Harnessing the Blue Helmet Enterprise: Brazil, MINUSTAH and the projection of a peacekeeping profile

Eric Cezne
International Relations
HARNESSING THE BLUE HELMET ENTERPRISE: BRAZIL, MINUSTAH AND THE PROJECTION OF A PEACEKEEPING PROFILE

By

Eric Cezne

Ås, 2016
The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.

The Noragric Master thesis are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the requirements under the Noragric Master programme “International Environmental Studies”, “International Development Studies” and “International Relations”.

The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.
Declaration

I, Eric Cezne, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature………………………………..

Date……………………………………….
I dedicate this thesis to all of those daring to take the wounds in transforming our world, fighting to avoid the catastrophic costs of conflict, and standing up to injustice and hatred wherever they exist.
Acknowledgements

No thesis is ever really the work of one person alone, and it is a pleasure to be able to thank those contributing to make this process easier and more enjoyable than it would otherwise have been.

At the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), I would like to thank my supervisor Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert for her invaluable guidance, kindness and clarifying advices. All the way from designing the research proposal to the write-up, her interest in the topic and assistance have positively contributed to the materialization of this thesis and for that I am extremely grateful. Thanks also to Wenche Hauge for sharing experiences and providing insight into Haiti, and to Kristin Sandvik for her encouragement and advice throughout the process. Big thumbs up for my colleagues at the Learners Loft for their continuous support and motivation during the challenging stage of writing-up.

This thesis has also benefited from other several fine contributions: John Karlsrud and Cedric De Coning at NUPI; Juliana Puig at UNESP; Daniel Guimarães, Thomaz Napoléão and Rafael Beleboni at Itamaraty; Eduarda Hamann at the Instituto Igarapé; Einar Braathen at NIBR; and my friend Vinícius Farah have all provided sound academic/practical advice and linked me to a wealth of sources on the topic. Moreover, the valuable and kind help of Lieutenant-General Santos Cruz, First-Lieutenant Henrique Garbino at CCOPAB and Gunhilde Utsogn at MINUSTAH has opened some important doors at field destinations and set the stage for the conduction of an interesting, safe and hassle-free fieldwork.

On the road, muito obrigado to my friend Ariane and her family for providing vital logistical support in Rio. In New York, particular thanks to Vicente and Freya for their assistance. In Port-au-Prince, special credits to Colonel Guerra and Captain Valdetaro for coordinating my arrival and ensuring things would run smoothly during my fieldwork with the Brazilian military, as they did. Also, my mesi anpil goes to Ingvill and Edwin Ceide for providing a home away from home during part of my stay in Port-au-Prince. Thanks also to Joseph Luckner, who has been a reliable driver and an excellent language assistant.

I also wish to extend my enormous gratitude to all of those who, despite their often busy schedules, took some time-off to participate in this study. Many have shared with me parts of their lives, provided interesting and insightful stories, and demonstrated genuine interest in the research project. This thesis wouldn’t have been possible without their kind participation and availability.

Institutionally, I would like to thank the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU) and the Department of International Environmental and Development Studies (Noragric) for supporting and encouraging students to face and confront field realities during their studies. I am also truly grateful to PRIO for allowing me to write this thesis at their premises and for exposing me to the stimulating environment of research.

Last but not least, my enormous gratitude goes to my family in Brazil and “second family” in Karmøy who, despite the distance, have always encouraged and supported me with my studies. To my friends and colleagues at Ås for their invaluable friendship and constant support. And to Katia, my nearest and dearest, for bearing with me and being a source of continuous inspiration during the ups and downs of this process.
Abstract

The present study looks at the Brazilian engagement at the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and seeks to bring insight into the growing participation of an emerging power in peacekeeping. To that end, both conceptual and practical implications of normative behavior in international relations are debated and peacekeeping is seen as a barometer to assess Brazil’s global posture. Accordingly, this thesis argues how the country has projected, through MINUSTAH, a distinguished and more proactive peacekeeping profile, and analyzes to which extent this profile has shaped, challenged or endorsed existing rules and practices. Exploring both how peacekeeping becomes discursively articulated by Brazil at the United Nations and what practical meanings it acquires on the ground in Haiti, it is demonstrated that the blue-helmet enterprise offers, at the same time, platforms for Brazil to demonstrate international commitment and capacity, as well as means for the country to become activist in themes it would otherwise have little influence on. The study draws upon social constructivist insights in International Relations, placing particular emphasis on the role of norms in multilateral processes, and argues that peacekeeping is constructed, shaped and re-shaped by normative underpinnings, shared principals and perceptions of appropriate behavior at the global stage. This thesis presents the results of fieldwork conducted in Rio de Janeiro, New York and Port-au-Prince in late 2015 and early 2016, and adopts a qualitative research design where primary empirical data is combined with secondary sources and theoretical insights. It concludes that Brazil’s peacekeeping profile, while not set in stone, reflects a balancing act where the country, ambitioning to strengthen its global standing, seeks to demonstrate its belonging and adaptation to the international environment within which it acts; but also to challenge and participate more vigorously in the normative casting of the still Western-dominated realms of peace and security governance. Through the illustrative case of the Brazilian peacekeeping engagement in Haiti, this thesis attempts to contribute to the yet limited academic debate on emerging powers’ posture in collective security and conflict resolution arrangements. The study can be of interest to scholars of international relations, peace operations and Brazilian foreign policy.
Contents

Declaration.................................................................................................................. vii
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... xi
Abstract......................................................................................................................... xiii
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... xvii
Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1- Methodology.................................................................................................. 9
  1. Philosophical Assumptions and Applying Qualitative Research.............................. 9
  2. Collecting, Managing and Analyzing data.................................................................... 11
     2.1 Data Collection ....................................................................................................... 11
     2.2 Data Management .................................................................................................. 17
     2.3 Data Analysis .......................................................................................................... 18
  3. Challenges and Limitations........................................................................................ 19
  4. Ethical Considerations................................................................................................ 21

Chapter 2- Background.................................................................................................. 23
  1. Reflecting upon UN Peacekeeping ............................................................................ 23
     1.1 Making Sense of Actors and Terms ........................................................................ 23
     1.2 Searching for a Definition ...................................................................................... 24
     1.3 Categorizing Peacekeeping ................................................................................... 25
     1.4 Reform and Changing trends in Peacekeeping ....................................................... 29
  2. Brazil’s Participation and Approaches to UN Peacekeeping ....................................... 33
     2.1 An Overview ............................................................................................................ 33
     2.2 Strategic, Operational and Tactical Approaches .................................................... 35
     2.3 Challenges .............................................................................................................. 37
  3. Making Sense of MINUSTAH as a Case Study .......................................................... 39
     3.1 Origins and Mandate ............................................................................................... 39
     3.2 Latin American Participation .................................................................................. 39
     3.3 Challenges and Achievements on the Ground ....................................................... 40
     3.4 Recent Years and Current Outlook ......................................................................... 43

Chapter 3- Conceptual Framework ............................................................................... 47
  1. Social Constructivism in International Relations ....................................................... 47
  2. Applying a Constructivist Approach ......................................................................... 48
  3. The Influence of Norms in International Relations ................................................... 50
4. The International Normative Context of Peacekeeping ................................................................. 54

5. Projecting a Peacekeeping Profile: Brazil as Norm-Entrepreneur and Norm-Follower .............. 55

Chapter 4- Findings & Discussion ................................................................................................................. 57

Part 1- Articulating a Peacekeeping Profile at the United Nations ....................................................... 58

1.1 Negotiating Peacekeeping ............................................................................................................. 59

1.2 Brazil’s Projection of Comparative Advantages in Peacekeeping .............................................. 61

1.3 Cross-cutting Aspects in Peacekeeping ....................................................................................... 74

1.4 Challenges and Limitations ......................................................................................................... 77

Part 2- Implementing a Peacekeeping Profile on the Ground in MINUSTAH ..................................... 80

2.1 Pre-deployment and Training ...................................................................................................... 81

2.2 Peacekeepers’ Identities and Motivations .................................................................................. 83

2.3 Operational Comparative Advantages of Brazilian Peacekeeping ........................................ 87

2.4 Challenges and Limitations ......................................................................................................... 95

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 101

References ............................................................................................................................................... 109

Appendices ............................................................................................................................................... 119

1. Informed Consent Form (Portuguese) ................................................................................................. 119

2. Informed Consent Form (English) ....................................................................................................... 120

3. Authorization Letter .......................................................................................................................... 121
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Agência Brasileira de Cooperação  (Brazilian Cooperation Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRABATT</td>
<td>Brazilian Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAENCOY</td>
<td>Brazilian Engineering Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-34</td>
<td>Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCOPAB</td>
<td>Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil  (Brazilian Peacekeeping Joint Center)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIOpPaz</td>
<td>Centro de Instrução de Operações de Paz  (Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Training Center)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVR</td>
<td>Community Violence Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G77</td>
<td>The Group of 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNP</td>
<td>Haitian National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti  (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDUC</td>
<td>Norwegian Defence University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUPI</td>
<td>Norwegian Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>The UN Security Council’s five permanent members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIO</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QIPs</td>
<td>Quick Impact Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RwP</td>
<td>Responsibility while Protecting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative to the Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIOGBIS</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPKOs</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

States in the Global South, despite contributing with personnel, have mainly held a marginal status in peacekeeping; when not targets themselves of interventions. However, although underlying conceptions and decision-making linked to the blue-helmet enterprise predominantly remain a great power privilege, the pendulum has swung in recent years. The complex demands and expectations facing peacekeeping with the end of bipolar hostilities and the upsurge of internal conflicts in the 1990s have progressively led to a more pronounced and assertive engagement of actors outside the West (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Under these circumstances, and reflecting the significant transformations in both the dynamics and power relations within the international system, countries like Brazil have increasingly taken on responsibilities and claimed more proactive roles in handling crises through United Nations (UN) missions (Tardy, 2012).

A founding member of the UN and having traditionally portrayed a diplomatic discourse of commitment to multilateralism, Brazil has contributed to peacekeeping operations since their outset in the 1950s with the deployment of troops to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai Peninsula (Uziel, 2015). Nonetheless, it was only in the late 1990s and especially in the 2000s that Brazil took on a more pronounced and steady peacekeeping interest. Accordingly, increased political interest, dedication of larger financial resources and, consequently, ambitions to translate economic sway into an increased global role have prompted the country to claim more assertive and proactive functions in the realm peace operations (Hirst, 2007). Hence, against the backdrop of an economic uptrend and aspiring foreign policy, Brazil saw in 2004 a window of opportunity in regional neighbor Haiti as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established. Ever since, Brazil has been in charge of MINUSTAH’s military component and contributed thus far with the largest number of troops throughout the mission’s existence (Kenkel, 2015). While MINUSTAH has not been Brazil’s sole recent effort in the blue-helmet enterprise, it has nevertheless been the country’s most prominent deployment in terms of personnel, duration and political priority (Uziel, 2015).

In a similar vein, the Brazilian participation and leadership in Haiti has also contributed to
underscore the growing engagement of so-called “rising powers” as key players in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) and the emergence of different profiles for dealing with instabilities and peace efforts.

Framing its approaches as alternatives to mainstream Western “liberal peace” processes, Brazil has sought to challenge conventional practices associated with conflict management and has shaped its models as easily adaptable and replicated to local realities of peacekeeping destinations (Mathur, 2013). Further, by attaching credibility and legitimacy to its own “developing nation” profile, peacekeeping à la brésilienne is deemed to reflect constructive approaches to multilateralism, autonomous and non-aligned stances in international politics and the interdependence between security and development (Amorim, 2007; Patriota, 2013; Uziel, 2015; Napoleão & Kalil, 2015). Accordingly, Brazil claims to find itself in a privileged position to build bridges and broker consensus in the fields of international peace and security. Moreover, ambitioning to coin its role as de facto stakeholder – rather than mere follower or observer – in the traditionally Western dominated and liberal oriented peace and security realms of global governance, peace operations have been perceived by Brazil as fundamental venues to project influence and, as a result, pursue greater international status (Tardy, 2012). Yet, on the other hand, the Brazilian involvement with global peace and security canons such as peacekeeping also seeks, in a somehow ambivalent fashion, to signal its endorsement and commitment to the basic principles governing an order that, although unequal vis-à-vis determinant powers, still favors actors with emerging profiles and middling assets in relation to their weaker counterparts (Kenkel, 2010).

Notwithstanding, although Brazil’s role in global economic, environmental and social governance processes has merited considerable focus from scholars, comparatively little attention has been given to the country’s participation in collective security and conflict resolution domains (Buxton, 2010). As suggested by Tardy (2012) and Kenkel and Cunliffe (2016), what posture actors like Brazil adopt, how they buy into the existing rules, and to which extent they shape procedures and challenge mainstream practices are yet to be more systematically investigated by researchers and can, in turn, bring insight into the broader trend of rising powers’ overall engagement with peace operations. Hence, despite increased attempts in academia to bring such issues into debate, the Brazilian engagement in harnessing and shaping
peacekeeping has thus been an underexplored research agenda and, given the dynamic and evolving nature behind such efforts, renewed research can complement existing analyses in light of recent developments and contribute to enrich knowledge on the topic.

Research Question

Through the illustrative example of Brazil, this thesis thus seeks to shed some light into a rising power’s increasing engagement with peacekeeping rationales and praxis. It takes Brazil’s landmark peacekeeping deployment in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to reflect upon how the country interacts with security governance norms and mechanisms, both in terms of subscribing to mainstream peacekeeping institutional forms and impacting established conceptions of conflict management. Hence, in order to delineate a clear research scope, this study is guided by the following research question:

- How has Brazil, through articulation at the United Nations and implementation on the ground in Haiti, projected its own peacekeeping profile?

Accordingly, the present work sets itself the task to outline and discuss, by looking at the United Nations and its MINUSTAH peacekeeping operation, Brazil’s projection of a peacekeeping profile. Based on the definition provided by the Oxford English Dictionary (2016), *profile* is understood here as a representation of a structured set of behavioral characteristics and preferences of someone or something. As a result, I will investigate the behavioral traits, particular characteristics and interests linked to the Brazilian participation in the blue-helmet enterprise. As this thesis examines the agential capacity of states – in this case Brazil – in reproducing and shaping peacekeeping’s rationale and practices within a wider normative global political framework, a predominantly state-oriented approach is adopted. Hence, *Brazil* is viewed through the agency of diplomatic and military actors, and these are contemplated as the main driving forces as they act on behalf of the state through multilateral organizational platforms and reflect Brazil’s official stance at the international stage with respect to peacekeeping and intervention norms. Further, taking into account the *articulation* and *implementation* dimensions of peacekeeping – exploring both how it is discursively constructed at the UN and what practical meanings it acquires in the field – enables the dissertation to offer a more comprehensive and holistic view of how such operations are understood and carried out by Brazil and Brazilians.
Further, I depart from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) definition of *peacekeeping* as a set of “operations comprising a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable peace” (p. 97) and underpinned by three core principles, sometimes referred as “Holy Trinity”: (i) consent; (ii) impartiality; and (iii) non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate (UN, 2008). While the conceptually contested nature of peacekeeping will be accounted for throughout this thesis, the need for a definition is nevertheless important to narrow down the field of study and provide the tools to argue meaningfully about it. In a similar vein, the above-mentioned conceptualization enables for the comprehension of peacekeeping as a multi-dimensional set of activities, which proves analytically useful for understanding modern-day operations.

**Relevance of Research Topics**

The United Nations (UN) has been, since its foundation at the end of World War II, the centerpiece of global governance. As argued by Karns and Mingst (2010), it is the only international organization “with global scope and nearly universal membership” (p. 95). Accordingly, the UN is one of the clearest expressions of multilateralism, serving as a platform for the creation of international law, norms and principles. As a result, the study of peacekeeping highlights the organization’s role in promoting multilateral solutions to violent upheavals. Similarly, it builds research relevance as states like Brazil, possessing middling assets, tend to value and capitalize on forms of UN multilateralism to demonstrate their capacity at the global stage and become activists in themes that they would otherwise have little influence on (Kenkel and Cunliffe, 2016).

The fact that the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) – established in 2004 and still ongoing at the time of writing – has always been led by a Brazilian Force Commander and represents thus far the country’s largest and longest peacekeeping commitment makes it a natural choice for this study. Further, through MINUSTAH, Brazil has become more visible both in the UN and in its own region, and has signaled ambitions to assert its regional leadership and project an increased international profile (Hirst, 2007). The relevance of investigating the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH is further reflected by the mission’s multidimensionality as peacekeeping goes beyond security functions and a diverse set of actors
becomes engaged in varied tasks and activities aimed at, for example, promoting capacity-building and institutional-strengthening. Also, as MINUSTAH has featured a strong Latin American involvement, it becomes pertinent to discuss aspects of regional involvement in peacekeeping and how this affects the way these operations are designed, managed and carried out. Furthermore, MINUSTAH’s initial security focus, underpinned by peace enforcement type of functions, later acquired a more humanitarian role in the wake of the 2010 Haitian earthquake and, as the mission supposedly draws to an end, concerns have shifted towards processes associated with institutional-strengthening and peacebuilding (Muggah, 2015). This reflects, drawing upon the various overlaps between the different stages of peace activities, the hybridity, adaptability and changing roles of peace operations. And finally, as MINUSTAH’s current phase is marked by a prospected withdrawal and a major peacekeeping review was conducted in 2015 – typified by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) –, this presents a timely opportunity to investigate how peacekeeping actors manage the uncertainties and challenges which comes with a mission’s consolidation while engaging with broader and evolving international normative environments.

Notwithstanding, as a result of the current aggravation of the political and economic landscape in Brazil, questions have been raised in relation to the country’s commitments abroad and ability to shape international outcomes. Recently dubbed as a “former star of the emerging world” by The Economist (2016), a period of significant growth and international projection has given way to a prospect of lost decade and international impotence as Brazil experiences considerable domestic turbulence. Nonetheless, I argue in this thesis that the current downtrend and instability, whether short-term or not, and while certainly affecting the sort of records that Brazil once ambitioned to achieve in terms of its global standing, should not debunk the point that the country has been increasingly able, through international commitments such as peacekeeping, to have a greater say and capacity to impact global normative contexts. Similarly, according to Hamann (2015) identifying and analyzing the potentialities and patterns of international commitments during periods of crises prove even more relevant as uncertainties drive stakeholders to rethink approaches and enhance decision-making once the storm has passed.
Scope of Study

The present dissertation adopts a qualitative research design and draws together empirical data, obtained from fieldwork in Brazil, the United States and Haiti in late 2015 and early 2016, with varied secondary sources. In theoretical terms, this thesis is informed by social constructivist insights in International Relations and observes Brazil’s peacekeeping profile as constructed, shaped and re-shaped by global normative underpinnings and shared principles. It places particular emphasis on the role of norms in steering, reproducing and challenging behavior and practices in multilateral frameworks.

Overall, as described above, the study focuses on MINUSTAH and sets out to analyze Brazil’s peacekeeping profile in light of meanings and interest formation within the wider normative global political framework of peace operations. For this reason, this thesis does not intend to be a comprehensive study about Haiti. Accordingly, the interesting but also tumultuous historical events and political processes in the Caribbean country, as well as societal structures and the role of local models of conflict prevention, will only be brought up to provide context and background information. Similarly, I don’t discuss Brazil’s domestic process of negotiating, authorizing and deploying peacekeepers, neither will I thoroughly take into account the different interests and bargains among domestic actors. Also, though MINUSTAH is central to this research, I won’t address the mission in its entirety. Hence, despite their importance, elements such as Latin American defense cooperation and the involvement of other countries and stakeholders in MINUSTAH, unless relevant to Brazil’s engagement, won’t be the objects of systematic investigation.

Thesis Outline

The study is divided into four main chapters. Chapter 1 (Methodology) highlights the research plan, the collection of data and its subsequent analysis. Reflections upon the qualitative nature of the study, the consideration of ethical standards and research validity criteria, as well as methodological limitations, are also discussed. Chapter 2 (Background) subsequently provides a brief literature review and aims to clarify, discuss and engage with the main thematic concepts
addressed in the study, namely UN peacekeeping, the Brazilian participation and MINUSTAH. Chapter 3 (Conceptual Framework) proceeds to present and discuss the theoretical underpinnings applied in this dissertation. It makes the case for the adoption of a social constructivist approach anchored by the role of norms as a conceptual framework, explains its appropriateness for investigating the proposed research question and acknowledges eventual limitations. Chapter 4 (Findings & Discussion) concretely addresses the study’s research problem. Based on the findings emanating from the analysis of fieldwork data, it approaches each of the analytical pillars laid out by the research question and structures discussions into two parts: Part 1 investigates the *articulation* of Brazil’s peacekeeping profile at the UN whereas Part 2 discusses its *implementation* on the ground under the auspices of MINUSTAH. And finally, the concluding section summarizes and discusses the study’s main discoveries in light of the proposed research question.
Chapter 1 - Methodology

1. Philosophical Assumptions and Applying Qualitative Research
Methodological choices provide tools for the operationalization of research investigations. However, as research is inherently underpinned by a set of assumptions, these methodological choices are inevitably a reflection of the researcher’s philosophical conceptions as to the nature of being (ontology) and how we choose to know and understand our world (epistemology) (Crotty, 1998). While discussions concerning which ontological and epistemological positions are better equipped to account for science have featured academic debates for a long time, agreement on the matter has proved elusive as philosophical assumptions are not necessarily commensurable and ways of appropriating knowledge are virtually endless (Renn, 2012).

Ultimately, it has been the researcher’s duty to conduct investigations with coherence, credibility and efficiency while being able to justify the adequacy and feasibility of their methodological choices. Methods are thus tools and procedures that habilitate research investigators to progress towards a stated objective (Campenhoudt & Quivy, 1992). They are applied, among other things, to design a research plan, enable data collection, guide analysis, supply evaluative criteria and limit the scope of research (Berg & Lune, 2012). In light of this thesis’ research purpose, which seeks to account for the projection of a Brazilian peacekeeping profile through articulation at the UN and implementation on the ground in Haiti, the methods hereby employed will lay concrete foundations for comprehensively carrying out this investigation.

Accordingly, as point of departure, the underlying ontological assumptions of this study, explained in the terms of Bryman (2004), reflect a more constructionist (or subjectivist) oriented understanding of the nature of reality. In other words, I adopt a view that social phenomena and their meanings are created as a result of the interaction between social actors rather than existing externally and independently from them. This ontological assumption implies that this study places emphasis on the social construction of objects and acknowledges that meanings are generated and held collectively. Interpreting this through the lenses of International Relations (IR), constructionist understandings of reality can justify the adoption of a social constructivist conceptual framework for this thesis. Social constructivism in IR essentially holds that
interactions of people and states construct the “international” and, consequently, create the building-blocks of international politics. The ontological and epistemological positions of this conceptual framework, as well as its desirability to address this study’s objectives, which all reflect on this thesis’ choice of methods, are discussed in greater length and detail in Chapter 3 (Conceptual Framework).

Similarly, acknowledging processes where meaning is socially generated, as opposed to objectively driven, makes the case for the adoption of a qualitative research design in this thesis. As a result, reflecting upon the projection of a Brazilian peacekeeping profile, in methodological terms, involves the investigation of the perceptions and interpretations expressed by a sample of respondents and embedded in key documents, discourses and literary sources. Consequently, this enables an understanding of the meanings ascribed with respect to the articulation and implementation dimensions of Brazilian peacekeeping and how this may or may not be projected into a cohesive peacekeeping profile. As suggested in the introductory part of this thesis, I will use a case study, namely linked to the United Nations and its MINUSTAH peacekeeping operation, to provide an empirical level of detail and understanding. Yin (2009), a prominent proponent of case study research, argues that a case study is “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 14). The interpretations of a Brazilian peacekeeping profile are thus seen as acquiring meaning and consistency vis-à-vis a particular contemporary phenomenon and unit of analysis.

Hence, a qualitative research design proves adequate here because I will apply my methods to produce information as to the particular case studied, focusing primarily on the how of processes and aiming at examining smaller but focused samples to better understand a social phenomenon. As elaborated by Johnson (1995), qualitative studies probe “for deeper understanding rather than examining surface features” (p. 4). In terms of the overall field of International Relations, qualitative approaches have dominated the discipline and are deemed appropriate, according to Bennet and Elman (2007), due to their advantages in studying the complex and relatively unstructured phenomena that characterize the field. Notwithstanding, evaluating qualitative research is a difficult task as the subjective nature of accounts and the presence of multiple interpretive sub-communities constrain the ability of findings to be replicated and judged against.
an overarching set of criteria (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Accordingly, in order to minimize these challenges, it is critical that qualitative investigations reflect upon their own biases while clearly acknowledging their research boundaries as to philosophical stances, research context and chosen methodology (Berg & Lune, 2012). The validity of qualitative research should thus reflect the limitations linked to choices of paradigm while being able to account for the trustworthiness and internal coherence of the research findings as well as how these are sustained by the collected data.

2. Collecting, Managing and Analyzing data

With the view of providing a meaningful contextualization and practical understanding of this thesis’ object of study, the following methods of data collection were applied: interviews, enabled by fieldwork in Brazil, the United States and Haiti; desk research, which involved the collation of existing research and documentation on the topic; and attendance at peacekeeping-related seminars in Norway. The following sub-headings thoroughly discuss these methods for data collection, touching upon the sampling procedures involved, research timing and locations, and account for how data was managed and analyzed in the course of this research.

2.1 Data Collection

2.1.1 Sampling, Locations and Timing

As highlighted, this study involved the collection of primary data – interviews and participation in seminars – and secondary data, as reflected by the conduction of desk research. The selection of respondents for interviews was, first and foremost, influenced by the purpose, initial research question and objectives of this study. Accordingly, the main criterion for picking respondents was their involvement with UN peacekeeping and knowledge about the Brazilian participation and MINUSTAH. Hence, I followed a purposive sampling strategy where informants were selected in terms of their relevance to the study’s topic. This approach was justified given my specific interest and the availability of relatively few people with expertise in the fields and case being researched. Initial contacts, based on knowledge of names, internet searches or indications, were mainly established by e-mail prior to the conduction of fieldwork. The application of this sampling strategy worked well as I managed to acquire contacts at all fieldwork locations and many of these contacts have acted as gatekeepers and referred me to other potential informants, both prior to and during my presence in the field. This thesis has thus combined purposive
samples with snowball sampling techniques as chains of referrals have led me to a larger and broader pool of respondents.

