Keeping the Peace Together?
Joint Russian-Western Peace Operations
in the Commonwealth of Independent States

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Preface
The purpose of this report is to discuss the conditions for future multinational peace operations in the Commonwealth of Independent States, including both Russian and Western forces.

The aim and scope of this study are based on a positive attitude to challenges in general, in other words, a will to see opportunities and solutions instead of obstacles and insolvable problems. I would, however, like to emphasise that I see military co-operation between Russia and the West neither as an objective in itself, nor as necessary from a military point of view. On the other hand I am convinced that combined peace operations (CPOs) have a potential for building confidence and mutual understanding, and create conditions for better relations between Russia and the West. Apart from these idealistic goals it is obvious that a combined peacekeeping force could be seen as a more reliable one by all the belligerent parties in the actual conflict. It also could give the West an opportunity to influence the development of democracy, human rights and other vital values in the CIS area. Last but not least, some Western nations also could be willing to use this instrument to protect the West’s economic (and other) interests in the region. It could be one of the reasons why Russia has been reluctant to accept Western forces on former Soviet Union territory.

It could be argued, as several experts have done, that it is impossible for Russia and the West to co-operate militarily in the CIS area. The report will indeed point to the many difficulties which may effectively hinder attempts at co-operation in that field. All the negative aspects, however, do not prevent combined peace operations from being at least a theoretical option. IFOR/SFOR and KFOR have shown that co-operation is possible if the will in Moscow and Washington (and Brussels) is present. In this report I will focus on the conditions necessary for this type of co-operation to become possible.

I would also like to emphasise that I do not see peace operations as an objective in itself, because, as Carl von Clausewitz stated, ‘military means are the tool when diplomacy and preventive measures fail’ and as such could be seen as a manifestation of the failure of diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict from going into the armed phase. On the other hand, there seems to be plenty of work for the armed forces in this millennium as well. When they are called upon, the ambition must be to deploy rapidly, to create conditions for the development of a civil society, and then withdraw.

During the work on this report I received valuable support from several people. I would especially like to thank Dr Lena Jonson from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Dr Pavel Baev from the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo and last but not least my colleagues Helge Blakkisrud and Dr Jakub Godzimirski at NUPI, Oslo. Valuable input has also been received from the former Norwegian Chief of Defence, General (R) Fredrik Bull Hansen, Editor of the Norwegian Military Journal, Major General (R) Gullow Gjeseth and Chief of the Norwegian Naval Staff, Commodore Jacob Borresen. I would like to thank you all for your constructive approach to the questions I have raised in discussions with you.

The first draft of the report was prepared in the beginning of January 2000, and the report reflects the state of affairs by the end of 1999.
**Introduction**

**Background**
During the Cold War traditional peacekeeping around the world happened without the participation of the United States of America or the Soviet Union. The UN action in Korea in June 1950 was a remarkable exception, authorised by the Security Council in the absence of the Soviet Union’s delegation. Experiences in the latest 10 years have shown, however, that the participation of the major powers is essential in post-Cold War peace operations.

There have been almost twice as many United Nations peacekeeping missions in the period after 1988 as in the previous 40 years. The most important catalyst leading to this dramatic increase was the end of the Cold War and a newly found resolve in the Security Council to play a more positive, proactive role in resolving international disputes.

The Gulf War was also an important event in the development of peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War. This UN-authorised action to force Iraq out of Kuwait after its invasion of that country, increased expectations, principally among Western powers, about the role the Security Council could play in international security. These factors led the Security Council to embark on more ambitious operations, sometimes even in conflict areas where peace had not yet been reached and the consent of the parties to the UN presence was tenuous. In situations where there was a lack of consent, greater force was authorised to accomplish mission goals. The operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia are examples of two ambitious operations undertaken by the UN during that period.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union there have been a number of regional conflicts internally in Russia and within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The world community and Russia have so far handled the domestic Russian conflicts as internal Russian matters. The CIS conflicts have been handled mainly by Russia and according to what has been defined as Russian national interests, but the solution of conflicts has also involved the CIS, the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The overall impression is, however, that the Russian policy so far has been that Russia should be an exclusive leading peacekeeper on former Soviet Union territory, and that no foreign troops from outside the CIS should be allowed. On the other hand, the Russians have stated that organisations like the UN and the OSCE have an important role in conflict prevention and solution, also in the CIS area. There is therefore both a potential for international peace operations to solve conflicts in this part of the world as well, and an obvious need for creating better political conditions for co-operation. The Balkan experience of keeping the peace together is perhaps one of the best possible cornerstones of future co-operation in the field of peacekeeping, also on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The Dayton agreement, the deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) to Bosnia and the ongoing operation of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) represented a new and enticing concept. The operation in Bosnia, based on a UN Security Council resolution, was lead by NATO. In addition
to the alliance, IFOR/SFOR includes several partner states, among them Russia.

The deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is also based on a Security Council resolution, even though the NATO air campaign that created the conditions for the force to be deployed was not. The unauthorised NATO operation in Kosovo resulted in grave tensions between Russia and the West. Russia recalled its military representatives from NATO and shut down the NATO liaison office in Moscow during the air campaign. These discrepancies were an obstacle to the establishment of KFOR after the agreement between NATO, Russia and Slobodan Milosevic was signed after an 77 days air campaign. The peak of tension was reached when a small Russian unit of paratroopers from SFOR in Bosnia captured the airport in Pristina. KFOR was, however, established and Russians are today an integrated part, although they have their own command and control arrangements. The overall experiences after nearly four years of co-operation in peace operations between Russia and NATO in the Balkans could be a platform for future co-operation and improved relationship in peace operations including Russia and Western countries. This report will seek to discuss conditions needed for this extended co-operation to happen.

Analysis

Problem
What are the possible options for multinational peace operations including Russian and Western forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States? I will focus on investigating possibilities for CPOs in the CIS area.

Content
The report will consist of an initial discussion focusing on various Russian approaches that influence thinking on combined peace operations. The focus on Russia is an inevitable consequence of my West/NATO origin, but in order to give a more balanced view of the problem it will also be necessary to look at some other factors influencing this potential co-operation. Further, I will discuss three generic options for combined peace operations in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Central topics
The report will discuss the potential differences between Russian and Western terminology concerning peace operations as well as legal foundations and international umbrella organisations for peace operations and the most relevant types of combined peace operations.

Next, I will consider whether there is a gap between Russian terminology and doctrines on the one hand, and what the Russians are actually doing in the field on the other. It is necessary to take into account the role of internal Russian operations when evaluating Russia’s credibility as a participant in peace operations. The next step is to investigate whether certain areas are out of bounds for Western forces from a Russian point of view and vice versa.
The next step will be to outline how the overall military and political relations between Russia and the West may influence conditions for co-operation in peace operations.

From a military point of view it is important to evaluate the capabilities and capacity of the Russian forces to conduct peace operations, focusing on Russian interoperability with potential Western counterparts.

The report will also contain a brief description of possible scenarios and geographical areas for multinational peace operations involving Russian and Western forces, including potential force compositions and command and control arrangements for such operations.

**Terminology and definitions**

The term ‘peace operation’ is used deliberately in the introduction as a general term. This is due to the fact that the term ‘peacekeeping’ is unfortunately often misused or misinterpreted. Any discussion of peace operations has to be based on a very clear definition of the terms used in the analysis and this is one of the main reasons why these terms are going to be thoroughly presented in chapter two.

When I speak about the ‘the West’ in this report I generally mean the NATO and EU member states. If other states, such as countries applying for NATO and/or EU membership are relevant, they will be mentioned explicitly. The military term ‘combined operations’ means operations conducted by a force consisting of more than one nation. This report has taken the liberty of extending the term to ‘combined peace operations’ (abbreviated CPOs), meaning a force consisting of at least one Western state in addition to Russia (and possibly one or more CIS countries). A full list of abbreviations can be found in the appendix.

**Assumptions**

It is presumed that the overall political relations between Russia and the West will stay at a level that makes mutual participation in some kind of peace operation somewhere in the world possible.

Based on the experiences from SFOR and KFOR it is useful to underline that combined Western-Russian peace operations are seldom necessary from a military operational point of view. The overall rationale for this is political – for instance as an incitement to improve conditions for overall co-operation, conflict solutions and prevention, as well as to improve the Russian-Western relationship in general.

**Limitations**

My engagement at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, during which I have written this report, has been limited to six months. Such a short assignment has inevitably forced me to reduce the span of the study and to treat some topics and sources only superficially. The new war in Chechnya has also taken away some of my attention from multinational peacekeeping, but on the other hand it helped me to focus on the complex challenge of bringing stability to the whole Caucasus region.
This report will only discuss peace operations with the participation of purely military formations. It will not cover national or multinational operations with the use of police forces or various sorts of observers or advisers. The main focus will be on conflict areas in the former Soviet Union. The West and Russia are co-operating in CPOs in Bosnia and Kosovo, but Russia and the CIS countries have so far operated alone in the CIS area. The time frame is limited to one to three years ahead, but I hope that this report could be seen as an important contribution to a more general debate on peacekeeping co-operation between the West and Russia.

**Working method**

The report is based on open, available official documents, news reports and comments, articles, studies and papers from the Internet, magazines, newspapers, radio/TV and available literature. I have also participated in discussions and seminars related to the subject, and when possible discussed it with relevant people. The information used is derived mainly from secondary sources published originally in English, although many of the texts used are reliable English translations of original Russian documents. The extensive use of news clippings has hopefully ensured that the report is relatively updated (as of January 2000) with respect to the developments in recent years which could have had a direct impact on the conditions for combined peace operations.

The report seeks to present the most relevant terms and definitions related to peace operations, and to clarify whether there is a conceptual gap between Russia and the West when it comes to terminology related to peacekeeping operations. It also looks at the international legal basis and principles for such operations, and analyses possible umbrella organisations. Thereafter, it presents various Russian doctrines and concepts related to peace operations. The next step is a presentation of a short historical review over Russian involvement in peace operations and their evaluation with respect to their compatibility with Russian national doctrines and concepts, and internationally accepted rules and principles. I also found it important to analyse the actual Russian military capacity and capability to conduct peace operations as well as the general framework of political/military relations between Russia and the West. It is also of crucial importance to assess the will and the intentions of Russia and the West with regard to combined peace operations, especially in the CIS area, where no actual co-operation has taken place so far.

