the international media through a systematic and structured analysis of their respective discursive constructions.

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1 Oromo Studies Association
1.2. Research purpose

This study is basically an academic exercise to complete the program in due manner. Thus the points raised, discussed and criticized should have to be taken as such. In the course of problematizing the dominant discourse of ethnic identity; the search for genealogy of the construction of Oromo identity and de(re)construction of Ethiopian society at large, I can, probably, affirm or dismantle some of the taken for granted assumptions of different significant political actors in Ethiopia. Yet I would like to forward, in advance, that none of them are necessarily my intentions. However, since I am also part of the subject under the study; it is quite apparent that, in one way or the other, I have personal bias. Issues that I take for granted and I am not sure to what extent does those biases cloud my judgement of facts and my analysis too. But the main thing here is that I will try to follow the discourses to their natural conclusion rather than taking side from the available discourses that I hold on to and rush to substantiate it. How I intend to do it will further explain in chapter four: methodology part.

Finding or come up with some kind of grand solution for the issue of ethnic identity politics in Ethiopia or the current Oromo Protest on Integrated Addis Ababa Master Plan is way beyond the scope of this paper. I would also not naively, try to address the issue in holistic manner; rather, what I intend to show is a specific segment from a grand whole bunch of problems. That is, how ethnic Oromo identity, from the angle of Oromo elites: OSA as an example, have been discursively constructed since the establishment of the 1991ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia (International Crisis Group, 2009) and the extent as to how these discourses reflected on the international media coverage of the current protest. Thus addressing the merit, demerit, legality and correctness of the Oromo protest per se is not the purpose of this study. After all such things in social construction are just a product of discourse and its representation. They are not something that we can find it out, objectively.

1.3. Research Question

Based on what I have discussed, in the introduction and research purpose of the study; the following are the main research questions:

- How do the Oromo elites discursively construct the Oromo identity: OSA [1993-2012] as a place of departure?
- What are the prevalent discourses in the OSA publications?
- To what extent does those discourses manifest in the international media coverage of the current Oromo Protest?
- What social relationships are under or overstated to what ideological goal?
1.4. Basic concepts

The need for discussing the basic concepts arose, based on the fact that in the construction of identity, be it religious or ethnic, the definition of the in group against the out group is always significant. It is even more so, in the case of ethnic identity because, unlike religious identity, ethnic identities do not have a dogmatic watertight prescribed rules to draw a line between their in and out group. Accordingly, I will define some of the basic concepts in this regard, like Ethiopia, Oromo, Oromo-ness, Habesha and Abyssinians. Yet again all the definitions I am going to illustrate wouldn’t and shouldn’t be taken as conclusive. It is illustrated for the purpose of clarity and common understanding to avoid the possible miss interpretation of the authors’ intent.

Tesoay Gebreabê, in his personal blog come up with an interesting definition of who Oromo is in three different stages based on the strength of the bloodline and naturalization (Gebreabe, 2016). Prof. Mekurya Bulcha, on the other hand, in his seminal work “The Survival and Reconstruction of Oromo Identity” negates such primordial conception of Oromo, pointing that it is almost impossible to trace pure lineage from ‘proper Oromo’ group (Bulcha, 1996). Thus drawing on this idea of Bulcha, in this work Oromo can be any one who identify him/herself as an Oromo taking the current state of Oromia as a starting point.

Keeping out the controversial biblical Ethiopia; the Homer Odessa Ethiopia (Levine, 1974); Greek classical texts conception of Ethiopia (Jalata, 2005), this study defines Ethiopia in its current geographic shape.

Abyssinians and Habesha, often (with in the public as well as academia) used interchangeable, so do in this study. Some even suggest that Habesha and Abyssinia used to call the same people: Ethiopian highlanders (Habesha by the Arabs and Abyssinia for Greeks). Even to date long after the secession of Eritrea, high land Christian Eritreans identify themselves as Habesha. Yet mainly, on the ground, with in the Ethiopian public the terms normatively used to identify Amhara and Tigre to gather. Assefa Jalata define Abyssinia “the people evolved through the children of Arab immigrants and Africans in the horn of Africa that differentiated as Tigre and Amhara” (Jalata, 2005) then this study will use both the term Habesha and Abyssinia in Assefa’s line

1.5. Outline of the study

This work is divided in to six chapters

Chapter one -Introduction, purpose, research question and basic concepts,
Chapter two --Historical background, Addis Ababa master plan and Oromo protest;
Chapter three- Theoretical framework;

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2 Eritrean national born and raised in Ethiopia: Bishoftu, naturalized Oromo and named Geda
3 Psalm 72:9
Chapter four- Methodology;

Chapter five- Analysis;

Chapter six -Conclusion.

As it is already illustrated, the first chapter covered, short introduction of the study; the main goal of the research; the research question and clarification of the basic concepts.

The second chapter will establish the synopsis of Ethiopian history, and the place of Oromo at its center. This chapter further illustrates the issues of Addis Ababa and the integrated Master plan, in legal and historic context.

The third chapter will then address, the theoretical framework of the study, which is mainly drawn on Laclau and Mouffe Discourse Analysis theory. There, I will, rather briefly, discuss the selected tenets of the theory; the basic general philosophical assumptions across its wide spectrum as a starting point; the role of language in social construction of the world through discourse; claim of truth, knowledge and power. In addition, I will explain, the concepts that I borrowed from the Fairclough Critical discourse analysis: Order of discourse, Genre, Intertextuality and Interdiscursivity vis-à-vis the rationale why I borrowed them.

In chapter four, I will discuss discourse analysis as methodology; the empirical materials that I am going to analyze in two separate stages. First, the publications of Oromo Study Association, second, ten international media texts over the current Oromo protest [three from Aljazeera, two from All Africa, one, one from The Washington post, The New York Times, BBC, IBT-International Business Times and News Week] will be analyzed and finally I will establish the frame work of analysis.

In chapter five, based on the historic context; the theory and methodological set up and the framework of analysis presented I will analyze the empirical materials thoroughly and address the research questions. In the last chapter: chapter six I will present the main conclusion of the study.
Chapter: Two

2. Introduction

In this part of the paper, the general overview of the research; the brief historical context in which the Ethiopian nation is constituted in modern sense; short description of the current Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan and lastly the current Oromo Protest will be discussed.

2.1. Historical Overview: Ethiopia,

As this paper tries to question the dominant discourse of ethnic identity politics in Ethiopia the points that I am going to raise under historical overview would also be problematized further since it is part of the social. The social is fundamentally a discursive construction. This study, as well as any representation is not reality out their independent of language. But problematizing the whole Ethiopian history, for the obvious reason that this project is a small scale master thesis, is well beyond the scope. Hence, keeping my personal biases aside, I will present the hegemonic discourse, which currently treated as ‘true’ dominant representation of the subjects: Ethiopia and Oromo.

Ethiopia has one of the ancient civilizations in Africa, stretched back to the Aksumite era 1st c B.C. Thus, obviously depending up on which specific period and international context are we referring to the boundary and the people there of shrink or enlarged.

The formation of Ethiopia, as we know it today is started in the 19th c by one of the local war lord of Gondar (North West Ethiopia today) Ras Kassa, letter named as King Tewdros first in 1855. He managed to unify the northern part of the country, commonly known as Habesha or Abyssinians, mostly Tigrigna and Amharic speaking people.

This process of formation of modern Ethiopia, as a nation, further strengthened by king Tekelhaimanot and King Yohannes forth respectively from Tigray and finalized by King Menilik of Shewa. The expansion of King Menilik had been mainly targeted the current southern part of Ethiopia. It was complicated, to say the list and controversial till to date. It fundamentally changed the character, content and obviously shape of the state. Currently out of 86 ethnic nationalities; more than 60 of them are found in the southern part of the empire.

A state which fundamentally perceived as Semitic under absolute majority of Orthodox Christianity in the second half of 19th c, incorporate a very diverse religious, ethnic and linguistic inhabitants (subjects) that totally changed the texture of the populace. This Menilik expansion, though, come up with both merits and curses. The incorporation of, especially the parts of Oromo’s, Wolayita and Sidama boosted up his military might, that eventually helped him to defend his empire against the European colonization.

As time passed by, the successive Ethiopian regimes-monarchs- continued to rule the empire as nothing had changed in the texture of the people. As still the empire is Semitic, orthodox

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4 I preferred here to designate the people by their language because of different sociological and anthropological reasons. It is very misleading to use the present day typology of ethnicity in Ethiopia for the events that took place in 19th c.
Christian, opened up a way to marginalize the un-marginalize-able majority of the people in the south.

In the first half of 20th c Amharic language and orthodox Christianity were the main tenets of Ethiopian nationalism (Hassen, 1999) that bred a fertile ground to detest both Orthodox and Amharic language by the majority of the south which their religious and ethnic identities have been supressed.

The successive regimes: Impress Zewditu, Lij Iyasu, and reagent, letter king, Haile Selassie instead of incorporating these differences [except the little effort made by Lij Iyasu] they persistently and voraciously continued the hegemony of the Abyssinian culture that aimed to create a homogeneous identity (Mekurya, 1936).

Amharic, imposed as official language, Orthodox Christianity continue to serve as a state religion, the head of the church: Abun, anoint Kings, often as powerful as the kings themselves. Then, these ethnic and religious pseudo hegemony made the other ethnic and religious groups like Oromo (Levine, 1972) and Islam (Østebø, 2014) the anti-thesis of Ethiopian-ism.

Using the prevalence of drought in 1973-74 as an immediate cause, the university students, especially in the capital: Addis Ababa, played a leading role in the revolution that finally led the overthrow of the ‘250th’ monarch: Haile Selassie, from power in September 12th 1974 (Bahru, 2014). This data, at least, marked the abolition of the monarchy hitherto the introduction of a secular Ethiopian state as a republic.

The committee of the armed forces, police and territorial army: Derg, a military junta that takes power from the Monarchy, indeed made some historical changes. Abolition of the monarchy, confiscation of farm land to redistribute to the farmers5, introduction of secular state is some of the major legacies of Derg.

Yet, the age old twin policies of assimilation and centralization however had not fundamentally been changed. The structure of the government remained strongly central that laws, policies and major decisions had been made in Addis Ababa and dispatched to every corners of the country. To make the matters worse, the ramification of being a pseudo Marxists were severely affected Dergs’ view of religious and ethnic identities. Derg had basically tried to answer identity issues through class struggle between the working class versus the bourgeois (Gudina, 2008).

With respect to ethnic identity, even though it wasn’t fundamental altered, Derg had tried to incorporate other identities to the centre by forming National Democratic Revolution under the auspices of Socialism in 1976 (Gudina, 2008). Nonetheless, the fact that Amharic language was maintained as an official language and used as a medium of instruction in formal education made all the changes taken as trifling. The mushrooming of insurgency like TPLF, ONLF, EPRP, EDU etc. in addition to the pre-existing ELF/EPLF and OLF could further shown, to some extent, the inadequacy of the changes that had been taken by Derg to address the issue.

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5 Proc no 2 1967 E.C
The assimilation policy of the empire had start facing challenges around the first half of the 20th c, mainly from the elites that gathered in and around educational institutions and returnees of students from Europe and America (Bahru, 2014). Derg that clinch to power using popular revolution miserably failed to address these issues in a proper manner and condemned the state for endless civil war throughout its era. Nearly two dozens of insurgencies were fought for independence in 1990s that, finally, came to an end by the coalition forces of EPRDF and EPLF in May 27,1991. That ultimately led to the success of Eritrea with overwhelming support of independence in a rather symbolic referendum.

EPRDF as a coalition of different ethnic groups, for the first time in modern Ethiopian history set up federalism as a state structure. Accordingly, the state is divided in to nine regions and two administrative cities6. Amharic language deposed from being a national language status to a working language of the federal government7. Religion and religious institutions have gotten the right to handle their own matters in their own way.

It seems, after all those havocs, famine and civil war Ethiopia looks get on the right track. Eritrea, rather smoothly seceded and continue to have a good neighbourhood relation with Ethiopia for a while. A Federal state structure sat up. The transitional government, who was responsible to oversee the formulation of a new constitution, modestly performed its duties and handed over power accordingly to the newly elected government in 1995.

This new constitution, though, as expected, couldn’t skip critique for its inadequacy of proper discussion among the stakeholders and the general public as it should be. Hence it is often considered as a political program of TPLF and OLF. Apart, it basically gives enormous right to nation nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. Even under its controversial article 39(5) permits ‘the right of self-determination up to secession’.

This euphoria, the wave of peace had not been stayed long. OLF, at that time had a significant amount of armed force with strong popular support in its constituency leave the transitional government too early. The love affair of the ‘brothers at war’ (Negash & Tronvoll, 2000), TPLF led EPRDF and EPLF that assumed power in Addis and Asmara respectively fall out short. A skirmish in a small border town called Bademe turned in to a whole out war 1998-2000. Countless ethnic conflicts in almost every corner of the country pop up, partly due to federalism per se and partly because of the failure and miss management of the federal government itself.

Then as most of authoritarian regimes, EPRDF in due course ‘learned’ how to hold on to power. The more opposition it faces, the more they learn how to deal with it. The current protest of the Muslim community, since 2012, in the one hand and the Oromo protest against the Addis Ababa integrated master plan on the other is yet an extension and manifestation of the failure of EPRDF’s rule of quarter a century 1991-2016, to address the age old questions of identities in Ethiopia.

The synopsis, of modern Ethiopia history is without doubt messy, one can trace so many incidents to justify tyranny or glorify inhuman treatments. But the main purpose why I render the historical overview is to show the dilemma and the main points of departure for any kind of identity discourses of to date. Thus depending up on which historical and anthropological

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6 Article 47[1] FDRE constitution
7 Article 5[2]
starting point chosen to put focus on, the same historical event and its representation of reality could be very different. To give an example many of those who advocate for Ethiopian Unity consider the 19th century Menilik expansion to the south as a process of state formation – hager Maqenat- while most ethno nationalists and radical secessionists see the expansion as a genocide and the process as colonization. This both campus can have agreed up on the historical facts like the war, number of casualties, the persons involved, yet they construct their respective discourses in completely different frame hitherto they produce a different knowledge and representations. If this is being so, then, now let me further narrow my focus to the current Oromo protest and give you the context.


