From territorial defence to comprehensive security?

European integration and the changing Norwegian and Swedish security identities

Pernille Rieker

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I. Introduction

1. The aim and structure of the paper

The aim of this paper is to study the relationship between the European integration process and the recent changes in the Norwegian and the Swedish national security identities. While several researchers have studied the influence of the EU on national institutions and policies, less attention has been given to the Europeanisation of national security identities. This paper is therefore an attempt to fill this gap. The fact that Sweden has become a member of the EU while Norway has not also makes these two countries good cases for examining the extent and scope of their respective Europeanisation.

Being aware of the different possible interpretations of ‘identity’, I will use the dominant national discourses by the political elites in the two countries as indicators of such national security identity. I use the term ‘discourse’ in order to emphasise that my main aim is not to compare the actual security policies of Norway and Sweden, but rather to compare how security is (and has been) perceived, interpreted and expressed through different periods of time.

While Norway and Sweden have had very different security orientations over the past 50 years (Sweden favouring neutrality and non-alignment and Norway being a faithful ally in NATO), their national security discourses are, in fact, not that different. Both Norway and Sweden have emphasised the importance of non-military aspects of security in various multilateral frameworks. However, until recently their domestic security discourses have been dominated by territorial defence. This lasting traditionalism does not mean that there has been no change in the national security discourses since the end of the Cold War. These changes, however, started somewhat later than in most other European countries, and seem to be influenced more by the European integration process and the development towards an independent European security dimension than by the actual end of the Cold War. Although this European influence is the main topic of this paper, other factors like geopolitics, domestic policy processes, bureaucratic politics etc. are also important. Nevertheless, my purpose here is limited to identifying and interpreting the impact of the European integration process.

I have chosen to look at the development of the Norwegian and Swedish security identities by distinguishing between before and after the referendums on EU membership. First I analyse the period before, which in both cases is characterised by a slight move away from a traditional and military-
focused vision of security and towards a gradual recognition of the EU as being not only an economic power, but also a significant political actor. Second, I focus on the period after the decision on membership was made. During this last period one may identify a Europeanisation of the two national security identities with more emphasis upon both international crisis management and comprehensive security. Since this period is characterised by greater differences between the two countries than the first one, I will study them separately (section II and III). Finally, I conclude by comparing the extent and scope of Europeanisation in the two cases.

But before I start to examine the Europeanisation of the Norwegian and Swedish security identities, I will briefly present a view on the EU’s potential as a comprehensive security actor.

2. EU and comprehensive security
While the last decade of the Cold War period opened up new ways of understanding the concept of security and while many analysts and policy makers have argued for a wider approach to security (Ullmann 1983; Westing 1988; Mathews 1989; Wæver et al. 1993), the policy means chosen continued, to a large extent, to be military ones. This resulted in a gap between the way in which the security context was described and interpreted, and the kind of security policy means actually adopted. While this was the case in most European countries until the end of the Cold War, some important changes are identifiable in many national security discourses at the beginning of the 1990s. It was these changes that paved the way, first, for the transformation of NATO and later also for the development of an independent European security dimension.

One may distinguish between at least two changes in the post-Cold War security discourses. The first change was the move towards defining international crisis management instead of territorial defence as the main task of the military forces. This led to the incorporation of crisis management as one of the main tasks of NATO in addition to collective defence and later also the development towards an independent European crisis management capacity. Second, and more recently, there has been increased focus upon the civilian aspects of international crisis management and the need for improving the coordination between the civilian and military components of crisis management. This change has led to a move in the European security discourses from being dominated by the development of a military crisis management capacity towards more emphasis on the need for a more comprehensive security approach. Since the EU is the only multilateral framework that covers a large number of different areas, this change has led to increased interest in the EU’s potential as a security actor. One may claim that the EU is the only existing ‘tightly coupled security community’ (Adler and Barnett

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With the end of the Cold War, ‘comprehensive’ conceptions of national security have become a growth stock. While the concept most often is referred to in relation to studies of environmental security (Westing 1989), the concept will, in this paper, be used with reference to a holistic security approach that includes both internal and external security mechanisms. Katzenstein (1996: 3) emphasises the social, economic and political aspects of security rather than focusing only narrowly on the explicitly coercive dimensions of state policy.
I. Introduction

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1998), which means a ‘pluralistic security community’, combined with a dimension of ‘tight’ political cooperation/integration (without becoming ‘amalgamated’).4 This special character of the EU combined with its comprehensive character, covering both internal and external security mechanisms, gives it a unique atout for practical realisation of a vision of ‘holistic’ security policy (Pastore 2001: 20).

While one starts to recognise the EU’s potential as a comprehensive security actor, several problems need to be solved before it becomes an operational and effective security actor. Besides the practical problems related to the development of an independent military capacity (see Bertelsmann Foundation 2000), more attention is now given to the need for improved coordination between the different pillars. This concern has, for instance, been expressed recently by the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten. In a speech held at IFRI in Paris he pleaded for ‘the indivisibility of European foreign policy, which cannot be confined to one pillar of the Treaty’ (see Missiroli 2001: Annexe A, p. 49). He also claimed that there was an increasing will among the member states to strengthen this aspect of European security policy:

…in recent years they [the member states] have begun to fashion a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which can be more than just declaratory. And they have recognised that this needs to integrate three stands: national policies, community policies, and CFSP itself (the so-called ‘second pillar’). European foreign policy must combine all three, and will become stronger as that combination becomes seamless (see Missiroli 2001: Annexe A, p. 49).

The need ‘to develop targeted common approaches to countries and regions at risk of conflict taking account of CFSP, development, trade and justice and home affairs issues’ was also presented in a joint report from the Commission and the High-Representative, which was submitted to the European Council in Nice in December the same year (Commission/High Representative 2000). And in an independent contribution from the High Representative on ‘Procedures for Comprehensive, Coherent Crisis Management: Reference Framework’ (see Missiroli 2001: Annexe D.2) a solution to the institutional problem was put forward, by proposing that the Political and Security Committee should be given a coordinating role in such a comprehensive security approach:

…in order to ensure consistency between the instruments available to the Union, it is essential that a single body should have access to all the information, proposals and initiatives relating to the crisis involved in order to make global assessment; following the conclusions of the Helsinki Council, this role would fall to the Political and Security Committee. This is without prejudice either to the institutional prerogatives or to the decision-making mechanisms peculiar to each pillar (see Missiroli 2001: Annexe D.2, p.79-80).

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4 The concept of ‘security community’ was first used by Karl W. Deutch (1957). He distinguishes between pluralistic and amalgamated security communities.
Together with ‘The Communication on Conflict Prevention’ (see Missirol 2001: Annexe F) presented by the Commission in April and the ‘European Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ (EU 2001) adopted in June by the European Council in Gothenburg, all these documents and speeches constitute important steps forward in the discussion concerning the development of a European security policy that is more coordinated and better adapted to the current security context.

While these changes are important, this security discourse has to a large extent been dominated by external security mechanisms. This means that the main focus has been on developing an effective international crises management capacity in order to be able to handle crisis outside the European Union.

However, internal security has also been given increased attention by the EU over the last years. But this aspect of the European integration process has not, until recently, been explicitly referred to as being a part of the EU’s security dimension. This development started with the decision made by the European Council in Amsterdam to incorporate the Schengen acquis\footnote{In 1985 France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands decided to create a territory without internal borders. This intergovernmental cooperation expanded to include 13 countries in 1997, following the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam (all EU members, except UK and Ireland).} into the EU and to create ‘an area of free movement of citizens and non-EU nationals throughout the Union within the following five years, while guaranteeing public security by combating all forms of organised crime and terrorism’. This area has recently been given increased attention and at the extraordinary European Council meeting in Tampere in October 1999, the agenda was entirely devoted to the development of such an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. The tragedy of 11 September has also put new light on the need for strengthening the cooperation on internal security (see EU 2001).

While there has been increased interest in both internal and external security over the last years, this is not new. In fact, this was emphasised by Jacques Delors in a speech given as early as in 1991 at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. In this speech he analysed how aspects of security figured in both the political and economic integration process. He emphasised the importance of the wider notion of security and claimed that:

…the defence issue is being raised in a very different context today from forty years ago, when the founding fathers believed that a European Defence Community could lead to a political Europe (Delors 1991: 2).

In this speech, Jacques Delors sees security as an all-embracing concept, which depends on the ability to create an attractive, harmonious society. In his view security covers not only problems of defence, but also problems of society at large. On the basis of this understanding of security he evaluated the security dynamics of the integration process and distinguished between internal and external security dynamics. Besides the main objective of the integration process, which has been to avoid another European war, he
defines the internal security dynamics of the integration process to include efforts in order to combat ‘new’ threats such as international crime, terrorism, drug trafficking and pollution, but also to handle social and economic problems such as economic recession, unemployment and social exclusion. External security mechanisms, on the other hand, were defined as efforts by the European community to avoid conflicts in the community’s ‘near abroad’, which might represent a threat to the stability of the continent as a whole. In addition to the Union’s external relations at large, these efforts include especially the enlargement process and the development towards the creation of both a non-military and a military crisis management capability (Delors 1991).

The importance of both internal and external security has also been emphasised by the current president of the Commission, Romano Prodi. He claims that:

Europe needs security. External security must be achieved by reducing unrest and tension on our borders. Internal security must be achieved by combating crime, including organised crime. Crime needs to be tackled at its source which often lies in institutional disorder, poor education, social injustice and the soullessness of inner cities and suburbs. Security should also mean a safe environment and safe consumer products, in particular safe food (Prodi 2000).