The report will also sketch possible geographical areas and scenarios for CPOs, and then suggest umbrella organisations, command and control arrangements and force composition. Finally the report will outline the future prospects for CPOs in the CIS. Positive as well as negative conditions will be highlighted, and in the last part I will take the liberty of presenting some recommendations for the way ahead from a Western perspective.
Terminology

The use of standardised terminology helps define and delineate the nature, goal and scope of peace operations. Launching a CPO would inevitably make it necessary to cope with inherent cultural, political and linguistic differences. If multinational operations in general are to achieve maximum effectiveness with minimum risk, all participating states, forces and personnel must uniformly understand the relevant terminology.

The concepts behind the terminology must also be commonly recognised, particularly when working across several languages. If, for example, a French peacekeeper speaks of ‘rules of engagement’, his Russian, British and Norwegian counterparts should all understand the term in the same way. The challenge seems to be, nevertheless, that the terminology to describe multinational operations has become confused and blunt, largely because an increased number of operations with diverging mandates and objectives have been conducted since the end of the Cold War under the much too general term of ‘peacekeeping’.

The terminological confusion reflects the fact that new methods of resolving conflicts are still being developed and lessons are still being learned. While there is a more or less accepted understanding of the concepts involved in traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, there is little consensus on the meaning and variety of missions that fall between them.

It is important to stress that in evaluations and discussions related to former and ongoing peace operations, issues of terminology are theoretical. The way the operation is conducted at all levels, from the strategic political level through commanders at all levels down to the individual soldier, shows the true face of intentions, capability, impartiality, morale, and code of conduct of the parties involved. The perception of the operation is also to a certain extent influenced by its presentation in national and international media (the so-called ‘CNN effect’) and often decides whether it is evaluated as success or failure. This report will therefore at a later stage discuss experiences from former and ongoing peace operations and to some extent other operations. Whether such experiences are judged positively or negatively in respectively Moscow and the Western capitals, is of course vital for decision-making related to CPOs.

Presentation and comparison of terminology

Since the UN is a global organisation and all states mentioned in this report are members, it is natural to adopt the UN Glossary. I will, however, look also at other terms relevant for the debate, for example on a Canadian re-definition of terms in the wake of the country’s quite negative experiences from the UN-authorised operation in Somalia in 1992. The understanding of the mandate during this operation changed from a traditional peacekeeping operation to a peace enforcement operation. The Canadian work is relevant as an exemplification of the necessity of a common and unambiguous terminology in peace operations. In addition NATO’s definitions from NATO Logistic Handbook are presented where applicable. The NATO term ‘peace support operations’ (PSOs) is a NATO general term for everything apart from traditional NATO Article 5 operations in defence of NATO territory.
Next I will outline the differences between Western and Russian terminology concerning peace operations (based mainly on Demurenko & Nikitin 1997). Russia does not yet have an officially approved peacekeeping terminology, and this causes certain problems in preparing for and implementing such operations inside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and makes the application of internationally accepted standards difficult. Some difficulties also arise because nearly all of the terminology and concepts used in connection with peace operations were developed and formulated in English. Hence, it is not always possible to translate them into Russian literally and yet preserve all the unique features of the English ‘original’.

**Peace operations**

**UN definition**
Peace support operations include preventive deployment, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, diplomatic activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building, as well as humanitarian assistance, good offices, fact-finding, and electoral assistance.

**NATO definition**
Traditional peacekeeping missions:
- Observation
- Interposition forces
- Transition assistance. This type of operation is initiated to support the transition of a country to peaceful conditions and an acceptable political structure after a civil war or struggle for independence or autonomy.

Conflict prevention missions:
- Conflict prevention can never be guaranteed, but there are several means that may have a positive influence on the situation. One means is preventive deployment, which may be attempted by the deployment of multinational forces to areas of potential crises.

Humanitarian missions:
- Disaster relief
- Refugee/displaced person assistance
- Humanitarian aid.

Indirect NATO involvement in PSOs:
In addition to direct involvement in PSOs, NATO can make important contributions to such missions through the less direct involvement of its assets:
- Co-ordination of support
- Employment of selected alliance resources
- Monitoring of sanctions

**Russian definition**
Peace operations:
At present, no single, strictly verified, co-ordinated Russian terminology exists that describes peacekeeping operations. It is interesting to see that the Russian proposal seems not to discriminate thoroughly between peace operations and peacekeeping. However, despite definite differences and ambiguities, the definitions in use to today have much in common and reflect the specifics of various types of peacekeeping operations. Virtually every well-known classification divides these operations into three groups:

- Those which employ primarily non-force methods of armed forces actions (such as observing and various forms of monitoring) in order to strengthen and support political and diplomatic efforts to halt and settle a conflict
- Those which combine political methods with active operations by armed peacekeeping forces that do not, however, conduct any combat operations
- Those which involve the use of force, including combat actions, to compel peace, in concert with political efforts, or even without them.

Canadian definition

The term ‘peace support operations’ covers a broad range of mechanisms for conflict resolution and management, from dialogue, i.e. preventive diplomacy, to intervention, i.e. peace enforcement. Preventive diplomacy involves the peaceful resolution of disputes before they develop into armed conflict. Peacemaking involves the peaceful resolution of disputes persisting after armed conflict stops. For example, the deployment of forces in Macedonia along the Macedonian-Serbian border in an effort to contain the Balkan conflict was a form of preventive deployment.

Peacekeeping

UN definition

According to this definition, ‘peacekeeping’ is a hybrid politico-military activity aimed at conflict control, involving a United Nations presence in the field (usually both military and civilian personnel). The goal of this activity is to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces etc.), and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid. An important reservation is that it should be done with the consent of the parties involved in the conflict.

Russian definition

Peacekeeping is a common term for various types of activities carried out in order to:
- Resolve conflicts
- Prevent conflict escalation
- Halt or prevent military actions
• Uphold law and order in conflict zones
• Conduct humanitarian operations
• Restore social and political institutions which have been disrupted by the conflict
• Restore basic conditions for daily life.

The distinctive feature of peacekeeping operations is that they are conducted under a mandate from the UN or regional organisations whose functions include peace support and international security. English-language sources call these operations ‘peace operations’ (USA) or ‘peace support operations’ (NATO). Peace operations are subdivided into the following types:

• Operations (or actions) to preserve peace. English-language sources refer to such operations as ‘military support of diplomacy’ (US Armed Forces), or ‘conflict-prevention missions’ (NATO). The objectives of operations to preserve peace include:
  • Preventing the deterioration of a situation in an internal or international conflict zone, and preventing armed actions
  • Resolving and regulating conflicts.

In conducting such operations, the role of peacekeeping forces consists of:

• Establishing and maintaining contacts between the opposing armed parties in order to establish and build trust
• Providing for the security of political structures that perform peacekeeping functions
• Preventing and halting incidents that could draw in the armed groups of the opposing sides and thus disrupt the process of peaceful settlement
• Acting as the guarantor of cease-fire agreements and treaties.

Canadian definition

The term ‘peacekeeping’ has been used to describe all types of peace operations. When used in this generalised fashion, the term ‘refers to any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes’. The UN continues to use the term ‘peacekeeping’ to refer generally to such international efforts.

Peacekeeping operations

UN definition

Non-combat military operations undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties. Designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement, PKOs cover: peacekeeping forces, observer missions and mixed operations.
Terminology

Russian definition

Peacekeeping operations are also conducted with the consent of one or all sides of the conflict and fall into one of the two categories. The first includes operations that are a sort of logical or practical continuation of peacemaking operations. After an armistice has been signed, negotiations begin in order to bring about the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The second category includes operations conducted in order to implement a previously signed accord. One such example would be the NATO operation in Bosnia after the signing of the Dayton agreement. In this case, the goal of the operation, including its military aspect, is to assure implementation of the terms of the agreement by all parties involved in the conflict.

In addition to other peacekeeping tasks, peacekeeping forces perform the following missions:

- They provide the military means to secure the realisation of cease-fire agreements, armistices or other peaceful conflict resolution methods, including a system of cease-fire lines, demilitarised and buffer zones, reduced-arms zones and various types of special-status regions
- They assist in the exchange of territories, if this is called for by peace treaty
- They help set up refugee camps and assembly points for dislocated persons
- They maintain law and order and help organise the activities of civilian authorities within their zones of responsibility
- They investigate complaints and pretensions with regard to armistice violations or violations of conflict settlement agreements
- They organise, if called for by the appropriate treaties, the collection and monitoring of certain categories of weapons, primarily heavy weapons.

As a rule, peacekeeping operations last as long as the possibility of resumption of fighting or other hostilities exists.

Canadian definitions

Traditional peacekeeping:

Because it is necessary to distinguish between the different types of operations, I use the term ‘traditional peacekeeping’ to describe only those operations which are based on the consent of all involved parties, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defence. The term ‘traditional peacekeeping’ refers, therefore, to UN operations under the command and control of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, conducted by military troops provided by member states on a voluntary basis, with the costs met collectively by member states. Because such missions are authorised and carried out by the UN, the troops appear impartial, something that is a prerequisite for this type of operation.

Second generation peacekeeping:

Between ‘traditional peacekeeping’ and enforcement actions, the military is likely to be involved in second generation tasks such as supervising cease-
fires between irregular forces, assisting in the maintenance of law and order, protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and guaranteeing rights of passage.

In all these cases of second generation peacekeeping, the consent of the parties is likely to be elusive and dynamic. Consequently, these missions require a ‘humane, but more proactive, concept of operations’, and forces must be able to choose from a range of military responses as tensions escalate and de-escalate. In other words, they must be ready to respond with the force necessary to control the situation.

Others use the term ‘second-generation peacekeeping’ to describe missions based on the same fundamental principles as traditional peacekeeping, but with greatly expanded tasks. Typically, these operations are multifunctional missions designed to implement comprehensive peace agreements addressing the roots of a conflict. Second generation peacekeeping is sometimes referred to as ‘wider peacekeeping’ as it involves tasks beyond those associated with traditional peacekeeping, but is still based on the consent of the parties. The functions of peacekeepers in these operations may include:

- Monitoring cease-fires
- Cantonment and demobilisation of troops
- Destruction of weapons
- Forming and training new armed forces
- Monitoring existing police forces and forming new ones
- Supervising or even controlling existing administrations
- Verifying respect for human rights
- Observing, supervising, or even conducting elections
- Repatriating refugees
- Undertaking information campaigns to explain the peace settlement.