Before all this current protest arose, back in Mid-April 2014, when the rumour of ‘Addis Ababa Integrated Regional Development Plan’ (in short Master Plan) has surfaced in the public, it had triggered a protest around university students of Ambo, Alemaya and Jimma. Claiming that the plan would evict Ethnic Oromo farmers and destroy the social fabric. Yet the protest was violently quelled by the security apparatus of the Federal government (Ararssa, 2015). According to Human Rights Watch Report the Security forces were killed several dozen students, hundreds were illegally arrested, tortured and inhumanly treated. Some even faced terrorism charge. When the US president Barack Obama scheduled to visit in late 2015 a couple of them were released (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Then after, for a little while things look like under control but it did not remain so for so long.

In November 2015, near a small town called Ginchi, due to a local issue related with misappropriation of a school land for Official personal use triggered a protest (Daniel, 2015). That follows, violent response from the government. Yet, this time the violent response further fuelled the protest and the demand of the protesters turned, in addition to the Master Plan, to further deep seated and not properly addressed identity issues. As Human Rights Watch stated until late January 2016 more than 200 people have been killed. High opposition leaders and thousands of nameless individuals have also been illegally arrested and tortured (Aaron, 2015).

Then if the protest is unravelled in such a way, why did the people of Oromo protest, after all it is a ‘development plan’ right? Before I tried to answer such boggling question it is wise to give some context how the city Addis Ababa, has been established.

2.3. Addis Ababa in Historical context

King Menilik of Shewa described as an architect of modern Ethiopia in its current shape established his capital in Addis. Often everything happened in Ethiopia genealogically traced back to his era, be it boundary demarcation with the then colonial powers, modernization, state bureaucracy and the flaming issue of identity so does the establishment of Addis Ababa as a capital city.
Though civilization and urbanization has a long history in Ethiopia, due to different reasons there were no tradition of having a permanent capital city. The capital cities, routinely, shifted based on the shift on the power balances of different warlords competing to ascend to the realm of the empire. In their golden ages, Aksum, Gondar, Lalibela, Menz, Ankober were just some of the epi centers of power and a capital city too.

In 1886 after the glorious victory of the battle of Adwa, Impress Taitu (the wife of Menilik) by then she had settled in Entoto moved down to a place called Fiel Weha (Amharic term), Finfinnee (in Oromo term) which both means hot spring water. By that time the area was inhabited by Oromo. Yet as history dictates, the Oromo came in to the central parts of Ethiopia, often referred as Shewa by the expansion that started in 16th century. In Oromo traditional democracy called the Gada system, in every 8-year interval power is transferred from one group to another. Accordingly, whenever this transition is concluded there had been a tradition to wage war for expansion and conquest (Jalata, 2005).

Then, just before the expansion of Oromo against the highland Abyssinians had started, the highlanders were engaged and even lost huge part of their territory in a struggle against the Muslim sultanate led by Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim of Adal, also known as Ahmed Gragne. The war was concluded with the death of Imam Ahmed at the battle of Wayne Adega in Feb 1543 (Mekurya, 1936) but it significantly weakens the empire. Consequently, the already weaken empire of the highlanders faced a 12 round battle (called Butta in Oromo) by the expanding Oromo army between 1522 to 1618 at 8-year interval (Jalata, 2005).

Before the Oromo expansion under taken, the place that we now call it Addis Ababa used to be Part of Fetegar. Fetegar was part of Shewa that had been ruled under the competing Christian kingdom of Shewa (Ayenachew, 2016) and the Muslim Sultanate of Shewa which is responsible for the expansion of Islam across south and Western part of Ethiopia between 10th to 13th century A. D (TrimIngham, 1952).

The main contested issue here is then: The Oromo nationalists claimed that Addis Ababa, which they preferred to call it Finfinnee as naturally Oromo land since there is enough evidence as to the presence of Oromo while the city was established back then in 1886. Yet on the other hand, others contested this notion tracing back history in between 10th – 13th century when the area had been ruled by Shewn kingdom. Yet, the Oromo nationalists respond for such claims by assuming the 16th c expansion as reclaiming of what is naturally Oromo land (Jalata, 2005).

2.4. Addis Ababa in legal context

The current government: EPRDF (de)reconstructed (Gudina, 2008) the empire as a union of nations, nationalities and peoples’ strife to build economic and political community based on common interest and working forward for the emergence of common outlook. Accordingly the city: Addis Ababa, has established as a capital city of the Federal government.

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8 Preamble of the FDRE constitution
9 Art 49(1) of the constitution
Before the constitution, under the transitional charter proclamation number 7/1992 the city of Addis Ababa was considered as one of the 14 autonomous regional states. But when the new constitution has come to effect in 1995, this status of being an autonomous state condensed in to an autonomous city, which makes it directly responsible for the Federal government\(^{10}\) and took away many of its, economic and political rights of the city residents that they would have got it had it remained as an autonomous region. Further, even though, the constitution reads ‘language, identity and consent of the people’\(^{11}\) were the basic criteria to delimit boundaries of States and back then in 1994 population census majority (49%) of the Addis residents were ethnic Amhara, 72% spoke Amharic language, it was delimited within the Oromia state, which account 19% of the population (Transitional Government of Ethiopia Office of the Population and Housing census Commission .Central Statistical Authority, 1994). The constitution also entrusts the right of ‘special interest to the State of Oromia (that its) particulars shall be determined by law’\(^{12}\) even though this ‘especial interest’ has not yet materialized. Some consider this legal provision as a play card of TPLF\(^{13}\) to pit the other co-coalition members of OPDO\(^{14}\) and ANDM\(^{15}\) one another, representatives of Oromo and Amhara people respectively.

Addis Ababa under Oromia state constitution is a bit unstable. The first Oromia State constitution in its article 6 determined Finfinnee [Addis Ababa] as a capital city of Oromia. Later in 2001, this constitution is revised its article 6 and moved back its capital to Adama, 100 K.M east of Addis. Yet again in 2005, when CUD\(^{16}\) won the election in Addis Ababa city, OPDO decided to re-revise the constitution article 6 to return its capital to Addis Ababa before power transferred from EPRDF, which OPDO is a member, to the winners CUD. To sum up Addis Ababa, legally, is a capital city for both the Federal government and the Oromia regional state, keep the notion of an unimplemented and never intended to, legal jargon, ‘special interest’ in its back door.

2.5. The Issue of Master Plan

In more than a century of its history Addis Ababa had started studying its ever first master plan at the time of Derg in between 1984-86. But the plan was not implemented. When EPRDF came to power it become de facto operational and officially promulgated in 1994. According to the high profile defector, Ermias Legesse\(^{17}\) this plan enlarges the city from

\(^{10}\) Art 49(3) of the constitution

\(^{11}\) Art 46(2) of the constitution

\(^{12}\) Art 49(5) of the constitution

\(^{13}\) Tigray peoples Liberation Front, the power house of EPRDF, fought insur_genre for 17 years to overthrow Derg.

\(^{14}\) Oromo People Democratic Organization founded in 1990 just a year before Derg toppled from power and then become member of the coalition as a representative of the people of Oromo

\(^{15}\) Amhara National Democratic Front founded as EPDM- Ethiopian People Democratic Movement- in 1982 fought as an insurgent, then in 1989 changed their name in to ANDM and formed a coalition with TPLF.

\(^{16}\) Coalition for Unity and Democracy, strong opposition figure in 2005 nationwide election.

\(^{17}\) Federal government minister D’état at his defection.
21000 hectar to 54000 hectar that substantially included rural agricultural land of Oromia to the city (ECADF, 2016).

Then a couple of years later in 1999, when it is about the first plan expires, Addis Ababa city had started a sisterly bilateral relation with the city of Lyon: France. The two cities were signed The Lyon Memorandum of Understanding (Midega, 2015) to work together on the things of common interest. A decade after, in 2009 a group of experts from Addis were sent to France to learn how to develop intercity integrated master plan using Lyon-Paris integrated master plan as an example (Midega, 2015). As a result, in 2014 a study of 25 years (2006-2030) integrated Master Plan is finalized as “Addis Ababa City Administration and Oromia Regional State Integrated Master Plan for Ethiopian Renaissance.” As it is described in the studied document, its main purpose is to integrate the development plans commenced by two different and fairly autonomous administrative bodies of Addis Ababa and Oromia regional states, which generally cover 36 towns including Addis Ababa in the next 25 years, hitherto guide to establish a proportional township system and to mitigate the prevalent difference between them. (Addis Ababa city Adminstration and Oromia Region, 2014)

Then when the rumors hovering around the public in 2014, a campus based protest across Oromia broke out that lead to dozens killed, hundreds detained and things eased for a while. Yet last November 2015 on a rather local issue in Ginchi, public protest resurfaced and letter spread in to the whole region of Oromia. Though there are some speculations that the protest has organized and led by an underground group known as Qeerroo (clandestine organization with in Oromia) (Kwaschn Media, 2015); widely, it is believed that the protest is leaderless and disorganized. It is just a combination of multi faced, deep seated, historic as well as current public grievances and dissatisfaction of the public that easily instigate the people to come out and make sure that their voices are heard. This claim is further supported by the incidents how the sporadic protest re-erupt in different places at different causes and yet lastly staged on similar issues.

Even though, the protests were basically started in local issues, apart from the fact that all were happened with in Oromia region, they all have some uniform demands chanted across the crowed. These are;

1- cancellation of the master plan
2- immediate withdrawal of the federal securities forces: police, military and intelligence
3- release of political prisoners.
4- independent investigation and trial of the officials who are responsible.

\[18\] which is already mate since both the federal government and the Oromia region announced the cancellation of the plan. It is worth mentioning that the third wave arose after the announcement of cancellation
Chapter: Three

3. Introduction

In this chapter the theoretical underpinning of this study: discourse analysis with emphasis on Laclau and Mouffe approach will be discussed. The general philosophical assumption of the theory; the role of language in the social construction of the world; the claim of truth and knowledge in discourse analysis; power hegemony and subject are presented. In addition, some important features of CDA will be discussed.

3.1 Conceptual Framework

This study aimed to draw a link between the international media coverage of the current Oromo Protest and how the Oromo Identity have been, for the past 25 years, discursively constructed by the Oromo elite: OSA as a place of departure. To this end I will mainly draw on the Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis theory. Discourse analysis, is a multi-disciplinary theory under the broader social constructionism. Within itself there are different approaches existed, as to how it should be conducted (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 16) trying to depict the social reality from different perspective, evolving from different ontological and epistemological premises.

Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) (*Hegemony and Socialist strategy*) based on the post structuralisms conception of language and Gramsci’s notion of the social build a coherent set of an approach towards the social reality and its discursive formation. Another renowned linguist, probably highly influential theorist and the most quoted one, Michael Foucault in his *Order of things: An Archaeology of human science* and *The Archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language*, done the foundational ground for other discourses analysis theories. From psychological point of view and cognitive process, theory of discursive psychology has been developed. In Critical discourse analysis, Norman Fairclough, conceptualize discourse as both constitutive and constituted by the social which is a product of both discursive and non-discursive practices. So that in order to understand the social we need to analyze it using both discursive and non-discursive analytical tools: *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*, co-written with Lili Chouliaraki 1999 can be a good example. However, discussing a comparative analysis of these approaches are not the issue of this study.

Thus, after I established the general philosophical assumptions of discourse analysis. I will further stipulate how Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis approach would be used in this study as a conceptual background. The fact that, beside it’s general frame work, there is no hard and fast rule as to how to conduct discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992, p. 225) and since the Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis theory has a serious short coming on its methodological and analytical framework as to how to conduct analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 24), then to fill this gap, I will draw on the Fairclough’s rich methodological framework of analysis. If this is being so, then here in the theoretical part, I would rather briefly introduce the concepts of Fairclough’s Critical discourse analysis like
Order of Discourse, Genre, Intertextuality and Interdiscursivity in addition to the main theoretical starting point of this paper.

3.2 General Philosophical assumptions of Discourse theory

The point of departure for all discourse analysis is social constructionism with the role of language at its center. Whether to study archaeology, (dis)continuity of historical events of the social (Foucault, 1972); the bases of our understanding of the self (Burr, 1995); the change in language and its possible consequence to the broader social field (Fairclough, 1996) etc. in all these instances the role of language and discourse is unescapable. Thus studying this peculiar character of human being will help us to understand the nature of the individual, family or the society in general.

When we communicate with each other using different signs, sound, gesture etc. we presuppose and prescribe for certain rules that aims to build a common understanding between the parties in the communication. However, the relationship between the sign we ascribed to a thing and the thing that the sign referred to has no relationship. It is just a convention between the parties in the communication. The sign also identified not directly in relation to the thing it represented, rather in relation to other signs (Burr, 1995, p. 40) (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 10). This relationship between the signs in a language is the main focus area for different studies. Structuralisms portrayed this relationship as fixed and post structuralism conceived it as flued which will be changed over time and situation. Therefore, one of the basic common assumption of all different discourse analysis approach is that the relationship between the sign and the thing it represent in any language use is arbitrary and it is identified in relation with other signs.