Fieldwork was conducted in three different cities across three countries: Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, New York in the United States and Port-au-Prince in Haiti. The stay in Rio lasted two days, from the 17th to the 18th of December 2015, and involved visits to the Brazilian Peacekeeping Joint Center (CCOPAB) and the NGO Viva Rio. CCOPAB supports, through courses and training exercises, the preparation of Brazilian armed forces, police and civilian personnel to peace missions, as well as contributes to research and doctrines on peacekeeping. Viva Rio, originally designated to tackle urban violence in Rio, has expanded its activities to Haiti, coordinating various social projects in the country and being the most prominent example among the yet few Brazilian civilian organizations acting alongside peacekeeping missions. The trip to New York comprised six days, from the 6th to the 11th of January 2016, and included visits to the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN, which is the Brazilian diplomatic representation to the UN headquarters; the International Peace Institute (IPI), a think-tank conducting work on peace operations; and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), responsible for the planning and management of such operations. And finally, from the 12th to the 22th of January 2016, a 10-day stay in Port-au-Prince, where the MINUSTAH headquarters is located and the Brazilian contingent is stationed, enabled me to visualize a peacekeeping operation on the ground and the different actors involved therein, including members of the Brazilian troops, Brazil’s embassy, MINUSTAH personnel and locals.

I’ve managed to obtain a sample size of 36 interviews. Three of these interviews have involved more than one person: one of which featuring four participants and the remaining two with two participants each. Speaking on different topics, one respondent has accepted to be interviewed twice. Hence, all considered, the total number of respondents amounted to 40 individuals. All but one of the interviews was carried out during the course of fieldwork. The only exception was an interview conducted following a seminar on peace operations on 26 November 2015 in Oslo, Norway. Breaking the numbers of fieldwork interviews further apart: six interviews took place in Rio, 11 in New York and the remaining 18 in Port-au-Prince. Out of the 40 interviewees, 28 individuals were Brazilian and 12 were non-Brazilian. Also, considering the totality of the sample, 22 interviewees were military actors, five were diplomats, seven were civilian personnel
at the DPKO or MINUSTAH, two belonged to a NGO, one was a researcher and three were local Haitians. Moreover, among all informants, only three were females, two of whom were part of the Brazilian contingent stationed in Port-au-Prince and one held a civilian post at MINUSTAH. The vast difference between male and female respondents can be explained due to the still male-dominated nature of groups dealing with peacekeeping and security, a prominent characteristic not only in military circles, but also among diplomatic and civilian ranks.

It should be noted that all military, diplomat and NGO actors interviewed were Brazilian. Among the 22 individuals from the military, two were former MINUSTAH Force Commanders while one was the mission’s current Force Commander. Having their authorization to disclose names in this thesis, these individuals were: Lieutenant- General Santos Cruz (MINUSTAH Commander from January 2007 to April 2009 and Commander of MONUSCO from May 2013 to December 2015, interviewed in Oslo); Lieutenant- General Paul Cruz (MINUSTAH Commander from March 2010 to March 2011 and current Director for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership at the DPKO, interviewed in New York ); and Lieutenant- General Ajax Porto (MINUSTAH Commander since October 2015, interviewed in Port-au-Prince). Among the responses from diplomats, four were obtained at the Brazilian Mission to the UN while one was at the Embassy of Brazil in Port-au-Prince. Also with their authorization to disclose names, this research has featured interviews with Ambassador Antonio Patriota (current head of the Brazilian delegation to the UN and Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from January 2011 to September 2013) and Ambassador Fernando Vidal (Brazilian Ambassador in Haiti). At the military and diplomatic circles, interviews comprised a balanced mix of respondents and reflected participants at different hierarchical and institutional levels. Further, the two interviews with NGO members were conducted with Viva Rio members at their headquarters in Rio. All the international civilian staff interviewed for this study were non-Brazilian and, considering the seven interviews obtained with this category, four were with UNDPKO personnel in New York while the remaining three were with MINUSTAH civil servants in Port-au-Prince. Among the MINUSTAH interviewees, it should be noted that two of them were Haitians. Moreover, the only researcher informant worked at IPI in New York and the three Haitian locals were interviewed at various locations in Port-au-Prince. Conversations with local Haitians were the only exceptions to my purposive/snowball sampling technique as they were approached on a
convenience basis – “those who are close at hand or easily accessible” (Berg & Lune, 2012, p. 51) – as I walked on different streets of Port-au-Prince.

Fieldwork as a methodological tool was essential and enabled me, as a researcher, to develop a wider understanding of the different aspects of my study. Conducting fieldwork provided opportunities for concrete data collection, greater insights and dynamic referential standpoints to analyze many relevant features as to both the articulation and implementation dimensions of Brazil’s involvement in peacekeeping in general and MINUSTAH in particular. Further, I believe my sample of respondents is able to reflect the objectives and research question of this thesis, enabling data collection from a relatively broad range of key actors and stakeholders involved in peacekeeping processes, the Brazilian participation and MINUSTAH.

Moreover, not only fieldwork was crucial for grasping perceptions and interpretations through interviews, but my presence at fieldwork locations offered opportunities to conduct direct observations, thus informing the research with external inputs. Also, information collected at the following seminars, all of them held in Oslo, Norway, were used to illustrate one or another point in this thesis: *Brazil: An Emerging Humanitarian Power?* (PRIO, 10 June 2015); *UN at 70: Peace and Security* (NUPI, 25 October 2015); and *Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (NDUC & NUPI, 26 November 2015).

In terms of secondary data, this was mainly done through a detailed literature review and sampling included relevant existing material available on the topic. Similarly, secondary data was also provided by fieldwork respondents, who contributed by sharing material.

Having discussed sampling procedures, data collection locations and research timing, the following paragraphs will highlight how each of the above-mentioned methods of data collection was applied in this study. Despite highlighting their considerable advantages, I will also briefly account further below for the different challenges involved in data collection and fieldwork, and the limitations embedded in this study.

**2.1.2 Interviews**

As implied above, interviews were chosen as one of the main research methods for this study. As observed by Walliman (2011), “interviews are particularly useful when qualitative data are required. Interviews can be used for subjects, both general or specific in nature and even, with
the correct preparation, for very sensitive topics” (p. 99). Practically speaking, the use of interviews reflected several advantages: my familiarity with the method; it gave a touch of formality to meetings and discussions, which proved particularly well-suited given the structured and hierarchical nature of military and diplomatic environments; and due to the limited fieldwork timeframe, interviews implied a more time-efficient method for acquiring targeted and focused information on the topics of interest.

As to format, I have mainly opted for face-to-face and semi-structured interviews. Based on the reflections of Berg and Lune (2012), a semi-structured format has enabled me, as a researcher, to keep a certain degree of standardization and structure while simultaneously being able to maintain a more flexible format with open-type questions. Using a set of standard questions allowed conversations to remain relatively focused and provided some basis for comparability across answers. At the same time, maintaining a flexible format enabled interviews to be adjusted according to the turn of discussions, habilitating the interviewer to explore unexpected elements brought by responses, uncover the complexity of topics and offer room for respondents to develop their answers. Similarly, face-to-face interviews, explained in terms of Walliman (2011), enables the interviewer to be “in a good position to judge the quality of the responses, to notice if a question has not been properly understood and to encourage the respondent to be full in his/her answers” (p. 100). Prior to fieldwork, I’ve drafted three overarching interview guides; each with a set of thematic points and questions aimed at my different types of informants, roughly categorized into military, diplomatic and civilian respondents. Naturally, as fieldwork locations, functions and nationalities under these categories varied, interview questions were constantly adapted and did not necessarily follow the topics or sequence determined by the guides. These nevertheless served, as implied by the name, for guidance purposes, providing references for my conversations with different respondents to stay “on track” and reflect the theoretical underpinnings and components of this study.

Further, as the vast majority of my sample was consisted of Brazilians and English-speaking UN/MINUSTAH personnel, interviews were either conducted in Portuguese, my native language, or English and didn’t require the intermediation of an interpreter. The only exception occurred with my three interviews with local Haitians, for which I was assisted by a Haitian Creole-Portuguese interpreter. The vast majority of interviews (33 out of 36), with the respective consents and
authorizations, was voice-recorded. For the few ones that weren’t, this can be explained due to
the inadequacy of settings, often featuring noisy backgrounds or other disturbances preventing
clear recordings. In these cases, I’ve taken manual notes to register the main points being said.
Initially, I’ve assumed that the request for recording would make respondents uneasy and
uncomfortable, but the majority didn’t seem bothered or disturbed as long as confidentiality and
privacy assurances were guaranteed. I’ve opted for the method of voice recording as it enabled
me to concentrate solely on the task of interviewing and for providing accurate summaries of
interviews, including tone and speed of voice, as well as capturing my own questions and
comments, which was saved for reference.

Notwithstanding, it should be noted that interviews are also limited tools in and of themselves.
They are limited to the extent that the collected data relies on the willingness of respondents to
disclose information, as well as influenced by the physical and social settings where they take
place. Similarly, reflecting a challenge of qualitative research in general and given the nuanced
nature of peacekeeping environments, different interviews often produce different meanings on
the same data, thus highlighting the subjective aspect of information, which poses further
constraints as researchers are virtually unable to triangulate with and access all target groups.
Also, the researcher’s background and position may affect what is told or not to him or her. For
example, as MINUSTAH is still an ongoing operation, some of the operational and tactical
information may be classified and not shared with those who do not integrate the mission.
Similarly, as warned by a military officer at the beginning of fieldwork in Haiti: “due to
hierarchical and institutional concerns, military people here are always careful and tend to
choose their words when speaking to civilians. They always smell a rat when speaking to
civilians”\(^1\). Accordingly, this study has also sought to go beyond interviewing and has drawn
upon other methods as complementary tools, such as desk research and seminar participation.

2.1.4 Desk Research

Using desk research, or secondary research, allowed for assessing how this study’s topic and
main research objects have been previously addressed and conceptualized in both empirical and
theoretical terms, as well as providing grounds to be familiar with the topic. Moreover,
reviewing secondary sources enables the researcher to identify existing gaps in the literature,

\(^1\) Personal communication, 12 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese
thus illuminating novel or under-researched domains to be approached by new studies (Berg & Lune, 2012).

In this thesis, desk research was based on the collation of a wide range of existing work and publications pertinent to the investigation of the present study. This included academic studies in the form of books, articles, reports and research statistical factsheets, as well as press material published on relevant newspapers, magazines and websites. Not least importantly, given the research objectives and case study being investigated, I have also consulted official intergovernmental and state sources containing institutional approaches, norms and reviews. These were prominently linked to UN peacekeeping, MINUSTAH and the Brazilian participation: UN Security Council resolutions, reports of the UN Secretary-General, reviews of High-level Independent Panels, among others at the intergovernmental level; and narratives connected to Brazilian state entities on peacekeeping.

Desk research was used to inform all sections of this thesis, mainly the background descriptions and literature review of Chapter 2 and the theoretical discussions of Chapter 3, but also to account for the methodological options addressed in the present chapter and to sustain some of the argumentative choices of the analytical part (Chapter 4). The use of desk studies, however, in order to make research credible and trustworthy, require manifold crosschecking and should be, when possible, derived from robust references.

2.2 Data Management

The adequate management of data, as reflected by Berg and Lune (2012), is a key step in assuring that the collected information is documented and analyzed systematically. Accordingly, the proper storage, identification and tracking of data allow the researcher to easily access, verify and account for the collected information. For this thesis, the recordings and/or notes from interviews and seminar attendances, upon arrival from fieldwork, were transcribed into electronic files and digitally stored on my personal computer. Transcriptions were done in the interviews’ original language. In the few cases where translation was required, only the excerpts translated by the interpreter were transcribed.

As a result, data became more consistently displayed as well as stored in a readily available and reader-friendly manner. This facilitated subsequent data assessments and coding procedures
during the analysis process. Also, transcriptions have allowed me to revisit the collected data and remove irrelevant passages. Similarly, I added side notes when necessary to account for other verbal and non-verbal features involved in conversations or observations and, in a comparative fashion, also sought to identify synergies and discrepancies across the different narratives. On the other hand, pitfalls linked to data management in this thesis relate to the large amount of collected material. This has been particularly the case with interviews. Considering this thesis’ time and space constraints, the sizeable number of interviews and their lengthy duration in some of the occasions meant that transcriptions were not only time-consuming, but much of the detail-rich information obtained had to be oversimplified and/or disregarded in the writing-up of this thesis.

2.3 Data Analysis
Analysis of data, in many ways, sits at the core and sustains the argumentative choices developed throughout a thesis. In brief lines, analysis is a process whereby raw data is reduced, codified, and converted into systematic and useful information (Judd et al., 2011). Accordingly, it provides for the identification of trends of interest and classification of relevant collected data into thematic categories. As a result, these outcomes are used to habilitate researchers to carry out comparisons, identify interconnections and support conclusions.

The present study has reflected this rationale and, by establishing a criteria to make sense of data, my investigation was equipped to use the collected information to offer a clear and coherent answer to the research question how has Brazil, through articulation at the United Nations and implementation on the ground in Haiti, projected its own peacekeeping profile? In light of that, I’ve mainly organized and classified the obtained data into coding frames reflecting my two broader analytical dimensions, which I coded into articulation and implementation. Each of these dimensions was further divided into thematic sub-categories that, in combination, were used to precise the specific features of the overarching parent dimension. Further, findings were applied to shed light on the dynamics within and between these two dimensions, thus enabling the study to build an argument and consistently discuss how these dimensions help to understand Brazil’s projection of a peacekeeping profile. With the aim of attributing credibility and trustworthiness to findings, relevant fragments of data such as interview quotations were used and secondary sources provided a basis for triangulation. A more detailed account of the analytical process in
this study, including an explanation of the (sub-)categories utilized will be presented in Chapter 4 (Findings & Discussion).

3. Challenges and Limitations

Many of the challenges and limitations linked to the applied methodological choices were already briefly touched upon, but I believe some of the obstacles faced by this study deserve further acknowledgement as they impacted how the research process was carried out and which findings were attained.

To begin with, and related to the nature of qualitative studies in social sciences, a clear, straightforward and practical understanding of reality is constrained, if not at all ungraspable, given the embedded subjectivity and the extremely dynamic realm of social phenomena. This couldn’t be any different with the present study as all stages of the research process, ranging from ontological and epistemological considerations to data collection and analysis, reflected the researcher’s own positionality and implicate subjective judgements of yet subjective and multiple interpretive sub-communities. To illustrate in terms of the interviews conducted, the representativeness of respondents reflected assumptions of what/who is Brazil, considered here in diplomatic and military terms, together with a restricted selection of actors deemed relevant to offer their judgements as to peacekeeping and the Brazilian participation. Similarly, interpretive accounts provided by respondents were not only inevitably limited by which information they wanted to disclose, but were also context and time specific. For example, during fieldwork in Haiti, this research has interviewed members belonging to the 23th Brazilian Battalion (BRABATT 23). As battalions rotate and change every six months, this means that 22 other battalions, from various regions in Brazil, have previously integrated MINUSTAH since 2004. As it will be highlighted in Chapter 2 (background and literature review), varied battalions have experienced different and evolving peacekeeping challenges and local dynamics, thus requiring diverse responses and approaches. Despite belonging to the same overarching institution, interpretations on peacekeeping may not be necessarily constant and the military accounts provided for this research may reflect particular observations in detriment of others. The same applies for diplomatic delegations and international employees, who change location and job assignments from time to time. Hence, this research is not aimed at strong objectivity, but rather
seeks to deliver comprehensive accounts through the lived experiences of respondents in relation to the investigated topics.

This thesis had also initially sought to include the views of local Haitians as to Brazil’s peacekeeping profile and participation in MINUSTAH. However, not only were interviews with this group short and limited in number (3 in total), but they were underpinned by a set of other challenges. As I was assisted by a Haitian Creole-Portuguese interpreter, use of translation inescapably involved, to a greater or lesser extent, the transfer of compressed, filtered and interpreted information. Further, as an example of how challenges and biases play out and eventually impact the type of information acquired, interviews with Haitians in this research occurred in comparatively affluent and stable areas of Port-au-Prince, thus posing constraints to the representativeness of this type of sample. Moreover, the interpreter, who worked for MINUSTAH and, as a matter of occupational rules, had to display his UN credentials when approaching potential informants. Hence, all combined, not least the presence of a foreign researcher accompanied by a UN interpreter, it was noticeably felt that responses given by Haitians were affected by a series of biases. While assured of the impartial and confidential treatment of information and encouraged to provide their critical observations as to MINUSTAH and Brazil’s engagement, Haitians tended to be vague in their responses, visibly refraining themselves from making negative judgements on MINUSTAH. Hence, although I had initially envisioned the inclusion of local Haitian views and voices in this thesis’ analysis, these methodological challenges meant that there would be, credibility-wise, weak basis for sustaining claims offered by the local population. Accordingly, perspectives from this sample category will only be used to illustrate one or another point of the study and this thesis will regrettably lack consistent local Haitian viewpoints on Brazil’s peacekeeping profile.

Moreover, in practical and logistical terms, a number of challenges also posed limitations to data collection. While arrangements with respondents, as rule of thumb, worked well and without major constraints, the conduction of research, particularly during fieldwork, has highlighted the need and convenience of remaining flexible at all times. Preliminary plans may not necessarily work out and unexpected elements may pop up regularly. This was particularly felt during my stay in Haiti as poor infrastructure, traffic delays and dependency on third parties implied time-consuming trips and frequent postponing of arrangements. Further, the delicate political situation
in the country – my visit in January coincided with the period when presidential elections were due to take place\(^2\) and political demonstrations were occurring throughout the capital – meant that some sites were not easily accessible and categories of informants that could be relevant for this thesis, such as the Haitian National Police (HNP), were overburdened and thus not easily reached.

Similarly to the very activity of peacekeeping *per se*, conducting research and the challenges implied therewith underscore the importance of being resilient and able to adapt day by day, when not hour by hour or even minute by minute. Nevertheless, challenges in research are valuable learning experiences, teaching important lessons, offering means to improve future investigations and driving researchers to find new ways of highlighting progress.

### 4. Ethical Considerations

Finally, before proceeding to the next chapter, this thesis could not neglect the importance of ethical aspects in research. Ethics, in this case, is related to moral guidelines that should thoroughly inform a research process, all the way from designing proposals to defending findings. Although these guidelines are not necessarily linear and straightforward and often imply the consideration of a nuanced set of dynamics, the principle of doing no harm remains essential and overarching (Berg & Lune, 2012). This implies researchers have to act with integrity and present values related to honesty and frankness, no matter how novel one’s research discoveries are (Walliman, 2011). It also implies, as indicated by Scheyvens et al. (2003), being aware of power relations between researcher and informants; reflecting upon the sensitivity of information; and identifying risks posed to researchers themselves and/or others involved in the process.

Methodology-wise, ethical considerations in this study involved concerns of informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity when conducting interviews. Informed consent meant informing respondents about the purposes and background of this study, the reasons and motivations for discussing a given topic with them, and, not least importantly, asking permission for audio recordings and giving assurances as to the confidentiality of the information collected. For this purpose, I’ve prepared informed consent forms in English and Portuguese (see Appendix) to be

\(^2\) At the time of writing, the runoff voting for the Haitian presidential elections was indeterminately postponed; most likely to occur after October 2016.
read and signed by respondents. In most cases, however, interviews acquired an informal and spontaneous atmosphere, and consent was given orally.

The vast majority of informants were given Chatham House rules, where the researcher is entitled to use the information received, but conceals the identity of the speakers (anonymity). In case of direct quotations emanating from interviews, even as I do not reveal identities, I’ve agreed to seek respondents’ authorization by submitting the specific quotation excerpt by e-mail before having it included in this thesis. Some respondents, at the wrapping-up stage of interviews, have already granted me their authorization to cite what was said on the record. Also, it was not uncommon that interviewees would ask to speak “off the record”. This was motivated by a series of reasons: expressing viewpoints that might not have been aligned with their institution’s official discourse; disclosing sensitive information without having to go through the bureaucratic and hierarchical steps of asking permission; offering a more personal opinion and account of what was being discussed; among others. All data was treated with confidentiality and accessible only to me, as researcher, and this thesis’ supervisor. Off the record data in particular, due to their potential sensitivity, was assessed carefully and, when considered, is neither attributed to persons nor institutions. Furthermore, as indicated previously, some sources, due to their authoritative and institutional importance (in this thesis: heads of military and diplomatic missions), have been asked and given authorization to have their names disclosed.

Having discussed this study’s methodological approach, the subsequent chapter turns to provide a literature review and aims to approach and engage with the main thematic themes addressed in this research, namely UN peacekeeping, the Brazilian participation and MINUSTAH.
Chapter 2- Background

1. Reflecting upon UN Peacekeeping
In order to contextualize and inform discussions on Brazil’s peacekeeping engagement and profile, an overall reflection upon UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) proves indispensable. Accordingly, before proceeding to literary revisions on the Brazilian participation and MINUSTAH, the following paragraphs will first highlight conceptual, structural and operational aspects of the blue-helmet enterprise, and shed light into the dynamic and multifaceted nature of peacekeeping.

1.1 Making Sense of Actors and Terms
Though peacekeeping activities are prominently associated with the UN and projected through conventional images of soldiers on blue helmets and berets, it should nevertheless be highlighted that, though the UN is often involved, the set of activities labelled under the term “peacekeeping” is not the monopoly of the UN. As brought into light by different reports issued by the UN itself and other scholarly work on the topic (see, e.g., Cilliers, 1999; Wilson, 2003; Bellamy & Williams, 2010; De Coning et al., 2015), international and regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization of American States (OAS), with varied approaches and often involving some degree of UN collaboration, have also been engaged in efforts to keep peace – or at least have framed their engagements in that way. When not responsible itself for implementation, the UN often provides these organizations support through mediation, expertise, logistics, and other practices. Further, one can add to the peacekeeping puzzle the countless actions of individual states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academia, social movements, among many others, when it comes to supporting peace efforts more generally (Andersen & Engedal, 2013). Notwithstanding, identifying the exact contours of peacekeeping activities is tricky, if at all possible, as they may not only be carried out and promoted by different actors, but also encompass many types of tasks, ranging from preventive diplomacy to the use of military force to attain peace. As Bures (2007) has put it: “‘peacekeeping’, consequently, is nowadays a term that imparts virtually no information about what type of operation is actually taking place” (p. 409).
Terminology-wise, it should be noted that there are no shortage of labels used to design the kind of civilian, police and military activities aimed at supporting peace efforts and comprehended in this dissertation as “peacekeeping”. The literature recognizes a wide range of terms, sometimes used interchangeably and sometimes embedded by implicit normative assumptions: “peacekeeping”, “peace operations”, “peace missions”, “peace support operations”, “peace force”, “stabilization missions”, just to name a few, are perhaps some of the most common examples on a long list of nomenclatures found across different works and studies. Labels similarly serve a wide range of interests and the highly contested nature of operations designed to keep peace means that the borders between these operations and other forms of human activities in conflict contexts, which can range from warfare to the provision of humanitarian assistance, are often blurred (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). As a result, terminological inconsistencies illustrate the hybrid, dynamic and not least contested nature of peacekeeping and how the field, in many aspects, lacks comprehensive foundations.

1.2 Searching for a Definition

Searching for a one-size-fits-all definition for peacekeeping is not a straight-forward endeavor. Bures (2007) reminds that the permanent evolution in mandate, scope and size of these activities, both at the UN and non-UN level, has posed additional complications, if not making it entirely unattainable, to come up with comprehensive types of definitions. Nevertheless, scholars and practitioners in the field have attempted to overcome these problems by differentiating peacekeeping from other peace efforts and, in 2008, the UN has developed policy guidelines, referred as the Capstone Doctrine, where it identifies peacekeeping as one among five activities undertaken by the international community to maintain international peace and security (UN, 2008):

- **Conflict prevention**: involves structural and diplomatic initiatives to prevent disputes from escalating into violent conflict.
- **Peacemaking**: the use of diplomatic action to address and contain conflicts in progress and provide the foundations for negotiated agreements.
- **Peacekeeping**: designed to preserve the peace and assist in the implementation of agreements achieved in the peacemaking process. “Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of
forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace” (p. 16).

- **Peace enforcement**: upon Security Council authorization, involves a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force, to restore peace and security.
- **Peacebuilding**: measures aimed at diminishing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, involving the strengthening of national capabilities to lay the foundations for long-term sustainable peace and development and address the root structural causes of conflict.

Notwithstanding, although categorizations are useful in and of themselves as they situate peace operations more concretely based on the way they are organized and tasked, this tells us very little about the changing and hybrid roles, as well as the underlying rationales, of operations (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Andersen and Engedal (2013) argue that in current peace operations, known for their multidimensionality, the boundaries between the five above-mentioned tools are transcended. The Capstone Doctrine also acknowledges this by pointing at linkages and grey areas between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding: “operations are rarely limited to one type of activity” and “experience has shown that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing” (UNDPKO, 2008, pp. 18-20). While the United Nations, in principle, has mainly deployed peacekeeping operations, this does not mean that such operations are limited to functions of supporting cease-fire or peace agreements. Peacekeeping, to various degrees, has been consisted by preventive, peacemaking, peacebuilding and enforcement activities and therefore embedded in other types of responses.

### 1.3 Categorizing Peacekeeping

Scholarly approaches have also attempted to make sense of definitions and purposes by categorizing and identifying peacekeeping chronologically. Authors such as Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005), Thakur and Schnabel (2001) and Karns and Mingst (2000) for example, have differentiated peacekeeping activities into three generations. First-generation missions can be traced to the origins of peacekeeping in the late 1940s and have extended till the end of the Cold War. Missions were mainly consisted of lightly armed personnel and deployed to inter-state conflicts with mandates prominently linked to the observance of cease-fires and peace
agreements, establishment of buffer zones and border-monitoring. The bipolar configuration of the international system during the Cold War meant that peacekeeping, in the few occasions that a Security Council agreement was reached, played a role in containing local conflicts from escalating into global confrontations and proxy wars. Missions have primarily taken place in the Middle East, where the potential for conflict escalation was recognized by both superpowers, but where neither was prepared to wage war (Bellamy & Williams, 2010).