**Peacemaking**

**UN definition**

The UN defines ‘peacemaking’ as the diplomatic process of brokering an end to a conflict, principally through mediation and negotiation, as foreseen under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Military activities contributing to peacemaking include military-to-military contacts, security assistance, and shows of force and preventive deployments.

**Russian definition**

Peacemaking operations are conducted with the mutual consent of the combating sides, or possibly at their request. For example, the parties may decide, independently or under pressure from international organisations or individual states, to cease military actions, but they are unable to do so without help from the world community and international peacekeeping forces.

Among the goals of such operations are helping stop military actions and organising the negotiation process.

The political aspect of these operations consists of arranging contacts, either direct or through intermediaries, for purposes of fire-extinguishing, or for a first-time separation of the combating sides, as well as to prepare and
initiate negotiations to bring the conflict under control. In this process, the armed peace force performs several basic military missions. Peacemaking operations are generally initiated when the combatants agree to halt their fire, and they usually conclude when an armistice is signed.

Canadian definition

Until recently, the term ‘peacemaking’ has referred to diplomatic activities to resolve outstanding issues such as demobilisation, disarmament, or reparations, once the parties to a conflict have agreed to stop fighting. However, the term is not mentioned in the UN Charter, nor is it exclusively the purview of the United Nations, though it is often said that peacemaking is provided for in the mechanisms included in Chapter VI on the ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’.

Because it is confusing to use the term ‘peacemaking’ to describe military operations that use force to bring about peace, this report instead uses the term ‘peace enforcement’.

Peace enforcement

UN definition

‘Peace enforcement’ is a new and tentative concept applying to the multidimensional operations which, while originally mandated under Chapter VI, are forced by realities in the field to turn into Chapter VII operations, as when humanitarian convoys need to be defended, or exclusion zones enforced by air strikes. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement should not be confused. UN peacekeeping has traditionally relied on the consent of opposing parties and involved the deployment of peacekeepers to implement an agreement approved by those parties.

In the case of enforcement action, the Security Council gives member states the authority to take all necessary measures to achieve a stated objective. Consent of the parties is not necessarily required. It has been used in very few cases including the Persian Gulf war, in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania. None of these enforcement operations was under direct UN control. Instead a single country or a group of countries directed them on behalf of the UN. A NATO-led multinational force succeeded the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The United Nations Charter provisions on the maintenance of international peace and security are the basis for both peacekeeping and enforcement action.

Russian definition

Peace enforcement operations involve the use of an armed force, or the threat of such use, in order to compel combatants to cease fighting and seek peace. Such operations might include combat actions taken by a peacekeeping force in order to separate and disarm the warring sides. These operations might be directed at all warring parties, or at a single party that refuses to submit to cease-fire demands.

At a practical level, peace enforcement actions include:
• Implementing international sanctions against the opposing sides, or against the side that represents the driving force in the armed conflict
• Isolating the conflict zones and preventing arms deliveries to the area, as well as preventing the penetration of the area by armed formations
• Delivering air or missile strikes against positions of the side that refuses to halt its combat actions
• The rapid deployment of peace forces to the combat zones in numbers sufficient to carry out the assigned missions, including localising the conflict and disarming or eradicating any armed formations that refuse to cease their warfare
• Upon the successful completion of these missions, i.e., after cessation of military activity, the peace force switches to actions that are typical of peacekeeping or peacemaking.

It must be noted that a number of peace enforcement operations conducted under a UN mandate have taken the form of ‘classic’ warfare. Such instances would include the UN operation in Korea during the 1950-53 war, and Operation Desert Storm, conducted against Iraq.

Canadian definition
Like ‘peacekeeping’, the term ‘peace enforcement’ has been used to describe a broad range of operations using force authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It has been applied to missions that impose economic sanctions or arms embargoes (in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia). The aims have varied, and have included, among other things, the creation of secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (Croatia, Somalia), the enforcement of a no-fly zone or creation of a buffer zone between belligerent forces (Croatia). Another objective was the protection of civilian populations in safe areas (Bosnia-Herzegovina) or the defence of a member state against armed attack by another state (the liberation of Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion).

The term ‘peace enforcement’ is sometimes used interchangeably with the term ‘enforcement’. However, it is helpful to distinguish between them. In keeping with a growing consensus on terminology, this report uses the term ‘enforcement’ to describe operations in which the United Nations authorises collective action in response to aggression by one state against another, such as the operation in Korea (1950-53) and the action in Kuwait and Iraq.

By contrast, the term ‘peace enforcement’ refers to the use of force with specific objectives (e.g., protecting safe areas, securing the delivery of humanitarian aid) designed to support non-military efforts to bring about a peace. Peace enforcement is sometimes referred to as ‘third generation peacekeeping,’ or ‘muscular peacekeeping’. These are missions in which the use of force is authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter, but the United Nations remains neutral and impartial between the warring parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor (if any is identified) or impose a cessation of hostilities.
Consent of the parties is desirable but not necessary. Examples of peace enforcement missions include the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF), the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), and the Implementation Force in the former Yugoslavia (IFOR).

**Other important Russian definitions**

**Operations-other-than-war**

In recent years the term ‘operations-other-than-war’ has been used widely internationally. Perhaps a more accurate description would be: ‘the use of armed forces for purposes other than war’. Such operations could, in Russian view, include various types of peacekeeping operations, international police operations (e.g., eradicating international criminal groups, combating terrorism, piracy, illegal arms and drug trade, and guarding strategically important facilities, such as nuclear power plants), and legal interventions.

**Comment**

A very important observation at this stage is the fact that the Russian definition says that the operations could be undertaken ‘with the consent of one or all sides of the conflict’. This is a principal difference compared with the UN and Western definitions stating very clearly that ‘the consent of all belligerent parties’ is needed although it can ‘be elusive and dynamic’ in second generation peacekeeping. From the Western point of view the consent of all parties is an important premise for CPO in a traditional peacekeeping and even in second generation peacekeeping. The Russian approach that a peace enforcement force easily can switch to peacekeeping when the situation permits is controversial, as the ‘peace enforcing’ units can easily be perceived as partial and thus lacking credibility.

**Underlying principles of traditional peacekeeping**

The term ‘peacekeeping’ is for different reasons misused. It is therefore decisive to present principles which have to be fulfilled in order to describe an operation as traditional peacekeeping. This report will only use the term ‘peacekeeping operation’ when an operation is planned and conducted with respect for these principles. These basic principles are thoroughly analysed in the Canadian Somalia report containing a thorough and fairly objective evaluation of this peace operation.

**Consent of parties**

The principle of all-party consent is crucial to traditional peacekeeping. Respect for state sovereignty, explicitly stated in the UN Charter, requires the UN to obtain prior approval of the parties involved in a conflict before deploying a peacekeeping force and during its employment. Consent remains a cornerstone for all traditional peacekeeping operations. This principle is formal as well as a practical character.
Non-use of force
Traditional peacekeeping missions limit the use of force to self-defence. Peacekeepers are only lightly armed and the configuration and equipment of the peacekeeping force sends out a clear message about its purpose. This principle ensures that UN peacekeepers cannot be perceived as a coercive force, which could diminish their ability to mediate and facilitate. Non-use of force is a practical principle that has to be implemented by the commanders and individual soldiers on the ground.

Impartiality
Peacekeeping forces (PKF) are meant to be impartial. No party to the dispute should be seen as favoured by the force, or identified as an aggressor. Nor should any part of the PKF be seen to have any stake or interest in the outcome of the dispute. The rationale for this principle is that impartial troops are more likely to be accepted by the parties involved in the conflict.

Impartiality is part of the rationale for having the United Nations or the OSCE as the sponsoring institution, as opposed to a member state. It implies drawing troops only from states that do not have an interest in the dispute, which would exclude neighbouring states or superpowers.

Comments
Impartiality as such is rather theoretical because most states and nationalities will have or will be perceived by the involved parties as having preferences. Therefore not only the selection of participating states is important, but also the composition of states in a PKF. The same could be said of the deployment of various ‘national units’ within the actual area of operations. A current example is the USA- led division MND (North) in SFOR with a Russian brigade in the Serbian sector and a Turkish brigade in the Bosnian sector.

Consent, the non-use of force and impartiality are interrelated and mutually reinforcing principles. All three are usually present in traditional peacekeeping operations, in conjunction with three less critical features. First, traditional operations are usually established only after the parties have agreed to a cease-fire or truce. Such operations have no guarantee of success. The peace agreement must be in place before the operation begins. Peacekeeping operations are thus largely reactive. Second, peacekeepers are primarily military personnel disciplined and trained as combat-ready soldiers in the first place. Third, UN forces must be dispatched by the appropriate authorising agency, usually the Security Council, whose mission mandate sets the legal foundation for the mission.

Strict adherence to the principles of traditional peacekeeping is paramount. While they do not necessarily determine mission success, missions are more likely to succeed if all conditions are fulfilled.
Terms related to ongoing operations

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

UN definition
The status of (the peacekeeping) force(s) agreement (SOFA) is an agreement between the UN and the host country.

Russian definition
This agreement is concluded between the UN (and/or other organisation under whose mandate the peace operation is conducted) and the country on whose territory the peacekeeping force is deployed. It defines the basic rights, immunities and privileges of the peacekeeping personnel, and it also regulates:

- Financial problems, including the use of local currency
- Issues of peacekeeping personnel movement across the territory of the host country; rules for the use of transport centres, including airfields and ports
- The nature of co-ordination between peacekeeping personnel and the local armed forces, special forces, etc.
- Conditions and rules for using local personnel
- Conditions for peacekeeping personnel use of electricity, water, various day-to-day services, and payment for these services
- Issues of civil and criminal liability of peacekeeping personnel
- Other practical material, legal or daily living issues.

The more detailed and skilfully prepared the Status-of-Forces agreement, the fewer problems will arise for the peacekeeping force as it organises the operation and conducts it.