The other common ground is, due to persistent use of a specific discourse, we often tend to consider our own version of discourse as an objective truth and reality. We often forget that as Jørgenson and Phillips rightly pointed out

” access to reality is always through language, with language, we create representation of reality that are never mere reflection of a preexisting reality but contributes to constructing reality. That does not mean that reality itself does not exist. Meaning and representations are real physical objects also exist [but] they only gain meaning through discourse” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9)

Hence, since reality is subjective, that constructed through different forms of social interaction, then our knowledge and perception of the world are essentially historical and culturally specific (Burr, 1995, p. 3) (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 5). What we think we know could be different had we have been situated and raised in different tradition at a given different period of time. Our knowledge is influenced by the culture and time. Therefore, knowledge is anti- foundationalist, in a sense that it is deeply embedded in our routine daily action without any objective foundation. It is also anti-essentialist by the fact that everything within the social does not have a predetermined character outside discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 5)

To sum up, though, discourse analysis is multi-disciplinary in nature (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 4) and different approaches have different epistemological and ontological premise
most of the approaches share the following basic assumptions: language use and discourse has a vital role in the social world; knowledge and reality [partly, in the case of CDA] are a result of discursive construction and basically historical and cultural specific; things that we take for granted, things that we consider as objectively true can be problematized. If this is being so, here in under I will explore the basic concepts of discourse analysis, starting from the role of language in social construction of the world, in line with Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis theory.

3.3 The role of language in the social construction of the world

The point of departure for the role of language in most of discourses analysis approaches is traditional French linguistic philosophy of structuralism and post structuralism (Burr, 1995, p. 31) (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 8). For structuralism, language in its own right is a system independent of what it represented in reality. Hence the relationship between the sign and the thing it represented has no natural as well as logical connection, rather it is purely a social convention. Apart from this relation, the meaning of a sign is determined by its relation with other signs. This web of signs which got their meaning in relation to one another have a fixed structure, accordingly this structure shall be the main focus on language research and studies. Post structuralism, however, letter adopt structuralisms assumptions on the relationship between the sign and the thing it represented and dismissed the claim of fixity of the system. For post structuralism the structure is susceptible for change. Studying this change can also serve to analyze fundamental changes within the social (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 10).

Most of discourse analysis approaches conceptualize language in a post structuralisms line. When specifically comes to Laclau and Mouffè’s discourse analysis theory take on language; they draw on some basic elements of structuralism and mainly adopt post structuralism. They perceive discourse as a persistent struggle to fix the meaning of a sign in relation to other signs which is ultimately impossible, since meaning is contingent (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 57) and this struggle for fixation of meaning in a specified social domain is their focus area.

Furthermore, in Laclau and Mouffè’s theory, there are some peculiar concepts which I am going to introduce here. Every sign within a discourse is called ‘moment’. Since there is no absolute fixation of meaning in a discourse, the moment [sign] around which different discourses are compete to dominate is called ‘Nodal point’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 26) (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 112). For example, in this study Oromo is the nodal point around which different discourse are compete to dominate. Yet, every such attempt to represent the nodal point is done by excluding other alternative representations, which is one of the basic character of every discursive construction: discourse is exclusionary in nature. However, the fact that, discourse is exclusionary, does not necessarily mean the excluded discourse remain excluded forever. As, the structure is flued and it is in a persistent struggle for permanent fixation of the nodal point, then the excluded alternative discourses and their representations have potential, at some point in time, to temporally secure fixation. This excluded discourses in Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis theory is named as ‘field of discursivity’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 27). The question as to the size and content of
the field of discursivity is, however, unclear. Whether it includes, only, the ‘potential’ discourses to represent the nodal point or does it, actually, refer to any other discourse? (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 29).

The other concept in Laclau and Mouffe discourse theory is the moment, which is a sign that has a multiple definition, a term that, as of yet, the definition of it is not inscribed with in the discourse. Therefore, in discourse the main goal is to transform these moments to elements (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 28).

The nodal point also become a floating signifier: an element that different discourses compete to secure partial fixation. Thus, depending up on its position the element within a discourse can be a nodal point or a floating signifier [ibid]. Returning to our example, the Oromo which is a nodal point, for one specific discursive construction, it can also be a floating signifier when we positioned and analyzed it in light of different discourses surrounded that subject ‘Oromo’.

As the structure of the language, in post structuralism sense, is susceptible for change and fixation of meaning is only temporary, then, so do discourse and its structure. Accordingly, as already mentioned, the focus of discourse analysis shall be the structure of the discourses as well as the permanence and change within it which has an immense ramification on the overall social field (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 30). Yet it is worth a note that in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis theory discourse is not only restricted to text, talk, communication and any kind of sign, rather the whole social field is conceived as discursive (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 33).

To sum up, language, in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis theory, is a crucial part of the social world, though discourse is much broader than just language. It conceptualized as a structure of the sign to represent a thing or a concept and the signs gain their meaning in relation to other signs, yet this structure is open for change. Discourse is basically about fixation of meaning in a certain social domain. It is also structured in a certain way, which is open for change. When it comes to the social, it is fully discursive, everything within the social world is a result of discursive construction.

If this is being so, based on this conception of language and the social, on the following pages I will further examine the concepts of claim of truth and knowledge discourses analysis theory.

3.4. The claim of truth and Knowledge

One of the fundamental premise that most of social construction discourse analysts share is the fact that knowledge is a result of discursive construction; not a real reflection of reality per se., which holds true for truth too. Hence different regimes of knowledge depending up on the focus area to the subject [nodal point in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory] determine what we can claim it is true and what is false (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 13). But this does not mean that our discursive construction of knowledge and its representation of reality is all there is about the subject. The subject of the discourse could be constructed and represented differently in a completely different fashion. Yet, on the other hand, one shall remember the
fact that in whatever way we constructed it, we always claim our truth and knowledge as an objective reality. Thus the claim of knowledge and truth and its representation, as an objective is a fundamental and common element in a discursive construction.

In Foucault’s sense, truth is something an unattainable and closely related with power and vice versa; further in his classic three phase work: Archaeology, Genealogy and Postmodern, he noted that truth can’t be separated from discursive formation and it is an unattainable in a sense that, it is absolutely impossible to gain access to truth without exposed to the competing discourse towards the subject, which ultimately biased the journey towards finding the truth. Thus, accordingly, the struggle to figure out the truth value of anything, objectively is meaningless (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 13). But in relation to knowledge, in Vivian Burr conception it is our own construction of a specific social phenomena in a certain specific way that has a ‘truth’ tag in it (Burr, 1995, p. 43).

3.5. Power, hegemony and the subject

These three concepts are enormously important to understand discourse and its process. True, that we often here, whites have more power than black, women than men, west over east, global north over global south, but to understand where and how this inequality lies in a given society, we need to carefully examine how the discourse is constructed, how each terms and concepts, within it, has been defined in a certain way and get accepted as a universal truth (Burr, 1995, p. 43) while leaving out other possible explanation. If one takes a closer look as to how it is constructed and what possible explanations have been excluded in due course, obviously, [s]he would get the importance of power and hegemon in the center. However, the types and source of power as to how the discourse is constructed in that specific way might be different based on its context (Dijk, 2001, p. 355).

3.5.1. Power

Power in this context, shall be understood in Foucauldian way; as a productive force that create the subject and agent relationship, rather than a material force owned by individuals and exerted up on the others (Burr, 1995, p. 43) (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 14). However, this productive force can, often, be used to control and manipulate discursive formation, by doing so, one can assert, maintain or change the status quo, protect or enhance its own interest.

3.5.2. Hegemon

When it comes to hegemony, the starting point for Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis theory is the works of Gramsci: The Italian Marxist, in fact he is one of the most quoted source on. He draws on the traditional Marxist idea of class. Accordingly, the society is projected as objectively classified subject between the base and super structure. Where the
base [working class] with false consciousness, believing that the existed economic relation between the bourgeois and the working class is to their advantage, while it actually serves the interest of the super structure that control the means of production as well as the production of ideology. Deceiving the base as if the system is serving their interest. But Gramsci [partially] dismissed the Marxist idea of economic determinism: in which the relationship between the base and super structure is solely determined by their economic relation. According to Gramsci, though, the economic relation between the base and super structure is pivotal in their identity as a base and super structure bit it is not all there is, hegemony is also play an important role (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 31-33).

When a struggle happens in between the super structure, elements of the superstructure will resort to the base to galvanize support and win over the struggle that happened in the superstructure. This in effect creates a channel through which elements of the super structure formed an alliance with the base that eventually helped the base to figure out and negotiate their real interest (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 31) Which had been the point of critique in Marx, that miserably failed to explain how the base can be conscious of its real interest, if the whole means of material and ideology production remains with in the super structure and worse the base is falsely believed that their interest is secured.

This consensus formation, the negotiation between elements of the superstructure and base is a process for the construction of hegemon. For Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis theory this process is a point of departure, since this consensus formation is basically performed by articulatory practice (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 134). However, they reject Gramsci’s understanding of the social, where the class is considered as an objective reality that constructed up on economic determinism, for them the social is fully a result of discursive practice, not something that essentially predetermined by economic reality or hegemon (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 33).

3.5.3. The subject

We human beings as a subject of discourse are both the product as well as producer of it (Burr, 1995, p. 96). We are all who we are through discourse. Our identity, organization and the whole social is a product of discourse. The conceptualization of the subject with in discourse is distinct from the normative understanding of it, which is an independent sovereign entity, who can make things on an informed manner from innumerable choices without any restriction. When it comes to discourse, however, the subject has a limited option, based on the specific field [s]he positioned and the structure of discourse available to him/her. Since the subject does not pre date language his role with in the social is repetition and [re]construction of the discourses he is immersed in (Burr, 1995, p. 23).

This coupling of subject with various discourses termed as positioning of the subject in discursive psychology (Burr, 1995, p. 96) and an interpellation in an Althusser’s approach (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 15), who further linked the subject with the concept of ideology and destined the subject to a specific discourse without much option at their disposal. But whether it is in Althusser’s interpellation or Vivian Burr positioning, the subject is projected as passive, who has no significant power to challenge. Yet when it comes to
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis theory, it is a bit different. They portray the subject with a significant freedom to choose, that are available to him (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 17) and as to the extent on which the elements within the discourse are partially fixed.

To sum up, in discourse theory the subject is not ‘an independent autonomous being’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 16) rather it is highly influenced by the waves of discourse. Its freedom to choose is restricted by the structure. When it comes to power and hegemony, both is considered as a result of social construction through discursive practice that contribute to the creation of subject and agent relation. If this is being so, now before I windup the theoretical part, I would like to discuss some ideas from Critical Discourse Analysis in particular, order of discourse, intertextuality and interdiscursivity in line of Fairclough’s approach.

3.6 concepts adopted from critical discourse analysis

As I have pointed out from the beginning, this study is conceptually embedded in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis theory. Working on comparative analysis between Laclau and Mouffe discourse theory and Fairclough’s Critical discourse analysis theory is way beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, I believed it is wiser to ascertain and justify the relevance of critical discourse analysis in this study. Then, doing so, would practically lead to a quasi-comparison. Hence it is worth note the fact that, the things illustrated here in under are not conclusive.

One of the basic shortcoming of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourses analysis theory is the lack of sufficient methodological framework for analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 147). On the contrary, Fairclough’s critical discourse theory model of analysis like 3D and its conceptual tools like order of discourse has proofed its importance in many discourse empirical research undertakings. Hence, since, there is no colossal contradiction in their philosophical departures, borrowing Fairclough’s rich analytical tools would be wiser and informative too. After all, in general in discourse analysis, there is no as such a specific dogmatic and procedural strictness (Fairclough, 1992, p. 225) that a researcher should adhere. Often, apart from some general common underpinnings, the specific way forward of any discourse analysis researches are, basically, determined by the research question and the way the research itself is constructed. However, the conceptual as well as methodological set up of the study need to be justified.

If this is being so, then, here in under I will briefly, discuss order of discourse, intertextuality and interdiscursivity.
3.6.1 Order of discourse

Before dealing with the order of discourse per se, it is quite useful to discuss some of the major constituting concepts. In critical discourse analysis, one of the peculiar differences from other discourse theories, like Laclau and Mouffe is, CDA’s conception of the social. In CDA theory the social is classified as discursive and non-discursive in a dialectical relation (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 61-62) (Fairclough, 1992, p. 61). Accordingly, the non-discursive part should have to be studied by using the relevant and applicable theory other than discourse. When it comes to the discursive part of the social, the competing discourses can be stratified in a certain way, since discourse is all about fixation of meaning in a certain domain. Then, this stratification of discourses is called, Order of discourse. In the terms of Jørgensen and Phillips order of discourse is:

*defined as a complex configuration of discourses and genres within the same social field or institution. Thus the order of discourse can be taken to denote different discourses that partly cover the same terrain which each discourse competes to fill with the meaning in its own way* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 14).

For instance, back on the previous example I have given, ethnic identity discourse within Oromo, is a kind of one order of discourse within which different articulations are and have been, struggling to fix what Oromo is.

Well as you have noticed in Jørgensen and Phillips definition of order of discourse quoted above, the other alien needs an introduction from Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis is: genre. In any order of discourse, the discourse of ethnic identity within Oromo for example, it is obvious that one can find numerous discursive constructions in different platforms with a little adaptation (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 67) (Fairclough, 1992, p. 145). To give an example, identity discourse in the media, school, household etc. Further within the media itself one can further explicitly see identity discourse in newspaper, magazine, radio show, TV, etc. This platform on which the discourse is entertained is called genre. Studying the genre, in its own right, can give you a clue as to the influence of power on that specific discourse. OSA publications is one genre which this study has chosen to focus on. By studying OSA; the formation, publication process, the editorial committee and production one can infer the kind of power and influence its discourse production have.

3.6.2 Intertextuality and Interdiscursivity

These are the last concepts that I shall import to this study from Fairclough’s discourse analysis theory. Mainly because of the fact that I already incorporated the Order of discourse, as a conceptual tool. Escaping Intertextuality and interdiscursivity would obviously
undermine the role and use of order of discourse in this study hitherto the outcome of the analysis.

