Tackling Welfare Gaps:
The East European Transition and New Patterns of Migration to Norway

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Introduction

The main purpose of the study is to analyse how the growing welfare gaps between Eastern and Western Europe have become a securitised issue that needs to be addressed by national, international and supranational bodies.

‘Welfare gap’ as used in this study of migration refers to a real, material and measurable difference in the standard of living, level of social security (including exposure to social, ethnic or gender conflicts) and disparities in income between the country of origin and the migration target area. In order to understand migratory choices, it is also necessary to address the issue of social representations – how the country of origin and the country of migration are ‘imagined’ by individuals and groups.

These social representations are important in the migratory context in at least two ways. On the one hand the decision to migrate is often based not exclusively on a rational analysis of situation in the country of origin and in the destination country, but also on shared and not always completely ‘correct’ representations on the destination country. On the other hand, the emigrants’ ability to find their place in the new country will often depend on how those emigrants are ‘represented’, ‘imagined’ and ‘thought of’ in their country of destination. Thus, in order to understand the complexity of migratory choices and the social, cultural and political consequences of these choices, it is not enough to focus on exclusively material, measurable aspects of migration. Our understanding of these complex processes can be much deeper if we add this ‘representative’ – or discursive – dimension to the analysis.

A major consequence of the very existence of real or perceived welfare gaps is the interest that both individuals and groups take in the overcoming what they see as a real or imagined hindrance to improving their lives. Of the many ways of solving this ‘welfare dilemma’, migration and various transborder activities seem among the most common choices. However, in order to place migration in the proper context, we will treat it here as only one of many possible individual and group survival strategies. Migration is a complex issue, and because there are various forms of migration, we will look at not only the classical migration understood as permanent settlement in other country, but also various other migration-like choices and strategies.

The very existence of welfare gaps is an important migratory push-factor. This study will examine how the economic and social transition in Eastern Europe – first of all in Russia and Poland, but also in the rest of what used to be defined as Eastern Bloc\(^1\) – has contributed to the emergence of a new set of push and pull factors in the region, and as a direct result, to new patterns of emigration. The next step will be to see how these emerging migratory patterns have influenced migration trends in Norway. As Norway is often

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\(^1\) In addition to Russia and Poland, this study deals with developments in the European part of the former Soviet Union – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia – and in Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania.
represented as the wealthiest country in Europe and a country that has successfully pursued what is often in the Central and Eastern European discourse described as ‘the third way’ of development: a country that, thanks to its revenues from oil, has managed to build a capitalism with a human face, Norway has become both a potential and actual country of migration to many of the citizens from the former Communist Bloc.

Thus, this study maps both the ‘push factors’ in the area of actual and potential emigration in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the most important ‘pull factors’ in the areas of actual and potential migration, with a focus on Central/Eastern Europe on the one hand, and Norway on the other. In this context we will look at various institutional and non-institutional strategies of eliminating the welfare gaps perceived as a major cause of migration. As migration is increasingly becoming a securitised issue, I will treat the ‘welfare gap/migration issue’ as a part of a new post-Cold War European security equation.2

**Mapping the study and defining the main concepts**

This study is multi-disciplinary, in focusing on various aspects of complex social and political reality and seeking explanations from various disciplines and approaches. In order to give the reader a better understanding of the most central and most used concepts, we will start by delineating the conceptual and disciplinary borders of the study and by presenting operational definitions of the central concepts used in the analysis.

The main general goal of the study is to see how the existing and perceived welfare gaps contribute to setting a new political and social agenda in Europe in the post-Cold War context. We will focus on welfare gaps and on both individual and group strategies of solving what could be described as a welfare gap dilemma. While highlighting the role that migratory choices play in this context, we also want to place migratory strategies within a broader framework of survival strategies in post-Communist Europe. To this end, we will examine the impact the implementation of these strategies has had on debate on and implementation of migration policy in the receiving countries.

We will focus on the post-Communist Europe and how the systemic transition in this area has helped to bring about new political and social challenges. The emergence of these challenges has, in turn, resulted in the emergence of various survival strategies used by the people of the region to address these new challenges and adapt to the new situation.

With the relaxation of travel restrictions in the former Communist Europe and in the West and the opening of borders as one immediate result of the first phase of transition, various types of transborder activities became increasingly important in those survival strategies. During the Communist period the possibility to travel was restricted – both by Communist regimes fearing that their citizens could be infected with some ‘improper ideas’ when travelling to the West, and by Western countries fearing Communist infiltrat-

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2 See also Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaître 1993 and Huysmans 2000; on the concept of ‘securitisation’ see Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998.
tion and uncontrolled movement of hordes of migrants fleeing the Communist paradise on earth.

However, the situation changed dramatically in the second half of 1989. On 4 June 1989, the first partly free parliamentary election took place in Poland. The result was the collapse of the Communist power in that country. A similar situation developed in Hungary. In February 1989 the Hungarian Socialists’ Workers Party (HSWP) opened the possibility of building a multi-party system in the country. In May 1989, János Kádár, who more then anyone else had personified the Soviet domination, was relieved of his power and duties, and negotiations between the HSWP and the opposition started. The immediate result was the election of the first opposition deputy to the Hungarian parliament on 23 July 1989. On 7 October 1989, the HSWP decided to dissolve itself.

That summer, however, the Hungarian and Polish authorities had to deal with a new and embarrassing problem in their relations with the most conservative of the Communist regimes – Honecker’s regime in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). After the rigged local election in the GDR on 7 May 1989 and the lack of even a dim prospect that the system in the GDR could be democratised, East Germans decided to vote with their feet. In early summer 1989, thousands of East Germans who were officially spending their holidays in the other socialist countries sought refuge in the West German embassies in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest. By late August 1989 almost 60,000 East Germans had decided to follow this path. This put pressure on relations between the GDR and the countries that refused to implement any harsh measures to stop this exodus. On 10 September 1989 the Hungarian authorities decided to open their border to Austria and let the East Germans – and others – to use this way if they wanted to leave for the West. This highly symbolic move heralded a new epoch in the history of the free movement of people in Europe. And then, on 9 November 1989, the most visible symbol of division of Europe, the Berlin Wall, was ‘dissembled’ by thousands of jubilant Germans. By late 1989 all Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe had crumbled – some, like the Czechoslovak one, as a consequence of a Velvet Revolution; others, like the Romanian one, in the wake of bloody turmoil.

Two more years were to pass before the collapse of the weakened Soviet system in the Inner Empire. Finally, on 25 December 1991, with the symbolic lowering of the Soviet flag over the Kremlin, the Communist period of European history took an abrupt and unexpected end. A completely new political map of all Europe had to be drawn. The old bipolar system was replaced by a new setting, far less predictable and clear. In the West, the agenda was dominated by debates on European integration; in the East, societies and elites had to cope with the transition from the detested but familiar Communist past to an ill-defined and unknown democratic and capitalist future.

The events of summer 1989 established a direct link between the individual choices of the East European citizens and European high politics. That 60,000 East Germans decided to ‘go West’ and challenge their regime on the issue of free movement of people put the matter on the European agenda in a spectacular way. When we recall that this challenge contributed directly to the collapse of the GDR regime and, indirectly, to the radical redrawing of
the political map of Europe, the link between ‘individual and group survival strategies’ and European high politics becomes even more obvious.

How should we define those pivotal concepts? What do we understand by ‘welfare gap’, or by ‘individual and group survival strategies’? And how should we approach the issue of migration?

Welfare gap
We have to start by mapping the concept of welfare itself. ‘Welfare’ can be defined and understood in many ways. In daily usage in English, the term ‘welfare’ can mean at least three things:

- governmental provision of economic assistance to persons in need;
- something that aids or promotes well-being;
- a contented state of being happy and healthy and prosperous.

An older (1913 edition) version of the Webster’s Dictionary provides the following definition:

Well-doing or well-being in any respect; the enjoyment of health and the common blessings of life; exemption from any evil or calamity; prosperity; happiness.

The term ‘welfare’ is often used as a substitute for the term ‘well-being’, and they both have much to do with quality of life. Well-being is defined in similar way as welfare. In defining ‘quality of life’ we will follow an approach similar to that chosen by the authors of the study on the monitoring of quality of life in Europe prepared by European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EFILWC):

Quality of life in a society can be defined as the overall well-being of those living there. Well-being then reflects not only living conditions and control over resources across the full spectrum of life domains, but also the ways in which people respond and feel about their lives in those domains. (Fahey, Nolan and Whelan 2003: 14)

Within the political framework, the most frequent use of ‘welfare’ is ‘welfare state’. The term defines a type of state in which the welfare of the citizenry in matters like social security, health and education, housing and working conditions is the responsibility of the government. According to the Penguin Dictionary of Sociology, the state has the following responsibilities in the sphere of welfare:

Welfare states typically protect people against poverty by means of unemployment benefits, family allowances, income supplements for the poorly paid, and old-age pensions; they provide comprehensive medical care, free education and public housing. These services are

3 http://www.hyperdictionary.com/dictionary/welfare
financed by state insurance schemes and taxation. (Abercrombie et al. 1994: 454)

In this study we will deal with most aspects of welfare as outlined in these definitions. We will also examine how the welfare situation – or in other words well-being – of the population of Central and Eastern Europe has changed as a consequence of the transition, and how the collapse of real socialism and the waning of its specific variant of ‘welfare state’ and the emergence of ‘wild capitalism’ have contributed to the formation of a new set of migratory push factors. We will also address the issue of how what is often perceived – not quite correctly – as the continued existence of the traditional Scandinavian model of welfare state in Norway has been an important migratory pull factor, inducing people to go to this country in search of a better life. We will thus deal with both the socio-psychological aspects of welfare and well-being in Central/Eastern Europe in the broader context of transition, and with the institutional aspects of the functioning of the welfare state system in Norway and how this system has tackled the migratory pressures from the former Soviet Bloc.

The level of welfare – both socio-psychological, understood as the subjective feeling of well-being, and institutional, understood as the level of ‘welfare services’ provided by a given state – can be measured through various gauging instruments. However, our study will focus not only on the material and measurable dimension of welfare, but also on representations or perceptions of welfare and welfare state, and how these representations affect migratory choices and movements.

The term ‘welfare gap’ will therefore have at least two meanings in this study. On the one hand, we will try to identify the measurable gap between the level of welfare and well-being in the source country and in the destination country. On the other hand, we will examine to what extent migratory choices are fuelled not only by these measurable relative welfare gaps but also by collective and subjective representations and perceptions concerning the level of welfare in the source and the destination country.

By ‘welfare gap’ we thus understand both the measurable and the represented differences in standard of living, level of social security (including exposure to social, ethnic or gender conflicts) and income disparities between the country of origin and the migration target area. In order to operationalise the concept of welfare gap we need to identify more specifically what is understood by welfare and well-being. In her interesting recent study on well-being and exclusion in Europe’s regions, Kitty Stewart offers an overview of various approaches to the question of well-being. (Stewart 2002: 8–12). Stewart decided to focus on five dimensions of well-being – material well-being/consumption, health, education and literacy, participation in productive sphere and participation in social sphere. In order to support her choice she presents a detailed analysis of other understandings of ‘well-being’. This overview, summed up in Table 1, reveals a common denominator of the study of well-being and some other proposals on what should be measured when studying problems of welfare, well-being, social inclusion and social exclusion.
Stewart presents a comprehensive approach to the problem of social exclusion in European regions, but geographically this study is limited to the area of the current members of the European Union. Another interesting study with a comprehensive approach to the measurement of welfare is that of Osberg and Sharp (2000). Their proposal on weighting various dimensions of welfare/well-being is also an important source of inspiration for this analysis. Their findings are summed up in Figure 1.


In the following, we will use Stewart’s and Osberg & Sharpe’s comprehensive approach to well-being and present developments in Central and Eastern Europe through the same ‘conceptual prism’. Taking these proposals on the measurement of well-being as our point of departure, we will present the challenges faced by the population of the region, and the local responses to these challenges.

**Survival strategies**

The challenges the people of Central and Eastern Europe have been facing over the past decade are inseparably linked with the systemic transition underway since the break-up of Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In response, the people of the region have devised various survival strategies to address the real – or perhaps only perceived – problem of welfare and well-being gaps, both within the borders of the region and between the region and the rest of Europe.

These ‘survival strategies’ range from national to individual level. The striving for freedom of the nations of the former Soviet Bloc in the late 1980s was to a certain extent the realisation of an unconscious national survival strategy. In the case of at least some countries – especially the Baltic republics of Latvia and Estonia – this link between the survival of the nation as a separate unit and the fight for freedom was openly expressed by the local political elites. Elsewhere, the determination to get rid of Soviet domination was often presented as a manifestation of pursuing the nation’s own, specific way of development, rather than that imposed by the Soviet hegemon. The will to liberation from the Soviet domination was one of the most important driving social and political forces throughout the region. However, the successful realisation of this postulate resulted in the emer-
gence of a completely new political and social situation that forced the local populations into often painful adaptations to the new social, political and economic realities.

We begin by looking at various adaptation and survival strategies traceable in the whole region, and then focus on the strategies with an impact on migratory choices. We will present the whole scope of available survival strategies and indicate how they relate to migratory choices. In talking about ‘survival strategies’ we define them as adaptive measures taken by groups and individuals in response to the new challenges of the transition in Central and Eastern Europe. These are strategies devised and implemented in a situation when individuals and groups are faced with a deterioration of their social and economic position and are challenged to adapt to a new social and economic reality in order to counter the negative developments and maintain – if possible improve – their own position.

After the collapse of the Communist system, the stated goal of the planned transformation was the establishment of democracy and the market economy throughout the region. Communism as a bearing ideology and prescription for dealing with social, economic and political challenges was declared null and void by the local political elites. The old system was to be transformed and the planned transition was to result in the creation of Western-like societies in the whole region. One highly visible result of this policy choice, and one with a crucial impact on the choice of survival strategies, was the almost immediate transformation of the local economies – almost overnight, the command economy of shortage of goods so characteristic of the former system was replaced by a deregulated economy of abundance of goods and a shortage of means.7

In some countries, the reformers embarked on a ‘shock therapy’ policy; in other countries, local policy-makers attempted to ease the economic transition by slowing the pace and depth of reforms. A decade after the beginning of these systemic economic and political reforms, there is, however, a widely shared perception that these reforms often resulted in a shock without a therapy.

The main challenge facing much of ‘post-Communist’ society in the wake of the reforms was that of economic survival. The situation was further complicated by the emergence of a new and previously practically unknown social and economic phenomenon – the shortage of labour. Successful adaptation to quickly changing surroundings thus became an adaptation to changing economic realities. The main problem was economic survival, so most survival strategies had a strong ‘economic’ component. In a situation when the entire surrounding social, economic and political system was undergoing deep transformation and everyone had to learn how to deal with new challenges, choosing migration as a strategy for coping with the new reality could look less dramatic than it had during the Communist period. Another factor facilitating the choice of either permanent or temporary migration as a coping strategy was the removal of almost all practical travel hindrances by the local authorities. The result was higher transborder mobility.

7 On various aspects of transition and its local results see After the Fall (1999); Gomulka 2000; Nelson, Tilly and Walker 1997; Tomer 2002; Transition. The First Ten Years (2002); UNICEF 2001.
Migration
How do we define migration in the context of this study? While examining the impact that various survival strategies have had on migratory trends between Central/Eastern Europe and Norway, we will cover not only traditional permanent or temporal migration from the region to Norway, but will also look at other ‘transborder activities’ that are linked with the choice of survival strategies and have had some impact on the Norwegian debate on migration from Central and Eastern Europe.

We will use the broadest possible definition of migration: a temporary, seasonal or permanent movement of people from one country to another or from one region to another. In short, migration will be defined here as an important component of a survival strategy involving movement of individual or group in space. As this study focuses on international migration we will not deal in detail with internal migration as a response to the new challenges, but it is important to bear in mind that international migration should be seen as a sort of spatial and qualitative extension of domestic migration. The decision to leave one’s place of living as a response to an economic and/or social challenge, whether for a limited period or permanently, is so compelling and fateful for an individual that it must be seen as a dramatic choice, whether one is leaving for another region, or abroad. Of course, leaving for another country involves extra challenges, such as the need to learn a new language, to learn new cultural codes, and to adapt to a new community.

Migration is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. At least three aspects of migration will be addressed in this study: moving in space, moving in time, moving for a reason. These three aspects of migration – spatial, temporal and teleological – will all be touched upon in our analysis.

Migration can involve moving within your known familiar landscape, or about moving to distant and unknown places. When you marry someone from a neighbouring village and decide to settle down with him or her, you migrate from your village to another one for all your life, but the distance is rather short. If you live in the Polish city of Zgorzelec and have a job in the German city of Görlitz located on the other side of Odra River you move to another country every day, but only for a limited number of hours. If you live in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and make your living by smuggling cheap alcohol and cigarettes from Kaliningrad to Poland and some goods back from Poland to Kaliningrad you may cross the Polish–Russian border many times a day in order not to violate the custom rules and to earn the money you need in order to survive. If, however, you live in the Ukrainian city of Lviv and decide to go to Canada, where you perhaps have some relatives, to seek better opportunities there, this probably means leaving for many years and being far from your home place – although you may survive without learning the new language or new codes if you remain within your own ethnically homogeneous local small community abroad.
When it comes to the spatial scope of migration, we will concentrate on transborder activities within the European framework. In identifying survival strategies we will focus on those strategies that have had the greatest impact on the emergence of a new pattern of migration between Central/Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, first of all Norway. Concerning the temporal dimension of migration we plan to cover the whole spectrum, as migration from Central and Eastern Europe to Scandinavia has been of both a permanent and a non-permanent character. When it comes to the ‘teleological aspect’ of migration, i.e. why people migrate, we will analyse migration patterns as an implementation of various individual and group survival strategies with a strong ‘migratory component’.

Our overall approach to migration will be based on a modified concept of migratory push and pull factors.\(^8\) By push factors we understand the negative factors that make people leave their homeplace in search of better economic, social and other opportunities. Pull factors can be defined as the positive factors that induce people to choose a country or region of destination. Push and pull factors should be seen as two sides of the same coin – ‘twin phenomena’ in that sense that the impact of the negative push factors on the decision to migrate can be drastically strengthened by the presence of positive pull factors in the chosen area of migration. Push and pull factors relate directly to each other – the most crucial is perhaps not the presence of push and pull factors alone, but their coexistence in the minds of those mulling the decision to migrate. It is not enough that you perceive your current situation as very difficult, that you are ‘pushed’ from your place by ‘push factors’ such

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\(^8\) Two interesting studies on reasons why people move are Cieślinska 1992; Schoorl et al. 2000. Also IOM 1998. and Pirozhkov, O. and Khomra 2003. give interesting insights into why people in Central and Eastern Europe may consider moving.
as poverty, lack of opportunities, hunger, war or persecution – you will probably not decide to move unless you can see a real alternative, unless you are attracted by some ‘pull factors’ in the area you consider moving to. Or you may be pushed by the ‘push factors’ without having a perspective and then become a forced migrant, a person forced to leave without having any positive alternative.

In discussing migratory push and pull factors we have to be aware that these factors do have not only – and perhaps not even primarily – an economic and material character. The whole ‘push and pull factor’ theory was originally deeply rooted in rational choice theory. People were seen as making the individual decision to migrate after having rationally considered their situation and looking at the various alternatives. Their decision to migrate was to be based, according to this theory, on a rational calculation of pros and cons – a kind of rational cost and benefit analysis. The most important single motive behind the decision to migrate was seen as the relative distance between the actual ‘loss’ caused by push factors and the potential ‘gain’ resulting from the beneficial impact of pull factors. For instance, if you have a job, even if it is a relatively poorly paid one, you will be more reluctant to migrate even if you know that there are many better-paid jobs available across the border. If, however, you are unemployed, see no chance of getting a job in your place of residence and know that there are plenty of well-paid jobs across the border, then it is more likely, according to the theory, that you will decide to migrate.

In this pull- and push-factor equation that, according to neo-classical migration theory, is seen as the main driving force behind migratory choices, the crucial element is information. A rational decision can be made only if based on correct and relevant information. However, as we all know in real life, individual decision-makers tend to make most decisions without having full information. In addition, their decisions are often based not so much on the unbiased information as on their individual and collective representations of the world ‘out there’. In this ‘information context’, the crucial push and pull factors are not so much objective and quantifiable economic, social and political indicators, but rather individual and collective representations and perceptions of reality, in the homeland and in the target country. The push/pull factor equation is thus better described not as an equation with all known elements, but as an equation with not only missing, but also incorrect information. This is also why the migratory decisions that get taken are not always the best ones.

Migration, as a complex issue, should be analysed within the framework of a multi-disciplinary approach. Castles and Miller rightly claim that ‘the basic principle is that any migratory movement can be seen as the result of the interacting macro- and micro-structures’ (Castles and Miller 2003:27). They list large-scale institutional factors as belonging to the macro-level, and networks, practices and beliefs of the migrants themselves as belonging to the micro-level. This interdisciplinary approach advocated by Castles and Miller as the most fruitful one for studying migration will be also clearly visible in this study.

To understand recent developments and get insight into what lies behind the new emerging patterns in migratory flows between the post-Communist
and Western/Northern Europe, we have to look at how the large-scale institutional factors – in this case, especially the collapse of the Communist system and the process of the European integration – have contributed to the emergence of the new social and economic challenges (or a new set of economic, social and political push/pull factors) and how these new challenges are addressed on the micro-level by a new set of social practices – survival strategies – that are largely a result of the new way of functioning of social networks and the redrawing of the existing ‘belief system’.

Welfare gaps are often seen as a central migratory push factor. To understand their impact on migratory choices in a given geographical setting, we need to start by mapping the problem and then look at what impact welfare gaps may have on various migratory choices.

In this study we will use various measurements of welfare and welfare gaps. In order to draw a global map of the problem and then see how it is ‘represented’ on the continental, European, and regional and sub-regional level it is important, however, to have a set of clear cut and preferably easily measurable data.

One widely recognised indicator for measuring the level of social and economic welfare – and therefore a useful tool in mapping welfare gaps – is the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI). This is as a summary measure of human development in three fields that together can give a clear picture of the human development situation in a given country. These three areas used to measure HDI are:

- longevity – and to a degree the quality of life – measured by life expectancy at birth
- access to knowledge, measured by the adult literacy rate (with two-thirds weight) and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (with one-third weight)

Global human development reports published since 1990 provide a good overview of the situation in the field of human development. The UNDP has also commissioned a number of regional reports on human development and assisted many countries in preparing national and regional human development reports. Six reports on human development have mapped the situation in the transition countries, with a focus on Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The first of these reports was published in 1995 and concerned gender and development in the region (UNDP 1995). The

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9 This brief presentation of the HDI is based largely on the first chapter of the Human Development Report 2001, where various aspects of measuring of human development and welfare are discussed.
10 An overview of all these reports with direct access to some of them is available at UNDP’s home page at: http://hdr.undp.org/ hd/default.cfm. For more information on region-focused activities of UNDP see information provided by Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (RBEC) at: http://rbec.undp.org/ and http://www.undp.org/rbec/publications/.
second\textsuperscript{11} was published in 1996 and analysed the situation of human settlements in the region from a human development perspective. In 1997, UNDP published its third detailed report on developments in Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union under the telling title \textit{The Shrinking State: Governance and Sustainable Human Development}. The next regional report, \textit{Poverty in Transition}, provided an in-depth analysis of such issues as poverty and income distribution, a balance between liberalisation and a state authority, poverty, education and white collar trends, the role of building small and medium-sized enterprises and micro-finance development in the whole region. In 1999, to mark the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the transition, the UNDP published \textit{Regional Transition 1999: The Human Cost of Transition. Human Security in South East Europe}.\textsuperscript{12} The latest report (2003) concerns the situation of the most exposed social and ethnic minority in the region, the East European Roma people. This is \textit{Avoiding the Dependency Trap: The Roma Human Development Report}.\textsuperscript{13} The main goal of the authors was to foster debate on the fate and contribute to increase human development opportunities for the most marginalised community of the region by giving policy- and decision-makers a better understanding of the challenges faced by this group.

In addition to these regional reports addressing issues of importance for regional developments, the various UNDP country offices have published country human development reports. To date there have been seven country reports on human development in Armenia, seven national reports on the situation in Azerbaijan, seven on Belarus, six reports on the situation in Moldova, six on the situation in Ukraine, seven on the situation in Estonia, seven on the situation in Latvia, eight on the situation in Lithuania, four reports on developments in the Czech Republic, four on the situation in Hungary, seven on the transition in Poland, nine reports on developments in Bulgaria and seven on the situation in Romania.\textsuperscript{14}

All these reports give good insight into regional developments and help place the region in a broader global and European human development context. They have also been very useful to our work of mapping both global and regional welfare gaps.

We will start our analysis by presenting some proposals and findings of the UNDP. Then we propose a special approach to the region that will make it possible to take into account not only economic and social but also other developments and their impact.

After having measured human development over the past decade, the UNDP decided to divide all the countries of the world into four groups. The first group – countries with high human development (HDI over 0.800) – consists of 55 countries. Norway is currently ranked as number 1, whereas Mexico ranks as number 55, at the bottom of this group. The second group – countries with medium human development (HDI between 0.500 and 0.799)\textsuperscript{11} Human Settlements under Transition. The Case of Eastern Europe and the CIS UNDP 1996.

\textsuperscript{12} Regional Transition 1999: The Human Cost of Transition Human Security in South East Europe

\textsuperscript{13} The text of the report is available on line at http://roma.undp.sk/

\textsuperscript{14} More detailed information these reports is available at: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/
Part I. Welfare Gaps: Mapping the Phenomenon

is made up of 89 countries. Antigua and Barbuda opens the list and Togo occupies the last position. The third group — low human development — consists of 34 countries, 30 of which are in Africa. In addition, there were 20 countries and territories where, for various reasons, employing the human development index was impossible; these are not to be found on the human development index.15

Another classification used widely by both the UNDP and the World Bank for measuring economic welfare is based on income per capita. According to measure, in 2003 there were 39 countries with high income per capita (above $9,206), 86 countries with middle income (between $746 and $9,206), whereas 66 countries were classified as low income countries (income per capita less than $745).

There are also other ways of measuring welfare and welfare gap. The most comprehensive and most recent overview of other indicators used by the UNDP can be found in the first chapter of 2001 global Human Development Report. In addition to the general human development index, it describes also other indexes and ways they are prepared. The Human Poverty Index 1 (HPI-1) measures poverty in developing countries by focusing on deprivations along three dimensions: longevity, knowledge and overall economic provisioning measured by the percentage of the population not using improved water sources and the percentage of children under five who are underweight. The Human Poverty Index-2 (HPI-2) measures the same dimensions as HPI-1, but also takes into account ‘social exclusion’ as shown by the percentage living on incomes below the poverty line (with disposable household income less than 50% of the median) and the long-term unemployment rate (12 months or more). In addition to these two poverty-related indexes, the UNDP employs two gender-related indexes—the Gender-related Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure.16

We will focus on the two indicators presented above – the overall HDI and per capita income.

Welfare gaps and migration: mapping global and regional Rio Grandes

Our mapping of welfare gaps will be based on the idea of what we would like to describe as relative welfare gaps existing in limited geographical space. This links in with our focus on welfare gaps as an incentive to migrate and on the use of various survival and adaptation strategies in this migration and welfare context. We seek to identify areas where the existing — or only perceived — welfare gaps motivate people to migrate or use other survival strategies in order to level the gaps.

The Rio Grande River separating the USA from Mexico has become a synonym for a border separating two areas with huge economic differences. This river — in fact known to Latin Americans as Rio Bravo del Norte — has become a practical challenge to all those Mexican and other Latin American


migrants who try to enter the USA illegally in order to improve their lives. Each year hundreds of people die in attempting to cross the US–Mexican border. The most obvious reason why people are willing to take such high risks is their perception of the other side of the border as a better place to live. They believe that by taking this risk they can improve their personal situation and establish themselves in the USA, a country that functions in their popular discourse as a paradise on earth. They are aware that they may risk not only death when crossing the border but also deportation and exclusion if they manage to overcome this first physical obstacle. Their main driving force remains the determination to improve their lives by doing something about what they perceive as a welfare gap, and they are willing to pay the highest price for solving their welfare gap dilemma.

The US–Mexican border is only one of several areas where there exist obvious welfare and income gaps. Not all those borders, however, have turned into an arena of a sort of guerrilla war between the US and Mexican authorities on the one side and human smugglers and individuals who are willing to challenge the existing legal order and border regime on the other. In order to understand what makes people willing to take such enormous risks, we need to put the USA and Mexico into the human development and income gap context, and then examine other areas where we can find similar conditions. The characteristic traits in the US/Mexican neighbourhood are huge welfare and income divides. The USA is ranked 7th among all countries of the world in the UNDP Human Development Report 2003, with an HDI at 0.937, whereas Mexico is the last country among the countries with high HDI (55th place in the 2003 ranking and HDI at 0.800). There is a visible income gap between the USA and Mexico, whether measured in terms of the dollar exchange rate or when the purchasing power parity rate is used. The dollar exchange rate gap between the USA and Mexico is approx. 5.68 to 1, and the PPP gap some 4.07:1, both in Mexico’s disfavour. Similar gaps can be observed when we compare estimated earned incomes at PPP in the two countries (3.44:1 for male workers and 5.69:1 for female workers) – especially differences between expected female incomes in the USA and Mexico are deep, adding a gender dimension to the welfare gap.

Table 1. The ‘Original’ Rio Grande: Mexico and the USA – welfare and economic gaps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>6,214</td>
<td>8,430</td>
<td>4,637</td>
<td>12,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>35,277</td>
<td>34,320</td>
<td>26,389</td>
<td>42,540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Estimated earned income 2001 at PPP $US, female  
b Estimated earned income 2001 at PPP $US, male

See also Eschbach, Hagan and Rodriguez 2001. According to data provided by the US Border Patrol, an average of 340 persons died each year between 2000 and 2003 in attempting to cross the US – Mexican border.
The US–Mexican border is an archetypical example of what the welfare gaps do with the migratory choices of people wanting to improve their lives by crossing – legally or illegally – this border.18

Where can we find similar migratory patterns, with people risking their lives in hopes of improving their welfare situation? Where do we find similar disparities, and how do they influence migratory choices? The answers to these questions are central to our further analysis of the emergence of the new migratory pattern in relations between Central/Eastern Europe and Norway.

‘Fortress Europe’, welfare gaps and migration

The notion of ‘Fortress Europe’ recurs frequently in the discourse on migration in the context of EU integration and enlargement. According to an independent NGO from the Netherlands, almost four thousand people died when trying to enter ‘Fortress Europe’ between 1993 and 2003.19 The average yearly death toll on the EU borders seems similar to that on the US–Mexican border; reasons why people are willing to pay the highest price are likewise similar. Most deaths occurred along the EU’s external terrestrial borders or in sea areas between the EU and its poorer neighbours.

The existence of deep welfare gaps between the EU and the surrounding areas can help to explain why people take such high risks to reach ‘Fortress Europe’. Table 2 clearly shows how deep is the welfare and income gap – especially in the areas often mentioned in the media when tragic accidents involving potential illegal migrants are reported.

Table 2. The EU and its neighbours: Welfare gaps20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gap area</th>
<th>GNI/cap at exchange rate</th>
<th>GNI/cap at PPP rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Otranto Gap: Italy–Albania</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gibraltar Gap: Spain–Morocco</td>
<td>12.06</td>
<td>5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland–Russia Gap</td>
<td>10.88</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Oder-Neisse Gap: Germany–Poland</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table and available data on migrant deaths in connection with illegal border crossings indicate a pattern – only three Polish and four Russian citizens can be found on the most detailed list of those who died in connection with illegal border crossings between 1993 and 2003. This may mean one of two things: either that the people of Poland and Russia do not perceive their situation as so difficult and are not willing to take such high risks in order to

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18 On the policy of countries that want to address this issue see the comparative study of US and European policies by Andreas and Snyder 2001.
19 This list of deaths prepared by UNITED, with most of the documented cases of deaths related to migration in Europe, can be found at: http://www.united.non-profit.nl/pdfs/listofdeaths.pdf
20 The figures in the table show the gap as measured by dividing GNI per capita of the country that has the higher GNI by the GNI per capita of the country with the lower GNI per capita.
improve their lives; or that they may have chosen different strategies for dealing with what they perceive as a welfare gap, strategies that can either be realised within their homelands, or that can be realised through other channels than illegal migration.

To explain why Poles and Russians – and more generally, East Europeans – are less represented among the fatal victims of the rush to ‘Fortress Europe’, we must examine conditions in the region. We need to place the region in a broader welfare gap context and see what strategies its people have applied to cope with what they perceive as their welfare dilemmas.

Interregional and regional welfare gaps
The UNDP classifies eight countries of the region – the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Belarus – as belonging to the top group of countries with the highest development, where Norway currently ranks as number one in the world. All other countries of the region belong to the second group, countries with medium human development. There are, however, huge differences as to rank and level of human development as measured by the HDI. The Czech Republic ranks as number 32 in the world, with an HDI of 0.861, while Moldova ranks as number 108 and has an HDI of 0.700. One way to measure welfare gap is thus to examine the ‘rank distance’ between Norway and the other countries in focus here, and look at the differences in the level of human development as expressed by HDI over time.