Standing Operations Procedure (SOP)

UN definition
SOP details the political and military situation in the area, staff duties, the structure of force, the mandate and methods of operations, the rules applicable to the carriage of weapons, the use of force and the states of alert (see also rules of engagement).

NATO definition
SOP is a set of instructions covering those features of operations that lend themselves to a definite or standardised procedure without loss of effectiveness. Procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise (NATO STANAG).

Russian definition
The standard operating procedure is a composite document containing the operation mandate, the UN classic peacekeeping force commander’s con-
cept, and the instructions and orders that spell out the actions of the force at the sector level. The standard operating procedure contains:

- Historical and political information
- Organisational and administrative structure of the sector and its headquarters
- A breakdown of operational units and services
- Basic provisions on the rules of engagement
- The operations plan and other directives.

**Rules of Engagement (ROE)**

**UN definition**
Directives issued by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) specify how units engaged in PKOs should interact with hostile parties and the population.

**NATO definition**
Directives issued by the competent military authority to clarify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces.

**Russian definition**
One of the most important principles of international peacekeeping operations is restraint in the use of force. This principle is often formulated as follows: weapons may be used only under extreme circumstances, when there is no other way to protect the life and health of service personnel. Great significance is attached to the creation, adoption and observance of the ‘rules of engagement’ (abbreviated ‘ROE’ in English-language sources). The ROE strictly govern all instances involving the justifiable use of weapons and the restrictions on their use.

**Conclusions**
The UN, NATO, Canadian and Russian terms and definitions related to peace operations do not exclude CPOs. Even though there are differences between the various definitions, the differences are in many ways superficial. An important exception is the consent of parties in peacekeeping and to some extent the Russian willingness to transform a peace enforcement force into a peacekeeping one. A CPO in a peacekeeping context must have the consent of all belligerent parties, and it seems that both the West and Russia share this view. The Russian terms and definitions are to a large extent translated from US documents on peacekeeping and seem to be based on Russian tradition and experiences only to a limited extent. The creation of positive conditions for cooperation depends on the more or less official common interpretation of terms and definitions. Nonetheless, the real challenge will be getting complete understanding and acceptance of the standards at all levels – from the political leadership to the individual soldier.
Development of a common and mutually accepted code of conduct, understanding and correct behaviour on the ground can only be developed through joint experience, in other words through the carrying out of CPOs. This is in itself a good argument for making an effort to launch a CPO-type operation with units from both the West and Russia. However, the need for real life practice should not lead to the negligence of common training, exchange of officers and other co-operation in the implementation of confidence and understanding building measures.

All relevant types of operations can in fact be found on the Russian definition list. Terms and definitions are not and should not be a limitation. On the other hand it is important that the work for common understanding of the definitions describing the use of military force in peace operations is extended and speeded up.

Common and mutually accepted terminology can serve as an important platform for common education, training, exercises and operations. In that respect it might be wise to discuss the NATO concept of ‘out of area’ operations and the idea of ‘spheres of interest’.

It is vital to underline that every scenario and operation should be treated as unique. All parties involved in that type of operation should agree on SOFA and ROE.

CPOs could be viewed as traditional peacekeeping, second generation peacekeeping or peace enforcement. The next chapters will most probably limit these three options even further. Experiences from SFOR and KFOR can be a platform for building a common Russian-Western peacekeeping glossary.
Relevant Organisations and Legitimacy

The NATO air campaign against the former Yugoslavia brought to the surface key issues in the interaction between Russia and the West with respect to peace operations. The main issue is the question of whether to base an operation on a UN Security Council resolution or not. There is no doubt that the veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the lessons learned from operation ‘Allied Force’ might have created a custom for future operations without a resolution. It seems, however, that the five permanent members still see a Security Council resolution as the optimal way of initiating an operation and the opposite as an exception. It is important to remember that both the deployment of KFOR to Kosovo after ‘Allied Force’ and the Australian-led Peace Force to East Timor were based on agreements reached in the UN Security Council. It is under all circumstances relevant to assume that a CPO has to be based on a UN Security Council resolution.

A major challenge in the post-Cold War period is the nature of the conflicts facing the international community. Most of the conflicts are no longer inter-state conflicts but internal conflicts within the borders of a nominally sovereign state. Russia and China on the one hand and the West on the other hand seem to have quite different views on the way these internal conflicts could be tackled. The Russian and Chinese view is that an international organisation should not interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states. This is a reality that has to be taken into consideration when estimating possibilities for combined peace operations. The experiences so far show that it will be extremely difficult to get a UN Security Council resolution to an operation that from a Russian and Chinese point of view could be seen as interference in an internal conflict. The West has through operation ‘Allied Force’ shown the will to interfere in internal conflicts for what it considers humanitarian reasons. The idea behind this seems to be that violation of human rights and crimes against humanity should not be allowed even within the borders of nominally sovereign states. This again leads one to the conclusion that the probability of CPO handling what the Russians consider a domestic issue is very low.

United Nations

Conflicts between sovereign states

The UN Charter establishes a system of collective security designed to resolve disputes between sovereign states, in which the five permanent members of the Security Council (the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States of America, and China) were to play a leading and co-operative role. As an initial step in the resolution of disputes, Chapter VI sets out methods for the pacific settlement of disputes through negotiation and mediation.

If peaceful resolution proves futile, Chapter VII can be invoked. It provides for collective action (in the form of sanctions or action by land, sea, or air forces) to deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. The Charter authorises the Security Council to take action to
maintain or restore international peace and security. However, the Security Council’s ability to use this power is limited by the right to veto its decisions by one or more of its five permanent members and the veto right effectively demands unanimity of this forum. One of the results of the UN’s impaired security function was the growth of defensive alliances based on the concept of collective self-defence authorised in the Charter. The most significant were NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Another important outcome was the emergence of peacekeeping as the Security Council’s tool for maintaining peace and security.

As the collective security powers (now known as enforcement powers) under Chapter VII of the Charter could have been neutralised by the veto in the Security Council, military operations for the management of conflict developed along different lines. The new operations, characterised by consensus and non-enforcement, were acceptable to the superpowers.

The development of UN peacekeeping operations without an explicit legal basis or mandate in the UN Charter led to ambiguity. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld referred to this when he talked about ‘the elusive Chapter VI and a half’. When compelled to identify an article authorising peacekeeping, commentators focus either on Article 36 in Chapter VI or Article 40 in Chapter VII. Article 36 provides that the Security Council may recommend, at any stage of a dispute that is likely to endanger international peace, ‘appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment’. Article 40 provides that the Security Council, in order to prevent the aggravation of a situation that constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, may call upon the parties to comply with provisional measures. With respect to peace enforcement missions, it appears to be generally accepted that Article 40 provides the necessary authority for them.

Internal conflicts
The original purpose of the UN was to prevent and handle conflicts between sovereign states. However, the UN Charter describes circumstances that could legalise intervention in internal conflicts: ‘The United Nations shall promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’ ‘All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.’

After the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of states, civil wars and internal conflicts have risen on the agenda. The former Yugoslavia, with its ongoing NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia and especially Kosovo, is a very relevant example for the discussion of mandates. The fact that both SFOR and KFOR consist of forces from NATO countries, Russia and other states makes this case even more interesting for our study.

The United Nations and the OSCE have a track record of co-operation in joint crisis prevention, peacekeeping and long-term peace-building. The two organisations have established field-level co-operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Albania and the Commonwealth of Independent States, including Georgia and Tajikistan. The OSCE is the only regional

**Ongoing UN operations in the CIS area**

**United Nations Missions of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)**

UNMOT was originally established by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 968, adopted on 16 December 1994. The mission is still operating. It was to assist the Joint Commission, composed of representatives of the Tajik Government and of the Tajik opposition, and its main task was to ‘monitor the implementation of the agreement on a temporary cease-fire and the cessation of other hostile acts on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country for the duration of the talks’.

**United Nations Observer Mission In Georgia (UNOMIG)**

UNOMIG was established on 24 August 1993 by Security Council - Resolution 858. The mission is still running to verify compliance with the 27 July 1993 cease-fire agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhazian authorities in Georgia. Its main task is to investigate reports of cease-fire violations and to attempt to resolve such incidents with the parties involved; to report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of its mandate, in particular on violations of the cease-fire agreement. The resumed fighting in Abkhazia in September 1993 invalidated UNOMIG’s original mandate. Therefore the Mission was given an interim mandate by the Security Council to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian military contingents, and to monitor and report on the situation, with particular reference to developments relevant to United Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement. Following the signing, in May 1994, by the Georgian and Abkhazian sides of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces, UNOMIG’s main tasks are:

- Monitoring and verifying of the implementation of the agreement
- Observing the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force.

**SHIRBRIG**

At the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the need for a more flexible composition of stand-by forces became apparent. In 1993 a United Nations Planning Team was mandated to develop a system of stand-by forces, able to be deployed as a whole or in parts anywhere in the world, within an agreed response time, for UN peace-keeping operations and missions. The system, known as the UN Stand-by Arrangement System is based upon commitments by member states to contribute specified resources to the UN. However, the system has some limitations: Not all contributions meet the readiness and self-sufficiency criteria originally foreseen. Consequently, the stand-by arrangement system does not at present provide the UN with a well-prepared rapid deployment capability.

A working group addressed the key considerations and formulated a concept outline for a Multinational Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in a report in August 1996. On 15 December 1996, Austria,
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden signed a Letter of Intent on co-operating in the establishment of a multinational Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade, organised according to the recommendations of the Working Group. This was followed by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on setting up a Steering Committee to supervise the establishment of the Brigade. In addition, a memorandum of understanding on the establishment of a permanent planning element (PLANELM) to exercise all the pre-deployment functions of the unit and, on deployment, to become the nucleus of the deployed Brigade, was signed. The SHIRBRIG headquarters are expected to be operational after 1 January, 1999.