Second-generation peacekeeping operations were “multilateral, multidimensional and multinational/multicultural” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p. 134) and reflected the political realities of the end of the Cold War. Reinterpretations of peacekeeping principles, associated with a more responsive Security Council and a global escalation in the number of intra-state conflicts, have prompted the deployment of missions, with broader mandates and Troop Contributing Country (TCC) base, to intervene in civil wars and humanitarian disasters. Similarly, the participation of civilian and police elements, as outlined by the 1992 An Agenda for Peace report, became more mainstreamed in peacekeeping practice. Accordingly, a twist towards multidimensionality, whereby a diverse set of peacekeeping actors contribute to varied tasks and activities, have characterized the period and supported efforts towards the “transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions” (UN, 1992, para. 59).

The third-generation, as debated in many literary sources, was a response to the UN failures in properly meeting the increased and more ambitious demands and responsibilities of post-Cold War peacekeeping mandates. This has become highlighted by a series of high-profile failures where the UN was deployed to places with “no peace for them to keep” (Clemons, 1993, p. 107), as evidenced by the operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s. Accordingly, Andersen and Engedal (2013) have argued that these troubling missions came to demonstrate that “the UN was not institutionally, militarily, logistically or managerially capable of fulfilling the ambitious mandates set out by the Security Council” (p. 19). Hence, following a period of loss of prestige and a decrease in the number of missions in the end of the 1990s, many of the institutional and operational failings became codified into the so-called Brahimi Report (UN, 2000), laying out a set of practical recommendations for the UN to “better manage planning, mission support, decision-making and personnel in the field to produce more effective results”
(Bellamy & Williams, 2010). The Brahimi report helped to prompt a new generation and approach to peacekeeping and represented a crucial turning point. With calls for improving decision-making at UN headquarters, more realistic mandates, well-resourced missions, rapid and effective deployment, greater effectiveness of deployed forces, among other things, the Brahimi Report contributed to the establishment of doctrinal foundations that were perceived to be more responsive and fit-for-purpose in the context of peacekeeping engagements (UN, 2000; Bellamy & Williams, 2010).

Accordingly, following the launch of the report, as an overall trend, third-generation missions have been given more “robust” mandates, allowing them not only to use force for self-protection, but also to act against spoilers in defense of the mandate. Similarly, the launch of a new UN Peacebuilding Architecture in 2005 and a growing recognition of a security-development nexus meant that missions were deployed for considerably longer periods and tasked with providing the foundations for sustainable peace. Mandates also contained a more pronounced protection of civilian dimension, enabling “for the greater, deeper and longer involvement of international actors in transforming domestic arrangements in war-torn societies” (Andersen & Engedal, 2013, p. 19). Consequently, as pointed out by Benner et al. (2011), the qualitative change in peacekeeping has led to a quantitative increase: between 1999 and 2010, peacekeeping figures indicated an eight-fold increase in terms of personnel and a growth by a factor of ten in terms of budget.

More recently, contemporary peacekeeping studies have also pointed at the emergence of a fourth peacekeeping generation, though conceptualizations of it are largely diverse. Benner et al. (2011) claims that a fourth-generation would roughly encompass a combination of the second and the third generations and feature a stronger peacebuilding component. Andersen and Engedal (2013) call attention to the fact that the latest qualitative and quantitative expansion of peacekeeping has led to an overload and fatigue in the UN system and forecast a move towards a fourth generation aimed at more short-term stabilizations rather than long-term transformation. Along similar lines, Muggah (2016) argues that a present mounting sense of disorder shaping geopolitical outcomes and the presence of hotspots and radical extremism, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, suggest for more muscular forms of interventions. The writings of
Karlsrud (2014), on the other hand, describe a fourth-generation of peacekeeping being shaped by the potentials of Big Data, social media and modern technology.

Across the literature, however, chronological classifications are varied. Segal (1995) and Kenkel (2013a), for instance, have identified five evolutionary phases or generations while much of the peacekeeping scholarship, according to Bellamy (2004), only distinguishes between the “traditional” or “classical” Cold War peacekeeping and the “new” or “multidimensional” peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. Other authors have argued that accounts dividing peacekeeping into generations is historically misleading as operations have not been chronologically straightforward (Diehl et al., 1998; Johansen, 1998; Bellamy, 2004; Bellamy & Williams, 2004). Bellamy and Williams (2004) have, for instance, proposed a classification based on the role peace operations fulfil in global politics and outlined five types of missions differentiated into two broader patterns of “Westphalian” – concerned in producing interstate order and downplaying what goes in within states – and “post-Westphalian” peacekeeping–addressing abuses and the internal seeds of conflict and rebuilding societies based on liberal and democratic models.

Moreover, though the Security Council does not necessarily need to refer to a specific Chapter when passing a peacekeeping resolution, others in the literature adopt a more legalistic framework and refer to the UN Charter, distinguishing between operations linked to Chapters VI and VII. In very brief lines, Chapter VI missions tend to be associated with first-generation or traditional peacekeeping, reflecting pacific settlement of disputes and operations where UN observers or lightly armed personnel act to peacefully prevent outbreaks and resolve disputes through the monitoring of cease-fires, vigilance of border and reporting of infractions (USIP, n.d.). Chapter VII provides for “increased permission to use force to impose the aims of a mission’s mandate” (Kenkel, 2013a, p. 130) and is normally linked to the deployment of more robust missions into volatile post-conflict settings. It should be noted, however, that the robust configuration of missions has led to heated debates. While considered a progressive and morally enlightened use of force by some member states, it is seen as a fundamental threat to norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention, especially among post-colonial states (Benner et al., 2011). As a compromise, the informal term “Chapter VI and a half”, famously coined by
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, has also been raised in the literature and refers to missions reflecting a middle-ground between Chapters VI and VII.

1.4 Reform and Changing trends in Peacekeeping

The UN peacekeeping apparatus, reflecting the shifting patterns of global politics and conflict dynamics, as well as in response to many of the political and practical obstacles, has undergone crucial normative transformations and has continuously attempted to engage in reforms to strengthen its capacity. Within the UN system, this is well-captured by a series of reports, reviews, resolutions, doctrines, among other documents that have conducted comprehensive assessments, codifying good offices, reflecting upon challenges and responding to human rights and protection of civilian concerns.

The Agenda for Peace report, following the establishment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992, has assigned a central and new role for UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. Written by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, it has outlined processes of preventive diplomacy, suggested distinct definitions for peacemaking and peacekeeping, proposed reinterpretations as to the concept of party consent and laid the foundations for multidimensional approaches by stressing the need for coordinated efforts to deal with the economic, social, cultural and humanitarian causes of conflicts. Not least importantly, the Agenda for Peace also assembled the idea of “post-conflict peacebuilding”, comprehended as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN, 1992, para. 21).

The Brahimi Report issued in 2000, as indicated previously, was an outcome of the failures of the 1990s and conducted a major assessment of the shortcomings in the peacekeeping apparatus, proposing institutional changes, underscoring the need for a robust doctrine and calling for more financial support and well-equipped missions that operate under more specific and realistic mandates (UN, 2000). Further, in 2005, the UN World Summit has led to the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, contributing to the diffusion of post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development rationales and development measures into peacekeeping mandates. In 2008, drawing on the Brahimi Report, the Capstone Doctrine, which was aimed at planners and practitioners, provided the basic principles and clearer doctrinal articulations for guiding training, planning and conduct, as well as supporting a vision of peacekeeping as “a system of
inter-locking capabilities” (UN, 2008, p. 10). Similarly, in a cross-cutting fashion, landmark UN resolutions on a number of issues have represented fundamental advancements in peacekeeping rationales: UNSC resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security has reaffirmed “the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts” (para. 5); UNSC resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians has expressed grave concern as to civilians affected by conflicts and called for specific and effective measures within UN peacekeeping to address this; and General Assembly resolution 62/214 (UNGA, 2008) has referred to the practice of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel in peacekeeping missions and outlined an assistance strategy to victims.

More recently, the release of the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in June 2015 followed by the holding of the UN Peacekeeping Operations Summit, chaired by US President Barack Obama in September of the same year, has contributed to a renewed global momentum in responding to the challenges facing peacekeeping. Concurrent with the UN-wide reviews on the Peacebuilding Architecture and on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, the HIPPO has highlighted major gaps between the established peacekeeping doctrine, as outlined by the Capstone document, and the conduction of current missions on the ground. It has exposed fundamental UN doctrine limitations when confronted with increasingly complex and volatile contemporary conflicts. Similarly, the report has laid out as underlying aspirations the need for reaching consensus regarding the use of force in peace operations and the importance of strengthening the credibility of the UN among those who are directly affected by its operations (Stamnes & Osland, 2016). Correspondingly, also in accordance with the synthesis provided by Stamnes and Osland (2016), the HIPPO constituted key recommendations based on the necessity of four shifts: (i) operations need to be more politically sensitive (primacy of politics) to the specific circumstances of each case rather than template-driven; (ii) operations should be designed to adaptively and flexibly respond to the context on the ground; (iii) stronger and more inclusive peace and security partnerships should be built in order to address the tensions in operations’ division of labor whereby some states tend to design and fund operations while others engage with troops; and (iv) deployments have to be people-oriented and field-focused, thus carried out in consultation with recipient societies at a broader level and for their benefit.
Building to a large extent upon the recommendations emerging from the HIPPO report, the Peacekeeping Summit, which was conducted at the level of heads of state and government, has garnered commitments to enhance peacekeeping capabilities and effectiveness. Furthermore, the summit has evidenced a more pronounced interest – at least in terms of pledges – of developed countries in stepping up contributions to peace operations, not only financially, but through the provision of manpower, material and specialized capabilities. Similarly, China – who has traditionally been a marginal peacekeeping actor compared to its political and economic stature – has made one of the biggest commitments. Also, as an outcome of the summit, countries pledges amounted to 40,000 new troops and police to peacekeeping efforts (UNDPKO, 2015a).

Moreover, concomitant to efforts to reform and reformulate the peacekeeping apparatus and rationale in the post-Cold War period was the growing quantitative and also qualitative involvement of “rising” or “emerging” powers in peace operations. Referring to countries like Brazil, South Africa and India, Jordaan (2003) and Flemes (2010) have described that such powers tend to be located at the semiperiphery of global production, are in the process of consolidating their democracies and are likely to be powerful in their own regions. Considering their evolving capacity to shape outcomes at the global stage, playing the role of peacemakers, peacekeepers and peacebuilders has been perceived as a fundamental hallmark to search for a greater international profile, gain prestige, balance between regional and global aspirations and highlight support and commitment to multilateral institutions (Kenkel, 2010). In terms of impact, Tardy (2012) has argued that rising powers have pushed and capitalized on peacekeeping’s reforms and sought to break the North-South paradigm by which “problems” are restricted to the South while “solutions” are brought by the North. Further, greater Southern involvement, besides increasing the legitimacy of the international community, is seen as shortening the capability and financial deficits that have structurally affected UN peacekeeping. For Western states, emerging powers’ increased participation is similarly interesting as it enables for burden-sharing, alleviates pressure and provides for refocusing attention to their own NATO/EU operations for crisis management. The literature (Kenkel, 2010; Van Rooyen, 2010; Tardy, 2012; Schrim, 2012; Mathur, 2014; Cunliffe, 2013) has also pointed out how the involvement of rising powers has put forward alternative ideas and options, placing emphasis on lighter peacekeeping footprints, strengthened local ownership and cautioned against the transplantation of models. Notwithstanding, besides still limited in scope, scholarly work – this thesis included –
on emerging power/Southern peacekeeping engagements has predominantly focused on single countries’ contributions, disregarding to a large extent comparisons among rising states themselves and their varied motivations to engage in interventions. “Emerging power” has thus often been used as an overarching label that, despite given similarities, in reality includes an array of heterogeneous actors adopting yet heterogeneous strategies driven by specific interests at the international arena.

Notwithstanding, it should be highlighted that, though the base of actors involved has been broadened and meaningful steps towards reform were undertaken to render peacekeeping more fit-for-purpose, UN political texts – due to the nature of the organization – remain overly vague and generalized and rhetorically ambitious, but often reflecting the lowest common denominator and with little or no enforcement applicability. In a similar fashion, competing political interests and budgetary constraints continue to limit, despite milestone pledges and reports, what the UN can effectively and realistically achieve on the ground. Also, as a matter of fact, while peacekeeping is firmly grounded on normative principles guiding international politics; at the mission level, however, concepts remain blurred and misty and their application is largely subject to interpretation. In addition to that, although emerging powers claim to have brought diversity and alternative rationales to peacekeeping, their engagements should also be understood as primarily reflecting selective self-interests rather than altruistic motives. This demonstrates that the UN still has a long way to go. At the same time, it should not be overlooked the fact that peacekeeping missions, despite a wide range of challenges, have managed to keep conflicts down overtime, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, though it remains impotent in the geopolitically contentious Middle East (Jones, 2016).

This brief literature review has demonstrated that peacekeeping is far from having a general agreed-upon conceptualization and definition, yet alone a coherent doctrine guiding implementation. To a great extent, improvisation has driven its evolution, but efforts within and outside the UN and associated to the turns of international politics have led to a repurpose and broadening of peacekeeping in order to better engage and deliver results in a volatile international system. Peacekeeping, however, remains distant from ideal and, as highlighted, challenges are mountainous, not least the organization’s silence on most systemic issues and the unrepresentative nature of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), who has the prerogative
to establish and authorize peacekeeping mandates. Nevertheless, the search for more proactive, credible and appropriately funded peacekeeping should be encouraged in order to reinforce the UN’s role as part of the solution, rather than part of the problem, for a safer world.

2. Brazil’s Participation and Approaches to UN Peacekeeping

2.1 An Overview
Historically, considering the totality of peacekeeping missions authorized by the Security Council, 70.1% of these missions – 50 as a whole – have had Brazilians, among military and police personnel, serving under the UN flag (Hamann, 2015). Still in accordance with Hamann, approximately 46,000 Brazilians have taken part in peacekeeping missions, but most deployments have largely occurred with the end of the Cold War. This is, however, not surprising as it corresponds to peacekeeping’s overall quantitative and qualitative post-Cold War expansion internationally and the end of a military regime at the domestic level prominently focused on internal threats (Herz, 2010). Similarly, it underlines a trend whereby the traditional bulk of Cold War TCCs – often middle powers and developed countries such as the Nordic states, Canada and the Netherlands – has been gradually replaced by troops from the Global South, who currently remain the major contributors in terms of manpower to peacekeeping. From the vantage point of developing countries, including Brazil, Krishnasamy (2003) and Sotomayer Velazquez (2010) outline various motivations for this shift: (i) interest to train and equip armed forces with means provided by the UN, a particularly relevant factor given the end of the Cold War and the sharp decrease in superpower military aid; (ii) the reimbursement paid by the UN to TCCs, as well as the obtainment of positions in the Secretariat for military and civilians from these countries, resources that sometimes add up to a significant share of their defense budgets; (iii) projecting countries that are internationally committed to peace and security, which may increase their chances of receiving development assistance or engaging in cooperation schemes with donor states; and (iv) particularly in Latin America’s case, the construction of a socially positive role for the armed forces as countries were emerging from military rules.

While an interplay of incentives has rendered peacekeeping engagements more beneficial and feasible to Southern countries and despite sending personnel to a wide range of operations, Brazil’s engagement in most UNPKOs has been limited to token contributions: the deployment
of a handful of military observers, “experts on mission” and police personnel (Hamann, 2015). The deployment of actual troops has occurred in far fewer occasions: UNEF I in the Sinai Peninsula in the 1950s and 1960s; Angola (UNAVEM III), Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and East Timor (UNTAET/ UNMISET) in the 1990s; Haiti (MINUSTAH) in the 2000s; and, more recently, Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 2011 (Uziel, 2015). At the time of writing, the UNPKOs in Haiti and Lebanon are ongoing and both missions have Brazilians in command positions: the post of Force Commander in MINUSTAH, occupied by a Brazilian since the mission’s outset in 2004, and UNIFIL’s Maritime Task Force, headed by Brazil since 2011. From April 2013 to December 2015, Brazilian Lieutenant-General Santos Cruz, who formerly led MINUSTAH, has also held the post of Force Commander in MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, though Brazil has not sent troops. Nonetheless, it is the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH, above any other, that has received the greatest share of media, academic and political attention both inside and outside the country. This is justified by the fact that Brazil has been in charge of MINUSTAH’s military component and deployed thus far the largest number of troops throughout the mission’s existence (Kenkel, 2015). Haiti, as reminded by Hamann (2015), accounts for 78% of all the Brazilian personnel deployments since 1990, amounting to more than 30,000 uniformed personnel on the ground since 2004, and therefore central to any study setting itself the task to discuss Brazil’s peacekeeping profile. As of 31 December 2015, Brazil is the 23rd largest contributor to UNPKOs with 1,231 uniformed personnel, almost 1,000 of which serving in MINUSTAH (UNDPKO, 2016).

Hamann has categorized Brazil’s profile to peacekeeping as driven by both “specific” and “general” interests: missions that attend “specific” interests attract large numbers of Brazilian troops while engagements oriented by “general” interests demonstrate the country’s overall desirability to signal its presence in multilateral platforms, even if this means few uniformed Brazilian peacekeepers on the ground. The overwhelming majority of Brazilian deployments, which involve low numbers of personnel and occur in regions that are often distant and not necessarily relevant to national interests, underscore the country’s “general” commitment to participate in the division of tasks of the international system and contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. On the other hand, more prominent peacekeeping participations involving troop contingents – deployments that require higher degree of logistical and operational complexity – often correspond to more “specific” interests. These normally tend
to be linked to the “hard-core” interests of Brazilian foreign policy. By mapping out Brazil’s overall contributions, Kenkel (2010) and Hamann (2015) suggest that Brazilian peace operations’ “specific” interests revolve around three main axes and are guided by regional, linguistic and cultural priorities and affinities: with the notable exception of UNEF I back in the 50s, major contingents, as highlighted, were sent to the Americas (Haiti); Lusophone countries (Angola, Mozambique – and Guinea-Bissau, where Brazil plays a key role in the UNIOGBIS peacebuilding mission); and diaspora ties (Lebanon – approximately 6 million Brazilians are of Lebanese origin).

Further, as highlighted by Fontoura (2005), Brazil’s approach to peacekeeping is not limited to mere on-the-ground contributions. Not least importantly, behind every peacekeeping engagement, token or expressive, there are always diplomatic efforts at the multilateral and political level (Uziel, 2015). Brazil, as this thesis will highlight more thoroughly in Chapter 4 (Findings & Discussion), has also been continuously engaged in multilateral UN forums on peacekeeping – being a member of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), participating in Core Groups, contributing personnel to major peacekeeping review processes and acting as elective member of the Security Council – and thus seizes these opportunities to project worldviews and notions of appropriateness in relation to peacekeeping activities.

2.2 Strategic, Operational and Tactical Approaches

While far from toppling contributions of developing countries such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Nepal, writings by Brazilian diplomats on peacekeeping, particularly in relation to most recent engagements, have underscored the country’s geographical, economic and political dimensions, as well as its profile as developing nation, as comparative advantages (Amorim, 2007; Patriota, 2013; Uziel, 2015; Napoleão & Kalil, 2015). Accordingly, academic scholarship on Brazil’s peacekeeping participation, which has been boosted and is largely dominated by analyses of the country’s landmark engagement in Haiti, has similarly addressed many of the strategic features of this participation. Souza Neto (2010), for instance, has claimed how Brazil, from being a marginal actor in terms of peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War, went on to acquire a more proactive role, which culminated in its centrality in MINUSTAH as the mission was established in 2004. Uziel (2015) has analyzed the Brazilian elective mandates in the Security Council, discussing how Brazil’s participation in the body led to greater refinement of
its capacity to shape norms in relation to peace missions, pointing at MINUSTAH in particular. Amar (2012) has argued that the peacekeeping agency emanating from the Global South has been a neglected research agenda and explains that Brazil’s practices and doctrines in peacekeeping, from the vantage point of MINSUTAH, reveals a mixture of a strong sense of solidarity with developing countries and a desire to challenge imperialist legacies. Kenkel (2010) has contended that Brazil’s peacekeeping agency exhibits classic middle or emerging power goals: the search for a greater international profile, balance between regional and global aspirations, and solid support to multilateral institutions; while at the same time seeking to reform a perceived unfavorable order by adopting a critical stance as to given structural aspects of the UN, most notably the unrepresentative structure of its Security Council. However, the author further argues that, due to the country’s colonial past and fears of interference, it remains cautious to norms linked to military interventions involving the use of force under robust Chapter VII interventions.

Other scholars (Braga, 2010; Buxton, 2010; Diamint, 2010; Herz, 2010) have looked at MINUSTAH’s regional component and suggest that, due to its ample Latin American participation, the mission has contributed to the establishment of a nascent security community in the region and has driven the actors to formulate novel concepts for post-conflict response. Furthermore, the involvement in MINUSTAH has also stimulated research and debates as to Brazil’s stance on sovereignty, intervention and use of force, as well as the impacts of a post-Cold War order on the Brazilian decision to approve and participate in peace operations (Esteves, 2010). While increased Brazilian engagement in peacekeeping has led to certain adaptability in relation to interventionism and the use of force, the notions of sovereign equality, non-intervention and international legality remain core values (Herz, 2010). Accordingly, it is defended that peace missions need to be supported by an incontestable mandate from the UNSC and have the consent of foreign authorities, thus reflecting a tool where the use of force comes with attendant responsibilities and is used to counter-balance military interventions conducted unilaterally and outside the UN framework (Muggah, Campbell, Hamann, Diniz, & Motta, 2013).

Existing studies and research on the topic have also considered the opinions of frontline peacekeepers as well as the operational features of peacekeeping on the ground, most
prominently in MINUSTAH. A few contributions, among which the writings of Vendramin (2015), Palma (2015) and Carrera (2015), have looked at the Brazilian military and police engagement in Haiti, describing, inter alia, training practices, adaptation and compliance with the mandate’s demands, and the implementation of the mission’s multidimensional aspects. Similarly, the work of Cavalcanti (2014) has divided the performance of Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH into 4 chronological phases, each one with a specific set of characteristics and challenges, and claims how an evolving training process enabled the compliance and implementation of UN doctrines, as well as the assimilation of lessons learned over time. Dorn (2009) and Norheim-Martinsen and Ravndal (2011) have claimed that Brazil has been able to push along much needed changes in the way the UN handles intelligence and have regarded this as a key factor behind the success of Brazilian operations against gangs in Haiti. Also, Norheim-Martinsen (2015) has pointed out that MINUSTAH and Brazil’s role within the operation is one of the few examples in the UN of urban peacekeeping and has been successful in providing viable solutions to address urban violence insecurity, especially gang-driven conflicts.

At the tactical level, Norheim-Martinsen (2015) has highlighted the employment of nighttime operations to diminish civilian casualties and the establishment of strong points to regain territorial control and insert a permanent presence in areas formerly controlled by gangs. Garbino (2015) has addressed MINUSTAH’s use of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), an approach supported by Brazil, as tactical tools to support small-scale development projects and reach out to the population. Kenkel (2010) and Napoleão and Kalil (2015) have argued that Brazilian troops in Haiti are more likely to be accustomed to contexts of underdevelopment and thus have a comparative advantage in dealing and understanding the dynamics of local realities. Abdenur (2016), on the other hand, has set herself the task of analyzing the less visible Brazilian maritime role in UNIFIL and suggest that rising powers, such as Brazil, are currently expanding their role beyond land-based troop deployments and are also helping to shape the naval components of UN peacekeeping.

2.3 Challenges

Although a wide body of literature, as highlighted, ascribes considerable merit to the modus operandi of Brazilian contingents, Brazil’s role as peacekeeper, on the other hand, is also marked by challenges, defects and shortcomings. Many of the critiques are, for example, associated with
the overall insufficiencies of peacekeeping and, by default, the role of Brazil within it in promoting long-term alternatives linked to social security, employment and political representation, as well as guaranteeing rights and basic services (Norheim-Martinsen, 2015).

Looking at Brazilian peacekeeping deployments in general, Hamann (2015) has noted that the participation of Brazilian police personnel has been scarce and sporadic, occurring prominently on an ad hoc basis, and administratively burdensome as police corps are submitted to the country’s different federative units rather than the central government. Moreover, no civilian experts are deployed on behalf of the Brazilian government and data on Brazilian civilian specialists serving for the UN in peacekeeping missions is almost inexistent. It is important, Kenkel and Hamann (2013) claim, that both police and civilian participation are not overlooked given the country’s global aspirations and the emphasis placed by Brazilian diplomatic discourse on the security-development nexus and multidimensionality aspects of UNPKOs. Also, despite increases during the last years, participation of Brazilian women in these operations has been timid at its best (Giannini, 2015). In the contingent stationed in Haiti, for example, female presence has been constant, but has not been higher than 1% of the total and the majority of women perform administrative or health-related tasks and usually have limited or no contact with the local population (Giannini, 2014).

Uziel (2015) has comprehensively outlined a set of limitations as to Brazil’s peacekeeping deployments. According to him, these are limitations that place Brazil in a less prominent position when compared to other actors. First, there is neither a domestic overarching policy orientating the country’s participation in missions nor an adequate legislation, thus effectively constraining the ability to expand contributions as decision-making tend to be slow, burdensome and politically costly. Second, while Brazil has been a constant contributor since the end of the Cold War, the nature of these contributions has been spasmodic as there are moments of significant expansion in troop deployment followed by periods of retraction. Even when contributions are significant and constant over a relatively long period of time, such as in the case of MINUSTAH, these deployments tend to be concentrated in a single mission and are likely to be dismantled with the end of the mission. Third, while peacekeeping is a source of revenue for many TCCs due to the reimbursement provided by the UN, the refund corresponds to approximately 40% of the total Brazilian costs with peacekeeping. Consequently, the country has
to draw on domestic budgets, which require governmental allocation of funds for that specific purpose and subsequent parliamentarian approval. Hence, it is not uncommon that budgetary commitments to missions abroad are questioned by political actors or the broader domestic public when they are indispensable to Brazil’s own domestic issues, especially given the current economic downturn affecting the country. Fourth, the lack of an explicit peacekeeping policy and the spasmodic nature of contributions may ultimately affect Brazil’s global interests as they may limit the country’s ability to influence international peace and security outcomes and undermine its quest for a permanent seat in the Security Council.