Figure 3 tells a story of turbulent transition. For most countries of the region the transition was a real human development roller-coaster. For instance, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova experienced steep downturns in the early and mid-1990s. Whereas in 1991 the Soviet Union of which they were a part was ranked 31, by 1998 Russia was ranked 62, Ukraine 102 and Moldova 113 in the world. By 1999, Russia and Romania had HDIs lower than in 1980, Bulgaria and Latvia lower than in 1985, while Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine had in HDIs lower than in 1990. (Figures from Human Development Report 2001)

That the human development index in these countries plummeted was due largely to the economic and structural crisis the whole region experienced in the early 1990s. While much of the world experienced sustained economic growth in the 1990s, 54 countries suffered average income declines. Of these, 17 were countries in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 6 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 6 in East Asia and the Pacific, and 5 among the Arab States. Only Sub-Saharan Africa had a worse record of economic development in the 1990s than Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, as 20 countries on this list were located south of the Sahara.

The economic effects of the transition differed in the countries of the region. While Poland experienced uninterrupted growth from 1992, Russia had to wait until 1999 to see much growth, and only in the beginning of the new
century did the country begin to recover more rapidly.\textsuperscript{21} The economic crisis has also had a direct impact on indicators describing the economic welfare of the population of the region. According to HDR 2003, GDP per capita grew on average 4.4\% each year in Poland between 1990 and 2001. The average for the region was, however, a 1.6\% decline in GDP per capita throughout the period from 1990 to 2001. Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Russia experienced the deepest drops in GDP per capita over the whole period, with minus 8.2, 7.4, 5.5 and 3.5\% respectively.

**Figure 3. HDI scale: Transition countries, 1991–2003**

The immediate result of the economic transition was that countries that had had comparable per capita incomes at the start of transition are today classified as either low income economies (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova) or as lower middle income economies (Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine) or even as upper middle income economies (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia). (Data from *Global Economic Prospects 2004* [2003].)

Although the *Human Development Report 2003* argues that that ‘the purpose of development is to improve people’s lives by expanding their choices’ (p.27) not just raising national incomes, the question of income gaps is central in both debates and migratory choices. According to *HDR 2003* data, the situation in the region is still complicated as far as GDP per capita is concerned. The whole region began its transitory journey in 1989–91 as a part of an autarchic Soviet economic sphere that was economically incomparable with the Western economies. By 2003 the countries of the region were facing some transitional problems, but some of them have tackled transition much better then the others. While in the old days there was only one important dividing line in the region – the border between the Soviet autarchic economic zone and the rest of Europe, where the market economy

\textsuperscript{21} An interesting analysis of the growth in economies in transition giving a good and detailed insight in various aspects can be found in Campos and Coricell 2002.
in diverse variants was the name of the economic game – today the region is far more heterogeneous. One cluster of countries is about to join the European Union and NATO, whereas others have reached the brink of economic and social collapse and are on the verge of becoming economic black holes. In addition to the economic cleavage between Western Europe and the acceding countries, there exist today deep economic and social cleavages between the countries of the region and even within some of them.

What is then the economic situation in this complex region? In looking into economic development in the migratory context, we must bear in mind that various dimensions of economic development will be important to various actors in various ways, depending on which migration strategy they see as the best way of dealing with their personal welfare security dilemma.

From the perspective of a potential permanent migrant, income levels in the destination country are especially important, because better incomes result in improved quality of life, and this is seen as the greatest compensation for expatriation and the accompanying potential social exclusion and lowering of social status. (Global Economic Prospects 2004 [2003]:157). In order to compare incomes in different countries, the figures must be made comparable. Until 1999 the Human Development Report used income measures based on exchange rate conversions in assessing global income inequality. In the opinion of many experts, however, exchange rate conversions did not take into account price differences between countries. As these differences are vital when comparing living standards, the UNDP and other international financial and political institutions now use purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates to convert incomes into a common currency in which differences in national price levels are taken into consideration.

Depending on the approach used for comparing income inequality, results can vary greatly. In the global context, for instance, the use of exchange rate yields a discouraging picture: the ratio of income of the richest one-fifth of the population to that of the poorest one-fifth doubled from 1970 to 1997 – from 34:1 in 1970 to 70:1 in 1997. The same comparison using PPP, however, presents a completely different picture. It tells a story of the closing of the distance between the richest and the poorest, since, measured by PPP, the same ratio fell from 15:1 to 13:1 in the same period.

If income disparities are placed in a migratory context and viewed as important push and pull factors, the picture becomes much less clear when the decision to use the exchange rate or the PPP is to be taken. However, the situation is not so complicated when permanent migration is the preferred strategy of a potential migrant. Once a migrant decides to settle in the destination country, the PPP is the best way to measure that individual’s potential economic gain from migration – provided that he or she can manage to establish him- or herself in the labour market and receive the same salary as the local labour force. The migrant’s potential economic gain from permanent migration can be said to be that, with the same work effort, he or she would be able to buy $x$-times more goods and services in the destination country than in the sending country. For instance, a bus driver working in

\[22\] See Borjas 1995 for an interesting study on how immigrants perform in the country of migration.
Moldova, with an average yearly salary that (according to HDR 2003) was at the level of 2,626 PPP $, could hope to improve his or her personal economic situation by moving to Oslo, Norway, where the same job would net an average of 36,043 PPP $ – an increase by a factor of almost 14.

However, when the preferred strategy is not permanent but temporary or even shuttle migration, it seems more appropriate to use the exchange rate to measure the potential economic gain. In an ideal situation, when no taxes, own costs and travel expenses are taken into consideration, the same bus driver from Moldova would earn almost 110 times more, at the exchange rate calculated in US$. After only three months in Norway – provided that he/she could save all earnings, and receiving in these three months a salary on a par with Norwegian colleagues – the bus driver would earn almost 9,000 Norwegian PPP$. This, in Moldova, would correspond to roughly 3.5 years’ salary, expressed in Moldovan PPP $.

This particular example is dramatic because the comparison involves the wealthiest and the poorest of the European countries; however, it provides a good illustration of various possible approaches to making an assessment of potential economic gains from migration. Similar calculations would seem to underlie many of individual strategies and migratory moves in areas with deep economic and social cleavages. Table 3 below identifies some of these areas in Europe and places them in a broader European and global context.

To illustrate how deep the income gaps are, we rank the areas in descending order after having calculated differences according to the PPP and the exchange rate methods.

**Table 3. Welfare gaps in Europe at PPP and exchange rate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of gap: GNI per Capita</th>
<th>PPP rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway–Moldova Gap</td>
<td>13.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otranto Gap, Italy–Albania</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar Gap, Spain–Morocco</td>
<td>5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bering Gap, USA–Russia</td>
<td>4.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece–Albania Gap</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasvik River Gap, Norway–Russia</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande Gap, USA–Mexico</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland–Russia Gap</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia–Moldova Gap</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Gap, Norway–Poland</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Gap, Sweden–Latvia</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania–Moldova Gap</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oder–Neisse Gap, Germany–Poland</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Gap, Sweden–Poland</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Gap, Finland–Estonia</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bug Gap Poland–Ukraine</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway–Greece Gap</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliningrad Gap, Poland–Russia</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bug Gap Poland–Belarus</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of gap: GNI per Capita</td>
<td>Exchange rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway–Moldova Gap</td>
<td>106.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasvik River Gap, Norway–Russia</td>
<td>17.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bering Gap, USA–Russia</td>
<td>16.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otranto Gap, Italy–Albania</td>
<td>14.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar Gap, Spain–Morocco</td>
<td>12.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland–Russia Gap</td>
<td>10.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece–Albania Gap</td>
<td>8.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Gap, Norway–Poland</td>
<td>8.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Gap, Sweden–Latvia</td>
<td>7.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia–Moldova Gap</td>
<td>6.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bug Gap Poland–Ukraine</td>
<td>5.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Gap, Finland–Estonia</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande Gap, USA–Mexico</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Gap, Sweden–Poland</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania–Moldova Gap</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oder Gap, Germany–Poland</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bug Gap, Poland–Belarus</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway–Greece Gap</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliningrad Gap, Poland–Russia</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the perspective of a person facing a welfare gap dilemma, external migration – be it permanent or only temporary – seems the most radical option. There are also other strategies, ones that can be realised either within the borders of the country or by crossing these borders without breaking ties with one’s local community and familiar social landscape. A ‘social journey’, the choice of internal migration to the areas where better social and/or pay conditions may be found, or shuttle economic transborder migration are often considered, before a decision on more or less permanent external migration is taken.

The chances that the choice of the internal strategy may result in a substantial welfare improvement depend on many factors. Upward social mobility may lead to considerable improvement, but success will depend largely on the social distance to be covered to bring about a fundamental change. This approach can be especially difficult in societies with highly uneven division of wealth, and those where much of the population is living under the local poverty line.

The Gini index is widely used to measure income and wealth inequality. It summarises the dispersion of income across the entire income distribution. The range is from 0, which indicates absolute equality where everyone receives an equal amount, to 100, which denotes absolute inequality, where all income goes to only one recipient or group of recipients.

The two symbolic extremes in the discourse on income and social inequality are the Latin American model, with small elites controlling huge parts of the national wealth, and the social democratic, Nordic model of so-
cial development with fairly even distribution of wealth and incomes within society. Although the highest Gini index value noted in HDR 2003 was found in Namibia (70.7), Russia has been developing in the ‘Latin American’ direction – Russia’s Gini index of 45.6 reveals deep internal wealth and welfare gaps. At the opposite end of the transition countries, we find Hungary, with a Gini index value even below the values observed in all Nordic countries (24.4 in Hungary, 24.7 in Denmark, 25 in Sweden and 25.8 in Norway).

As to internal geographical diversification, the most recent and detailed study of the situation in four countries of the region – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia – concluded that:

- Capital cities and major urban areas are mainly winners, while regions further from central cities and further from their richer Western neighbours are losers. This has led to rising differences between rich and poor regions as well as greater inequality within regions.
- The contribution of intra-regional inequalities to overall inequality largely outweighs the interregional contribution and, contrary to conventional wisdom, the latter is less important in Central and Eastern Europe than in some Western EU countries.
- In the three EU candidate countries included in our analysis, inequality was higher in capital cities than within the country as a whole, but the converse was true for the Russian Federation.
- The urban–rural gap seems to have increased in all countries.
- Variations in poverty and inequality across and within regions are considerably higher in the Russian Federation than in the three EU candidate countries. In these three countries, variations are only slightly higher than in Western EU countries.
- With the notable exception of the Czech Republic, regional disparities in poverty rates are lower when a local poverty threshold is adopted.

(from Förster et al. 2003)

The choice of internal strategy for dealing with welfare gap depends not only on spatial but on other factors as well. In the case of potential labour migration – or more generally speaking, migration driven by the wish to do away with a perceived welfare gap – two other factors may be decisive when the choice between internal and external migration is to be made. These are social inclusion versus social exclusion and a political dimension: the quality of the regional political class and its ability to design and implement effective, active welfare-improvement policies. As to social inclusion, the situation on the local labour market and access to labour – and decent salary – are crucial factors. With the political dimension, welfare gaps in this area are mostly linked to the type of political regime being developed.

Welfare gaps in Europe: access to labour

The Second Report on Cohesion Policy published by the European Commission in January 2003 provides good insight into the situation on the Euro-
European labour market in the area referred to as EU-27: this includes both the existing members of the EU and all candidate countries. The report reveals deep welfare disparities in access to labour market. Of the 24 regions with highest officially registered unemployment rates of 20% or more, seven are located in Poland, five in Bulgaria, three in southern Italy, four are French non-European territories, three are in Spain, and two in Slovakia. All in all, more than 4,286 million people were without work in the hardest-hit regions of the enlarged EU by the end of 2001. Of these, 2.32 million lived in the most jobless regions of the acceding countries, and of those 1.42 millions were in the seven regions of Poland where more than 20% of the labour force was unemployed. Moreover, on average almost half of these unemployed Poles were long-term unemployed. For many of them neither internal nor external migration seem to be a strategic option, due to lack of initial capital and social mobility.

At the opposite end of the scale we find 31 European regions with unemployment rates of 3% or less. Only two of these regions can be found in the acceding countries – one area located around the Czech capital Prague (3% unemployment), and the Hungarian region of Közép-Magyarország (2% unemployment).

However, even within the borders of the hardest-hit country of the region, Poland, there are huge regional differences in unemployment. According to recently released data, the highest unemployment rate in Poland was registered in Lobeski county in Zachodniopomorskie voivodship, where 39.3% of the active labour force was without work, while the lowest rate registered in December 2003 was in Warsaw – 6.1% of the active labour force.23

Also general data confirm that that unemployment rate varies from place to place. The EU-15 had by the end of 2001 an unemployment rate of 7.6% of the labour force; unemployment in ten acceding countries reached the level of 14.5% in the same period, but was slightly lower when all 12 candidate countries were taken all together (13.7 percent). The EU-25 showed an unemployment rate of 8.7% by the end of 2001.

Unemployment rate differences within the EU are already rather high – the ratio in the EU-15 is 27.75:1 (French Guadeloupe 33.3%, as against Utrecht 1.2%) – or 20.6:1 if we take only ‘purely European regions into consideration (here the extremes are the Italian region of Calabria, and Utrecht). The disparities are unlikely to grow any further with the planned EU enlargement, but a combination of income gap and unemployment gap can result in some pressures on the labour markets, especially in areas where those two gaps seem to overlap.

The map in Figure 4 and Table 4 indicate where these areas of potential pressure are located within the enlarging EU. The deepest double gaps lie along the Polish–German border, and to a lesser degree along the Czech–German and the Czech–Austrian and the Slovak–Austrian borders. The fear that this pressure could result in some social tensions was probably one reason why the German and Austrian authorities decided to push for the introduction of a period of up to seven years for the protection of their local labour market in connection with the planned EU enlargement.

Figure 4. Unemployment gaps in European regions EU-27\textsuperscript{24}

![Map showing unemployment gaps in European regions EU-27](image)

Table 4. Double gaps in Polish-German border regions: GDP per capita in € and PPP 1999, unemployment 2001\textsuperscript{25}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP/cap. in € 1999</th>
<th>PPP/cap. % of EU average, 1999</th>
<th>Unemployment rate 2001, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>24,024</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>22,494</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania</td>
<td>15,745</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td>16,068</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Silesia</td>
<td>3,849</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubuskie</td>
<td>3,416</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Poland</td>
<td>3,961</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pomerania</td>
<td>3,766</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{24} The Second Progress Report on Cohesion Policy at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/interim2_en.htm

\textsuperscript{25} Data on GDP from Stiller 2003, on unemployment from 2003 report on cohesion policy
Welfare gaps in Europe: political dimension

In the migratory context, the problem of democratisation of the political system and how the policies designed and implemented by political elites fit the needs of the population are of crucial importance. The way political agendas have been set in Europe over the past decade has had a huge impact on migratory choices of populations, and there is an obvious link between the emergence of authoritarian and nationalistic regimes and policies resulting in the brutalisation of political sphere.

For many migrants, the decision to leave is a dramatic though often largely rational choice based on a thorough consideration of the pros and cons involved. For one group, however, migration may become the only available survival strategy: this is the case with forced migration. Such migration has been an important practical issue all Western European governments have had to deal with in the wake of the bloody conflicts in the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–95 and Kosovo 1998/99), and quite recently in the Caucasus. Migration may appear as the sole rational choice to people whose very existence as individuals or a group is threatened by the policy choice of those in power.

For instance, by 2002 and 2003 the victims of the Russian policy in the breakaway republic of Chechnya had become the biggest and the fastest growing group of asylum-seekers in Europe. Diederik Kramers, spokesman for the UNHCR’s EU regional office, gave the following assessment of the situation in an interview with RFE/RL in November 2003: ‘We see that in the first three-quarters, from January to September 2002, there were 14,107 asylum applications from Russian citizens. And in the same period of time, January to September 2003, it’s 23,465. So that looks like a 66% increase.’ An important reason why the West found itself faced with growing Chechen migration was also the rise of xenophobia in Russia.26 This made the situation of Chechens difficult not only in Chechnya proper but also in other regions of Russia, prompting Western governments to revise their policies towards this particular group.

Although the UNHCR does not provide any information on the ethnic background of asylum-seekers, most of them were, or claimed to be, from Chechnya. Many of them seemed to meet the criteria for receiving protection against racially or politically motivated persecution in their country of origin. In Austria there were nearly 6,000 asylum-seekers from the Russian Federation by the end of October 2003, compared to 700 in the whole 2002. Some 62% of Russian citizens who stayed for the duration of the legal procedure ended up with fully-fledged, permanent asylum in Austria – a country known for its highly restrictive asylum policy.27

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26 More on the growth of xenophobia in Russia Neterpimost’ v Rossii: starye i novye fobii 1999.
The growth in the number of asylum-seekers from Russia is directly linked with the developments in Russia and in Chechnya, and indirectly with the state of democracy and governance quality in that country. The deficiency in democracy serves as an important migratory push factor, whereas a functioning democracy, especially if combined with better standard of living offered to the victims of political persecution, works as an important migratory pull factor.

Measuring the political dimension of welfare is far more difficult than measuring its economic or even social dimensions, but some useful instruments and indicators are available. One widely used indicator for measuring political developments in the world, with a focus on transition countries, is the democratisation index proposed by Freedom House, a non-governmental and non-partisan body that since 1972 has published annual assessments of the state of freedom in all countries. According to this index, each country is assigned a rating for political rights and a rating for civil liberties based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom present and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Those two indicators must be said to be central when we discuss the level of ‘political welfare’ and potential political welfare gaps as push factors. The map of democratisation and rule of law in the region differs slightly from the economic welfare map.

In its 2003 assessment, Freedom House placed the countries of the Eastern/Central European region at the levels shown in Table 5, in terms of democratisation (DEM) and Rule of Law (ROL). The countries of the region are divided into five groups for measuring the level of democratisation and rule of law. This diversification of the region is important for at least three reasons.

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Table 5. Nations in Transit Democatisation Score 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEM Score</th>
<th>ROL Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>6.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Firstly, we will use the Freedom House indicators to propose a new and more comprehensive well-being index to measure the levels of well-being in the region in question and compare these levels with the situation in Norway. Secondly, the lack of democratisation and rule of law may be in itself an important push factor impelling people to leave their country of origin. Thirdly, the proper level of democratisation and rule of law has now been defined as the prerequisite for a country to become 'eligible' for joining the Western democratic clubs – NATO and the EU. Membership in these has been seen as one of the best long-term strategies for improving the level of well-being in the transition countries. A functioning democratisation process and the introduction of the rule of law as basic principles of functioning can be seen as an important test of these countries’ ability to meet the entry criteria. Their ability to meet these criteria has been in turn the most decisive factor in the negotiation process on the road towards full EU/NATO membership. Such membership will definitely facilitate the fulfilment of their transition from the old regime, which was unable to provide its citizens with what they saw as a proper level of well-being, to a regime whose main goal remains expanding the European zone of peace, stability and economic and social welfare.

Transformation of the social and political system in Eastern Europe and integration of Europe are the best available strategies of dealing with the

challenges that could contribute to an uncontrolled and unwanted wave of migration in Europe. The EU is important not only as a positive example to be followed: it is also important as regional ‘soft power house’ providing local actors with important political, social and economic incentives as well as institutional solutions.

**A new well-being index**

In order to measure the welfare gap between Norway and the group of countries in transition where also the political dimension is taken into account, we propose a compound well-being index (CWBI). This index is a combination of the UNDP HDI and Freedom House index of democratisation and rule of law, as follows:

\[
\text{Year } CBWI = \{\text{Year } (\text{HDI} \times 100) - \text{Year } \text{Average DEM+ROL}\}
\]

By using the CBWI we can also cover the political dimension of transition, a dimension still relevant to the overall assessment of the outcome of the difficult transformation process. The declared macro-level goal of transformation was the creation of democratic states with functioning market economies; at the human, micro-level, the transformation was, however, to result in the higher level of well-being for the citizenry. The transformation was also intended to do away with the reasons for forced migration, and to limit the incentives for labour migration. In an ideal post-transition – read: Western-like – society, people would wish to move only for pleasure. All welfare needs – economic, social, political, personal – were to be met in the respective countries through the implementation of the model of social, political and economic development tested successfully in the West.

Those were the intentions. Some fifteen years after the beginning of transition and on the eve of the planned EU and NATO enlargement, these goals seem still remote, and the continent is facing serious political, social and economic challenges that must be solved if the integration project is to survive. Welfare gaps remain a real challenge, and migration is still seen as a viable strategy for coping with individual and group welfare dilemmas.
Table 6. Compound well-being index (CWBI): Norway and transition countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dem&amp;ROL average</th>
<th>HDI 2003</th>
<th>CWBI 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.944</td>
<td>93.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>83.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0.841</td>
<td>82.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>81.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>81.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>81.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>0.824</td>
<td>80.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>78.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>76.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>0.804</td>
<td>74.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>73.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>0.779</td>
<td>72.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>71.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>69.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>68.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>67.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>65.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This proposed CWBI provides a rather good picture of the multidimensional welfare-related dividing lines on the European continent. It also offers a good point of departure for our analysis of the impact that the very existence of welfare gaps may have on the development of European security in the context of EU enlargement.
Part 2. Tackling the Welfare Gap

Challenge

In order to see how the issue of welfare gaps has been coped with over the past decade in Europe we need to identify the most important factors influencing the developments in this area and examine how institutions and individuals have addressed this problem. As the main goal of this study is to find out whether there is a link between the welfare gaps in Europe and migratory choices made by individuals, we will focus on the aspects that impact on the development of new migration patterns in Europe and the modification of existing ones. As this study has limited geographic and historic focus – the development of new migratory patterns between Central/Eastern Europe and Norway in the post-Soviet period – we will pay most attention to developments that have been crucial to migratory relations within this limited geographic space.

Three macro-factors in particular have contributed greatly to changing the European migration landscape:

- the collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War,
- the systemic transformation in Eastern Europe,
- the eastward enlargement of the European Union.

The collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe was caused by its inability to adapt to quickly changing social, political and economic circumstances. This collapse unleashed a chain of events that have brought about the complete remaking of the political, economic and social map of Europe. Fifteen years after the beginning of the end of the Communist system in Europe, symbolised by the forming of the first non-Communist government in Poland in August 1989 and by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, there is only one country in Europe – Belarus, ruled by the autocratic Alexander Lukashenko – that still officially identifies with the old Communist system. Even in Russia, the very core of the former Communist world, the nostalgia for the old days of Communist stability and the Brezhnev era has much more to do with a longing for a brilliant ‘imperial past’ than for the ineffective rule of the Communist Party that once controlled the entire lives of the Soviet citizens.30

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was ultimate proof of the inability of the Communist elite to face the challenges of modernisation. The organisers of the failed August 1991 coup wanted to preserve the Soviet system and to reverse Gorbachev’s reforms; instead, their action dealt a lethal

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30 An interesting study on how Russians tackled the post-Communist challenges can be found in Humphrey 2002.
blow to the Soviet project. The Soviet monolith was replaced by 15 more or less independent states that have chosen various strategies and paths of transition, away from the Soviet past towards a post-Soviet system to be based on democracy and functioning market economy, on some more or less clearly defined ‘local traditions’, or on a combination of the two. The Soviet republics followed the example of the former Soviet vassals in Eastern Europe who had embarked on this policy of political and economic transformation even earlier.

The collapse of the Communist system in Eastern and Central Europe compelled both the local and the Western European elites to find a new political, institutional and ideological framework for Europe. In purely theoretical security terms, there were many possible paths to follow. In the East at least five possibilities could be considered potential strategies for adapting to the new geo-political reality. The countries of the region could 1) continue their close co-operation with Russia; 2) choose the path of Swiss-like neutrality and sovereignty; 3) form a regional political, military and economic alliance, a Central/East European variant of NATO and the EU, counterbalancing both Russia and the existing Western organisations; 4) opt for strengthening existing all-European institutions like the OSCE; or 5) seek integration with the existing – and well functioning – Western integration projects.

One thing was clear to most of the local political elites who took power in the region in the early 1990s – the Communist ideology as practised under the former Soviet regime and the command economy of shortage were no longer viable alternatives; the declared official strategic goal was to build democratic states with a functioning market economy. What was thus needed was a strategy of transition from the old system to the new one, modelled on the Western experience. It was therefore not so surprising that most regional policy-makers expressed interest in joining what they saw as their ‘role model’: the existing and institutionalised Western integration projects, the European Union and NATO.

The decision on what in Eastern and Central Europe is often referred to as ‘re-joining Europe’ – ‘re-joining’ to indicate that they had previously belonged to a wider Europe before being forcibly transferred to the Soviet sphere of influence in 1945 – was of crucial importance for the redrawing of political, economic and social map of the region. The second important decision was the decision on the path and pace of economic reforms. The design of reforms and then their implementation resulted in the division of Central and Eastern Europe into two zones: one of relative success, made up of the countries that were implementing a policy of painful but needed reforms, and a zone of more or less ‘failed reform’, consisting of the countries that embarked on an inconsistent policy of reforming their economies.

By late 1989, when the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe loosened and the Brezhnev doctrine was renounced by Gorbachev, the local elites were al-

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31 On the choices they faced and their consequences, see Gomulka 2000. For a good summing up of the first ten years of transition with focus on various, both economic and political outcomes see Transition. The First Ten Years. Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 2002.

32 However, the social costs of the transition were high; see Ellman 2000.
lowed to choose their own ways of coping with political, economic and social challenges. The Communist ideology and ideology-driven policy were rejected by all serious political forces. A new chapter in the history of Eastern Europe could begin.

Local policy-makers had a difficult dilemma to solve. On the one hand, their potential voters expected to be provided not only with more freedom but also with more social security and better chances of improving the quality of their lives. On the other hand, the policy-makers were confronted with the need to change the entire political and economic system in order to make their countries better prepared to meet the challenges of modernisation and globalisation. The best option would be to find a solution that both the people and the state could benefit from.

In most cases, however, this proved unachievable. Those responsible for designing and implementing system reforms had to make difficult choices on the scope, depth and speed of the political and economic reforms. They had to decide on the role of the market forces, and the regulatory role of the state in the transforming economy. Another decision they had to make was the decision on the speed and depth of economic reform. Was the reform to be a shock therapy, or a gradual transition from command economy towards an economy ruled by the invisible hand of the market? Moreover: What sort of social cushion were they to provide to their societies? What share of the limited state resources should go to protecting the most vulnerable groups within society?33

They also had to make long-term strategic decisions on the kind of political, economic and social system they wanted to create; and which countries – or groups of countries – were to be treated as models and potential partners and allies, and which models were to be rejected.

As far as the last issue was concerned, the most crucial decision concerned the nature of relations with the most important European agenda-setters, first and foremost the EU and NATO. In most cases, membership in the Western European clubs – the EU and NATO – was defined as the main long-term objective. Closer cooperation with West was to help the countries of this region achieve this ambitious goal. On its side, the West also decided to extend a helping hand towards the East, but also formulated a list of ‘threshold requirements’ to be met by countries wanting to join the Western institutions. The creation of the conditions for the development of a democratic political system, of civil society, of functioning market economy, the solving of the social, political, territorial and ethnic conflicts, and the rule of law – these were all defined as prerequisites for joining the West. This in turn meant that local policy-makers would have to design and implement deep and dramatic political, social and economic reforms that were to lay the ground for the development of a new type of political, economic and social system along Western lines. Some countries, however, decided that other solutions than those proposed by the West were more suitable.34

33 For more on that see Ferge 1997.
The decisions made at the early stage of transformation, but also under way, have contributed greatly to changing the political, economic and social landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. All the countries of the former Soviet Bloc had the same point of departure for their systemic transformation. They had formed a part of a Soviet empire ruled by the local Communist parties obeying orders from Moscow; the development of their command economy had been restrained by ideology and the bottom–up initiatives and calls for reforms had been effectively jammed by a party apparatus that had no desire to allow competing political forces to present their alternative programmes. And then, when Moscow was no longer willing to use its resources to support its local henchmen, the Communist regimes collapsed one after another. Political power was transferred to new elites or in some cases retained by former Communists turned nationalists or liberals.

These elites’ plans and commitment to implement the needed political, economic and social reforms have contributed to changing the political, social and economic map of Central/Eastern Europe in a definitive way. What used to be a part of the Soviet Bloc is today a heterogeneous region. After the first decade of reforms, the whole region could basically be divided into various ‘sub-units’ with specific features. In defining these sub-units we will take into consideration such factors as the macro- and microeconomic results of the reforms, the social impact of the reforms, the quality of governance in these countries and their relations with the European Union, undoubtedly the most important European agenda-setter in social welfare and policy.

In order to categorise and group the various countries, we will employ a set of indicators consisting of the items that will be used to measure the effects of the reforms. The macroeconomic effects of the transformation will be measured by comparing GDP in 2000 with GDP in 1989; the microeconomic effects of transformation will be measured by comparing real wages in 1999 with real wages in 1989. The social impact of transformation will be measured by comparing the most recent available data on poverty levels, by looking at the level of registered unemployment and by examining the impact of the transformation on one specific indicator – male life expectancy. This has proven an excellent instrument for measuring the ‘socio-biological’ impact of the transition. In order to compare economic welfare before the transformation and ten years later, we also will look at the number of personal cars registered per 1000 inhabitants; this is a good and relatively objective measure of the overall economic results of reforms.

The political/governance effects of the reforms will be measured by looking at what type of regime has been created, at the perceived level of corruption and, finally, these countries’ relations with the European Union. The last issue – the nature of relations with the European Union and the prospect of joining the EU in the foreseeable future – will be the most important instrument for categorising the countries of the region. In order to have at least the slightest prospect to being admitted to the EU, a country must meet a range of political and macro- and microeconomic criteria; many of the criteria we have chosen for mapping the region and presenting its diversity are consistent with those used by the EU to gauge the preparedness of a country for membership.
The choices made by policy-makers and the direct and indirect results of the still ongoing transformation have had a huge impact on the choices of various groups and individuals, and the survival and adaptation strategies of ‘ordinary people’. In the following we will therefore first look at the diversification of the post-Communist space in Europe, then at the EU’s strategy for coping with the emerging welfare gap dilemma, and finally at the broad spectrum of group and individual survival and adaptation strategies devised and adopted by citizens who have had to face the challenges of transition in their daily lives.35

**Diversification of the post-Communist area: to be EU or not to be?**

The most important dividing line in today’s post-Communist Europe is the one separating the countries with prospects of joining the European Union in the foreseeable future, from those that will not be able – or willing or interested – to meet the EU’s formal entry criteria in a middle- and even long term perspective. The use of the EU entry criteria as a tool for mapping post-Communist Europe in the context of the welfare gap problematique seems justifiable – the countries that have committed themselves to meeting these criteria have also much better prospects of abolishing the welfare gaps, both within their borders and within the borders of the enlarged European Union. The choice of the national long-term strategy of meeting the EU membership criteria is in the longer run closely linked with the choice of national strategy for solving the domestic problem of welfare gaps, as expected EU membership seems to be not only a purely political goal but also a practical policy instrument for addressing the welfare gap after having achieved full membership. The EU, as a ‘soft power’ with considerable focus on the social situation of the population, has at its disposal various policy instruments that can be used for abolishing existing welfare gaps. The EU has been addressing issues of social exclusion, poverty, inequality in economic development and welfare gaps in a rather comprehensive way.36

A combination of national policy aimed at meeting the EU entry criteria in the preparatory phase and the transfer of economic means to the underdeveloped regions of the enlarged Europe is probably the most effective approach to the problem of welfare gaps in today’s Europe. By making an effort to meet the EU entry criteria, countries are forced to make their economic, political and social system more compatible with that of the EU. Once these efforts are crowned with success, they will gain access to EU re-

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35 On the social cost of transition see After the Fall. The Human Impact of Ten Years of Transition 1999. and Human Development Report For Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS 1999 1999.

36 Fehay et al. 2003 p. 36 give the following assessment of this side of the EU policy: ‘The concerns of European policy, and in particular the social policy agenda, have expanded and deepened in recent years. This has been a response to the challenges posed by sustained high unemployment, for example, ageing populations, the increasing importance of knowledge and skills, the transformation of traditional family structures and gender economic roles, and environmental degradation.’ They also see the following welfare gap related goals as being the main driving force behind the EU policy: raising living standards and improving living and working conditions, strengthening social cohesion and combating exclusion, promoting equal opportunities, and safeguarding sustainability.
sources, making the fight against the existing welfare gaps much easier a task. On the other hand, those who do not undertake this effort will be forced to stay outside the Union, and will not be able to tap the EU for its resources in attempts to confront their own welfare gap related challenges. As regards the fight against social and economic inequalities, the enlargement of the EU will therefore play a decisive role in the coming period of European history. The citizens of the countries that are going to join the EU will also have far more options when it comes to the choice of their own ‘private’ strategies for coping with what they may see as welfare gaps. In that sense, the choice of the national strategy of seeking or of not seeking rapprochement with the EU, a strategy that also must imply the will to meet EU entry criteria, has a direct impact on the choices to be made by individuals living in the countries in question.37

From that EU membership-centred perspective, post-Communist Europe anno 2004 can be divided into at least four categories of countries. The first category are the countries that joined the EU as of 1 May 2004; the second group are the countries that are promised EU membership in the foreseeable future; the third group consists of the countries that, under given circumstances, have at least theoretical chances of applying for EU membership in the foreseeable future but whose institutional rapprochement with the EU will take more time; and the fourth group consists of those countries whose chances of joining the EU are negligible, or who, for various reasons, have ruled out full membership but may be interested in developing a constructive cooperation with the Union.