While there has been an increasing interest in the EU’s potential as a security actor in the post-Cold War context, there are still several remaining challenges to overcome. One of the main challenges that the EU is facing in this respect is to find a way to overcome the current polarisation between the different sectorial notions of security and the different institutional frameworks (the pillar structure) (Pastore 2001). While these challenges remain there is an increased understanding of the European Union as being an important comprehensive security actor. This means, as Antonio Missiroli has emphasised in a recent paper, that it would ‘be a tragic irony if what is increasingly regarded as the comparative advantage and perhaps the greatest asset of the EU as an international actor – namely, the plurifunctional nature, the unique variety and the virtual completeness of the policy instruments and resources it can resort to – turned into a source of division and a liability’ (Missiroli 2001:15).

With the EU becoming an increasingly important security provider in the post-Cold War European security context combined with the fact that it is more ‘tightly coupled’ than other multilateral frameworks, there are reasons to believe that its security approach also will have an impact on how security is defined at the national level both in member states and in states that one way or the other are closely linked to this community (Rieker 2000). In the following I will take a closer look at the relationship between the European integration process and the changes in the post-Cold War Norwegian and the Swedish security identities.
II. Atlanticism, Neutrality and Euroscepticism (1990-94)

In this section I will present the main developments in the post-Cold War Norwegian and Swedish security identities before the referendums on membership in 1994. While the first two years (1990-92) are characterised by a traditional security approach combined with scepticism towards an eventual European security dimension, the last two are characterised by an increased recognition of the European dimension in European security and a slight move away from the traditional security discourse characterised by neutrality and Atlanticism. As we shall see, this change must be understood in relation to the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of a political union.

1. 1990-92: A traditional security discourse

a) Norway: Atlanticism and territorial defence

The Norwegian security discourse in 1990 was dominated by a continued emphasis on territorial defence as the main task of the defence forces combined with a strong support for NATO. This support for NATO has not always been that strong and while NATO membership was an important part of the Norwegian security identity in the beginning of the 1990s, this choice was not self-evident in 1949 when the North Atlantic Alliance was established. In fact, it represented a dramatic change for a country with little experience with foreign policy and with a favour for neutrality and isolationism. It was the painful experience with the German occupation during the Second World War combined with a new concern with the USSR’s expansionist policies and methods that eliminated neutrality as a viable security policy orientation for Norway. When the attempt to create a Nordic defence cooperation failed in 1948/49, membership in the Atlantic Alliance was little by little perceived as the best policy option in the post-war security context.

Over the next 40 years Norway became a devoted transatlantic ally. The most obvious explanation for this change is of course the geopolitical strategic position of country. In fact, during the Cold War Norway was attracting attention and diplomatic interest out of proportion to its military, economic or population size. According to the Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes, Norway was the NATO country that received most support from the US and the allies in proportionality with its population. He describes the Norwegian relationship with the US as so close that it represented ‘an alliance in the

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6 In 1905 Norway gained its independence after nearly 500 years under the dominance of Denmark (1536-1814) and Sweden (1814-1905). The first Norwegian foreign minister, Jørgen Løvland (1905-1908), emphasised two ambitions for the new independent Norwegian foreign and security policy: (1) to defend the Norwegian economic interests and (2) to keep the country out of war between the European powers. This meant that an active trade policy should protect the Norwegian economic interests while non-alignment in peace and neutrality in war were the main strategy in order to protect the nation against international conflicts. At the same time defence of international norms and the respect for international law were seen as important in order to guarantee the interests of a small state like Norway. In fact, foreign and security policy was not a major concern for Norway at that time. There was a general agreement that conflicts and wars were the result of a hidden great power game and that small states were better off isolating themselves from this game. The Norwegian Foreign Minister’s negative conception of the other European states is evident in the following statement: ‘The aim is to keep us outside participation in alliances and those combinations of alliances that might drag us into wars together with some of the European warrior states’ (Neumann and Ulriksen 1997).
alliance’ (Tamnes 1997:61-69). While the decision to join NATO must be understood as an instrumental adaptation to external changes, more than 40 years in NATO had transformed the Norwegian security identity into what one may refer to as ‘Atlanticism’.

The special and privileged Norwegian position in NATO was seriously challenged with the end of the Cold War, and explains the Norwegian ambivalence to this historically important transition. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War was something Norway had waited for and also promoted for a long time through the UN and the CSCE. On the other hand, Norwegian politicians feared that this change would lead to less international interests in the Nordic region. While the breakdown of the Soviet Union, which reduced military concerns and automatically increased the influence of the European integration process, was seen as a positive development by most of the other European states, the Norwegian political leadership was sceptical. It feared that a more independent European security policy would reduce American interest in Europe and make Norway more vulnerable for eventual pressure from Russia. This worry was expressed in the report from the defence commission of 1990, which emphasises that:

Europe must under no circumstances send signals that might reduce NATO’s role or weaken the basis for the US engagement in the Alliance (NOU 1992).

The fact that Norway was one of the last countries to accept NATO’s new strategic concept of 1991 is another indication of Norway having difficulties in moving beyond the Cold War (Sjursen 1999).

The Norwegian interest in and policy towards the European integration process were rather limited in the years following the referendum of 1972. While a slight change may be identified from 1986, this was mainly for economical reasons. In fact, it was not until 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of a political union that one started to recognise the importance of the European integration process for European security.

b) Sweden: Neutrality and territorial defence

Like in Norway Sweden’s response to the post-Cold War security situation has taken some time. This means that Sweden also continued to keep territorial defence as the main task of the national defence forces after the end of the Cold War. However, while Atlanticism has been the main part of the Norwegian national security identity since 1949, the Swedish policy makers continued to hold on to the country’s tradition of neutrality and non-alignment – a tradition that dates back to the beginning of the 18th century. While this policy of neutrality in times of war was not always respected to begin

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7 It was first attributed in 1810, by King Karl XIV Johan, as a response to the drastically changed geopolitical and strategic position of Sweden after the Napoleonic wars. From being an important European power Sweden saw itself as an insignificant state after having lost most of its possessions on the eastern and southern shores of the Baltic Sea during the Napoleonic wars. The fact that Sweden managed to annex Norway did not affect this view, and King Karl Johan’s strategic plan for the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway included the establishment of a balanced position between major European powers. He claimed that ‘separated as we are from the rest of Europe our policy and our interests will always lead us to refrain from involving ourselves in any dispute which does not concern the two Scandinavian peoples’ (quoted in Ojanen et al. 2000: 157).
with, one may claim that the Swedish neutrality policy was well established at least around the turn of the century.

Despite this attachment to neutrality, it was nevertheless Sweden that took the initiative for negotiations concerning a defence alliance between Denmark, Norway and Sweden in early 1948. While this seems to be in contradiction with the neutrality policy, it was not perceived like that in Sweden. In fact, while the treaty with the Soviet Union prevented Finland from joining such an alliance, this was seen as compatible with the Swedish long-standing policy of neutrality since the alliance was perceived to be independent of the two power blocs. However, as Denmark and Norway joined the North Atlantic Alliance, the negotiations failed and Sweden then declared that it would pursue a policy of non-alignment backed by a strong national military defence.

Sweden chose to formulate its policy as a policy of ‘non-alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in the event of war’. Such a policy option had to be accompanied by a credible defence policy combined with a national defence industry to supply this force with materiel in case of war. However, while the Swedish security policy aimed at being credible and independent, it was at the same time based on an unofficial assumption that the other Western countries would assist Sweden militarily if necessary. These unofficial contacts with NATO also show that the difference between the Norwegian and the Swedish security identities was less important than what is often believed. One important difference, however, is to be found in their relations to the integration process. While Norway rejected EC membership in 1972 mostly for economical reasons, EC membership has been regarded as impossible for Sweden during the Cold War period because of the neutrality policy doctrine. Even in May 1990 the Swedish prime minister, Ingvar Carlsson, wrote in a newspaper article that Sweden could not apply for membership in the EC because of the neutrality policy (Strömvik 1999: 248).

Only five months later, however, the government changed its policy and Sweden’s ambition to join the EC was expressed in the form of a press release. In a subsequent message to the Swedish Parliament (the ‘Riksdag’), the government clarified its position by noting that as a consequence of positive developments on the continent ‘Swedish membership in the European Community is in the national interest, provided that her policy of neutrality is retained’ (quoted in Carlsnaes 1993). After a series of deliberation in the Riksdag, the prime minister at that time, Ingvar Carlsson, formally presented Sweden’s application for membership to the EU 1 July 1991. This change does not really represent a big change in the Swedish security discourse and EC membership was understood to be compatible with the policy of neutrality because the Swedish government at that time chose to downplay the issue of a future foreign and security policy and instead face the broader socio-

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8 After the end of the Cold War there have been many analyses showing the limits of the policy of neutrality and that Sweden had close contacts to NATO throughout the Cold War period. Ola Tunander claims that Sweden was ‘plugged in to NATO’ (Tunander 1999: 183). While the end of the Cold War provoked a debate concerning the future of the Swedish security policy, it also led to an increased demand for the past to be examined. This is why in 1992 a commission was established to examine Sweden’s military cooperation with the West from 1949 to 1969. The commission’s report showed that links, both formal and informal, had been far more extensive than previously publicly admitted and beyond those that might be expected of a non-aligned state (SOU 1994).
economic challenges (Agrell 2000: 270). In fact, the EU membership was seen as a potential means to increase international confidence in a Swedish economy, at that time under acute pressure from currency speculation (Miles 1997: 182-183). In an article in the *Economist* (8 November 1990) Carlsson stressed that the reasons for the change in the government’s policy were principally due to economic difficulties reflected in Sweden’s high inflation, big budget deficits and low growth (Miles 1997: 193). He even emphasised that the neutrality policy still was valid.

c) Comparison

The Norwegian and the Swedish national security discourses in the early 1990s continued to be far more traditional compared to the majority of the EC countries. While most of the states had moved beyond the Cold War and adopted a security discourse somewhat better adapted to the new security context, the Norwegian and Swedish policy makers and security analysts continued to define national security in rather traditional terms by emphasising the territory as the most important ‘referent object’ and territorial defence as the most important security policy means. It is less important, however, that this traditionalism was expressed through very different security policies (neutrality in Sweden and Atlanticism in Norway). Another similarity at the beginning of the 1990s was the two country’s scepticism towards the European integration process. As we shall see in the next section the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of a European Union aiming at a common European security and defence policy led to changes in the Norwegian and the Swedish security identities.