3. Making Sense of MINUSTAH as a Case Study

3.1 Origins and Mandate
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established and authorized by the UN in June of 2004. The legal basis for its creation was Security Council resolution 1542, determining that MINUSTAH would be consisted of both military and civilian components and mandating the mission to act under Chapter VII to ensure a secure and stable environment in Haiti after the fall of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (UNSC, 2004). Given its establishment in the early 2000s, the mission in Haiti belongs to a new post-Brahimi Report wave of Security Council-mandated operations and reflected the emergence of, if not new, a renovated and reinvigorated peacekeeping modus operandi. It comprises more robust and multidimensional aspects as peacekeepers may act beyond pacific and consensual provisions to implement their mandate and, alongside a civilian and police component, engage in wider tasks such as development projects, organization of elections, promotion of human rights and provision of humanitarian assistance (Bellamy & Williams, 2010).

3.2 Latin American Participation
Moreover, as indicated previously, MINUSTAH has featured a strong regional dimension by embodying a significant Latin American presence since the mission’s outset. Troops from the so-called ABCU countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) alongside smaller but steady military deployments from a wide range of other Latin American countries have contributed to the greatest share of MINUSTAH’s military strength. As of 2015, though the mission has been lately experiencing a downsizing due to its prospected withdrawal, approximately 80% of MINUSTAH’s military force was from Latin America (UNDPKO, 2015b).
Since the mission’s establishment in 2004, this participation reflects a trend whereby regional actors, approaches and mechanisms were increasingly perceived as key building blocks in peacekeeping processes (Braga, 2010). In a Latin American context, regional actors saw a peacekeeping engagement in Haiti as windows of opportunity for self-assertion, advancing specific interests at the hemispheric and global stage, strengthening cooperation and defense ties, among other factors (Herz, 2010; Kenkel, 2010). Building on the last argument, an increased Latin American participation was also the result of an interplay of reasons: political leadership as individual presidents took a vested interest on peacekeeping; a shift towards more cooperative stances to security at the regional level; an overall economic uptrend; and a desire to claim “Latin America for Latin Americans”, thus demonstrating disposition to alter the dynamics in areas predominantly seen as US “backyards” (Buxton, 2010; Marcondes Neto, 2015). Meanwhile, multilateralizing peace operations in Haiti, which after all lies little more than 1,000 km from the shores of Florida, was deemed similarly convenient to the United States. Buxton (2010) has indicated that the mission was seen as likely to secure a pro-US government in Haiti and could allow the Bush administration to “outsource” non-priority security preoccupations in a cost-effective and more legitimate manner. While enabling to downplay criticism for intervention in its own neighborhood, it allowed the USA – together with other major Western powers – to concentrate on new security fronts, namely those linked to the War on Terror in the Greater Middle East.

3.3 Challenges and Achievements on the Ground
The challenges that MINUSTAH experienced and continues to experience on the ground are complex and multifaceted. Braga (2010) has pointed out that, due to Haiti’s social, political and geographical specificities, the security challenges faced by the mission did not fit conventional approaches, rationales and doctrines developed for international peacekeeping. According to him, on top of the failures of previous UN missions in Haiti, the country’s historically chaotic socio-political environment, persistent political violence and unrest, extreme poverty and vulnerability to natural disasters meant that MINUSTAH had to be designed with an overarching and multidimensional mandate. The mandate was thus not only aimed at maintaining a secure and stable environment, but also dedicated to contribute to political reconciliation and, not least, promote long-term efforts directed to rule of law and development.
Further challenges included the lack of formal opposing parties and the absence of a peace agreement to be implemented. As reflected by Norheim-Martinsen (2015), instability in Haiti has been linked to the existence of spaces lacking state presence and with limited opportunities in terms of healthcare, education and job generation. These ungoverned areas often had an urban component as marginalized city dwellers, often young men in shantytowns, were pushed into gang-related activities and where political tensions could be capitalized upon. Accordingly, the type of instability faced by MINUSTAH did not take the form of a cohesive and overarching insurgent group or belligerent party, but was rather linked to pockets of instability where, as described by Kilcullen (2013), a mixture of criminal and political forms of violence takes place in increasingly ungoverned, crowded and connected urban spaces. Armed groups in Haitian cities like Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien and Gonaïves had diverse backgrounds, ranging from criminal gangs and militias loyal to ousted President Aristide to politically oriented armed rebels and individuals from the former Haitian military, which was disbanded in 1995 (Girard, 2010).

MINUSTAH, faced by an escalation of violence throughout 2004, 2005 and 2006 and the presence of gang strongholds in Haiti’s major cities, particularly at the capital Port-au-Prince, was pressured to engage in a more proactive use of force, which was not only a politically controversial undertaking, but also an operationally new experience for many of MINUSTAH’s Latin American troops (Cavalcanti, 2014). To expand and optimize the mission’s footprint as well as to regain territorial control of notoriously inaccessible neighborhoods such as Port-au-Prince’s Cité Soleil and Bel Air, the mounted pressure combined with cost-benefit calculations on the usefulness of force ended up leading to more assertive military interventions in gang strongholds. Hence, MINSUSTAH prominently became a peace enforcement operation in its initial stage as it was characterized by a more robust use of force and marked by the occurrence of kinetic confrontations (Braga, 2010).

Addressing the operational and tactical dimensions of the operation, the literature (Kenkel, 2013b; Cavalcanti, 2014; Napoleão & Kalil, 2015) tends to agree that, despite significant challenges, MINUSTAH remarkably managed to improve the security environment in Haiti by 2007. Similarly, although forceful interventions by Latin American contingents were subject of initial frictions, a mutual acceptable level of understanding with regard to the usefulness of force was also reached. For Brazil, mainly responsible for the operations in Port-au-Prince, a
generalized hesitancy to use force was gradually replaced by an engagement, although cautious, with intervention norms and reinterpretations as to the appropriateness of robust engagements (Kenkel, 2013b). From a military standpoint, the use of force enabled the Brazilian contingent to make great strides operationally and tactically (Norheim-Martinsen, 2015). And from a diplomatic perspective, this tradeoff, as long as embedded by an incontestable Security Council mandate and thus reflecting Brasilia’s leanings to multilateral solutions, could lead to greater international prestige and strategic influence.

Notwithstanding, MINUSTAH has also been marked by a series of setbacks: the most remarkable of which taking place in January 2010 when a catastrophic earthquake hit the country. With an epicenter close to Port-au-Prince, the 2010 earthquake was considered Haiti’s most devastating event, causing a widespread destruction of the infrastructure in the capital and surrounding areas and with casualty estimations of approximately 160,000 (Kolbe et al., 2010). Much of the country’s governmental capacity, both in terms of public buildings and staff, was also destroyed. The disaster meant a heavy toll on MINUSTAH as well, destroying the mission’s headquarters and claiming the life of many of its personnel, including Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) Hédi Annabi (UN, 2011). Accordingly, many of the mission’s achievements, which have taken place under already volatile and challenging circumstances and over a long period of time, had to start from scratch, especially with regard to long-term development and construction projects. Current MINUSTAH Force Commander Lieutenant-General Ajax Porto Pinheiro, who was deployed as Commander of the Brazilian Battalion shortly after the earthquake and speaking on the record to this research about the impacts of the disaster: “In 2009, when I was being prepared to deploy, they were talking about the end of the mission in 2011… and I'm still here in 2016. This is because an earthquake appeared in the middle of the way and we had to start all over again”.

As a result, the earthquake’s aftermath was characterized by a focus on humanitarian assistance and emergency response. The mandate provided by Security Council resolution 1927 (2010) has underscored the need for MINUSTAH to collaborate with other UN agencies, programs and funds to support humanitarian and recovery efforts (UNSC, 2010). Military and police deployment, as determined by the resolution, also reached its peak in 2010 with 8,940 military

---

3 Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
and 3,241 police personnel. Similarly, the period saw a huge influx of NGOs and donations pouring into Haiti as the shocking news of the earthquake made the headlines. Accordingly, tasks that were strictly military acquired a greater humanitarian dimension, highlighting the necessity of enhanced civil-military cooperation to mitigate the impacts of the earthquake. Brazil had almost doubled its contingent by sending a second battalion and reached its largest historical peacekeeping contributions in the years of 2010 and 2011 with contingents containing little over than 2,000 personnel (Hamann, 2015). The Brazilian troops, responsible for the most critically affected region of Port-au-Prince, have responded to the crisis by supporting and conducting emergency operations; maintaining security and public order; and working to re-strengthen the mission’s capacity (Cavalcanti, 2014).

### 3.4 Recent Years and Current Outlook
The years following the earthquake, though under precarious circumstances, saw a slow and progressive recovery as the Haitian government’s legitimacy has somehow improved and the security situation, reflecting the gains from the mission’s early years, has ameliorated (Muggah, 2015). After 2010, ensuing Security Council mandate renewals have moved the mission towards a more developmental or statebuilding approach (Muggah et al., 2013). Hence, MINUSTAH and other international actors started to place emphasis on long-term peace and institution building strategies aimed at consolidating the mission’s security and support pillars. This has been reflected by a gradual downsizing of MINUSTAH’s military component while strengthening the capacity and performance of the Haitian National Police (HNP) as the country’s first line of security (Cavalcanti, 2014). In 2013, the Secretary- General report on MINUSTAH has laid out a “conditions-based Consolidation Plan”, outlining a reduced number of key stabilization benchmarks in the areas of police capacity, rule of law and human rights, electoral capacity and progress on governance issues (UN, 2013). These benchmarks, according to the report, were linked to an exit strategy envisaged to take place until the end of 2016 and aimed at consolidating security and stability in Haiti. In the meanwhile, MINUSTAH would progressively disengage itself in coordination with other local and international actors.

However, more recently, the fragility of the ongoing Haitian presidential electoral process – marked at the time of writing by allegations of fraud, violent demonstrations, postponements and now an interim government established to manage the electoral transition – casts doubt as to the
realistic plausibility of a mission withdrawal by the end of 2016. While concluding the current electoral dispute will be key for the UN and eventual assessment commissions to adequately envision a role for the future of the international community in the country, five possible options for reconfiguring MINUSTAH, as outlined by the Secretary-General’s report from March 2014, have been considered and debated: (i) to end MINUSTAH’s mandate and designation of a UN Special Envoy to deliver political good offices; (ii) to end MINUSTAH’s mandate and the creation of a Special Political Mission with continued support and capacity to develop the HNP; (iii) to end MINUSTAH’s mandate and establish a smaller, more focused peacekeeping mission without military presence, broader political role and increased police presence; (iv) to end MINUSTAH’s mandate and establish a new but smaller peacekeeping mission with UN Police and the deployment of a small military force for strategic reserve; and (v) MINUSTAH continues with an adjusted mandate reflecting a reduced scope of activities aimed at the completion of the Consolidation Plan (UN, 2014).

While funding fatigue and new security hotspots in the Middle East and Northern Africa have been driving the international community away from Haiti, many of the country’s underlying problems are unlikely to be resolved, among them corruption, weak institutions, lack of capacity, fragile dialogue between opposing parties, aid dependency and overall absence of durable development projects (Braga, 2010). Despite the large influx of external resources brought by the UN mission, an overall inability to promote long-term improvement has also led many Haitians to perceive MINUSTAH as an occupying force and local support has further deteriorated due to allegations of sexual misconduct and the spread of cholera by UN peacekeepers. The literature (including Howland, 2006; Ceide, 2008; Edmons et al., 2012; Hauge, Doucet, R., & Gilles, 2015) has similarly raised a wealth of critiques as to the peacekeeping presence in Haiti, among which: shortcomings in mainstreaming human rights; neglecting the root causes of conflict; overlooking the potential role of local models for conflict prevention; the reduction of the Haiti problem to a gang problem; highly militarized responses to a country facing only episodic lapses of violence; the implementation of development projects that tend to bypass local governments and actors; and lack of coordinated efforts in the provision of humanitarian assistance, especially in the earthquake’s aftermath. Other scholars, most notably Girard (2010), blame Haiti’s misfortune not to the flaws of MINUSTAH, but rather to the mind-numbing complexity of Haitian political life, historically plagued by racial conflict, corrupt and uncaring regimes and a
perennial expectation that foreign countries and aid will pull the country out of poverty. Girard claims that it is not a coincidence that Haiti is infamous for its “NGO Republic” label, possessing one of the highest per capita numbers of NGOs in the world, but remaining as impoverished and desperate.

Notwithstanding, according to Muggah (2015), even MINUSTAH’s fiercest critics have acknowledged that there was an overall reduction of the various types of violence and disorder since 2004. While Haiti remains experiencing intermittent violence outbreaks, normally associated with the tensions embedded in electoral processes, public security had remarkably improved between 2007 and 2009 after the bold confrontations with gangs and the conduction of stabilization operations. Moreover, the HNP, notwithstanding material insufficiencies and accountability deficits, has been strengthened and, through joint operations with the UN peacekeepers, the Haitian state has managed to regain territorial control of urban strongholds previously held by gangs. Nonetheless, a full and comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of MINUSTAH will only be possible with the mission’s withdrawal and depend on whether the Haitian state will be minimally capable of carrying out its basic functions.

Before applying the above-discussed background information to contextualize this study’s findings in Chapter 4 (Findings & Discussion), the next section takes a theoretical turn and proceeds to present the conceptual framework applied in this dissertation.
Chapter 3- Conceptual Framework

1. Social Constructivism in International Relations

Taking into account the study’s research question *how has Brazil, through articulation at the United Nations and implementation on the ground in Haiti, projected its own peacekeeping profile?*, this thesis holds that Brazil’s profile, which reflects particular visions of behavioral traits and preferences in international peacekeeping, is constructed, maintained and reproduced by social interactions and normative structures. Accordingly, the present work treats state interests as not exogenous to them, but rather as an outcome of social structures at the global stage and international relations as underpinned by shared understandings, expectations and knowledge. The “international” is thus considered the result of the interplay of ideas, the role of institutions and the political calculations of actors. Similarly, peace operations are deemed to represent, based on the writings of Bellamy and Williams (2004), issues that are constructed, rather than discovered, and depict processes where “relative significance attached to particular issues is shaped by factors such as ideology, material circumstances, epistemological assumptions and geographical location” (p. 8). Peacekeeping actors like Brazil are therefore regarded to have the agential capacity to shape outcomes while international structures and environments simultaneously induce certain peacekeeping practices and modes of behavior to be adopted and followed by such actors.

Focusing on understanding the dynamics of social meaning and practices involved in Brazil’s peacekeeping profile projection, this study draws upon insights raised by Social Constructivism in International Relations (IR) to account for the proposed research question. With its origins traced to the 1980s, constructivism is a relatively new but increasingly mainstream theoretical strand in IR. A term coined by Nicholas Onuf in *The World of our Making* (1989), constructivism generally holds that the “international” is constructed and underpinned by interactions of people and states, who in turn create norms and operating procedures governing appropriate action and behavior. The writings of Alexander Wendt (1987; 1995; 1999), one of constructivism’s most prominent scholars, have described the fundamental structures of international politics as being social rather than strictly material and these structures are seen as
shaping actor’s identities and interests. Moreover, Checkel (1998) has highlighted the constructive turn in IR theory and looked at how the role of norms and social structure in global politics has provided important and corrective alternatives to the individualistic and materialistic meta-theoretical insights that came to dominate the discipline. Accordingly, constructivists do not necessarily reject concepts such as “balance of power” and “anarchy”; instead they observe that their meaning is rather dependent on ideas and interpretation than given by an external reality (Barnett, 2010). Similarly, also based on Barnett, “development, human rights, security, humanitarian intervention, sovereignty are all important orienting concepts that can have any number of meanings” (p. 156).

While there is no consensus among constructivists as to their commitment to science, it can be claimed that they share some overall assumptions. First, Checkel (2008) observes that they all give “greater weight to the social – as opposed to the material – in world politics” (p. 72). Second, constructivists share similar ontological assumptions as proponents (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986; Wendt, 1987; Dessler, 1989; Adler, 1997; Kacowicz, 2005) treat reality as plastic, open, and complex. Epistemologically, however, constructivists differ among themselves in their approach to scientific-style theorizing, ranging from those who underscore the interpretive nature of social science (the critical variant) to those who commit themselves to more natural-science like and positivistic theoretical approaches (the conventional variant) (Chernoff, 2008).

Though various approaches within constructivism maintain different foci, the overall potentials for assessing the agential capacity of states in shaping international politics and the plurality of methods employed in theorizing have given much appeal and credibility to constructivist perspectives, especially in the end of the 1990s and early 2000s. As reflected by Adler (1997), constructivism is capable of building bridges by seizing the middle ground between rationalist and reflectivist approaches in IR and creates novel areas for methodological investigation.

Having briefly discussed constructivism’s underlying assumptions, I now make the case for its adoption in addressing this study’s research problem.

2. Applying a Constructivist Approach
Reflecting on constructivism’s adequacy as a conceptual framework in the study of peacekeeping engagements, Paris (2000) has argued that peace operations shed light “on the role of norms in
world politics, ultimately lending weight to ‘constructivist’ understandings of international norms” (p. 34). Under these circumstances, Paris has further observed that these operations “support constructivist arguments about the relationship between international norms and the properties and identities of states” (p. 37). Bellamy (2004), referring to constructivist and subjectivist approaches, has claimed that particular visions of order are constructed, maintained and reproduced by peace operations. He also implied that constructivist-like frameworks of inquiry can potentially help addressing peacekeeping by bringing into question its rationale and evolving role in global politics. Adding to that, constructivist approaches similarly emphasize global networks of institutions, social meanings and structures that have specific consequences through various levels of a peacekeeping activity (Fetherston, 2000).

Constructivism, in turn, doesn’t come without limitations. To begin with, at least for constructivism’s conventional camp, states are identified as “the principal units of analysis for international political theory” (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). Addressing this state-centrism, Weber (2010) has accused constructivists of falling into the same trap as their rationalist counterparts. While liberal and realist accounts naturalize and materialize the structure of the international system, constructivism ends up reifying the state itself. Accordingly, in analyzing peacekeeping, a state-centric approach presents many pitfalls. First, it privileges the experiences of international diplomats, intergovernmental organization personnel and peacekeepers. This has both theoretical and practical implications to peace operations as it overlooks the role of local and bottom-up approaches in preventing, managing and providing solutions to conflict and peacebuilding. Second, and linked to the first argument, the complex and diverse nature, as well as the cultures of violence of the social settings in which peace operations take place, are seldom reflected upon (Fetherston, 2000). Third, interventions are deemed successful or unsuccessful based on a very narrow set of pre-established goals and in accordance with wider international relations discourses.

In addition to the abovementioned aspects, as research underpinned by constructivist insights primarily seeks to understand the dynamics of social meaning and practice, it poses limitations in terms of rendering practice more appropriate and efficient (Pugh, 2004). In other words, while suitable for examining the how and understanding the foundations of peacekeeping as a social institution and practice within the larger frame of international politics, conventional
constructivist accounts have limited transformative usefulness, thus contributing to normalize and legitimize, rather than challenge, these institutions.

Notwithstanding their overall limitations as a conceptual framework, constructivist accounts stand out as one of the most suitable tools to effectively address this thesis’ main research problem, namely the projection – through articulation at the United Nations and implementation on the ground in Haiti – of a Brazilian peacekeeping profile. My ambition is neither to systematically assess peacekeeping’s social emancipatory potential nor to contextualize its practice within domestic societal structures. Rather, I seek to understand its articulation and implementation through the agential capacity of states – in this case Brazil – and its meanings in relation to a wider normative global political framework. Hence, an approach underscoring the construction of state identities and interests, and the role of social structures in ascribing meanings and standards of appropriateness can provide fundamental insights.

To that end, this thesis draws on a constructivist theorizing of norm dynamics and, as a result, pays close attention to the role of norms – which are shaped and reproduced by state actors – in steering appropriate action in peacekeeping and contributing to the formation of Brazil’s profile. Accordingly, I further expand below on how norms both constitute and drive change in international relations, elaborate on the international normative context of peacekeeping and discuss how Brazil, as a peacekeeping actor, engages, reproduces and reinterprets the existing normative order.

3. The Influence of Norms in International Relations

As implied by a constructivist perspective, events in international relations are shaped and reshaped by norms and normative dynamics. Hence, the negotiation and re-negotiation of norms steer development and lead to change on a wide array of global issues, ranging from the management of violent conflict to processes of governance of the seas and international human rights (Karlsrud, 2013).

Following Björkdahl’s definition (2002): “norms are intersubjective understandings that constitute actors’ interests and identities, and create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behavior ought to be by expressing values and defining rights and obligations” (p. 21). Norms and normative agendas thus constitute and reconstitute the identities of states, as well
as the relationships between them (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Accordingly, norms are deemed to shape the behavior of actors while actors are also constantly seeking the reformulation of these norms (Sandholtz, 2008). The interests of states in international politics are thereby not fixed, but rather influenced by norms, determining standards of appropriateness for actions and the type of state behavior that is legitimate and adequate.

At the global arena, norms are promoted through organizational platforms and are often – though not necessarily – articulated from within existing international governmental and/or non-governmental organizations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). These organizations, according to the authors, are either created for the specific purpose of promoting norms (e.g. transnational advocacy networks such as those defending human rights, environmental protection and ban on landmines) or have distinctive structural features that influence the nature of norms promulgated (e.g. the organizational structures and agendas of the UN, the World Bank and the International Labor Organization strongly influence the type of norms promulgated by these institutions). Through their use of expertise and access to information, they are primordial sources of influence upon the behavior of other actors. Similarly, organizational platforms contribute to the role of norm diffusion by providing essential venues for socialization, learning and propaganda (Yee, 1996; Björkdahl, 2002).

Notwithstanding, measuring how norms actually regulate, constitute and evaluate actor behavior is neither a simple nor a clear-cut task. As argued by Björkdahl (2002), norms are generally the outcome of intersubjective understandings and collective expectations, thus entailing an evaluative and shared assessment where X only acquires meaning in relation to A, B or C. Furthermore, by acknowledging that norms are “shared (thus social) understandings of standards for behavior” and referring to South Africa’s apartheid, Klotz (1999) has emphasized that norms are not necessarily moral: “standards can have functional and non-ethical origins and purposes” (p. 14). In the same line, norms that were powerful in the past and are now labelled as “bad”, such as racial superiority and slavery, were once regarded as appropriate behavior by those promoting the norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

The shifting of global norms, as argued by Klotz (1995), sheds light into the dynamic nature of interest formation and re-formation. Finnemore (1996) reinforces that argument by claiming that shifts in behavior are an outcome of changes in normative standards articulated by states.
Accounting for this change of norms over time, Martha Finnemore’s and Kathryn Sikkink’s much-cited work *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* (1998) outlines the idea of *norm life cycle*. Accordingly, through the conception of a norm cycle, they advance some perspectives as to the functioning of norm dynamics in international relations and seek to explain, among other things, how international norms emerge, are diffused and start to influence both state and non-state behavior. The figure below illustrates the norm life cycle, as laid out by the authors, and consisting of three essential stages:

![Norm Life Cycle Diagram](image)


As reflected above, the process of norm emergence is initially induced by *norm entrepreneurs*. These agents often act through organizational platforms, framing issues in accordance to their perceptions of appropriateness and seeking to create alternative normative standards. Norm entrepreneurship, however, does not happen in a vacuum, but is informed by, engages with and contests prevailing normative contexts and pre-existing practices (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Norm entrepreneurs are also persuasive and use different political strategies to convince other actors about the appropriateness of the ideals and values associated to their norms.

In order for a norm to reach the “tipping point” threshold and *cascade*, a critical mass of states have to be persuaded and some degree of institutionalization is believed to facilitate the process. Such undertakings have the potential of conferring moral stature to norms and, through international socialization, other states are persuaded to adhere more rapidly. Nevertheless, what is deemed “critical mass” varies from issue to issue, but as observed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), critical states are often “those without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised” (p. 901). Under these circumstances, not every state is similarly critical to a norm’s adoption. Great powers, due to their stature and overarching influence in international politics, can both facilitate and prevent norms from cascading. On peace and security issues, for example, the endorsement of a norm by the UN Security Council’s Permanent 5 (P5) is essential.
for its achievement and increases its likelihood for success. Institutionalization, on the other hand, may occur through international law, foreign policy strategies or multilateral organizations’ initiatives and contributes to norm cascade by providing content and explicitness to international action and behavior.

The final stage – but not the end point as cycles regularly repeat and reinvent themselves – is of norm internalization. Here norms are widely accepted as instructional unities directing the behavior and guiding the actions of actors. Correspondingly, states comply with norms on a taken-for-granted and almost automatic quality. For this reason, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that these types of norms are extremely powerful as behavior is seldom questioned, but are also hard to discern given that norm-conformance, due to their taken-for-granted nature, does not tend to generate controversies. This is precisely the reason why efforts to promote new norms are often contentious, face resistance and are at times considered “inappropriate” as they tend to challenge standards of appropriateness underpinned by pre-existing norms.

Before proceeding, however, a few quick points on norm dynamics should be highlighted. First, following Björkdahl’s (2002) and Väyrynen’s (1999) line of reasoning, the existence and strength of a given norm differ from the actual issue of enforcement and compliance, as well as the norm’s capacity to affect state behavior. Well-established and institutionalized body of norms such as the international human rights regime, endorsed by virtually every state, has seen states themselves as being one of its major violators (Uvin, 2004). As the provided example demonstrates, norms prompt expectations in terms of what ought to be done, but that doesn’t mean that they will be followed or, when followed, it doesn’t mean that they will be done so consistently (Hehir, 2013). Second, the speed in which a norm emerges, reaches its tipping point and cascades greatly varies. As pointed out by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), while women’s suffrage took nearly 100 years to reach its tipping point, efforts to ban landmines moved from norm emergence to norm cascade in a relatively short period of time. Third, states never solely follow and comply with norms out of an inherent notion of duty or moral commitment. Norm-compliance involves evaluative relationships and strategic political calculations whereby states “want others to think well of them, and they want to think well of themselves” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). Following norms can thus fulfill psychological notions of belonging and
adaptation to a given social environment, contributes to fashion legitimate political selves at the global stage and symbolizes quests for international approval.