**EU insiders 2004: Three reform leaders and one special case: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia**

Four countries of the region – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – joined forces and formed the Visegrad Group, a loose political organisation intended to facilitate their accession to the Western clubs. The four countries have performed rather well in the economic field, but due to political turmoil in Slovakia under the Meciar regime, Slovakia was perceived as a Visegrad outsider, and its accession to NATO had to be postponed until 2004.

Of the four Visegrad countries, **Poland** seemed to be an economic winner after the first ten years of reforms.38 By 2000, its GDP had risen to 128% of the 1989 level – Poland was in fact the first country of the region to see its economy rebound already in 1992. Also real wages almost returned to the 1989 level after the first decade – 95.6% of the 1989 level was achieved in 1999 – but the country had to pay a rather high social price39 for the economic grand strategy proposed and implemented by the father of the Polish economic miracle, Leszek Balcerowicz.40 In 2001, unemployment reached 16.2% of the active labour force, rising to almost 20% by 2003. Almost one

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37 Good insight into enlargement debate is given in Croft, Redmond, Rees and Webber 1999.
38 On the ideology and technology of the Polish reform see Balcerowicz 1999.
39 On the social transformation of Polish society see the comprehensive study by Marody 2000, Marody 2002.
40 For more on Balcerowicz’s plan and his views on transition see Balcerowicz 1999.
fifth of the population (18.4%) has to get by on less than 4.3$/PPP per day.\(^{41}\) On the other hand, there are also some positive examples of the effects of the reform. Male life expectancy increased by more than 3% compared with 1989 level. Polish society has also become more prosperous, at least in terms of the number of motor vehicles in use: from 160/1000 in 1991 to 259/1000 by 2003. Also on the political level, the country achieved its long-term strategic goals, becoming a full member of NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. The building of democracy, despite some minor setbacks, was also a success story and an important prerequisite for Poland’s joining the Western institutions. On the other hand, the country is perceived as the most corrupt of the group of four leaders of transformation, ending at the 67th position in the 2004 Transparency International listing, far below all its Visegrad partners, as well as below all the Baltic countries and Bulgaria.

**Hungary** ranks next in terms of economic performance, although the country has also had its own economic and social problems to solve. Due to the relaxation of economic control under the Kadar regime, a specific Hungarian model of economic policy was developed, later known as Kadar’s ‘goulash Communism’. This prepared the country better to meet the challenge of economic transition when the ideological restraints were removed in 1989. By 2000, Hungary’s GDP had reached 105.3% of the 1989 level. In the microeconomic sphere, the country lagged behind its Visegrad neighbours – real wages reached only 81% of the 1989 level in 1999, and 15.4% of the population lives below the poverty line. On the other hand, registered unemployment was lower than in all other countries of the Visegrad group – 8% of the labour active population was without work in 2001. The hardships of transition took their toll on the population – male life expectancy rose only slightly during the first ten years of transformation, by 1.4% compared with 1989. On the other hand, more Hungarians could drive their own cars – in 1991 there were 195 cars registered per 1000 inhabitants, while by 2003 the figure had risen to 244. In the political sphere, Hungary managed to achieve its long-term goals – a viable democratic system was created on the post-Communist ruins, and the country joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. As far as the level of perceived corruption, the country is the second best among all post-Communist countries – Hungary is ranked 42nd in the 2004 Transparency International report. Only Estonia scores better on this scale.

In **the Czech Republic** the government of Vaclav Klaus was more reluctant when it came to implementing deep-going economic and social reforms. In 1997 the country experienced economic problems and the course of economic and social reforms had to be adjusted. Although Czechs faced a situation when, almost overnight, their assets were reduced by 10% due to the devaluation of the Czech currency in May 1997, the country has never experienced Poland’s levels of unemployment. The Czech capital, Prague, has achieved a level of economic welfare even above the EU average. By 2000, the Czech Republic had not yet managed to equal the 1989 GDP level – GDP in 2000 represented only 97.4% of the 1989 level. However, the coun-

\(^{41}\) On the link between reform and welfare in Poland see Garces, Rodenas and Carretero 2003, Huffman and Johnson 2002..
try’s citizens could reap other fruits of the transformation – in 1999 real wages were over 7% higher than in 1989, only 0.8% of the people were living on less than 4.3$/PPP, and only 8.5% of the labour force was jobless in 2001. It seems that stress levels are much lower than in the other countries of the region, the result being longer life for Czech men – they can now expect to live almost 5% longer than in 1989, and only men in the Georgian Republic have achieved a better result in the same period – at least according to official Georgian statistics. As far as access to consumer durables is concerned, Czechs are probably the best-off in the whole region – while in 1991 there were 215 motor vehicles registered per 1000 inhabitants, in 2003 there were already 343 cars registered per 1000 inhabitants. The Czech leadership also managed to achieve the nation’s political goals – to build a democratic system and to join NATO (1999) and become a fully-fledged member of the European Union (2004). As to the level of perceived corruption, the Czech Republic, ranked at 51, lags behind Estonia (31) and Hungary (42), but also behind Lithuania (44).

**Slovakia** was the last of this group to benefit politically from transition. The country had to wait until 2004 before it could join both NATO and the EU, largely because of support for the nationalistically inclined elite under the Mečiar regime. This, however, did not prevent the country from performing rather well in macroeconomic terms, and by 2000 the GDP of Slovakia was 2.4% greater than in 1989. Real wages grew more slowly – by 1999 they had reached only 86.1% of the 1989 level. Moreover, 8.6% of the population – among them most of the Roma families living in the country – lives under the poverty line, and registered unemployment was in 2001 even higher than in Poland – 18.6% of active labour force. In terms of material wealth, Slovaks have fared slightly worse than their Czech neighbours – the number of cars grew from the Czechoslovak level of 215 per 1000 population in 1991 to 240 in 2001. The level of perceived corruption as measured by Transparency International gives Slovakia 57th place in the global ranking – behind the two Baltic republics (Estonia and Lithuania), Hungary and the Czech Republic, but ahead of Poland (67th place in 2004).

**EU insiders 2004: Baltic tigers – three success stories with a bitter aftertaste?**

The three Baltic republics faced an even tougher challenge than most of the former Soviet vassals in Central Europe. After what they perceived as almost five decades of the Soviet occupation, the countries faced not only huge economic and political problem, but also social and ethnic ones, as their ethnic composition had changed during the decades of forced Russification. All the same, these three countries have managed to meet the EU and NATO entry criteria, and joined both Western organisations by 2004. That they were allowed to join both NATO and the EU was an ‘institutional’ recognition of their efforts on what they themselves often presented as their institutional return to Western Europe.42

42 More on the situation in the Baltic countries can be found in Cornett 2003, Paas 2003.
Of the three, **Lithuania**’s path towards Europe has been perhaps the bumpiest one in economic terms. The population suffered heavily as real wages were more than halved during the first ten years of transition, reaching only 47.8% of the 1989 level by 1999. More than one fifth of the population – 22.5% – have to live on less than 4.3$ per day. The main reason for this situation was the collapse of the post-Soviet economy – Lithuania’s 2000 GDP represented only 63.6% of the 1989 GDP level. Unemployment has also been high, in fact the highest among the three Baltic countries (12.5% in 2001). As to other socio-economic indicators, male life expectancy was slightly longer in 1999 than in 1989. Moreover, the population had more than twice as many cars at their disposal in 2001 than in 1991 (337:142). In the political sphere, Lithuania has developed a functioning democratic system that has managed to solve many problems linked with the transformation. The level of perceived corruption was much lower than among the country’s direct neighbours: in 2004 Lithuania was ranked as no. 44 on the Corruption Perception Index, as compared to Poland (67), Latvia (57), Russia (90) and Belarus (74).

**Estonia** has been the most successful of the Baltic countries in terms of economic performance and social situation. The economy shrank by only one fifth after the first ten years of transformation – GDP in 2000 represented 80.6% of the 1989 level. The microeconomic situation was also much better then in the other Baltic countries – although real wages reached only 66.2% of the 1989 level by 1999 and almost one fifth – 19.3% – of the of the population was living under the internationally recognised level of poverty, unemployment was relatively low (6.5% in 2001) and the number of cars was almost doubled after the first ten years of transition (154 cars per 1000 in 1991: 299 in 2001). Estonia, like most of the European transition countries, has experienced negative demographic trends, but male life expectancy has not changed dramatically after the first ten years of transition. Estonia has been the most successful of all the transition economies in the fight against corruption – at least according to the latest findings published by Transparency International, which rank Estonia as no. 31 on its Corruption Perception Index, making it the least corrupt of the post-Communist countries.

In **Latvia** the results of the transformation have been to a certain degree paradoxical. The collapse of the economy was even more severe than in Lithuania – by 2000, GDP had regained only 62.2% of the 1989 level. However, real wages shrank less than the economy in general – by 1999 they had regained 65% of the 1989 level. In the area of social exclusion, the record has also been mixed – unemployment relatively low (7.8%) in 2001, but more than one third of the population – or 34.8% – were living under the poverty line. The high level of poverty does not seem to have a direct impact on male life expectancy, however; and, paradoxically enough, has not prevented Latvians from purchasing cars, as the number of cars in the country more than doubled between 1991 and 2001 (123:249). As far as the perceived level of corruption is concerned, Latvia scores much worse than its Baltic neighbours, ranking as no. 57 in the latest overview prepared by Transparency International. This place it shares with Slovakia, but performs much better than Poland, which is ranked as no. 67.
EU insiders 2007: Romania and Bulgaria, or the case of delayed transformation and postponed membership

The four Visegrad countries represent the most positive pole of the transition map, as their transformation was almost completed by the time they joined the EU in 2004. The Baltic countries also managed to join the Union, their social, political and economic problems notwithstanding. By contrast, the two former Soviet vassals in the Balkans, Bulgaria and Romania, have performed rather poorly. Lack of commitment among the local political class to design and implement political, economic and social reforms has resulted in a delayed transition. In the sphere of economy and in political development, the two countries have experienced many setbacks on their road from Communism to the market economy and democracy: this was the main reason why their entry into the European Union had to be postponed until 2007.

Bulgaria experienced a collapse of its economy – in 2000, GDP was only 69.6% of the 1989 level; real wages were almost halved in the same period (52.2% of the 1989 level in 1999) and 18.2% of the population were living under the poverty line (less than 4.3$ in PPP per day). In 2001, almost one sixth of the labour force – 17.5% – was without work, and male life expectancy was in 1999 still slightly lower than in 1989. However, the level of material welfare as measured by the number of personal cars was much higher – in 2001 there were 262 cars registered per 1000 inhabitants, while ten years earlier the figure was 151. Although Bulgaria has gone through various episodes of political turbulence since the break-up of Zhivkov regime, the country is today described as having a functioning democracy. Also the perceived level of corruption is lower than in many other countries of the region – according to the latest Corruption Perception Index, Bulgaria ranks as no. 54. This means that it is perceived as less corrupt than at least three of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Poland, Latvia and Slovakia). This mixed record notwithstanding, Bulgaria will probably have to wait until 2007 to join the European Union. Then, however, it can benefit, as all regions of the country will be eligible for EU developmental help.

Also in the case of Romania, EU membership has been postponed until 2007. There were many factors contributing to this decision, but the country’s poor economic and political performance in the post-Communist period was the main reason. On the macroeconomic level, Romania has performed somewhat better than its closest Balkan neighbour, Bulgaria. Romania’s GDP in 2000 represented only 76.8% of its 1989 level, while real wages had fallen even more – by 1999 only 62.3% of the 1989 level was reached. On the other hand, official statistics showed that only 8.6% of the available labour force was without employment in 2001. Furthermore, the country seems to have managed to overcome health-related problems linked with the transition, as male life expectancy also regained the 1989 level in the tenth year of transition even though 44.5% of the population were living under the poverty line. Also as to consumer durables measured in terms of private car ownership there has been a remarkable improvement – by the 2001 there were almost twice as many cars registered in the country compared with the situation ten years earlier (139/1000 in 2001 as against only 61.8/1000 in 1991). In one area, however, Romania has scored worse than even some of the former Soviet republics (all three Baltic republics and Armenia and Bela-
rus): it is seen as definitely the most corrupt of the countries aspiring for EU membership, ranking no. 87 on the 2004 Corruption Perception Index.

**EU wannabees: Ukraine and Moldova, or the story of unfulfilled transitions**

Two of Romania’s eastern neighbours, Ukraine and Moldova, have not yet dared to begin to think about future EU membership. Of the many reasons why their prospects are so remote, their poor economic and political performance are the most obvious factors explaining why they will have problems with meeting EU entry criteria and getting the EU to help them solve their huge social and economic problems.

Ukraine, the second largest country of Europe, with a population of almost 50 million mostly disappointed former Soviet citizens has become a major political and social problem and a huge challenge to European policymakers. Only two countries of the European part of the former Soviet Union, Moldova and Georgia, have been performing worse than Ukraine in economic terms. By 2000, official GDP had reached only 37.6% of the 1989 level, and real wages were at 48.4% of their 1989 level. 29.4% of the population were living under the poverty line – but only 3.7% of the labour force was unemployed in 2001. We can therefore describe Ukraine as a country of working people whose incomes have been more than halved, and who produced even less than what they were paid for compared with the 1989 situation. It is thus not so surprising that the material standard of living has changed little compared with 1991 situation, at least if we use private car ownership as a measure. In 1991 there were 95.5 motor vehicles registered per 1000 inhabitants; in 2001 the figure was 102. The transition has also taken its toll on the men – male life expectancy in 1999 was almost 5% lower than in 1989 (95.45% of 1989 level). Other negative features are corruption (Ukraine has been ranked as no. 122 in the latest Corruption Perception Index) and the development of the corrupt, authoritarian and incompetent regime.

The situation in Moldova has been even more dramatic than in Ukraine. Moldova experienced a real economic collapse – in 1999 its official GDP fell to 30.6% of the 1989 level; real wages in 1999 were at 35.1% of the 1989 level, and 84.6% of population were living below the poverty line. However, registered unemployment was very low – 2% in 2001. Male life expectancy fell in 1999 to 98% of its 1989 level. In the area of ‘motorisation’ of Moldovan society there has been a positive development, as the number of registered motor vehicles per 1000 grew from 40 in 1991 to 64 in 2001. Moldova has experienced considerable political turmoil – the outbreak of civil war in 1992 resulted in the division of the country, and the population has had obvious problems with finding a suitable political ideology, as voter preferences switched from nationalist ideology towards a Communist one. These shifts in the political preferences of the population could also be interpreted as an expression of despair and dissatisfaction with a ruling elite that was not able to provide the citizenry with the basic level of social and

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43 On the Moldovan dimension of transition see Orlova and Ronnas 1999.
economic security. Another reason for the dissatisfaction in Moldova can also be the widely shared perception of the country as a corrupt one. In 2003 Moldova was ranked as no. 114 among the countries listed in the Corruption Perception Index – much worse than in Romania (87) but better than in another neighbouring country, Ukraine (122).

EU wannabes: the Caucasus, or the curse of geopolitics and ethnicity

The three former Soviet republics located on the outskirts of Europe in the Caucasus region have perhaps been more successful than Moldova in meeting the economic challenges of transition, but their chances of joining the EU are still rather slim. In addition all of them have been involved in devastating separatist and political local conflicts and have been facing serious political problems. Only one country in the area – Georgia – has today a regime that could be described as democratic. But this democratisation could take place only after a bloody transfer of power in 1992 and a rose revolution in 2003 that finally removed the corrupt Shevardnadze regime from power. Azerbaijan has become a hereditary autocracy when Heydar Alliev was replaced after his death by his son – a choice was democratically ‘legitimised’ in what was apparently a rigged election. Armenia has a semi-autocratic regime headed by former leaders of the separatist war in Nagorno-Karabakh, a regime clearly unable to address the country’s social and economic challenges.

The most visible result of the decade of negligence is the very high level of poverty throughout region: 54.2% of the population in Georgia, 64.2% in Azerbaijan and an incredible 86.2% of the population in Armenia have less than 4.35$ in PPP per day to live on. On the other hand, at least officially, unemployment has remained very low – 10.4% of the labour force in Armenia, 5% in Georgia and a rather amazing 1.3% in Azerbaijan. Also in the demographic sphere there have been strange developments, with male life expectancy increasing in the period between 1989 and 1999 by more than 8% in Georgia and by more than 2% both in Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the area of material welfare the data are also rather confusing – real wages fell in 1999 to 35.1% of the 1989 level in Armenia, to 50.2% of the 1989 level in Azerbaijan and to 73.2% of the 1989 level in Georgia – and yet, according to available sources, in 1991 there were 67, 32 and 77 vehicles per 1000 in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively, whereas data for 2001 show that 10 years later there were 70, 42 and 56 vehicles per 1000 in each of these countries. This probably has more to do with the reliability of data than with the real situation. As to corruption, Armenia, at 82 place in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, scores better than almost all other former non-Baltic Soviet republics (outranked only by Belarus, in 74 place), while both Georgia (133) and Azerbaijan (140) are found almost at the bottom of the list.

44 Data for 1991 are calculated on the basis of data on population and number of motor vehicles as provided by Britannica Yearbook 1993.
EU outsiders: Belarus, or sticking to the Soviet way

Belarus is the only former Soviet republic in Europe where the sitting autocratic regime of Lukashenko has openly expressed interest in managing the country in what could be termed ‘the Soviet way’. Politically Belarus is often described as the last European country to be ruled by a dictator; economically the country still has many Soviet features, but many indicators show that Belarus has managed to adapt to the new situation without paying too high a price, at least if we are to believe the official statistics. The country’s GDP in 2000 was only 18% lower than in 1989, and real wages had fallen even less, to 87.4% of the 1989 level by 1999. Official unemployment was also rather low: at 2.3% in 2001, it was almost 7 times lower than in the neighbouring Poland (by many seen as the champion of economic reform) and five times lower than in Lithuania. Also when it comes to material welfare measured by private car ownership, Belarus has done relatively well compared with other transition countries, as the number of registered cars almost tripled between 1991 and 2001, from 48/1000 to 147/1000. The Lukashenko regime is also seen as less corrupt than the regimes of all non-Baltic former Soviet republics – in 2003 Belarus was ranked 74 on the Corruption Perception Index, outdoing even one of the EU candidates, Romania, which occupied 87 position on the list. However, in one area Belarus has scored worse than all its neighbours. Although Belarusian men could expect to live longer than their Russian counterparts – 62.2 years versus the Russians’ 59.9 years in 1999 – the relative decrease in male life expectancy in Belarus has been even more pronounced than in Russia.

EU outsiders: Russia - from democratic chaos to an oil-lubricated hybrid regime

Russia occupies a special position among the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. Not only is it the biggest – also the scope of the problems facing the country’s decision-makers seems enormous. Although Russia inherited more than 72% of the area of the former Soviet Bloc, almost 40% of its former population, more than 70% of its oil production and between 60 and 70% of its armed forces, the country has experienced many tough moments since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The collapse of its economy in 1998 was the most dramatic economic event; the country has been recovering economically since, due not least to high oil prices and the increasing demand for domestically produced goods.

In one area, however, Putin still faces problems comparable to those faced by his predecessor – the most dramatic long-term problem the country is confronted with is undoubtedly that of demographic collapse. The population fell by 1.8 million, from 147 million in 1989 to 145.2 million in 2002; had it not been for the net migration from the former Soviet republics (an estimated 5.5 million people between 1989 and 2002), the drop would have been even more dramatic. According to various estimates, the population of Russia may shrink to slightly more than 125 million (UN projection) or slightly more than 135 million (census projection) by 2025. Two factors have contributed greatly to these negative demographic trends that endanger the future of Russia as a viable economic and political actor: the low fertility
of Russian women, and what has been described as ‘stubbornly, catastrophically high mortality’. (Eberstadt 2004:18) This is clearly illustrated by life expectancy of Russian men, which decreased from 64.2 years to 59.9 years between 1989 and 1999. In fact, the figure had reached 57.6 years in 1994 – on a par with that of many developing countries, and a level unheard of not only in Western and Eastern Europe, but indeed in the whole post-Soviet space. Not even the economic recovery experienced since 1999 has improved the situation here – male life expectancy has continued to fall, down to 59 years in 2000 and 2001, and 58.5 in 2002.

Demographic problems are not the only challenges the leadership has been facing since 1991. Economically Russia has not yet recovered – in 2000 GDP was still at only 60.8% of the 1989 level, and real wages in 1999 were done to 38.2% of the 1989 level. On the other hand, officially registered unemployment was low – 1.6% in 2001. Even with many years of uninterrupted and relatively high economic growth caused by positive terms of trade and growing domestic demand, Russia’s GDP in 2003 was still far below the 1989 level (between 70 and 77%, according to various sources). Although Russian authorities have announced that real income has been growing at an impressive rate since reaching bottom in 1999 (46% of the 1991 level) and was in 2003 52% higher than in 1999, this was still only 70% of the 1991 level. This might explain why, according to the latest available data, 50.3% of the population have to live on less than $4.3 in PPP per day. On the other hand, private car ownership has soared – by 2001 there were 147 cars registered per 1000 population, compared with only 65.5 in 1991.

The positive economic development in Russia is associated with the stability of the regime in power since the first president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, decided to step down on the New Years Eve of 1999. The new president, Vladimir Putin, promised to put an end to the problems – although his record is today rather mixed. He has managed to implement some important economic reforms that have revitalised the economy, but in political terms his first and the beginning of his second period were more controversial. He has been widely accused of building a hybrid semi-autocratic regime, where democratic procedures are seemingly followed but the real political decisions are taken in non-democratically elected fora and individual freedoms are in many respects narrowed. Especially Putin’s inability to solve problems in the Caucasus, resulting in the wave of terror haunting Russia, and his handling of the touchy problem of the outcome of privatisation in Russia, have led many to doubt his capabilities as leader of the country. Nor has Putin been able to change the image of Russia as a country of corrupt bureaucrats – Russia scores poorly on the latest list of most corrupt countries, ending as no. 90.

Although Russian policy-makers reiterated that Russia should not be treated as a candidate for EU membership, Russia has made efforts to make its laws comply with EU standards. Both Russia and the EU have expressed

45 For more on poverty and marginalisation in Russia see Klugman 1997, Marginal'nost' v sovremennoi Rossi 2000, The Social Crisis in the Russian Federation 2001. Also Yemtsov 2003 gives a good understanding of this aspect of Russian transformation on the regional level
46 For more on various aspects of corruption in Russia see Makarychev 2000.
interest in creating a common European legal space. The main goal of this policy is to encourage economic cooperation between these two important economic actors with complementary economies, through a process of legislative approximation. Russia wants access to the European markets, while Europe has developed interest in Russia as an important provider of energy and other strategic commodities. Russia is therefore treated as a special case by EU policy-makers. On the one hand they consider Russia as still too different – and indeed, it defines itself as too different – to join the Union, but on the other hand they see Russia as becoming more and more integrated with Europe and reaping the positive fruits of this integration. This is true not least in the area of economic cooperation, which provides Russia with huge profits that the country’s authorities have been employing partly to narrow the welfare gaps between Russia and the rest of Europe. In that sense, although indirectly, the EU has also a role to play in Russia in addressing the problem of welfare gaps.
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>73.2</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>108.3</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2.0(133) D</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 Poverty in Eastern Europe and the CIS in Economic Survey of Europe, 2004 No. 1 p.169 defines as ‘poor’ those who have to subsist on less than 4.30 $ in PPP per day.
48 Data from TransMONEE Database 2003.
50 Based on Corruption Perception Index 2004 by Transparency International. CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts; it ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
Institutional strategies: the EU enlargement context

The very existence of welfare gaps is one of the most important push and pull factors influencing people’s decision to move. As early as in 1991, Jean Claude Chesnais identified a unique combination of ‘push factors’ on Soviet-dominated territory that were to play a central role in the migration choices taken since by the population of the area. The factors listed by Chesnais were: economic backwardness, lack of functioning democracy, nationalistic uprisings and inter-ethnic conflicts.53

Today, more than a decade after Chesnais’ original diagnosis, the situation in the area seems to be even more complex. The relative liberalisation of travel restrictions, the deep economic crisis that has haunted this region for the past decade and political processes in Europe, first of all European integration and the EU enlargement, have made the target area in the West an even more attractive and more easily accessible area of actual and potential migration. In addition, there are in the West various pull factors that make it an attractive choice for those seeking better opportunities: the proximity of the area, the existence of local ethnic networks making permanent or temporary migration easier, a growing demand for labour in certain sectors of the Western economy, and not least the possibility of finding temporary work on the black labour market and the transfer of earnings in the form of remittances to the low-cost country of origin.54

This new set of challenges and responses has put European migration in a new political context. Myron Weiner, who has written extensively on the relationship between migration and security,55 identifies five central aspects of what he describes as ‘the global migration crisis’: the problem of control over entry, problem of absorption, the impact migration has on international relations, the relationship between migration and international regimes and institutions, and not least how migration is seen as a moral problem. (Weiner 1995:9–20) The way individuals or groups try to surmount welfare gap by migration or by choosing other strategies seems to challenge all these five points. The realisation that Europe cannot remain divided into a zone of relative welfare in the West and a zone of insecurity and lack of basic welfare in the East has been a major factor influencing European integration policies. NATO and EU enlargement have been perceived as the most efficient ways of improving the security of the continent, as they were expected to result in a lessening of the welfare gap.56 The list of requirements to be met by candidates to these two European clubs is largely a set of preconditions for building a system with smaller welfare gaps than those existing today between the East and the West and within many of the countries in Eastern and Central Europe.

53 Quoted in Brochmann 1996, p.41.
54 For more on the recent trends in Central and Eastern European migration in the context of EU enlargement see Migration Policies and EU Enlargement: the Case of Central and Eastern Europe 2001.
56 On the social goals and targets of this policy see Atkinson, Marlier and Nolan 2004. Also the conclusion that higher level of social inclusion and protection may have some long-term positive impact on economic performance was probably one reason why the EU formulated these targets. For more on this link see Arjona, Ladaigue and Pearson 2003.
The political and social instruments used first of all by the enlarging EU will change both the welfare and the migration landscape in Europe in a very definite way. On the one hand, EU enlargement will result in the inclusion of states with relatively weak economies and great social problems, further deepening the welfare gap within the Union. This development will confront the EU with an ‘absorption dilemma’ – the new, poorer members will have to be absorbed in the same way as the real immigrants. This also could mean that many individuals and groups may decide to migrate within the EU and the EEA in order to improve their lives, as their movement would no longer be restricted by strong bureaucratic barriers.

On the other hand, those left outside will perceive the enlarged EU area as a potential provider of welfare and may try to get in, legally or illegally, challenging the enlarged EU’s ability to control entry. This may force the enlarged EU to create new regime and institutions, or change the existing ones, thereby contributing indirectly to the modification of the existing regional ‘migration regime’. The need to absorb the new, poorer members and to address the issue of permanent or temporary outsiders has already resulted in the emergence of political and social challenges. The issue of the broadly understood welfare gap and the social, political and economic consequences linked to its very existence has become politicised and then even partially securitised in the European political debate.

The West has found itself confronted with an acute political dilemma – it could continue integration efforts and work for a deeper integration of the existing Western community, or it could open its doors to the East and embark on a project of building a broader, united Europe, facing new political, economic and social challenges stemming from the enlargement of the zone of responsibility and stability. It was felt that the new situation had to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Europe was no longer haunted by the spectre of Communism; rather ‘the spectre of uncontrolled mass migration from Eastern Europe became a public issue in the West’ (Castles and Miller 2003:10). The main incentive for migration westward was that the West was perceived as a better place to live than the countries going through a painful systemic transition. The EU risked an uncontrolled inflow of legal and illegal migrants from the former Soviet Inner and Outer Empire.

This challenge could be addressed in at least two ways. The first option was the reintroduction, this time by the Western democratic governments and not by the local authoritarian regimes, of travel restrictions for the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe who, naturally enough, wanted to make use of their newly won freedom of movement. The second option was to give them hope that their situation could be gradually improved in their home-places, as a consequence of an ambitious plan of enlarging the Western zone of stability and welfare to Eastern and Central Europe. The first option could be described as building an exclusive Western club, keeping at distance the poorer Europeans and risking their outrage, uncontrolled growth

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57 Even on the eve of enlargement the EU provided the candidate countries with support – for more on this phase of the process see Bailey and De Propris 2004.
58 On EU efforts to work out a common migration policy see Furuseth 2003.
59 For more on the early phase of this migration debate see The New Europe and International Migration; Special Issue 1992.
of populism and nationalism and, in the mid-term, a conflict between the Western club and the outsiders. This approach would perhaps be tempting from the purely economic point of view, but would contradict the very principle underlying the whole European integration project – the principle of solidarity and cooperation as the way of preventing international conflict.

The EU is basically a peace project. Its main original purpose was to link together former wartime foes by building a net of economic interdependence and cooperation. This would make any military conflict between them unthinkable and impossible, because by going to war against each other they would in fact be going to war against themselves. This original spirit of the EU was perhaps not so visible in the first years after the dissolution of the Soviet empire. The very thought of enlargement at that stage was a challenging concept, due not least to the enormous economic, social and political differences between the western and eastern parts of the continent. However, the EU finally decided to respond to this new challenge through a policy that could be labelled ‘institutional migration’. Instead of exposing itself to uncontrolled movement of people from the East, the EU sent a clear message: ‘Do not come to us; we will come to you and help you resolve your problems and improve your situation. However, if you want us to come and help, you will have to meet some basic requirements.’

In 1993 the EU, and in 1995 NATO, made public their ‘entry criteria’ for those aspiring to join the Western integration projects. Since that point, reforming the economic and political sphere has become much easier for those countries that decided to seek full integration with the existing Western institutions – they were provided with a clear set of rules to be implemented, and goals to be met in order to make them ‘eligible’ for full membership.60

The successful implementation of this policy of meeting entry criteria was to open the EU doors to the new seekers. This would secure them access to EU resources, which would in turn help them change their own economic and social landscapes to such a degree that mass migration would no longer seem a desirable option. By promising substantial assistance in return for meeting the EU criteria, the Union could help the countries of the region to embark on a policy that in the longer run would result in greater equality in levels of economic and social well-being.

The recent history of European migration shows two main driving forces behind the largest migration waves. In peacetime, economic and opportunity gaps are the main driving forces, with both migratory push and pull factors. However, it is in situations of violent conflict and political instability that the most dramatic and massive migration occurs. Preventing conflict and political instability by promising membership – and economic benefits – has become the basic policy line of the two big Western clubs. There has also been a sort of division of labour between NATO and the EU – NATO was to help the countries of the region solve their basic security dilemma by providing them with what was seen as a ‘hard security’ guarantee; the EU was to address problems stemming from the other parts of the broadly understood ‘security spectrum’. When the political elites of the region decided to seek closer ties and membership in the two Western clubs, this was obviously dic-

60 For more on that see Wallace 2000.
tated by the hope that full membership would result in a substantial improvement in welfare and well-being in the societies they were to lead on the bumpy road to the West. Membership in NATO and the EU was expected to give the societies the chance to meet their needs on almost all levels. NATO membership would ensure physical safety and security in an unstable international environment (the Balkan wars, political instability and violent conflicts in the FSU); EU membership would facilitate the realisation of social and individual needs by providing the resources needed to improve their social, political and economic well-being.

Once the decision on enlargement was made, the West – and first and foremost the EU – had to address at least five immediate and long-term challenges:

1. How to organise the enlargement process?
2. How to reform its own structures that were to encompass the new members so they could function smoothly also after the planned enlargement?
3. How to finance the enlargement and the enlarged EU?
4. How to adapt to the new situation with the gap between the rich and the poor growing deeper in the enlarged Union?
5. Where to draw the external borders of the enlarged EU, and how to build relations with immediate neighbours outside the enlarged Union?

Organising the enlargement was perhaps the easiest part of the exercise, as the EU had already gone through similar processes in connection with earlier rounds of enlargement. The EU was definitely the stronger of the two parties in this process: indeed, the candidate countries had to accept the basic conditions for joining even before the negotiation process could start – the stage for negotiations was in a way preset. It was agreed what would be the goal of the negotiations – the *acquis communautaire* were largely predefined – and it was clear from the outset that the candidate countries would have to adopt the set of rules proposed by the EU, and that at this stage their influence on the final shape of the Union would be limited. Debate on the future shape of the Union intensified when the negotiation process seemed to be nearing an end. What was often described as a ‘rotten compromise’ was reached at the EU summit held in December 2000 in Nice, where the decision was made on the future balance of political power among the Union’s old and new members. This decision was to survive for only about three years, however. An alternative proposal on post-enlargement decision-making was put forward by the former French president Valery Giscard d’Estaing, who proposed the adoption the EU Constitution. The heated debate on the changes in future political decision-making in the Union resulted in deep disagreement. The December 2003 Rome summit was a fiasco.

In fact, the existing and perceived welfare gaps in Europe were at the root of almost all problems confronting both the West and the East in the painstaking negotiation process and then in the debate on the future shape of the enlarged EU. The coming enlargement was to be the most asymmetric one in EU, in terms of economic and social potentials. Moreover, the welfare gaps between the existing member states and the candidate countries were huge. It
was clear that the enlargement would be a costly affair for the old members of the EU.

The EU budget was already on the brink of collapse due to huge transfers to underdeveloped areas within the Union itself and to its ‘rural community’ (CAP). The EU badly needed reform of its own public finances. The realisation that it would be impossible to apply existing EU rules to the new members because that would result in the economic collapse of the whole integration project prompted policy-makers to work out a new set of rules for the division of the EU’s ‘financial cake’. A balance would have to be found between the financial capabilities of the old members and their willingness to finance the enlargement, and the perhaps unrealistic expectations of the future members. It was also important to avoid the impression that the enlarged Union would be divided into an old ‘core’ with full rights, and the new peripheries with formal full membership but in practice treated as ‘second class’ members.