To begin with intertextuality: it is one of the significant text analytical tool for both Foucault and Fairclough (Fairclough, 1992, p. 101). It can be explained as a situation where the newly produced discourses are drawn on earlier production of communication events (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 73). in the words of Fairclough

‘all utterance [communicative event] are populated and indeed construed by snatches of other utterance more or less explicit or complete (Fairclough, 1992, p. 102)
Bracket added

Therefore, this tendency of relying on previous discursive production is referred as intertextuality, which is quite obvious in most situations since, we as a subject immersed in to the social world that is full of discursive practices. To put it differently, language predates the subject (Burr, 1995, p. 96). Hence whenever the subject construct a discourse he/she always start from her/his positioned place. In addition, texts repeated across different discourse constructions, is an indication of stability in that social terrain and manifestation of a successful fixation of meaning in a certain social domain. On the other hand, the combination of different orders of discourse and genres in a new systematic way, is a precursor for social change and instability with in that specific social domain. This mix between different discourses or even between different orders of discourse, in one articulation, however, is called Interdiscursivity (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 73). According to Fairclough this interdiscursivity in between different discourse or orders of discourse can apply in different levels: the societal order of discourse and Institutional order of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, p. 124). However, we shall remember that discourse, in its own right, is not an objective reality that we can find out there. Thus the delimitation of a specific discourse/ articulation in one or different order[s] of discourse is an analytical process performed by the researcher/author based on the research question, theory, method and analytical framework employed on a rational and justifiable base. Thus interdiscursivity- crossing of this an analytically delimitated line should have to be understood accordingly.

To sum up the chapter, the main theoretical starting point for this study is Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis theory under social constructionism. Therefore, this study perceived the social world as fully discursive; a result of our daily discursive practice. When it comes to discourse, it is not restricted to Semiotic [language, body language and visual image (Fairclough, 2012, p. 11), it includes everything within the social. Not in a sense that there is no tangible material thing, rather those things/ concepts outside discourse, who has a material existence is gained meaning through discursive practices. Therefore, their meaning, the concepts and the attribution attached with them are susceptible for change. Accordingly, in this study I will employ this conceptual tool to analyze how the ethnic Oromo identity, for the last quarter a century [1991-2012] have been constructed by the Oromo elite, taking a closer look to the Publication of OSA and the international media coverage of the current Oromo protest. To this end in the next chapter I will discuss some of the fundamental methodological guideline of this study and lay an analytical frame work of analysis.
Chapter four: Methodology

4. Introduction

In this chapter, discourse analysis as method; data collection sampling and selection criteria; research strategy; the frame work of analysis on two different and separate stages: first for OSA publications, second the Anabella Carvalho 2000 media text analysis framework for the international media texts on the current Oromo protest will be discussed and finally some ethical concerns will be presented.

4.1. Discourse Analysis as Method

As it was illustrated in the introductory part of this study, this work is mainly focused on the construction of Oromo ethnic identity by the Oromo elites using the OSA publications as a point of departure. Try to examine to what extent does the identity construction by the Oromo elites have been reflected on the international media coverage of the current [March-2016] Oromo protest. To this end discourse analysis as a method is employed mainly because this study’s theoretical underpinning is embedded in discourse analysis and accordingly in discourse analysis, theory and methods are intertwined (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 73). It is also adopted because it provide a rich analytical framework to undertake an in depth analysis of both texts of the OSA publications and the international media.

4.2. Research strategy

To effectively address the research, question this study posed, I will employ discourse analysis in a qualitative case study approach. It is qualitative in a sense that the overall study is based on analyzing texts [ OSA publications and Media texts] as an empirical material rather than a quantitative research procedure with a quantifiable outcome. The theoretical background of this study, mainly, is intended to be implemented in qualitative research undertakings (Alan, 2008, p. 373). It is a case study because, it entirely focused on Oromo ethnic identity construction, though the empirical materials are collected from different sources [ OSA and different international Medias]. Even if so, case study as a research approach is not about how the data is gathered rather its focus and approach of the study (Berg, 2001, p. 225). The case analysis approach is employed in this study because it best serve to undertake an in depth analysis of the research question that this study attempting to answer

If this is being so, in this study, the analysis will have two stages. In the first stage of the analysis, the OSA publication that have 23 published journals between 1993 to 2012, compiled 117 different articles, 23 editorial notes and 41 book reviews will be analyzed. These articles are mainly written on Oromo issues. From different perspectives by mostly
ethnic Oromo’s, some other Ethiopians and foreigners who are interested on Oromo issues. Thus in this stage, the systematically selected articles will be broken down in five themes based on their discursive similarity to identify the dominant discourse with in the elites.

At the second stage of the analysis, using (Carvalho, 2000) critical discourse analysis analytical framework of media texts, I will investigate ten international media texts on the current Oromo protest produced between November 2015 and February 2016 to identify to what extent the discursive construction of Oromo identity by the Oromo elites letter manifested in those international media coverage of the Oromo protest.

4.3. Data collection, sampling and selection criteria.

Since this study does not intend to generalize its final outcome, the writer decided to employ both systematic and convenient data sampling method. The collection procedure for the empirical materials is mainly, due to the fact that they are easily accessible both for the author to collect as well for any person who wish to verify the validity. Hence, all the data selected to analyze in this study [OSA publications as well as the ten international media coverage over the Oromo protest] can be easily retrieved online on the internet.

When it comes sampling and selection criteria, it is better if we see it in to steps: first the OSA publications, second the international media coverage.

To study how the Oromo elite, discursively construct the Oromo identity, the best place to start looking shall be OSA. It is one of, if not the only, place where we can find a coherent and complete set of scholarly publications on Oromo issues. However, the fact that, over the years 1993-2012 OSA has published a vast article vis-à-vis a need to have a limited amount of data to commence a textual discourse analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 148) make the selection process of the relevant articles for further analysis very tedious.

In the preliminary reading of the OSA publications, those articles that are not written within the framework of Ethiopia or Oromo or the combination of two are immediately excluded from further reading. Even those who are written solely up on Oromo with a little dimension of identity in its introduction are also excluded. In effect, those criterions are significantly decreased the empirical material for the systematic reading. Accordingly, out of 23 journals, 117 articles 41 book reviews and 23 editorial notes only 18 journals 2 editorial notes and 19 articles have been selected for a systematic reading. Then, after a systematic reading has conducted 7 articles and two editorial notes, were selected for an in depth analysis to map which discursive constructions are prevalent with in the Oromo elites. In due course, strict consideration has been given to be representative and at the same time capture all available discourses within that specific social domain. It is worth a not here that in a textual analysis the selection and delimitation of different discourses shall done after a systematic reading of the empirical material (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 148). This is more so when the author, [which is the case in this paper] is subject of the social under investigation, since [s]he has a predetermined knowledge that would eventually biased the selection and delimitation of the discourse.
The selected articles are:

3- A great African Nation: The Oromo in some Europeans account. Volume 17[1]. Tsega Etefa. 2010
7- Failed modernization of Ethiopia: Oromo perspective on Ethiopian political culture. Volume 15[1]. Marco Bassi and Gemetchu Megerssa

The two editorial notes:

1- The place of Oromo in Ethiopian history. Volume 14[1]. Tessema Ta’a. 2003

Second, ten international media coverage on the Oromo protest has been selected. The main reason why the author has chosen to analyze the texts of international media is because Ethiopia according to CPJ 2015 report is the fourth most censored nation in the world (CPJ, n.d.), with a very low internet penetration and existence of free media that one cannot get an adequate and reliable amount of empirical material this study is needs. Thus the author is obliged to relay on international media productions that were written on Oromo protest. Since, many international media companies are existed and produced a text on the protest, the author tried to narrow down the scope of the search by placing a time frame. Accordingly, from the free online google search ten international media reports and opinions have been selected. These are: three from Aljazeera, two from All Africa, one from each: The Washington post, The New York Times, BBC, IBT-International Business Times and News Week.


Framework in textual discourse analysis can be understood as a pattern for organizing our cognition of reality or as an organizing principle that gives coherent meaning to a symbol or as an emphasis on perspective (Carvalho, 2000, p. 7). Accordingly, in this study framework is conceptualized as a unifying means of similar discursive construction features in the text of the international media reports as well as OSA publications. To this end, as we have two different sets of empirical material, our framework too, have two different stages to analyze each sets of the document separately. Hence here in under I will illustrate the analytical framework for both stages: First for OSA publications and letter for the international media texts
After an in depth reading of the selected seven articles and two editorial notes; a set of different discourses, repeated words and concepts have been detected. This detected discourses across the OSA publications are systematically summarized and coded in to five major themes. These are, the discourse of Indigenous Oromo, the discourse of Gada ‘democratic Oromo’, the discourse of the settler ‘neftgna’, the discourse of colonized Oromo and the discourse of marginalized Oromo. This summarization and categorization of different discursive constructions would help the writer to map up concepts and discursive constructions which seems apparent or partially fixed (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 26) within the social terrain that this study is attempting to investigate. Hence, after identifying the prevalent discourse within the OSA publications, then in the second part of the analysis I will resort to the texts of the international media reports and opinions to evaluate to what extent the already identified discourse within the OSA publications are letter repeated, altered or modified in the international media texts. How I intend to analyze the international media texts will be discussed in the new paragraph.

On the second stage of the analysis, to identify the themes and central features of the international media texts I will employ the Anabela Carvalho analytical framework of media text analysis (Carvalho, 2000), which is fundamentally embedded in Fairclough 1995 CDA and Van Dijks 1985 work. Accordingly, the framework has six distinct yet interrelated stages. These are:

1- Surface description and structure of the empirical material.
2- Object
3- Social actors
4- Language use
5- Framing
6- Ideological underpinning

In the following pages I will discuss each stages of the framework separately.

4.4.1. Surface description and structure.

This part of the analysis serves as an introductory part. A glimpse as to what follows in the empirical materials on the international media texts. The name of the author, the organization, publication date, the size, the title and structure of the article etc. (Carvalho, 2000, p. 21) shall be demonstrated. Knowing these things could help both the readers of the study and the writer to anticipate and cautiously examine the texts’ institutional affiliation, political standing and the ideological underpinning of the production of the text in general. Hence in this part I will discuss and illustrate all the ten international media texts’ authors, titles and every necessary detail. Yet it is worth a note that we should make a balance between anticipating the texts ideological and political motive from the surface description vis-à-vis prejudice (Carvalho, 2000, p. 21).
4.4.2. Objects

To identify the objects of any discourse construction whether it is a news or an article a ‘which’ question is very important. Which objects does the text construct? The main theme or idea of the article should be figured out. It seems obvious and often it is but it cannot always be. Sometimes the authors or their institutional affiliation have their own hidden agenda on the object at stake. The need for professional norm and accountability on the other hand pushed them to conceal and transmit their agenda implicitly. Then in such situations locating the object may demand effective deconstruction of the text to understand the underlying discourse (Carvalho, 2000, p. 22). Doing so would obviously help to locate the real object of the text. After all it is through discourse that objects are constituted or transformed (Fairclough, 2012, p. 41). Accordingly, I will examine and identify the objects that the international media attempt to construct while they cover the Oromo protest.

4.4.3. Social actor

At this stage I will examine the main social actors. How they are portrayed and represented across our empirical material. The social actor can be an institution, individual, a group or anything like that. Thus to identify such things in our text, I would scrutinize the most quoted sources. It could be individuals that were interviewed by the authors whether as a witness or as a person with some sort of authority [can be professional or public] or it could be person or article quoted in the texts (Carvalho, 2000, p. 22).

Identifying the major social actors and how they are constructed in the texts in this study, would help to observe how the Oromo identity are constructed in the media texts. However, it should be clear that analyzing theses texts individually does not amount to analyzing the discursive practice, though, texts are part of the discursive practice. Single text and discursive practice in CDA are two separate stages which should be analytically, separated and delimited (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 69) (Fairclough, 1992, p. 73). Lastly the subject and object of a media text could be sometimes the same (Carvalho, 2000, p. 22).

4.4.4. Language use

In this stage I will look for the core concepts and their relationship with the wider cultural and ideological framework in the different media texts that cover the Oromo protest (Carvalho, 2000, p. 23). It is wise to remember that the relationship between the words and their meanings is not liner rather it is multi-dimensional. In a sense that one word can convey different meanings and a situation can be described in different terms (Fairclough, 1992, p. 185). That is why the structure of language in a Saussure way is not fixed rather it is open for change (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 10) (Burr, 1995, pp. 25-26). Hence identifying the language use and its attempt to portray a situation, like the Oromo protest, in a certain text
tells you the authors perspective. Since, to describe the situation, he had many alternative words to choose from, as to how to portray the subject. Accordingly, out of his alternative he made a choice to describe it in the way it is presented on the media.

One of the important element in this process is rhetoric, its main purpose is persuasion, making the discursive construction plausible to the targeted audience (Carvalho, 2000, p. 23). By this model I will search for metaphors; quoted credible sources as persons and understated or overstated social relationships across our data.

Traditionally metaphors have been considered as a conclusive part of language studies like poetry but currently it becomes a spice of discourse analysis since ‘metaphor structure shape the way we think and the way we act, and our system of knowledge and belief, in a pervasive and fundamental way’ (Fairclough, 1992, p. 194).

4.4.5. Framing

According to Anabela Carvalho framing is an act of constructing a discourse according to a certain point of perspective. Selection of a specific angle by excluding all other possible facts and angles to represent a complex social reality (Carvalho, 2000, pp. 23-24). To put in other word, it is a discursive manipulation of reality by the author of the text. Hence in this study’s empirical material from international media texts, I will identify these discursive manipulations.

Framing can be performed using positioning of the subject as a discursive strategy. Discursive strategy, in Anabela Carvalho 2000 framework, is presented as a wider stage with a variety of mechanisms, not solely restricted to framing and positioning but also includes narration and legitimation etc. (Carvalho, 2000, p. 25). However, narration and legitimation is wittingly excluded from this particular framework due to our empirical materials content and its irrelevance for the specific case in hand.