2. 1992-95: The effects of the Maastricht Treaty

a) Norway: A compromise between Atlanticism and Europeanism

While the Norwegian security identity continued to be dominated by territorial defence even after 1992, some important non-military or ‘soft’ security initiatives were either initiated or at least strongly supported by the Norwegian government of the beginning of the 1990s. The first initiative came in March 1992 when the Danish and German foreign ministers invited the foreign ministers from Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden and a member of the European Commission to meet in Copenhagen in order to strengthen the existing cooperation among the Baltic Sea states and to decide on the establishment of a Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The ministers found that the recent dramatic changes in Europe heralded a new era of European relations, where the confrontation and division of the past had been replaced by partnership and cooperation. An enhanced and strengthened Baltic Sea cooperation was a natural and logical consequence of these events. The ministers agreed that the Council of the Baltic Sea States should serve as an overall regional forum focusing on the needs for intensified cooperation and co-ordination among the Baltic Sea

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9 Concept used by the so-called ‘Copenhagen research group’, which refers to ‘things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 36).
states. The aim of the cooperation should be to achieve a genuinely democratic development in the Baltic Sea region, a greater unity between the member countries and to secure a favourable economic development.

While participating in this framework was seen as important to Norway, developing a similar cooperation framework in the Barents region was seen as even more important. The so-called Barents region initiative was therefore presented by the Norwegian foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, calling for cooperation between north-western Russia and the Nordic states north of the Arctic circle. The initiative presupposed a lasting community of interest between East and West and emphasised civilian more than military problems.\(^{10}\) The Kirkenes Declaration, which established the so-called Barents Council in January 1993, followed the same logic as the Council of the Baltic Sea States with representatives from all the Nordic countries, Russia and the European Commission.\(^{11}\)

While the national security thinking still was dominated by NATO and territorial defence, the Norwegian power elite had found a compromise with the Barents cooperation initiative of 1992, which leaned to the ‘European’ side. While NATO still was perceived as the most important security actor, the Norwegian policy makers recognised the need for other initiatives and saw the potential of the EU in this respect. Johan Jørgen Holst, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, described the Barents region as a Euro-Arctic Nordic-Russian ‘meeting place’, requiring attention from the EU and aiming to ‘normalise and stabilise’ relationships between East and West, as contribution to ‘a new European security structure’ (Tunander 1996: 55). The Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, also emphasised the importance of the European dimension in this cooperation initiative:

> We need a stronger European basis when developing the cooperation eastwards (quoted in Tamnes 1997: 240).

However, despite increased recognition of the importance of the EU, there was still a tendency to interpret these initiatives as being general foreign policy rather than part of the national security policy. Another indication of such a compromise was the explicit support for Norwegian EU membership given by ‘Atlanticists’ such as General Fredrik Bull Hansen and Professor Olav Riste. They were especially emphasising the important security role of the Union (Tunander 1996: 55). This Europeanisation must be understood as a reaction to the newly signed Maastricht Treaty, which transformed the European Community to a European Union aiming at a common security and defence policy.

This new European dimension in the Norwegian foreign policy was the beginning of a closer relationship between Norway and the EU. A move in
this direction started in 1992 with the signing of the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, the Norwegian application for EU membership, together with the associated membership in the WEU and an explicit support for the integration aims laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. To begin with, this did not mean any radical change in the overall Norwegian security identity, which continued to be dominated by territorial defence, NATO and the Atlantic dimension. But while the need for military strength through NATO in northern Europe continued to be emphasised, the orthodox ‘Atlanticism’ was gradually losing some support and the EU was now perceived as a complement to NATO in European security:

Security and stability are not only a military challenge. Political and economical means are increasingly important. It is the EU that possesses the broadest range of such means (Utenriksdepartementet 1993-94: 14).

The NATO membership and the cooperation between North America and Europe are still essential for the security of Norway (Utenriksdepartementet 1993-94: 14).

However, the period between the signing of the treaty of accession in June 1994 and the referendum held on 28 November 1994 led to a major change of attitude in the Norwegian foreign policy elite. In fact, this period must be considered as a milestone in understanding of the foreign policy cooperation within the EU, in the sense that Norway fully participated in the various working groups, established under the CFSP. In the interim period Norway was also connected to the COREU network, a restricted data network for exchange of information on foreign and security policy. Even though the negative result of the referendum made this learning process rather short, it led to an increased understanding of the EU as also being a political project playing an increasingly more important role in the field of security policy (Sjursen 1999).

While the result of the referendum did not lead to Norwegian membership in the EU, this compromise between ‘Atlanticism’ and ‘Europeanism’ that Norway reached in the first half of the 1990s opened up for development towards a close relationship with the EU in the second half of the 1990s.

b) Sweden: From neutrality to non-alignment and Europeanism

While the Maastricht Treaty and the acceleration of the European integration process led to a slight change in the Norwegian security discourse towards more emphasis on the European dimension in European security, it paved the way for the first reconsideration of the Swedish security policy doctrine. In fact, the Maastricht Treaty made it increasingly difficult for the Swedish political leaders to hold on to the neutrality concept since they had to relate their policy also to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

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12 The Norwegian application was sent in November 1992 after a heavy debate within the ruling Labour Party under the leadership of Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. The EEA agreement was adopted in October.
The new centre-rightist coalition government, which was in power since September 1991, under the leadership of Carl Bildt, recognised this aspect, and in his first major post-election statement on this topic he claimed that

whereas strategic realities in Northern Europe and the North Atlantic are such that Sweden’s prime security principle, summarised in the expression ‘non-alignment in peace aiming at neutrality during war’ retains its fundamental importance, Sweden’s foreign and security policies are nevertheless changing in tune with European developments, creating new possibilities for security cooperation with other European states (quoted in Carlsnaes 1993: 83).

A month later, the prime minister held a speech in Bonn where he went a little bit further and claimed that

…it is obvious that the term ‘neutrality’ no longer can be utilised as an adequate general designation for the foreign and security policies which we wish to pursue within a European framework. Sweden must pursue a policy with a clear European identity (quoted in Carlsnaes 1993: 83)

After an extensive debate, the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs then presented the new outlook on security and concluded that Sweden should be more active at the international scene while maintaining the foundations of non-alignment. In its statements the Committee also included a passage declaring that the Swedish policy of military non-alignment in peacetime remained valid in order to enable Sweden to remain neutral in the case of war in its vicinity (Ojanen et al. 2000: 179). This was done by changing the formulation from being ‘non-alignment in peacetime aiming at neutrality in wartime’ to ‘non-alignment in peacetime, in order to enable Sweden to remain neutral in the case of war in its vicinity’ (quoted in Ojanen et al. 2000). The result of this change was that the term neutrality was being phased out in official usage and replaced by the notion of military non-alignment, referring strictly to defence issues in military terms, and to Sweden’s continued intention of not being part of any form of military alliances systems. While the specification that non-alignment was military only was a confirmation of a policy that had been a reality for many decades, it now paved the way for Swedish membership in a multilateral framework, which was not to be classified as a military alliance, namely the European Union.

However, the formulation in the Maastricht Treaty that emphasised the long-term goal of an eventual common defence continued to be problematic for Sweden. In fact, the Swedish political leadership faced the challenge of convincing both the domestic public opinion and the other EU countries that Swedish EU membership was possible to combine with the policy of non-alignment despite this goal. As the formal negotiations started on 1 February 1993, the Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade, Mr Ulf Dinkelspiel, declared that:

(As) recently stated by the Swedish parliament, Sweden’s policy of non-alignment in military alliances remains unchanged. At the same time, we recognise that the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which in time might lead
to a common defence, is one of the CFSP goals which is to be further discussed in the context of the 1996 review conference. We will not hamper the development of the European Union as it moves forward towards this goal (quoted in Ojanen et al. 2000).

One year later, a report, written for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, considering the foreign and security consequences of both joining and remaining outside the EU (SOU 1994), also argued that there was no barrier to full Swedish participation in the EU’s CFSP (Archer 1996: 24). This means that there was a move towards acceptance of the compatibility of non-alignment and EU membership.

It is interesting to note that contrary to the EU membership, the participation in NATO’s PfP programme caused no controversy in Sweden (in contrast to fellow neutrals such as Austria and Switzerland). The explanation for this is probably that the PfP programme was closely identified with both Sweden’s CSCE policy and its long peacekeeping tradition. While there was some uncertainty concerning what the security and defence dimension of the EU really meant, this was not the case with the cooperation with NATO.