The hot debate on the eve of enlargement on how the new Union was to be managed, and especially what many interpreted as the fiasco of negotiations in Rome in December 2003, triggered discussion on the dangerous future of the European integration project. The heart of the matter seemed to be the relationship between economic and political power in the enlarged Union. In an insightful article, the French scholar Nicolas-Jean Brehon (Brehon 2004) has presented a set of data illustrating the main bone of contention. According to the Treaty of Nice, the existing members’ share of political power would be 68.7% in the enlarged Union; at the same time they were expected to contribute 94.4% of the budget. By contrast, the new members were to be given 31.3% share in the policy-making body, while their contribution to the Union’s common budget was to be limited to 5.6%. The main contributors to the common budget – Germany and France, which were to contribute respectively 22 and 16.6% to the new 2009 budget – apparently felt that this lack of balance between financial contribution and influence on political decisions was unacceptable.

There were many other reasons for the row that emerged between some old and some coming EU members just before enlargement. A basic issue was the question of solidarity in solving the economic and social problems that had been caused by the candidate countries’ rather unwilling earlier participation in the ‘Soviet project’.

The welfare gaps in today’s Europe originate largely from the circumstance that the eastern part of the continent was forced to take part in the destructive Soviet political, economic and social experiment between 1945 and 1991. In the interwar period, Czechoslovakia had been counted among the wealthiest countries of Europe, with a standard of living similar to that in the Nordic countries. Poland had had levels of social and economic development similar to those of Spain in the same period. The difference in the social and economic development between the two parts of Germany on the eve of unification is perhaps the clearest illustration of the ‘welfare price’ the countries of the region had to pay for their forced participation in the Communist project of building a paradise on earth.

The candidate countries have still to struggle with the social, political and economic legacy of Communism. Deep disagreement on how to make deci-
sions, and on who is to finance the process of levelling out the welfare gaps, may well derail the whole process of the pan-European integration, by fuelling mistrust between the old and the new members and by making them reassess their policy choices. In that sense the very existence of welfare gaps has already become a serious political problem. The issue has become visibly, although indirectly, politicised in the European debate on the future of the institutional, political and economic shape of the enlarged Union and the emergence of new migratory trends.\footnote{For a discussion of the new pattern of migration in Central and Eastern Europe see Romaniszyn 1997. On the securitisation of the debate on migration see Huysmans 2000.}

Another issue that has become politicised – even partly securitised – is the question of opening the EU labour market to workers from the new member countries. The deep welfare gap may have a direct impact on migratory choices, prompting people living under difficult conditions to seek improvement by moving to the western and northern parts of the Union, in a situation with no formal restrictions due to the common policy on free movement of labour within the enlarged Union.

The economic gaps within the EU are best measured by comparing GDP per capita measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) at the regional level. A quick look at Table 7 shows that after the 2004 enlargement the economic gap between the richest and the poorest region within the union will double. In 1999 the difference between the wealthiest and the poorest regions in the union – Inner London in the UK (242\% of EU average) and Ipeiros region of Greece (51\%) – was 4.7:1. By 2007, we can expect the gap to have grown to 13.4:1, with Inner London at the top and Romania’s North-East Region at the bottom (not shown in the table).\footnote{For details on the differences within the existing and the enlarged European Union see for instance a study A new partnership for cohesion, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion3/cohesion3_en.htm}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ten highest</th>
<th>The ten lowest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Inner London (UK)</td>
<td>1. Lubelskie (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bruxelles-Capitale (BE)</td>
<td>2. Podkarpackie (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Luxembourg</td>
<td>3. Warmińsko-Mazurskie (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hamburg (DE)</td>
<td>4. Podlaskie (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Île de France (FR)</td>
<td>5. Świętokrzyskie (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Vienna (AT)</td>
<td>6. Esztergom (HU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Berkshire, Buckinghamshire &amp; Oxfordshire (UK)</td>
<td>7. Opolskie (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Provincia Autonoma Bolzano (IT)</td>
<td>8. Eszak-Alföld (HU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Oberbayern (DE)</td>
<td>10. Latvia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This comparison dramatically illustrates the scope of challenges facing EU decision-makers. In a situation where the peace is seemingly secured in Europe and work on opening up borders in much of Europe will be more or less concluded by 2007, economic motivation is likely to become the most important push- and pull factor influencing migratory choices in the enlarged EU. Studies of the expected impact of opening up the Western European la-
bour market to the workforce of Central and Eastern Europe have become a thriving ‘industry’. These studies form part of the broader process of preparing for the crucial changes that will take place in connection with the enlargement. They are also a part of the learning and adaptation process intended to make policy- and decision-makers better prepared to meet this new ‘human challenge’.

The EU has at its disposal a range of instruments for addressing the welfare gap, aimed at reducing this problem’s importance in the new emerging European security landscape and influencing migratory choices. The most powerful of these instruments are the EU’s cohesion policy and economic help to the underdeveloped areas within the Union, the EU common social and migration policy, and, finally, the EU’s policy towards countries remaining outside the Union. As shown by the example of Spain, Portugal and Ireland, and to a lesser degree Greece, application of these instruments has been successful in preventing mass and uncontrolled migration and equalising welfare levels within EU borders. Developments in relations between the EU and the candidate/acceding countries from Central and Eastern Europe have also shown that the Union has managed to retain control over migratory flows and, to a certain extent, guide developments also in areas outside its jurisdiction.

Of all the decisions taken by the EU over the past ten years the most important is the decision on enlargement. This will change the political and social map of the continent in a decisive way. It will also have a direct impact on the migratory choices and plans of millions of people in Central and Eastern Europe. For potential migrants, three issues are of crucial importance:

- the possibility to travel without restrictions
- the possibility to find legal or illegal source of income
- the possibility to settle more or less permanently in the country of one’s own choosing.

EU enlargement will have a direct bearing on all three, as it will mean the extension of the principle of free movement of persons and free movement of workers to all citizens of the new European Union.

Although formally part of the Justice and Home Affairs area of EU policy, the policy of free movement of persons and workers overlaps with other

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63 For more information on cohesion policy and the Cohesion Fund see: [http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60018.htm](http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60018.htm)
64 For more detailed information on the regional dimension of the European Union’s policy see: [http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s24000.htm](http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s24000.htm)
65 Basic information on EU social and employment policy can be found at: [http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s02000.htm](http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s02000.htm)
67 Basic information on the EU’s external relations and its instruments in this field can be found at: [http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s05000.htm](http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s05000.htm)
68 For more on that in the enlargement context, see Martin, Velazquez and Funck 2001.
69 On how difficult and challenging this decision was, see Schimmelfennig 2001.
70 On this dimension of the EU policy see Schmähl 2004.
central areas of common European policy-making. In the enlargement context this issue was directly linked with external relations policy: in fact, the whole issue of enlargement was originally a purely external policy issue. The main goal of the EU in the first stage of cooperation with countries seeking membership was to identify those who, due to their commitment to meeting EU entry criteria, would become ‘eligible’. Thereafter, negotiations could begin. One of the main ‘prizes’ at the end of this process was to be the opening of the common labour market to citizens from the new member states and the extension of the principle of free movement of persons and workers to all new citizens. What began in the early 1990s as an external policy issue had by 2004 become an issue pertaining to common policy in the area of free movement of persons and workers. The answer to the question ‘Who is eligible for full EU membership?’ has thus become an answer to the question ‘Citizens of which new countries, former EU-outsiders, are to be given access to the EU labour market?’

The decision on the enlargement and the application of the principle of free movement of people and workers have also had a direct bearing on both common EU and national migration policy. With enlargement, new groups of European citizens who previously had restricted possibilities to move freely between their countries and the EU, and within the EU, will gain almost unlimited possibilities to settle in the countries of their own choosing – provided that they can secure employment there.

Another policy area affected by the decision on enlargement and the planned application of the rule of free movement of people and workers is the common European and national welfare policy. Since enlargement could be expected to result in deeper welfare gaps within the enlarged EU, and since application of the principle of the free movement of people and workers would open the borders of the old EU countries to millions of potential job-seekers from the poorer parts of the continent, many began asking how enlargement would affect the welfare situation in their countries, and to what extent ‘welfare shopping’ might create problems for both national and supranational bodies shaping European welfare policy.

There was also the realisation that enlargement and the application of the rule of free movement of persons and workers would impact on common and national social policy. Two issues were intensely discussed: the fear of social dumping in the more prosperous EU countries; and the problem of potential brain drain from the new member countries.

The debate has also had impact on matters involving the common regional and cohesion policy of the enlarged Union. How could the available cohesion and regional policy instruments best be used to change the migratory push and pull balance sheet of the enlarged Union? By changing this pull and push migratory balance sheet through applying financial tools provided by the EU, policy-makers hoped to prevent uncontrolled and uncontrollable migratory movements.

However, these financial levelling instruments could be used only if the old members of the EU – and especially the main contributors, i.e. Germany, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg, Austria and Belgium – were willing to provide the necessary financial support for applying the cohesion and regional policy tools also after the planned enlarge-
Part 2. Tackling the Welfare Gap Challenge

ment. Moreover, how would the current major beneficiaries of the cohesion and regional policy – first and foremost Spain, Portugal and Greece – react to this new cohesion challenge from Eastern Europe? The common European cohesion policy is an important expenditure post – approximately 1/3 of the new EU budget for the period 2007–2013 (€ 345 billion or ‘only’ 60 billion less than the most costly Common Agricultural Policy) is to be spent on this policy post, according to the February 2004 budget proposal. The tug-of-war for these resources is expected to lead to the creation of new and or altered intra-EU coalitions and to a sharper tone in discussions between EU’s net contributors and those who are to benefit from the regional and cohesion policy related transfers.

The combination of all these factors and considerations has resulted in the creation of a Europe with varying degrees of freedom of movement of persons and workers. With the May 2004 enlargement, the EU has become divided into two ‘formal’ blocs and into various ‘freedom of movement of persons and workers’ subgroups.

These two ‘formal’ blocs are the EU insiders and the EU outsiders. The first group consists of the countries that are formally full EU members: the 15 old EU members, the 10 new members and then the 2 future EU members, Romania and Bulgaria, due to join in 2007. The second group is made up of those countries that are not EU members nor are likely to be so in the foreseeable future. This group is far more heterogeneous than the first one: within it we find some countries that have no problems in meeting the formal membership criteria and have been offered EU membership but have decided against this (Norway and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland), as well as countries which for various reasons are not yet eligible for EU membership (Belarus is not ‘willing’ to accept the EU entry criteria; Russia has been rejecting EU membership also for other reasons), and countries that could currently be described as ‘EU wannabies’ – i.e. those that want to join but whose way to membership is long, as they still have problems in meeting even the most basic EU entry criteria.

As to the application of the principle of free movement of persons and workers, the situation today is highly complex. Among the EU insiders, four subgroups can be identified. There are the old EU members, whose citizens have unrestricted access to the EU common labour market; the second one, the new members, is internally divided into two subgroups, one with Malta and Cyprus, whose citizens have had the same rights as the old EU members from the first day of membership, and another one consisting of the 8 new members from Eastern Europe. Their citizens have limited access to the common labour market; the old EU countries have imposed the ‘2+3+2’ transitional arrangements (see below), limiting access to their domestic labour markets for up to 7 years. In addition there is a fourth group – Romania and Bulgaria. They will formally become EU members in 2007, but their relationship to the policy area labelled ‘freedom of movement of persons and workers’ is as yet undefined. In theory, they could end up in the Malta/Cyprus subgroup, with unrestricted access to the EU labour market from the first day of membership (rather unrealistic), or they will have to follow the ‘restricted access path’ imposed on the 8 new members from Eastern Europe.
Among the EU outsiders we also find various subgroups in terms of access to EU labour market. Although Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein have opted to stay outside the EU, they have become a part of the European Economic Area (EEA). This has enabled almost unrestricted access of job-seekers from the whole EEA area to the whole EEA labour market, which is made up of the old EU, the new EU and the three EFTA countries. Switzerland has chosen to stay outside both the EU and the EEA, but has signed a special bilateral Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland and the 15 previous EU member states; this entered into force on 1 June 2002. According to this agreement, each year up till 15,000 citizens of the old EU countries can settle in Switzerland in connection with work. Since 1 June 2004, Swiss nationals who want to live and work in one of the old EU countries are granted the same treatment in the 15 old EU countries as EU nationals with regard to entry and residence provisions and access to the labour market and no longer require work permits. These four countries – Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland – can therefore be described as formal EU outsiders but *de facto* and *de jure* insiders as far as the access of their citizens to the EU common labour market is concerned. The same cannot be said about the citizens of the other countries outside the EU fold – neither citizens of wannabies or the ‘non-eligible-for-the-time-being’ countries have unrestricted access to EU common labour market, although they can use – and have been using – other migratory gates to get into this attractive labour market.

Table 8. Freedom of movement of workers in Europe – various categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Access to EU labour market through the free movement of labour principle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU insiders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Old EU</td>
<td>Unrestricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 New EU EE</td>
<td>Restricted, 2+3+2 rule may apply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 New EU</td>
<td>Unrestricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Future EU</td>
<td>Probably restricted from 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>Unrestricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Unrestricted from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wannabies</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not-eligible</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a potential migrant worker, the crucial question is whether he or she will be granted the same rights as local employees. The main stated goal of the principle of the free movement of workers is the elimination of any discrimination based on nationality as regards employment, remuneration and other working conditions, access to accommodation and the worker’s right to be joined by his or her family. This at least nominal equality of all citizens

71 For more details on that agreement see:

72 The policy of free movement of workers is based on the following set of regulations:
of the enlarged EU – and the EEA area and Switzerland – may become the main legal and institutional incentive for those willing to try a migratory adaptation and survival strategy in order to improve their quality of life and the level of welfare.

The realisation that this new opportunity could be exploited by many of the new EU citizens has contributed to the flourishing of not always so independent expertise on post-enlargement labour migration in Europe. Tens, if not hundreds, of reports have seen the light of day, aimed at providing interest groups and political actors with arguments in favour or against opening the EU labour market to the new members. These studies have had a big impact on decision-making in the area of common and national policy of opening – or rather of not opening – of the EU common labour market. The most visible consequence has been the introduction of transitional arrangements, at the request of countries fearing that the inflow of job-seekers from Eastern Europe could have a destructive effect on their domestic labour market and their system of welfare and social protection. According to this principle the most exposed countries – Germany and Austria are held to be most vulnerable due to their geographical proximity to source countries – can delay the decision on the opening of their labour markets for up till 7 years (the 2+3+2 rule). Originally intended as an extraordinary policy tool for the most exposed countries, this has become more a rule than an exception – of the old 15 EU members, only three – the UK, Ireland and Sweden – have decided that an open door policy was to be introduced on the day of enlargement. All other 12 member countries have introduced various transitional arrangements. Some, like Germany and Austria, have almost closed their labour markets to job-seekers from the new member countries; others have introduced restrictions or bureaucratic procedures to provide better control over the expected migratory flows.


73 A central study is Boeri and Brücker 2000, the full text of which is available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/empl_esf/enlargement_en.htm. One of the last contributions on the eve of enlargement was Alvarez-Plata, Brücker and Silverstovs 2003. The Polish researcher J. Oczki (2002) has compared the findings of various studies on potential labour migration from Central and Eastern Europe. His summing up shows that predicting on a complex social issue like migration is difficult, no matter what methods are chosen.

74 On the German understanding of the impact of enlargement on the local labour market see for instance Bauer 1998.
Table 9. Migration potential from Central/Eastern Europe – various studies  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author and year</th>
<th>Migration to EU</th>
<th>Emigration from</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korcelli (1992)</td>
<td>40,000–70,000</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franzmeyer (1997)</td>
<td>590,000–1,180,000</td>
<td>All candidate countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huber and Pichelmann (1998)</td>
<td>140,000–200,000</td>
<td>Eastern/Central Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walterskirchen (WIFO) and Dietz (1998)</td>
<td>160,000, falling to 110,000</td>
<td>8 countries from Central/Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauer and Zimmermann (IZA) (1999)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt (1999)</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>8 countries of Central/Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orłowski and Zienkowski (1999)</td>
<td>380,000–1,500,000 in the next 10–12 years</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brücker (DIW) and Boeri (2000) (labour migrants)</td>
<td>70,000, falling to 30,000</td>
<td>8 countries of Central/Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brücker (DIW) and Boeri (2000) (all migrants)</td>
<td>200,000, falling to 85,000</td>
<td>8 countries of Central/Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hille and Straubhaar (2000)</td>
<td>270,000–790,000</td>
<td>10 countries of Central/Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn (IFO) (2001)</td>
<td>240,000–125,000</td>
<td>8 countries of Central/Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although Norway is not a member of the EU, decisions taken by the EU have also had direct bearing on the potential migratory choices of people wanting to go there. On the one hand Norway as an EEA member is obliged to follow EU policy concerning migration and free movement of persons and workers; on the other hand, potential migrants seem opt for similar migratory strategies with respect to Norway as with the EU area.

As this study seeks to analyse how the political, social and economic processes underway in Europe over the past 15 years have contributed to modifying the migration patterns from Central and Eastern Europe to Norway and how the strategies applied by individuals and groups from this region have resulted in changes in these patterns, in the following we will analyse these various strategies. The focus is on Central/Eastern Europe and Norway, but we will also look into the broader European framework that forms a natural part of the Norwegian migratory environment.

Individual and group survival and adaptation strategies under transition

In the introductory section of this report, ‘survival and adaptation strategies’ were defined as coping measures taken in response to the new challenges linked with the post-Communist transition in Central and Eastern Europe.  

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75 Based on Oczki 2002.
76 This definition does not differ greatly from that proposed by Russian sociologist T. Zaslavskaya, who in her fundamental work on the social transformation of Russia defined
Individuals and groups were faced with a deterioration of their social and economic position and had to tackle a new social and economic reality in order to counter the negative developments and retain – and if possible improve – their own position.

In order to understand what impact these strategies have had on the emergence of the new patterns of migration in Europe – and between Central/ Eastern Europe (CEE) and Norway – we need to shed light on the broader social context of transformation and see how people in this part of Europe responded to the new challenges.

When the social, political and economic transition began in the CEE countries in the late 1980s, it was not the first time the local population was confronted with challenges. In fact, the whole Communist period of the history of the region was one of more or less acute permanent economic crisis, forcing the population to devise survival strategies for coping with what the Hungarian economist J. Kornayi aptly labelled an economy of shortage. Economic survival under the old Communist regime was a major point on the individual, family and group agenda of people living in the Soviet Bloc. Not only had they to live under a regime that restricted their political and individual freedoms; that same regime proved incapable of supplying even the most basic goods. Instead, a whole net of state-driven social security networks was established that provided the population with relatively low-priced basic commodities, such as housing, public transport and a partially functional health care system. The result was a situation where people had to relate innovatively to a non-functioning market and to the networks that provided them with an illusion of social security – which in fact they themselves were financing, as the state took the lion’s share of their incomes. The population became used to living in a state of a permanent shortage of goods and distrust towards the state structures and policies.

Several studies conducted in the period of decline of the Communist power in Poland clearly showed the ways of life and strategies chosen by various groups in Polish society during what were to prove the final years of Communist rule in Poland. Although the studies referred to here describe Poland, the situation was similar elsewhere on the brink of collapse of the Communist system.

R. Milic-Czerniak found that there were six main strategies of coping with the economic crisis (Milic-Czerniak 1989). She labelled them: consumption stabilisation, innovation, ‘consumption under the protective umbrella’, consumption objection, ritualism, and helpless discontent. To map the relations between these, Milic-Czerniak focused on the following set of variables: attitude to life, level, form and means of consumption, consumption need and aspirations and socio-demographic features.

This work was a part of a broader study of the strategies of adaptation to economic crisis in Poland in the early 1980s (Beskid 1989). The findings of this study are important for understanding survival strategies related to the economic, social and political transition of the 1990s, as the initial stage of transition had many features similar to the crisis of the early 1980s.

what she labelled ‘adaptive behaviour’ in the transforming society as the ‘search for new ways of social behaviour in response to the changing circumstances and rules of game’ (Zaslavskaya 2003, 451.)
These ‘common features’ are described by the Beskid study as considerable fall in real income, disorientation of the purchasing power of income received, and change in the system of state-regulated sale. Moreover, access to consumer goods on the market changed, during the crisis and the transition – in the case of crisis, access was limited by the shortage of goods on the market, during the transition access was made easier due to the abundance of goods on the market but was limited by lack of economic means. This contributed greatly to changing the behaviour of consumers, forcing them to devise new survival strategies or to adopt the strategies already in use concerning the emerging and quickly changing circumstances.

Also a study of lifestyles in Polish cities on the verge of crisis edited by A. Sicinski has proven useful for our analysis of survival and adaptation strategies in the transition period (Sicinski 1988). Sicinski defines ‘lifestyle’ as a ‘set of everyday forms of behaviour specific to a given population or to an individual’ (Ibid., 383–4). His typology is partly based on Mitchell’s findings from the USA (Mitchell 1983). Mitchell identified three main lifestyles in American society, with various ‘strategies’ for coping with life resulting from these three. The way a person chooses to behave in daily life – the lifestyle adopted – is driven either by needs or by an interest in inner or in outer life; there is also a style in which these approaches are integrated. The result is a four-part classification of lifestyles:

- Needs-driven: Sustainers and Survivors
- Inner-directed: Societally Conscious; Experientials; I-Am-Me
- Outer-directed: Emulators; Belongers; Achievers;
- Integrated

This classification was an important source of inspiration for Sicinski, who proposed the concept of homo eligens, or the human being making choices (Sicinski 1988, 384–85.) He identified six main lifestyles, as well as many mixed styles in Poland on the verge of the crisis in the 1980s:

1. Lifestyle in a situation of drastically limited choice opportunities
2. Lifestyle consisting in avoidance of making choices.
3. Lifestyle as a quest of a way of life.
4. Lifestyle oriented to action as goal in itself.
5. Lifestyle oriented towards conserving the results of one’s actions.
6. Lifestyle oriented towards actions leading to change.
(Ibid., 51–122.)

The combination of Sicinski’s concept of homo eligens in his study of Polish society on the verge of crisis, Mitchell’s typology of lifestyles in a developed ‘capitalist society’ (which was to some extent a model for the designers of transition in CEE) and Milic-Czerniak’s classification of survival and adaptation strategies in a time of drastic economic change will serve as point of departure for our general classification of the survival strategies devised and implemented in the transition period. Beskid and Sicinski describe and analyse the situation on the eve of transition, Mitchell’s analysis focuses on the situation in a model Western society – my aim here is to see what paths leading from the Communist period to the post-Communist period have been
chosen by groups and individuals faced with making a choice in a completely new situation. With the collapse of the Communist regime and the formal introduction of the rules of the free market and individual and group freedom of choice, *homo eligens* was confronted with a totally new situation – one in which choices could be made without risking confrontation with state, indeed now a liberal state that invited citizens to take their fate in their own hands.

Although Sicinski’s conclusion in 1988 was that ‘Polish society stubbornly opposes the change of styles and ways of life’ (Sicinski 1988, 388), the dramatic shift in the political situation in the wake of the 4 June 1989 election and the ensuing change in the economic and political system of Poland gave a boost to social and individual initiatives, changing not only the country but also many previously dominant styles and ways of life. Polish society was forced to devise new set of survival strategies for coping with the new challenges, and was also given more freedom to choose how to adapt to the new circumstances. Poland has been a ‘change leader’ in many respects, but similar responses to similar challenges can be found throughout Central and Eastern Europe. 

**Old and new survival strategies: General overview**

Survival and adaptation strategies are complex social phenomena. In her study on the transformation of Russian society, T. Zaslavakaya lists the various strategies available to those who had to adapt to the quickly changing circumstances. Among these strategies we find: improving one’s qualifications by taking additional education, general improvement of professional qualifications to help one adapt to the new situation and find a new place in the new transformation context; changing of profession to meet the new challenge; taking additional/new jobs in addition to one’s main employment in order to improve one’s economic situation; organising own activity by establishing one’s own company or small business; revision of family economic strategy by reducing expenses; resigning from services that must be paid for; greater focus on one’s own ability to produce food on family plots or weekend homes in the countryside (*dachas*); developing new family networks to facilitate adaptation to new circumstances, etc. Zaslavskaya also lists a number of factors that created the new context and could induce people to choose new ways of coping:

- The possibility to exploit the weakness of state structures and law enforcement agencies for illegal personal enrichment or appropriation of economic assets (for instance, previously state-owned companies);
- Social resignation and withdrawal in confrontation with new problems, resulting in economic and social marginalisation and exclusion and even in direct physical degradation;

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77 For more on the Russian case see for instance Zaslavskaya 2003, 164–165.
78 A similar list of survival strategies can be found in Johnson, Kaufman and Ustenko 1997.
- The defence of the old system and opposition to the new emerging system, including economic sabotage, refusal to pay taxes etc;
- Support for political opposition and attempts to reverse the course of reforms by protest actions and confrontation with new power structures that are seen as illegitimate by supporters of the old regime;
- The loss of social status and identity, lumpen-proletarisation, alcoholism other social problems, deviant behaviour etc;
- Directly criminal behaviour.

In order to map the strategies devised and used during the transition we need to take into consideration various aspects of strategy making. We have to ask: What is the main focus of the strategy? What is its main purpose? What is its social and geographical dimension, and its temporal scope? Are we dealing with a single act, or with something that is regularly repeated? Also the dominant pattern of the strategy should be taken into account – to what extent a strategy used by a given person is one freely and deliberately chosen by that person, or is imposed; to what extent a strategy involving more than one person is a win-win strategy – i.e. one that can yield positive results for all parties involved – and to what extent the strategy is a zero-sum game, where one’s win is another’s loss. Also the legal aspects should be explored – to what extent a chosen strategy is in compliance with existing legal regulations, to what extent what is done falls with the ‘grey’ or ‘black’ legal zone, or is even a completely illegal action.

My classification of strategies is based on the matrix below. I start with an overview of various components of strategies and showing how together they may result in specific social practices and actions. Then I present some predominant specific strategies of many transition societies and show how these can impact on the emergence of new patterns of migration.

**Figure 6. Strategy building blocks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Social dimension</th>
<th>Spatial</th>
<th>Temporal</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Pattern 1</th>
<th>Pattern 2</th>
<th>Legal dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material assets</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>Hourly</td>
<td>Chosen</td>
<td>Win-win</td>
<td>Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Days</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical space</td>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Weeks</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social space</td>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>Sub-region</td>
<td>Months</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>Forced</td>
<td>Zero-sum</td>
<td>Illegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Lifetime</td>
<td>Once in life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dimensions of strategies**

As to the focus of the strategy applied, a survival and adaptation strategy is always chosen as a response to one or many challenges. When embarking on a strategy one chooses to address some crucial issues. Strategies are used for dealing with various aspects of daily life and when one decides to apply a
strategy, it is with the expectation that one’s overall situation will improve or at least not deteriorate.

In applying a given strategy the user will make use of the material assets available. For instance, an important survival strategy in the former Soviet Union and in today’s Russia is the use of dachas and small plots of land to ensure the necessary food supply and become less dependent on food from the money-driven markets. This dacha strategy is definitely an asset-based one, as successful implementation depends on having access to this specific material asset—a dacha or a plot of land. This strategy also has another aspect—by covering food needs through the use of the dacha, one can also be more successful in achieving goals of another asset-focused strategy—what is saved by consuming home-grown vegetables and other food also contributes to making the individual’s asset-accumulation strategy more viable as an option. In addition, one can try to sell some of the food produced and thereby even increase one’s material assets. The dacha can also be used for implementing a strategy of social self-promotion—it can serve as a social meeting place whereby one can strengthen ‘membership’ in a social network, which might in turn provide better access to other assets or improve the chances of implementing other strategies.79 Or one could move into the dacha and rent out the flat in Moscow to foreigners, significantly improving the family economic situation. This extra income could be spent on private consumption, but it could also be reinvested in a new property, enabling the accumulating of even more assets.

Asset-accumulation strategy is among the most important asset-centred strategies available. Accumulating material assets helps to provide protection against future economic threats. It may in the longer run be applied towards changing one’s social status, as the accumulated assets may help to ‘buy’ a new status, thereby serving as tool for climbing the social ladder.80 How one decides to accumulate material assets will be linked with the choice of strategy. For instance, an individual may be employed in a private or a state-owned company, but perhaps that person feels that his asset-accumulation strategy will be more successful if he changes status and starts his own company… or opts for the less-legal path of asset accumulation in the shadow or informal economy, or through completely illegal ways of money making.

Strategy may also have a strong spatial component. Labour migration—both domestic and international—is a good example of a strategy that combines asset-accumulation strategy—people choose to migrate because they are given a better opportunity to accumulate more assets—and a strategy with focus on movement in space. Also other migration-related strategies have, by their very nature, strong spatial components.

Migratory strategies have much to do not only with spatial mobility but also with social mobility. When people migrate permanently, this means leaving their society, no longer being part of an accustomed social structure. In moving to another place, they must become part of a new social structure.

79 On the role of dacha in Russia see Lovell 2003.
80 This strategy may be successfully applied not only by those at the lower end of the social ladder in transition countries. We can for instance treat the Russian oligarch’s Roman Abramovich investment in Chelsea FC as a most obvious, clear and vulgar example of this strategy of using your material assets as a way of ‘buying’ your social status.
Their social situation is changed in a very definite way – there is great chance that the migrants may have a lower social status in the target country than in their ‘own’ society – although it may also prove possible to achieve positive change in status and climb up the social ladder. Or there can be a mixture – lower status in the target country, but the material assets accumulated abroad can improve the migrants’ material and social status, should they decide to return to their original homeland.

**Knowledge strategies** are widely used in transition countries as a way of improving chances in a quickly changing reality. In a situation when the whole social, economic, political and legal structure is undergoing deep transformation, those with an understanding of the emerging system can gain a substantial ‘knowledge rent’ that could drastically improve their material and social situation. Familiarity with the Western way of doing business, with the principles and practices of the free market economy and a knowledge of Western languages, first and foremost of English – these are important assets that have catapulted many to central positions in the new society. Moreover, they can use this initial knowledge-based social and economic boost to acquire more new skills, making even them better prepared to meet challenges and further improve their position.

The interest in getting a better knowledge basis is especially visible among the younger generation of Central and Eastern Europe. Throughout the region, various more and less serious educational institutions have blossomed. Some of these do give their students much better chances to survive in and adapt to the new society; others, however, simply represent the application of another survival strategy – by those who have realised that the new quest for knowledge could give them a golden opportunity to earn extra money by offering seekers an often quite illusionary chance to learn more and adapt to the new rules. The educational sector has been among the fastest growing branches of the economy in many transition countries, and the number of persons with higher education has increased drastically despite the withdrawal of the state from this arena. Improved skills and qualifications are seen as major assets for success in the new situation – not least in terms of protection against the social and economic exclusion linked with the long-term unemployment that has become a major social plague in transition societies. In fact, improved professional skills are often a precondition, not merely for advancing up the ladder, but indeed of remaining employed.

Employment and knowledge go hand in hand in the **strategy of self-employment**. With the removal of ideologically justified restrictions on the private ownership of enterprises, and with the privatisation of much of the formerly state owned economy, this option has become increasingly relevant. All the countries of the former Soviet Bloc have seen a blossoming of ‘private initiative’ – a term previously synonymous with a rather suspect type of economic activity not fully controlled by the state.

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81 In 1988, 6.5% of the population of Poland had tertiary or university level education; by 2002 this figure had risen to 10.2%. There has been a similar increase in secondary and post-secondary education as well – in 1988, 24.7% had completed secondary /post-secondary level; for 2002 the corresponding figure was 32.6% (GUS 2003). See Blöndal, Field and Girouard 2002 on how education can contribute to improving chances in society.
In some countries, like Russia or Ukraine, this process has resulted in the creation of a new oligarchic economic and political system, with the clear underdevelopment of small and medium-sized business sector. Many of those who opted for the strategy of appropriating the formerly state-owned assets today top the lists of the wealthiest persons, not only in the former Soviet Bloc, but also in their new countries of residence. This strategy of asset-accumulation, which combines a special type of knowledge with specific personal skills and the ability to establish the right political contacts, has proven rather successful – at least for those who are still in control of the assets they grabbed so successfully during the heyday of Russian privatisation.

In general, however, the strategy of self-employment has played a largely positive role. Millions of people chose to engage in independent economic activity when this possibility was opened to them, and this has contributed greatly to changing the economic and social landscape of Eastern and Central Europe. The strategy has been mostly successful, despite the rather high turnover. According to a study on the creation of new businesses in Poland (Chmiel 1998), three periods could be distinguished in the early phase of transformation: 1991–92 saw a high rate of enterprise creation (35%–40%) and failure (20%–25%); then, between 1993 and 1994, the increase was relatively lower and the failure rate reached 17%; and in the post-1995 period (until 1998) a new wave of business establishment rolled over the country (40% increase over the previous period) whereas the failure was very low, only 10%.

Private farming is one area where this strategy became an option. During the Communist period, it was ideologically forbidden in almost all countries of the Soviet Bloc – with the exception of Poland, where almost 80% of arable land was in private hands. Elsewhere, the creation of the state- and collective-run system of kolkhozy and sovkhozy changed not only the social but also the cultural landscape of much of Europe.