When we return to our subject: positioning, it is something like a norm that guide social actor’s relationship to perform or prohibit certain acts as an [un]acceptable with their relation to other actors (Carvalho, 2000, p. 24). For Althusser, this positioning of the subject and limits of his choices is called interpellation (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 15, 40). Hence in our data I will investigate this positioning of the subject: Oromo, on different media texts. If this is being so now let us tern to the last stage of the framework.

4.4.6. Ideological Underpinning

This is the last stage of the analytical framework. Here the ideological premise of the international media text over the current Oromo protest shall be analyzed. Ideology in this context, can be understood as something essentially tied with power and common sense assumption. Things that are taken for granted in a specific social domain in the service of
maintaining unequal power relation between the social actors (Fairclough, 1996, p. 84). Yet Carvalho, the person who developed the analytical framework here, has taken a bit different strand that relates ideology with values and moral judgements. Ideology for him can perform a ground work for a basic political standing in any given social terrain (Carvalho, 2000, p. 26).

However, in practice, it would be naïve to crack to locate the ideological underpinning in casual reading of the texts. Thus to effectively unveil the ideological underpinning of the texts in our empirical material it demands a diligent deconstruction of the texts and interpretation of the terms and concepts (Carvalho, 2000, p. 26).

To sum up this second stage, as it is already identified the main discourses, that are prevalent across the Oromo elites; now in this second stage to check to what extent does those prevalent discourse of Oromo ethnic identity by its elites has been consequently repeated by the international media texts in covering the current Oromo protest, I will go through in ten international media texts at six independent but interrelated stages. Which are: Surface description and structure of the text, subject, object, social actors, language use, framing and lastly, ideological underpinning. By doing so I will thoroughly address the research question this study has posed.

Now before the conclusion of this chapter I would like to discuss some ethical considerations that might, rightly, raised in connection with the validity of this study procedure as well as its outcome, since the author is part of the social under investigation.

4.5. Ethical considerations

For a social science qualitative, case study research, posed a ‘how’ and ‘to what extent’ question within a social constructionist discourse analysis theory, the obvious ethical consideration that needs to be addressed should be, First: the role of the researcher on the process and outcome of research. Second, the question of subjectivity.

To begin with subjectivity, it is not unique for discourse analysis alone. It is a common critique against any social science qualitative studies in general. When it comes to discourse analysis, to its credit, dismissed the very existence of society as an objective and completed entity (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 38). Conceived the social as fully discursive which means it is subjective, both constitutive and constituted with in the discourse. The social is a place where, different discourses are in everlasting competition for partial fixation of meaning. So there is no point in questioning the subjectivity of a specific study, since everything is subjective. The focus, rather should be on the studies analytical framework, methodological and theoretical coherence (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 22) and its logic and the arguments plausibility.

When it comes to the first question and fundamental one; the role of the researcher and his/her personal bias, it is tricky and to some extent inexorable. True that distancing oneself from the empirical material or crafting the issue through the theory lens could, to some level would help to mitigate the influence and extent of the bias [ibid] however, it would not avoid it completely. To make the situation even worse, the fact that, the author is part of the social
under investigation, would inevitably increase the magnitude of the bias. Hence, keep the question of to what extent does it become successful in mind, the author, in addition to the aforementioned tactics of Jorgenson and Phillips the following tactics are employed.

First, by accepting the unavoidability of the issue [approaching the subject from totally neutral position] the author was vigilant throughout the course which will protect him from what would happen otherwise. Second, the way we frame the study and research question can determine the extent of the role of the researcher’s involvement. That is why in this study rather than adopting Fairclough’s CDA theory, as a theoretical guideline, which presuppose identifying social wrong to analyze, the author resort to Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis theory. Because to identify a social wrong in a given society, it obviously requires to take some aspects of it as given, which is a huge/decisive intervention by the author. Thus, in this study, as it is illustrated clearly in the research questions, the main focus is to plot the discursive struggle as to how the Oromo identity have been constructed by the elites and to what extent letter manifested in the international media texts. Thus by doing so, the role of the researcher is significantly diminished, though, it will not be totally illuminated. Since, still, the author has a great deal of intervention while selecting the empirical materials at both stages [OSA and international media texts] and in the systematic reading as well.
Chapter Five: Analysis

5. Introduction

In accordance with the research question this study has framed; the empirical materials that were introduced in the previous chapter [4] and the theoretical and methodological concepts laid in their respective place; this chapter is dedicated to present the analysis. For the sake of clarity and convenience the analysis will have two stages; at the first stage, the OSA publications will be analyzed and second the international media texts on Oromo protest are followed.

5.1. The main discursive features detected across the OSA publications

As stipulated above and in a manner describe in the first part of the analytical framework in the previous chapter; from the seven articles and two editorial notes that were selected for an in depth reading from across the OSA publications five major discursive constructions of ethnic Oromo identity have been detected. Hence in this part of the analysis I will present these five discursive features separately. These are:

1- The discourse of ‘indigenous Oromo’
2- The discourse of Gada ‘democratic Oromo’
3- The discourse of ‘the settler ‘neftgna’’
4- The discourse of ‘colonized Oromo’
5- The discourse of ‘marginalized Oromo’

Meanwhile it is worth a note that, even though the author of this study has a previous knowledge about the discourses just mentioned; the delimitation process has performed after the systematic reading of the empirical materials (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 148). Though it is obvious that the prior knowledge had ease things very much in the process, and this assertion [confession] of the author is difficult for the reader to verify. Now let us see them individually.

5.1.1. The discourse of ‘indigenous Oromo’

The earliest written literature by a Christian monk Aba Baheri’s Zenahu Ze Galla 1593 refer the people of Oromo as Galla (Haile, 2002) (Yates, 2010, p. 25). However, starting from the second half of 20th c, this nomenclature is highly politicized and disliked by the very people and often considered as derogatory. Spenser Trimingham surmise it could mean immigrant (TrimIngham, 1952, p. 187). Letter, Krapf, a German missionary who lived amongst the Shewa Oromo between 1839-42 used a term Ormania [Orma] in relation to the people of Oromo (Hassen, 1999, p. 121). Some writers suggest Orma as a father of all Oromo which every tribe try to link its genealogy (Bulcha, 1996, p. 50). In 1970’s when OLF articulate

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19 Oromo Liberation Front
the Oromo nationalism changed the name Ormania to Oromia. Finally, the 1995 FDRE\textsuperscript{20} constitution recognize the name Oromia as one of the nine regions within Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{21}

As Tsega Etefa puts it,

‘Oromo is the earliest inhabitant of the region, stretching from today’s north Sudan to the entire Horn of Africa’ (Etefa, 2010, p. 88) that belong to the ‘Cushitic stock of the earliest indigenous inhabitants’ (Ta’a, 2004).

The fact that most of its members has been lived a nomadic herdsman life (TrimIngham, 1952, p. 188) and its history, culture and tradition were transferred through oral communication without using written manuscripts (Megerssa, 1996, p. 94) makes it difficult to articulate coherently. Yet some scholars like the Egyptologists, Flinders Petrie and Henry Tomkins has identified some similarities with the ancient Egyptian dynasties. They even argued that the Oromo might be the descendants from the ancient Egypt to their current positions (Etefa, 2010, pp. 90-91).

Other scholars like A. Batrawi, Charles Johnston, I. M. Lewis etc. draw a link between the Oromo and the ancient civilization of Nubia and Meroe in the horn of Africa. According to these scholar’s language similarities had identified. The discoveries of ancient graves in Mandera, Wajir, south of the Juba river and Berbera resembled with the Oromo which indicates the presence of Oromo [ibid]. As quoted by Tsega, Charles Johnston even concluded that the Oromo ‘have arisen from the ruins of the once civilized and extensive empire of Meroe’ (Etefa, 2010, p. 92).

Before the Oromo expansion has started in the 16\textsuperscript{th}c, the Oromo people have lived in a loose confederation of tribes with a highly developed political organization called Gada (TrimIngham, 1952, p. 187) (Jalata, 2005, p. 20). Which we will see in the second discourse

In the words of Tessema ‘it was in the first half of the 16\textsuperscript{th}c that a section of the Oromo began their mass movement being organized under the Gada system (Ta’a, 2004, p. 2). ’ The two major groups Barentu and Borena follow a different direction of expansion. Barentu expanded to the present day Harerge, Arsi, Wallo and parts of Shewa. While Borena march towards the other parts of Shewa, Keffa, Gamu Goffa, Sidamo, Wellega, Gibe regions etc. then due to its expansive geographic area Borena further divided in to Mecha and Tulama. To make the long story short between 1522 to 1618 the Oromo fought 12 Butta\textsuperscript{22} to settle in and reclaim the present geographic area (Jalata, 2005, p. 20).

Even though there are many sub section with in each sects of Oromo tribal confederation (TrimIngham, 1952), according to Tessema, we can find six major branches:

1- The north Oromo [Yejju, Raya, Assabo,]  
2- The south west Oromo [the Mecha Oromo]  
3- The central Oromo [Tuiama Oromo]  
4- The South eastern Oromo [Arisi, Bale, Kereyu,]  
5- The eastern Oromo [Ittu, Humbena, Afran Qallo of Harerge]

\textsuperscript{20} Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  
\textsuperscript{21} Article 47[1] [[4]}  
\textsuperscript{22} According to the Geda system when every new administration come to power, every 8 years, has a responsibility to wage a raid against enemies which has never been raided before which is called Butta.
6- The southern Oromo [Borena, Guji] (Ta’a, 2004, pp. 3-5).

To conclude this discursive feature, I will point out an ascertaining words of Mohammed Hassen:

‘it must be stated clearly that the Cushitic language speaking family of peoples [which include Oromo] lived for thousands of years in what is todays Ethiopia, predating by a millennium, the immigration of the Semitic speaking groups [which is Amhara, Tigray and Gurage] from what is today Yemen to Ethiopia (Hassen, 1999, p. 120) bracket added.

It is a common knowledge, in the OSA publications as well as with in the Oromo elites that the Semitic speaking peoples, especially Abyssinians, are an Arab migrant who descend in to the cost of red see by the Africa side in the first half of the first century before Christ. (Jalata, 2005, pp. 47-48).

Though, it seems conflicting when one read the tracing of the origin and indigenousness of the Oromo people from Egyptian civilization to Meroe, to Nubia, the underlying motive behind is to ascertain that the present territory which the Oromo resides as a natural homeland of the people. Especially when it compared to the Abyssinians. This assertion also serves to counter argue to the argument and Justification of Menelik’s 19thc conquest as legitimate since the Oromo too inhabit the area by the 16th c expansion.

5.1.2. The discourse of Gada ‘democratic Oromo’

Arguably, beyond the language: ‘Afan Oromo’, what makes unite all the Oromo confederacies is the Gada system. Yet due to its omnipresence, different scholars used it in different context and meaning. Macro Bassi describe it as ‘conceptual abstraction or a symbol of pan Oromo national identity’ (Bassi, 1996, p. 150); Ezekiel ‘a unifying figure of the Oromo community’ (Gebissa, 2008, p. 01); Hassen and Ta’a ‘participatory form of democracy’ (Hassen, 1999, p. 124) (Ta’a, 2004, p. 04). From these texts it is apparent that the political aspect is overemphasized. But none of them succinctly and in a holistic manner describe it as Asmerom Legesse23 did in his seminal work: Gada: Three approaches to the study of African Society 1973.

‘Gada is a system of classes [Luba] that succeed each other every 8 years in assuming military, economic, political and ritual responsibilities. Each Gada class remains in power during a specific term [gada] which begins and ends with a formal power transfer ceremony. Before assuming a position of leadership, the gada class is required to wage war against a community that none of their ancestors had raided. This particular war is known as ‘Butta’ and is waged on scheduled every eight years (Legesse, 1973, p. 08).’

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If this is being so, Gada in the OSA publication, is primarily presented in its political sense as a form of government and a symbol of Oromo nationalism (Gebissa, 2008) (Hassen, 1999) (Ta’a, 2004). Hence, our focus of analysis is also directed to that specific aspect of Gada, though it is much more than that. The other point is, Gada due to the expansion of the people of Oromo back in the 16th century hitherto inclusion and adaptation of new people and tradition it has developed little variation between different locations (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008, p. 87).

Even though Menilik conquest to the south in the 19th century had significantly weakened the institutional, political and economic base of the system Gada; it had continued up until the Derg time [1974-1991]. Then, Derg officially banned the performance and practice of Gada and its rituals. However, as of to date, in towns across Oromia where modernity in the European sense is prevalent, elderly people remembers the tradition vividly (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008, p. 103) Marco Bassi and Gemetchu Megerssa writes;

‘Geda is currently [2008] presented by urban elders in towns close to Addis Ababa [Holeta, Welliso, Ambo and Dembi Dollo] as a democratic and egalitarian mode of political organization’ (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008)

Gada as a system of government in our empirical material presented in to two levels. Geda from the perspective of the governed and Gada as a system in its own right. Often in comparison with the Abyssinians system and structure of governance

As a system, it is depicted as a pure invention of African form of democratic governance where the executive, legislative and judiciary functions separately. It can be ‘compared with the Greeks Olympiad’ (Hassen, 1999, p. 126) with a remarkable power sharing system; effective dispute settling mechanism; political debate; election; parliament; term of office; united bureaucracy; smooth transfer of power; check and balance and separation of power were the hall marks of Oromo democracy (Hassen, 1999, pp. 123-127) (Baissa, 1994, pp. 47-48).