The scepticism towards the EU as a political actor was now getting less important in Sweden and the implementation of the EEA agreement might have been important in this respect. In fact, the EEA agreement can be viewed as a stepping-stone to obtain experience of what it actually meant to be part of the EC. One can also identify a certain Europeanisation of the Swedish foreign policy during this period, and when looking at the UN voting records one sees that Sweden had started to adjust its policy to the West European political mainstream (Lindström 1997: 6). Like in Norway, the explicit recognition of need for involvement of the EU in the newly established Council of Baltic Sea states and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council also shows that the EU now was perceived as an important political actor.

On 1 March 1994, the European Union managed to secure final agreement with Sweden, Finland and Austria on the final detail of their accession packages after marathon negotiating sessions. However, this did not represent the end of the accession process and a real battle between the Swedish government and the domestic population begun. After a vivid debate Sweden voted in favour of joining the EU on 13 November 1994 (Miles 1997: 248).

c) Comparison

After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty there is possible to identify a stronger European dimension in both the Norwegian and the Swedish security discourses. While territorial defence continued to be the main task of the defence forces, there is an increased recognition in both countries of the importance of the EU for European security. In the Norwegian security discourse this resulted in a certain compromise between Atlanticism and ‘hard’ security on the one hand and Europeanism and ‘soft’ security on the other. In Sweden this European dimension led to a change in the national security

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13 The decision to join the PfP programme was launched at the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994 and enabled Sweden to participate in NATO’s peacekeeping operations.

14 The EEA agreement included the EFTA countries in the internal market and gave Sweden, as well as all the other EFTA countries that had accepted the agreement, most of the benefits of membership except political influence.
formulation that would make possible an eventual Swedish membership in the European Union. As we have seen, the increased Europeanism opened up for the membership question to be discussed in both countries and finally also led to the referendums on the membership question that were held in 1994.

While the referendums undertaken in Norway and Sweden in 1994 resulted in full membership only for Sweden, the close relationship that the Norwegian political leadership has managed to establish with the EU is so far-reaching that it may be characterised as a kind of ‘B-membership’. This means that Norway is participating in several of the most important parts of the integration process through special agreements and the like without the possibility of participating in the decisions. In the following two sections I will study the influence of the EU on the two national security identities since the referendums on membership undertaken in Norway and Sweden in the autumn 1994.
III. Europeanisation of the Norwegian security discourse

In order to give an idea of the reach of Europeanisation in the Norwegian case I will start by presenting the special relationship Norway has established with the EU since the referendum in 1994. Then I will study the influence of the integration process on the national security thinking with references to both national defence reforms and the development towards a comprehensive national security.

1. Moving closer to the EU

The period after the Norwegian referendum is characterised by several moves aiming at strengthening the relationship between Norway and the EU. Since the EEA agreement already regulated the Norwegian relationship to the EU’s first pillar, these efforts were done especially in relation to the second and third pillars.

First, a political dialogue in relation to the EU’s CFSP was established. Although cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy in the EU was initiated in the 1970s with the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) little interest has been shown from the Norwegian side towards the EPC. At that time Norway conducted its foreign and security policies through NATO, and any other (competing) multilateral forums, which did not include the United States, were regarded with suspicion (Knutsen 2000).

This new dialogue gave Norway a possibility to join the EU’s foreign and security policy statements and common positions. The number of such joint statements has increased. This is partly a result of Norway being invited more often by the EU to join, but also as a result of an unofficial Norwegian policy to follow EU statements as far as possible. In addition to this, Norway has also been invited to participate in some of the working groups under the CFSP. Currently Norway participates in those groups working with security, the peace process in the Middle East, the Western Balkans, Russia/CIS, the OSCE, disarmament, weapon export and non-proliferation. Even though the Norwegian government also has managed to obtain meetings twice a year at the political level concerning the CFSP, the importance of these meetings has proven to be rather limited. These meetings normally take place during the second day of the European Council meetings, which means that the EU countries are seldom represented by members of their governments.

Second, Norway also made some efforts in order to establish a closer link to the EU’s third pillar concerning Justice and Home affairs. These efforts resulted in an agreement between the EU on the one hand and Norway and Iceland on the other in 1996. The aim of the agreement was to regulate the two countries’ participation in the Schengen cooperation, which included police cooperation and common border control.

With the EEA agreement, the political dialogue and the Schengen agreement Norway had now managed to establish a close link to several of the most important areas of the integration process. Some have characterised this situation as a kind of B-membership in the European Union (Claes and Tranøy 1999), since it means extended participation without the possibility of participating in the decisions taken at the EU level.
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which led to an acceleration of the integration process in these two intergovernmental pillars, made this situation even more problematic. Concerning the second pillar, the decisions taken in Amsterdam opened up for a process towards an eventual integration of the WEU in the EU. The consequence for Norway would then be that the special Norwegian member status in the WEU might be lost. This status had given Norwegian officials and political leadership the possibility to participate at all levels without the right of vote as the only limitation. The expressed ambition of the Norwegian government was therefore to obtain a similar status in the future EU arrangements. The need for such an effort became even more important after the French-British summit in St. Malô in December 1998 where France and UK, for the first time in the history of European integration, agreed upon the need for an autonomous European security and defence policy. This initiative was followed up by the EU countries throughout 1999. Even though the Norwegian initial ambition was to convince the EU members to transfer the special member status Norway had profited upon in the WEU (Missiroli 2001), this was soon understood as being an unrealistic ambition.\(^\text{15}\) Comparing the Norwegians initial ambitions with the outcome of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 when the ESDP was formally launched, proves that the overly ambitious Norwegian diplomatic efforts had failed. The European Council suggested the establishment of ‘appropriate arrangements’ for the participation of non-EU allies under the condition that the decision-making autonomy of the EU was kept.\(^\text{16}\) While the importance of these meetings is difficult to foresee, the few meetings that already have taken place have been rather disappointing for the Norwegians. Instead of being invited to participate in the debate concerning how to conduct European security policy, third countries have been given a rather passive role where they only are being informed of the status of the EU’s work in this area.

Concerning the third pillar, the Amsterdam Treaty also made some important changes with consequences for Norway. In fact, the EU countries decided to integrate the Schengen cooperation in the first pillar, which meant that this cooperation was going to be handled inside the EU institutions and no longer as an intergovernmental cooperation. The agreement of 1996 was therefore no longer valid and Norway and Iceland had to negotiate a new agreement in order to insure these two countries at least some influence in

\(^{15}\) In October 1999 the Norwegian government issued a PM (Pro Memoria) in connection with the EU’s preparation to the European Council in Helsinki. The PM expressed a Norwegian support for the development of a ESDP, but also proposed to the EU how the six non-EU allies could be involved in the decision-making structures. The proposal was day-to-day consultations in the proposed Political and Security Committee and in subsidiary working groups. The non-EU allies would have the right to speak and make proposals and have access to all relevant documents and information. This format would also be the basis for regular consultations in the proposed Military Committee. ([http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/andre/dokumenter/memo.htm](http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/andre/dokumenter/memo.htm))

\(^{16}\) Later (at the European Council in Feira and Nice) this rather vague suggestion has been concretised and opens up for meetings between the EU and all the candidate countries together with Iceland and Norway (the so-called 15+15), but also some special meetings between the EU and the non-EU allies (the so-called 15+6). However, the participation will be different in an eventual operational phase where the contributing non-members will be invited to participate in an ad hoc committee of contributors. In such a phase, the ‘appropriate arrangements’ will imply a day-to-day consultation and discussion concerning how to conduct the operation.
III. Europeanisation of the Norwegian security discourse

The decision-making process. The new agreement was signed in May 1999 and resulted in the establishment of a common forum, between the EU and the two non-members, where Schengen questions were going to be discussed. As part of the agreement Norway also joined the European passport-free zone together with the other Nordic states in March 2001.

This presentation shows that Norway has reached a high level of cooperation with the EU since 1994 in order to compensate for its non-membership. With the EU developing into an important contributor to what I have referred to as comprehensive security, there are reasons to believe that a close relationship to this community also will influence the way security is defined on the national level in Norway. In the next two sections I will take a closer look at the Norwegian national security discourse with regard to two different aspects of security; the transformation of the defence forces and an eventual development towards comprehensive national security approach. The aim is to find out whether there is a link between the European integration process and the changing national security discourse.

2. From territorial defence to international crisis management

Even though the Norwegian security thinking still was dominated by territorial defence and NATO throughout the 1990s, it is possible to identify some recent changes towards an increasing emphasis on the EU and international crisis management. The first important change came in 1999 with an explicit support for the ESDP process and a recognition of the need for transforming the national defence forces. This change must be seen as a reaction to a process, starting with the Amsterdam Treaty in June 1997. However, the importance of this process was first recognised after the St. Malô summit in December 1998. The fact that the Norwegian government at that time was a coalition of parties opposing Norwegian membership in the EU makes the influence of this process on Norwegian security thinking and policy even more evident (Knutsen 2000: 26).

However, the white book on defence presented in February 1998 shows that the government was at first rather reluctant to this process (Forsvarsdepartement 1998). Even though the government states that active international involvement, substantive contribution to NATO’s mutual defence arrangements and participation in peace operations even outside NATO’s borders should form an important part of Norwegian security and defence policy, suspicion towards a development of an exclusive European security arrangement prevailed and no important initiatives in order to change the Norwegian defence forces were proposed. Rather it is the negative aspects of giving the EU a defence role that are emphasised including negative views on a possible EU WEU merger. In that connection the government underlined the possible adverse consequences of the EU developing into a ‘defence alliance’, saying that such a development could harm the forthcoming EU enlargement because an EU role in the sphere of security and defence could alienate Russia and cause strains in the EU Russian relationship (Knutsen 2000: 22). Norway ignored the importance of the CFSP for a long time (see for example Bondevik 1998) and until the St. Malô declaration the Norwegian government considered the traditional reluctant British
position to security cooperation in the EU as a guarantee for a continued Atlantic solution.