During the transition period, the remnants of this system have posed considerable challenges to reformers, who have had to restructure the ineffective state-run farms while also coping with the grave social and economic problems caused by the liquidation of this sector of the former Communist economy. The re-privatisation of agriculture has opened possibilities for self-employment for those interested in returning to the countryside or in going from state-run farms to private ones. The strategy of self-employment in agriculture became thus a new approach available to those seeking to adapt to the new circumstances.

82 In 2004, Roman Abramovich, one of the wealthiest Russian oligarchs, was declared the wealthiest person in the whole UK. Also other Russian tycoons occupy relatively high positions on the annual Forbes list of the 500 wealthiest persons of the world. For some of them, however, the coming to power of President Putin put an end to their new status – two of them, Boris Berezovskiy and Vladimir Gusinsky were forced to leave Russia, while others, like Mikhail Khodorkovskiy and Platon Lebedev from Yukos, were accused of economic crimes and put behind bars.

83 For an interesting account of this strategy see Majerová 1997. In the early 1990s, less than 0.5% of the Czech agricultural workforce were private farmers who had persisted through the period of forced collectivisation. Privatisation of the Czech economy after 1989 resulted in the restitution of land to the original owners, and by 1997 private farmers comprised about 20% of the agricultural workforce. The return to private farming meant a major change in lifestyle for farming families – they gained more freedom, personal independence, and deci-
Application of the strategy of self-employment is linked to the state-driven employment policy. For instance, in Poland, where the additional cost of employment soared in the 1990s, self-employment was in way imposed on those who simply wanted to have a job – they were encouraged to create their own one-man businesses so both they and their employer could avoid the extra economic burden imposed by state. Confronted with the choice of getting work by creating their own firms or going jobless, many have opted for the first approach. It offers less social security, but can give financial compensation in the form of higher net income.

The strategy of self-employment has made Poland a special case. According to a recent study on working conditions in the EU candidate countries, Poland had the highest level of self-employed workforce – 26% were self-employed without employees and 7% were employed with employees. The average for all 12 candidate countries was 17% and 5%, while for the EU-15 it was 11% and 5% respectively (Paoli and Parent-Thirion 2003, 18.).

Another form of survival strategy based partly on self-help and self-employment is the strategy of having a second job. According to the above-mentioned study (ibid., 20–21) this strategy is widely used in the transition countries: 10% of respondents in the 12 candidate countries reported that they had a second job (4% regular, 4% occasional and 1% seasonal) as against only 6% of respondents in the EU. The highest figures for second employment were found in Romania (12%), Estonia, Latvia and Poland (11% each). By contrast, 95% of the Bulgarian respondents said that they had no second job.

Also the extension of working time may be used as a survival and adaptation strategy. Working longer yields higher pay, and the employer may see it as sign of loyalty to the firm, especially in critical periods. There is thus a higher economic reward as well as extra job security to be gained. The findings of the Paoli and Parent-Thirion study seem to indicate that longer work is a widely used survival and adaptation strategy, especially in transition countries:

An examination of the various aspects of working time in the acceding and candidate countries leads to three main findings. Firstly, the results show that working hours are considerably longer than in the EU: workers in the acceding and candidate countries, particularly women, have longer working days and weeks. Secondly, part-time work is less widespread in the acceding and candidate countries than in the EU and is distributed equally between men and women. Finally, ‘atypical’ forms of work such as night work or shift work are more widespread. (Ibid., 46.)

Although the main goal of survival and adaptation strategies is to achieve satisfactory economic security, we should look at other aspects as well when discussing how the various strategies have been devised and used. Because the transition also led to a transformation of the social structures in transition societies, it has been important for people to retain or improve their social responsibility, but at the same time faced the harsh rules of the free market and had work hard at adapting to these new circumstances.
status. The material component of the strategy chosen – to obtain a satisfactory level of economic security – has at times been seen only as an instrument for achieving the social goals involved.

In other instances, economic survival has been seen as the primary concern. One example can be found in Poland’s Silesia and Zagłębie, where the restructuring of the coal industry led to a dramatic rise in unemployment and change in the social status of miners, who during the Communist period were often depicted as the elite of the working class. Although the state invested huge sums in various restructuring programmes intended to help the local community, many families suffered financially. In this situation, many women found they had to take more active part in their families’ attempts to survive. One unexpected consequence was the blossoming of the local pornography industry in these parts of the country. According to a recent article in the leading Polish magazine *Wprost*, 95% of all websites with erotic content were produced in the Silesian city of Dąbrowa Górnicza by a Polish Of.pl company whose manager said that they had managed to undertake the most successful restructuring in Poland – they had replaced the old ineffective coal mining industry with a state-of-the-art erotic industry and given new job opportunities to a new, rather special group of job-seekers. As one of the women working in this new branch of the Silesian economy explained – ‘I began with this [live sex shows] because I cannot survive on the 600 zloty I earned in the local supermarket’.

Another way to cope with economic problems could be termed the strategy of withdrawal and retirement. An individual faced with losing his job may be tempted to withdraw from the labour market, especially if the state – or more or less corrupt state employees – offers an alternative source of income. A lower income can seem acceptable in return for more long-term social security and retention of social status. Especially in a country like Poland, where there is a dramatic shortage of labour and almost permanent high unemployment, this strategy of trading labour for social pensions seems to have attracted many. A very high proportion of people of labour-active age are living on state budget-financed retirement pensions, social pensions and social benefits. In 2003 there were 25.9 million persons in productive age living in Poland – 13.3 million of them were employed or self-employed, 9.3 were inactive, 3.3 million were unemployed and 4.7 million were receiving retirement benefits. A mere 51.3% of population of labour-active age (16–65 years) were active on the labour market (only Turkey and Bulgaria had lower levels of labour activity in Europe), while 35.8% of population of normal working age were inactive – 40% of these received either pensions resulting from work disability or early retirement benefits. Some 3 million persons – or 12% of the population of working age – received pensions resulting from inability to work; this cost the budget almost 5% of the country’s GDP. Poland had in 2003 almost twice as many recipients of health-related pensions than the OECD average (132 per 1000 of working age in Poland as against 63 per 1000 in the OECD). For 4.5 million Poles, various types of social transfers (pensions resulting from work disability, pre-retirement benefits) were the sole official source of income.

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84 ‘Różowe zagłębie’, *Wprost*, Nr 1114 (04 April 2004).
The strategy of withdrawal from the labour market seems to be successful – in 1990 there were 7.1 million retirees and pensioners in Poland; by 2000 their number had grown to 9.4 million, falling slightly to 9.3 million in 2001. Many analysts feel that this development is mainly due to a rather liberal, and partly corrupt, system of decision-making as to who ‘deserves’ state support during the period of transition. Certainly, from the viewpoint of those who are interested in this type of strategy, the flexibility of the state system has been a positive feature.

Another important question in connection with strategy options is to what extent adopting a strategy is a purely individual decision. Many strategies will have an impact on the nuclear and the extended family, indeed even the entire local community – as with the strategy of chain migration.85 The choice of strategy by the few may also influence the situation of the whole nation – the fact that some Russian young businessmen decided to take part in a rather dubious privatisation process and then supported President Yeltsin’s bid for a second term is said to have put an effective end to the Communists’ dream of rebuilding the USSR. When thousands or even millions of individual Polish small business-owners in the early 1990s decided to engage in the market economy, this created conditions for the bitter success of Polish economic reforms. In an historical perspective, some survival strategies – like the earlier strategy of mass migration from poverty-torn Europe to the New World – have had wide-ranging effects, as the emergence of a USA ‘built’ by those 19th and 20th-century migrants changed the political map of the whole world.

Strategies have also a clear spatial dimension. A strategy may be implemented with one’s local community, or it may have a much broader geographical scope. If, for example, you happen to live in Kaliningrad and are offered a job with better pay in Khabarovsk, that will mean moving eastward over 11 time zones, but you will stay within the borders of the same country, Russia. If you, however, live in Murmansk and are offered a job in the Norwegian fishing industry in neighbouring Finnmark county, that will mean moving some 200 km – but it will involve crossing an international border, so you will have to apply to the Norwegian authorities for a special work permit issued to Russian citizens living in the Barents region. Or, if you are a Ukrainian professor of mathematics and your colleagues in Norway inform you that there is position available at one of Norway’s educational institutions, you may decide to leave your country and move to another part of Europe, whether for a limited period or permanently. This strategy will involve crossing many state borders in a legal way, and legal employment in the target country. If you, however, are a Ukrainian carpenter who wants to earn some money during a summer ‘visit’ to Norway, you may decide to cross those same borders legally, but the work done in Norway will be classified as illegal, unless you have managed to get from the Norwegian authorities a special work permit for ‘foreign specialists’.

Especially during the early phase of transition, many chose the strategy of building direct economic contacts in the countries that offered goods not

85 On such migration strategies, see for example Jazwinska and Okólski 1996, Osipowicz 2002.
available in the former Communist realm. Stories abound of, for instance, Polish trade tourists who went to India to sell Polish-produced goods; in return they bought Indian-made textiles which they could sell with some profit in Poland. Others went to Singapore in the late 1980s and early 1990s to buy computer hard disks and other components; these were then assembled in Poland and sold as computers at a rather high profit. Many of those who participated in this primitive trade and established direct contacts with Asian partners later embarked on a more efficient strategy of creating their own trading companies, or even big Polish computer firms.

Strategies can have two temporal dimensions. Realisation of some strategies may take only some hours or days, or months, but a decision on permanent migration to another country or taking a job in other company may have consequences that will last for years or even for the rest a lifetime. A further temporal aspect of strategies is the degree of frequency or repetition. Some strategies can be applied only once – like a traditional nuptial strategy, where the expectation is a life-long arrangement; or the strategy of selling body parts, where physical limitations mean no possibility to repeat the strategy. Other strategies may involve a high degree of frequency, as with having a second job, or smuggling small amounts of goods across the border – which may even be repeated many times a day.

For a drug smuggler who employs a criminal survival strategy, involving border crossing, the whole ‘action’ may take some days to complete, but the tensest time centres on the few minutes when the smuggler has to cross the border, and it is paramount to avoid control and detection. In the case of a Russian woman using a strategy of body selling who visits Northern Norway to sell sex on a regular basis, perhaps every month, there are two temporal components. First there is the trip from Murmansk to Skipagurra, Tana, Vardø, Vadsø, Kirkenes, Lakselv, Alta – all of these being Norwegian localities where the sex traffic from Russia had become a social and political problem in the late 1990s. This takes some hours. Then she stays for a while in Norway and returns to Murmansk with small amount of money that will help her survive until the next trip. This can be described as strategy that lasts for some days but has a certain pattern of repetitiveness.

For more on how this strategy is used in Poland see ‘Kurierzy białej śmierci’, Wprost Nr 1041 (10 November 2002). According to this article more than 20,000 Polish citizens are involved in drug smuggling and trafficking on the global basis. In 2003 there were 334 Polish citizens imprisoned in connection with drug-related crimes – 55 of them were behind bars in Latin America alone. Poles are believed to cooperate with all major international narcotics syndicates, including the Colombian drug producers, Peruvian producers of cocaine, Nigerian mobsters and South-East Asian criminal organisations.

The issue of trans-border prostitution was a hectic topic in Norway, especially in the late 1990s, when many local organisations tried to put an end to this practice. Between 1992 and 2003, 150 articles on the issue of prostitution from Murmansk were published in the major Norwegian newspapers and magazines, showing the scope of the problem. A typical presentation of this problem can be found at www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article471363.ece. However, the strategy of body selling as a response to challenges of transition is definitely not limited to the Norwegian–Russian neighbourhood. The blossoming of various forms of sex industry and prostitution, including child prostitution, in the transition countries and in border areas indicates the widespread use of this strategy for overcoming economic and welfare gaps. The case of the Czech border town of Cheb is one example of a situation out of control. A simple Google search on ‘Cheb’ and ‘prostitution’ returns more than 7,000 entries.
For a Polish seasonal worker who spends 5 or 6 months in Norway every year and helps a Norwegian farm owner, who also has a second job, to run his farm, the strategy has also a very special temporal pattern. He is away from his family for 5 or 6 months at a time and this pattern is repeated every year during the agricultural season.

A Polish or a Russian woman who plans to marry a Norwegian man (and there have been of them in recent years) expects that this nuptial strategy will change her situation for the rest of her life. It is not unlikely that she will also intend to go through the whole process only once, making this strategy a strategy with the law grade of repetitiveness but with long temporal perspective. For a woman from a transition country who deliberately embarks on this nuptial strategy, there is another important time framework: only if she stays married to a Norwegian for more than three years will she automatically be allowed to stay in Norway for the rest of her life. Otherwise she may be forced to leave the country, or at least undergo a humiliating procedure and prove that she was the victim of domestic violence or sexual harassment while married to her Norwegian husband.88

To take another example: A Moldovan man who plans to sell one of his kidneys to a rich ‘customer’ in Israel or in the USA in order to earn some needed cash knows from the very beginning that there can be no repetition of this strategy because he needs the second kidney himself in order to survive. This drastic body-part selling strategy has an international character and a low grade of repetition for the organ donor (although there may be repetition for those who act as intermediaries, for whom such involvement is a criminal survival strategy). Trafficking in human body parts is a horrifying example of survival strategies where the individual puts his or her life at risk. It is difficult to indicate the size of this market, but many examples show that this strategy has been applied by individuals and groups from Central and Eastern Europe. Perhaps the best-known example is the case of the ‘Moldovan mafia’ that operated in the USA and Israel. Application of this strategy is facilitated by a set of push and pull factors described by Pratt (2004) in the following way: ‘The desperate need for organs, the miracles of modern surgery, and the total immorality of the criminal elements, create strange bedfellows in our globalized world’ (ibid., 68).

Pattern is another important aspect of strategy implementation. Some strategies are based on a win–win principle, where all parties involved benefit; others have a more predatory character and can be more rightly seen as a zero-sum game. A clear example a win–win strategy is a mutually beneficial strategy of care-taking involving elderly people and their families in Italy or Spain, and illegal labour migrants from Ukraine; while a good example of predatory, criminal zero-sum game strategy is the strategy of human traffickers who deceive young women and sell them dreams.

88 A typical journalistic depiction of the nuptial strategy can be found for instance in ‘Betaler 2000 dollar for en norsk ektemann’, Dagbladet, 05 December 1999. For more on this strategy in the broader European context see the findings presented at EUROFOR Annual Conference in Berlin in December 2003, where a workshop on Marriage as Immigration Gate was organised. The text of the summary of the workshop can be found at: http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj44_pdf/HeiratWorkshopReader.pdf
89 For more on this see Pratt 2004.
The trafficking strategy illustrates another dimension: a strategy may be forced on a person by the circumstances. What you believed was a strategy of your own choosing, may prove to be a disastrous strategy forced upon you. Nothing illustrates this dilemma better than the situation of thousands of young East European women who are recruited each year to work in ‘hotels’ and ‘restaurants’ but then – and mostly against their will – fall victims to international human trafficking networks and end up as forced labour and semi-slave workers in the international sex industry.\(^90\)

A strategy can be interpreted in various ways, depending on who is looking at it. Human trafficking and smuggling is a growing business with many faces involving two parties, the trafficker or the chain of traffickers (and the profiteers) and the trafficked (often the immediate victim, but also in some cases the future beneficiary of the post-trafficking situation).\(^91\) Human trafficking and smuggling are clearly illegal, criminal activities, but there are varying degrees. We see a whole range of trafficking-like activities – from smuggling of trafficked women who are forced to work against their will in the international sex industry; through the professional smuggling of migrants who are willing to pay criminal networks that specialise in this sort of illegal activity in order to get people to what they want to believe is a Promised Land; to the illegal smuggling of relatives by those who have already established themselves in the Promised Land and want their families to join them. Trafficking is also an example of a two-sided strategy adopted by both those who do the trafficking for profit and those who choose a trafficking strategy in order to improve their own lives. In all its forms, trafficking is an illegal and criminal activity. This raises another question that must be addressed in discussing survival strategies: their legality vs. illegality.\(^92\)

Due to the changing role of the state and state law-enforcement agencies, and the general restructuring of society, lifestyles and value systems, as Zaslavskaya (2003) rightly points out, the process of transition may facilitate the growth of purely criminal behaviour. Illegal activity may thus become a widely used criminal survival and adaptation strategy, especially in societies that have experienced a ‘social value earthquake’, with the complete remaking of the socially accepted system of values and norms. There are two main forms of the criminalisation of transition society – the growth of organised crime, where corrupt state structures may interact or even partly overlap with new criminal structures greedily eying high profits; and the growth of the mainly needs-driven strategy of petty crime, where individuals see the criminal way as their only chance of surviving, or at least as the easiest way to realise their own asset-accumulation strategy. The growth of criminal networks in Eastern Europe and the export of their activities to the West demonstrate the broad appeal of this way of tackling transition. Especially in Russia, the growth of organised crime has become a


\(^91\) Poland, located between the main EU countries and the unstable former Soviet Union, has become an area through which many migrants are smuggled to the West. On the Polish dimension of this smuggling business see Glabicka 1999. and Okólski 1999a.. On the Russian dimension of human smuggling see Tyuryukanova and Yerokhina 2002.

\(^92\) Good insight into this topic, with many personal stories of the victims of trafficking, can be found in Trafficking in Persons Report 2003.
cially in Russia, the growth of organised crime has become a huge social, political and even security challenge; the Russian mafia has not only established itself as an important player in Russia but has also become involved in the global criminal game.93

Also petty crime strategy may pose challenges to state and international bodies. When borders between areas with deep economic welfare gaps are practically open and criminals can cross them at will, petty criminals from CEE can operate unhindered, from the Atlantic in the west to the Bug River in the east. The problem of Polish car thieves in Germany is well known, but they form only the tip of a criminal iceberg with roots in Central and Eastern Europe. Even a marginal country like Norway can fall victim to their activities. In Norway Polish criminal gangs specialised in raids against local watchmakers – between December 1999 and March 2000 gangsters from the Polish city Krosno Odrzanskie managed to steal hundreds of many expensive watches from various Norwegian shops. According to international police sources, similar commando-like raids against watchmakers have been organised in other European countries by the same group and by another one from Koszalin. Danish police sources have estimated the damage done by these gangs at $100 million for all Europe.94 According to Norwegian newspapers, the raids were organised by unemployed youth from Krosno Odrzanske and the Norwegian police managed to put an end to this activity by arresting the leading figures from this small criminal milieu.

It is possible that these petty criminals belonged to the ‘Juma subculture’. This specific transition and transborder phenomenon has been analysed by a Polish sociologist. In 1990, Jacek Kurzepa from the University in Zielona Gora published an interesting book on this topic.95 The Juma subculture developed on the Polish side of the Polish–German border; its main feature is the transborder private and criminal redistribution of goods caused by feelings of material deprivation on the part of young Poles living in areas with high welfare gaps. In other words, Polish youth from the Polish part of the region developed a subculture where it was not only acceptable but even respectable to organise criminal raids to steal goods from German shops and sell them – or give them as presents – on the Polish side of the border. Those who were most impudent and most successful in shoplifting enjoyed special respect, were seen as local heroes and even developed a kind of professional pride. This subculture was a local variant of a survival strategy in conditions of material deprivation in areas marked by deep welfare gaps, and is another example of a perverted adaptation with a clear international impact and criminal pattern.

When defining survival and adaptation strategies in terms of their legality or illegality, we must bear in mind that there is a whole spectrum of strategies. At the one end we find various completely legal strategies implemented

94 For details see: http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article.jhtml?articleID=477874
by law-obeying citizens; at the other end of the spectrum are vicious representatives of the criminal underworld. And in-between, there are the thousands and millions of individuals who decide to live and act in the grey or black legal zone – shadow people, who realise their strategies mostly in the shadow, informal and thus illegal sector of the economy also described as the ‘non-observed economy’. Hiding in this non-observed economy is a survival strategy adopted by many, both in their own countries and abroad, for instance when they travel to other countries and enter the illegal labour market or engage in other illegal activities.

A recent OECD analysis (Blades and Roberts 2002) gives a good understanding of the main features of this social, economic and political phenomenon and of its transition dimension. The non-observed economy is multidimensional – the authors define it as having four dimensions: activities carried out clandestinely to avoid paying taxes or social charges or to avoid the costs associated with legislation on safe working conditions or protection of consumer rights, often referred to as ‘underground’ or ‘hidden’ economy; certain kinds of illegal activities, in transition countries mostly production and trade in narcotics, prostitution, production and trade in counterfeit goods (audio/video products, fashion goods and watches) and fencing of stolen vehicles, which may represent as much as 1% of the country’s GDP; the production of goods for own use, usually perfectly legal, such as construction and maintenance of dwellings or growing one’s own food in transition economies where following the collapse of Communism small scale crop production became an essential survival strategy and accounted for up to half of total agricultural output in some countries [our ‘dacha strategy’]; and finally the ‘statistical underground’ (ibid p.4). The study also lists the sectors of the economy, such as home repairs, retail trade, taxis, trucking, cafés and restaurants, where it is easiest to apply shadowy survival strategies.

In discussing illegal survival strategies, we should not forget one that is perhaps not specifically transitional, but which seems to overshadow developments in many transition countries. Corruption has become a central issue in the whole region. In discussing the differentiation of the transition area in previous sections of this report, we indicated that the level of corruption in transition economies was generally rather high, but with local differences. Examining corruption as a survival strategy, we should look not only at the spread of this negative phenomenon, but also at its social nature. After all, corruption can be counted among the survival strategies focusing on asset accumulation. J.C. Andvig has provided the following definitions of corruption and embezzlement:

*An act is corrupt if a member of an organisation uses his/her position, his/her rights to make decisions, access to information, or some other of the resources of the organisation, to the advantage of a third party and thereby receives money or other economically valuable goods or services in ways that either are illegal or against the*

organisation’s own aims or rules. An act represents embezzlement if a member of an organisation uses his/her rights to make decisions, access to information or some of the other resources of the organisation to his/her own economic advantage, eventually to the advantage of some other members of the organisation, in ways that are either illegal or against the organisation’s own aims or rules. (Andvig 2003, 7)

That corruption is seen as more widespread in the transition societies than under the Communist rule seems clear. A study covering twelve transition countries (referred to in Andvig 2002, 9) found that more than half of those surveyed felt that corruption had become a more acute problem after the fall of Communism (from 52% in Poland to 87% in Ukraine). In a survival strategy context, corruption poses at least two challenges – for the one who is being corrupted the most important issue is to not be caught; for all others, the issue is how to corrupt him or her in order to achieve own goals, how to make corruption an effective tool of one’s own survival strategy or how to reject corruption – without doing too much damage to one’s own interests.97

Living in a corrupt state where important decisions impacting on your life are taken by often corrupt state functionaries may add to the feeling of insecurity, making security-centred survival strategies relevant. How you perceive your security depends on many economic, social and political factors. After all, transition and transformation, due to their very nature, change people’s economic, social and political environment, and their perception of security – or insecurity – may change drastically. The demise of Communism compelled many to try other ways of dealing with daily challenges. Embarking on a new path, choosing a new strategy of coping with the daily challenges, changing your lifestyle – all these imply changing the nature of your interaction with others, and that you must learn how to interact with new emerging institutions and structures. These challenges, attractive as they may also be, are also a source of potential insecurity.

One of the best-known individual cases involving a security-centred strategy is the ‘Konanykhin case’. Aleksander Konanykhin built a business empire in Russia in the early 1990s. By age 25, he was a multi-millionaire. Then, as he relates the story, the former KGB officers whom he had hired to help run his businesses decided to muscle him out and take over. In 1992 he was forced to leave Russia and arrived, via Hungary, in New York, where he applied for political asylum on the grounds that he had been persecuted in Russia. He was granted asylum in the USA in 1999, but the court decision was later changed when the Russian authorities accused him of embezzlement and demanded his extradition. A new decision was made; when he was to be sent back to Russia he decided to flee to Canada and apply for asylum there. He and his wife were arrested in trying to cross the US–Canadian border. Then, on 27 January 2004, the US Department of Justice reversed its

97 For more on how the corruption functions in practice the transition context see Grødeland, Koshechkina and Miller 1998, Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina 2001.
decision to deport him to Russia, and said it would reopen hearings into his political asylum case.\textsuperscript{98}

\textbf{Strategies, transition and migration}

The Konanykhin case is mentioned here first and foremost because it is a well documented and relatively well-known case that clearly demonstrates the link between individual and group survival strategies and migration. That he decided to leave Russia and apply for asylum in the USA re-established a pattern in East–West migration that many had thought was no longer relevant after the collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe.

During the Cold War period the \textit{asylum strategy}\textsuperscript{99} was the most effective of all available migration strategies that could be applied by citizens of the then Soviet Bloc who wanted to settle in the West. This was mainly due to the ideological competition between the two rival political blocs, as each case of an East European citizen seeking asylum in the West was seen as a minor ideological victory, especially since there were few political migrants moving in the opposite direction.

During the Communist period those who wanted to leave their countries could do it in various ways. Many applied for a passport to go abroad on a short tourist trip and then to ‘choose freedom’ – i.e. not to return to the East, but stay in the West. As the West was keen to prove its superiority, those who voted with their feet for the West were generally welcomed. They were allowed to settle in the West and could start a new life there. The \textit{strategy of seeking asylum} thus became a central strategy used by Easterners wanting to settle \textit{permanently} in the West. They were in fact forced to settle permanently in the West by the Communist regime policy that treated their choice as an ideological betrayal and punished them if they returned. They were encouraged by the Western authorities, who almost automatically granted protection to this group, if only to underline the superiority of their own political system.

Also other migration strategies were available to those wanting to leave the Central and Eastern Europe. The \textit{playing of the ethnic card} allowed millions of Central and East European citizens to settle in the West. Especially two ethnic groups had access to this strategy. There were the East European citizens of Jewish descent and their families who were allowed – or forced, as in Poland in 1968 – to leave for Israel or other Western countries.\textsuperscript{100} And secondly, there were millions of ethnic Germans – or persons defined by the West German authorities as belonging to the German historic nation (those born in territories that had belonged to Germany before 1938 and their descendents, and those who could document that they were persons of German descent living in the Soviet Bloc) – who were allowed to migrate

\textsuperscript{98} For more details on this special and interesting case as it is presented by Konanykhin himself see http://konanykhin.com/.

\textsuperscript{99} On the historical dimension of asylum-seeking as a strategy see Hovy 1993. For more on asylum in the EU context, see Havinga and Böcker 1997.

\textsuperscript{100} For more on the Jewish migration see Dietz, Lebok and Polian 2002; Stola 2000; and Polian 2003.
to West Germany.\textsuperscript{101} Also many thousands of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish
descent were allowed – or rather forced – to leave Bulgaria for Turkey during
the Communist period. These two circumstances contributed greatly to
the establishment of Central and Eastern European diasporas and communi-
ties in the West.\textsuperscript{102} Also during transition, the ethnic card was played by
those who wanted to get legal access to the Western – first and foremost
German – labour market but who were not yet eligible according to EU
rules. Among other migrants who played this ethnic card were millions of
Russians returning to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{103} Also
representatives of the Roma community tried to play this card – often in
combination with the asylum strategy – seeking protection against what was
presented as ethnically motivated persecution.

In 1997 the West had to cope with migratory pressures from the Czech
Roma community. By the end of 1997 more than 1200 Czech Roma had ap-
plied for asylum in Canada, and 800 in the United Kingdom and France. The
Czech authorities portrayed them as merely economic migrants, but the
overall situation was very embarrassing for a country that liked to portray
itself as the champion of economic and political reforms in the whole region.
According to some sources, the Roma migration of 1997 was triggered by a
screening in Czech TV of a Canadian documentary on the favourable situa-
tion of minorities in Canada.

A similar strategy was also applied by Roma in Slovakia, and this was to
have consequences for relations between Slovakia, which was at the time
seeking EU and NATO membership, and some Western countries. The UK,
Ireland and Finland decided to reintroduce visa requirements for Slovak citi-
zens because of the inflow of Slovak Roma seeking protection against what
they presented to the Western authorities as persecution in Slovakia. No mat-
ter whether this choice of migratory strategy by Central European Roma was
triggered by economic or social push factors in the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia, and/or economic and social pull factors in the West, these two stories
illustrate how migratory movements can be seen as a survival strategy.\textsuperscript{104}

The strategy applied by Roma combined elements of the ethnic and the
asylum-seeking strategy. However, this group was not the only one to try the
asylum strategy even under the new circumstances. We have already indi-
cated the link between political regime and the increase in asylum-seekers
from Russia. This was, however, a rather special case, as the outbreak of a
violent conflict prompted many to seek protection in the West. With the

\textsuperscript{101} On the German migration from Central and Eastern Europe and its determinants see Dietz 2002, Nemetskoe naselenie v poststalinskom SSSR, v stranakh SNG i Baltii (1956-2000 gg.): Materialy 9-i mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii 2003, Pallasko 2001.. On the German concept of nation as an important factor influencing migration policy see Brubaker 1992..

\textsuperscript{102} For a good overview of the main trends in migration between the transition countries and the West based on statistics from the sending and receiving countries, see International Migration from Countries with Economies in Transition: 1980–1999 2002.. On the size of migrant communities from transition countries in Europe see Münz and Fassmann 2004..

\textsuperscript{103} On this movement see Heleniak 2004.

\textsuperscript{104} For more on the social, political and economic background for Roma migration see Avoiding the Dependency Trap – A Human Development Report on the Roma Minority in Central and Eastern Europe 2003.. For more on Roma recent asylum migration in Europe see Castle-Kanerová 2003.
opening of the borders also other strategies with an asylum component were applied by those wanting to settle in the West.

Statistics on the flows of asylum-seekers from the Central and Eastern European countries to Norway in the 1990s (Table 10) indicate a pattern – citizens of some countries were seemingly more prone to apply for asylum in Norway in a rather selective way when it came to the time schedule for their applications.

Table 10. Asylum-seeker flows to Norway: transition countries 1994–2003

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>97</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Rapid growth in the number of asylum applications filed by citizens of one and the same country in a short period of time – like a single year – and in a situation where no visible change can be noted, may indicate a modified asylum strategy. The filing of an asylum application can be thus interpreted not as a move meant to secure personal security of the applicant, but rather as an attempt to open a migratory gate with the help of what the applicant may believe is the only migratory strategy available.105 We cannot rule out that such a strategy may have become part of a growing asylum-selling business that results in ‘asylum tourism’, where some groups sell ‘asylum packages’ to those who want to move to another country.106

105 For an interesting analysis of how information is spread among asylum-seekers see Koser and Pinkerton 2002.
106 Good insight in how these groups may operate is provided by information found on a web server in Russia. One of the areas of the activity of the Moscow-based company Advokat Servis is namely the selling of the ‘asylum packages’ to various Western countries, including Norway. More on this activity and professionalisation of the asylum strategy and the way they ‘sell’ Norway can be found at http://www.advokat-service.ru/old/no.htm. The Norwegian authorities’ reaction to many cases of what was widely seen as organised asylum traffic – like the rapid growth in the number of asylum-seekers from Mongolia in 2001 and 2002, the Bulgarian asylum-seekers in 2001 and 2002 and the Ukrainian asylum-seekers in 2001 and 2002 – was to try to find out who organised this traffic. Both Bulgarians and Ukrainian authorities
Although travelling to the West was not easy during the Communist period, some individuals from the Soviet Bloc countries still managed to get to the West and even work there, whether legally or illegally. This was especially the case of the citizens of these CEE countries that at some stage introduced less restrictive travel regulations, first and foremost Poland and to a lesser degree of Hungary. Once the CEE countries got rid of their Communist systems, the local authorities removed most travel restrictions, declaring that they were now building a democratic system. In return, the West generally welcomed this decision and opened its borders by removing visa requirements, especially in relations with those countries that embarked on the policy of quick institutional, economic and political Westernisation. The immediate consequence of the introduction of democracy was that the persecution of dissidents and various opposition groups working against the old regime ceased, thereby rendering the classic asylum strategy irrelevant in the migratory exchange between the former Soviet Bloc and the West. Also the ethnic strategy became less attractive, as many of those who wanted to leave had already done so before the fall of Communism; those who were still in the East could now hope for a better life there and were less inclined to leave for the West.

However, the political and ideological factors that once prompted people to seek better life opportunities and protection in the West have now been replaced by a whole spectrum of economic, social and to a certain extent political challenges that could make them interested in moving to the West. People could decide to leave not because they were politically persecuted (though some certainly have been), but because the hardships of transition were making life more difficult than under the oppressive political system of Communist rule. Especially after de-Stalinisation, politically motivated persecution was a measure applied to only small marginal groups, whereas the great majority in society could enjoy what even today is referred to as the time of ‘small stabilisation’. The system was still oppressive, but in general terms there were few who were really persecuted. With the transition almost everything changed – and not always to the better. In fact, it was not even the direction of the change – to the worse or to the better – that mattered: the change itself became the main challenge.

If the situation becomes unbearable and you feel threatened, you may decide to change your environment totally, to leave your community and try your chances somewhere else. A strategy with a migratory component may promised co-operation in solving this problem, but it seems that no one was legally punished for devising and applying this modified asylum strategy.


108 The success of the asylum strategy hinges on the asylum policy of the receiving countries, and this policy has been changed to correspond better with the new circumstances. More on various choices of asylum policy see Schuster 2000.