Since Gada is a traditional participatory and egalitarian democracy, people has a role over what will happen within the government. The people directly or indirectly participate in the decision making process based on their social status [Based on the stratification of class within the Gada, in four stages] (Baissa, 1994, p. 48) (Jalata, 2005, p. 23) (Shunkuri, 1995, p. 68). The extent of this, peoples power is described by Mohammed Hassen as,

*The authority of the elected leaders was based on the democratic will of the people under the Gada system, government was an embodiment of popular democratic will, and those who wielded power were accountable to the people. The society delegates power to luba for a period of eight years, but the power is always subject to the higher authority of the assembled multitude. Power emanates from the people and if those to whom it was entrusted fail in their responsibilities, they can be removed’ (Hassen, 1999, p. 127)*

Returning to its dialectical relation with the Abyssinians political culture, in contrast to the Gada system, the Abyssinians had developed an authoritative and undemocratic (Hassen, 1999, p. 127) (Shunkuri, 1995, p. 66), hierarchical and monarichic (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008, p. 103) (Ta’a, 2004) system which is the exact opposite of the democratic egalitarian Gada system of the Oromo.
To conclude, I will present the Hassen comparison, which focused on the lack of smooth transfer of power in modern Ethiopian history. Mohammed writes

‘compare with the history of modern Ethiopia that has not seen a single transfer of power which was not drowned with the blood of thousands of victims. Smooth transfer of power was the strength of Oromo democracy, as absence of peaceful transfer of power is the hallmark of Ethiopian political culture’ (Hassen, 1999, p. 126).

The point worth a note here is, the term ‘Ethiopia’ employed to refer Amhara and Tigray only, which is common across all the OSA publications. As if in the Ethiopian political culture, no Oromo or anyone outside Amhara and Tigray had never been put its influence and shaped events in history. However, what makes Mohammed Hassan’s assertion different is unlike the others who put it impliedly, he clearly mentioned in his article the term Ethiopia refers to Amhara and Tigray.

5.1.3. The discourse of the Settler ‘neftgna’

Neftgna is an Amharic term. The literal meaning of the term is bearer of arm: a soldier. But the term eventually become politicized especially after 1991. It often employed as a nick name with the negative connotation to represent Amhara. Hence, currently both terms ‘neftgna’ and ‘Galla’ for Amhara and Oromo respectively considered as derogatory. In some sense it is ironic, since both terms in their linguistic dictionary definition does not have as such negative meaning. But now the context that the terms are used; the intention as well as the representation of the word has changed. If a linguist can try to study these terms in the early 20th c and now in a comparative analysis, it is obvious that the results will be interestingly different. This in turn shows, the meaning and representations of the word, as post structuralism rightly puts it, is not permanent (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 10) hence, parole needs to be the focus in their research undertakings.

Be that as it may, when we come back to the discourse of the settler. It all started back to the beginning of conquest of the Oromo land by the Abyssinians which even preceded Meniliks conquest of the 19th c to his grandfather, king Sahle Sellase of Shewa [1814-1848]. King Sahle Sellase has started wagging expedition against the neighboring Oromo (Hassen, 1999, p. 128). Since then leaving soldiers behind in the newly raided parts of Oromia become a norm, which letter emerged as towns.

The main factors mentioned as to why the once mighty cavalries of the Oromo under the Gada administration that successfully penetrate both the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia and the Muslim Sultanate in the 16th c and maintain their dominance for more than 300 years, had failed to protect itself is because of the fact that the Christian highland kingdom, especially king Menilik, using his Christian ties with the Europeans had been able to acquire weapons of destruction and logistic support; from France, Russia, Britain and even Italy (Jalata, 2005, pp. 65-68) (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008) (Gudina, 2008) (Hassen, 2011) (Ta’a, 2004) (Hassen, 1999) (Shunkuri, 1995). In addition to the weapons, however, controlling the vast territory; cross border trade roots with in its boundary and slave trade has strengthened the empire. Marco Bassi and Gemetchu M. writes:
From the second half of 19th c onwards some of the Abyssinian political centers were able to maintain access to significant quantities of firearms by controlling the international trade of slave, gold and ivory and by establishing international connections. The new technology of warfare dramatically affects the power balance of the region (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008, p. 85)

Menilik king of Shewa has, started successfully incorporating the neighboring Shewa Oromo (Gudina, 2008, p. 116) then using the Shewa Oromo, especially Ras Gobena Dache (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008, p. 92) he further incorporates the other parts of Oromia, within in just 25 years. In addition to his Ras Gobena connection Menilik had also used the policy of divided and conquer amongst Oromos (Ta'a, 2004, p. 05).

Once Oromia is controlled by Menilik army, since he had a peasant army and the conquered lands were far from his center in Shewa, he started to build garrison towns for his soldiers (Jalata, 2010, p. 39) (Hassen, 2011, p. 121) as Mohammed puts it;

After the conquest and occupation of Oromia Menilik gave both the people and their land to his armed settlers known as ‘neftgna’. The neftgna who played a pivotal role in the political landscape of Oromia (Hassen, 1999, p. 139).

These neftgna, as they have a lot to get from the system, they had played a significant role in maintaining the interest of the ruling class. In contrast when we evaluate their contribution to the conquered society that they are settled in, it was insignificant, Mohammed continues; ‘the Abyssinian administration [run by the settlers] had very little to offer in the way of social progress’ (Hassen, 2011, p. 135) bracket is added.

These, island of new urban towns which is surrounded by predominantly Oromo people, has been in a continuous cultural conflict with its surrounding people, since the surrounding Oromo had an egalitarian political economy (Jalata, 2010, p. 44). In the contrary the settler Abyssinians had created a stratum of the social, further to make the matter worse the Abyssinians had a superiority complex. Once again Mohammed continues

The Abyssinian settlers assumed that their own innate superiority over the local residents [the beneficiaries [settlers] of the Oromia state truly thought that they were in this position of dominance because of they were superior beings with superior culture (Hassen, 2011, p. 134)

To sum up, the aforementioned three discourses: the discourse of indigenous Oromo, the discourse of Gad democratic Oromo and this discourse of settler neftgna were the main discourses that are identified in our empirical data. It seems across a variety of Oromo scholars; such discursive features are prevalent. Which, in turn shows, that these three concepts in relation to Oromo identity across the Oromo elites are dominant. Hence we can say they are partially fixed. However, when it comes to the next two discursive constructions: the discourse of colonized Oromo and the discourse of marginalized Oromo; they are in a fierce competition amongst the Oromo elites to dominate the discursive field with their

24 The highest military title

25 Ras Gobena is a Tulama Oromo member of Abichu family. By that time only 2 individuals had appointed with the title ‘Ras’ [Gobena and Darge].
respective narratives and representation of Oromo. On the pages to come I will discuss them in detail.

5.1.4. The discourse of ‘colonized Oromo’

Apart from little historical and contextual modifications this discourse of colonized Oromo has a fascinating similarity with the EPLF discourse of the ‘colonized Eritrea’ and the very initial discourse of TPLF oppressed ‘Tigray narratives’. Hence those, who are familiar with one of those discourses of EPLF or TPLF can easily grasp the main tenets and departure points of this colonized Oromo discourse too.

When it comes to the discourse of colonized Oromo and the discourse of marginalized Oromo, both discourses agreed up on and draws on, on the previous three [indigenous Oromo; democratic Oromo and the settler] discursive features and their representation. However, they diverge as to how they can depict this historic ‘reality’; whether it is colonization or marginalization is a point of conflict.

The other point worth a note here is the fact that within these discursive constructions of colonized Oromo, we can find other subcategories, with small variation of discourse like dependent colonialism (Hassen, 2011) domestic colonialism (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008) internal colonialism (Gudina, 2008) colonialism (Lata, 2004) (Jalata, 2005) with their own perspective of the concept colonialism and narration of Ethiopian history.

Meanwhile delimitation of discourse is an analytical practice that should be done on a logical base (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 148) and the analytical line between the concept of Marginalization and colonization is so thin. In this part the discourses have been delimited as ‘colonized’ and ‘marginalized’ based on the facts and the existence of the term ‘colonized’ and ‘marginalized’ on their texts. Additionally, their ideological underpinning is also considered. Which is secession for the discourse of colonized Oromo while Self-rule for Marginalized Oromo discourse.

If this is being so, there are different definition of what colonialism is. Most of the aforementioned variants of the discourses does not define the term, rather they resort to explain the manifestations. However, I have got two definitions across our empirical materials. The first definition I got is Mohammed Hassens’ that he directly quoted from Bonnie Holcomb and Sisai Ibssa’s seminal work *The invention of Ethiopia: The making of a dependent colonial state in north east Africa*. But due to its length the author decided to adopt the paraphrased version of his text, Mohammed writes

*[in the] quotation three elements are rightly stressed. These are, first, conquest by force second, exploitation of the economic resources of the conquered society by the conquerors; and third; the imposition of alien rule on the conquered society. (Hassen, 1999, p. 114)*

The second definition I have got is from Ezekiel article which is incomplete and fairly similar with the one I have just discussed. Ezekiel defines colonialism as;
A form of domination characterized by the control by individual or a group; a form of exploitation which hinders and distorts the advancement of indigenous people; and a process of cultural change among the colonized that would ensure the hegemony of the colonizer (Gebissa, 2001, p. 04).

Besides this vague and broad definitions of colonialism, there are also another manifestation illustrated.

This manifestations of Abyssinian colonization have been presented in to two different approach. The first approach asserts its claim of colonialism by conducting a comparative analysis. Mainly focused on two cases: first the Egyptian occupation of Harerger [eastern Ethiopia] 1875-1885 and second the case of Sudan.

Ezekiel Gebissa made the comparative analysis on Sudan and Britain versus Ethiopian south and Abyssinia. When he illustrates the purpose of his article, he said,

*My goal is to show that the relationship that developed between the Abyssinians and the conquered southerners [including Oromia] was similar to the one that developed between the British and the Sudan* (Gebissa, 2001, p. 04) bracket added

After he go through a historical analysis, especially in the economic and political aspect he concluded that;

*The Sudanese and the southerners in Ethiopia has shown the existence of some parallels [ ] The Ethiopians [it refers to Abyssinians] were primarily motivated in launching the conquest by the devastated economic base and the need for financial resource to run their own state* (Gebissa, 2001, p. 24)

When it comes to the second approach, which is comparing Abyssinian and Egyptian conquest of Harerger [1878-1885] Mohammed concluded that the Egyptian colonization were the better and inflicted less damage than what the Abyssinians has done. In his words ‘Egyptian presence versus Abyssinian in Harerger highlights the lessor destruction of the Egyptian colonizers over the Abyssinians’ (Hassen , 2011, p. 135).

Comparing Abyssinians with other colonialists on the formation of towns Assefa states.

*just as European colonialists founded cities that reflected their power structure and protected their interest in their colonies, the Ethiopian colonialists created or developed urban centers* (Jalata, 2010, p. 50).

The other ways of manifestation of Abyssinian colonialization is analyzed through the socio economic and political condition of the Oromo people. We can find lots of illustrations in the OSA publications. However, to be explicit the author will just point out some of the telling and poignant illustrations. To begin from Mohammed;

*Ethiopia [Abyssinians] treated the Oromo as less than a human, hassled like a dog that has trespassed in to the church* (Hassen , 2011, p. 137).

Assefa Jalata from the perspective of Oromo versus settlers across Oromia
The Abyssinian colonial settlers created two worlds of those who have socially, politically, economically and culturally dominated Oromia cities and towns and the world of the people who lost their country (Jalata, 2010, p. 60).

From economic perspective, the very driving factor for Menilik conquest of the 19th century is depicted as economic rather than a sheer ambition of empire building as it is narrated by the Ethiopian-ist discourse. This economic narration of colonialism has also two facies: Macro and micro level analysis. Accordingly, at macro level, the Menilik expansion gave for the Abyssinians a chance to control the international trade route, slave and firearms trade in the region that increased the wealth and might of Menilik.

At micro level analysis, the land tenure system: the gebbar\textsuperscript{26}, that denied ownership of land for the peasant can be taken as a manifestation of colonialism (Gebissa, 2001, p. 17) (Hassen, 2011, p. 135) (Hassen, 1999, p. 114) (Jalata, 2010, p. 56) to conclude in the words of Mohammed ‘in Oromia Ethiopian colonialism was built on twin pillar of the gebbar system and slavery’ (Hassen, 1999, p. 114).

Lastly in its cultural aspect, the brute war; the expedition that Menilik conducted to the south had broken the traditional and social fabric. Institutions that had existed like the Gada across Oromia had also been affected. The ban that imposed on pilgrimages and ritual ceremonies like Aba Muda weaken and prevent the people to discuss their own matters (Hassen, 2011, p. 139).

The name change of places across Oromia, from Haremaya to Alemaya; Adama to Nazret; Bishoftu to Debrezeyet etc. and the imposition of Abyssinian culture on the Oromo society vis-à-vis Christianization through Ethiopian Orthodox church is yet another manifestations of Abyssinian colonization (Gebissa, 2001) (Jalata, 2010) (Hassen, 2011) (Hassen, 1999).

Before the conclusion, across the OSA publications; this discourse of colonized Oromo is dominant. Most of the articles written across our empirical material, try to frame their issues within the discourse of colonized Oromo. Starting from HIV/AIDS across Oromia which seems peripheral to the issue of ethnic identity to matters that has a direct link with ethnic identity like the language policy of Ethiopia somewhere in the articles the discourse of colonized Oromo will be detected.

However, to this dominant discourse of colonized Oromo across our empirical material, we detect another competing discourse which is ‘marginalized Oromo’.

5.1.5. The discourse of ‘Marginalized Oromo’


\textsuperscript{26} Amharic term for serfdom
Even though this two articles shared the basic assumptions [the first three discourses of this part] they mainly depart on the role and extent as to the Oromo had played on the construction of the empire, as Merera Puts it

‘during the Abyssinians expansion in the second half of the 19th c the Oromo elites stood on both sides of the fence as conquerors and the conquered’ (Gudina, 2008, p. 116) [Gudina 2008: p-116]

Macro and Gemetchu illustrates this role of the Oromo; based on the interview they conducted across the towns of Oromia and they found:

What is evident in this narratives [interviews they conducted] is that the Oromo were deeply involved in the administration structure (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008, p. 94)

According to this discourse of marginalized Oromo the interaction of the people between Abyssinians and Oromos is not drawn clearly as it is drawn in the discourse of colonized Oromo. In the words of Marco and Gemetchu

‘the preliminary analysis of our survey show that the members of all ethnic groups participate in Ethiopian culture, though with different level of involvement’ (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008, p. 102)

Once again, contrary to the discourse of colonized Oromo which portray Oromo as a destitute and people who alienated from the national economy which is controlled by Abyssinians. In the marginalized discourse you will find assertions like

successful Oromo town dwellers participate in a national economy as any other Ethiopian [] most successful town dwellers came from distant Oromo areas. (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008, p. 102).