Organizational platforms like the United Nations in general and peacekeeping missions in particular, guided by pre-existing but not immutable practices and normative order, exercise a prominent role as important sources of influence upon the interests and behavior of states. Accordingly, their practices do not happen in a normative vacuum, and they not only shape behavior by changing incentives, but they also “seek to constitute the very actors whose conduct they seek to regulate” (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 22). Simultaneously, as such activities enable access to information and important audiences, they provide different tools and are crucial springboards for norm entrepreneurs to persuade and act from the vantage point of shaping peacekeeping realities in accordance with their own interests and notions of appropriateness. With that said, I now explore the significance of peacekeeping in the creation, diffusion and functioning of international norms.

4. The International Normative Context of Peacekeeping

As elaborated by Björkdahl (2006), a constructivist theorizing of norm dynamics can “assist in analyzing peacekeeping missions as channels for norm diffusion as well as offer broader reflections on how peace operation practices can contribute to sustaining or changing the existing normative order” (p. 214). In a similar fashion, though the practice and problems of peacekeeping are not new, Crawford (2002) acknowledges that constructivist approaches anchored by the role of norms provides useful analytical tools for understanding peacekeeping meanings as not necessarily constant.

Contemporary multilateralism, Finnemore (1996) has argued, is driven by shared norms and principles. Unlike multilateralism in the past, which she claims was prompted by shared fears and perceived threats, contemporary multilateralism acquires a qualitative dimension and is organized in accordance with generalized principles guiding, for instance, “international responsibility and the use of military force, many of which are codified in the United Nations charter, declarations, and standard operating procedures” (p. 16). International peacekeeping is thus not detached from this normative context of contemporary multilateralism. Rather, it informs and supports its practices and normative underpinnings by inducing, among other things, actions related to notions of international responsibility and use of military force. However, as
reminded by Björkdahl (2006), “this does not mean that novel practices cannot affect the normative context and contribute to change old normative structures” (p. 216). In other words, peacekeeping norms, as underpinned by a global multilateral framework, will lead to certain practices while these practices, in turn, may reconfigure certain norms of the existing framework. Peacekeeping missions are thus considered channels of norm-diffusion, norm-entrepreneurship and norm-compliance as they provide platforms for international socialization, persuasion and institutionalization.

In her study of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Björkdahl (2006) points at concrete examples of these dynamics as the mission, focused on prevention and with deployment of troops prior to rather than after the eruption of violence, challenged traditional principles and symbolized a development in UN peacekeeping. While observing the “old settled norms” of host-country sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as peacekeeping’s “Holy Trinity” of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force, UNPREDEP, with an explicit conflict-prevention mandate, contested existing norms and was “the UN’s first clearly preventive mission” (Björkdahl, 2006, p. 216). She attributes this to the prominent engagement and norm entrepreneurship of the Nordic countries. The deployment of Swedish, Finish and Norwegian troops and the role played by Nordic decision-makers, attempting to export domestic norms of conflict prevention and Nordic political life, functioned as driving forces and UNPREDEP served as a channel of norm diffusion. As a result, this has led to norm-promotion at the global arena as future missions replicated the preventive nature of UNPREDEP and subsequent UN reports on the topic underscored the importance of preventive measures in missions. Björkdahl also noted that the US participation with a battalion under UN command, thus deviating from the Cold War well-embedded norm of middle state contribution to peacekeeping, have facilitated the norm-building process as the presence, endorsement and rhetoric of the hegemon, as discussed previously, are often crucial for a norm to cascade.

5. Projecting a Peacekeeping Profile: Brazil as Norm-Entrepreneur and Norm-Follower

Similarly, actors like Brazil, having their own strategic political interests and notions of appropriate behavior, participate in peacekeeping processes and end up engaging, reproducing
and reinterpreting the normative order within which they cat. As highlighted by Björkdahl’s (2006) above-mentioned case study, while pre-existing practices are supported, novel patterns and attempts to reshape peacekeeping activities simultaneously take place. Accordingly, this thesis draws upon conceptions laid out in Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s (1998) *norm life cycle* to account for the projection of a Brazilian peacekeeping profile. I hypothesize that Brazil’s profile follows a dual act as *norm-entrepreneur* and *norm-follower* in international peacekeeping. In other words, the projection of a peacekeeping profile demonstrates that Brazil, acting as a norm-entrepreneur through an organizational platform – in this case the UN in general and the MINUSTAH mission in particular –, attempts to frame issues according to its perceptions of appropriateness and seeks to create alternative normative standards. Simultaneously, as part of an interactive environment, the country is also passive to international socialization that induces norm-following for reasons that relate to its identity as member of an international community (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Accordingly, the figure below provides an illustration as to how these concepts will be used to address this study’s research problem:

![Diagram](image)

*Figure 2. Norms and the articulation/implementation of Brazil’s peacekeeping profile.*

Under these circumstances, peacekeeping is assessed in relation to the extent to which Brazil endorses, adapts and associates to mainstream peacekeeping modes of action (norm-follower); but also in relation to how the country harnesses the normative gaps, shortcomings and vagueness of the blue-helmet enterprise to frame issues according to its perceptions of appropriateness and attempts to create alternative normative standards (norm-entrepreneurship). Viewing Brazil’s peacekeeping engagement through rising power lenses, the following chapter demonstrates that this profile involves cost-benefit calculations in terms of norm-following and norm-entrepreneurship, and is used strategically with the intent to advance particular interests and strengthen, among other things, the country’s position, belonging, influence and credibility in international governance platforms.
Chapter 4- Findings & Discussion

In light of the suggested conceptual framework, methodology and literary inputs, the present chapter applies the research question *how does Brazil, through articulation at the United Nations and implementation on the ground in Haiti, project its own peacekeeping profile?* to the collected data in order to extract and discuss the study’s main findings.

The chapter approaches each of the analytical dimensions laid out by the research question, namely the *articulation* and *implementation* dimensions. Looking more closely at these dimensions – how they are characterized, built and maintained, and to which extent they assimilate or differ – will provide a more comprehensive basis to assess the study’s objects of investigation and, consequently, debate Brazil’s projection of a peacekeeping profile. Reflecting the theoretical underpinnings applied in this thesis; it is argued that articulating, implementing and, as a result, projecting a peacekeeping profile represent a setting for Brazil to both adopt a revisionist international stance (norm-entrepreneurship) and reinforce its international presence and belonging through forms of norm-following. Hence, in the context of this study, peacekeeping and MINUSTAH are interpreted as organizational platforms offering barometers to assess Brazil’s global posture, seen as not only upholding universal principles as a mere receiver of norms, but also increasingly seeking to identify spaces for participation in the peacekeeping normative conversation.

Accordingly, I divide the chapter into two parts. Part 1 approaches the *articulation* dimension, comprehended as the action of elaborating and putting into speeches the expression of thoughts and rationales. For this part, I will mainly consider the Brazilian diplomatic discourse at the United Nations and investigate specifically how peacekeeping through MINUSTAH becomes an instrument of multilateral foreign policy and reflects perceptions of international reality and construction of new interests. Part 2 discusses the *implementation* dimension, regarded as the process of executing or putting ideas/decisions into effect. Here I will seek to outline the agency of Brazilian peacekeepers acting in MINUSTAH at the operational and tactical levels, thus verifying how peacekeeping mandates and practices are projected and implemented on the ground. Subsequently, the concluding section of this thesis will revisit some of the analytical insights provided in this chapter and conclude that Brazil’s projection of a peacekeeping *profile*
reflects a balancing act of behavioral traits and preferences at the global stage that simultaneously seek to change and sustain the existing normative peacekeeping order.

Brazil, as indicated previously, is considered here in terms of diplomatic and military actors. These are contemplated as the main driving forces as they act on behalf of the state through multilateral organizational platforms and reflect Brazil’s official stance at the international stage with respect to peacekeeping and intervention norms. With regard to the primary data collected, diplomatic views and narratives will be mainly used to illustrate the articulation dimension in Part 1. Military standpoints, on the other hand, will be primarily considered in discussions concerning the implementation dimension in Part 2. Inputs deriving from civilian actors – such as the observations of international civil servants, NGO personnel and local Haitians – are used throughout to provide qualitative judgements as to each of these dimensions.

**Part 1- Articulating a Peacekeeping Profile at the United Nations**

As argued by Björkhdahl (2002), “the manner in which states talk about norms is often just as important, if not more so, than how they act” (p. 13). Diplomatic narratives, though by no means accurate indicators of practical commitments, are nevertheless key in understanding the political motivations and actions embodied by states internationally. As a result, interpretations offered by diplomats have considerable weight in matters concerning foreign policy. Lang (2002), for example, argues that “more importantly, he [the diplomat] represents the national purpose, the historical record of the state, a historical record that embodies the political and ethical ideas of the community” (p. 18). Hence, the interpretations on which I focus in accounting for the Brazilian peacekeeping articulation are those linked to the country’s diplomatic narratives elaborated within the framework of the United Nations, which is the main arena for the formulation of discourses and norms linked to peacekeeping.

Under these circumstances, Part 1 draws upon my interviews with members of the Brazilian diplomatic corps, both at Brazil’s Permanent Mission to the UN and the Embassy in Port-au-Prince, as well as statements delivered at the UN by Brazilian state representatives and key documentation on peacekeeping. Interviews with DPKO staff and NGO members are also used to provide insight and comparative judgements.
Part 1 structures and addresses the articulation dimension according to four main pillars, which are used to illustrate Brazil’s peacekeeping agency under the auspices of the UN: (i) Brazil’s role in negotiating peacekeeping at the UN; (ii) Brazil’s projection of comparative advantages in peacekeeping; (iii) Brazil’s approaches to civilian participation and gender norms in peacekeeping; and (iv) existing challenges and limitations of Brazil’s peacekeeping articulation.

1.1 Negotiating Peacekeeping

The negotiation of peacekeeping by Brazil complies, first and foremost, with the UN’s overall strategy and principles for this type of activities. Notwithstanding, it is similarly perceived as providing several windows of opportunity.

Asked about how peacekeeping is discursively and politically articulated by Brazil at the UN, diplomats have mentioned that this is not necessarily clear-cut as it involves several stages: negotiating a mandate, providing content to the mandate, its duration, amount of troops, tasks, among other things. This is not only done within the framework of the UN Security Council, but also through the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), with the Secretariat, the DPKO, the several TCCs involved, and internally with the armed forces and among members of the Brazilian diplomatic body. Also, both technical and political aspects are involved in negotiations. Technicalities include issues such as logistics, operability of a mission, the reimbursements provided by the UN, and are seen as offering less room of maneuver for printing a specific “Brazilianness” as they tend to follow pre-determined standards. Peacekeeping entrepreneurship, on the other hand, covers peacekeeping’s political aspects and is more easily visualized, according to a diplomat, through the participation of the country at Security Council meetings and sessions, which can be restricted if Brazil is a member or otherwise take the form of open debates and informal consultations: “If you look at the discourses of our Ambassadors on peacekeeping over the last decades… they will reflect key ideas of the Brazilian diplomacy”.  

Another diplomat has argued that, as Brazil can only hold intermittent non-permanent seats at the Council, participation at Core Groups – consisted of member-states directly concerned or with special interest in the matter under consideration – of peacekeeping missions is therefore essential. In MINUSTAH’s case, Brazil attributes central relevance to the Core Group, which

---

4 Personal communication, 7 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
includes some of the Council’s P5 members, Latin American countries provisionally represented at the UNSC and the mission’s major Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). The group has the prerogative to draft MINUSTAH’s resolution, which is renewed on a yearly basis, and subsequently forwards the document to United Security Council (UNSC) members for approval. Generally, little or nothing is altered when the resolution is formally considered at the UNSC. The Core Group has thus provided platforms for Brazil, despite its non-permanent presence at the Council, to shape given aspects of the mandate. For example, through MINUSTAH’s Core Group, Brazil and other Latin American countries have managed, for example, to push the mission towards a more development-oriented profile. Moreover, through means of quiet diplomacy, the Core Group has offered direct channels to strike deals with the P5, reach consensus and make up like-minded countries, thus contributing to overcome the structural limitations of the UNSC and enabling for the crafting of more tailored mandates.

When it comes to Brazil’s negotiating profile, while it was expressed that each mission and peacekeeping-related topic has its own dynamics, the country was identified as having a vocation to build bridges between the Global North and South. Although cleavages in the international security architecture are not necessarily North-South and actors in each of these artificial categories are far from homogeneous, Brazil was pointed out, due to the moderate nature of its approaches in international relations and deriving from a region of eminent inter-state peace, as a natural actor to seek consensus-building. As reflected by a member of Brazil’s delegation to the UN: “We can act selflessly in almost all cases in the Council’s agenda … and this is an advantage…. This is not necessarily the case with large part of the Council’s members. France, for example, has a vested interest when it comes to Francophone countries”. Accordingly, while some states were considered to be guided by “sphere of influence” strategies, Brazil’s geopolitical characteristics imply that its peacekeeping profile does not seek to “take care of its own backyard”.

Further, Brazilian discourses at the UN on peacekeeping have continuously underscored the centrality of the organization. “Either the UN Charter will remain at the center of the international order, or there will be no order”, Brazilian Ambassador to the UN Antonio Patriota stated at a General Assembly debate (Patriota, 2015a). Also, ongoing normative processes under

---

5 Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
the UN framework, such as the recent reviews on peace operations, peacebuilding and resolution 1325, are deemed valuable opportunities to promote policy coherence and make the UN fit for its core purpose of preventing conflicts. Not least importantly, demands for Security Council revitalization, one of the dearest ambitions of Brazilian foreign policy, are regarded as crucial to tackle the current challenges affecting the peace and security pillar. Further, Brazilian discourses at peacekeeping forums, such as in the recent UN Peacekeeping Summit, has called for the greater participation of developing countries, who are the main troop contributors, in decision-making processes. When it comes to negotiating dynamics, Brazil considers this essential for the UN to be more willing to deliver as perspectives of the ones deciding on the mandates, mainly the UNSC’s P5, would have been matched with those of the ones implementing them.

Looking back to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and the role of norms in the shaping of international relations, it can be argued that Brazil not only projects a quality of “oughtness” for dealing with global peace and security issues through UN platforms, but also poses itself as a reliable and appropriate actor in negotiating forums through notions of empathy, altruism and ideational commitment, essential features in norm-entrepreneurship and used to advocate for alternative standards of appropriateness. At the same time, commitment to multilateralism, with the UN at its center and signaled by subscription to its normative processes, is demonstrated as the country values and heightens the importance of international governance in dealing with global instabilities.

1.2 Brazil’s Projection of Comparative Advantages in Peacekeeping

Comparative advantages attributed to Brazil’s peacekeeping involvement were mainly linked, based on the collected data, to six overarching attributes, all of which discussed at greater length below: (i) credibility; (ii) role of soft power; (iii) primacy of politics; (iv) responsible use of force; (v) security-development nexus; and (vi) regional solidarity.

1.2.1 Credibility

Described as an emerging power with certain level of regional leadership and driven by notions of altruism, Brazil was deemed a credible and qualified actor to engage in MINUSTAH since its establishment in 2004. According to interviewees at the Brazilian delegation, this perception is recognized at the highest political level:
In all the conversations that I have followed during the last years here in New York between the Secretary-General and our presidents, there have always been mentions to MINUSTAH…. This reveals, at the highest political level, the UN’s recognition and gratitude. This is also a very relevant political and foreign policy element and we always seek to divulge and capitalize on this in one way or another.\(^6\)

Consequently, it was argued that peacekeeping capacititates Brazil to credibly take part in a wide range of multilateral debates and deliberations. The credibility aspect also goes beyond peacekeeping as it portrays the image of a committed, professional and competent country that manages to achieve positive results at the international stage. As a result, diplomats expressed that several doors have been opened to Brazil’s foreign policy.

Correspondingly, the Brazilian Ambassador to the UN Antonio Patriota considers Brazil’s peacekeeping experience, particularly in Haiti, a very positive as it has led to international recognition and image enhancement. He also speculates that the demonstration of a credible and balanced stance in peacekeeping may legitimize Brazil to undertake more ambitious engagements at the global stage:

In the day we reach an agreement for Syria, for example, countries that have maintained balanced postures like Brazil, South Africa, India, the IBSA [India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum] in general, which never stopped to have relations with Damascus … we believe we can contribute to a political and diplomatic transition and settlement for the Syrian issue, and even contribute to the monitoring of cease-fires… I believe it is possible to speculate about this type of engagement.\(^7\)

Interviewees at the DPKO have endorsed such claims of credibility projection by mentioning that Brazil has been able to “milk the peacekeeping cow”. Accordingly, it was argued that Brazil became known, at least within UN circles, for their good reputation as well as for capable, well-trained and cohesive military contributions. As the UN is nowadays called to do increasingly difficult peacekeeping tasks in places such as Northern Mali, the Central African Republic and the Eastern Congo; the work done by the Brazilians in the slum of Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince, is

\(^6\) Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
\(^7\) Personal communication, 7 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
viewed upon as paving the path, especially in terms of intelligence gathering and use of specialized contributions, to take out very volatile problems. These approaches, as indicated by a DPKO officer, have been gradually mainstreamed into other operations, thus reflecting a process of norm diffusion.

Brazil, on the other hand, has also been quick to underscore the deficiencies of the same organizational platforms from which it receives recognition from. At multilateral meetings, Brazil constantly points at the absence of reform in the peace and security pillar and claims that this has led to a credibility deficit at the UN (Duarte, 2015). Accordingly, pointing at the deficiencies of normative spaces while strengthening one’s position and credibility to provide solutions to these very same deficiencies are thus perceived and used as fundamental tools for countries like Brazil to project influence and enhance their own global standing.

1.2.2 Soft Power

Coined by Joseph Nye, the concept of soft power relates to states’ ability in international relations to shape, through appeal, attraction and persuasion, the opinions and preferences of others (Nye, 2004). Conversely, as underlined by a Brazilian diplomat, “soft power is perhaps the most fundamental tool available to us”. As underlined by a Brazilian diplomat, “soft power is perhaps the most fundamental tool available to us”. Accordingly, it was mentioned that in a peacekeeping mission like MINUSTAH soft power was able to remove a wide array of obstacles. Due to cultural proximities and socialization easiness, Brazil was believed to stand out simply for being Brazil. As reflected by a Brazilian delegate to the UN:

In the case of Haiti, we do have of course a linguistic barrier. Haitians don’t speak Portuguese, but they have a lot in common with us. Haitians love Brazil, love the Brazilian football, are crazy for the Brazilian football. If you want to break the ice in Haiti, bring the national team’s t-shirt, it works.

As peacekeeping engagements are challenging endeavors due to the presence of foreign forces, linguistic barriers and armed personnel, this was seen as being slightly mitigated through engagements underpinned by soft power approaches. As perceived by one of the interviewees, the personality of the Brazilian soldier is generally guided by the need to understand and

---

8Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
9Personal communication, 7 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
dialogue with the local population. There is close interaction and this is seen as being a reflection of Brazil’s foreign policy core values, which have traditionally been based on settling disputes through peaceful approaches. Similarly, it was argued that Brazil carries a noteworthy reputation when compared to other countries involved in Haiti. Reflecting on the role of soft power, a Brazilian diplomat has shared that one of the highlights of his career was a meeting he had with the French Embassy when serving in Haiti:

This meeting started somehow weirdly, it sounded like they wanted to ask a question, but didn’t know how to do it… but they ended up opening themselves: ‘what does Brazil do to generate so much appeal in Haiti? Why does Brazil have all this leverage that no one else has? What do you do to feed this?’

Coming from France, former colonizing power in Haiti, that was not only considered an implicit recognition with regard to Brazil’s approaches, but also a tacit endorsement that, in Haiti’s case, peacekeeping environments can indeed benefit from soft power approaches as they may translate into more trustworthy relations and greater acceptance of the mission.

Respondents at the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio have also supported this perception by claiming that similarities between Brazil and Haiti in terms of a common colonial past, African inheritance, religious syncretism, football, similar food and belonging together to the so-called Global South contributed to facilitate their presence in the Caribbean country. Viva Rio staff said they have also capitalized on this soft power caused by Brazil’s attraction and were able to work closely with Haitian communities while, at same time, being able to ease several of the bureaucratic pitfalls.

From a social constructivist point of view, the role of soft power demonstrates the importance of the social aspect in international engagements, leading to the articulation of peacekeeping identities capable of projecting empathy and ideational commitment. Similarly, as the emergence, cascade and internalization of norms are narrowly linked and embedded in social practice, soft power plays a vital role in showcasing the appeal, attractiveness and persuasiveness of Brazilian peacekeeping approaches. This is capitalized accordingly by its diplomatic body, who promote the attractiveness and desirability of Brazil’s model. Further, as described above,

---

10 Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
the importance attached by a Brazilian diplomat to the recognition of France, a former colonial power and permanent member of the UNSC, can also be seen as critical, in normative terms, to legitimize the desirability of Brazil’s behavioral traits in peacekeeping.

1.2.3 Primacy of Politics

While acknowledging that there has been certain adaptability and flexibility in the Brazilian stance towards the use of force and robust peacekeeping (discussed in greater detail further below), all my Brazilian diplomat informants were keen to emphasize that Brazil always subordinates its peace engagements to what they call “primacy of politics”. In other words, it is argued that political dialogue, rather than fully-fledged militarization, is essential to settle disputes. The role of political negotiations and the importance of the UN as a multilateral and state-driven platform are thus regarded as fundamental. In peacekeeping terms, it is imperative that mandates are endorsed by the Security Council and follow a careful political assessment. Moreover, it was argued that UNSC endorsements alone are often neither sufficient nor a guarantee that mandates would be carried out responsibly. Brazil’s Ambassador to the UN Antonio Patriota recalled during our interview that the ethical precept of Medicine since Hippocrates – “do no harm” – must be thoroughly observed in multilateral initiatives. Additionally, in situations where the UNSC authorizes the use of force, mandates should enable for the political follow-up and monitoring of their implementation. If this type of caution is not observed, the Ambassador implied that the international community runs the risk of being embroiled in other Libyas and Iraqs.

This standpoint was further reinforced by personnel at the DPKO, who argued that more political care needs to take place when analyzing the use of peacekeeping missions as tools. A DPKO officer also observed that, over the last years, there haven’t necessarily been careful assessments as to why the UN goes in certain places. He also highlighted that conflicts in locations such as Haiti and Mali would have been better addressed by a more pronounced political solution, not a military one. The establishment of operations with significant military components, according to my source, means that they are not only costly and are there for a long time; but also crowds out other solutions, political solutions in particular.

Brazilian diplomats have also often referred to peace operations’ latest review process, the HIPPO report, and argued how the aspect of “primacy of politics” was one of the report’s
underlying messages. This can tell, based on a constructivist rationale of norms, how states’ engagement in international normative environments is, more often than not, a type of balancing act. While demonstrating association to normative processes such as the HIPPO confers international legitimation to Brazil’s peacekeeping discourses, the country also strategically takes advantage of given aspects and the open-ended nature of ongoing multilateral normative dynamics to maximize its own interests and utilities: discrediting, for example, interventions such as Iraq and Libya in light of an evolving normative architecture endorsing the primacy of politics opens the field for the promotion of alternatives.

1.2.4 Responsible Use of Force

As highlighted by this thesis’ background chapter, Brazil’s approaches to the use of force in peacekeeping missions have been vividly debated. While regarded as a cautious and skeptical actor when it comes to employing force and engaging in Chapter VII/robust types of peacekeeping operations, Brazil’s most notorious peacekeeping commitment, MINUSTAH in Haiti, was itself authorized under Chapter VII premises. As indicated previously, the Brazilian presence in Haiti had also led to a certain adaptability and flexibility in relation to the appropriateness of interventionism and the use of force. Speaking on the record for this thesis on the issue, a diplomat working closely with peacekeeping said that he sees Chapter VII as a mere technicality that permits greater latitude for action, and considered it a particularly relevant instrument when exercising leadership roles in peacekeeping missions, as it is the case with MINUSTAH. Also, it was regarded natural to use force when countries participate in peacekeeping as they need to be prepared to defend themselves, protect civilians and act on behalf of the mandate. Nevertheless, the same interviewee highlighted that Brazil had not stopped being cautious when it comes to employing force: “We remain committed to the primacy of politics and diplomacy, and use of force only as last resort”.11

Reiterating that caution and skepticism towards the appropriateness of force have by no means disappeared, but recognizing that there has been an evolution on foreign policy standings, the Brazilian Ambassador to the UN pointed out: “you are perhaps right in speaking about an acceptance by Brazil of peacekeeping operations’ modalities under Chapter VII that were

---

11 Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
previously not so easily accepted”. The Ambassador also admitted that there have always been frictions regarding the usefulness of force between the Brazilian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the former more favorable than the latter. Notwithstanding, as MINUSTAH increasingly provided a platform for exchanges and coordination between these two bodies, the Brazilian diplomacy ended up adjusting its stance as the military, met with armed resistance in Haiti, had to employ force as a necessary procedure for effective troop operation.

Brazil’s UN Ambassador, subscribing to approaches underpinned by the primacy of politics, suggested that the use of force is nevertheless carried out responsibly by Brazil. In other words, according to him, this means that forceful engagements are to be guided by uncontestable UNSC mandates, reflect peacekeeping’s “Holy Trinity” and deployed under regional consent expressed through relevant regional organizations. Pointing at the example of the Intervention Brigade in MONUSCO, featuring both host country and African Union consent, it was acknowledged that forceful engagements can indeed lead to positive results and, consequently, so-called robust peacekeeping engagements have their reasons to exist in specific situations. On the other hand, expressing a cautionary stance and recalling upon the HIPPO report, the Ambassador argued that use of force cannot be seen as a panacea and should be determined on a case-by-case basis and take into account local circumstances.