109 On the early phase of the debate on link between migration and transition see The New Europe and International Migration; Special Issue 1992. and International Migration in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1995.
appear tempting in a situation when your social, economic and political environment undergoes drastic change. If, in addition, the transition makes it easier to move by removing almost all institutional obstacles and barriers to free movement of people, many will try to see for themselves whether the grass is really greener on the other side of the fence. Some of those who choose to travel may decide that they will have better chances of improving their lives by staying ‘out there’ a bit longer than originally planned.

The new situation opened also new possibilities. During the Communist period there were in fact only two migratory choices – to leave your country permanently, in a decision that would change your whole life forever, or to try a form of circular migration – but under conditions that made this choice a rather difficult one. ‘Circular migration’ meant regularly living and working for a while in the West, then returning to your country of origin with the money you had earned abroad. This was difficult in practice because in most cases it was necessary to apply for a travel document each time, and the authorities could refuse without further explanation, thereby shutting the door. This strategy was also available only to those living in countries with relatively flexible travel policies, and there were not so many of them in the former Soviet Bloc.

After the collapse of Communism, many new strategies with a stronger migratory component have become available. The most important new form is often referred to as ‘incomplete migration’, but also circular migration\(^\text{110}\) became more of an option. Polish demographer and migration specialist Marek Okólski claims that incomplete migration has become a strategy used by many millions of Central and East European citizens (Okólski 1997, 11). According to him the essence of incomplete migration is its quasi-migratory character, meaning that the people involved do not strictly (if at all) fulfil the preconditions generally set for a migrant. On the other hand, writes Okólski, this form of migration more than any others realises the economic function of migration. He adds that there are three main features characteristic of a migrant of this kind:

- ‘loose’ social and economic status in the country of origin
- irregularity of stay or work in the host country
- maintaining close and steady contacts with migrant’s household in the home country.

An important new survival approach could be termed the strategy of **market-makers and market-takers**. What has become the landmark of the new transition economy is the emergence of local open-air markets that mushroomed in towns and cities throughout the region in response to local needs and as a visible sign of a new survival strategy in the making. Shuttle traders – in Russia known as *chelnoki* – have played an important part in the adaptation of post-Communist masses to the new realities. Shuttle trade has also become a practical school of the market economy. Finding the balance between market demand and supply has become the name of the new transition game for millions who have opted to take their fate in their hands instead of

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\(^{110}\) For more on that form of migration Kaczmarczyk 2002.
waiting for the state to provide them with economic means. According to Holtom there are three main types of those who decided to apply a market-oriented survival strategy that was a part of the growing informal and partly illegal economy (Holtom 2003, 3–4):

1. ‘Primitive entrepreneurs’ can be divided into two groups – the first consists of people who engage in shuttle trading to supplement their incomes, while the second is made up of professional traders or ‘ants’ with no other job but small-scale cross-border trade; they make a living by crossing the border up to ten times a day, carrying small amounts of goods to sell at a profit on the other side.

2. ‘Kontrabandisty’ or smugglers cross the border almost as often as the ‘ants’, and like them make their profits from cross-border differences in prices and demand; they trade in commodities that are cheaper in one country and more expensive in other (alcohol, cigarettes, amber, petrol, food etc.) and they profit by not declaring the amounts carried across the border and by not paying the duties.

3. ‘Traffickers’ are often linked to transnational organised crime groups; they often engage in trafficking of drugs, weapons, people and stolen vehicles.

The political change and the opening of borders facilitated not only the emergence of the new strategies but also the implementation of existing survival strategies, many of which now have a much stronger migratory component.

For instance, knowledge-based strategies have got a new dimension and boost – young East Europeans studying in the West, but also the opening of CEE educational institutions to students from the West has become a reality hardly imaginable earlier. Study abroad has become much more readily available as a strategy for improving your chances for a better life – in your home country, but also if you decide to stay abroad, which has also become far easier in today’s integrating Europe. Also all other forms of knowledge transfer – scientific exchange, various sorts of training and intern schemes, paid and unpaid professional practices, transfer of personnel from one branch of the company to other one, located abroad – have flourished.

However, the same can be said about the criminal strategies of those for whom the transition has represented a new opportunity. All forms of smuggling and trafficking have been thriving, thanks to the relaxation of travel restrictions and border control. This has become a main challenge of the integrating Europe, where borders no longer fulfil their traditional roles as physical and legal walls separating countries but are seen as a business op-

portunity by less scrupulous individuals and groups who eye huge profits from the illegal transfer of goods and people across these borders.

The case of East European – Russian, Polish and Lithuanian – and Israeli car smugglers who in August 2002 tried to open a new route through the Norwegian–Russian border crossing at Storskog illustrates how criminal groups operate under the new conditions. It is believed that the attempt to smuggle stolen Audi and Mercedes automobiles through Norway was a response to the tightening of border controls on the traditional smuggling routes through Poland, where criminal groups could realise their strategies more efficiently due to the geographical proximity of supply and demand area, as well as the widespread corruption among Polish and Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian custom officers. According to a survey published on 15 October 2001 in the Polish weekly *Wprost*, it costs between 500 and 3000 zloty to persuade a Polish customs officer close his or her eyes for a while so that you could cross the border in a car without proper documents – the better the car, the more to pay, indicating that also custom officials have learned how to adapt to the new market situation. The same source presented data on other services to be ‘bought’ on the Polish border – for instance, the passing of a truck with a $100,000 load of cigarettes costs between $10,000 and $15,000, while the price of smuggling one person across the border ranges from $100 to $200. Thus we see that not only market-makers and market-traders but also evil-doers have been profiting from the transition and the introduction of market rules and the opening of European borders in realising their private asset-accumulation strategies.

A clear example of a predatory, zero-sum game strategy that can thrive in a transition area governed by the rule of the market and the despair of those who want to improve their situation at any cost is the strategy of con and fraud schemes. You can, for instance, decide to make your living by placing adds in newspapers where you offer jobs abroad – against a small ‘administrative’ fee to be transferred to your bank account or sent directly to you in an envelope. Once the money has been transferred, you might then send a publicly available leaflet with basic information on the general rules of employment in some countries, or even a false job offer to be ‘realised’ in the target country. Your customer may even risk going abroad and investing substantial sums, only to discover that the product you sold was worthless.

Another strategy of this type involves criminal job recruitment schemes. Someone, say in the Italian province of Calabria, needs cheap labour during the olive harvesting season. He organises a network of people in Eastern Europe, for instance in Poland, to represent his interests. The regional heads organise a network of representatives and recruiters to hire people willing to work in Italy. The conditions offered are attractive – potential recruits are told that they will earn €30 a day, but that they will have to have €250 to cover transport and accommodation in Italy. After a team of ten job-seekers has been assembled, the local representative of the organisa-

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112 For more on this special case of car smuggling and the attempt to open a new ‘Northern route’ see http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article.jhtml?articleID=397188.

113 An interesting report on this issue was published in the leading Polish newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Zobaczycy Neapol i umrzeć. Praca na czarno we Włoszech, Duży Format, 23.11.2003, http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/metroon/1,0,1786070.html).
Jakub M. Godzimirski

...tion is contacted; he then organises their transport to Italy after receiving €250 from each of them. The recruiter gets 500 złoty per a ‘load’ of ten workers, while the ‘representatives’ are paid €50 per head – the rest goes to the network’s ‘country manager’ and to the boss. The workers, many of whom have had to borrow money in order to cover the initial fees, are sent to Italy, where they are confronted with a situation completely different from what they had been promised – they are offered a job but have to pay a special fee to those who organise the work, and thus end up earning no more than €5 or 6 a day for 12–15 hours work.

Those who choose the strategy of finding a job abroad through what later may turn out to be a criminal recruitment scheme may enter the illegal labour market in the target country and become a part of the shadow or black economy. In a situation when no visa is required to enter a country – or visas have become relatively easily accessible – the development of an international informal labour market has become a reality that all European countries need to recognise, and do something about.114

In entering the informal labour market, a worker can realise many strategies. Participation in the illegal labour market and economy can be a means of realising an asset accumulation strategy – the migrant worker may apply a survival strategy based on circular and incomplete migration, making a living in economic terms in the target country but living his ‘real’ life in the country of origin. On the other hand, participation in the shadow economy of the target country may improve the chances for more permanent settlement in the target country – if, for example, the local laws are changed and openings made for settlement of the special group to which the worker happens to belong, he will be in a privileged position due to his knowledge of the market and prior participation in networks that can help legalise his stay. This has probably been the case with at least some East European irregular workers who entered the Norwegian labour market illegally, but could legalise their status after the more flexible system for employment of specialists was introduced on 1 January 2002, and even more successfully after the EU enlargement in May 2004.

Another possibility for changing one’s status from illegal/irregular to legal and regular emerges if the host country can be expected to regularise illegal aliens. Especially in Southern Europe, there are rather good chances of ‘hiding in the shadow’ while waiting for a new round of legalisation and regularisation (Apap et al. 2000). Italy had five rounds of regularisation of illegal aliens between 1987 and 2002; Spain, five rounds between 1985 and 2002, while Portugal had three rounds between 1992 and 2001.115

The latest regularisation of aliens in Portugal reveals how migratory flows and the growth of new legal migration communities can be boosted by an administrative decision. One of the most interesting and unexpected developments in the recent history of irregular labour migration in Europe is the emergence and the rapid growth of the regularised Ukrainian migrant community in Portugal. Until 2001 there were relatively few Ukrainians – or East Europeans in general – living and working in Portugal legally, although

115 For more details on the effects of the regularisation and a good overview of the regularisation policy see Papademetriou, O’Neil and Jachimowicz 2004.
the local authorities suspected that there were many who were staying and working in the country illegally. Then in 2001, Ukrainians became the main beneficiaries of the decision adopted by the Portuguese authorities that opened for legalisation of the foreign labour force in the country (Decree-Law no. 4/2001 of 10 January 2001). After this decision, 61,756 Ukrainian citizens regularised their stay in Portugal; they by far outnumbered Brazilians, who had traditionally been the most important foreign workers on the Portuguese labour market. Today Ukrainians form the biggest East European community in Portugal and their number is still growing.

The choice of shadow labour market rather than the legal labour market can be dictated by many factors, first and foremost legal and economic ones. As far as the possible legal obstacles are concerned, the most important hinder may be that the legislation of the given country does not allow CEE to take legal work, making the irregular labour market the only option. Or local regulations may provide access to legal labour to some categories, but the potential migrant worker does not belong to these and therefore has no other option than to enter the labour market through the illegal back-door. Also the complexity of the process of obtaining a legal work permit may prompt some job-seekers to choose the irregular market. In economic terms, the choice of the irregular market may be dictated by the worker’s interest in being cost-competitive and his unwillingness to pay taxes to a country that is, at least in the case of irregular and circular migrants, seen as a source of income, but not as a place for long-term future investment.

This predilection for remaining in the shadows is also linked to attitudes towards the law and state in most post-Communist countries. Rooted in the old system, this legal – or rather illegal – culture and this attitude towards state, seen not as a provider of social goods but more as a semi-predatory institution willing to take your money but without providing even a basic level of security, are expressions of the lack of trust between citizens and state. Such an attitude towards state institutions can easily be transferred to the new social and political context. The result is a negative impact on the relationship between migrants and state institutions in the target country, especially if the migratory move is triggered by negative experiences stemming from the relationship between state and citizen – as is the case with those forced to leave their country due to the state’s brutal behaviour. This lack of trust – and more generally, the disappointment with the social, economic and political results of transition and transformation – may become an important incentive for permanent emigration.

In today’s European legal and institutional context there are in fact only two strategies available to most of those who want to settle permanently and legally in the West but do not have previous family links to the target country. They can either ask for protection against persecution in their country of origin (asylum strategy), or they have to find a job, enter the legal labour market and use this migratory gate. The first strategy is available to those who come from conflict areas and countries with oppressive regimes and a bad record of democracy and human rights. The second one is available to the rest of those seeking permanent settlement in the West, but in order to be ‘eligible’ they have to fulfil certain entry criteria, such as specific qualifications or skills in demand on the local labour market. Even within the inte-
grating Europe, a citizen of one EU or EEA country is allowed to settle permanently in another EU country only if he or she can find a job there, whether as an employee (freedom of movement of workers) or as a service provider (freedom of movement of services).

There are many available survival and adaptation strategies involving legal labour migration, be it permanent legal migration, seasonal labour migration or shuttle labour migration. And there are many possible combinations of social, political and economic push/pull factors that may make people willing to move. All the same, it is obvious that wages differences are a central factor influencing the decisions of migrants, both regular and irregular. Studies conducted among Ukrainian labour migrants reveals the most important factors that ‘pushed’ them abroad. The results of a survey conducted in Lviv region by the West Ukrainian Centre ‘Women Perspectives’ and quoted in the Ukrainian Ombudsmann’s report on migration from Ukraine show that low wages were the most important single factor that forced people to seek employment abroad (mentioned by 52.8% of those surveyed); other important factors were the high unemployment (mentioned by 31.7%) and the need to earn money to repay debts (29.7%). According to another survey conducted among Ukrainian labour migrants in Italy and quoted by Markov (2003) there were the following main reasons for going abroad: low wages (52.83%), the need to buy a place to live in Ukraine (33.56%), unemployment (31.7%), the need to pay back debts (29.7%), high costs of the education for children (23.8%) and the domestic violence (5.66%).

Another recent study quotes the following reasons mentioned by the respondents as the main five factors pushing them abroad: the wish to increase the level of welfare (52.8%), unemployment (28.9%), low wages and wage arrears (27.3%), the need to pay for education or medical treatment for a family member (12.1%) and the desire to see new places (11.8%) (Pirozhkov and Khomra 2003, 26). The findings of the 1998 IOM study confirm that similar set of social, political and economic push/pull factors plays a major part in decisions of potential migrants. In order to shed light on what may be purely economic motivations for migrating, we give an overview over 2003 data on average monthly wage in some transition countries. (Table 11)
According to Coppel, Dumont and Visco (2001:11) ‘on the supply side, the relative expected income difference between host and source countries is generally thought to be an important factor influencing the incentive to migrate’. This conclusion on the link between level of earnings and migration, combined with data from Table 11, will serve as the point of departure for two case studies in Part Three. They focus on the emergence of a new pattern of migration between Poland and Russia on the one side and Norway on the other.
Part 3. Case Studies

There are many reasons for focusing specifically on developments in Poland and Russia and on the emergence of a new pattern of migration between these two East European countries and Norway.

Poland has been chosen because it is located near to Norway and already had a strong migratory link established in 1980s. Moreover, the country has had a mixed record of transition: Poland has been seen as a champion of transition in the CEE region, an economic success story – but this success has come at a rather high social price. The country has still to struggle with high levels of unemployment and the resultant social consequences.

Russia has been chosen for several reasons. It is Norway’s neighbour, with a shared border in the Finnmark/Murmansk area. Especially in recent years, the two countries have decided to strengthen their ties in the North in various ways. Also, the depth of the social and economic crisis could prompt many Russians to seek better opportunities abroad, and Norway would be a natural choice. On the other hand, over the past four-five years Russia has seen its economy rebound, and this may have changed the incentives that could induce Russian citizens to migrate vs. stay at home. The political system in Russia has been evolving towards a more autocratic regime and some Russian policies have triggered a wave of forced westward migration. All these are factors that made us interested in examining the link between the strategies applied to meet the challenges of transition, and the emergence of a new pattern of migration between Russia and Norway.

In some areas, the former East Bloc countries border on regions with a very high standard of living and much higher earnings. The situation is especially challenging along the border between Russia and the Nordic countries (Russia and Norway, Russia and Finland), and to a lesser degree along the border of the former Soviet Union and the regions now joining the enlarging Western economic and political organisations (Belarus and Poland; Belarus and the Baltic republics; Ukraine and Poland; Moldova and Romania; Russia and Baltic republics; Kaliningrad and Poland; Kaliningrad and Lithuania) and to a limited degree along the borders of the existing EU and candidate countries (Poland and Germany, Poland and the Nordic countries, the Baltic countries and the Nordic countries).

The need to cope with daily problems in a situation when the old social and institutional networks have not been replaced by a new web of relations to alleviate the pangs of transition has led to the development of both individual and group survival strategies. Many of these strategies – such as labour migration, participation in criminal networks and in the shadow economy – can have a direct impact on distant areas. This is especially the case now that also the poorer citizens have greater mobility due to the elimination of many restrictions on the free movement of people, and the absence of visa regimes on most borders between the former Soviet republics, between for-
mer Soviet republics and Central Europe, and between candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the EU area.

The situation can be especially difficult to tackle in border areas where awareness of the welfare gap is naturally high. The very existence of an area, just across the border, with higher standard of living, much higher incomes and a more stable social and political situation is a psychological and economic challenge.

The motivation to do something can be especially high among the population trying to subsist on incomes under the local minimum level. According to data from 2000, in 1999 almost 20% of the population in Murmansk oblast had incomes lower than the official Russian existential minimum, which in 1999 was defined as 908 roubles per month (approximately US$ 30). The situation was even worse in other border regions. In Leningrad oblast, the corresponding figure was 51.5%, in St. Petersburg – 33.2%, in Pskov – 51.2% and in Kaliningrad 37.4%. Although the situation in Russia, also in the border regions, has improved considerably since then, still almost one fifth of the population is living under the poverty line. As to incomes, there have been two positive developments since the collapse of 1998. The first was that by 2002, real wages had not only recovered, but also risen by almost 20% compared with their level in 1997, the last pre-crisis year. Secondly, the problem of wage and pension arrears has clearly diminished in recent years, and many Russians now perceive their situation as more stable and predictable. Indeed, some calculations indicate that the economic situation in Russia’s border regions is not as dramatic as it is often presented in the West.

Table 12. Russian border regions in a broader context – GDP per capita, adjusted values, times higher or lower (Granberg, Zaitseva 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions of Russia</th>
<th>Murmansk oblast</th>
<th>Republic of Karelia</th>
<th>Leningrad oblast</th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
<th>Pskov oblast</th>
<th>Kaliningrad oblast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Granberg and Zaitseva (2003), the adjusted GDP per capita of Murmansk was in fact higher than that in Lithuania and Latvia, only 10% lower than in Poland and Estonia and 3 times lower than in Finland and 3.7

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times lower than in Norway. These calculations show that, while there is still a huge economic gap, Murmansk has a level of adjusted GDP per capita similar to that of most new Eastern European EU members.

For Poland, it is estimated that almost half of the population have incomes under the local social minimum. With an average monthly wage at $450 in 2001, countries like Germany, Sweden and Norway seem very attractive, especially to those unable to find work on Poland’s domestic labour market, where the unemployment rate is almost 20%. Poland can therefore be perceived either as a promised land – or a bridge to the West – by those living across the Polish eastern border and earning perhaps $40 month; and as country with no perspectives, by jobless Poles excluded from the local labour market and by those who feel that the true paradise on earth lies further west.

We can therefore talk about a regional welfare gap paradox, since an area perceived by its own inhabitants as an area of welfare failure can be still seen by outsiders as a welfare paradise. Some countries, however, are widely perceived as true welfare paradises. Especially in recent years, Norway has been widely identified as such and is definitely perceived in that way by transition-tired Poles and Russians. The two cases presented below will examine how the strategies adopted by citizens of these two countries have contributed to changing the patterns of migration to Norway.

**Case Study 1. Polish workers and Polish nurses in Norway**

Many factors make the study of migration flows from Poland to Norway an interesting topic. Firstly, there is a sizeable Polish community in Norway, and the very existence of local ethnic networks is often seen as a factor that promotes various forms of migration. Secondly, Norway has for many years been known in Poland as a country with relatively high wages and a place where it is possible to find employment – whether legal or illegal. Thus, a link has already been established between the Polish and the Norwegian labour market. Many Poles have established themselves on the Norwegian labour market, especially in two segments already open to non-EEA citizens: the seasonal labour market, and the market for foreign specialists. In addition, of course, comes the Norwegian irregular labour market.

Another factor with potential impact on migration is the recent stagnation in the Polish economy, and the demographic situation on the labour market that has resulted in a substantial rise in unemployment – an estimated 20% by late 2002. Unemployment is hard on all segments of the population, but the most exposed and vulnerable group are the young people. Five of the ten regions with the highest level of unemployment in the whole EU – in-

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118 On various understandings of the impact of transition on welfare in Poland see Huffman and Johnson 2002.

119 A look at wages in Poland and other countries of the region gives a good indication of what could be the main driving force of labour migration. For more on these differences and their potential impact on migration see Golinowska 1998, Jacukowicz 2000, Jacukowicz 2002.

120 On ways of coping with the challenges of transition in Poland see the interesting study by Giza-Poleszczuk, Marody and Rychard 2000.
cluding French non-European territories – are Polish voivodships, where un-
employment is between 21.8% and 26%. For youth, the situation is dramatic – 42.5% of those between 15 and 24 were unemployed in 2002 and 41.9% in 2003. Moreover, in Zachodniopomorskie, which is relatively close to the Nordic countries, 51.5% of those between 15 and 24 were jobless in 2003.

Poland is the biggest of the new EU members, and Poland’s 2004 mem-
bership will give its citizens right to work in the EU and the EEA. Poland will also become a ‘front state’ of the enlarged EU, attracting many potential migrants from outside. This can make it an important transit country and a sort of buffer zone for those wanting to reach the attractive labour markets in the west and north. Or perhaps people from Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and other EU ‘outsiders’ will try to find a place in the Polish illegal labour mar-
et, thereby pushing more Poles to seek employment abroad.

The combination of these push/pull factors’ can result in many Poles choosing Norway for permanent or seasonal labour migration, although it has never been an area of mass Polish migration. In a historical perspective, Germany was the main country of migration from Poland. Both Polish and German studies confirm that also during the transition period Germany has retained its central place on the Polish migration map. Kepinska sums up the main trends in permanent and registered migration from Poland in 2002:

In 2002, as in previous years, Polish emigrants chose most frequently EU-member countries as destination (82.3 per cent). Germany played as in previous years a crucial role (72.6 per cent), followed by Austria (2.1 per cent), France (1.4 per cent), Italy (1.2 per cent), the Netherlands (1.9 per cent) and the United Kingdom (1.0 per cent). The United States and Canada were the two major non-European destinations, accounting for 10.9 per cent and 4.1 per cent of the total respectively. (Kepinska 2003: 10.)

According to the same study, Norway played a marginal role in permanent migration from and to Poland – in 2002 there were 47 registered migrants leaving Poland for Norway and 31 coming from Norway to Poland. Also in previous years, the number of Poles moving to Norway has been low – 49 in 2000 and 71 in 2001. Permanent migration to Norway, as reflected in official Polish statistics, has been marginal also in relative terms – between 2000 and 2002 it never represented more than 0.3% of total registered permanent migration from Poland, whereas Germany alone stood for between 72.3 and 75.8% of the total in the same period.

These low figures can be variously interpreted. Perhaps Norway is not a central country on the Polish migration map, the huge economic and welfare gaps and relative geographical proximity notwithstanding. Or perhaps official Polish statistics do not accurately reflect reality, and we should look at the Norwegian migration statistics. Official Norwegian data on recent migra-

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121 On the pattern of social interaction and migration in EU buffer zone see Wallace 1995.
123 For more on the pattern of migration from Poland see Frejka, Okólski and Sword 1998, and the recent study by Kepinska 2003. On earlier patterns of migration see Okólski 1994.
mation from Poland to Norway in the period 1999 to 2003 are shown in the graph below. They reveal a completely different picture of Polish migration to Norway than the Polish one.

**Figure 7. Recent migration from Poland to Norway – Norwegian data (SSB)**

We see that migration from Poland has been on the increase not only in general, but also in relative terms – in 1999 Poles represented 0.67% of all those moving to Norway; in 2000 – 0.79%; in 2001 their share increased to 1.41%; it peaked at 1.75% in 2002 and in 2003 decreased to 1.63%. Only once before in the recent history of Polish migration to Norway had Poles have a higher share – between 1986 and 1990 there were on average 485 Poles moving to Norway, which corresponded to 1.77% of all migrants to Norway in the same period. Even during the turbulent years after the emergence of the Solidarity movement and the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, fewer Poles came to Norway. Between 1966 and 1970 the number was modest – an average of 89 persons per year. In the next five-year period – 1971 to 1975 – this grew to 112, between 1976 and 1980 – to 133, then almost doubled to 257 between 1981 and 1985, and doubled again to almost 485 in the next five-year period (1986–1990). Between 1991 and 2000 the figure decreased – to 322 per year on average between 1991 and 1995 and to 268 in the next five-year period (1996-2000). All in all an impressive total of 8,330 Poles migrated to Norway between 1966 and 2000. If we add to this the 1,771 who settled in Norway between 2001 and 2003, we get an even more impressive sum: 10,101 Poles moved to Norway between 1966 and 2003.

As of 1 January 2004, the size of the Polish community in Norway was between 2,741 (if we take only Polish citizens into consideration) and 11,206 (if we count all those defined by Norwegian statistics as persons of Polish background).
Poles living in Norway formed approximately 2% of the total migrant population in the country. In one category – ‘citizens of foreign countries living in Norway’ – the share of Poles was much lower: only 1.34% of all persons with foreign citizenship living in Norway as of 1 January 2004. This low figure has much to do with the recent history of Polish migration and also with the policy of the Polish and Norwegian authorities. Since many Poles came to Norway in the 1980s as political migrants, they applied for Norwegian citizenship as soon as this was formally possible; as a result, by 1 January 2004 only 24.46% of ‘Poles’ living in Norway still had Polish citizenship. By contrast, migrants from Russia had generally come much later; the share of those maintaining their Russian citizenship at that time was almost three times higher (69.95%).

Another special feature of the Polish community in Norway is its uneven gender composition. Well over half – some 64% (4,872) – of the persons of Polish origin living in Norway as of 1 January 2004 were women. The gender composition of both the Norwegian population in general and of the overall migrant population in Norway was more gender-balanced (51/49% among migrants and almost 50/50% among the population in general).

Data on the year of first entry to Norway might provide a more detailed picture of the history of the growth of the Polish community in Norway. (See Figure 9.) These data indicate a link between developments in Poland, Norway’s policy towards the victims of political persecution in Poland, and the steady growth of the Polish community in the 1980s and 1990s.

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The emergence and growth of Norway’s Polish community are due to a specific set of political, economic and social push/pull factors. Especially important here are the political persecution in Poland in the 1980s, and flexible migration policy towards this group implemented in Norway in the same period; the huge differences in economic development between the two countries – with the social, economic and political crises of the 1980s in Poland and the oil boom in Norway in the same period; the growing demand for a qualified labour force in Norway, together with the decision to leave Poland taken by many specialists who saw no future under the oppressive regime in Poland. Also Polish women who married Norwegian men contributed greatly to the growth of this community in Norway.

We can identify three mostly parallel waves of migration from Poland to Norway in the period between the early 1980s and Poland’s EU entry in May 2004. In the first period, from 1980 to 1989, the strategy of seeking protection was predominant. Most Polish citizens who applied for protection in Norway were granted either asylum or the right to stay for humanitarian reasons. However, also the nuptial strategy was used in this period, as well as other strategies, mostly by those who could not meet Norway’s rigid criteria for migration of specialists.

Official Norwegian data on the refugee community in Norway, on the ethnic background of this group and duration of residence in Norway confirm that many Poles used the asylum strategy in the 1980s – of the 930 Poles with refugee status living in Norway as of 1 January 2003, there were 674 who had been living in Norway for between 10 and 19 years, and 241 for over 20 years. Only 15 had been living in Norway for less than nine years. This indicates that those coming after 1992 had to use other strategies.
than the asylum strategy if they wanted to settle permanently in Norway, as Poles were no longer officially ‘eligible’ for asylum in Norway. In the 1990s some Poles did try to use this previously so successful strategy – for instance in 1996 there were 209 Polish citizens, mostly of Roma origin, who filed asylum applications in Norway – but most of them failed.

The prevalence of women in the Polish community may have much to do with a clearly gender-related strategy. According to a recent study on inter-ethnic marriages in Norway (Lie 2004), 66% of 2,241 married women of Polish origin living in Norway in 2002 were married to Norwegian men; in 1990 only 53% of women with this background were married to Norwegians. Between 1990 and 2001, Polish women never ranked lower than 8 among foreign brides in Norway; in 1991 and 1992 they even occupied the 4th place on this list. In these two years, almost 4% of all marriages between Norwegian men and women from abroad involved a bride from Poland (Lie 2004).

Since the rapid phase in the growth of the Polish community in Norway dates back to the 1980s and early 1990s, and most Poles did acquire Norwegian citizenship after seven years in Norway, this meant that a new migration gate could be opened for those in Poland who had relatives in Norway and wanted to join them. Family reunification is one of the main strategies used by Poles seeking permanent residence in Norway. This strategy was widely used in the early 1990s where other strategies – such as asylum – were no longer available. It is still in use today.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total reunifications</th>
<th>Poles</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12,142</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14,607</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10,469</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another specific feature of Norway’s Polish community is its relatively high level of education. Poles aged 30 to 44 living in Norway are generally well educated – 38.5% of them have higher (post-secondary) education (22.4% up to 4 years, 16.1% – more than 4 years of higher education). In the top category – those with more than 4 years of higher education – Poles belong to a small elite club among migrants in Norway. They are beaten only by Germans (26.8%), Americans (22%) and Russians (23%). In fact, they outdo the host nation, Norwegians, of whom only 6.8% in this age group have similar level of tertiary education of more than 4 years’ duration. This may have much to do with the application of another strategy – coming to Norway as specialists and qualified labour force. Until Norway relaxed its rules for immigration of skilled labour in January 2002, those wanting to settle in Norway had to have a fairly high level of competence. That many Poles have this relatively high level of education may indicate the use of a knowledge-based migration strategy – or that many well-qualified Poles de-

125 http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/flyktninger_en/tab-2004-06-24-03-en.html
126 http://www.ssb.no/emner/04/01/utinnv/tab-2003-02-26-01.html
decided that they could realise their long-term goals in Norway better than in their homeland. The DUF database confirms this conclusion: between 1989 and the end of 2003, 1,617 applications were filed by specialists from Poland.  

**Figure 10. Applications to Norway filed by Polish specialists**

While Polish women seem to opt for the nuptial strategy, the specialist strategy is more of a male domain – of 1,617 applications filed, only 258 were from women. Figure 10 reveals that, after a period of limited interest, there came an explosion of interest in Norway. While in 2000 there were only 54 Polish specialists registered in DUF, in 2001 their number soared to 241, even doubling to 528 in 2002, before decreasing slightly to 438 in 2003.

This development was linked with administrative decisions taken by the Norwegian authorities. On 1 January 2002 a more flexible system for migration of specialists to Norway, also from non-EEA countries, was introduced. A yearly quota of 5,000 skilled workers or persons with special qualifications was set; moreover, the former requirement that the employer must prove that the post could not be filled by an employee either from Norway or the EEA was removed, as long as the quota was not filled within one year. Furthermore, the threshold for being recognised as specialist or person with special skills was lowered. Specialists were now defined as ‘persons who are trained in a particular field or have special qualifications needed in Norway’. In addition their expertise should be critical for the enterprise seeking to hire them.

Poles, especially those relatively familiar with the Norwegian labour market, quickly discovered this new opportunity and began coming in great numbers. In fact, as Table 14 shows, they were the largest group in both 2002 and 2003.

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127 Category ARBSDPESFAGUTORD from DUF-databasen
Table 14. Polish specialists in Norway after 1 January 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>2003 Number</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>2002 Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1127</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles’ share of quota</td>
<td>6.62%</td>
<td>Poles’ share of quota</td>
<td>10.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles’ share of those who came</td>
<td>29.37%</td>
<td>Poles’ share of those who came</td>
<td>30.78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That Poles discovered this new opening indicates that this group was able to pick up new signals and adapt to the changed formal circumstances. However, with implementation of this ‘specialist scheme’ came some new challenges Norwegian authorities had to address when shaping the country’s migration policy. Although filling the 5,000 quota had never been a stated goal of the policy, the relative lack of interest abroad caused some concern. On the one hand, there was a realisation that the needs of Norwegian employers could be met by the supply of labour coming from the domestic market, which meant that there were still unexploited reserves of labour that could be used to cover growing future needs. On the other hand, however, it was important to identify what factors influenced the choices of potential labour migrants and see whether Norway should adopt new measures aimed at attracting migrants with skills and expertise that the local reserves could not cover. One case in particular is highly illustrative in this respect, as it shows how the interplay between domestic and international developments can impact on the shaping and redefining of policy: this is the case of Polish nurses and Norway.

Polish nurses in Norway
In one specific segment of the Norwegian labour market and society there was especially heated debate on the measures to be taken to solve problems with the lack of qualified personnel. By the late 1990s, the Norwegian health sector showed signs of deep crisis. The shortage of qualified nurses and physicians plagued Norwegian hospitals and other health institutions, as well as creating problems for patients. In Oslo alone, there were over 1,000 vacant positions in the health sector; in Norway as whole as many as 7,200 nursing positions were unfilled.

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128 To learn more on where these reserves can be found in Norway see the presentation given by Lars Østby at http://www.udi.no/upload/Seminar/SSB%20Lars%20Østby.pdf
129 Norwegian newspapers reported a dramatic labour shortage in the country’s health sector. Aftenposten wrote for instance on 04 October 2000 that only in Oslo there were approx. 3500 jobs to be filled, more of 1000 of these in the health sector (nurses and auxiliary nurses).
Discussions centred on two potential strategies. According to proponents of the first strategy, the shortage of labour in the health sector, especially in nursing, could be dealt with by offering new economic incentives that would bring back qualified nurses who had left the sector for social and economic reasons. The message sent by this ‘camp’ was rather simple – if the state poured more money into this sector and provided strong economic incentives to those who had decided to seek better opportunities elsewhere, the problem would be solved, as many thousands of well-educated Norwegian nurses would go back to their original work.