Generally, the epitome of this two articles, are to show that the Oromos has not been totally subjects there are Oromos who participated in the building and administration of the empire. Not to conclude that the suffering and the injustice had never inflicted on the people, rather to show the complexity of the situation and to ascertain that the people of Oromo indeed marginalized but not colonized. To this end in the texts, they propose self-rule as a solution for the current predicament of the people of Oromo.

To sum up the first part of the analysis, according to our empirical material that we have selected to analyze how the Oromo ethnic identity have been discursively constructed [1993-2012] by the Oromo elites; OSA as a place of departure, it is identified that the discourse of indigenous Oromo; the discourse of Gada: democratic Oromo; the discourse of the settler ‘neftgna’; the discourse of colonized Oromo and the discourse of marginalized Oromo, are ubiquitous.

If this is being so, the second stage will be analyzed using the Anabela Carvahlo framework of media text analysis that I have discussed it in chapter three. The ten international media texts that are done on the Oromo protest [November 2015-March 2016] are analyzed to evaluate to what extent the aforementioned five discourses of the Oromo elites have consequently been repeated by the international media texts.
5.2. Analysis of the media text on Oromo protest

In this second stage, the empirical material on the media text are analyzed to answer the question: to what extent does the discursive construction of the Oromo identity by the Oromo elites have consequently been repeated in the media texts while they cover the Oromo protest? To this end the six stages of Carvahlo framework are operational.

5.2.1. Surface description of the media texts

The sequence of the articles illustrated here in under are random.


4- ‘Oromo Nationalism on the rise in Ethiopia: Protest and online activism in recent months have brought a resurgence of ethnic Oromo nationalists in Ethiopia.’ Written by William Davison. Posted on August 01, 2014. Aljazeera (Davison, 2014).

5- ‘Oromo protest: Why Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group is demonstrating.’ Written by Conor Gaffey. Posted on 26 February 2016. Newsweek (Gaffey, 2016).


These reports and opinions over the Oromo protest are mainly performed by non-Ethiopians, except the two: Mohammed Ademo of Aljazeera and Henock Gebissa on AllAfrica. Both writers are ethnic Oromos reside in diaspora.

The Other general point is two of the articles are written in anonymous. The one which is found in AllAfrica, should be connected with security since the article is adopted from Addis Standard, Addis Ababa based local magazine it is a high probability that the author too resides in Ethiopia which is the 4th most censored nation in the world. In Ethiopia, being critical on the government will lead to terrorism charge.
Out of the eight writers who put their names on, only two of them William Davison\textsuperscript{27} of Aljazeera and Jacey Fortin\textsuperscript{28} of The New York Times, based in Ethiopia. The other six writers reside abroad. Even though, it is impossible to approach social reality, like the Oromo protest, from totally a neutral position, however, writing a story based on a short personal experience can lead to be dependent in and biased by the existing literatures on that social terrain, without examining the peculiarity of this new context. That may be one of the reasons why the authors of these media productions [since most of them resides abroad] have given much emphasis to the ethnic perspective, though the Oromo Protest were mainly about land grab. One can observe this over emphasis of the identity issues, simply from their title ‘the worst ethnic violence in years’ of Washington Post; ‘what do Oromo protest mean to Ethiopian Unity’ of BBC and ‘Ethiopia’s Oromo people demand equal rights in protest’ of Aljazeera can be a good example.

Out of the ten articles from our data only two The New York Times, Jacey and Mohammed Ademo of Aljazeera prefer to use a title connecting the Master plan with the Oromo while the rest construct their title as if it is Oromo versus Ethiopia identity issue.

5.2.2. Objects

As it is a media coverage and opinion on the Oromo protest the main subjects constituted on the texts are primarily the protest itself; the rallying cause; the ‘Master plan’; the fatalities; the government response and the social, political and economic marginalization directed against the Oromo people. The implicit object that constructed on the texts is the marginalizes: Amhara, which is a bit twist from the OSA publications, since in the OSA publication the term ‘Abyssinians’ was employed to represent both Tigray and Amhara but in the media texts this tend to be given to Amhara only. This is especially apparent on IBT’s text of Ludovica that she states ‘perceived marginalization by the government and to fight the hegemony of Amhara’. In addition, Henock Gebissa in AllAfrica text while he was narrating the genealogy of Addis Ababa, he states

\textit{Emperor Menilik start confiscating the land that belong to the \textbf{indigenous} Oromo community and distribute a huge chunk of it to his dignitaries [] the ruling elite [Amhara] start inviting co-elite.}

However, we also found a notable exception from John Markakis on his reflection to Aljazeera’s Mohammed Ademo, made a clear distinction between Amhara and Tigray as a people and their ruling class, he said

\textit{since moving in to Ethiopian highlands in the 1600’s, the Oromos have been discriminated against by the \textbf{ruling Tigray and Amhara class} who often saw them as uncivilized}

\textsuperscript{27} https://twitter.com/wdavison10
\textsuperscript{28} https://twitter.com/JaceyFortin
5.2.3. Social actor

The main actors that are detected in our data are Oromo, Amhara, the ruling class: EPRDF, media companies, experts, journalists, academics, opposition political groups, participants of the protest as an interviewee.

In all most all texts, the protest is mainly constructed as a protest against the land grab. A land grab that the federal government of Ethiopia unconstitutionally and without proper consultation of the people concerned try to implement what ‘it’ termed as a master plan. This triggered a public protest, when the peaceful protesters mate with violence it escalates and resort to even deep seated historical grievances. Albeit, the government at both level; the regional as well as on the federal announced that the plan is scrapped, the protest continued.

The ethnic Oromo identity across the international media texts are constructed and represented as marginalized. To Exemplify from the data:

- Oromo activists complain political and socioeconomic marginalization that stretches back generations. The New York Time.
- A marginalized community; Charles Stratford, Aljazeera.
- Since moving to Ethiopian highland in 1600’s Oromos have been discriminated. William Davison. Aljazeera.
- [the Oromos] Suffered systematic discrimination and oppression. Conor Gaffey bracket is added. Newsweek.
- Over the last quarter of a century, the Oromo people have been ruthlessly targeted for their identity. AllAfrica

The Amhara is sometimes openly and often implicitly constructed as a dominant group who evict the indigenous Oromo; construct the empire and establish a social, political and economic hegemony. The Washington post states; ‘Addis was established 150 years ago by the Ethiopia’s dominant Amhara people;’ the International Business Times states ‘fight the hegemony of the Amhara people.

The other interesting point that worth a mention here is the way how the journalists intervened in the discursive construction. True that these articles of the international media, from the outset in its own right, are interventions by the authors. However, these interventions which will be illustrated here in under shows the extent and influence of the discretionary power the authors had when they write these pieces and reconstruct the social actor’s identity thereof.

These interventions are observed on two levels: first, on the selection of the perspective as to how to narrate the story and build the Oromo identity with in it from the available discourses. Here, the term ‘available discourse’ is employed to show that, the authors of the text in discourse are positioned/interpelled and the structure is partially fixed. The second intervention is demonstrated on the selection of the persons as an authority; be it an interviewee, expert, politician, activist, journalist etc.

In the selection of a perspective by the authors; a presence of terms like marginalized, discriminated, targeted for their identity are pervasively detected across all the articles. Such presence shows the writers of the media texts were drawn on the discourse of marginalized Oromo. Therefore, this study is concluded that, these international media texts are
reconstructing the aforementioned discourse of ‘marginalized Oromo’ by the Oromo elites across OSA publications.

The other intervention is observed, in the selection of authorities. Throughout our data the writers have selected ten different individuals as an expert in different forms, which some of them are presented in more than one articles. To mention:

1- Merera Gudina, [The Washington post, New York Times, Aljazeera (Charles S.)]
2- Jawar Mohammed [Aljazeera (William D), BBC]
3- Etana Habte [Newsweek, IBT]
4- Daniel Berhane [BBC]
5- Michael Woldemariam [Aljazeera: William D.]
6- Hussen Hassen [Aljazeera: Mohammed A.]
7- Bonnie Holcomb [Aljazeera: Mohammed A.]
8- Felix Horne [Aljazeera: Mohammed A.]
9- Hallelujah Lulie [The New York Times]

From this list, except the Addis Ababa university professor who demand to be anonymous in New York Times [which we cannot know who he is] and Michael Woldemariam, the rest of individuals are known for their ethno nationalist position in Ethiopian politics. Had the authors relied on other experts’ opinion with a different perspective, may be far right Ethiopian-ists or secessionists for example, the result would have been very different. And it is not a coincidence that the name of Merera Gudina\(^{29}\) is detected in three publications; and at the same time, in the first part of the analysis, across the OSA publications, we found his article amongst the ‘Marginalized Oromo’ discourse advocates.

However, in general, at this stage, it is preemptive to say the writers of the texts are influenced by the experts they have chosen, neither the writers choose the experts only to justify their ground. It remains unknown until the investigation has conducted as to the procedure how the articles were produced, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

5.2.4. Language Use

In our data from the outset the Oromo identity, in the international media texts, is constructed as the nation largest group, marginalized ever since its incorporation. Keep this in mind, in this part the choice of language use will be discussed. Language use can be wordings, quoting credible sources and under and over stated facts.

Even though the protest is primarily and basically about the master plan; a protest against a land grab; as it is discussed before, the titles of the texts in our data [except New York Times and Aljazeera: Mohammed A.] emphasized on the identity dimension of the issue.

The other observation made in this study is that the authors of the texts interviewed experts as an authorities and ordinary people as a witness. The striking difference detected between these two categories is that, while all the witness narrates about excessive use of securities,

\(^{29}\)Ph.D. holder. Late Addis Ababa University professor of political Science, chairman OFC Political party
corruption, land grab and maladministration; the experts, to the contrary, talk about the historic grievance, marginalization and other historic injustices. For example, to start from the witnesses,

*The request of the Oromo people is this: do not expand Addis Ababa in to Oromia. said the Burayu*\(^{30}\) *resident The New York Times*

*People are protesting because they are dissatisfied with the government. When we give them demands, they don’t respond. said Tarecha Guttama. The Washington post*

*Protesters say the central government is trying to evict Oromo farmers from their land under the auspices of urban development. Aljazeera, Mohammed A.*

Literally, in none of the cases, the ordinary people cited by the writers, has spoken about ethnic identity issue. To the contrary except Hallelujah Lulie who talks about federalism; the Addis Ababa university anonymous and the unidentified security analyst; the rest experts put identity as the main theme or at least a spring board in their analysis. To give an example,

*Members of the community [Oromo] feels marginalized. Bracket is added. Merera Gudina, Aljazeera: Charles S.*

*Stemmed from the discontent among people [Oromo] over a perceived marginalization. Bracket is added. Etana Habte, IBT.*

*There is a strong sense of victimhood [among the Oromo] extending back 150 years. Bracket is added. Daniel Berhane, BBC.*

Yet it should be noted that, since I have not seen the whole original data that the writers collected and relied on; it might be the case that the authors choose to relay on, on ordinary individuals’ testimony to demonstrate the facts about the protest and leave the genealogy of the protest to the experts. But the consistent pattern observed makes it worth of mentioning here.

The last point in this part is about over and understated facts across the international media texts over Oromo protest. To begin from over stated facets, the dominant Amhara discourse which we have detected [see page 39] is an over statement. After all Amhara’s existence as an ethnic group is debatable. There are peoples like Professor Mesfin Woldemariam and Professor Getachew Haile who persistently argued for its non-existence \(^{31}\). To their support, the people now we call Amhara had never lived together as a group before 1991. There is no genealogical, mythological and psychological commonness across that group except the language ‘Amharic’. The people used to live as Shewa, Gonder, Wollo and Gojjam and even, often fought each other. However, even though we accept the existence of Amhara as a group, its dominance has ceased to exist when King Haile Selassie [Shewa Amhara] overthrown by the revolution 1974, or for most when TPLF came to power in 1991. Yet, often people made a mistake by equating the language with a people, as if every Amharic speaker is an Amhara. Which is misleading. In Ethiopia due to its historic legacy Amharic is like a perfect parallel of English. Anyone who spoke English is not British same is true for Amharic.

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\(^{30}\) A town near to Addis Ababa

\(^{31}\)https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jkh6jg0ree4
To demystify further this Amhara domination; from the major ethnic groups that had existed, the only ethnic group that have not had a representative in 1992 transitional government of Ethiopia were Amhara. Arguably the architect of this ethnic based federalism: Late Prime minister Meles Zenawi, in his recorded interview with Paul B. Henze\textsuperscript{32} in April 3-5 1990 just a year before he assumed power said

*the Amhara are oppressed people. When we talk about the Amhara domination we mean the Amhara of Shewa and the habit of Shewan supremacy that established in Addis Ababa [ ] this system has to change* (EthioObserver, 2011).

Here he was implicating two things first he differentiates the ruling class and the people of Amhara in a phrase ‘established in Addis Ababa’; second, though one might sniff the political power play behind, he condensed the domination from Amhara to Shewa after he categorize all the Amharas as an oppressed.

Thus talking about ‘Amhara domination’ after 25 repressive years today is at least an over statement.

The other overstated point is a marginalized, discriminated, specifically targeted Oromo discourse. A contrary reading of this assertion paint a misleading image about Ethiopia which perceived as specifically targeted only Oromos for their identity. It embeds an assumption of the existence of a modest form of democratic government or the existence of a privileged ethnic group like the myths of dominant Amhara until 1991 and the myth of Tigray domination [as a people] since then. Which melodramatically understate the participation of ‘significant others’ in the administration.