A major change in attitude took place in 1999 concerning the way the Norwegian leadership perceived the emerging ESDP. This change also led to an increased awareness of the pressing need for a transformation in the military forces. The first sign of change took place already in January 1999, only a month after the French-British summit in St. Malô. The Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, Knut Vollebæk, then addressed the Norwegian Parliament with a ‘Statement on the Government’s European policy, with emphasis on relations with the EU’. He stated that the

...experience gained from the peace process in the Middle East, the implementation and the follow-up of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and the efforts to reach cease-fire and a peaceful solution in Kosovo have strengthened the position of those who feel that the EU should not only make an economic contribution but also play a more prominent role (...) if the EU should become the framework of political decisions on European security and crisis management to a greater extent than at present, the natural result would be for Norway and the EU to deepen their existing cooperation within the framework of the current arrangement for political dialogue (Vollebæk 2000).

The foreign minister also emphasised that Norwegian participation in the ESDP was important in order avoid any loss of influence in NATO:

The continuation of full Norwegian participation in European security policy cooperation is also important, especially for our position in NATO. ...Norway’s rights as an ally, and as an associated member of WEU, should be maintained in any future solutions that may change the cooperation between the EU, the WEU and NATO (Vollebæk 2000).

The Norwegian prime concern was not the development of an EU dimension in the sphere of security and defence per se, but rather the fear of being excluded from the process in such a way that Norway’s status in the end would be inferior to the current one, namely that of an associated member of the WEU. This means that the significant change in the Norwegian attitude towards the security and defence dimension in the EU must be explained by a fear of being marginalised.

Increased European focus was also present in the reorganisation of the defence forces. The Norwegian government submitted a report to the Norwegian parliament in June 1999 where it emphasised the need for reform in the Norwegian defence forces. The aim was to improve the national capability to take part in peace support operations led by NATO or the EU (Forsvarsdepartementet 1998). This report must be understood as a major step towards Norwegian adaptation to the new security context and especially as a reaction to the newly launched process in the EU. The main content of the report is that the government recommends the establishment of an Armed Forces Task Force for international operations. According to the report the task force will consist of units from all branches of the armed forces and include a total number of more than 3500 personnel. It will be capable of fulfilling
both NATO Article 5 as well as non-Article 5 missions and tasks, it will also be answerable to the WEU and will be assigned to future European force structures (Knutsen 2000: 24). This development indicates that even though the Norwegian security thinking continues to be dominated by a focus on territorial defence, and firmly rooted upon conscription, more emphasis is now being put on the capacity to participate in crisis management operations.

This modest move from territorial defence to international crisis management has also led to an increased awareness of the need for a more radical adaptation of the general Norwegian security thinking. This explains why the Norwegian government decided to establish a Defence Policy Commission in July 1999. Its mandate was to:

...review Norwegian defence policy, its scope and objectives. Our current defence is based on general conscription, allied coordination and international cooperation, and civil society is heavily involved in national defence as a whole. The Commission is charged with assessing how these instruments can be applied and adapted to meet the challenges of the future (quoted in Knutsen 2000: 30).

The Defence Commission conclusions, presented in the end of June 2000, indicated that the Norwegian armed forces were in a deep crisis:

The idea of nationally balanced forces exists only in rhetoric. The adjustments made during the 1990s have to a considerable extent failed, despite good intentions and high ambitions. The infrastructure and organisation of the forces are too large. (...) A continued turn away from the singular focus on traditional invasion defence towards a broader and more balanced structuring of the forces is needed. The future forces must be flexible, i.e. able to meet the challenges that may arise in the short and medium term, and able to adapt to a fundamentally different situation in the longer term (quoted in Knutsen 2000: 47).

Based on the Defence Commission’s conclusions and a report from the Chief of Defence (Forsvaret 2000), the government submitted a report to the Parliament in February 2001 (Forsvarsdepartementet 2001), proposing radical changes in the defence forces compared to earlier reports.

It is the acceleration of the process towards an independent European crisis management capability that has made it important for Norway to adapt its security policy. The most important change is an increase in the troops trained for international crisis management, but there have also been some changes in the way the security environment is analysed. While there was a bad link between the description of the new security context and the Norwegian security policy in the beginning of the 1990s, the government has now managed to present a more overall and coordinated picture (Forsvarsdepartementet 2001).

However, the reactions to this report reflect a continued traditional approach and also an existing gap between the Norwegian establishment and the Norwegian people. When the Norwegian Minister of Defence, Bjørn Tore Godal, claimed in an interview with the main Norwegian newspaper, Aftenposten, that Russia no longer represents a threat to Norway, he was
widely criticised for this statement (Aftenposten, 11 February 2001). The reactions to NATO’s Secretary-General, Lord Robertson in Oslo in February 2001 also shows the prevailing differences between the Norwegian security thinking and the one dominating in NATO (Aftenposten, 3 February 2001). This indicates that while the Norwegian establishment recognises the changed security context and the need for more Europeanism and international crisis management, the Norwegian people still want to hold on to territorial defence and NATO as the main ingredients of national security identity. The Parliamentary Defence Committee’s conclusions concerning the governmental proposal show that the Norwegians are not yet ready for too radical changes. Especially the conservative parties hold on to a traditional understanding of security with the main task of the military forces being territorial defence (Forsvarets 2001).

But in spite of this continued traditionalism, the ESDP process has initiated a development in Norway towards greater acceptance of the EU as an important security actor and a move towards a stronger focus on international crisis management. This means that the political leadership has begun to review the traditional understanding of national security and also taken some decision in this direction.

Even though the discussion in this section indicates a change in the Norwegian security discourse compared to the traditional and Atlanticist approach from the first half of the 1990s, it does not change the fact that security policy continues to be defined more or less exclusively in military terms. While other referent objects than national territory are recognised and other challenges are formulated in security terms, there still is a continued focus on military means in order to meet these new challenges. I will now look at the non-military aspects of both external and internal security in order to see if there has been any change in the national security discourse towards what I have referred to as comprehensive security.

3. Towards a comprehensive national security discourse?
The general impression is that there still is a difference between how one defines the new security context and what one considers as the most important security policy means. In the official discourse new threats are often described as being challenges like international crime, pollution, terrorism, the vulnerability of the society’s dependence on information technology etc. However, security policy decisions and their implementation continue to reflect a rather traditional security thinking. In a speech from 1998 the Norwegian foreign minister at that time, Knut Vollebæk, claimed that

Security policy has become a more complex matter. This means that the Foreign Minister’s overall responsibility for security policy is getting more challenging. The distinction between domestic and foreign policy is totally different today (...) and this is affecting how one defines security. For instance, parts of the environmental policy are now defined as a security aspect.
But even though he recognises the complexity of the security context, he still emphasises NATO and collective defence as the most important security means.

Even though Europe has changed, it is the cooperation in NATO that remains the main basis for our and Europe’s security (…) The capability and will to collective defence remain the most important elements of NATO cooperation (Vollebæk 1998).

This indicates that even though the ‘soft’ security initiatives like the Barents cooperation, the enlargement processes of both the EU and NATO, and the stability pact for the Balkans etc. are perceived as important for regional stability, it still seems like the priority continues to be given to ‘hard’ security, NATO, collective defence and some elements of international crisis management.

While the main change in the Norwegian security thinking has been limited to the role of the defence forces, it is possible to identify a slight tendency towards increased emphasis on the need for a more comprehensive approach to security that includes both civilian and military means. The need for a better coordination between civil and military crisis management and for comprehensive conflict prevention has been given much attention by the EU and the Norwegian political leadership has been supportive of this development. However, even though this development is positively referred to in speeches by the Norwegian political leadership there is little to indicate a transformation of the national security policy in order to enable a better coordination between the civilian and military component of international crisis management. While Norway has long experience with participation in international police operations through the UN, WEU and OSCE, these have traditionally been administrated independently and therefore not entered into the overall security thinking. In a speech concerning a wider security concept, the former Norwegian Foreign Minister, Torbjørn Jagland claimed that:

Complex conflicts are difficult to solve. It needs an overall approach and extended cooperation between different actors. The contribution may vary between military units, assistance in order to build up national police forces and functioning legal systems to humanitarian aid or more traditional and long-term economic aid (Jagland 2001, my translation).

While the need for a coordinated approach is recognised also in the last report from the government (Forsvarsdepartementet 2001: 36), no concrete proposals are given in order to facilitate this coordination in the future. But the Norwegian participation in the Stability Pact for Western Balkans and the fact that the working table with responsibility for internal security is under the leadership of Norwegian officials might also result in some more attention to this aspect.

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17 Norway participated in 24 international police operations between 1989 and 2000.
When it comes to internal security there is also a tendency towards a security thinking characterised by a better coordination between civilian and military security mechanisms. Despite few concrete changes, there is possible to identify at least some processes that indicate a perceived need to evaluate the current national security context and to find a new approach. One example is the Norwegian government decision, in September 1999, to establish an independent Commission that should evaluate the current Norwegian security environment. The so-called ‘Vulnerability Commission’ presented its report 14 August 2000 (NOU 2000) at the same time as the Defence Commission (NOU 2000) and the Chief of Defence (Forsvaret 2000) presented their reports on the transformation of the Norwegian defence forces. It identified a long list of current challenges to national security (terrorism, cyber warfare, pollution, diseases etc.), and made a proposal indicating the need to establish of a ministry responsible for coordinating the various national security policy means.