Hence, while accepting that there has been a gradual evolution on the Brazilian stances concerning the appropriateness of force, diplomats tended to underscore that the issue is an unfinished debate. This is perhaps most visibly identified by Brazil’s reaction to the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In light of the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011—which included a reference to the R2P in its mandate—, Brazil voiced its concerns as to the misuse of force under the auspices of the R2P in the Libyan case and sought to identify spaces for normative conversation by launching the concept of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP). Notably acting as a norm-entrepreneur, in accordance with Benner (2013), Brazil attempted to find a unifying position between Southern mistrust of the R2P, particularly in the aftermath of the Libyan intervention, and Western notions of imperatively acting in situations of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing. Referring to the R2P and speaking on the need of cautious and responsible approaches to the use of force in multilateral operations,

---

12 Personal communication, 7 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
Brazil’s Ambassador further mentioned: “depending on the manner how you decide to protect, you may also unprotect and be irresponsible”.13

In a similar fashion, recognizing Brazil’s evolving but yet cautious willingness to accommodate the use of force in its peacekeeping engagements, another diplomat underlined that many of the operational successes credited to the mission in Haiti were precisely due to what he called a “maturation” of Brazil, both within the armed forces and diplomatic corps, concerning the usefulness of more robust engagements. Yet, when asked to define “robustness”, Brazilian diplomats advising on peacekeeping tended to associate robustness primarily to the notion of mission multidimensionality:

Robustness has to do with multidimensionality. It is when the mandate foresees support to the Legislative, capacity building in the Executive, acting on behalf of human rights, reducing community violence, civilian affairs; it is thus a mandate acting on several dimensions, it goes beyond the security core.14

While recognizing that robustness has to do with the duty of maintaining a secure and stable environment, Brazilian diplomatic discourses tend to soften the security oriented implication of robust peacekeeping and seek to broaden its notions by associating robustness with subsidiary functions and place greater weight to development-oriented components.

Outside Brazilian diplomatic circles, think-tank and DPKO staff interviewed for this thesis have attributed Brazil’s evolving stance in terms of use of force mainly as a necessity to respond to the way how events unfolded on the ground, particularly in Haiti: “Brazil got there expecting it would be easy, and quick they had to adapt because they faced quite a bit of resistance and gunshots; their own equipment, their own posture had to change, including a tougher stance”.15

Referring to Lieutenant-General Santos Cruz, head of MINUSTAH’s military component from 2007 to 2009, one informant claimed that more forceful engagements had to do with the individual agency and vision of given Brazilian Force Commanders: “I don’t know what kind of

---

13 Personal communication, 7 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
14 Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
15 Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York.
backing he had, but it was the fact of him asking the Brazilian Ambassador and making it possible. But initially, Brasília, the capital, was not very keen on having that kind of approach.”

Concerning Brazil’s shifting normative stances in discourses on the use of force; a DPKO officer offered yet another interpretation. Generally speaking, given the dynamics of UN politics, it was suggested that there is often a disconnect between countries’ normative positions advocated at the diplomatic circles and practical commitments: “I think this applies to Brazil as well... being part of the G77, etc, you will see them quite vocally opposing any sort of responsibility to protect and interventions in other countries’ sovereign affairs.” Nevertheless, the country’s engagement in MINUSTAH was regarded as a classical case in international politics where idealism is replaced with realpolitik: “Brazil sees an easy case, an easy context where they can get all these foreign policy benefits and away with this idealistic principle that you should not intervene with other people’s and country’s affairs.”

1.2.5 Security-development Nexus

Mentions to the security-development nexus in Brazilian peacekeeping were ubiquitous across much of the interviews conducted and literature reviewed for this study. It stands as a clear attribute when discussing Brazil’s peacekeeping profile, especially in MINUSTAH. Similarly, scholarship and UN reports have increasingly underscored how security and development are closely interconnected, mutually reinforcing and essential for sustaining peace. Speaking at open debates at the UNSC, Brazil often tends to reinforce this interdependency by arguing that militaristic agendas and the unilateral use of force tend to be greater sources of instability if not followed subsidiary developmental approaches (Patriota, 2015b). Hence, applying multidimensional and development-oriented approaches to conflict prevention is considered essential for designing effective peacekeeping strategies. Further, claiming know-how and familiarity with contexts of underdevelopment, Brazil capitalizes on the security-development nexus to project appropriate purpose and legitimacy to its peacekeeping profile, as well as seeking to strategize perceptions of comparative advantages. This is also done, for instance, by challenging the *modus operandi* of other peacekeeping agendas, especially those of developed countries: “actors [from developed countries] may criticize us because they don’t know how this

---

16 Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York.
17 Personal communication, 8 January 2016, New York
18 Personal communication, 8 January 2016, New York
functions, they’ve never participated, they’ve never done this type of actions… they lack field experience, of stepping there and accompanying how things are done”.\(^\text{19}\)

Another diplomat linked the security-development focus in peacekeeping to Brazil’s broader ambition to portray itself as a champion of the Global South through projects oriented by South-South cooperation strategies. Considered the “golden age” of the Brazilian diplomacy, the final years of the 2000s, roughly from 2007 to 2010, were characterized, according to my informant, by unprecedented ambition to elevate Brazil’s profile internationally. There were resources and political will to carry out South-South cooperation projects headed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), Brazil’s governmental agency for international development cooperation. Haiti, due to the increased political proximity enabled by MINUSTAH, was a natural partner. “We wanted to compensate our military presence with civilian development projects. We wanted that institutions of the Brazilian government, academia and NGOs could offer other contours to a mission having, after all, a security focus”\(^\text{20}\), he argued. In Haiti, for instance, this meant the launching of programs across a wide array of activity areas, among which: structuring initiatives to strengthen the country’s economy, tackling hunger, aiding child education and transforming the agricultural sector into an engine for national development. My respondent further illustrated Brazil’s appropriateness to engage with such issues as it had vast domestic experiences in these areas. Concrete guidelines were also drafted at the governmental level to support cooperation initiatives, funding was available and, as reflected, “this was a considerable undertaking considering that Brazil is also a developing country”.\(^\text{21}\) Explaining the modalities of development projects, it was argued their medium to long-term goals, their demand-driven nature and the ownership of local agencies as projects were required to be closely followed-up by the Haitian state. During this “golden period”, it was also mentioned that Haiti has been the largest bilateral cooperation partner with Brazil, thus demonstrating the multifold potentialities of peacekeeping engagements.

The security-development nexus was similarly regarded as “directly benefiting the local population and assisting in building confidence in the peace process and the mission throughout its life-cycle” (Patriota, 2015c). In MINUSTAH, for example, the Brazilian diplomacy has

---

\(^{19}\) Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York. translated from Portuguese.

\(^{20}\) Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.

\(^{21}\) Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
thoroughly supported the inclusion of mandated tools aimed at developing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Community Violence Reduction (CVR) initiatives. The former, as indicated in Chapter 2, are tactical tools to support small-scale development projects. The latter has to do with actions directed at violent communities, often those concentrating gangs, and employing civilians to engage in social projects and dialogue with community leaders. Deemed central to sustain reconstruction efforts and promote an enabling environment for the operation of the troops, a diplomat argued: “Here in New York we strongly defend, despite resistance of some Security Council members, that 1% of MINUSTAH’s budget should be dedicated to QIPs”22. While QIPs are not necessarily carried out by troops themselves, such projects are nevertheless useful for the military as, if not implementing, they provide logistical and security support. This type of involvement, which Brazilian discourses tend to associate with peacebuilding, is also seen as enhancing peacekeepers’ image. Similarly, reinforcing the notion that Brazil’s peacekeeping profile is one of close contact with the local population and places emphasis on developmental aspects, there were mentions to so-called CIMIC actions, which are civilian and military jointly coordinated activities taking place in a theatre of operation (explained in greater length and detail in Part 2).

Advocating for the appropriateness of more pronounced roles in promoting development and strengthened cooperation with civilian agencies was considered, however, a challenging normative effort when articulating peacekeeping at the UN. Pointing at P5 discourses opposing the implementation of QIPs and CIMIC actions in the UNSC, an informant at the Brazilian delegation to the UN observed:

Some of the Council’s permanent members believe that troops should not lose time with this because they think this is neither the mandate’s core nor functions to be carried out by troops. They claim this has to do with the UN Country Team and UN agencies and programs.23

It was pointed out that Brazil disagrees with such understandings as the process of peacekeeping’s acceptance requires that the soldier, who already has the burden of circulating daily in a foreign country with weapons, needs to be in direct contact with the locals in order for

---

22 Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
23 Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
him/her to be seen as someone humane and sensitive to the needs of the population. Further, this was conceived as transmitting a message that the peacekeeper is not there to use his weapons against the population, but rather to defend the population.

Alluding to the Brahimi Report, interviewees at the DPKO and the International Peace Institute (IPI) have supported ideas that stabilization contributes to development and vice-versa. They’ve also endorsed Brazil’s approaches in Haiti underpinned by developmental and capacity-building concerns, which reflect measures aimed at peacekeeping’s multidimensional aspects. This was deemed particularly relevant given the peculiar peacekeeping environment in Haiti, considered the kind of setting with needs for pushing for development and reconstruction, not least in the earthquake’s aftermath. Moreover, it was observed by the DPKO and MINUSTAH personnel that development-oriented undertakings in vulnerable peacekeeping environments become more than needed as these are areas where private contractors do not necessarily want to operate in.

Referring to this thesis’ theoretical underpinnings, it is possible to use Brazil’s promotion of a security-development nexus in peacekeeping to illustrate a few points in international norm dynamics. On the one hand, perceived development successes in Brazil’s domestic realm are projected internationally and contribute to strengthen the country’s position to shape peacekeeping debates and practices. On the other hand, by bringing developmental aspects into peacekeeping, Brazil also subscribes to rationales embedded in institutionalized normative processes and practices, namely the conception of peacekeeping multidimensionality prompted by normative shifts in the post-Cold War period.

**1.2.6 Regional and Cultural Solidarity**

Yet another perceived comparative advantage of Brazil’s profile in MINUSTAH was linked to regional and cultural solidarity, as well as empathy, towards neighboring Haiti. Despite acknowledging that the peacekeeping participation in Haiti was not only about altruistic approaches and good will at all times, a diplomat argued that solidarity motivations, symbolized by interests in helping and being concerned with the welfare of “our brothers and sisters”, have been major driving forces of the Brazilian presence and led to peacekeeping articulations reflecting such concerns. This can be justified, recalling upon the above discussion of soft power, due to the historical, geographic and cultural proximities linking Brazil to Haiti.
The Brazilian Ambassador in Port-au-Prince acknowledged that MINUSTAH marked a watershed in Brazilian-Haitian bilateral relations, but recalled that this relationship is not recent as the countries have sustained diplomatic ties, symbolized by the establishment of embassies, since 1928. According to the Ambassador, not only was the peacekeeping engagement in Haiti a result of solidarity with a regionally and culturally close partner, but also the peacekeeping presence in the Caribbean country further contributed to increase this solidarity. To justify this viewpoint, he pointed at Brazil’s concession of so-called humanitarian visas to Haitians, initiated in the wake of the earthquake in 2010 and still in place nowadays. This visa modality is granted by Brazil to citizens of countries undergoing or still affected by short or long-term consequences of complex humanitarian emergencies. While not permanent solutions to a person’s migratory status, beneficiaries are legally authorized to reside, work and have health and education entitlements in Brazil. In the Ambassador’s own words: “the humanitarian visa was a response given by Brazil to the crisis caused by the earthquake… a crisis that has led to vast unemployment, where institutions have literally vanished… Brazil thought it could contribute by receiving Haitians in Brazil”.24 The solidarity and altruistic dimension of the measure, according to him, is reflected by the current unlimited number of visas issued and the non-restrictive criteria: to be Haitian, demonstrate lack of criminal record and be willing to go to Brazil.

Yet another spin-off of the Brazilian participation in peacekeeping, a DPKO officer pointed out that, through claims of solidarity and linguistic ties, Brazil has been increasingly able to translate its peacekeeping reputation into the domain of peacebuilding as well. My informant considered that Brazil has been able to elevate the profile of the peacebuilding commission on Guinea-Bissau, a lusophone country, not only within the UN, but also among donors. Accordingly, this implies that solidarity with culturally close countries is also strategically used to project commitments aimed at long-term political reform and peacebuilding. Besides Haiti and Guinea-Bissau, when asked what motivated Brazil to contribute to UNIFIL in Lebanon, a Brazilian military adviser in New York replied: “Lebanon is not in our strategic surroundings, is further away and much more difficult in logistical terms, but we have historical and political links with

---

24 Personal communication, 21 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
Lebanon, our vice-president [now interim president] is of Lebanese origin, these ties contribute to justify our presence there”.25

Applying constructivist perspectives to understand Brazil’s normative engagement in peace operations, it can be highlighted how notions of identity and culture are used to shape and justify state behavior at the global stage. Notwithstanding, claims embedded by solidarity and cultural empathy are also employed as means to ascribe international legitimation and benevolent outlooks, at least in discourse, to politically contested interventions.

1.3 Cross-cutting Aspects in Peacekeeping
As indicated in this thesis’ literary revision (Chapter 2), peace operations’ turn to multidimensionality has increasingly highlighted the importance of cross-cutting and interlocking approaches in complementing and supporting military interventions. Among which, notions linked to fostering civilian participation and promoting gender needs have progressively emerged in multilateral peacekeeping discourses and norm-making. Accordingly, the subsequent paragraphs discuss how Brazil, driven by desires to extend legitimacy and esteem to its engagements, approaches and interacts with evolving international doctrinal articulations calling for greater civilian involvement and gender-sensitive concerns in peacekeeping.

1.3.1 Civilian Participation
NGOs and other civilian driven initiatives – mainly but not exclusively in the West – are often regarded as essential foreign policy instruments. Among other things, they can be relevant channels for the dissemination of state funding, and tools to control and implement projects, provide expertise and interact with local actors. The post-Cold War shift towards multidimensional peacekeeping correspondingly meant that, besides the engagement of TCCs and UN agencies, peacekeeping environments could also benefit and collaborate with non-state actors. While firmly subscribing to the conception of multidimensional peacekeeping and nurturing a peacekeeping profile respondent to civilian and local needs, no civilian experts or entities are deployed on behalf of the Brazilian government. Further, in Brazil’s case, the NGO-government channel in international commitments is virtually non-existent and the country’s peacekeeping engagement, in particular, has been absent of a conscious strategy among

25 Personal communication, 8 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
governmental and non-governmental agencies. Brazilian NGO actors interviewed in this study have pointed out that, while Brazil has utilized peacekeeping platforms to convene an image of a new global aid power, evidence shows that this aid architecture has been smaller than expected, is currently shrinking and has also been absent of organizations acting at the grassroots level. Accordingly, the Brazilian NGO sector has limited and reduced international activity and, among the small count of organizations engaged internationally, few have received Brazilian governmental funding.

In Haiti, for instance, Viva Rio has been the most prominent example of Brazilian NGO acting alongside MINUSTAH and is on the ground since the mission’s outset in 2004, initially supporting Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) efforts and subsequently becoming involved with CVR and capacity-building projects. Accounting for the NGO’s involvement in Haiti, a Viva Rio representative admitted:

“Our engagement there ended up happening by chance. Viva Rio went to Haiti autonomously and, on the ground, we’ve established positive relations with the Brazilian army and embassy. There was synergy, a lot of joint work, institutional support and proximity. However, we haven’t been able to launch any idea with ABC [Brazilian Cooperation Agency].”

Highlighting impediments for establishing a more pronounced civilian engagement, shortcomings were further associated with the fragility of Brazilian schemes for international cooperation and development assistance. My informant added that such initiatives were promising in the end of the 2000s, but interest gradually vanished as political will faded, thus leading to a loss of momentum and dynamism. Approaches of this kind, as highlighted, are not yet consolidated in Brazilian policy-making and rely, to a great extent, on the leadership of individual presidents: “While Lula sought to expand the field, Dilma closed it, she didn’t show interest”. Similarly, it was believed that Brazil’s Congress does not have a clue on the political importance and significance of international development cooperation projects. Besides the fact that the minimum required to foster this kind of activities was simply not in place, such initiatives, according to informants, are a long distance away from being seen as high-priority

26 Personal communication, 17 December 2015, Rio de Janeiro, translated from Portuguese.
27 Personal communication, 17 December 2015, Rio de Janeiro, translated from Portuguese.
issues at the governmental level in Brazil, especially considering the current domestic political aggravation and negative economic outlook.

1.3.2 Gender facets

Mentions to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security as well as references to the recent high level review process on the topic were frequently expressed by diplomat informants during the course of interviews. Deemed as key priority aspects of Brazilian foreign policy, it was argued that the country is closely aligned with the Women and Peace and Security Agenda and solidarizes with the international plight against gender-based violence. In an exercise of norm-following and assimilation, Brazilian discourses at the UN portray the country’s peacekeeping engagements as examples where such values and norms are upheld.

Demonstrating that behavior and practices are in conformity with the social environment that they belong, Brazil has pointed out in UN forums that it has contributed with the deployment of female peacekeepers, who are seen as “uniquely well placed to build trust with local communities and to address sexual and gender-based violence” (Patriota, 2016). In a similar fashion, the Brazilian Ambassador to the UN Antonio Patriota has underlined his role as chair of the 60th session of the Commission on the Status of Women, held in March 2016, as an indication of the importance attributed by Brazil to gender equality in political and security processes. Moreover, it is argued by the Brazilian diplomacy that recognition for women’s role as agents for peace starts already at the pre-deployment stage of peacekeeping as CCOPAB, the Rio-based training center, promotes workshops and courses on gender issues and applies rigorous standards in terms of conduct and discipline of personnel during training practices. Notwithstanding, as discussed in Chapter 2, participation of Brazilian women in peacekeeping has been at best timid. Also, contradicting diplomatic normative discourses, visibility and interaction with local peacekeeping social environments tend to be limited as women prominently perform support functions and, despite exceptions, work mainly within military compounds. Stepping-up gender mainstreaming initiatives would imply, among other things, efforts to foster women participation across all stages of peace and security engagements, nurture egalitarian relations with male troops and civilians, and strengthen assistance and cooperation on gender issues.
1.4 Challenges and Limitations

While several rosy accounts of Brazil’s peacekeeping engagement were given above, this sub-section underscores that this has not been absent from a wide range of challenges, inconsistencies and shortcomings.

Concerning peacekeeping’s articulation, diplomats interviewed for this thesis understandably tended to downplay criticism linked to Brazil’s own peacekeeping agency and primarily pointed at structural shortcomings associated with the UN when accounting for challenges. An interviewee in this category, for example, claimed that a fundamental challenge in peacekeeping had to do with the reimbursement provided by the UN. It was argued that UN refunding is still very low and does not encompass, for instance, expenditures linked with pre-deployment preparation and training. Given that quality and ability of troops to operate at the highest level are associated with good training capabilities, the lack of incentives for such purposes, was perceived as undermining the overall efficiency of peacekeeping as most TCCs, especially those seeking to profit from UN peace operations, are unlikely to adequately prepare their personnel to missions. Another highlighted challenge concerned the implementation of QIPs. The extremely long and demanding UN-led process of evaluating, approving and implementing QIPs, particularly in Haiti, were similarly deemed to constrain what MINUSTAH can concretely achieve on the ground. As a mission that portrays a multidimensional and development-oriented profile, the bureaucratic embroilments – extending at times throughout a whole year while troops rotate every six months – mean that too little gets done too late. Diplomats have also blamed the 2010 Haitian earthquake for many of the set-backs experienced by Brazilian peacekeepers, a point of view that was also echoed by respondents across my different categories of informants.

Notwithstanding, several of my informants in Brazil’s diplomatic corps have also acknowledged that they do not have a romantic vision of the Brazilian participation and profile either. Peacekeeping has been after all regarded as a learning experience consisted of many right doings, but also mistakes. Brazilian peacekeepers, while applied only to a tiny minority, as acknowledged by a delegate, have also held racist and bigoted views at certain points. Moreover, linked to the above-mentioned security-development nexus and cooperation projects, many actions have not managed to become sustainable or be followed-up upon over the long-term. Similarly, in Haiti’s case, Brazilian initiatives might have been carried out during a certain
period only to crumble shortly afterwards amid lack of funding, loss of political will and absence of local expertise to enable continuation. “Things end up getting lost in the middle of the way”, an informant observed.

Diplomats have also called attention to budgetary constraints. Brazil is currently second only to the United States as the largest debtor to the UN regular budget and also possesses a debt of US$121 million to the organization’s peacekeeping budget (Ninio, 2015). This constrains, as argued by respondents, the country’s ability to advocate for normative change at UN platforms, hampering not only the above-mentioned peacekeeping credibility, but also undermining bids for a permanent seat at the UNSC and for more influential roles in the UN system. Also, reflecting concerns raised in the literature regarding the lack of adequate domestic policy orientating peacekeeping engagements, the Brazilian Ambassador to the UN endorsed this view and argued that a legislation enabling swifter authorization of troop deployment would be more appropriate. Nowadays, as he recalled, domestic procedures have to be done through Congress and on a case-by-case basis, leading to a long and complicated process.

DPKO, MINUSTAH and research personnel consulted in this thesis were more vocal in criticizing certain aspects of the Brazilian engagement. Assessing whether Brazil really possesses a differentiated peacekeeping profile was deemed hard to gauge given the limited and concentrated dimension of its contributions. Also, while the DPKO has been trying to convince Brazil to deploy elsewhere, it was pointed out that current political and economic turbulences in the country’s domestic realm make the DPKO believe that it won’t be successful, at least in the short-term, in convincing Brazil to contribute significantly in the near future. In a correspondent fashion, interviewees have also expressed uncertainty as to whether Brazilians would be interested in deploying much beyond their strategic areas of interest.

Looking specifically at UN politics, it was observed that MINUSTAH, like any other peacekeeping mission and bureaucratic institution, is a self-perpetuating entity. Countries are interested in securing resources and setting political agendas, and people involved want to keep their jobs. Accordingly, peacekeeping operations become pillows for actors to extract individual benefits without necessarily having to engage in meaningful solutions. Brazil, as implied by an

28 Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
informant, is there for exposure, for visibility, for training and for money. While acting as entrepreneurs and strategizing reforms suited to their own specific ambitions, prominent peacekeeping actors like Brazil haven’t yet been able to change the political processes that can change underlying dynamics. To illustrate, drawing upon one of my sources, although peacekeeping in Haiti played a role in stabilizing the situation and avoiding security problems from escalating, it didn’t resolve such problems, it simply put a lid on them. The sustainability of peacekeeping measures once the UN leaves Haiti was therefore questioned even by DPKO informants.

In order to bring more meaningful forms of entrepreneurship to the normative table, an interviewee at the DPKO suggested that the Brazilian participation in Haiti missed a huge opportunity in terms of using its military leverage to advocate for deeper political reform. This could be done by using its influence in MINUSTAH’s Core Group and in the negotiation of mandates to ensure that reforms would take place; and also by capitalizing on its peacekeeping leverage to affect change and engage in dialogues with authorities on the ground. Similarly, pointing at the essentiality of primacy of politics present in Brazilian discourse and highlighted in the HIPPO, my source argued how the country could deploy more political officers or even try to pitch Brazilian Special Representatives (SRSGs) or deputy SRSGs in Haiti. Accordingly, this could potentiate Brazil’s peacekeeping footprint by enabling more meaningful engagements with the political track: “Once you have decided to establish a peacekeeping operation, I think there is an underutilization of both the police contributions and the military contributions. Not as resources to stabilize the country, but resources to affect change in terms of political outcomes”. However, if not completely refuted, such types of arguments are viewed carefully upon by the Brazilian diplomacy. Using military leverage to affect political outcomes on the ground presupposes a tricky balance as, depending on how one decides to act, it may also raise suspicions of meddling in another country’s internal affairs. This would not only contradict Brasilia’s reluctance of excessive intervention in another country’s sovereignty, but would also hamper international legality by undermining the fundamental norm of impartiality in peacekeeping.

---

29 Personal communication, 8 January 2016, New York.
Observing peacekeeping from within the wider picture of Brazil’s recent economic downtrend and political squabble, informants outside Brazilian diplomatic circles have shared yet another set of interpretations. Interviewees who made several trips to Haiti throughout MINUSTAH’s life-cycle observed that, since the deployment peak following the 2010 earthquake, the mission has not only been downsizing due to financial constraints and other international priorities, but it was perceived that the back-up for a mission in Haiti has been disappearing among those who had supported it the most before, among which Brazil. Moreover, as Haiti does not conform to the typical parameter of a country that requires a peacekeeping operation, the strong support that has contributed to MINUSTAH’s establishment and maintenance over 12 years has been linked to the fact that the Caribbean country has eventually proven a safe ground for countries in Latin America to “play international politics”. For Brazil, who ambitions an increased international political role, Haiti provided a more manageable and controlled environment to engage with global normative environments than taking the risk to deploy to more turbulent peacekeeping locations. To highlight this viewpoint, Lieutenant-General Ajax, current MINUSTAH’s Force Commander, stated in interview for this thesis: “deploying elsewhere would involve calculations of risks as, once you deploy, you may also carry the burden of failures”.\[30] Further, considering Brazil’s current domestic inward looking and the gradual sidelining of foreign policy commitments in recent periods, there is arguably less appetite to undertake such risks, even in more controlled environments.

**Part 2- Implementing a Peacekeeping Profile on the Ground in MINUSTAH**

Peacekeeping is not solely the outcome of discursive articulations and diplomats’ efforts to convince others of the wisdom and virtues linked to a given way of carrying it out. Although largely promoted and legitimized through diplomatic and multilateral articulations, peacekeeping wouldn’t acquire *de facto* meaning, as argued by Lang (2002), if not consisted of practical attempts to translate decisions into actions.

Accordingly, Part 2 explores the implementation aspects of the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH, bringing the knowledge and exploring the perspectives of individuals who have

---

30 Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
fundamental roles in interpreting and implementing a peacekeeping mandate. Here, by considering the opinion of frontline actors, I will seek to investigate how norms and agendas, through ground level experience, give practical meaning to a mission and contribute to the projection of a specific peacekeeping profile.