SHIRBRIG has so far not participated in any operation. The concept implies that none of the five permanent members in the UN Security Council will participate in the brigade. The basic fact is therefore that SHIRBRIG is excluded from leading CPOs with e.g. a Russian battalion as long as Russia is among the permanent five. On the other hand, it does not exclude the brigade’s participation alongside formations including forces from the permanent five, or be subordinated to head- quarters or division level formations from the permanent five. The brigade has therefore a potential role in CPOs if a Security Council resolution in a given situation demand that the UN plays an active military role in an operation. The military capacity of SHIRBRIG and the UN as a whole is limited to peacekeeping. The Security Council is undoubtedly a decisive organ in order to get a mandate for a CPO. The experiences from UN itself in peacekeeping are, however, to a large extent negative, especially in the Balkans. The UN Force concept is more or less based on ad hoc formations from a variety of states with very different background. This is probably not the right military response to future peace operations. Australia as the lead state in the East Timor operation is probably a result of such conclusions in the UN head-quarters. The establishment of SHIRBRIG is another answer from the UN to future challenges.

Regional organisations
Regional organisations based on the global UN Charter play various roles in the security web of the world and the Euro-Atlantic/Eurasian area in particular. Organisations like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are already involved in several ongoing peace operations. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union/Western European Union (EU/WEU) are developing concepts for peace operations but have so far not launched operations with troops on the ground. When it comes to CPOs, it is already at this stage worth mentioning that, besides the UN, the OSCE is the only organisation where Russia is a full member and as such on equal terms with the major Western powers. Furthermore it is important to point out that despite its new strategic concept, NATO is still an alliance with the defence of its member states as the main goal and rationale.

A preliminary conclusion at this stage would be that the permanent five members can agree in the Security Council that there is a variety of options for CPOs, and that regional organisations can also be involved. In fact this is
the model for the NATO-led IFOR/SFOR and KFOR operations, which at present are the only running CPOs. Political agreement at the top level between Russia and the USA seems to be a decisive prerequisite of successful co-operation. This has been the case for Bosnia and Kosovo where the USA and the leading Western powers have pressed hard for a leading role for ‘their’ organisation, NATO. In these cases the Russians have accepted this. In the following chapters I will discuss what regional organisations and configurations of forces could be acceptable for the permanent five Security Council members in the CIS area.

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a security organisation of which the 55 participating states represent the geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The OSCE is the main instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in the whole area.

The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative. It deals with a wide range of security issues, including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, election monitoring and economic and environmental security. Because decisions are made on the basis of consensus, all states participating in OSCE activities have an equal status. Its area includes continental Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and North America, and it co-operates with Mediterranean and Asian partners. The OSCE thus brings together the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Asian communities.

Starting from the premise that security is indivisible, participating states have a common stake in the security of Europe and should therefore cooperate to prevent crises from happening and/or to reduce the risk of already existing crises getting worse. The underlying assumption is that co-operation can bring benefits to all participating states, while insecurity in a state or region can affect the well-being of all. The key task is to work together, achieving security together with others, not against them. (OSCE Home-page).

The Helsinki Document 1992 made provision for OSCE peacekeeping activities, stating that peacekeeping constitutes an important operational element of the overall capability of the OSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management. OSCE peacekeeping activities may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating states to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution. So far, no OSCE peacekeeping operation has been mounted.

Former and ongoing OSCE involvement in the former Soviet Union

The organisation has so far not conducted peacekeeping operations. However, it has been and still is involved in the solution (or rather attempts at solving) several conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, including the conflict in Chechnya. Generally speaking the purpose of the OSCE is twofold: to facilitate the political processes that are intended to prevent or settle conflicts, and to ensure that the OSCE community is kept informed of developments in the countries where missions are present. Russia has special
interest in the OSCE as it considers this forum an important instrument in building collective security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. It seems that the OSCE has to prioritise what it is good at and not try to bite off more than it can swallow, with the monitoring and observation of conflicts being the two most obvious tasks. However, it could be possible for the OSCE to become involved in peacekeeping, especially if the West wanted to get into CIS territory in order to conduct a traditional peacekeeping operation together with Russia and/or with some other CIS states. The OSCE High-Level Planning Group (HLPG) was established on 20 December 1994. It is made up of military experts seconded by OSCE participating states and is mandated to:

- Make recommendations to the Chairman-in-Office on developing a plan for the establishment, force structure requirements and operations of a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh.
- Make recommendations on, inter alia, the size and characteristics of the force, command and control, logistics, allocations of units and resources, rules of engagement and arrangements with contributing states.

After conducting fact-finding visits to the region, the HLPG began a detailed conceptualisation that resulted in the Concept for an OSCE Multinational Peacekeeping Mission for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, presented to the Chairman-in-Office on 14 July 1995. It included four options, of which three were a mixture of armed peacekeeping troops and unarmed military observers, their strength varying from 1,500 to 4,500 personnel, the fourth being an unarmed military observer mission. Putting into place the peacekeeping force depends on the successful implementation of the political settlement process and on consensus among the OSCE participating states. At present, the HLPG is adapting the concept to the current stage of negotiations and updating the four options through fact-finding missions.

Status by the end of the millennium

The last OSCE summit of the 20th century, which took place in Istanbul in November 1999, was originally meant to draw up security and co-operation in the next millennium. However, these tasks were to some extent overshadowed by the Chechnya conflict. Russia maintained that the war in Chechnya is an internal matter and should not be interfered in by the outside world. The West, on the other hand, urged for political solutions, negotiations and aid to the refugees. The OSCE managed, however, to smooth over these differences and the European Security Charter with the potential for creating conditions for combined peace operations was signed. The Charter

- Creates a framework for OSCE peacekeeping operations
- Establishes rapid reaction teams for crisis areas
- Obliges states to answer accusations of human rights violations
- Spells out the OSCE’s role in relation to NATO and the UN
- Reaffirms OSCE commitments to democracy and human rights
• Provides for the increased training and monitoring of police forces.

It implies that the signatories remain committed to reinforcing the OSCE’s key role in maintaining peace and stability throughout our area. The OSCE’s most effective contributions to regional security have been in areas such as field operations, post-conflict rehabilitation, democratisation, and human rights and election monitoring. The OSCE decided to explore options for a potentially greater and wider role for the OSCE in peacekeeping. All future involvement in this type of operations will be considered on a case-by-case basis and decision should be reached by consensus. In accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, it could also provide a co-ordinating framework for such efforts.

The actual capability of the OSCE in general and the HLPG explicitly is very limited in military terms. The OSCE has no intelligence or command and control capabilities and this makes the organisation totally dependent on member states and other organisations to launch even small peacekeeping operations.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
It is important to mention that the Council of Heads of States in the CIS has no standing in international law. Around 1992, Russia began formulating its policy to the newly independent states. From early 1993 the political guidelines from President Yeltsin moved towards consolidating Russia’s sphere of influence in the so-called ‘Near Abroad’. Moscow’s initial ambition seemed to be to take on a leadership role in the CIS and the role of security guarantor in troubled areas such as the Caucasus and Tajikistan. Internally in Russia there was a broad consensus about the expediency and efficiency of military instruments for restoring Russia’s great power status. This consensus was, however, severely undermined by the first Chechen war. The CIS summit in Kishinev in October 1997 left little doubt that Russia’s leadership was unsupported by economic resources and humiliated by the military defeat in Chechnya. By the end of 1998 it became clear that Russia could no longer pretend to be a provider of stability and had instead become a major source of economic and security problems for its neighbours. The lack of natural leadership from Russia resulted in some CIS states seeking other powers and partners to co-operate with. The alternative solutions can be based either on co-operation with other CIS partners (for example GUUAM co-operation) or on tightening bonds with the Western anchor organisations such as NATO and the EU (Ukraine). These developments illustrate a trend I expect to see continue, in which former Soviet republics learn to co-operate rather with each other than with Russia. Russia, confronted with a war being fought on its own territory, with domestic and international problems and a need for reforming the country’s economy cannot find enough resources to support or even control its smaller neighbours. These developments within CIS may in the longer run contribute to creating better conditions for CPOs, as Russia can be challenged by other CIS members to let Western troops take part in peacekeeping operations in what is today defined as a Russian exclusive sphere of influence.
The Tashkent Treaty

On 15 May 1992, in the Uzbek capital Tashkent, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of the CIS. Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia did not sign the treaty in 1992, but joined it later. In April 1994, upon ratification, the CST entered into force. The treaty is open to new members and member states do not intend to create a new military block (Zemsky 1999: 97)

In accordance with the collective security concept, the signatories to the Treaty ensure their collective security by all available means with a special trust being placed in peaceful means. The main priorities in collective security efforts are as follows:

- Participation, jointly with other states and international organisations, in creating collective security systems in Europe and in Asia
- The expansion of confidence-building measures in the military sphere
- The establishment and promotion of partnership relations, on an equal footing, with various military political organisations and regional security structures with the aim of consolidating peace; to conduct peacekeeping operations in line with UN Security Council and OSCE decisions and co-ordinate measures on matters of disarmament and arms control, the reduction and limitation of military activity, the harmonisation of border protection efforts and so forth.

One of the main tasks of the collective security system to be built on the Tashkent Treaty should be to guarantee the member states’ protection. In the event of aggression against any of the member states all other member states are to make available to it the necessary assistance, including military assistance. They will also provide support with the means at their disposal in exercise of the right to collective defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN charter.

Other tasks and achievements of the Tashkent Treaty are:

- A collective security concept document
- A declaration of signatories to the Collective Security Treaty
- Main guidelines for deepening military co-operation for signatories to the Collective Security Treaty
- Creation of a unified air defence system
- Development of joint border protection
- Regular consultations.

Unfortunately, according to representatives of the member states themselves, the comprehensive full-scale fulfilment of first stage tasks is hindered by a lack of political will, economic means and not least by elements of mutual prejudice. Furthermore, the practical implementation of the agreements reached is lagging behind the process of co-ordinated decision-making.

Conflicts on the territories of the member states can be a serious source of tension between them. These conflicts divert the member states’ attention as well as their human and material military resources, which naturally ham-
pers the galvanisation of their joint efforts in the interest of collective security. The Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty, Vladimir Zemsky, sees it as urgent that the Treaty is used more actively in the sphere of peacemaking and peacekeeping, although the text of the Treaty does not contain any reference to this type of operations. Russia has proposed to create within the framework of the Treaty rapid reaction peacekeeping forces that could be used under the auspices of the UN Security Council. The idea has been discussed in the course of regular consultations and is currently being reviewed by the member states.

Among last month’s developments in the field of collective security on CIS territory two issues seemed to play a central role in attempts at revitalising this organisation and restoring Russian influence within the CIS. The first was the war in Dagestan and Chechnya, the second the decision on military aid to Kyrgyzstan.