Another strategy came from those who felt that the response should include increased internationalisation of the sector and the introduction of new regulations and economic incentives to induce people with the right qualifications to move to Norway and fill the gap. In implementing this second strategy, one should consider closer cooperation not only with the countries that had already supplied personnel with qualifications almost identical to those of Norwegians, but also with some new regions – first and foremost Central and Eastern Europe, but also such exotics as the Philippines and South Korea. Due to their geographical proximity, the changes underway in Central and Eastern Europe, the clear trend towards integration of this region into Western institutions and what was probably perceived as a promising set of push/pull factors that could prompt many to move to Norway, the three Baltic republics and Poland were highlighted as the most interesting markets for potential recruitment of medical personnel to Norway.

However, those who were to make a decision on migration had to answer a set of questions on pros and cons linked with this migratory move. The International Council of Nurses recommends in its leaflet Career Moves and Migration: Critical Questions that those considering migration should answer the following set of questions before making a final decision:

- What are the credentials of the recruitment/employment agency?
- What are the credentials of the employer?
- What are the conditions of employment?
- What is the job description?
- What is the impact of this career move?

According to the same source, the main incentives for nurses to migrate are improved learning and practice opportunities, better quality of life, pay and working conditions, and personal safety. Table 15 shows the push and pull

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131 Two articles published in Økonomisk Rapport (22 November 2001) presented the situation from two angles – the one dealt with the situation of Polish nurses who had moved to Norway, the other one was based on interviews with Norwegian nurses who decided to leave the profession. The Polish nurses interviewed were mostly satisfied with their situation, while the Norwegian ones said that they should be offered much more in order to return.

132 According to Bergens Tidende (23 June 2001) there were 18500 qualified Norwegian nurses who left nursing and established themselves in other sectors of the Norwegian economy.

133 On plans to recruit nurses from South Korea see an Aftenposten article at the following address: http://tux1.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/oslo/d213135.htm

factors that another recent study – Buchan, Parkin and Sochalski 2003 – identifies as the main factors prompting nurses to migrate.

Table 15. Migration of nurses – push and pull factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Push factors</th>
<th>Pull factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low pay (absolute and/or relative)</td>
<td>Higher pay and remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions</td>
<td>Better working conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of resources to work effectively</td>
<td>Better resourced health systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited career opportunities</td>
<td>Career opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited educational opportunities</td>
<td>Provision of post-basic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Political stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable/dangerous work environment</td>
<td>Travel opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic instability</td>
<td>Aid work</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Norway seemed to meet all the requirements for being perceived as an attractive country of migration to Polish nurses, and so it was felt that recruiting nurses from Poland would be fairly simple. In order to win the confidence of potential employees, the Norwegian authorities decided to launch an information campaign, and on 10 March 2001 the Oslo daily *Dagbladet* wrote about a Norwegian diplomatic offensive aimed at achieving agreements on the recruitment of health personnel from Poland, the three Baltic republics and the Czech Republic. These personnel were to replace two groups already established in Norway – Norwegian nurses who had ‘emigrated’ to other sectors of the Norwegian economy, and nurses who had been recruited earlier from abroad, especially from Germany, Sweden and Finland, but now were returning to their home countries. Norwegian authorities were aware that, especially in countries with similar levels of development and earnings as Norway, recruitment of medical personnel was a difficult task, and the return migration of those who had come to Norway earlier was an important factor in triggering the new recruitment campaign in the CEE area. This was probably one main reason why Norway decided to seek the solution in Central and Eastern Europe, where health-sector salaries were much lower and the hardships of transition much more severe – these local push factors, it was felt, would help Norway fill the more than 7,000 vacant posts in the country’s health sector.

Poland was seen as a major area of recruitment. Some 25 million Norwegian kroner were to be spent on the first phase of the project coordinated by Aetat – the Norwegian labour market and employment agency. It was to be a win–win solution – Norway could cover its needs for personnel, and Polish medical personnel would get better chances for realising their own professional and economic goals. As one of the Polish nurses interviewed by NTB said in February 2001 ‘Norway is a light in the end of the tunnel’. The comment made by Piotr Szucza (age 34) made encapsulated the dramatic situation of this group in Poland. Especially the very low level of earnings – he mentioned that he earned 738 Polish zloty (approximately $ 200) per month – prompted many Polish nurses not only to join but even to lead the wave of

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social protests that rolled over their country in 1999 and 2000. With perspectives of earning as much as 23,000 or even 27,000 Norwegian kroner (equivalent to US$ 3,000 – 3,500) per month, it seemed that convincing nurses to go to Norway would be an easy task.\textsuperscript{136}

Thus, it appeared that the Polish nurses would see Norway as the country of their dreams; that recruitment would pose no problems, and that Norway could fill its needs by simply putting a bit of money into the newly established network of recruitment centres in Poland. On paper, the situation seemed very promising – although the number of nurses was declining in Poland, from the peak 213,000 in 1998 to 186,500 in 2001, the Norwegian authorities could still hope that Polish nurses could cover much of the country’s needs. Perhaps not all 7,000 vacant positions could be filled by these newcomers, but the hope was that up to 500 nurses – not only from Poland – could be recruited each year. The plan was to recruit not only nurses with qualifications on a par with those of Norwegian nurses, but also Polish nurses with shorter training, to work as auxiliary nurses and in other positions where their qualifications could be suitable.

In July 2001 the first 33 Polish nurses began at a special course in Poland to prepare them for working and living in Norway.\textsuperscript{137} Already in November 2001 the first of them came to Norway, and there were high expectations that many more would follow. Ewa Dylla, Anna Smyt and Teresa Morsbejek came to work in Bærum municipality near Oslo; all three had top qualifications. Norwegian media noted their arrival with interest, pointing out the differences in earnings between Poland and Norway. Their arrival was almost presented as a ‘liberation’ from the hardships of transition they experienced in their home country. Commenting on the recruitment and interest in coming to Norway, two Norwegian representatives who went to Poland to meet and accompany the candidates said: ‘They queued for coming to Norway, we could easily get twice as many of them to come’. Those who decided to come were to sign a two-year contract with their Norwegian employer. They would be offered a standard Norwegian nurse’s salary of 250,000 kroner per year – almost ten times more than what they could earn in Poland – and a smaller sum (40,000 kroner) to help them establish themselves in their new place.\textsuperscript{138}

Despite this promising beginning, the attempt to recruit medical personnel from new countries cannot be described as very successful. According to information from the reputable daily \textit{Aftenposten}, in 2002 the Norwegian Registration Authority for Health Personnel licensed 1,424 nurses from abroad to work in Norway.\textsuperscript{139} Interestingly, most of them came from the countries that had provided Norway with medical personnel before the new recruitment policy was launched in 2000 and 2001. There were 659 nurses who came from Sweden, 305 from Denmark, 157 from Finland, 132 from Germany, 68 from the Philippines – and only 33 from Poland.

\textsuperscript{136} According to \textit{Bergens Tidende}, Danish nurses working on contract at Haukeland hospital earned more than 27,000 kroner a month, while Norwegian nurses with same qualifications working in the same hospital earned 4,000 kroner less (18 June 2001).

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Aftenposten}, 04 July 2001, Internet edition.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Økonomisk Rapport}, 22.11.2001.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Aftenposten}, 25 May 2004.
All in all, only 190 nurses from Poland received licences to work in Norway between 2000 – when the debate on the shortage of medical personnel became acute in Norway – and late 2004. They formed only a small share (0.26%) of the 71,389 nurses working in Norway in 2004.

Table 16. Polish nurses receiving licence to work in Norway (HPR Data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chronological overview in Table 16 shows that recruitment took off in 2001, after the campaign to recruit was launched in Poland in 2000. However, only a limited number of nurses actually took the decision to go to Norway, and already by 2004 we can note a negative trend, with fewer licensed than the previous year.

The great majority were women – only 9 of the Polish nurses licensed in the period were men. Most were relatively young and in the early stage of their professional careers. The oldest was born in 1946 and was 57 years old when she received her license to work in Norway in 2003; the youngest was only 23 (see Figure 11).

Figure 11. Polish nurses in Norway 2000-2004, by year of birth

It seems surprising that so few decided to come to Norway, given that the situation of this group in Poland has not improved substantially since the recruitment campaign was launched in 2000, and that there is still the same gap between their real wages in Poland and expected wages in Norway.

One possible explanation is that Norway is competing for nurses from Poland with other countries both European and non-European, and, with the
An overview of nominal salaries and the purchasing power of these salaries in countries of potential migration of Polish nurses published recently by the main Polish newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza* may give a partial answer. Norway, although, as an EU outsider, it is not on the list, is perceived as an expensive place to live. According to this overview, average pay for nurses in Poland was 1300 Polish zloty (1 zloty = 2 Norwegian kroner) and the same was the purchasing power of this salary. In Sweden a nurse could earn 13,200 Polish zloty per month, and with purchasing power in Sweden estimated at 5,600 zloty. In Denmark the salary was 14,400 zloty and purchasing power 6,400. In the Netherlands, which runs a huge programme for recruitment of Polish nurses, the salaries offered were much higher, also in terms of purchasing power. A Polish nurse going to the Netherlands could earn as much as 17,500 zloty, with purchasing power of almost 10,000 zloty. Also in other European countries, the purchasing power of an average nursing salary was higher than in the Nordic countries. As Norway tends to be even more expensive than either Sweden or Denmark, the level of income offered to a qualified nurse, as expressed in purchasing power parity, was probably even lower in Norway than in its two Nordic neighbours. Moreover, also the USA and Canada have entered the Polish recruitment market, and both these countries can give even stronger incentives for emigrating.

Another possible explanation is that many perceive migration to Norway as difficult due to the complicated and restrictive practice of licensing. Also some in Norway are aware of the problem, as was revealed by the exchange of views on procedures to be followed for issuing licences to Polish nurses. While the director of the Norwegian Registration Authority for Health Personnel held the view that one should pursue a strict and rigid policy of licensing for the sake of the patients, the head of the Norwegian Health Personnel Board (HPN) was of the opinion that it was time to adopt a more flexible approach and to be more open to recognising the quality of education and training of job-seekers from Poland.\footnote{For more details on this debate see *Aftenposten* 11 and 22 August 2003. For more details on the authorisation procedures see: http://www.safh.no/english/professions/general_nurse.html}

Newcomers and potential candidates could also feel less secure because contracts signed between nurses from Poland and Norwegian health institutions were originally of 2 years’ duration; moreover, the working committee for evaluating the practice of authorising foreign health-sector specialists warned in June 2003 that new measures could be introduced to sharpen control with medical personnel recruited from abroad.\footnote{For details of this discussion see *Aftenposten* 21 June 2003.} As other European countries had less restrictive practices and offered either the same or even better conditions, Norway was risking marginalisation.

Also the cultural explanation cannot be completely ruled out. When the recruitment of Polish nurses began in 2000 and 2001 many arguments were heard, both for and against. Those who were against the decision raised the issue of the brain drain – they claimed that by inviting CEE nurses to work
in Norway, their home country would lose necessary health personnel. The same forces opposed to the recruitment of CEE nurses also advocated the introduction of better salaries: this, they maintained, would result in many former nurses rejoining the profession. This might even look like a sort of a crisis-maximising exercise on the part of Norwegian health personnel who wanted to force the employer side to make a better economic offer so as to encourage many nurses to return to their profession. In that situation, the decision to recruit abroad could be seen as an element of a strategy aimed at forcing them to accept a less beneficial solution. As a result of this debate, foreign nurses could be seen as almost strike-breakers whose arrival changed the balance of power in the ongoing debate.

Nurses from CEE could be met in Norway with a certain amount of scepticism also because their Norwegian counterparts might fear that they represented another ‘health sector culture’ and that their training and education was of lower quality. Especially the problem of corruption and implementation of specific East European strategies of coping with economic challenges through the use of private and informal payment schemes in the health sector could cast a shadow on relations between Norwegian and Polish employees. In fact it was not that the nurses who were to come to Norway were involved in these corrupt social practices – they were the cream of Poland’s, not least due to their long training and documented knowledge of languages, and the meticulous selection process undergone before they could come to Norway. The problem was more that they were coming from an area that was not a part of what had for many decades been Norway’s natural frame of reference. Poland and Central/Eastern Europe were seen as something unknown, belonging neither to the completely developed nor to the underdeveloped world. Nurses from CEE were a new element, as well as being seen as a potential threat to the established ‘health sector order’. This was why also arguments on the need to prevent social dumping were heard. Social dumping was seen as threat, for at least two reasons. The first involved the concept of social solidarity – Norwegians were against social dumping, because those who do the same job as Norwegians do deserve the same pay and access to the same social goods. The second reason had much more to do with ‘self-interest’ – the fear that the migration of nurses from abroad could solve the problem of understaffing in Norway’s health sector and thus deprive that group of powerful political leverage that could be translated into economic gains for the whole group.

A final explanation for why there has not been a massive inflow of nurses from Poland is based on the idea that the migratory strategy to which they had access (through the implementation of Norway’s policy of recruitment) did not match their needs. Well-educated nurses – and this group was the

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142 See for instance Bente Slåtten’s comments in Aftenposten 4 July 2001, where she spoke out against the recruitment and used namely this argument. Also others used similar arguments see [http://www.dagsavisen.no/innenriks/2004/02/782397.shtml](http://www.dagsavisen.no/innenriks/2004/02/782397.shtml).

143 When asked what could prompt them to go back to nursing, two of the nurses answered quite frankly – Only much, really much money could make us consider going back to our original profession (Økonomisk Rapport, 22 November 2002).

144 For more on the issue of corruption in health sector in Central and Eastern Europe see Lerbergh, Conceicao, Damme and Ferrinho 2002, Lewis 2000. Also Experience with corruption in the health sector in Poland, gives a good insight in this topic.
main target of the Norwegian recruitment effort – could choose other survival strategies, both in Poland and abroad … and not necessarily in Norway. They could use the same strategy as their Norwegian colleagues who were not satisfied with the conditions offered to them in the Norwegian health sector and who decided that ‘migration’ to other sectors offering both better pay and better working conditions was an appropriate response strategy. For example, work in the fast-growing Polish pharmaceutical industry offered much better pay than the public health sector, and this was one option available.

They could also opt for nursing employment in other Western countries that offered better conditions than Norway. The relatively low purchasing power of salaries offered in Norway has been noted. Moreover, nurses were offered contracts of only 2 years’ duration; and their families (mostly husbands) could find it difficult to establish themselves on the Norwegian labour market.

Here is two worst-case scenarios: In the one, a family decides to move to Norway, and both spouses give up their jobs in Poland; however, the contract of the one who was offered a job in Norway is not extended, forcing them to leave Norway and return to Poland, where all bridges are already burned. Or, they could face a situation where both leave their jobs in Poland and go to Norway, but only one manages to enter the Norwegian labour market. The other has to struggle with the new reality and is not able to realise the economic rent of migration. In such a case, the social costs of migration may outweigh the financial gains. In both these cases, the migrants may be forced to adopt a strategy of return to the country of origin, due to inability to achieve the long-term goals of their original migratory strategy.

These potential perils of migration may prompt another type of migratory strategy – as mentioned above, *circular and incomplete migration* have now become more prominent in the CEE migration landscape. A look at the numerical dimension of migration between Poland and Norway in the 1990s and early 2000s shows circular migration as the most important strategy adopted by Poles.

**Polish seasonal workers and irregulars in Norway**

Until 1 January 2002, when the Norwegian authorities introduced new and more flexible rules regulating the immigration of specialists to Norway, the specialist strategy was available to only a limited number of Poles – those who could document that the Norwegian labour market was short of the qualifications they had and that Norwegian employers were willing to hire them in order to fill this competence gap. Those who could not use other strategies – the nuptial strategy, available only to those who found their ‘right person’ to marry in Norway; the family reunification strategy, or the strategy of asylum-seeking, no longer open to Poles due to the political changes in Poland – but wanted to move to Norway, or realise their asset accumulation strategy in Norway, were left with only two possible strategies. The first one was a legal strategy of seasonal work in Norway; the other was based on legal entry to Norway, followed by an asset accumulation strategy on Norway’s irregular and informal labour market. Naturally enough, some
information is available on those who chose the first of these two strategies, but we know almost nothing about the second group.145

According to the database of the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, between 1990 and 2002 this institution dealt with 29,415 applications from Polish citizens seeking seasonal employment in Norway. Of these applications, only 37% were filed by women, and 63% by men. Figure 12 presents an overview over the number applications handled each year.

**Figure 12. Applications for seasonal work in Norway filed by Polish citizens**146

Poles became the most important group among those applying the combined strategy of circular migration and asset accumulation in Norway in the 1990s. An overview over the Poles’ share of those with seasonal work in Norway over the past three years reveals this Polish domination with all clarity – for the whole period they formed between almost 60% (in 2003) and 73% (in 2000) of those employing this approach in Norway. The strategy of legal circular labour migration was preferred by those who wanted to earn their living in Norway but spend that money in Poland; the economic motivation was definitely central. According to Norwegian regulations those arriving in Norway as seasonal workers have no possibility to apply for permanent residence in the country, and their access to Norwegian social welfare goods is also limited. This strategy seems to be preferred by those who could not – or did not want – to settle permanently in Norway, but wanted to

145 We do not have any study on Polish irregulars in Norway, but we can more about this phenomenon from studies of other Polish illegal diasporas. To learn more about this aspect see for instance Düvell 2004, Grzymala-Kazlowska 2001a, Grzymala-Kazlowska 2001b.
146 ARBDETAKSES – category in DUF database.
reap the economic fruits of circular migration without breaking the social and economic ties with their homeland.147

Table 17. Number and share of Poles among seasonal workers in Norway148

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Number of Poles</th>
<th>Poles’ share in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9,894</td>
<td>7,177</td>
<td>72.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11,920</td>
<td>8,006</td>
<td>67.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>15,721</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>17,660</td>
<td>10,492</td>
<td>59.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the legal gateway for circular migration provided by the Norwegian authorities was widely interpreted as the Poles’ response to changing circumstances. Even by the late 1980s, thousands or even tens of thousands of Polish citizens were working in Norway each year, especially during the summer months. There were already some legal possibilities of working in Norwegian agriculture, and thousands of Poles, many of them with very high qualifications, combined this possibility with their ‘normal life’ in Poland.149 Especially during the years of the economic crisis of what was to be the end of the Communist era in Poland, there were strong economic incentives for using this circular labour migration strategy.

Two factors made this strategy appealing in late 1980s and in the 1990s. The first was the flat structure of earnings in Norway. Barth and Røed (2003, 82–83) describe Norway as a country where the return on higher education is relatively low – the ‘income gap’ between those with completed tertiary education and those with only primary or secondary education is narrow compared to other European countries. The purchasing power of what these Norwegian researchers define as ‘net income’ of employees with the highest education level is also rather low, due to the generally high price levels in the country. The top expected income for the upper quarter of those with the highest educational level and highest earnings is 7% lower than the average for the same category of employees in 12 other countries in the Barth and Røed study. This means that the Norwegian authorities may face real challenges in trying to encourage the labour migration of highly skilled specialists, who can find much better economic incentives in almost all other West

147 Although there were many Poles working in Norway, Germany remains the main arena for both legal and illegal, permanent and seasonal migration. An interesting study of Polish seasonal labour migration in Germany is Korczynska 2003. Also Kaczmarczyk 2001. gives a good insight in the life of Polish diaspora in Germany
148 Numbers from UDI’s yearly reports.
149 During the interview with the staff of the Norwegian Embassy in Warsaw, this author was told that in the late 1980s, ‘whole departments of Jagellonian University could be met in the strawberry fields of Norway. They were not doing field research but simply earning money that they needed in order to survive in this time of economic crisis’. In fact, some of the leading figures of the first democratic government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, formed in summer 1989, received their invitations to join the government when they were on their yearly ‘strawberry-picking trip’ in Norway. The list of those who have this experience in their CV and have made political and economic careers in post-Communist Poland is long and includes many prominent names.
European countries. On the other hand, Norway may seem attractive as an alternative for migrants with less formal education – those with primary and secondary education can expect a much higher return on their ‘nominal’ salaries (47% and 43% higher than the average for 12 countries) and ‘real’ salaries (24% and 18%) than in other West European countries. This combination of social-democratic policy of redistribution of incomes and levelling of earnings may backfire on Norway in terms of attracting highly skilled specialists, but has resulted in relatively high earnings for less skilled workers. It has also translated into relatively high earnings for those with higher education who came to Norway to do simple jobs – the only ones available to them – and who made these trips to Norway an important part of their survival and adaptation strategy in crisis-torn Poland.

Moreover, the purchasing power of these relatively high earnings received for fairly unskilled work by those who treated this as a part of their survival strategy was even higher after they returned to their home country. Thus we can see how the strategy of seasonal work and circular labour migration was clearly rational in the economic terms of the late 1980s.\(^{150}\)

As a practical example let us look at the possible calculations of a young Polish university lecturer employed ‘normally’ at Cracow’s Jagellonian University in 1987 who decided to work at one of the many Norwegian strawberry farms. His monthly salary – in black market US dollar rates – was perhaps $50. As a university lecturer, he had relatively long summer holidays. If he travelled by car together with two colleagues, they could bring along most of the food they would need for the whole stay in Norway, making their actual expenses in Norway very low. After three months in the strawberry fields, he could probably save as much as $2,000 (13,000 Norwegian kroner) and perhaps even $3,000 (18,000 kroner), if he also took extra jobs, like house painting. In other words, during those summer months in Norway he could earn and set aside 40 or 60 of his normal Polish monthly wages. This money helped him not only to survive until the next year but was also important for building human and economic capital that he could later invest in improving his situation in a more permanent way.

The collapse of the Communist system in 1989 changed this calculation completely. The structure of earnings is still relatively flat in Norway and payment for simple jobs – like strawberry picking – is still rather high compared with other countries. But the other variables have changed drastically. One paradoxical result of economic transition, especially in ‘shock therapy’ countries like Poland, was the extreme depreciation of the US dollar on the domestic markets. According to some calculations, the purchasing power of the US dollar in Poland changed at the following pace: In 1985, $1 could buy goods and services worth today’s 50 zloty; in 1990, goods and services worth only 11 zloty; with the progress of economic reforms purchasing power of the US dollar diminished even further – sinking to 5 zloty in 1995 and to 4 zloty in 2003 and to a mere 3.5 zloty by 2004. Thus, those who earned their dollars abroad and wanted to spend them in Poland have lost very much of their purchasing power: between 1990 and 2004 their dollars have lost 65% of their value. On the other hand, salaries in Poland, espe-

\(^{150}\) To learn more on pre-1989 labour migration from Poland see Stola 2001.
cially expressed in dollars equivalents, have increased ten-fold in the same time – from $50 in the late 1980s to more than $500 in 2003.

This success of economic reforms in Poland has also contributed to modifying the pattern of migration between Poland and Norway. Although many Poles still work in the fields of Norway during the summer, the composition of this group seems to have changed drastically. The transformation of the Polish economy and society opened new possibilities in Poland to those with the higher level of education, so this group has now lost most economic motivation for coming to Norway as seasonal workers. For those who still come, this survival strategy is much less profitable than in the late 1980s: today one would have to work in Norway for 5 or even 6 months in order to get by until the next ‘circular trip’. In the late 1980s, seasonal circular migration between Poland and Norway allowed people not only to survive but also to invest in the future; today it has become a pure survival strategy adopted by those with no other options.

As cyclical return to the country of origin is a central element, this strategy can also be described as a strategy of repetitive return, and that opens for new interpretative possibilities. According to the widely used theoretical framework for interpreting return migration proposed by Cerase (1974) and used innovatively by Iglicka (2002) in her study of return migration in Poland, there are four types of return migration: connected with conservatism, with failure, with innovation and with retirement. The circular strategy of seasonal work has features of all four types of classical return migration, although they are put together in a rather surprising manner. As to the element of failure, it is rather the failure to adapt fully to the conditions of transition – you are forced to commute between your homeland and the country where you earn your money partly because you haven’t been able to integrate in the new social structure; perhaps you belong to the group of transformation losers. With the element of conservatism, you don’t want to leave your country permanently because you still feel that your place is where you were born, so you return with your capital to satisfy your – and your relatives’ – needs in your homeland. There is also an element of innovation in these repetitive returns, as you are probably prepared to make use of all the means and new skills acquired during your migratory experiences. Finally, there is also an element of ‘retirement’ in circular migration, as each return to your homeland is in a sense a temporal ‘retirement’ from your main work, which is located abroad.

The interpretation presented above is especially pertinent in the case of those who use this circular strategy of seasonal migration as a permanent survival strategy, but it also has more general relevance for this study. In a situation when transition is seen as not a permanent state but a process that will result in making the systems of the sending countries more compatible with those of the receiving countries, the incentives to migrate may become less obvious, and return migration may gain momentum. We can already see how Polish EU membership may be interpreted as the end of systemic transition and opening of a new chapter in the country’s history and in the history of Polish migration. Polish reforms have made economic incentives to migrate less obvious, but the high level of social exclusion, and especially the high unemployment, may impel many to seek new opportunities abroad.
However, in the longer run, EU enlargement may change also this equation and modify the push/pull factors that have been shaping Polish migratory strategies. Enlargement has given Polish citizens better access to the European labour market, and by 2011 this access is to be completely unrestricted. However, it may turn out that by then, and due not least to the EU common policy aimed at solving the problems that force people to migrate, migration will become a strategy of choice and not one of necessity.

What can we expect as to migration between Poland and Norway in the wake of this watershed event that took place on 1 May 2004, when Poland became a fully fledged member of the EU? Back in 1999, Stola and Okólski presented their opinions on the future of Polish migration – these views are also highly relevant for our understanding of the future trends in migration between Poland and Norway. They identified the following as the dominant features in future Polish migration (Okólski and Stola 1999: 26–27):

Labour migration to Western Europe, in particular Germany, will remain prevalent, and the improvement or worsening of the economic situation in Poland will be the main factor influencing migratory trends. The policies of individual receiving countries will continue to play a major role, but the removal of restrictions for labour migration within the enlarged EU will have major impact on the extent of labour migration. As in the 1990s, migratory strategies will be chosen primarily by those with less education and older people from areas of inferior economic development, especially areas that are peripheral as well as agricultural ones, and where migration networks operate. We can also expect greater migration of entrepreneurs and the self-employed, in the wake of the application of the directive on the free movement of services and workers within the enlarged EU. As previously, family migration – and probably family reunification – will remain the main strategy used by those who opt for legal, long-term and settlement migration from Poland to the EU. The opening of borders and labour markets may also increase the number of those choosing nuptial strategies, but the same developments may serve to change this trend, as women will no longer be compelled to marry in order to gain access to the labour market and social goods in the enlarged EU. We can expect an increase in migration from the EU – and Norway – to Poland, due to internationalisation of Polish economy, but the return migration of Polish citizens living abroad may emerge as the dominant trend.

In the case of Norway, this could mean the shrinking of Polish community, as many of those who arrived in the 1980s may choose the ‘return for retirement’ strategy. This seems especially likely if the problem of mutual recognition of periods of work as entitling one to retirement benefits can be solved within the new European framework.

There can be no doubt about it: the EU enlargement will change and modify the pattern of migration between Poland and Europe. However, because so many factors influence migratory choices at both the macro- and micro-level, it is difficult to offer more detailed predictions.
Case Study 2: The growth of the Russian community in Norway

According to official Norwegian statistics, as of 1 January 2001 there were 4,524 persons classified as ‘Russians’ living in Norway. Since the early 1990s the Russian community in Norway has been growing, continuously and rapidly. Whereas in the period 1986–91 there were on average only 72 persons a year who moved from the then USSR to Norway, already by 1992–1995 the number of Russian citizens moving to Norway had grown to almost 600. By 1997 it had reached almost 600.

Official reports of the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet, UDI) listed a range of ‘push factors’ in Russia – such as unemployment, wage and pension arrears, poverty and ethnic tensions – that are clearly related to the existence of welfare gaps between Russia and Norway. Russian citizens could embark on various migratory strategies to realise their plans of coming to Norway – ranging from asylum-seeking in the case of the victims of the Russian policy in the Northern Caucasus to ‘marrying Norwegian’, with many other strategies in between these extremes.

This case study deals with the growth of the Russian community in Norway in the 1990s. The analysis is based on available Norwegian and to a lesser degree Russian statistics and on the available literature. Unless other-

wise indicated, all figures presented here are based on data from the UDI and from Statistics Norway (SSB, Norway’s official bureau of statistics). The two main sources are UDI’s yearly reports and SSB’s publicly available overviews of the ethnic composition of the population of Norway. This information is supplemented by data from UDI’s DUF database giving good insight into long-term migratory trends. Most statistics cover the whole post-Soviet period, from 1991 to November 2003.

The UDI divides permanent and temporary migrants to Norway into various categories, and this classification can be useful in indicating which migratory strategies have been preferred by Russians and which have been seen as less attractive. By using UDI data we can also see whether these strategies were gender-related. In the first part of this case study we focus on the overall development of the Russian community in Norway as reflected in official Norwegian population statistics; the second part presents an analysis of various strategies used by Russians who have found their way to Norway.

**How many Russians live in Norway?**

Migratory exchange between Russia and Norway has been rather limited throughout the post-Communist period, with the dominant pattern being immigration of Russian citizens to Norway. Between 1991 and 2003 there were 7,737 more persons who moved from Russia to Norway than the other way (SSB Data). In the first five years after the collapse of the USSR (1991–95) Norway had a net migration gain of 1,150; in the next five years (1996–2000) the figure was 2,845, and between 2001 and 2003 this grew to 3,742.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Period</th>
<th>Gain from migration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991–95</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996–2000</td>
<td>2,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–03</td>
<td>3,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gain from migration 1991–2003</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,737</strong></td>
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In 2003, Russia became the main ‘supplier’ of migrants to Norway, with almost 1600 more Russian citizens moving to Norway than in the reverse direction. This exceeded arrivals from traditional migration countries like Somalia and Afghanistan.
According to official Norwegian statistics (SSB) and depending on the categories used, there were between 6,203 and 8,868 persons with Russian background living in Norway as of 1 January 2004. The lower figure represents the number of Russian citizens living in Norway by that date, the higher figure represents the number of persons with Russian background. We also find that 7,465 persons living in Norway were born in Russia; 7,189 persons born in Russia with at least one parent born in Russia; and 7,457 with two non-Norwegian-born parents. Of course, this numerical confusion has more to do with the Norwegian way of classifying migrants than with the actual choices made by Russians deciding to move to Norway.

As of 1 January 2004 more than 3% of all foreign citizens living in Norway were Russian; as to persons ‘with foreign background’ – the most inclusive of all SSB categories – the 7,465 persons with Russian background represented 2.1% of the total 348,940 persons with foreign background living in Norway.

Another way to measure the size of the established ethnic community in Norway is the look at the pupil population receiving schooling in their mother tongue, as provided by Norwegian law. In 2002 there were only registered 9 pupils receiving education in Ukrainian; in the same year, there were 497 pupils receiving education in Russian and 185 in Polish.

A further aspect should be addressed when discussing data on migration from Russia. As Russia is a multi-ethnic country, not all migrants coming from Russia to Norway are of Russian ethnic background. The data collected and produced by the SSB and UDI are based exclusively on political and not ethnic geography. This may give an incorrect picture of the Russian community developing in Norway. When we talk about the Russian civic community in Norway, a community based on the formal – and from the viewpoint

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152 Data from http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2004-05-26-03.html.
153 Data on the ethnic composition of the Norwegian society by 1 January 2004 from www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2004-05-26-09.html
of the Norwegian authorities also previous and parental – Russian citizenship, we include not only ethnic Russians but also persons with other ethnic background who – or whose parents – formally have – or have had – Russian citizenship. However, in speaking about the Russian community based on ethnicity, we should realise that many persons with other ethnic backgrounds, although formally Russian citizens and as such classified as ‘Russians’ by the Norwegian authorities, do not identify with this group and have no wish to be classified as ‘Russians’. We return to this question when analysing the situation of the fast-growing number of Russian citizens of mostly ethnic Chechen origin who have been applying for protection in Norway: they define themselves as ethnic Chechens coming from an independent country invaded by Russia, but are defined by the Norwegian authorities as a part of the Russian community in Norway.

Where do they live?
As shown in Figure 15, there are two areas of concentration of Russians living in Norway – Finnmark County and the capital city of Oslo. The concentration of Russians in the northernmost counties of Finnmark, Troms and Nordland can be explained by geographical proximity to the Russian border, while the growth of the Russian community in Oslo and neighbouring Akershus follows the familiar pattern of concentration of migrant communities in central urban areas. This probably also explains the relatively high number of Russians in the counties of Hordaland (Bergen) and Rogaland (Stavanger).

However, the total population of Finnmark was only 73,514, and Finnmark was the county with the lowest concentration of persons with foreign background in the whole country. Thus, the comparatively high number of Russians there has to be deemed a special Russian phenomenon on the Norwegian migration map. The 843 Russians living in Finnmark as of 1 January 2003 represented almost 1.1% of the total population of the county, while the 826 Russians living in Oslo represented only 0.15% of the population of Oslo.
When did they come?