Inputs will be mainly drawn from my interviews with instructors at the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB) in Rio de Janeiro and members of the Brazilian military contingent operating under the UN flag in Port-au-Prince – consisted at the time of fieldwork of an Infantry Battalion with the sheer size of 850 (BRABATT 23) and an Engineering Company of 120 (BRAENGCOY 23). Similarly to Part 1, information provided by DPKO/ MINUSTAH civil servants and NGO members will be used to offer cross-cutting qualitative judgements and additional perspectives. That being said, the analysis of the implementation dimension will be structured according to the following: (i) Brazil’s pre-deployment and training; (ii) Brazilian peacekeepers’ identities and motivations; (iii) perceived operational comparative advantages of Brazilian peacekeeping; and (iv) challenges and limitations linked to Brazil’s peacekeeping implementation.

2.1 Pre-deployment and Training
Implementing peacekeeping, as argued by Brazilian military interviewees, starts long before the deployment of personnel. Hence, pre-deployment preparation and training were deemed as invaluable stages in any peacekeeping engagement. Brazil’s notable General Santos Cruz, who served as Force Commander both at MINUSTAH and MONUSCO, and speaking on the record for this research: “Keeping our people well-trained means that they will be highly motivated and prepared to serve at the highest operational level”. The General also argued that, perhaps most importantly, training affects the mindset of the peacekeeper and emphasized that effective peacekeeping cannot be neatly planned; it is prominently the result of soldiers’ way of thinking as they need to react to events unfolding on the ground in a spontaneous and quick manner. Brazilian General Paul Cruz, also former MINUSTAH Force Commander, contended in interview that Brazil’s training period is very significant, leading to the preparation of troops that are familiar with the mandate, rules of engagement and applicable political regulation. This

---

31 Personal communication, 26 November 2015, Oslo, translated from Portuguese.
enables a mission’s commander, according to him, to have tranquility and security in implementing a mandate.

As indicated previously, pre-deployment preparations and training are mainly the responsibility of contributing countries themselves. In Brazil, following the country’s début in MINUSTAH, the creation of the first comprehensive structure for training and dissemination of peacekeeping procedures occurred in 2005 with the launch of the Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (CIOpPaz). An informant admitted that, besides providing support to the country’s recent commitment to MINUSTAH, the creation of the training center was motivated by varied reasons: fill a gap in terms of peacekeeping participation as knowledge from deployments in the 1990s has been lost; offer a platform for the collation of feedback; and refine peacekeeping doctrines. In 2010, reflecting the need to coordinate response efforts in the wake of the Haitian earthquake and bring together the different branches of the Brazilian Armed Forces, CIOpPaz – originally a unit of the Brazilian Army – changed its name to Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Joint Center (CCOPAB), accommodating in its structure the Brazilian Navy and Air Force, as well as providing support to police and civilian personnel involved with peace operations.

While troop tactical training procedures are prominently conducted at given regional units, CCOPAB, as informed by a respondent, “adds, complements and lapidates our training to peacekeeping operations”32 through several preparatory courses and exercises. CCOPAB also coordinates the so-called UN Pre-Deployment Advanced Field Exercise, which takes place at the end of the preparation period and brings together the entire Infantry Battalion and Engineering Company prior to deployment. Exercises are characterized by a thorough simulation of the operational environment in Haiti and replicate situations that are both likely and unlikely to be experienced in the field. Moreover, reflecting on the importance of the preparatory process, which lasts longer than the battalion’s deployment life-time of 6 months, a Brazilian soldier in Haiti employed on foot patrols acknowledged: “We know what we are doing here. We’ve been through all these trainings and we see how our techniques have improved. This brings security to our work and reliability to our troops”.33 Further, a training instructor added: “Our military

32Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
33Personal communication, 13 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
personnel arrive quite ready for a mission. We stick in their heads and repeat, repeat and repeat: ‘I have to protect me, protect my colleagues and protect the civilian’”.\textsuperscript{34}

Similarly, and linking back to this thesis’ conceptual framework, CCOPAB provides a vital space for normative conversations with the overall peacekeeping \textit{modus operandi}. The latest quote reproduced above, for instance, evidences the importance of conforming to the core robust peacekeeping norms of self-defense and protection of civilians. Also, the creation of CCOPAB itself, as mentioned on the Center’s website, was normatively sustained by UNGA Resolution 44/49, which encouraged member-states to establish training programs for peacekeeping deployment (CCOPAB, n.d.). Moreover, besides contributing to pre-deployment training, the Center functions as a platform for experience-sharing upon contingent return from missions. What worked? What didn’t work? How can we use what was learnt to improve peacekeeping doctrines? Such questions and reviews also contribute to boost Brazil’s credentials to act as a norm entrepreneur. Accordingly, expertise that was gathered bt CCOPAB and developed by Brazil throughout MINUSTAH’s life-cycle, such as notions linked to the use of force, short-distance attritions and protection of civilians in urban settings, has subsequently featured DPKO doctrines and reports. This, in turn, according to an informant at the DPKO, has been applied to shape operational aspects of other missions. Further, the development of a body of peacekeeping instructors and expertise also fostered international collaboration between CCOPAB and peacekeeping training centers worldwide, providing vital networks for knowledge sharing, socialization and norm diffusion. In a similar fashion, the fact that some of CCOPAB’s preparatory courses are certified by the DPKO – only 14 other centers have such certification globally – was deemed by informants as conferring credibility and turning Brazil into an international reference in peacekeeping preparation and training.

\textbf{2.2 Peacekeepers’ Identities and Motivations}

Despite the subjectivities involved in personal accounts and noting that the collected data prominently reflects the observations of peacekeepers experiencing a comparatively stable period in MINUSTAH, this sub-section attempts to describe how Brazil’s peacekeeping profile is perceived and constructed by deployed individuals themselves, as well as their motivations and how they see their own roles as peacekeepers.

\textsuperscript{34}Personal communication, 18 December 2015, Rio de Janeiro, translated from Portuguese.
For the Brazilian diplomacy to be able to present itself as a credible actor in articulating a peacekeeping profile and portraying a desirable way of behavior, Brazil’s Ambassador in Haiti claimed that this is only possible due to the agency of Brazilian peacekeepers acting on the ground. MINUSTAH’s current Force Commander General Ajax specified that what marks his Brazilian – and also Latin American – subordinates is the adaptability and flexibility of troops. Adaptability was regarded as the ability to quickly adjust to exogenous peacekeeping environments while flexibility was linked to the capacity of performing different peacekeeping tasks throughout a battalion’s deployment. In the General’s own words: “Flexibility has to do with holding a riffle, delivering back the riffle and help to build a school at the same day, and do that naturally and with the heart”. Another military officer offered an additional interpretation and associated flexibility à la brésilienne with actions undertaken with the aim of facilitating and offering shortcuts for the achievement of a specific goal. However, he warned that this can lead to both advantages and disadvantages. It can be an asset in terms of enabling things to move forward with dynamism through the cultivation of personal relationships and dialogue, a quality that can prove essential for achieving and optimizing mandate objectives in highly bureaucratic peacekeeping environments. On the other hand, when this flexibility is not guided by balanced and impartial approaches, it may similarly open the door to different forms of corruption.

Further, an international civil employee who served in Haiti observed how the respect that the Brazilian contingents had from the Haitians had struck him. The image of Brazil as a soccer nation, as he explained, contributed to create proximity, but this respect was also an outcome of the tough posture of the Brazilian military in restoring, through effective day and night patrols, some sort of rule of law in areas previously held by gangs. Justifying this effectiveness in MINUSTAH’s context, and endorsing the observations raised by the literature, the mission’s Force Commander underscored the existence of a wide array of social issues in Brazil and how Brazilian soldiers, most of whom coming from unprivileged backgrounds themselves, tend to better adapt and cope with operational environments in Haiti.

When asked about their motivations to apply for peacekeeping deployments, many military members pointed out how these were unique and complete opportunities to effectively employ much of the knowledge and training received throughout their careers. Most answers also

---

35 Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
highlighted that taking part in a peace operation was a dream fulfilled and several regarded their time as peacekeepers as the best professional experience of their lives. Many observed as stimulating the competitive and rigorous selection process, the intense training, and the possibility to deal with the best available types of equipment and weaponry. Moreover, as explained by a military officer, when a person is deployed to a peace mission, he or she is earning more money and is subtly driven by an embedded notion of contributing to something real and meaningful. Considering that someone is deployed for 6 months and often has neither family nor partner to give attention to, it was deemed natural for peacekeepers to want to work harder and demonstrate strong commitment to their duties. In Brazil’s case, this becomes even more visible in commanding posts as many battalion commanders, who are Colonels, may be promoted to the level of General after deployment. Other senior military personnel may also seek placements at the DPKO or even be recommended to integrate panels aimed at revising peacekeeping doctrines. The latter two are not irrelevant, following a logic of norm-entrepreneurship, as they provide Brazilians with opportunities to normatively contribute and perhaps influence multilateral processes. As a result, personal interests end up being in tandem with national interests in peacekeeping environments.

Illustrating how international norms are directly perceived and assimilated at the frontline level, some respondents even referred to the opportunity to promote human rights as an incentive to engage in peacekeeping: “There are no fundamental rights without peace. It is impossible to achieve right to housing without peace, it is impossible to guarantee any other right without securing peace”, 36 a soldier said. Moreover, accounts also demonstrated the impact of ongoing normative processes in setting appropriate standards of behavior in peacekeeping practice: “Gender equality is something the UN promotes a lot here. The UN has encouraged us to have more women in our activities, but gender issues do not only have to do with women: it is about men and women interacting normally and respectfully in professional and hierarchical terms”, a male peacekeeper observed.

Female peacekeepers interviewed in this study similarly expressed how the inclusion of women in battalions is extremely important and a motive of pride. When asked to give a peacekeeper’s definition of women empowerment, a female interviewee mentioned that it has to do with “being

---

36 Personal communication, 13 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
seen as professional by men, having equal training and having no distinction during deployment: carrying the same backpack, wearing the same helmet and same vest”. They also highlighted how MINUSTAH promotes gender meetings where women and also men from the different TCCs have the opportunity to interact and raise gender-related issues. Further, it was acknowledged that, due to their mostly administrative or health-related postings, females in the Brazilian military had limited contact with social environments outside battalions, but pointed out that they try to promote notions related to gender equality and women empowerment in their interactions with Haitian women working at the military compound and during social activities that they partake. In terms of challenges, they indicated that, despite increased efforts in the Brazilian Armed Forces to include women, there is still a long way to go in terms of qualitatively expanding women’s roles within peacekeeping and other military activities. An interviewee also added that, among her female friends in the military, many would have liked to join the Army ranks in Haiti, but are unable or unwilling in order not to leave family and children behind.

Moreover, the projection of a peacekeeping profile and identity also has to do with the portraying of Brazil and Brazilian peacekeepers as responsible, competent and reliable actors. Accordingly, concomitant with the expansion of the internet and social media, an interviewee observed how social communication detachments at different Brazilian Battalions have increasingly acquired a vital role. BRABATT contingents now operate accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and Flickr, and possess a dedicated set of staffers working with such platforms. In my conversation with an informant dealing with communication matters at BRABATT, he explained how the risk of bad press, despite host government consent, remains very high in multinational settings featuring military operations. It was further mentioned how peacekeeping reputations are slowly built and take years to consolidate. However, it takes very little for such reputation to be damaged and jeopardized. Hence, what is shown by the different media, especially given the speed of communication technologies nowadays, has significant importance for peacekeeping and the Brazilian participation. Accordingly, Brazilian contingents in MINUSTAH have developed a vested interest in monitoring the internet, analyzing what is being said about them and using the cyberspace and social media platforms to promote – through pictures, videos, news reports, among other means – notions linked to appropriate behavior and responsibility in

---

37 Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese
peacekeeping. “We have to take care of our image because, if we don’t, our military, our diplomacy, our country and, ultimately, the UN can be severely undermined”, a military informant stated; thus demonstrating the vital role of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in constructing, sustaining and safeguarding Brazil’s attraction and credibility as a peacekeeping actor.

2.3 Operational Comparative Advantages of Brazilian Peacekeeping

Operational aspects in peacekeeping are key in ensuring effective deployment of troops and resources, and are linked to practices aimed at providing adequate support to a mission’s viability while troops are on the ground. Based on the material collected, this thesis discusses the perceived operational comparative advantages associated with Brazil’s peacekeeping profile and participation, which can be linked to the following aspects: effective use of force; expertise on urban operations; and implementation multidimensionality.

2.3.1 Use of Force

Endorsing some of the perspectives offered in this thesis’ literary discussion (Chapter 2) and the primary evidence presented when discussing the articulation dimension, most military informants tended to agree that there was certain adaptability in Brazil’s normative approaches concerning the international legality and usefulness of force. MINUSTAH’s current Force Commander General Ajax claimed in our conversation that there has been indeed a paradigm shift as to the use of force. The presence of a Brazilian Force Commander in MONUSCO and in charge of the operation’s Intervention Brigade from 2013 to 2015, was deemed by the General as the most prominent evidence of this shift of paradigm. According to him, the Intervention Brigade even goes beyond mainstream international normative underpinnings regulating the use of force. Notwithstanding, it was similarly highlighted that this adaptability hasn’t occurred overnight, being the result of practical experience, changing training approaches and heated debates. Further, according to the General, debates between the Armed Forces and the diplomatic corps were essential to mature Brazil’s standpoint concerning forceful engagements.

Former MINUSTAH Force Commander General Paul Cruz cautioned, however, that robust peacekeeping and Chapter VII engagements, where force may be applied, has to be distinguished from other forms of interventions, which he called “invasions”. Invasions, as argued, are enforcement warfare operations using force at the strategic level and do not feature blue berets.
The intervention in Libya was listed as such an example. Force there was used strategically: an alliance of states against another state. On the other hand, force in robust peacekeeping was considered to be applied at the tactical level and used in a punctual, controlled and consented manner. In other words, force is not used strategically to interfere in a country’s political life, but rather as an instrument consented by host governments and utilized tactically to achieve punctual stabilization objectives.

Adding to that, Brazilian military interviewees, training instructors at CCOPAB in particular, were keen to underscore that use of force, in most cases, does not mean use of lethal force. Use of force, as an informant explained by alluding to the experience in MINUSTAH, is guided by the mandate’s rules of engagement and occurs in a gradual and tempered way. It was mentioned that training exhaustively focuses on preparing peacekeepers to defend themselves and protect civilians without having to resort to lethal weapons. Such approaches include, for instance, means ranging from the use of emphatic oral warnings and pepper spray to the employment of rubber bullets and airsoft guns. A training instructor explained:

> For us, use of force translates into the rules of engagement that we have and our focus is to neutralize a threat without causing unnecessary damage, but sometimes we may reach a limit where we need to use lethal armament. We want to do our work in the best possible manner. We are there to help and we want to generate confidence in the population.  

Moreover, speaking with soldiers deployed on street patrols in Haiti, it was mentioned that an effective use of force required readiness from troops. Peacekeepers are instructed not to retreat when attacked as inaction can transform the UN into a target. Accordingly, a posture revealing readiness to apply force, besides being an instrument for self-defense, can serve to deter potential aggressors. Also, troop performances, in both positive and critical terms, are always discussed and assessed by troops themselves prior to and after the conduction of patrols. Additionally, as informed by the New York-based researcher, Brazil was equipped with a set of capabilities, including intelligence, snipers and urban experience, which enabled them to achieve optimal results when operating a Chapter VII mandate in Haiti. Furthermore, contrary to assumptions of

---

38Personal communication, 18 December 2015, Rio de Janeiro, translated from Portuguese.
“what happens in Haiti stays in Haiti”, a military officer informed that use of force follows meticulous procedures and is accounted for as there are structures within the UN verifying such undertakings.

Military respondents have also validated observations raised earlier in this thesis by DPKO personnel linking Brazilian shifting approaches on the use of force to events challenging troops on the ground. “When we got to Haiti, we had had a completely unstable scene, we experienced shootings and we had to react to that”, an officer who experienced MINUSTAH’s initial phase observed. Eventually, it also became perceived that in gang-controlled areas there was some sort of respect for “strongman-type” approaches. Hence, for troops to be respected and trusted, it was acknowledged that they also had to go for forceful operations. The consulted Force Commanders admitted that the fact they had troops from their own country and region facilitated and provided greater room of maneuver to conduct such type of actions. Also, and contributing to the crafting and projection of a Brazilian peacekeeping profile, it became increasingly felt that it was not only sufficient to use force: “After operations, we concluded that it is important to come back to that specific neighborhood, greet them, do some CIMIC activity [discussed below] and be cordial”.

Accordingly, in order for it not to backfire, force was only deemed effective when the population could understand that troops were not there to harm or target them, but rather as someone that can be trusted to protect and help them. Hence, throughout time, practical engagements with peacekeeping environments meant that acquired experiences were shared, adapted into training and, as noted, there has been a gradual evolution both in terms of preparation and operational procedures resorting to the use of force.

2.3.2 Urban Operations

As indicated previously, Brazil’s role in Haiti is renowned within UN circles for providing valuable expertise and normative approaches in dealing with urban violence insecurity. An informant at Viva Rio argued that upon his arrival in Haiti in 2004 during MINUSTAH’s initial stage, it was evidenced that local destabilizing circumstances have puzzled the UN operationally. According to him, Haiti has broken the UN peacekeeping logics of A fighting against B, such as in a typical civil war. Rather, it became clear that violence followed as a result of the actions and

---

39 Personal communication, 18 December 2015, Rio de Janeiro, translated from Portuguese.
40 Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
reactions of urban communities, and were fueled by crime, state absence and a tumultuous political landscape. The interviewee at IPI, who also experienced MINUSTAH’s outset, suggested that such kind of operations would have been a great challenge for most militaries around the world as armies are not designed to do what he considered “police work”. From this perspective, given the familiarity of Brazilian and Latin American troops with urban environments, it was contended that they were able to tackle organized crime effectively “without making a mess of it”. Justifying this familiarity, a Brazilian peacekeeper recalled how similar military operations were conducted in some of Rio’s favelas both prior and after troops started to engage in kinetic combats in Haiti and how experiences in both settings, despite variations, were mutually reinforcing.

Moreover, informants at the DPKO observed operational features such as the use of special forces, adequate training, motivation, capacity to build a network of informants and ability to use force when required as critical for acting in urban environments. It was similarly mentioned that much of what MINUSTAH was able to achieve in 2006-2007 was a lot the effect of the Brazilian Battalion, which contributed to mop out many of the gangs in Port-au-Prince’s troubled slums, most notably Cité Soleil. DPKO and NGO interviewees, as highlighted elsewhere, also attributed the positive results to the strong leadership skills and charisma of specific Force Commanders, most notably Lieutenant-General Santos Cruz, seen as having a grip of the situation, understanding the different angles of the problem, not allowing force to be used disproportionally and knowing how to obtain support from locals.

Speaking with General Santos Cruz himself, MINUSTAH Force Commander from 2007 to 2009, he reminded, recalling his arrival in Haiti, how the Haitian state and the police have not entered neighborhoods such as Cité Soleil for a long time. Accordingly, following up on the strategies initiated by his predecessors, he opted to occupy given slums and confront gangs, which were regarded as the main destabilizing elements, in order to effectively deal with the problem and enable MINUSTAH to implement its mandate. In operational terms, given that urban confrontations are marked by close proximity and aiming at minimizing collateral damage, nocturnal operations were deemed essential to offer better combat conditions. Moreover, the General recalled how tactics had to be constantly adapted and changed as gang combatants were flexible and resilient and used the irregular urban landscapes of slum settlements to offset their
qualitative and quantitative disadvantages. The establishment of strong points, consisted of choosing well-placed edifications with suitable observation reach inside a slum, has enabled the Brazilian troops to occupy given points, fortify them, launch patrols and expand their influence and control within a given area. Another MINUSTAH Force Commander, General Paul Cruz, added that the institution of checkpoints also proved crucial in the context of urban operations as they enabled troops to verify and control who entered and exited contentious areas.

MINUSTAH’s urban engagements championed by the Brazilian role in pacifying, or at least putting a lead on gang-related instabilities in Port-au-Prince, illustrate how perceived best practices and achievements reached at the frontline level can induce certain peacekeeping approaches. These practices – in this case, linked to urban operations –, when justified in terms of constructivist normative perspectives, confer new frameworks of appropriateness to peacekeeping actions as they have become institutionalized by the DPKO and had their effectiveness recognized by other peacekeeping actors. It also demonstrates how domestic practices and expertise (operations at Rio’s favelas) are externalized and projected at the international arena. Similarly, being renowned in a particular field contribute to states’ international reputation and ability to influence the normative order. As such reputation, according to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and Björkdahl (2002), is often the result of moral shared assessments and recognition from other parties, a quote from a Brazilian military informant in Haiti illustrates well this theoretical insight:

Our reputation became clear to me when an official at the US Army told me that there is a Brazilian Army before and after Haiti. Before Haiti, he said that the Brazilian Army was unknown to the world. Today the perception is that we have a competent, reliable and disciplined army.41

2.3.3 Implementing Multidimensionality

Advancing multidimensional mandates, as indicated previously, has been the underlying rationale guiding much of the UN’s peacekeeping deployments since the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, missions go beyond functions restricted to the maintenance of peace and security, integrating military actors with police and civilian peacekeepers to facilitate a political process,

41 Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
assist with developmental projects, support the rule of law, protect and help civilians, promote human rights, among others activities. Notwithstanding, multidimensional peacekeeping mandates do not solely aim at providing missions with benign facets by moving them beyond the security toolbox. Multidimensionality is in fact narrowly linked to peacekeeping mainstream norms of maintaining, first and foremost, secure and stable environments. Referring to the Brazilian engagement in MINUSTAH, the vision of peacekeeping as a system of inter-locking capabilities has to do with being well-regarded, increasing impact, and reinforcing contingents’ ability to move around, get information and gain acceptance. As argued by a DPKO staffer, this becomes even more important in Haiti as the UN is essentially “using armies to do police work”.

A Brazilian peacekeeper interviewed during fieldwork expressed, from a military perspective, the importance of a multidimensional approach in Haiti by arguing that “although we look like Ninja Turtles [alluding to the way the military is dressed-up], we are here to help and want to be seen as someone that can help the population”.42 Soldiers further highlighted in conversations how they don’t think they will radically change things in Haiti. Nevertheless, actions aimed at helping the population and contributing to strengthen local capabilities, however simple, were seen as crucial for bringing some degree of hope to Haitians. “We know we can at least plant a small seed and that small gesture can eventually change the life of a child later on”,43 an informant stated. Similarly, the researcher at IPI pointed at the peculiar peacekeeping environment in Haiti, which is prominently marked by chronic poverty rather than a protracted conflict, thus requiring Brazilians to go beyond the barrel of the gun and engage in social and development programs. For him, such undertakings, despite augmenting Haiti’s historical dependence on foreign help, played a vital role, particularly in the beginning of MINUSTAH and following the 2010 earthquake, as the mission had minimal conditions to fill some gaps of an absent state.

While MINUSTAH’s core multidimensional mandates linked to political reform, capacity building, delivery of humanitarian aid, among others, are undertaken by the mission’s civilian and police components, performing wider peacekeeping tasks, particularly those related to the above mentioned security-development nexus and the provision of assistance to the local

42 Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
43 Personal communication, 13 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
population, was deemed crucial to provide a quality seal to the Brazilian engagement, which is overwhelmingly military. Also, according to the DPKO source, this posture was fundamental not only to generate proximity with locals, but also to overcome Haitian perceptions associating MINUSTAH’s military component with *turistas*: “For Haitians, it was not necessarily clear what they were doing to help; they are not a humanitarian organization, not a development organization; and it was not clear either how they would fight criminality with an army”, ⁴⁴ he argued. Another welcoming characteristic of the Brazilian contingent enabling them to be something else than *turistas*, according to a MINUSTAH international civil servant, was the fact that they pro-actively hired local interpreters, which allowed them to go on many foot patrols and shortened peacekeeping’s distance from the local population.

As indicated elsewhere, Brazil’s multidimensional and wider peacekeeping actions in Haiti also included, for instance, the identification and implementation of QIPs, which were developed in coordination with MINUSTAH’s civilian branches and included projects such as equipping hospitals, rebuilding schools, paving roads, among others. Although QIPs are small-scale and low-cost projects not intended to serve as long-term development support, they were seen as tools that can directly benefit the population while helping to build confidence in the mission. Similarly, QIPs offered platforms for the military to engage with civilian personnel, domestic authorities and local communities.

Military engineering assets of contingents, such as the Brazilian Engineering Company (BRAENCOY), were also deemed to play a vital role in terms of peacekeeping multidimensionality as they provide support or directly implement different sets of projects, among which QIPs. Interviewees at BRAENCOY were keen to mention that their activities, although primordially mandated to support MINUSTAH-related infrastructure or operations, would often leave some sort of legacy to Haitians. This could be in the form of capacity-building as engineering components employ and teach skills to locals in their various projects. Additionally, it can also encompass the infrastructure constructed to enable MINUSTAH’s operations, including installations, wells and bridges that will remain in Haiti once the UN withdraws. “The population looks differently to the engineering component because they know something will be left as legacy; also, peacekeeping impacts are often more visible through

---

⁴⁴ Personal communication, 7 January 2016, New York.
engineering as it leads to something that will be materialized on the ground”, a BRAENGCOY informant suggested. In 2013, an engineering bilateral agreement where Brazil committed to construct a school and send human resources to train Haitian engineers was announced. However, given the current political and economic turbulences in the South American nation at the time of writing, whether and how the agreement will be implemented remains to be decided.