The initial aim was that these three reports together should provide a comprehensive basis for the government’s work on the forthcoming proposition on the transformation of the Norwegian security policy in general and the transformation of the defence forces in particular (Singsås 2000). However, while the two other reports were referred to in this proposition, the Vulnerability Commission’s report was totally neglected (Forsvarsdepartementet 2001). The fact that these aspects were overlooked indicates the difficulties of integrating the non-military challenges into the overall national security thinking. While there is a general agreement concerning the need for focusing more on a broader range of threats, there are great difficulties in accepting radical changes in order to meet these new challenges. However, after 11 September 2001 these aspects of security have, in Norway like everywhere else, been given much more attention.

While many of these new threats are challenges that the EU takes seriously and has developed different policies towards, the EU is seldom mentioned in this respect. When the EU is mentioned it is rather in relation to the ESDP process and the EU’s relationship to NATO. This should indicate that the influence of the EU on this part of national security thinking is less important than its influence on the transformation of the defence forces. However, the fact that Norway signed a new Schengen agreement in 1999 led to a recognition of many potential ‘new’ threats. These were discussed by the Vulnerability Commission, which was established only a few months after this agreement had been signed. While few of the Commission’s conclusions have led to concrete results, the Ministry’s proposition on the transformation of the defence forces made some changes with reference to the Schengen agreement. This includes an increase in the tasks and responsibili-

18 In a speech held by the State Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, Øyvind Singsås (Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence), in April 2000 many new challenges were referred to without excluding the traditional territorial threat. In fact he distinguished between four different groups of risks. The first was the traditional territorial threat, which in his eyes cannot be totally excluded even though there is no such threat against any of the NATO countries for the moment. The second group of risks was regional instability in NATO’s near abroad, which could threaten the stability of one or more of the allies. The third group is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Finally he refers to terrorism and international crime as important security challenges. Related to this he also emphasises the need for cooperation with the police forces for handling these kinds of challenges (Singsås 2000).
ties of the Coast Guard and the forces supervising the borders to Russia in the north (Forsvarsdepartementet 2001: 33).

4. Concluding remarks
Even though Norway is not a member of the EU, it is possible to talk about Europeanisation of the Norwegian security discourse. As this presentation shows, a European influence may be identified in relation to the reform of the national defence forces, which has been accelerated since the ESDP process was launched. Here the discourse has been closely tied to the developments in the EU and it has been matched with decision-making activities. Concerning the development towards a comprehensive national security discourse, the connection to the EU process is perhaps less evident. However, it is possible to identify a development towards an increased recognition of the EU being an important comprehensive security actor. This has also led to some changes in the national security discourse. Concerning external security, it seems like the EU’s emphasis on conflict prevention and civilian crisis management has led to increased interest in these aspects also in Norway. Even though some people have been interested in these questions for a long time, this has not, until recently, become a part of the dominant national security discourse. It is also possible to find a link between the European integration process and the development towards a comprehensive internal security discourse. Especially the Norwegian participation in the Schengen area has highlighted the need for also emphasis on internal security. While this aspect of security has been given less attention both in the EU and on the national level compared to the external aspects, the terrorist attacks against the US 11 September 2001 have dramatically highlighted the need for a better coordinated security approach that combines different security mechanisms – both internal and external.
IV. Europeanisation of the Swedish security discourse

While it was not the national security identity that prevented Norway from joining the EU, Sweden actually had to change its security formulation in order to make membership possible. While the first change was done shortly after the membership application was sent in 1991, the increased political importance of the EU made this insufficient and raised the question concerning the need for a new change that would leave out the neutrality concept and only keep the reference to non-alignment. In addition to the discussion concerning the Swedish security formulation, EU membership has also had an impact on the reform of the national defence forces, and to some extent also on the development towards a comprehensive security identity.

1. Adapting the Swedish security formulation

As we have seen, Sweden changed its security formulation slightly in 1992 in order to enable EU membership. However, the new formulation, ‘non-alignment in peacetime, in order to enable Sweden to remain neutral in the case of war in its vicinity’, continued to be problematic for Sweden as a EU member. The difficulties were especially related to the WEU and to the formulation in the Maastricht Treaty concerning an eventual common defence.

Concerning Sweden’s relationship with the WEU the Swedish government found a solution and stated that a status as observer was considered to be consistent with Sweden’s non-alignment policy:

…the government regards it as valuable that Sweden, while keeping military non-alignment, is given the opportunity to gain insight and participate in the security policy discussion which is maintained within the WEU; especially humanitarian and peace-keeping missions as well as crisis management… Observer status also provides the opportunity to participate in the discussion of EU decisions whose implementation has been given to the WEU (quoted in Lindström 1997: 13).

However, the Swedish political leadership continued to be sceptical about the formulation in the Maastricht Treaty concerning the development of an eventual common defence. Once inside the EU it therefore became important for Sweden to use its influence in order to avoid such a development. Since Finland shared this concern they decided to take a joint initiative in this regard.

This explains why the foreign ministers of Sweden, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, and Finland, Tarja Halonen, published an article in the morning papers Dagens Nyheter and Helsingin Sanomat (21 April 1996) where they suggested that the EU should enhance its role and capabilities within the area of conflict management. This was the beginning of a Swedish-Finnish initiative that led to the incorporation of the so-called Petersberg tasks19 in the

19 On 19 June 1992, the WEU Ministrial Council adopted the Petersberg Declaration, which defined the WEU’s operational role. This resulted in what later has been referred to as the ‘Petersberg tasks’. These tasks includes ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and also tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking’ (WEU 1992).
Amsterdam Treaty. This ‘demilitarisation’ of EU’s security dimension was perceived both in Finland and Sweden as a major diplomatic success since it meant that a development towards collective defence was avoided and that participation in the European security dimension was compatible with the non-alignment policy. Despite this success, the development towards a common European security policy continued to make it difficult for Sweden to hold on to its security formulation of 1992.

Even though non-alignment was the term most frequently used, the neutrality concept was still referred to and Sweden continued to be perceived, both by many Swedes themselves and by foreigners, as a neutral country. This attachment to neutrality must be explained by the fact that this was considered an important part of Swedish national identity together with other important Swedish references like the welfare state and internationalism through the UN. Since neutrality still was referred to in the security formulation, the Swedish people together with several parliamentarians had difficulties understanding what the changed formulation in 1992 really meant (Miles 1997: 200; af Malmborg 2000). This difficulty was even greater from abroad where Sweden also continued to be perceived as a neutral country. One example is the statement Jacques Chirac made in a speech held in Stockholm as late as April 2000 where he claimed that ‘I know how important neutrality is to the Swedish people’ (quoted in Ahlin 2000). Because of this confusion, several Swedish researchers and journalists have argued for the disappearance of neutrality (Wahlbäck 2000; Åström 2000; Ahlin 2001). Some even talk about the need to let go of the non-alignment policy now that Sweden is a member of the EU. The argument is that it has become difficult to understand how a non-alignment policy can be consistent with Swedish participation in the ESDP (Schultz 2000; Kristoffersen 2001; Landerholm 2001).

While there is no tendency towards an abolishment of the non-alignment policy, the Swedish political leadership has started to question the relevance of the concept of neutrality. At several occasions the Swedish government has declared that Sweden could not be indifferent in case of a EU member being attacked. The Deputy Minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, claimed in a newspaper article that:

…there are no military commitments in the EU but we have a political duty to help each other. I cannot see Sweden as being passive in the case of a war in our neighbourhood (quoted in Ojanen et al. 2000).

But because of the important place neutrality has in the Swedish identity, she also believed that some debate and some information for the general public would be necessary before the concept could actually be erased from the security formulation. However, one year later, in the yearly declaration on foreign policy, the government invited the Swedish Parliament to reconsider the security formulation from 1992 (Utrikesdeklarationen 2001). The terrorist attacks on the US 11 September 2001 and the subsequent war on terrorism have also given new dynamics to this debate. In fact, the Swedish government has used the opportunity to clearly argue that the threat posed by terrorists and the risk that they will get hold of weapons of mass destruction
radically change Sweden’s security needs. The Swedish minister of foreign affairs, Anna Lindh, even suggested that Sweden would be ‘unlikely’ to stay neutral if an armed conflict should break out nearby (The Economist, 13 October 2001).

While the neutrality concept seems to be fading out of the Swedish security formulation, the government continues to insist on the continued validity of non-alignment and that this policy also is consistent with Swedish participation in the ESDP. The argument is of course that the European security dimension is not about collective defence but about international crisis management (Lindh 2001; Von Sydow 2001).

The EU’s military capability is about international crisis management, and not about collective defence. Sweden may therefore be militarily non-aligned and participate in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations together with other EU and UN countries (Lindh and Von Sydow 2000).

While this has been the case since Sweden managed to have the Petersberg tasks incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty, Sweden still has a tendency to be more interested in the non-military aspects of the ESDP, which include conflict prevention and civilian crisis management. At the Helsinki summit, Sweden proposed the establishment of a Civilian Crisis Management Committee in parallel to the military institutions agreed upon. And during the Swedish Precidency an action programme for prevention of violent conflicts was proposed and adopted by the Gothenburg European Council in June 2001 (EU 2001).

This shows that it is not only the EU that influences Swedish security thinking. Contrary to the Norwegian case, the influence seems to go both ways in the case of Sweden. In fact, while Sweden has been obliged to change its security formulation slightly in order to make it compatible with EU membership, the Swedish attachment to a non-alignment policy has also led to several Swedish initiatives concerning the further development of the European security and it has been important for Sweden to avoid any tendency towards a collective defence system.