Ethiopia in modern sense of the concept ‘nation’ is and has never been democratic, by long shot. Currently the 4\textsuperscript{th} most censored nation (CPJ, n.d.). the current party EPRDF won 100% of the Federal parliament seats\textsuperscript{33}, stays in power since 1995 and according to 2016 freedom house report Ethiopia have got, in freedom rating 6.5, civil liberties 6 and political rights 7 in a 1 best 7 worst scale (Freedom House, 2016) which is way below the Sub Sahara and even East Africa average, says it all that all the people are marginalized for that matter.

What I want to make out of this is then, true that the Oromos are marginalized but so does the rest of Ethiopians. If we have to stratified the level of marginalization; then, due to the fact that Amharic is serving as a working language of the federal government\textsuperscript{34} the people who spoke it maintain an advantage over the others, including Oromos. Thus we can say under being marginalized, those who spoke Amharic are unwittingly favored. In terms of representation within the repressive ruling class, ethnic Oromos are/were represented on the regimes next to Tigray and Amhara. I can name more 2/3 of ethnic groups found in Ethiopia but have never represented in that ruling class until 1991, then we can say in relation to those ethnic groups Oromos were treated better/ less marginalized.

The last overstated point I detected is the role of Amharic language itself hitherto exclusion of Oromo language. The Ethiopian bureaucracy: administrative structure; establishment of public

\textsuperscript{32} The CIA and National Security specialist of USA by then. And serve as a negotiator between Derg EPLF, TPLF and OLF
\textsuperscript{33} https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_WK5KhBbQkU
\textsuperscript{34} FDRE constitution article 5[2]
amenities are recent developments in the beginning of the second half of 20th c. schooling is started after the Italy occupation, the first university Haile Selassie university established in 1950, the medium of instruction after elementary school [grade 1-6] were English not Amharic\textsuperscript{35}. Hence the likes of assertion of the Newsweek ‘Oromo language was sidelined and not thought in schools for much of the 20th c’ is an over statement, since schooling is started in the second half of 20th c

When we come to understated points, it is identified that the contribution of Oromos in the construction of the Ethiopian empire in the late 19th c up to now is understated. Though the contribution of Amhara in the construction of modern Ethiopia is huge, presenting Oromos as a subject only with no visible participation [often detected implicitly from the texts] is understatement.

In the late 19thc; probably and arguably better than the Tigray, the participation Oromo, especially the Shewa [Tulama Oromo] and Wollo [Yeju Oromo] (Tolessa, 1992), that were assimilated by Menilik (Gudina, 2008, p. 117) had significant influence. The second most important person next to Menilik the king were Ras Gobena from Shewa Tulama Oromo Abichu family (Bassi & Megerssa, 2008, p. 90), who was in charge of the expedition to the south. Here in under I will illustrate some other examples of noble men with Oromo descent.

Ras Gugssa’s grandson [Merso and Betul] were the father of Impress Tayitu, the wife of the King, she herself were a dominant figure on the administration as well as the battle of Adwa. (Tolessa, 1992)\textsuperscript{36}


King Lij Iyasu, who under the will of Menilik become a king in Ethiopian between 1913-1916 [from his 4 grandparents 3 of them were Oromo and one Amhara]. He was the son of King Mikael and Shewarega (Tolessa, 1992).

Dejazmach\textsuperscript{36} Wold-Mikael Gugssa (Tolessa, 1992)\textsuperscript{36}.

Fitawrari\textsuperscript{37} Habte Giorgis Dinegde: Commander in chief in 1890 and one of the architects of Adwa victory (Tolessa, 1992)\textsuperscript{36}.

Dejazmach Balcha Aba Nefsso, (Tolessa, 1992) etc.

Thus the claim of William Davison [Aljazeera] ‘the Oromo have been discriminated against by ruling Tigray and Amhara classes who often saw them as Uncivilized’ or the Washington post assertion that Oromos were ‘treated like second class’ understate the Oromo participation on the construction of the empire hitherto overstate the marginalization.

\textsuperscript{35} [though teaching children at their formative age in an alien language has a multi-dimensional negative effect]

\textsuperscript{36} A high Military title. A grandfather of King Haile Selassie

\textsuperscript{37} Military title
5.2.5. Framing

Framing as it is described in the analytical framework is an art of constructing a discourse in certain perspective (Carvalho, 2000, p. 23) leaving out other possible ways. Then, even though most of the arguments raised in the previous titles [social actor and language use] can be taken as part of framing, for the purpose of avoiding redundancy, I will restrict myself to the arguments not dealt with earlier. Accordingly, here in under some examples are given;

‘the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia moved its capital to Oromia land and in 1886 founded what is today Addis Ababa’ IBT

‘Addis Ababa was established 150 years ago by Ethiopians dominant Amhara people in the heart of Oromo territory’ The Washington post

This representation of the geographic Addis Ababa as a heart land of Oromia is misleading and leave out other possible angles. It is a result of an impression deducted from the observation of the current delimited internal ethnic based boundaries as given. In fact, these boundaries [see figure 1] are delimited 25 years ago by a consensus between OLF and EPRDF. If we see the internal boundary map that had been existed before1991 [see figure 2 below] we will have a very different perception, and also narration, about Addis Ababa.

Figure 1 the current Ethiopian map

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38 http://www.ethiopiantreasures.co.uk/pages/geography.htm
If this is being so the previous quoted assertions of IBT and The Washington post, in addition to taking the present internal boundary as given and natural it also gives an impression that the Amhara came over the alien land to the heart of Oromia and establish its capital there. While there is another perspective that Shewa is and had been, ever since the Oromo expansion of the 16th c to the Abyssinian proper, is a place for both Oromo and Amhara in fusion. That is why, currently one can find the name ‘Shewa’ for both sides: North Shewa of Oromo region and North Shewa of Amhara region with substantial number of the ‘others’ [Oromos in the Amhara N. Shewa; Amharas in Oromo N. Shewa]. In the 1994 population census (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Office of Population and Housing Census Commission , Central Statistical Authority., 1996), out of 1.1 million residents of Oromo North Shewa 20% of them were Amhara. Which show the fusion of the people even in the current Oromia region let alone in Addis Ababa.

The other sign is when Addis Ababa was established in 1886, impress Tayitu moved the capital from Ento’to to Fil Weha. Currently both Ento’to and Fil Weha are Parts of Addis Ababa, with a wild guess, 15 to 20 K.M distance between them; the Amhara were in Ento’to while the Oromos live in Fil Weha. However, this is not to deny the presence and numeric superiority of the Oromo in the area, rather to show the fusion of the people in Shewa, which Addis Ababa

39 http://www.haileselassie.net/maps-of-ethiopia-across-time/
is at its center, hitherto to demonstrate the exclusionary nature of framing by the international media. Which [being exclusionary] is an inherent nature of any discursive practice though.

5.2.6. Ideological underpinning

The discursive constructions that our data, on the international media coverage over the Oromo protest, held are mainly draws on, reconstructed and also shaped by the wider phenomena of federalism and ethnic politics in Ethiopia.

The way they [writers of the text] present reality; how the Abyssinian and Oromo relationships and history are portrayed; the authorities selected as an expert with a known ethno national standing; perception of the geographic Oromia as given ‘expand the boundaries of Addis Ababa [f] in to Oromia’ (Stratford, 2016); understate the fusion of the people of Oromo and Amhara in Shewa, and impliedly, the solution they proposed, are mainly arise from the fact that they evaluate history, sociological, anthropological, economic and political relationships of the Ethiopian people through ethnic lens. Hence to fit in all the social realities in that narrow lens, they are obliged to exclude significant facts. Which is exactly the test of Federalism in today’s Ethiopia. Therefore, the facts they exclude and the perspectives they have chosen to present their discourse is deeply embedded in their ideological underpinning; that is federalism. This is even reflected in Hallelujah Lulie’s excerpt for The New York Times, when he said,

\[\text{Beyond the issue of the master plan, the protests are caused by broader issues, including the proper implementation of Federalism}\]

So he is proposing a proper implementation of federalism as a panacea, by quoting Hallelujah, the author [Fortin] too is impliedly agreed with it. Newsweek also states ‘Oromos understand Oromia as their own territory, where they have an absolute and constitutional right of self-rule’ we can find the likes of assertions across all the 10 international media texts of our data. Which demonstrate the ideological underpinning of the writers.

To sum up this rather significant chapter of the study: in this analysis, in the first part, across the OSA publications, five major discourses have been identified amongst the Oromo elites as to how they construct the Oromo identity within the Ethiopian framework. These are: the discourses of ‘indigenous Oromo’; Gada ‘democratic Oromo’; the settler ’neftgna’; colonized Oromo and finally Marginalized Oromo. To check which features of the discursive constructions of the elites’; letter manifested across the international media reports over the Oromo Protest, we have analyzed ten international media texts. Accordingly using Anabella Carvalho analytical framework we have detected that, the discourse of Marginalized Oromo has an omnipresence. The inter-ethnic Oromo/Amhara relationship is significantly understated; historical and political contribution of the Oromo to build the empire: Ethiopia, was also understated and finally the discursive intervention, framing and narration of the authors of the media texts were ideologically embedded on Federalism.
Chapter six: Conclusion

As it is pointed out, right from the beginning, the main purpose of this academic text is to investigate how the Oromo identity in Ethiopia has been discursively constructed by the Oromo elites for the past quarter a century, using OSA publications [1993-2012] as a point of departure and to what extent does these discursive constructions are letter reflected in the international media texts take on the Oromo protest. To this end, discourse analysis theory has employed as a conceptual tool and methodological guideline.

Accordingly, across the OSA publication five major discursive features are detected. These are: the discourse of indigenous Oromo, the discourse of Gada: democratic Oromo, the discourse of the settler ‘neftgna’, the discourse of colonized Oromo and the discourse of marginalized Oromo. Out of these discursive constructions, the first three discourses are ubiquitously identified throughout our empirical data. Which shows the Oromo elites have a common consensus on the facts that; Oromo is an indigenous people of the land who had been living a democratic, egalitarian life under an African democracy called Gada until the late 19th of Meniliks conquest. After the conquest what follows is an establishment of a garrison towns with privileged settlers, having different culture than the indigenous. These settlers also had a mission to keep the system intact.

The main discursive competition, amongst the Oromo elites in our data, has observed on as to how to articulate and represent this late 19th c Meniliks conquest of Oromia. Most of the elites construct their discourse on colonialism, with their own variants in between them. They support their argument by presenting different economic, political and cultural subjection that the people of Oromo had suffered and being suffering since the 19th c. They also narrate using a comparative analysis of the people Oromo and other colonized people like the Sudanese and the Harari experience of Egyptian occupation 1875-1885. In this discourse the line between the Oromo people and the Abyssinians are clearly delimited as being colonized and the colonizer respectively. Thus all political, economic and historical relationships of the people with in the current Ethiopian boundary is analyzed and narrated accordingly. To this predicament succession is often presented as a solution.

The alternative discourse which challenge the aforementioned dominant discourse is the discourse of marginalized Oromo. These discourse, though, it shares the basic assumptions of the previous; it mainly departs on the watertight classification colonizer Abyssinians and the colonized Oromo. It recognized the role of Oromo in the building of the empire in the late 19thc, not as a colonized only but as a colonizer too. However, it accepts the hegemon and dominance of Abyssinians in the system. Hence, it resorts to characterize the situation of the Oromo people ever since the Menilik conquest as marginalization and propose self-rule, as a solution.

If this is how the Oromo identity have been constructed for the last quarter a century, then, to address the second question which is to what extent do these discursive constructions have letter on, on the international media coverage of the Oromo protest been exhibited? we investigate ten international media texts. These ten international media texts are: three from Aljazeera, two from All Africa and one, one from The Washington post, The New York Times, BBC, IBT-International Business Times. These media reports were analyzed using Anabella Carvalho discourse analysis framework for media texts. Accordingly, the media
texts over Oromo protest have been analyzed in six stage. Accordingly, we identified that, even though, the protest has been, primarily, about the issue of land grab; extending the capital Addis Ababa city boundary to the neighboring Oromia region, which would evict substantial number of farmers, most of the media products frame their narration from the ethnic identity perspective.

The media articles portrayed Oromo as the nation’s largest ethnic group, who are indigenous and marginalized ever since their incorporation to the Ethiopian empire, by the dominant Amhara group. The current master plan issue is just, yet, another manifestation of the century long subjugation of the people of Oromo. By so doing, the writers of the international media texts were rearticulating the discourse of marginalized Oromo which was a minority voice across the Oromo elites.

In this dominant discourse of marginalized Oromo in the international media texts however, some social relationships were overstated. The role of Amharic language in the Ethiopian empire, the notion of discriminated Oromo and the domination of Amhara is the major points. Nonetheless, this should not be taken as an absolute denial of the facts that Oromo has never been discriminated, Amhara was not dominant and Amharic language has never been instrumental for subjugating the people in the south, rather concerning those issues, the texts throughout the international media presented some overstated facts. When it comes to understated facts, the role of Oromo in building the Ethiopian empire in the late 19th c has been understated.

At last, when we investigate the ideological underpinning of these discourses, it is discovered that, the discourses constructed by the international media texts over Oromo protest is contributed to and it is part of the wider social practice of the current Ethiopia, which is ethnic politics and Federalism. The facts overstated, understated, the experts quoted across the texts, the framing, the interventions of the authors and the perspectives that the writers of the media text have selected to articulate the Oromo protest is deeply embedded in the current ethnic politics of Ethiopia, which is part of the struggle to settle a federal form of government in a country were centralized form of government is entertaned for over a century.
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Appendixes

1- OSA Publications

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### Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANDM</td>
<td>Amhara National Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>Ethiopian Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>Eritrean Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPDM</td>
<td>Ethiopian people Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
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<td>FDRE</td>
<td>Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia</td>
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<td>International Business Times</td>
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<td>Kilo Mater</td>
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