In September 1999, Moscow insisted that ‘terrorists’ were using Georgian and Azerbaijani territory to reach the North Caucasus and pressed for the creation of joint CIS intelligence and antiterrorist bodies under Russian control. All the CIS delegations unambiguously condemned terrorism and endorsed all-out efforts to combat it at the national and international levels. But most of them at the same time resisted, in various forms and degrees, the Russian proposals to create new structures within the CIS or to turn existing bodies into supranational ones. The September 1999 meetings resulted in general proposals to strengthen bilateral and multilateral co-operation against international terrorism, contraband and security of transportation arteries, as well as to create antiterrorist centres at the national and CIS levels and to use more effectively the CIS data bank on terrorism. The two ministerial meetings demonstrated that all CIS countries are determined to co-operate in antiterrorist efforts, and that most of them seek to avoid the misuse of joint endeavours by Russia’s security agencies in Russia’s political and hegemonic interests.

In October 1999 the presidents of several CIS member states signed a decision ‘On collective military assistance to Kyrgyzstan within the framework of the CIS’s Collective Security Treaty’. This was the first time in the history of the CIS that the 1992 treaty was activated and that a decision has been made on providing collective military assistance to a member country.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

The military capability of NATO to conduct peace operations has been clearly demonstrated in IFOR/SFOR and so far in KFOR. This will be discussed further in a separate chapter. It is worthwhile including a discussion of the effects of the air war against Yugoslavia, even though it is not strictly within the frame of this report. No matter what forced Slobodan Milosevic to the negotiating table, the facts are obvious: by the turn of the millennium NATO is the only multinational military organisation with the capability of conducting offensive joint military operations in a hostile environment. This is due to some basic military requirements, for example:

- A 19 state-integrated command and control system working on a daily basis with the option of ‘plug in’ for partner states and others.
IFOR/SFOR/KFOR has shown that this also is the case for the Russian forces:

- Access to global real time intelligence
- Integrated air defence
- The world’s strongest air power
- Strategic mobility
- The necessary vocabulary to launch a broad variety of operations, including peace support operations.

The limitation for NATO as participant and/or a leader in peace operations is not related to the military capabilities of the alliance but to the political reality. Even though NATO through its new strategic concept presents a spectrum of options for peace operations there are several *realpolitik* obstacles. These obstacles will be discussed in the chapters presenting different Russian concepts and doctrines and the actual relationship between Russia and the West. Some of the main problems with respect to possible combined peace operations would in short be:

The overall negative Russian attitude toward NATO in general, especially among politicians and the top brass in the Russian army.

USA is the dominating NATO state and the only superpower, while Russia is interested in building a multipolar world system and not a unipolar (read USA-led) one. US forces and probably NATO as a whole would not accept Russian or any other command – they would need a clear mandate from the Security Council, the OSCE or perhaps other regional organisations.

Some of the NATO states, especially Turkey but also to some extent Germany and Italy, have a negative record in the CIS area. Turkey is also seen as a rival by Moscow.

NATO’s new strategic concept adopted at the Washington 1999 summit clearly indicates that the alliance also in the future will focus on peace support operations. Co-operation with other organisations such as the UN, the OSCE and the EU is specially mentioned. When it comes to possible CPO, especially the CJTF concept and PfP co-operation can be seen as important factors facilitating this sort of co-operation. It is also worth mentioning that NATO still regards the Security Council mandate as an important condition for launching a peace enforcement operation.

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) as a CPO capability

The definition of a CJTF is a multinational (combined) and multi service (joint) task force, organised for specific contingency operations that require multinational and multi service command and control by a CJTF headquarters.

This newly formed CJTF head-quarters would then provide a designated CJTF Commander with his mission-tailored command and control element. The concept also includes options to employ a NATO CJTF head-quarters for WEU operations and for the possible participation of partner and other non-NATO states, involving a much broader multinational approach. This is much like the military structure adopted by NATO for the IFOR/SFOR
Relevant Organisations and Legitimacy

operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has provided valuable practical insight into the CJTF concept’s development.

The new operational role of the Partnership for Peace

Numerous enhancements have also been introduced to make PfP more operational. The most significant of these are:

- Participation by partner states that so wish, together with NATO allies, in future PfP operations agreed by the North Atlantic Council;
- Expanded scope of NATO/PfP exercises to address the full range of the alliance’s new missions, including peace support operations;
- The involvement of Partners in the planning and conduct of PfP activities, including NATO/PfP exercises and other PfP operations, through the establishment of PfP Staff Elements (PSEs) at different NATO Headquarters. Partner countries will thus be able to assume international roles in these spheres and, in addition, will fulfill international functions at the Partnership Co-ordination Cell (PCC) within NATO’s International Military Staff;
- Possibilities for participation of PfP Staff Elements in CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces) exercise planning, concept and doctrine development, and operations;
- Possible involvement of national personnel from Partner countries in CJTF headquarters;
- The enhancement of arrangements for national liaison representatives from Partner Countries at NATO Headquarters as part of the establishment of full Diplomatic Missions formally accredited to NATO;
- Expansion of the Planning and Review Process (PARP) modelled on the NATO defence planning system, including the development of Ministerial Guidance and of Partnership Goals. These measures are to be combined with increased opportunities to develop transparency among PARP participants;
- Development of modalities for extending in principle the scope and orientation of the NATO Security Investment Programme to include Partnership projects;
- Increased scope for regional co-operation activities in the context of the Partnership, including consultations on regional security matters and on practical co-operation.

NATO, with its new strategic concepts, CJTF and PfP, is undoubtedly the best military tool for CPO. Especially the PfP creates conditions for enhancement of interoperability between Western and Russian forces. The PfP should, however, be further developed to create conditions for a successful launching of a CPO.

The European Union/ Western European Union

The European Union has during the last year set up high ambition for future military capability. Before 2003 EU should be capable of mounting a 50-60 000 men strong force for peace operations at army corps level. Even though
it remains to be seen to what extent the member nations are able to reach this aim, I have to take into consideration that EU in mid-term can get a much more prominent role in security and defence issues’ (Løwer 1999: 7).

The EU claims that Russia has to be a part of the European security architecture, be an equal partner and stresses co-operation across the old iron curtain. This view was clearly expressed at the EU meeting in Cologne in June 1999 at which the EU launched its strategy towards Russia. The Treaty on European Union establishes a number of links between the European Union and the Western European Union (WEU). The integration of EU with respect to security and foreign policy and closer co-operation in the military field is now gaining momentum, and it seems that the WEU will be integrated into EU, but this development, as not relevant for this report, will not be discussed here. Until recently the Union has had to haverecourse to the WEU for drawing up and implementing any Union decisions and actions with defence implications. Now it seems that this type of decisions will be taken directly by the European Council and adopted and ratified by the member states. Petersberg tasks, so named after the place where the WEU Ministerial Council formulated them in June 1992, are important when the potential for CPO is discussed. These are: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking. As a result of the Kosovo conflict, the Cologne meeting of the European Council placed the Petersberg tasks – as was already the case in the Treaty – at the core of the process of strengthening the European common security and defence policy. The fifteen Heads of State or Government and the President of the Commission, meeting on 3 and 4 June 1999, declared that, to this end:

‘The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO’.

Discussions are under way in the European Union with the aim of exercising political control and strategic guidance in the Petersberg-type operations conducted by the European Union. Furthermore, there is a discussion on how to determine the implementation of operations, with or without the resources and capacities of NATO, and how to arrange for participation in the operations by members of the European Union, the European members of NATO and the associated partners of the WEU. All that means that the European Union can in mid-term develop into a very important Western European military tool with regard to CPO with Russian participation. One of the most important advantages the EU has is the apparent lack of the historically and ideologically motivated Russian prejudices to co-operation with this Western European organisation, prejudices which still sour relations with NATO and make co-operation with Russia a very difficult task.

Conclusions
Both the UN and the OSCE include Russia and the West on a formally equal basis. They are therefore, at least theoretically, the best legal and psycholog-
With a UN or OSCE mandate, several regional organisations and individual states have the military capability of leading different types of CPOs. The UN itself has conducted several traditional peacekeeping operations and observer missions around the world. The global organisation has had few, if any, successes in peacekeeping so far. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that a revitalised UN will succeed in conducting peacekeeping and preventive deployment in the future. The fact that UN is already in place in two CIS areas of conflict could technically serve as a convenient starting point for a UN-led peacekeeping operation on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

NATO seems to be the world’s most competent military organisation. The alliance is capable of conducting the whole spectrum of peace operations, defined in the in NATO terminology as Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Partnership for Peace (PfP) is an excellent instrument in training and preparing Russian, CIS and Western forces for operating together in CPOs. PfP creates interoperability and it is therefore important that Russia is kept within the PfP framework. Increased interoperability through PfP improves military capability of each participating state, and indirectly of the UN and the OSCE, as the very same states are represented in those two organisations and may take part in operations launched under the auspices of either of these international bodies. The OSCE is at present a political organisation with minimal military capabilities. The Istanbul summit has through its European Security Charter laid the foundations for OSCE peacekeeping. The OSCE presence in several CIS conflict areas could be developed into peacekeeping operations.

The rapid development of a European Security and Defence Policy - (ESDP) within the EU seems to be the most dynamic of the processes forming the new European security architecture. It can make EU peacekeeping possible, and in a longer perspective the EU may even be capable of launching peace enforcement operations.

The CIS, with assumed Russian domination, is to some extent militarily capable of conducting all types of peace operations within the CIS area. With a balanced mix of CIS and Western states it should be militarily possible to conduct peacekeeping operations. The organisation could have some minor potential if extended with non-CIS states under the CIS umbrella, but this is not likely for political reasons.

The concept of peace operations led by a single state will be discussed later, but Russia and Australia (in East Timor) are already today conducting such operations. Russia-led operations will be discussed in a separate chapter.