Despite this eagerness to ‘demilitarising the EU’, the national Swedish security discourse has been far more traditional and militarily focused. The changes here have happened far more slowly and, like in Norway, territorial defence has until recently continued to dominate the national security discourse. As we shall see in the two following sections, some recent changes both related to the role of the defence forces and to the development towards comprehensive security might be identified. There is reason to believe that the EU process also has had some influences on these changes.

2. From territorial defence to international crisis management

When Sweden became a member of the EU a change in the Swedish security discourse towards more emphasis on the country’s international commitments in security questions may be identified. But despite this change, it was not until recently that one decided to undertake a major reform of the national defence forces. Territorial defence had continued to be the main task of
the defence forces and, like in Norway, the recent changes towards more emphasis on international crisis management must be understood in relation to the European integration process and the development towards European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Bengtsson and Ericson 2001).

The decision in order to undertake a major reorientation and reform of the Swedish defence forces was taken by the Swedish Parliament as late as in 1999. While this decision must be seen as a logical result of a process, which had already started when Sweden decided to join the EU (the changes in the Swedish security formulation), the timing of the parliamentary decision indicates that this could be more related to the ESDP process.

Since both neutrality and a credible independent national defence have been the defining elements of Swedish security identity, it was important to obtain a national consensus before proposing any radical changes. In order to obtain such a consensus the government decided to establish a permanent commission for consultations between representatives of the Government and representatives of the political parties of Parliament concerning the long-range development of Swedish Defence and Security Policy. This is why the Swedish Defence Commission was established in 1994. This Commission prepares major Defence Resolutions on Defence Programmes by publishing a series of reports, which have been used as a base for Government Bills to Parliament.

In 1995, the same year that Sweden became a EU member, the Defence Commission presented a report emphasising the importance of building cooperation among the European states and that Sweden should give high priority to ‘conflict prevention’, crisis management and humanitarian efforts’. Continued European integration was seen as ‘the focus of Swedish security’, especially with the EU being expanded to include Central and Eastern European and the Baltic states (Forsvarsdepartementet 1995). This report represented the first real change in the Swedish post-Cold War security thinking in demonstrating a greater stress on Swedish international commitments, rather than on the tradition of national defence. While important elements of the latter still remained, Sweden was now starting to take a greater responsibility for European security rather than seeing itself as being dependent on a security situation determined by the great powers (Archer 1996).

The parliamentary decisions from 6 December 1995 and 14 February 1996, devoted to the Swedish security policy formulation, also indicate this shift. In reference to Sweden’s first year within the EU, it was stated that ‘membership in the EU and participation in the CFSP framework gives Sweden an improved security policy position as well as increased opportunities to engage in foreign and security policy issues in our vicinity’. Similarly, the February 1996 declaration continues in the same line of thought, adding a call for greater interaction with the exterior world: ‘we shall all depend on our common understanding and can in the long run only evolve in cooperation with the outside world’ (quoted in Lindström 1997: 14). These decisions opened up for Swedish participation in peace support operations and underlined that taking part in these kinds of operations should be considered as one of the major tasks of the Swedish defence.
Increased emphasis on the European dimension and a move towards a greater European commitment have also become increasingly evident in the yearly declarations on foreign policy since 1997. In the one presented in February 1997, the Swedish government put forward, for the first time, the European dimension in international cooperation besides the cooperation with the other Nordic countries and the UN. The ongoing IGC and the importance of the EU as a security community were referred to. This was further emphasised in the next declaration (Utrikesdeklarasjonen 1998) and the 1999 declaration, which was presented shortly after the St. Malô summit, explicitly stated that ‘Sweden has a European identity and a European responsibility’. Emphasising the continued Swedish non-alignment policy, the government also expressed its intention to work for ‘a strengthened European capacity for international crisis management’ (Utrikesdeklarasjonen 1999). At the European Council in Feira the Swedish prime minister also explicitly supported the Portuguese proposal concerning the constitution of a European force before the end of 2003 and that this force has to have close relations to NATO (Bengtsson and Ericson 2001).

Taken together, all these statements indicate that the Swedish political leadership seemed convinced that national security had to be considered in a European context and that this also implies a close relationship to NATO (Bengtsson and Ericson 2001). In addition, this increased recognition of the development of a European military capacity and the Swedish contribution to this dimension have also led to an acceleration of the national defence reforms. While the 1996 parliamentary defence decision was the first change away from territorial defence, more radical changes were proposed by the so-called ‘control station for security and defence policy’, which was undertaken by the Defence Commission during spring 1999 (Försvarsberedningen 1999).

The Commission’s report emphasised the need for giving higher priority to the development of the crisis management capability. Based on advice from the Commission and the defence establishment, the Swedish government presented a proposal concerning a major defence reform in November 1999 (Försvardepartementet 1999/2000). The Swedish Parliament voted in favour of this proposition in March 2000, which was the beginning of the biggest transformation of the Swedish defence forces in the post-Cold War period. It represented a clear move away from territorial defence towards smaller and more flexible forces ready to meet a broad range of challenges.

These changes must be seen in relation to the recent development in the EU towards a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Similar reforms have been implemented in other European countries (…) The last years’ incidents on the Balkans have strengthened the European countries’ will to develop a capability for crisis management and conflict prevention. Important steps in that direction were taken by the European Council in Cologne where the EU’s member states decided to develop an effective European capacity for crisis management. This decision will be followed up by the European Council in Helsinki with a decision concerning concrete headline goals for the European crisis management capability and institutional framework for commanding the future capabilities (…) We are going to reform our national defence
forces, which give priority to a new defence. This is a reform that follows the
development in Europe and which gives Sweden a modern defence for the future
(Von Sydow 1999).

In fact, in the 2000 declaration on foreign policy the government affirmed
that ‘Sweden is part of Europe and its foreign policy is characterised by a
triple identity, which is at the same time Nordic, global and European’. It
also emphasised ‘that the Swedish government fully supports the recent pro-
gress towards a strengthened European capability in both military and civi-
lian crisis management’. The non-alignment policy is still referred to, but at
the same time it is emphasised that ‘Swedish security has a clear European
dimension’ (Utrikesdeklarationen 2000).

This shows that the Swedish security discourse, just like the Norwegian
one, has moved away from its traditional security approach throughout the
second half of the 1990s. Gradually the Swedish security identity has chan-
ged from being characterised by neutrality and territorial defence to increa-
sed Europeanism and international crisis management. Even though these
changes are important they remain in the military sphere of security. In the
next section, I will take a closer look at the other aspect of security to find
out if it is possible to identify a development towards a comprehensive
approach in the Swedish security discourse and, if so, whether this change
can be linked to the development towards a comprehensive security dis-
course at the EU level.

3. Towards a comprehensive national security discourse?
Both Norway and Sweden are known for their interest in non-military
aspects of security and for being active promoters of these aspects in multi-
lateral frameworks like the UN and the OSCE. The main difference between
the two, however, is that the Norwegian political leaders also have had the
possibility to discuss questions related to hard security in multilateral frame-
works like NATO. The Swedish neutrality and non-alignment policy have
limited this discussion to the national level. This probably explains why the
Swedish security identity, far more often than the Norwegian one, is per-
ceived as one with little or no interest in hard security questions. But in real-
ity the two national discourses are less different than often believed. In fact,
one finds the same gap in Sweden as in Norway between how the security
context is defined and the actual policy adopted. While the post-Cold War
security context is defined as being far more complex than under the Cold
War, and that new security mechanisms are needed, territorial defence has,
as we have seen, continued until recently to be the main focus of the national
Swedish security policy. The Swedish minister of foreign affairs, Anna
Lindh, confirmed this at a conference early in 2001:

The rapid and far-reaching political upheavals of recent years have not only
given rise to a totally new security policy situation in both Sweden and in
Europe; it has also had repercussions on other continents (…) But agreement on
the existence and nature of a new reality does not mean that the ability to deal
IV. Europeanisation of the Swedish security discourse

with new security policy challenges has developed accordingly. Many debates still cling to views and notions dating back to the Cold War era (Lindh 2001).

However, the Swedish tradition with neutrality and non-alignment has made every form of international cooperation on hard security difficult. Even though the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty made participation in a future European security and defence policy possible, such participation continues to be contested in Sweden (Schultz 2000). This is why the Swedish political leaders have been focusing more on the non-military aspects of security. In fact, Sweden has been one of the promoters of the comprehensive external security dimension in the EU. Since Sweden became a member of the EU, Swedish political leaders have managed to ‘demilitarise’ the EU’s security dimension, first, with the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Treaty and, more recently, with several initiatives concerning the development of the non-military aspects of crisis management. While Sweden has been in advance when it comes to the development of a comprehensive external security approach, the security discourse at the national level has, just like the Norwegian one, been far more traditional and militarily focused.

Recently, however, the need for developing a comprehensive national security approach has been given increased attention also in Sweden. In fact, the major defence reforms of 1999 have been followed by initiatives in order to increase the emphasis on civilian security and what is referred to as the vulnerability of civil society. Two reports are important in this respect. The first is a report from the Swedish Defence Commission and must be seen as a contribution to the ongoing discussions concerning the national security doctrine emphasising ‘the need to define more clearly the capabilities required to deal with threats that are not armed attacks in the strict sense of the term, but rather threats coming from attacks where advanced methods and weapons, including non-conventional weapons, that are implemented by other actors than states’ (Försvarsberedningen 2001: English summary). The report is focusing on various forms of terrorist attacks, but has been criticised for focusing too much on cyber terrorism (Eriksson et al. 2001). The second report is from an independent commission established by the Ministry of Defence with a mandate to analyse and submit proposals concerning a more integrated approach to civil defence and emergency planning. The Commission proposes the establishment of an institution for coordination of the various national security mechanisms (SOU 2001). In an article written for the Swedish Defence Commission, Professor Bengt Sundelius argues that Sweden needs to replace the traditional total defence, which was built upon the conception that civil society needed to assist the military in case of war, by what he calls a ‘societal defence’ where the protection against the vulnerability of civil society is given priority (Sundelius 2001: 8). While these contributions show that a debate concerning these questions has started, the question is in what way these changes are related to the European integration process.