A look at the chronology of the Russian migration to Norway reveals a clear link between macro-scale political and historical events and micro-scale survival and adaptation strategies with migratory component. Until the fall of the Soviet Union, migration from Russia was rather low: only after the relaxation of the travel restrictions by the Soviet and then Russian authorities did the West see the arrival of substantial numbers of Russians.

In his interesting analysis, Russian historian Polian (2003) divides the history of the recent migration from Russia into four waves. The first was the post-1917 Revolution migration of people belonging to classes that had lost the battle against the Bolsheviks and were forced to leave, in order to escape persecution and death. Polian estimates that this wave was made up of approximately 2 million former Russian subjects who settled permanently in the West. The second wave of migration from Russia was directly linked with the Second World War and the incorporation of the areas of Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union – as a result, between 500,000 and 700,000 persons, mostly of non-Russian origin, were forced to leave the expanded Soviet sphere of influence. The third wave, from 1948 to 1986, resulted in the migration of approximately 500,000 of Soviet citizens, most of them of non-Russian ethnic origin: 290,000 Soviet Jews, 105,000 Soviet citizens of German descent and 52,000 ethnic Armenians, according to Polian. The
fifth wave began with the relaxation of political control under Gorbachev and is not yet concluded. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has seen a huge inflow of migrants from other post-Soviet republics. Migratory-wise, the Russia of the post-Soviet period has been a country in-between – many Russian citizens decided to leave the country, but many others have seen the Russian Federation as an attractive country of migration.

These migratory waves affected Norway in a very limited way. It has never become an area of mass migration from Russia, although in the early 1990s, with the social, political and economic situation in Russia rapidly deteriorating, fears were expressed in Norway that the country could face a wave of uncontrolled Russian migration, especially in the case of an environmental crisis or catastrophe in the neighbouring Russian regions. Contingency plans were prepared by the Norwegian authorities and Norwegian media noted these possible dramatic scenarios, but these fears have never materialised.

What Norway has seen is a steady increase in the number of Russian citizens settling more or less permanently in the country. As Table 18 shows, there has been a substantial increase, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of Russia’s borders.


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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966–70</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another way of presenting the temporal aspect of migration is to see when Russian citizens settled in Norway for the first time (Figure 16). These data from the SSB confirm our conclusion that the emergence of the latest wave of Russian migrants in Norway is inseparably linked with recent domestic political, economic and social developments in Russia. These new political, economic and social conditions have created a new set of push/pull factors encouraging – or forcing – Russian citizens to embark on a survival strategy with a migratory component. On the other hand, although Norway might be seen as an attractive country of migration, only a very limited number of Russian citizens have actually decided to settle there.
Figure 16. Post-1990 Russian migration to Norway, by first year of migration (SSB)

1999–2003 trends
The number of migrants from Russia to Norway has increased dramatically — while in 1999 there were 800 such cases, only four years later the figure had more than doubled, to 1,835. To understand this trend we need to analyse the strategies used by migrants from Russia and then see whether there is a causal link between these strategies and recent domestic developments in Russia. (See Figure 17.)

Figure 17. Migration from Russia to Norway – 1999–2003 trends
Russian survival strategies and Norway, or how and why do they come?
Although the Russian authorities have lifted almost all practical travel restrictions for Russian citizens, a visa is still required to enter most countries outside CIS area. Both Russian citizens, who have to queue in the Western embassies and consulates each time they want to travel to the West, and the Russian authorities, who have politicised this issue in relations with the EU, have reiterated how humiliating this situation is for citizens of the former superpower. However, before travel restrictions on the part of the Western governments can be lifted, Russia will have to solve its own problems related to the use of the Russian territory as a transit area for illegal migration to the West, and it will have to sign a number of agreements on readmission with the countries that are most affected. As Norway coordinates its visa policy with other EEA and Schengen countries, those wishing to travel to Norway need a visa. Obtaining a visa to Norway or any of the Schengen countries is the first practical obstacle Russian potential migrants must consider in selecting a migratory strategy, especially if they want to reach the target area without the help of predatory networks of human smugglers.

In 2002, there were 13,376 visa applications filed by Russians in the Norwegian consulate in Murmansk; 10,770 in Moscow and 3,864 in St. Petersburg. Only 437 (3%), 46 (0.4%) and 25 (0.6%) respectively were rejected by the Norwegian authorities.

Knowledge-related strategies: studying and learning in Norway
Among the least controversial migration strategies is temporary and incomplete migration involving the transfer of knowledge, thereby indirectly improving the quality of human capital in the source country. This strategy has become widely used by Russian citizens. Many have decided to spend some time in Norway in order to widen and deepen their knowledge basis, as they can expect this experience to improve their chances of adapting to a new situation in Russia – or elsewhere, if they see Norway as an intermediary station on the way to other, more attractive, target countries. Since the early 1990s, the Norwegian authorities have developed many schemes and institutional solutions in order to facilitate contacts between Russia and Norway, so the choice of this survival and adaptation strategy seems wise. Also other gates for incomplete migration from Russia to Norway have been opened – and used by Russians interested in improving their qualifications through studies, intern/trainee (praktikant) schemes, or through staying with Norwegian families as au pairs.

Since 1991, 1,423 Russian citizens have applied for student visas to Norway; 250 decided to go au pairs, while 465 applied for praktikant visas and 78 wanted to spend some time in Norway as working guests.

The latest available overview (2003) of the situation of Russian ‘knowledge-seeking’ incomplete migrants in Norway shows which knowledge-related strategies have been most widely used. In 2003 there were 159 Russian citizens studying in Norway, 19 Russians at the Norwegian ‘folk col-

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leges’ and 2 Russian post-doctoral students affiliated with Norwegian educational institutions. In the same year there were 55 au pairs from Russia, 28 praktikants and probably 6 working guests. All in all, 269 Russian citizens applied for a student or other knowledge-related visa in Norway that year, and 247 renewal applications were filed by Russians already studying in Norway.

Russian ‘knowledge-seekers’ have been strongly represented in the knowledge-seeking community in Norway: 7.6% of all foreign students studying in Norway in 2003, and almost 6% of all au pairs and more than 5% of all praktikants that year were Russians. That Russians represented more than 10% of those who applied for renewal of their student visas in 2003 indicates that the Russian student community in Norway is well established.

**Figure 18. Russians in Norway 2003: knowledge-related strategies**

What may prove to be a specifically Russian – or perhaps more generally East European – feature of the ‘au-pair strategy’ is its application as a potential gate to permanent migration and as a useful ‘opener’ of the Norwegian labour market for Russian specialists. According to the Russian-language LEAPS website (http://awis.virtualave.net/a_norw.html) the au pair system can be used in order to improve one’s chances on the Norwegian labour market. The site recommends specialists like physicians, dentists, veterinarians, psychologists, nurses, lawyers etc., to begin by staying as au pair with a Norwegian family for at least 2 years in order to improve their language skills and get better acquainted with the Norwegian system, before filing a job application. The company provides information on conditions in Norway and helps to file applications, charging between $70$ and $120$ for its services. Apparently many of those who chose the au pair solution are in fact interested in establishing themselves on the Norwegian labour market through entering it in this unconventional way. The same could be probably
said about those who use the *praktikant* and working guest schemes. Moreover, there is growing number of Russian graduates from Norwegian educational institutions who choose not to return to Russia but try – often successfully – to establish themselves on the Norwegian or other Western ‘ordinary’ labour markets.

**Working in Norway: Russian labour-related strategies**

According to Norwegian regulations there are two legal ways of accessing the Norwegian labour market for the citizens of the countries that are not parties to the EEA agreement. One of these – the ‘specialist scheme’ modified on 1 January 2002 – gives foreign employees the right to settle in Norway permanently after an initial period of three years. By contrast, the seasonal work permit provides access to the Norwegian labour market for a limited period only, and without the right to settle permanently. A special arrangement was also put in place for potential job-seekers from the Russian part of the Barents region who were interested in working in the Norwegian fishery industry in the Far North. Although this special type of work permit gives Russian job-seekers right to stay in Norway for up till one year, it does not entitle them to settle permanently, and should thus be seen as an extended seasonal work permit.

Depending on their main goal and their qualifications, potential migrants can get access to the Norwegian labour market either through one of these legal migratory gates or by adopting a strategy of illegal entry. As no data are available on the number of foreigners working in Norway’s grey or black labour market, and estimates vary and are not reliable, we will focus here on official Norwegian data on those Russian citizens who have entered the Norwegian labour market through legal methods.

**Seasonal workers**

Getting access to the Norwegian labour market for a limited period of time may be an attractive solution to those who are not thinking of leaving Russia permanently but would rather use a strategy of circular migration. Those wanting to reap the economic gains from temporary labour migration may prefer this to permanent migration. In a situation when they can get a Norwegian level of earnings (or almost that) while in Norway, and can then return to Russia to spend the money there, the purchasing parity of their Norwegian earnings is much higher than in the case of permanent migration to Norway. This possibility has attracted many Russian citizens.

During the whole 1991–2003 period, 826 Russian citizens applied for seasonal work permits in Norway (UDI data). On the other hand, interest in this strategy was much lower in Russia than in many other CEE countries, especially Poland and Lithuania.
Especially in recent years, new groups of Russians seem to be discovering Norway as a place where one can earn money legally for at least some months of the year. In 2003, 256 Russians received seasonal work permits. This was almost the same as in 2002 (264), but compared with the situation in 2000 (103) and 2001 (148), it shows that almost twice as many found their way to Norway through this legal gate. In general, however, Russian citizens do not seem to be choosing this strategy, as their share in the total number of seasonal workers in Norway has been fairly low. (See Table 19.)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total no.</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Russians’ share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9,894</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11,920</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>15,721</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>17,660</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russian specialists in Norway
According to UDI data, 536 Russian citizens applied for work permits in Norway as ‘ordinary specialist’ in the whole 1991–2003 period. The introduction in January 2002 of a new set of rules offering much easier access to the Norwegian labour market to all those wanting to come and able to document that they were in possession of some special skills has resulted in growing interest from Russians with the higher and middle level of education required to qualify as ‘specialists’ under the new rules.

According to these new rules, work permits may be granted to as many as 5,000 specialists from non-EU/EEA each year. ‘Specialists’ are defined as ‘persons who are trained in a particular field or have special qualifications

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155 ARBDSPEFAGUTORD – category in DUF database
needed in Norway. Their expertise must be critical for the enterprise seeking to hire them.\textsuperscript{156} Prior to applying for a work permit as a specialist a person must have a concrete offer of employment. Once granted, a specialist work permit is connected to a particular job and a particular place of work; the wages and work conditions cannot be less favourable than those specified under Norway’s collective pay agreement or what is normal within the trade or profession in Norway. After three years, a specialist may apply for a residence permit, and his family members can join him in Norway.

The introduction of these new regulations meant a definite relaxation of the rather restrictive earlier practice that had permitted labour migration only of specialists with very specific skills, usually requiring tertiary-level education.

It seems that Russian citizens have discovered this opportunity and many have chosen this strategy. The opening of the Norwegian labour market did not result in a dramatic inflow of skilled labour – in 2002 only 1,676 applications were granted (approximately 1/3 of the quota), and in 2003 only 1,127. On the other hand, Russians ranked fifth in 2002 and third in 2003 among all those who used the ‘specialist strategy’ in order to gain access to the Norwegian labour market as well as the right to settle permanently in the country after the initial three-year period. (Table 20)

Table 20. Russian specialists in Norway 2002 and 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Year 2003</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Year 2002</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Serbia &amp; Montenegro</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Serbia &amp; Montenegro</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russian brides and grooms in Norway

One clearly gender-related survival strategy involves marrying into Norway. This seems to be the approach adopted by many Russians who decided to leave their country and settle in Norway; it was also one of the few legal strategies available. This strategy could be especially successful in areas with specific demographic characteristics, such as Finnmark, where every fourth marriage in 2000 was said to involve a Russian citizen.

\textsuperscript{156} http://www.udi.no/upload/Faktaark/Engelsk/Arbeid_engelsk.pdf
Between 1989 and November 2003, UDI registered 905 cases of visa application for Russian citizens who married either Norwegian citizens or other persons living permanently in Norway. In addition there were 44 cases where a Russian citizen applied for visa in connection with planned marriage to a person residing in Norway. In the vast majority of these cases (849 out of 905, or 94%) the bride was Russian. Only in 56 cases (6%) was the groom Russian and the bride had a Norwegian background.

What was the temporal dynamics of this social phenomenon? Figure 20 shows when cases were registered in the UDI database.

**Figure 20. Brides and grooms from Russia**

According to a recent study (Lie 2004:46), as of 1 January 2002 there were 1,464 Norwegian men married to women from Russia; and a very low, statistically insignificant number of Norwegian women married to men from Russia. Russian women ranked in 9 place among the 33,090 women with foreign background married to Norwegian man at that time.

All in all, as of 1 January 2002 there were in Norway 1,902 women with Russian background who were married, and 376 Russian men who were married. Of the Russian women, 79% were married to ethnic Norwegians, while only 13% of the men had ethnic Norwegians as their spouses.

As only 12 years earlier, in 1990, there had been only 84 Norwegian men married to women from the Soviet Union – they were ranked 29 among women with foreign background married to Norwegian men – a completely new pattern of ‘nuptial migration’ between Russia and Norway seems to have developed in recent years. The same study shows, for instance, that in the case of marriage involving Polish women and Norwegian men, there has been a less dynamic development – although there were almost twice as many marriages between Norwegian men and Polish women in 2002 compared with 1990 (1483 and 749), Polish women married to Norwegian men ranked 8 among all foreign brides, both in 1990 and in 2002. Table 21 shows developments in this field in recent years.
Table 21. Norwegian men marrying women from Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign bride: total</th>
<th>Brides from Russia</th>
<th>Russian brides – rank</th>
<th>Russian brides’ share of all marriages to non-Norwegian women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,698</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,809</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In recent years, Russian brides have become increasingly visible in the Norwegian ‘nuptial landscape’ – in 1992 they were ranked 12 among the women with foreign background marrying Norwegian men; in 1996 they advanced to the 7 place and in 1999 and 2000 they topped the list, only to be demoted to the second place by Thai women in 2001 (Lie 2004: 64). In 2001 there were 403 women with Russian background who married in Norway – 89% married an ethnic Norwegian and only 20 of them (a mere 5%) married a man with Russian background (Lie 2004: 71).

Thus we see that the ‘nuptial strategy’ has been used by Russian woman as a most attractive migratory and survival strategy for those wanting to settle permanently in Norway. Also the composition of the community of married Russians in Norway shows a strong gender element in this strategy: as of 1 January 2002, 1,902 of 2,278 married persons with Russian background living in Norway were women. 79% of all Russian married women and 13% of all Russian married men were married to ethnic Norwegians. Russians married to Norwegians formed a substantial part of the Russian community that was in the process of establishing itself by January 2002, as these 1,550 Russian women and men married to ethnic Norwegians comprised almost 1/3 of the whole community of 4,442 persons of Russian background registered as the first-generation migrants.


During the first years of the Russian transition, Russian citizens were no longer seen as the victims of an oppressive political regime, and most of their applications for asylum were flatly rejected by the Western authorities. Some did, however, keep trying to use this strategy to get to the West, especially after the worsening of the situation in the southern part of the Russian Federation after the outbreak of the first and then second Chechen war. The policy of turning a blind eye to the abuses of the Russian authorities in Chechnya backfired on the West – by the late 1990s, the West found it had to deal with a growing inflow of asylum-seekers from Russia, and many countries finally had to admit that these applicants had a real need for protec-
tion against the abuses committed against them by various actors in their native Chechnya.

Table 22. Number of asylum-seekers from Russia in main European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiving country</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2,820</td>
<td>4,110</td>
<td>4,275</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>2,079</td>
<td>2,755</td>
<td>4,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>3,594</td>
<td>2,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>1,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>2,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,833</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,441</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,285</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,865</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Norway has been no exception in that respect. It is a country with a long tradition of extending protection to the victims of political persecution in its direct neighbourhood, including Russia. For two of the most prominent political refugees of the Soviet era – Leo Trotsky and then Alexander Solzhenitsyn – Norway was the first country to offer them some security against politically motivated persecution after they were allowed to leave the USSR. Although neither of them decided to remain in Norway, a special pattern had been established. Norway, especially given its self-chosen role as global peacemaker, could not afford to ignore the issue of the new victims of persecution in Russia.

According to official Norwegian data, the number of asylum-seekers from Russia grew from 32 in 1992 to 1,718 in 2002 and 1,923 in 2003. In the whole period between 1991 and 2003 there were registered more than 4,500 applications for asylum in Norway by citizens of Russia. Approximately one-third of these were filed by women. Most of them, especially after 1999, were somehow linked to the deteriorating situation in the Caucasus.

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Also in relative terms, asylum-seekers from Russia have become an important issue. While in 1998 they comprised only 1.5% of all asylum-seekers in Norway, in 2001 they represented almost 9% of the total. Their share continued to increase – almost 10% in 2002, and over 12% in 2003.

It also seems that seeking protection in Norway has become more successful. In 2000, 93% of all asylum applications were rejected, with only 7% of all asylum-seekers from Russia granted either asylum or protection on humanitarian grounds. In 2001, however, one-fourth of asylum-seekers from Russia were granted protection in Norway (4% received asylum and 21% protection on humanitarian grounds).

In 2002 the situation changed with the introduction of the Dublin Agreement on asylum-seekers. In 2002, 36% of all asylum-seekers from Russia (read: Chechnya) were sent back to other European countries in accordance with the Dublin rules. Also in 2002, 16% of all asylum-seekers from Russia were granted protection in Norway (5% political asylum, 11% on humanitarian grounds). In 5% of the cases, the application for asylum was withdrawn, while in 43% of all cases the application was rejected by the Norwegian authorities. The situation changed only slightly in 2003. All in all, 1,653 decisions on asylum were made by the Norwegian authorities in that year. The result: 8% of all applicants were granted asylum; 35% were granted the right to stay in Norway on humanitarian grounds; 20% were sent back to other European countries that were to treat their cases in accordance with the new Dublin rules. About one-third – 34% – were rejected and 3% withdrawn by applicants themselves. These figures indicate that in 43% of all cases dealt with by the Norwegian migration authorities, good enough reasons were found for considering Russian citizens the victims of politically motivated persecution, and for providing them with protection according to internationally accepted rules of conduct.

These high figures bear witness to the dramatic situation in Russia, but they also indicate that the Norwegian authorities have begun adopting a more nuanced approach. As the head of the Norwegian Directorate of Immig-
The high share of positive decisions was also closely linked with the fact that the share of ethnic Chechens among asylum-seekers from Russia had risen to almost 90% by 2003. With no end to the bloody conflict in Chechnya in sight, we can expect the success of this survival strategy may encourage other members of this vulnerable community to follow in their footsteps.

For many migrants, the choice of migration as the way of solving their welfare dilemma is a dramatic but often rational choice based on careful consideration of the pros and cons involved. For one group of migrants, however, migration may be the only available survival strategy. If we take a look at the history of forced migration in Europe over the past ten years – and forced migration has been an important practical issue all Western European governments have had to deal with in the wake of the bloody conflicts in the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–95, Kosovo in 1998/99), and quite recently in the Caucasus – we can see how migration may appear as the only option to those who may feel their very existence as individuals or a group threatened by the policy choices of those who wield power.

The Chechens seem to have realised that the conflict in their native country is going to drag on due to the lack of the political pressure on Russia to find a real political solution to this tragic conflict. They decided to emigrate to the West because their situation in Russia has worsened due to Moscow’s policy of ‘demonisation’ of this whole ethnic group, making it responsible for the latest wave of terrorist attacks on Russian military and civilian targets. The situation of the Chechen community in Russia has become unbearable – they are persecuted because they belong to a specific ethnic group and may believe that they are about to face pogroms similar to those which forced Jews to leave Imperial Russia in 19th and 20th centuries.

The Chechen community – perhaps not without reason, in view of the casualties caused by the two Chechen wars – is prone to interpret Moscow’s policy towards them as one of genocide. From the Chechen perspective, the whole conflict is about the survival of Chechens as a separate ethnic group and community. While the first Chechen war was a war of independence, the second Chechen war has turned, in the opinion of many Chechens and independent observers, into a war of survival and attrition. At stake is no longer the survival of Chechnya as a political community, but the survival of Chechens as an ethnic entity. In this situation, migration to the West is perhaps the most reasonable option available.

Due to the decisions taken by the Norwegian authorities, 1,129 Russian asylum-seekers, the majority of them ethnic Chechens, were granted the right to stay in Norway between early 2000 and late 2003. Formally, as the Norwegian authorities treat them as ‘migrants with Russian background’, they form a large part – 13% (1,129 of 8,868) – of the broadly defined ‘Russian community’ living in Norway as of 1 January 2004. In reality, however, they form a distinct community that has very little to do with, or in common, with others formally defined as persons with Russian background.

These two communities – both defined from the purely practical and statistical point of view as ‘Russian’ – live more side by side than together. We

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158 On 27 May 2004 at NUPI’s conference on migration from Russia.
can also expect their integration into Norwegian society to follow different paths. The existence of two separate Russian communities in Norway may also pose serious conceptual challenges to Norwegian policy makers, not least when they have to make practical decisions on opening the other migratory gate to migration from Russia: *family reunification*.

**Family reunification as a two-stage strategy – Russians in Norway**

Due to the emergence in the 1990s of a new pattern of migration from Russia to Norway and the growing number of Russian citizens settling permanently in Norway, family reunification has began to play a major part in the rather one-sided migratory exchange between the two countries.

The use of this migratory gate is a two-stage strategy – first, a ‘family link’ has to be established between home country and the target country and a ‘family bridgehead’ has to be set up abroad. Since there has been a quick and steady growth of the Russian community in Norway, and also the nuptial strategy can involve family reunification, it should be not surprising that Russians are well represented among those entering Norway through this migratory gate. Data on Russian entries to Norway through the family reunification gate are shown in Table 23.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Russians’ share in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12,142</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14,607</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10,469</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>7.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is also a very special case in the migratory exchange between Russia and Norway over the past ten years, a case that comes under two headings – ‘family reunification’ and ‘playing of the ethnic card’. This is the case of more than 200 ‘Kola-Norwegians’ – persons with Norwegian ethnic background, generally living in the Far North, who were allowed to return to Norway only after the fall of the Soviet Union – and the introduction in 1995 of a special Norwegian regulation on the return of ethnic Norwegians and their descendents from Russia. The history of this small and special Norwegian community has been described in detail by Norwegian journalist Morten Jentoft (2001) and their fate after returning to Norway is sometimes cited as an example of the lack of coherence in Norwegian migration policy. On the one hand, more of 200 of them, with their families, were allowed to return to Norway, which was a positive move on the part of the Norwegian authorities; on the other hand, however, the Norwegian authorities provided scant practical and economic assistance to those who decided to return.159

Many have to go through what they – and their supporters – describe as hu-

159 For more details on this see a circular issued by UDI in which practical information is given on how to treat these returnees. The text can be found on:
http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/norsk/dep/nedlagt/kad/1997/publ/036005-994007/dok
mn.html#Informasjon.
mitigating procedures in the Norwegian social welfare and assistance bureaucracy.160

The strategy adopted by this relatively small group is a good illustration of the interplay between micro- and macro-structures. Had it not been for the fall of the Soviet Union and the Norwegian decision to open for return of this group, these potential migrants would have either to adopt another migration strategy or decide to stay where they were, no matter whether they liked it or not. It was only when the outside world changed that they have the option – to migrate or not to migrate – and could contemplate whether they were interested in establishing themselves in Norway or not. The strategy they adopted was a combined strategy of playing the ethnic card and family reunification. They could employ this strategy only when the Norwegian authorities decided that the ethnic game could be played at all in relations between Russia and Norway; only when this decision on the higher level had been made was it possible for them to employ the dual strategies of playing the ethnic card and reunification with an often nebulous ‘Norwegian family’.

The Kola-Norwegians case shows how high politics makes it possible for various groups to devise new social practices and how these new social practices contribute to changing the pattern of migration in Europe. Figure 22 sums up the finding of this case study and clearly shows the complexity of issues involved and the multi-faceted pattern of Russian migration to Norway.

Figure 22. New pattern of migration between Russia and Norway

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160 For a good description of the situation of this special group of migrants see for instance: http://www.klassekampen.no/Arkivsamling/Arkiv/2003/April/15/176697
Conclusions

This study has focused on how recent political, economic and social developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have contributed to changing the pattern of migratory exchange between the region and Norway. Migration has been treated here as one of the survival and adaptation strategies available to individuals and groups seeking to cope with new challenges.

The study has focused on migratory exchange between two CEE countries – Poland and Russia – and Norway. Poland was chosen because it was about to become a fully-fledged member of the EU, and this membership would change the legal framework for migratory exchanges between Poland and Norway. Since Poles have been active on both the regular and irregular Norwegian labour markets for many years, they could be expected to become even more visible with EU enlargement, especially after the introduction of a new legal framework for migration of foreign specialists to Norway in January 2002. Russia was chosen because Russian citizens in recent years have become the most numerous group of new migrants to Norway, and because this specific group has embarked on a more varied set of strategies in order to establish a migratory link to Norway.

If we treat migration as a survival and adaptation strategy we can gauge its success by examining the extent to which implementation of the strategy – migration – has solved the dilemma that prompted people to leave their country of origin. The general goal of applying a migratory strategy is to improve one’s personal situation. To measure whether migration has served to improve the situation, we need to understand the main original goal of the strategy and then compare the situation of the migrant before and after the migratory move.

In the case of **forced migrants** who flee their homeland to avoid persecution or even loss of life, the absence of persecution and threat to their lives can already be deemed a positive result of migration, a pure gain from migration; everything else, like relative improvement in personal economy, shelter, access to education etc. comes as an additional gain from migration. Even if such a migrant does not manage to get integrated in the society of the target country and feel excluded, this social exclusion is not an existential threat to life. In many cases this may mean trading one form of exclusion for another one, but the individual survives and can experience a dramatic improvement in quality of life, in well-being, in welfare.

In the case of **economic migrants**, we would need to compare their economic status before migration and afterwards. In most cases, an important precondition of economic success is integration into the society of the target country and full participation in labour market, or at least filling a specific economic niche in order to secure economic advantages.

There are many obstacles a migrant has to overcome on his way towards a ‘strategic success’. If we look at the situation of the two relatively numer-
ous Central and East European communities that are growing in Norway – Poles and Russians – we can conclude that these obstacles vary in nature. From the purely legal view, EU enlargement changed the situation of Poles in a dramatic way, without influencing the situation of Russians. After EU enlargement, Russians face more legal obstacles than Poles, who are given de facto free access to the Norwegian labour market, provided they can find a job. Both Poles and Russians may, however, face other obstacles that may prove more difficult. For instance, the way these two groups are viewed in Norway may have a negative impact on their chances of being treated on a par not only with Norwegians, but also with Nordic and other Western job-seekers with whom they have to compete for jobs.

There is no place here to present an in-depth analysis of how these two groups are viewed and represented in the Norwegian popular discourse, or to assess how such perceptions may influence their chances of establishing themselves on the Norwegian labour market, and thus realising the economic and social goals of their migratory survival strategy. The predominant popular discourses on these two groups differ, but their possible and mostly negative impact on overall perceptions of those two groups in Norway should not be underestimated.

As far as Poles are concerned, we can find many representations that appeared in the Norwegian popular and, to a certain degree, official discourse in recent years. Poles have often been represented as:

- strawberry pickers: nice people with basic skills, a little backward, reliable and hard-working, but perhaps not good candidates for more complicated tasks and jobs.
- underpaid house painters and labourers operating mostly in the shadow economy: the job they do is as good as that done by overpaid Norwegian craftsmen, but it is not safe to hire them for two reasons – you may be caught by Norwegian authorities and fined for employing irregulars; and there is the insecurity of not having any possibility to complain if the job they do is not good enough.
- overeducated Polish female house cleaners who work in Norway in order to improve their economic situation – they give us chance to have our own private variant of development assistance, to clean not only our houses but also to salve our conscience and feel better by hiring them.
- nature polluters: they come to Norway, live in their cars at Bogstad camping grounds, pollute the countryside, and have to be chased away by police who every year have to restore social and natural order in the areas of ‘Polish occupation’.

Also other representations can be traced in the Norwegian discourse on Poles, especially in the period with more open borders and more social interaction between the two groups. In 1990s Poles became associated with illegal or even criminal strategies: the archetypical Pole was thus a petty criminal or a drug, vodka or cigarette smuggler.
On the eve of EU enlargement new elements in the Norwegian discourse on Poles emerged – images of Poles as welfare shoppers, as the potential victim of social dumping in Norway and as an underpaid threat to the Norwegian economy and welfare.

Generally speaking, Poles are viewed either as being below par, nice but not as good as ‘we’ are, or, when the consequences of the opening of the labour market are discussed, as a threat to the Norwegian welfare system and way of life. Poles are simply different from us Norwegians, and this difference, this otherness, is a source of concern, especially in a situation where we feel that we are losing control over developments, with external forces – the EU – obliging us to open our doors and even transfer money to our new, still rather unknown, second-rank European fellows.

Russians are even in a worse situation then Poles as far as popular images and representations are concerned. Especially the situation of Russian women who want to integrate into Norwegian society – and they form the majority of Russians living in Norway – may be difficult, due to a special set of prejudices and mostly negative representations traceable in the Norwegian general discourse on Russia and Russians.

In a historical perspective, Russia has always been seen not only as a great neighbour, but also, and especially during the Soviet time, as a source of existential threat to Norway (the mighty Russian Bear). Now Russia is no longer seen as an immediate military threat – but it is the source of many risks and various social and environmental threats. Images of the polluted city of Nikel on the Kola Peninsula, of the nuclear waste in Russian military bases located close to Norwegian borders, of starving Russian children in Murmansk and Russian women, ‘proud daughters of Russia’, forced to sell their bodies abroad in order to survive – these were to become the dominant elements in the Norwegian discourse on Russia in the 1990s. To many Norwegians, Russia has become not only an example of a failed state, but the failed state, the failed neighbouring state with a huge destructive potential and a population driven to despair.

It was not by chance that the fear of mass migration triggered by an ecological catastrophe was a dominant element of the Norwegian discourse on Russia in the early 1990s. Russia was seen as the heir to the Soviet Union, and thus still posed a threat to Norway. The Soviet Union and Russia have been depicted as the Norwegian ‘Others’ – threatening Others, with a massive destructive potential … and they are located in the Norwegian neighbourhood. This geographical proximity combined with the feeling of cultural and mental otherness and perceptions of the Soviet Union/Russia as a source of challenge and even threat to Norway – all have coloured the perception of Russians in Norway. While Poles may be seen as a sort of second-rank Europeans, Russians are still mostly viewed as completely ‘other’, as those with whom Norwegians have little in common. The ‘Russian system’ and the ‘Norwegian system’ are viewed as two opposite poles of social and political organisation, and are therefore incompatible. This image of other-

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161 For more on Norwegian perceptions of Russia see Hønneland and Jørgensen 2002. Also Hønneland’s presentation on the topic at NUPI/UDI seminar on Russian migration to Norway held in Oslo gives a good insight in this discussion and shows how these representations have relatively little to do with reality.
ness and incompatibility may become a main obstacle to the integration of Russians in Norway, making it more difficult for them to achieve the goals of their adaptation strategy.

These same integration challenges may confront the Chechen community in Norway. Formally and mentally they are seen as ‘Russians’ – so they face similar challenges as Russians themselves. However, Norwegian perceptions of Chechens may be coloured not only by their ‘Russianness’, but also by the images of Chechens as Islamic terrorists and members of the international terrorist network – views conveyed by the media in recent times. This will make them even more ‘other’ than Russians, and in the longer run may pose serious challenge to their integration into Norwegian society. On the other hand, the Chechens’ survival strategy was in many cases one of a sheer survival – so perhaps they may feel that they have achieved their ‘strategic goals’ by simply escaping the Russian onslaught and finding a safe haven in Norway.

Importantly, the emergence of these new patterns of migration linked to the transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the choices of survival and adaptation strategies by CCE citizens points up the need for serious debate on the future of Norwegian migration policy, and here Norway’s decision makers will have to give comprehensive and coherent answers. A central issue is the future development of the Norwegian labour market and the need for more – or less – labour migration, also from the region in focus in this study. Norway, like many other West European countries, will have to solve its demographic dilemma, and opening the Norwegian labour market to workers from Central and Eastern Europe could be one approach. However, the whole region is also undergoing deep demographic, social and economic changes, and will probably face similar – if not even worse – demographic problems as the rest of Europe. In order to adapt to this new situation of a decreasing labour force and increasing international competition for this ‘shrinking commodity’, Norway will have to adopt a more nuanced and long-term migration policy. Of course, such a policy should take into consideration Norwegian needs – but it is also important to learn more about the forces and attitudes that drive migration in Europe. Sending out signals that it is possible for people to realise the most important goals of survival and adaptation strategy in Norway could encourage more to follow in the footsteps of those who have already come. If the Norwegian authorities want to see more migrants coming to Norway, where they can help the country solve its future dilemmas, the authorities will need to make it easier for migrants to realise these adaptation strategies, as well as assisting those who have already come to adapt to the new situation. If, however, the opposite is the case, if the authorities should decide that there are other ways of solving these dilemmas, and that migration is not a part of the solution but rather a part of the problem, then official Norwegian policy should instead focus on discouraging potential migrants from coming to Norway.

This report has been a modest attempt to contribute to this debate by examining and analysing the linkage between the transitional survival and adaptation strategies and the emergence of new patterns of migration to Norway.
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