There are many options linked to the organisations and single state concept. The Security Council can request a regional organisation or a single state to conduct an operation on behalf of the UN. The OSCE can, for instance, request NATO, CIS, the EU or a single state to lead a peacekeeping operation. A single state can have a leading role, e.g. provide head-quarters and C2 infrastructure.
The evaluation of the capability to conduct CPOs is very simple from a strictly military point of view. NATO has no efficiency when it comes to military capability, the UN has a good conceptual basis, which so far has been used in a not so very successful way, the OSCE has not been tested and the EU’s capability is not yet in place. NATO supremacy is primarily based on Command and Control, intelligence and joint operational capability. Under the right political conditions, like in the case of IFOR/SFOR and KFOR, NATO is the best military instrument for peace operations. The political freedom of action especially in the CIS area is, however, so far very limited. Since there is no doubt that NATO is the best military tool, this report will discuss the question where, when, why and how this tool could be used with the consent of all interested parties.

The main question to be addressed here is which organisation/state is the best choice for possible CPO in the CIS area. The West and especially the USA have so far shown little enthusiasm for the OSCE as more than a mandate provider. Russia, on its side, is negative to NATO, and maintains that the OSCE should have a leading role in peacekeeping. It seems therefore that a more positive Western attitude to the OSCE is one of the preconditions for closer co-operation between the West and Russia in launching CPOs. The UN and the OSCE are the organisations where the West and Russia meet each other on equal terms and should as such have the best potential to launch CPOs. This does of course not exclude the possibility of assigning the task to other institutions.
Russian Concepts and Doctrines Related to Peace Operations

Overall attitude to the West after the fall of the Soviet Union

In very broad terms the Russian attitude has gone through three phases after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union:

- The pro-Western period at the beginning of the 1990s
- A more balanced and nationalistic approach with some anti-Western undertones from the middle of the 1990s
- As a reaction to NATO enlargement and the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, a more anti-Western approach, especially to the USA and NATO.

Initially Russia intended to follow up on Gorbachev’s partnership with the West by clearing away the military and political legacy of Stalinism and Brezhnevism. The new democratic Yeltsin regime intended to initiate a policy of unrestrained partnership and integration with the West. The policy was implemented as the new Kremlin rulers saw the Western states as their chief ideological and political allies, the main source of economic aid and a model for domestic development. The development of closer ties with the former Soviet republics grouped in the newly formed CIS was defined as a second main task. President Yeltsin had the idea that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the annihilation of communism opened wide vistas for friendship and fruitful co-operation among new neighbours. Moscow displayed a will to confess and correct the historical misdeeds of the USSR. This development met a turning point in the middle of the 1990s. Internally, the failure of shock therapy led to a weakening of the democrats and strengthening of the communists and nationalists. The pressure for a change of course came in addition to the opposition from insiders in the Kremlin.

When it comes to external relations, Russia had become disappointed with the behaviour of the West. The perception in Moscow was that the West had failed to become a reliable ideological and political ally, the aid was limited and the Western models seemed not to work in Russia. The connections to the former Soviet republics were also troubled. Controversies developed over the Russian diaspora, property division, arbitrary borders and so on. Due to the Russian retreat from Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, there were clear economic, geopolitical, cultural and prestige losses. Russian foreign policy became a target for criticism and a national debate started on new priorities in foreign and security policy. Four main groupings were visible: Westernisers, who continued to defend the basic ideas of the initial strategy. At the opposite end of the political spectrum were those who claimed that the West was a perpetual enemy of Russia and proposed to counter the supposed Western threat by creating new alliances, primarily with the CIS states, Iran or China. A third faction saw enemies of Russia throughout the world. Finally, a camp uniting many democrats and centrists proposed a more balanced world strategy, open and co-operative, but without being overly pro-Western.

This debate inevitably led to a gradual modification of the Russian policy. More emphasis was put on security, armed forces, foreign intelligence
and foreign strategic partnerships in different regions. Nationalism found an expression in the protection of the Russian diaspora, glorification of the Russian imperial past and reducing the policy of penitence for the misdeeds of the communist regime. Super-power ambitions could be observed in growing claims to play the pivotal role throughout the former Soviet Union, to enter the exclusive club of G7 and to show the Russian flag on all continents. Democratic ideas did not influence the Kremlin’s relations with other states, while economic interests encouraged Moscow to restore co-operation with third world states. From the mid-1990s to the start of the Kosovo campaign, Russian policy was less pro-Western and more balanced in relations with other global centres of power, more security-minded, more focused on potential economic gains and more pragmatic. The near abroad dominated the diplomatic agenda, but with little progress in integration matters.

In 1999 a clear, but possibly temporarily, setback occurred in the Russian-Western relations, especially relations with the USA and NATO. This is thoroughly described in other parts of the report, but in the beginning of 2000, then acting President Putin and the visit to Moscow of the NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson in February 2000 sent out some positive signals. In his interview with BBC Putin hinted that Russia could even consider becoming member of NATO, while Robertson’s visit to Moscow paved the way for the resumption of the work of the Joint Permanent Council. The following words of the Hungarian ambassador to Norway, Gábor Iklódy, on 24 January 2000, reflect to a very large extent the realistic perception of the need for finding a *modus vivendi* for Russia’s relations with the West:

Whatever strange feelings one may have reading Russia’s leaked draft military doctrine or seeing the way the new Duma was recently elected, co-operation with the West has no alternative for Russia. I think that as rationalism and pragmatism prevail in Russia this will be more and more realised.

The CIS area is defined as the Russian near abroad, and is in the brand new security doctrine defined as a ‘vital strategic direction’. Right from the birth of the new Russia, friendly ties with the newly independent former Soviet republics have been a key component of foreign policy. Initially, the dissolution of the Union was important to unseat Gorbachev and to avoid violent disintegration such as in Yugoslavia. It was also anticipated that it was important to give freedom to other people in order to make Russia a normal, democratic state. Last, but not least the fact that the Union republics had become an economic burden also played a key role.

The Kremlin’s goal was to develop mutually profitable co-operation, with Russia as the natural leader among equals. Initial frictions were anticipated as directed against the old regime and temporary in nature. In 1992 the then Foreign Minister Kozyrev argued that unity of the CIS peoples was under way and agreements regarding defence and military co-operation together with a framework for social and economic interaction were to be signed. The CIS was one of the main priorities, but the developments however took another direction. Some of Russia’s new neighbours displayed open aversion for Russia and the Russians. Ethnic Russians were in some cases denied basic rights. The Russian minority in the near abroad is a serious challenge for all parties involved. This issue, combined with other controversies, like
property, borders, historical issues and so forth, has created more friction than integration.

The newly independent states feel that they have to balance co-operation against newly won independence. Their leaders have a tendency to blame (right or wrong) Russia for their difficulties, and seek protection elsewhere, for instance in the West. Reciprocal moves by the ‘would be protectors’ of the newly independent states make Moscow even more nervous. The assessment is that Russia will be pushed out of its traditional sphere of influence, isolated and thus suffer politically, economically and strategically. There is a growing apprehension that the West, if not contained, may come to dominate Russia economically, may exclude it from Europe and deny it access to Eastern Europe and the former republics of the Soviet Union, in other words, that it could lead to a new encirclement of the Russian motherland. It is widely anticipated in Russia that while Russia step by step tries to get closer to the former Union republics, the West encourages them to strengthen their independence and search for partners outside the CIS. ‘The aim of the West is to cut Russia off from the CIS countries, to restrict its field of activity and to make it passive and weak on the international arena’ (Bazhanov 1996:30).

On the other hand, Russia has undoubtedly reasons for concern related to several conflicts in the near abroad. These conflicts are discussed separately. Russia’s ambition seems to be a collective CIS security system with definite military aspects, such as an integrated air defence.

**National security concept**

Former President Yeltsin endorsed the National Security Concept (NSC) of the Russian Federation on 17 December 1997. The Concept is a political document that formulates state policy guidelines and principles, constituting a foundation for the elaboration of concrete programmes and organisational documents on the Russian Federation’s national security. The NSC is supposed to reflect a combination of officially accepted views as regards specific goals and state strategy aimed at ensuring security against any kind of internal or external threat.

The NSC maintains that there is a tendency towards the development of a more multipolar world, and that military factors and power still retain their importance inside the overall system of international relations. It also states that the various preconditions for the demilitarisation of international relations have been created, making it possible to strengthen the role of law during the settlement of contentious inter-state problems. According to the NSC the danger of direct aggression against the Russian Federation has diminished. Taking this as its starting point, the Concept describes prospects of more international integration and co-operation in general and in the CIS area explicitly.

Current and potential hotbeds of local wars and armed conflicts near the Russian state border are judged as the most obvious military threat to Russia.

When it comes to the role of global and regional organisations, it is stressed that Russia views NATO’s projected eastward expansion as an unacceptable threat to the national security. The eastward expansion could
among other things motivate a continental split. There is a clear ambition of shaping a collective security system within the framework of the CIS.

The Concept openly admits that the armed forces and other armed units of the Russian Federation have acute social problems, a low level of training and lack up-to-date and advanced weapons systems and hardware. Thus inevitably the necessity of restructuring the military organisation is also mentioned. The importance of increasing the number of professionals in all armed formations is stressed explicitly.

The main task of the armed forces is considered to be to ensure nuclear deterrence in order to prevent both a nuclear and a conventional large-scale or regional war, and to meet commitments to allies.

It is important to notice that Russia, for geopolitical reasons, is interested in having a military presence in some strategically important regions of the world. The deployments should be based on contracts and principles of partnership and the purpose is to demonstrate preparedness to meet commitments to allies, help establish a strategic military balance of forces in the regions and give the Russian Federation the possibility to respond to critical situations as they arise.

In the Kosovo crisis it became evident that Russia in defending Belgrade generally emphasised the primacy of the concept of national sovereignty over human rights. It also repeatedly disputed the efficacy of the threatened or actual use of military force to bring peace to the Balkans. The Russians were in favour of diplomatic means, and they also took part in diplomatic efforts to bring peace through Viktor Chernomyrdin’s contribution in the final phase of the conflict. By the end of 1999 the Russian government and military leaders moved to finish work on several key national security documents. The two most important are a new version of the military doctrine and a new National Security Concept. The Security Council of the Russian Federation approved a draft Concept of National Security on 5 October, and the document was signed into force by the then acting President Putin on 10 January 2000. The revised national security encompasses a wide range of foreign and domestic policy issues deemed to be of fundamental importance to Russian security.