While it is easier to identify the relationship between the ESDP process and the recent reforms of the Swedish defence forces, it is possible to argue that there is some connection between the recent developments in the EU
towards a more holistic approach to security and the development at the national level towards a more comprehensive security approach. One possible explanation is that the Swedish EU membership has made it more difficult to continue having two different discourses. In fact, it has become increasingly difficult to defend one approach to security at the EU level, where one emphasises the non-military aspects of international crisis management, and another one at the national level, where one continues to focus on the military aspects of security. This should indicate that the Swedish political leaders have to adapt their national discourse to the one they undertake in the EU where Sweden has worked for increased emphasis on civilian and non-military crisis management. Another factor might be, like in Norway, the influence of the integration of the Schengen acquis into the EU and the need for strengthening the cooperation concerning internal security. This development shows that increased attention has been given to strengthening the internal security mechanisms in the EU over the last years. This means that the need to focus more on the vulnerability of the society or ‘societal defence’ might have come as a consequence of implementation of Schengen, which has put emphasis on several new threats and the need for further cooperation in third-pillar issues.

Even though it is difficult to find any evidence of a direct link between these processes at the EU level and the ones at the national level, there are reasons to believe that Swedish membership in the EU might have contributed to an increased awareness of the new security context and the need for a better coordinated security policy. There is also an increased recognition that the EU has a good potential as a comprehensive security actor. Referring to the emphasis Sweden has put on including the civilian aspects on external crisis management, Bengt Sundelius argues in a paper written for the Defence Commission that Sweden now should follow up these initiatives by emphasising the need for the establishment of an internal crisis management capacity in the EU (Sundelius 2001: 14). However, as a result of the terrorist attack in the United States these have been put on the agenda in the EU without such a Swedish initiative.

4. Concluding remarks
Since Sweden became a member of the EU there has been several changes in the Swedish national security discourse. First, EU membership has led to increased attention concerning the need for changing the national security formulation. The result has been a discussion on whether or not one should leave out the neutrality concept of the formulation and only keep the reference to non-alignment. Second, there has, like in Norway, been a move from territorial defence towards more emphasis on international crisis management. This change must be seen in relation to the recent development towards a European Security and Defence Policy. Third, it is also possible to identify a move towards more emphasis on a comprehensive security approach. While Sweden has taken the initiatives in order to demilitarise the European security dimension, there has also been a change in the domestic security discourse towards more emphasis on comprehensive internal security. The impact of the EU on this aspect of the national security thinking is
perhaps less clear than in the case of the changing national security formulation and the national defence reforms. However, there are at least two parallel processes and there is an increased recognition of the EU’s potential as an important comprehensive security actor. The fact that Sweden is a member of the EU also makes the possibility for influencing the European security dimension greater and reduces the necessity of adapting the national security discourse.
V. Comparison
Throughout the 1990s, the EU has developed into a ‘tightly coupled security community’ - a community that in addition to its level of political integration has a comprehensive policy range, covering a large number of different areas. While these elements should give the EU the potential for meeting the many challenges of the post-Cold War security context, there are also reasons to believe that such a tightly coupled security community will have a certain impact on national security identities of both member states and countries that are closely linked to this process. The aim of this paper has been to compare developments in the Norwegian and the Swedish security identities in the 1990s and to evaluate the extent and scope of Europeanisation in the two cases. The fact that both Norway and Sweden had very traditional security discourses at the beginning of the 1990s and that it is possible to detect shifts away from this traditionalism in parallel with the development towards a European security dimension should prove that a Europeanisation has indeed occurred.

Despite some obvious differences between the two countries’ security orientations (that Sweden has held on to its neutrality doctrine while Norway has remained a faithful ally in NATO and that the Swedish people accepted EU membership in 1994 while the Norwegians refused), the national security discourses are rather similar, even though the character and the scope of the Europeanisation process have been slightly different. The similarities were most evident before the referendums on EU membership in 1994; they were characterised by traditionalism, expressed through Atlanticism/neutrality, Euroscepticism and emphasis on territorial defence. With the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of a political union such traditionalism was challenged for the first time, resulting in a slight move in both discourses towards a greater interest in the EU’s potential as a political actor. This also led to a discussion over eventual membership of the EU. Despite this change, the national security discourses remained to a large extent concentrated around the traditional approach of the Cold War period. It was only after the referendums on the membership question in 1994 that one might spot real changes in the two discourses, changes that may be characterised as ‘Europeanisation’. Such a Europeanisation was facilitated by Swedish membership and Norwegian so-called ‘B-membership’ of the EU.20

In Sweden one may identify a slight move away from this traditional security approach rather early after joining the EU. However, there are more tangible changes in both countries’ security discourse after the Amsterdam Treaty and the acceleration of the process towards an independent European security dimension. First, there has been a move away from focusing on territorial defence as the main task of the defence forces towards more emphasis on the need for participating in international crisis management. Second, there has been an increased interest in comprehensive security, which indicates a development towards a more holistic and multifaceted national

20 While Sweden was a full member as from 1995, Norway used the first years after the negative result of the referendum to establish a close relationship with the most important areas of the integration process – the character of this relationship has been referred to as a B-membership.
security approach more similar to the one we see as prevailing at the European level.

Along with the many similarities between the developments in the Norwegian and the Swedish security discourses since 1995, there are some differences related to the character of their respective Europeanisation. As one could expect, the changes in the Swedish discourse seem to be more profound: while the changes in the Norwegian discourse must be characterised as a result of perceived necessary adaptation to external changes, the changes in the Swedish discourse seem to represent a real change in identity. One example of this difference is the fact that Sweden is clearly moving away from its traditional security formulation dominated by the neutrality doctrine while Norway continues to have a security identity characterised by a strong Atlanticism.

Another important difference is, of course, related to the different relationship to the EU and the fact that Sweden has had the possibility to use its influence inside the Union to shape the future European security dimension. While Sweden had to change its security formulation in order to be able to join the EU, it has also managed to influence the European security dimension. This happened first with the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Treaty and then, more recently, by stressing the importance of the non-military aspects of security. This means that Sweden has managed to ‘demilitarise’ the EU’s security dimension. While such interest in non-military aspects is natural for Sweden in multilateral frameworks such as the UN and the OSCE, the EU is different. In fact, the level of political integration in the EU makes it more difficult for the Swedish political leadership to defend its emphasis on non-military aspects in the EU and at the same time to preserve a traditional and militarily focused national security discourse. Therefore, one may claim that the domestic security discourse is being increasingly influenced by the security discourse expressed by the same political elites in the EU. Several changes can be identified. First, one may identify an explicit support for the newly launched ESDP process followed up by an initiative to undertake a major reform of the national defence forces. Second, there has been an explicit recognition of the EU as an important security actor and increased emphasis on comprehensive security.

Even though the Norwegian security identity remains traditional and strongly wedded to Atlanticism, Euroscepticism and territorial defence, some changes may be identified also here. However, they do not challenge the traditional Norwegian security identity as much as in Sweden. The changes in Norway must to a larger extent be understood as instrumental adaptations to external changes in order to avoid being marginalised in European security. Such adaptation is recognisable especially in relation to the reform of the national defence forces; a process that was accelerated shortly after the ESDP process was launched. However, recently we also see a development towards a greater recognition of the potential of the EU as a comprehensive security actor and greater emphasis on the need for having a comprehensive security approach, which indicates that the Europeanisation process to some extent has moved beyond purely instrumental adaptation.

The main reason why one might talk about an identity change in relation to Sweden is that neutrality as a defining element of the national Swedish
security identity has been increasingly challenged by the European integration process. The move towards recognising the EU as an important security actor and the move towards comprehensive national security are strengthening this argument. Concerning the Norwegian security identity one may also talk about a Europeanisation. However, the change has not been as profound, or reached the same level, as in Sweden and a strong and traditional Atlanticism still remain the most important element of the Norwegian security identity.

The analysis in this paper indicates that the European integration process has had, and still has, an impact on national security identities of both member states and countries that are closely linked to the integration process. Not surprisingly, member states seem to be influenced in a more profound way. However, member states also have the possibility to influence and shape the integration process, which might limit the negative consequences of Europeanisation. Non-members do not have this opportunity and might therefore, in some cases, feel forced to adapt in order to limit the negative consequences of non-membership. This means that Europeanisation in these cases has a tendency to be more instrumental and a result of perceived necessary adaptations rather than a real change in identity.

While the influence of the integration process seems to be important in order to understand the move in the Norwegian and the Swedish security discourses from emphasising territorial defence to focusing more on international crisis management and comprehensive security, unpredictable incidents can also accelerate such a process. Indeed, the 11 September tragedy has given increased attention to new threats and the need for developing security policy mechanisms that are better adapted to the current security context. This tragedy has put light on the vulnerability of modern societies and that military security mechanisms are not enough to create security and stability. The result of all this might be an acceleration of the process towards comprehensive security and a better use of the EU’s potential as the only multilateral forum that can be characterised as a comprehensive security actor.
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