Similarly, reflecting the appropriateness of closer proximity with the local population and strengthening peacekeeping coordination with civilian actors, Brazilian peacekeepers have also referred to so-called CIMIC initiatives. As explained by an informant, these are jointly coordinated civil-military activities that take place in a theatre of operation and bring together uniformed personnel, NGOs and different UN agencies. CIMIC initiatives can include medical care, dental treatment, distribution of food baskets, small-scale repairing projects, entertainment events for children, among others, and are designated to provide assistance to the local population and create support for a mission. Given the tensions normally embedded in peacekeeping settings, CIMIC events, which are often conducted by the same military personnel employed on street patrols, are one of the few moments when peacekeepers are able to break the toughness of unstable realities and perceive themselves as being kind and helpful towards those in need. Notwithstanding, institutionally speaking, as explained by a respondent working closely with CIMIC, such activities are never conducted out of charity alone: “They are done for us to reach operational benefits; it is for the acceptance and legitimacy of the mission”. Hence, CIMIC initiatives are particularly relevant in the wake of armed military operations conducted in urban neighborhoods as they are intended to “purify” the image of the military and create support for MINUSTAH from within the local population. As a result, according to a training instructor at CCOPAB, Brazilian soldiers in peacekeeping contingents are specifically trained to conduct CIMIC. Based on DPKO doctrine, it was argued that training teaches the military that CIMIC should not be confused with humanitarian action, but rather employed for operational purposes, for exchanging expertise with civilian peacekeepers and NGOs, and to boost the morale of troops. Not least importantly, CIMIC was also regarded a primordial instrument for

45 Personal communication, 13 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
46 Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
institutional propaganda “as those are the kind of things that Brazilian diplomacy capitalizes upon when promoting peacekeeping internationally”, a military source suggested.

In terms of the “norm-follower/norm-entrepreneur” duality, perceived multidimensional peacekeeping functions carried out by Brazil in MINUSTAH, such as engineering activities and CIMIC, are firmly embedded and standardized into DPKO doctrines and manuals, thus highlighting actions that are trained and implemented in accordance with standing international purposes and procedures. Notwithstanding, as discussed with a training instructor at CCOPAB, DPKO doctrine can often be vague and generic, giving therefore leeway to engagements that go beyond institutionalized schemes and enable peacekeeping actors to project their own biases and perceptions of appropriateness. Illustrating this, General Santos Cruz mentioned how his Brazilian and Latin American peacekeepers always tried to do the extra in peacekeeping, going beyond what was written on handbooks and engaging in spontaneous actions. According to him, this was an asset as troops leveraged their cultural flexibility and adaptability to overcome the often distant and not interactive nature of peacekeeping, allowing them to deliver and put their own fingerprint, despite limitations, on many of the multidimensional facets of peacekeeping.

2.4 Challenges and Limitations
Members of the Brazilian military acknowledged that their participation in Haiti should not be romanticized, but tended to pinpoint that they have done more good than harm when considering the long-term engagement and quantity of personnel deployed. Similarly to accounts provided by diplomats under the articulation dimension, the challenges and limitations identified by my informants in the military were prominently associated with peacekeeping’s overall shortcomings, often attributed to the UN, and external circumstances. Again, mentions to the 2010 earthquake – considered an event that has blasted away a progressive and well-crafted dynamics taking place until then – featured as the single greatest obstacle in several of the narratives provided by military informants. Reflecting on the challenges posed by the disaster, MINUSTAH’s Force Commander argued in our conversation that the UN and the Brazilians proved extremely effective and quick to deal with relief as there was international solidarity, emotions were stirred and the media ended up contributing.

47 Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese.
Nevertheless, once the initial commotion had waned, the promotion of long-term development and reconstruction, which have to be thought in terms of decades, proved more elusive. Adding to this observation, a Viva Rio informant contended that, despite the portraying of multidimensionality through a security-development nexus, the UN apparatus and the actions taken by Brazil had fallen short of addressing underlying structural issues in Haiti.

For some of the construction and rehabilitation projects conducted by the Brazilian contingent in Haiti, a non-Brazilian source criticized the quality of such projects. Especially at a time when Taiwanese firms were operating in the Caribbean country, it was argued that MINUSTAH personnel and local authorities have complained about the comparatively poor standards associated with Brazilian works. The same source, however, alerted that this has to be put into perspective: unlike engineering firms, peacekeeping military engineering assets, albeit calls in the HIPPO for greater involvement, are primarily conceived to deliver services to support military operations. Accordingly, this brings up a normative issue of how much military contingents should or are able to get involved in civilian infrastructure tasks. Standards may vary as, for them, the priority may be to construct a road or a bridge that can enable force mobility; not necessarily to build structures that can last for several years.

Nonetheless, Brazilian peacekeepers themselves acknowledged that they had the will and capabilities to do more to develop and support a self-sustaining environment in the Caribbean country, but ended up being limited by the mandate they were tied to. Furthermore, many initiatives, particularly those dealing with infrastructure and improvement of public spaces, ended up being hampered because of corruption and lengthy bureaucracies involving local authorities. Even when paperwork was completed and authorizations granted, resources and inputs for projects, both from the Brazilian and UN sides, would not always reach the frontline. Members of the engineering component, for instance, admitted that it was not uncommon to have stationed machinery deteriorating in their compound while plenty of work could have been done throughout Port-au-Prince. A military official who served in Haiti in 2006 and returned again in 2015 shared his disappointment: “It was very frustrating to come back and see, almost 10 years after, the same garbage on the streets, the same polluted canals, the same open sewers”.

48 Personal communication, 18 December 2015, Rio de Janeiro, translated from Portuguese.
Moreover, peacekeeping environments, as noted by military and civilian informants alike, are huge featherbeddings where international personnel seek to advance career interests and prospects. Job security might be more or at least as much important as human security and, as long as paychecks are awarded, it becomes interesting and comfortable to perpetuate missions in places like Haiti – curiously located at the crossroads between Florida and the Caribbean – without having to radically engage in changing things. Additionally, at the top of the chain of command, MINUSTAH Force Commanders described in our conversation that challenges in implementing peacekeeping could also be linked to the volatility of events in Haiti: “things might look quiet today, but everything can turn upside down tomorrow and we need to be ready”, 49 General Ajax observed. Further, they mentioned how MINUSTAH and the Brazilian troops, who operate in the capital, are often considered an entity who acts on behalf of a corrupt local government, thus negatively affecting their credibility and acceptance, and steering political demonstrations against them among the local population.

Although informants across my different categories of interviewees considered the Brazilian participation overtly successful in terms of bringing stability back to Haiti, this success was mainly linked to putting a temporary lid on the problem rather than triggering new political dynamics and addressing root causes. According to a source at the DPKO, notwithstanding the implementation of successful approaches in operational terms, the Brazilian profile did little more than conforming to traditional and linear peacekeeping models where one comes in (takes time), goes on patrols, provide some sort of security blanket and tries to build capacity. However, as it is the case with other missions, by the time MINUSTAH advanced to the capacity-building stage, it was already very late and funding fatigue started to push the mission to withdraw. Accordingly, even my most optimistic Brazilian respondents working at the frontline level acknowledged that the UN and Brazil will leave without having offered adequate post-conflict solutions.

Furthermore, as MINUSTAH has been a significant source of income and employment in Haiti, some respondents believed that its termination would lead to difficulties as an entire workforce of Haitians, which flourished with the UN presence and increased foreign aid, will be left with little or no job alternatives. Military informants attempted to suggest that the mission could have

49 Personal communication, 14 January 2016, Port-au-Prince, translated from Portuguese
been more effective if it had strived for deliverables such as the creation of universities and a more ambitious capacity-building program. These were deemed small gestures that could lead to significant long-term effects by contributing to overcome dependency through training and income generation schemes. Similarly, besides alluding to MINUSTAH’s alleged spread of cholera, the few Haitians interviewed for this study mentioned that for them, beyond any security concern, the UN and the Brazilians in Port-au-Prince could have done more for Haiti’s development. Though the Caribbean country has been historically poor and vulnerable, they expressed considerable disappointment over the fact that voluminous resources brought by MINUSTAH to Haiti led to little or no change for the average citizenry.

While it was argued that Brazilians have a vested interest on CIMIC activities, which are precisely designed to harness the synergies between military and civilian stakeholders, my military informants often held doubts and reservations as to their civilian counterparts. Explanations highlighted administrative burdens, incompatible values and corruption. To exemplify, an army officer present in Haiti during and after the earthquake described in our conversation how given humanitarian organizations, despite the existence of a context of emergency, refused to transport their aid on military trucks even though these were the only available means for transportation at the time. Moreover, a Brazilian NGO worker endorsed this skepticism on behalf of the military, but shared the view that the army in Brazil still possesses, for instance, an antiquated idea of NGOs and humanitarian agencies:

They see us as a Casa da Moeda [Mint, a place where money is coined in Brazil] and a place for excessive euphoria; the latter has to do with us not being serious enough and the former is linked to perceptions that we are there to make money; they hardly see us as facilitators that work with goals, targets and plans of actions.\(^{50}\)

Accordingly, while normative environments prompted by the Brahimi Report and the Capstone Doctrine have called for the involvement of actors with distinct, albeit overlapping, expertise and capabilities to engage in a coherent and coordinated manner in peacekeeping, implementation at the ground level remains marked by a specific set of ideological and practical challenges. Based on the Brazilian experience, while endorsing a system of multi-stakeholder inter-locking

\(^{50}\) Personal communication, 17 December 2015, Rio de Janeiro, translated from Portuguese
capabilities in discourse – the very core of peacekeeping’s multidimensionality – synergies between different actors remain underexplored and marked by skepticism in practice.
Conclusion

The projection of a peacekeeping profile as a normative balancing act

In light of the research question *how has Brazil, through articulation at the United Nations and implementation on the ground in Haiti, projected its own peacekeeping profile?*, this thesis has provided a detailed, though not exhaustive, analysis as to how the country, through its engagement in MINUSTAH, crafted behavioral traits and preferences on peacekeeping issues. The investigation has been based on a qualitative research design, drew together theoretical and empirical insights, and offered field observations and literary inputs. Holding that the “international” is constructed and underpinned by interactions of people and states, who in turn mold and reproduce norms governing appropriate action and behavior, this thesis has used the Brazilian engagement with peacekeeping and MINUSTAH as an illustrative example to investigate both conceptual and practical implications of normative behavior in international relations.

In examining normative dynamics with regard to global governance structures and questions of intervention, the present study concludes that the Brazilian projection of a peacekeeping profile reflects a dual, yet intertwined, form of normative behavior: as norm-entrepreneur and norm-follower. In other words, the Brazilian projection of a peacekeeping profile implies, particularly in its most outstanding contribution in MINUSTAH, a balancing act at the global stage where it seeks, at the same time, to demonstrate its belonging and adaptation to the environment within which it acts; but also capacity to shape practices and frame issues according to its own perceptions of appropriateness.

Looking at the specific features of Brazil’s peacekeeping profile, examined through the lenses of the *articulation* and *implementation* dimensions, research findings have highlighted that Brazil’s peacekeeping participation has been broadly influenced by global trends such as mainstreams principles linked to the usefulness of force, and embedded in the Holy Trinity and the post-Cold War turn to multidimensionality. Yet, as demonstrated, and borrowing a term from Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), these have been filtered and applied in accordance with Brazil’s “standards of appropriate behavior”. The projection of a Brazilian peacekeeping profile has thus not been in rupture with what other countries do – mandates tend to follow a common blueprint and bureaucratic procedures are standardized –, but the overly vague and generalized language of UN
normative texts and processes opened up space for Brazil to think and act “outside the box”, enabling the country to tailor the situation on the ground – or at least some aspects of it – according to its own preferences and perceptions.

For Brazil, peacekeeping commitments, as seen in MINUSTAH, provided spaces to further geopolitical objectives and to portray itself as well-placed to participate in normative conversations at the global stage. As highlighted by a diplomat: “We know peacekeeping tasks are normally ‘outsourced’ to developing countries, but we don’t want to contribute for the sake of contributing and following what others do, we want to contribute and influence political and strategic outcomes”. Hence, the promotion of approaches guided by soft power, the responsible use of force, the primacy of politics and notions of solidarity, which reflect both on peacekeeping’s articulation and implementation dimensions, are used to project attractiveness to the Brazilian profile. However, for this profile to be deemed credible and legitimate to shape behavioral standards that can be followed, it has to act from within pre-existing normative environments. As suggested by this study’s constructivist theoretical underpinnings, efforts to advance new norms do not happen in a vacuum and are often elaborated within the standards of ‘appropriateness’ defined by prior norms. This is precisely why actors like Brazil work from standing international organizations and instruments – in this case, the UN and peacekeeping – that include firmly embedded, yet open-ended, purposes and agendas that provide room of maneuver for shaping new or alternative practices.

As highlighted by analytical inputs, underscoring the centrality of the UN in international governance and constant mentions to peacekeeping resolutions, reports and reviews reinforce Brazil’s endorsement and commitment to the existing order. Notwithstanding, the language of multilateralism is similarly evoked to call attention to issues and construct – through diplomatic negotiations, peacekeeping training and field operations – new frames of appropriateness. Moreover, as evaluative perceptions are inescapable in such dynamics, access to international audiences provided by these organizational platforms are similarly important as it shapes approval and adherence. In peacekeeping terms, recognition from the UN and, not least, from major powers, whose overarching influence in international politics motivates other states to follow their assessments, is critical for Brazil to project legitimacy and credibility to its profile.

51 Personal communication, 6 January 2016, New York, translated from Portuguese.
as well as to enhance its own self-esteem when acting at the global stage. As illustrated by informants in the diplomatic corps and military, approval and recognition of the Brazilian role in MINUSTAH from actors such as the UN Secretary-General, France and the United States – crucial stakeholders in peacekeeping decision-making – was met with satisfaction and pride. For reasons relating to its identity as a member of the international community, this is perceived to fashion Brazil as an international political-self capable of shaping peacekeeping outcomes while simultaneously abiding to the cultural-institutional context within which states act; necessary attributes for projecting a differentiated, yet credible and responsible, profile.

Brasília’s tendency to embrace multilateral solutions to international issues also highlights a fundamental ambivalence. As demonstrated by Brazil’s role in peacekeeping, multilateralism offers an ideal setting to search for a greater international profile and challenge the order favored by the determinant powers. Paradoxically, however, these very same powers, as discussed above, are also critical, through endorsement and recognition, for the country’s ability to credibly and adequately perform distinctive functions. Hence, the projection of a peacekeeping profile also reflects a delicate balancing act where Brazil, on the one hand, seeks recognition from major powers and, on the other, attempts to reform, through emerging power lenses, a perceived unfavorable order. Accordingly, crafting an international profile in peacekeeping is driven, to a certain extent, by wishes to contest central normative tenets. Yet, it is similarly convenient for Brazil not to advocate for a radical shift of paradigm and, when necessary, adapt behavior to reflect mainstream global norms and standards related to peacekeeping’s conventional corrective and policing functions. This enables the maintenance of an order that, although unequal vis-à-vis great powers, still privileges actors like Brazil in relation to their weaker counterparts.

This thesis has also demonstrated that Brazil’s projection of a peacekeeping profile tend to adopt a more pro-active and entrepreneurial approach in areas where it possesses relative strengths. Given its middling assets – too big to merely follow others, but also too small to craft a political agenda of its own –, Brazil must become selectively active and identify areas where it has comparative advantages in order to allow for the maximization of its profile to be gained “in return for investment of economic and diplomatic capital” (Kenkel, 2013b, p. 273). As demonstrated, diplomatic and military narratives, aided by technological tools and institutional
propaganda means, have also capitalized on Brazil’s perceived strengths and comparative advantages to project credibility and attraction to its peacekeeping profile.

Accordingly, the very choice for an expressive peacekeeping deployment to Haiti is not in vain. Due to geopolitical and cultural affinities, as well as MINUSTAH’s type of operational environment, the mission in Haiti offered an adequate setting – which eventually became a safe and controlled ground – for Brazil to play that kind of role. For example, the country has externalized its own domestic development successes to the international security arena, promoting the marriage of security and development by supporting small-scale rebuilding projects and initiatives aimed at combatting poverty and hunger in post-conflict settings. Similarly, rhetoric and actions in tandem with strategic ambitions of championing the Global South have also shaped the Brazilian footprint in MINUSTAH. By enshrining, for instance, alternative forms of development assistance through notions of South-South cooperation, Brazil sought to advance greater international influence in line with the projection of an alternative Southern portfolio for peacekeeping detached from great power interest, and driven by altruism and solidarity. As a result, the engagement in MINUSTAH has made considerable strides in developing a specific profile that both promoted Brazil’s own interests and brought practical alternatives to the overall peacekeeping modus operandi; alternatives that do not necessarily equal to best or ideal solutions, but symbolize nevertheless attempts to constructively engage with peacekeeping normative environments.

Brazil’s role and mobility within the international system through peacekeeping has also been characterized by tensions with normative canons. As demonstrated by a Brazilian evolving stance on the utility of force, traditional post-colonial concerns with the inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity have been, if not replaced, cautiously adapted to reflect a putative willingness to converse and engage with norms associated with international interventions. The country’s leadership role in MINUSTAH highlights that, when gains can be expected in terms of international prestige and status for the diplomacy and operational efficiency for the military, hesitations and concerns can be mitigated. Obstinate hesitancy to forceful interventions has thus shifted towards a profile where use of force is linked to claims of responsibility, genuine commitment to multilateralism and projection of operational
effectiveness – in Haiti’s case, connected to the suitability of the Brazilian forces in operating at urban and underdeveloped environments.

Additionally, projecting a peacekeeping profile is also associated with demonstrations of adaptation to the social environment one belongs. In a norm-following exercise, which is closely linked to efforts of extending legitimacy and esteem to its contributions, Brazilian narratives have, for example, increasingly followed international – or Western – discourses nurturing the importance of enhancing civilian participation and responding to gender needs in peace operations. While Brazilian commitments are still sub-optimal on the ground, this nevertheless demonstrates an active process of international socialization where countries adopt – or at least start to talk about – norms out of desires to fulfill psychological needs of being part of a group and wanting others to think well of them.

Notwithstanding, Brazil’s peacekeeping profile is not set in stone. As implied throughout the present work, it should rather be understood as the result of ever-changing actions and reactions that are shaped, adapted and reproduced against the backdrop of evolving perceptions of appropriateness in international conduct and practice. Normative balancing acts in Brazil’s peacekeeping profile similarly reflect how preferences and modes of conduct at the global stage are often a dynamic puzzle of different and intricate motivations resulting from domestic developments, strategic calculations, international socialization, among other factors. Profiles are thus malleable and demonstrate the plasticity of the international, where appropriate operating procedures are cyclically challenged, constructed, internalized and de-constructed; and where new crises and obstacles continuously drive actors to find new ways of highlighting progress.

Similarly, Brazil’s peacekeeping profile is also marked by challenges and limitations. Whether MINUSTAH and the Brazilian participation have succeeded in providing lasting security and political stabilization to Haiti will only be possible to be comprehensively assessed with hindsight after the mission’s withdrawal. Notwithstanding, while future research will bring more clarity into peacekeeping outcomes in Haiti, this thesis has pointed out how stakeholders acting on peacekeeping’s articulation and implementation dimensions believe, despite punctual successes and improvements, that MINUSTAH and Brazil will leave without having offered adequate long-term solutions. In this sense, the Brazilian profile did little more than following linear peacekeeping models where actors engage, start providing some sort of security blanket
and are then pushed out due to funding fatigue, and lack of political will. Also, constraints to the Brazilian profile are evidenced by a range of limitations, including: low levels of intragovernmental institutionalization, weak domestic political debate on the topic, lack of parliamentary interest, scarce civilian and police participation, timid female presence, significant budget debts to the UN, among others; which all contribute to undermine Brazil’s ability to project further influence and advocate for greater normative change at UN platforms. Also, whether Brazil’s engagement and peacekeeping profile is context dependent, temporary and unique, as demonstrated by the MINUSTAH-dominated nature of its participation, or whether it symbolizes an aspiration to take part more proactively in future operations remains to be seen. While future deployments would require adaptations to destinations’ local circumstances, the acquired peacekeeping expertise, the training of human resources and, not least, the ability to understand the “UN beast” and the reputation built in Haiti are certainly qualities that can be of use elsewhere. However, as argued by informants, although Brazil is likely to remain at MINUSTAH until the definitive closure of the mission and keep on being present in peacekeeping through so-called token contributions, significant future troop deployment elsewhere is more uncertain given that this is a political decision requiring the alignment of foreign policy interests with domestic incentives.

Notwithstanding, perhaps Brazil’s single greatest challenge is its current political turbulence, fueled by a sharp economic slowdown and significant budget cuts. An increased peacekeeping presence, partly the result of considerable growth, optimism and a more proactive foreign policy during the leadership of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the last decade, is now challenged by a deepening scenario of political and economic crises. At the time of writing, Lula himself is faced with corruption crime charges while his hand-picked successor Dilma Rousseff, who stepped down from office in May 2016 to face impeachment trials, has been stricken by record low popularity rates and plummeting political support, and is on the brink of being permanently removed from her presidency more than two years ahead of her mandate expiry. Accordingly, the impeachment quagmire amid a scenario of austerity measures and unsuccessful attempts to bring the economy back to terms has led to a more domestically oriented agenda in recent years. Whether the trend is expected to follow suit remains to be seen based on what directions Brazil’s forthcoming presidents and governments will adopt to rethink the country’s global strategy and foreign policy. Arguably, however, domestic politics on stormy waters and
sharp economic decline are present circumstances that raise questions as to Brazilian commitments abroad and even cast considerable doubts as to the country’s not so long ago praised status as a rising power at the global stage. Inward looking policies, shrinking budgets and political impotence similarly pose dilemmas as to the continuity of Brazilian contributions to UNPKOs, leading to perceptions that reputation and influence dividends paid by peacekeeping engagements may run the risk of being overly optimistic and short-lived if not followed by sustained expansion and disposition to contribute in the future.

On the other hand, this shall not discredit the fact that international actors like Brazil, which were up till recently held to marginal status on the global stage, have now a greater say in world affairs and are able to participate more vigorously in the normative casting of the international system. This has been, as demonstrated, especially true with the case of peacekeeping rationales and praxis as alternative players like Brazil have managed to challenge, take on responsibilities and become involved in the normative-construction of established-powers’ traditional private hunting grounds of international peace and security governance.
References


Appendices

1. Informed Consent Form (Portuguese)

Consentimento livre, prévio e esclarecido
Você está sendo convidado(a) a participar de uma pesquisa de mestrado a respeito do engajamento brasileiro na Missão das Nações Unidas para a Estabilização no Haiti (MINUSTAH).

Esta pesquisa está sendo conduzida por Eric Cezme, mestrando em Relações Internacionais pela Universidade Norueguesa de Ciências da Vida (NMBU), e orientado pela professora Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, pesquisadora-sênior no Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Dúvidas e perguntas sobre a pesquisa devem ser direcionadas a Inguna Bohman, coordenadora do mestrado em Relações Internacionais na NMBU, através do e-mail inguna.bohman@num.no ou pelo telefone +47 6496-3331.

Sua participação será importante para esta pesquisa e lhe agradecemos, desde já, por disponibilizar parte do seu tempo para nos ajudar.

Os nomes, informações e detalhes fomecidos nesta entrevista/conversa serão usados exclusivamente para fins acadêmicos, não sendo disponibilizados para outras finalidades ou a terceiros. Além do investigador principal, Eric Cezme, e sua orientadora, professora Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, ninguém terá acesso às respostas obtidas.

Nenhuma informação que revele identidades individuais será divulgada ou citada, exceto em casos onde haja autorização prévia do(a) entrevistado(a). Sua participação é voluntária. Você não deve se sentir obrigado(a) a fornecer informações que não queira ou a responder perguntas que prefira não responder. Caso, em qualquer momento, não deseje continuar com a entrevista, você pode simplesmente informar o entrevistador e a entrevista será encerrada.

Ao assinar abaixo, você confirma que leu e concordou com o que está sendo solicitado, e que concorda em participar da entrevista.

Participante:

__________________________  ____________________________  ____________________________
nome                        assinatura                   data
Entrevistador:

__________________________  ____________________________  ____________________________
nome                        assinatura                   data
2. Informed Consent Form (English)

Informed consent
You are being asked to take part in a research study concerning Brazil’s engagement at the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

This study is being conducted by Eric Cezze, MA student in International Relations at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), and supervised by Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, senior-researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Doubts and queries about this study may be directed to Ingunn Bohmann, student adviser for the International Relations program at NMBU, by e-mail at ingunn.bohmann@nmbu.no or by phone at +47 6496-5331.

Your participation is important to this research and we appreciate that you take the time to help.

Names, information and details provided in this interview will be used exclusively for academic purposes, and won’t be made available for other purposes and third parties. Besides the principal investigator, Eric Cezze, and his supervisor, Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, no one will have access to the collected data.

No individually identifying information will be reported or cited, except in cases where the interviewee has given his/her consent and permission. Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to provide any information that you do not wish to provide, or answer any questions that you prefer not to answer. If, at any time, you decide not to continue, you may simply say so and the interview will be terminated.

By signing below, you indicate that you have read and understood what is being asked of you, and that you consent to participate.

Interviewee:

________________________  __________________________  __________________________
name                     signature                          date

Interviewer:

________________________  __________________________  __________________________
name                     signature                          date

120
3. Authorization Letter

Norwegian University of Life Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric)

To
When it might concern

Year ref
Inger Bolthamnn
Date
12.11.19

Confirmation of student status and fieldwork

I hereby confirm that Eric Miram Grena, born 19.01.1991, citizen of Brazil, currently is enrolled as a full-time student at the Master programme: International Relations (M-IR) at The Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU).

Students who attend this program are given the opportunity to go for fieldwork in connection to collecting data and do their own research for their final Master thesis.

Mr. Grena's research will address Brazil's engagement in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The research will involve fieldwork in Brazil (Rio), the United States (New York) and Haiti (Port-au-Prince).

According to the plan, the fieldwork will start by mid-December 2015 and last until the end of January 2016.

The research proposal has been approved by the Department of International Environmental and Development Studies (Noragric), and by the main supervisor prof. Maria Gabriela Jumbert, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

We ask you kindly, to assist our student and help him to accomplish his work if necessary.

P.O. Box 5003
NO-1432 As, NORWAY
www.nmbu.no
www.unhco.no
+47 97 29 02 00

Please contact me if you have any further questions.

Sincerely yours,

Egil Bolthamnn
Study coordinator, Department of International Environment and Development studies, NMBU
Norway
inganzbolthamnn@nmbu.no