By the turn of the millennium Russia’s new National Security Concept presented the following international threats that are directly connected to the West and possible CPOs in the CIS more explicitly:

- The desire of some states and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the UN and the OSCE
- The danger of a weakening of Russia’s political economic and military influence in the world
- The strengthening of geopolitical blocs and alliances, above all NATO’s eastward expansion
- The possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presence in the immediate proximity of Russian borders
- The weakening of integration processes in the CIS
- The outbreak and escalation of conflict near the state borders of the Russian Federation and the external borders of CIS member states.
Russian officials point directly to NATO’s air campaign in Yugoslavia as the key external incentive for rethinking Russian security needs.

The NATO action in Yugoslavia was officially characterised by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an aggression against a sovereign state. Some researchers in this context speak even of NATO international terrorism (Krivokhizha and Barabanov 1999: 27).

The Russian national security concept and the military doctrine are related documents, and are therefore being shaped by the same perceived threats and goals. They interpret the promotion of ‘multipolarity’ (the creation of regional power groupings) as the key goal of Russian diplomatic and military policy. US efforts to dominate the world, which presumably includes its leadership of the NATO military alliance, are said to be aimed at constraining Russia’s actions on the world stage and preventing Moscow ‘from establishing its status as one of the influential centres of the multipolar world’.

The perceived internal threats to Russia’s security are interpreted in terms that have also become widely used in Russia’s diplomatic response to events in the Caucasus. They focus on the fight against terrorism and what Moscow deems to be various forms of separatism and extremism. Internal and external threats to Russia’s security are seen to intersect on the issue of foreign support for groups identified as terrorist or separatist by Moscow. That point, obviously, reflects recent Russian charges that Chechen rebels are being supported by fundamentalist Islamic groups abroad.

Russian political leaders have made it clear that defence spending in Russia is set to rise. What is unclear is how these documents, meant to serve as guidelines for defence policy, will help the Russian government prioritise its security-related spending.

The way Russia handles its conflict with the separatists in the Caucasus also seems to confirm Moscow’s priorities. Russian government and military officials have expressed fear that NATO might use such a development as a pretext to launch an attack on Russia itself – under the guise of a humanitarian mission. NATO reacted to those claims by labelling them as ‘wild imaginations’, but this Russian approach shows quite clearly that Russia and also probably the CIS seem to be out of bounds for NATO.

**Specific peace operations issues**
The Concept states very clearly that Russia and other states share common interests in a wide area of international security issues:

- Efforts to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- The settlement and prevention of regional conflicts
- A crack-down on international terrorism and drug trafficking
- Solutions to pressing global environmental problems.

Such a statement from official Russia indicates quite clearly that there in principle is a potential for participating in international peace operations. The need for a mandate from UN at the global level and the OSCE and the
CIS at the regional level, is mentioned explicitly in the document. On the other hand, the Concept emphasises that those mechanisms are not yet effective enough and the mechanisms for the collective management of global and economic processes, primarily through the UN Security Council, should be strengthened. It is maintained as necessary to make utmost use of the collective capabilities of the CIS and the UN and in the future of the OSCE.

**Military doctrine**

The basic principles for the first Russian Federation Military Doctrine were discussed in the sessions of the Russian Federation Security Council on 3 March and 6 October 1993. The document was accepted by the same Council on 2 November 1993 and was implemented by presidential decree on the same day. The doctrine consists of an introduction and three parts: political, military and military technological including economical principles.

Internal armed conflicts are presented as a serious threat to vital interest of the Russian Federation and can according to the doctrine be exploited by foreign states to intervene in Russian Federation internal affairs.

The new draft of Russian military doctrine from late October 1999 also points to a wide number of specific threats. They include everything from local and regional conflicts to the possibility of a large-scale attack, presumably from the West. The draft also mentions as threats the escalation of regional arms races, the aggravation of informational warfare and the alleged weakening of international organisations such as the UN and the OSCE. Commentaries on the draft military doctrine seem to suggest that all of these threats are thought to be increasing.

In addition, the draft military doctrine, in combination with recent statements made by a number of senior government and defence officials, suggests that the government hopes to optimise defence spending and improve general military capabilities by streamlining command and procurement within the defence and security establishments. The draft doctrine says that Russia will still need conscription but aims at shifting the balance towards a more professional army.

The draft of Russia’s new military doctrine states that nuclear arms are an ‘effective factor of deterrence, guaranteeing the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, supporting international stability and peace’. The draft notes that ‘the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear or other mass destruction weapons against it or its allies’. Furthermore it can use these weapons ‘in response to large-scale aggression involving conventional arms in situations critical for the national security of Russia and its allies’. Among the key security threats listed in the document is the ‘expansion of military alliances to the detriment of Russian military security’.

Defence experts has signalled that the main surprise of the new doctrine was its strikingly anti-Western tone. The new doctrine describes two opposing trends – unipolar, meaning US superpower domination, and multipolar, implying numerous centres of influence, including Russia. The Russian leadership considers that social progress, stability and international security can only be guaranteed in the framework of a multipolar world. The unipolar
world is aimed at constraining Russia’s actions on the world stage and preventing Moscow from establishing itself as one of the centres of influence.

The United States and its NATO allies are not explicitly mentioned but the meaning is clear. The doctrine lists among the country’s main external threats attempt to marginalise Moscow in world affairs and the stationing of troops near Russia.

Comments
The change in attitude to the West could be caused by Russia’s anger at NATO’s enlargement to include East European states as members. NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia and Western doubts about the country’s economic reforms could also have played a role. The draft doctrine indicates widespread anti-Western opinions inside Russia’s military elite.

The first strike strategy points above all to the weakness of Russian conventional forces and the passage on ‘situation critical for national security’ leaves room for interpretation. The focus on both internal and external threats could be seen as possible justification of an increase in defence spending during an economic crisis. It no longer seems taboo to be anti-Western. In 1993 it was old-fashioned to write that the enemy is the West. Now it seems to be written between the lines.

Another, unnamed factor in the shaping of Russia’s new military doctrine is the presidential election and the extreme politicisation of key defence issues. It is unclear whether the new doctrine is a manifestation of campaign rhetoric.

Specific items related to peace operations
The 1993 doctrine states that in maintaining international peace and security, the prevention of war and armed conflicts, the Russian Federation considers all states partners as long as their policy does not threaten Russian interests or is non-compliant with the UN Charter. Russia is willing to cooperate with other states in solving security-related problems in the following way:

- With the member states of the CIS to solve problems connected to collective defence and security including co-ordination of military policy and restructuring of defence forces. This field of cooperation is prioritised
- At the regional level with the members of the OSCE and other states and military structures in adjacent regions with existing and developing systems for collective security
- Globally with all members of the UN, primarily within the framework of the UN Security Council and according to the principles and standards of international law.

The law of the Russian Federation, along with international obligations and treaties, including the CIS, should define the characteristics, conditions and appearance of Russian Federation participation in peace operations executed by the UN and other international organisations. When participating in peace operations, mandated by the UN Security Council or resulting from Russia’s international obligations, armed forces can be assigned the following tasks:
• The separation of the parties’ armed formations
• To ensure the provision of humanitarian aid to civilians and their evacuation out of the conflict zone
• Blocking of the conflict area in order to ensure enforcement of sanctions determined by the world community.

The 1999 draft doctrine does not exclude CPOs even though the document is more anti-Western in tone. The Russians state very clearly that the UN, the OSCE and the CIS are the acceptable organisations related to peace operations.

Main lines in foreign policy
In an article in *International Affairs* (No.1 1999) Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov highlights some Russian viewpoints that could have influence on CPOs:

All attempts to make NATO the centre of a collective security system in Europe are counterproductive. This continent will face another rupture if NATO goes on with its expansion.

The Charter of European Security now being elaborated by the OSCE will be the linchpin of a stable and balanced European security structure.

The founding act between Russia and NATO describe the obligations shouldered by NATO and Russia as unprecedented ones. The dialogue within the Joint NATO-Russia Council should contribute to elaborating the standards of non-menacing behaviour. The Russian-NATO relationships may become an important component of the all-European security model.

Neither the role of the UN nor the OSCE in peacekeeping should be doubted. This conviction is supported by the UN’s half a century experience in peacekeeping and the OSCE universal and all embracing competence. I proceeded from this consideration when I suggested in the OSCE a kind of code of All-European peacekeeping intended as a guide to action for individual states and their group of alliances.

The Council of Euro-Atlantic Partnership and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council can significantly complement the above effort: relevant groups set up within the Council should contribute to creating a joint peacekeeping potential and elaborating agreements on genuinely equal partnership. These efforts should be co-ordinated with the UN, the OSCE and other authoritative international organisations’ peacekeeping efforts.

The Russian-EU relationship is based on shared values and interests and the Agreement on Partnership and Co-operation. I proceed from the assumption that the European Union’s concentrated foreign policy and security measures will stimulate rather than slow down our co-operation. I am closely following the initiative of creating an EU defence potential, which is gaining momentum and proceed from an assumption that it will be compatible with the current elaborated model of an all-European security. There is no need to conceal the fact that I expect real support from European partners. It is signally important that the EU lifted trade and investment barriers and promoted co-operation in industry, banking and other business spheres.
I expect the EU to positively contribute to making decisions related to Russia in other international financial organisations.

Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov also spoke on international military interventions during his 21 September 1999 address to the UN General Assembly. He pointed to separatist movements in countries around the world as one of the gravest threats to international stability. The Russian foreign minister linked this ‘aggressive separatism’ to what he called the ‘monster of terrorism’. Ivanov urged the UN to take decisive action against ‘any manifestations of separatism’, and to consistently defend ‘the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of national borders’. Moscow seems repeatedly to underline that sovereignty and territorial integrity are more important than human rights. That stance has been evident especially in Moscow’s defence of the Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade and in Russia’s sharp opposition to NATO’s effort to rectify the situation there through military intervention. Ivanov insisted on the importance of UN Security Council approval for all international peacekeeping efforts.

Russia and the attitude to the West in the Caucasus and Central Asia

The Caucasus and Central Asia are quite different in terms of their historical evolution, their cultural conditions and their ethnic and geographic structures. For almost 200 years they formed the southern periphery of the tsarist and Soviet empires. The region encompasses both successor states to the Soviet Union and newly created secessionist entities. This region has become important mainly as a result of the discovery of further oil and natural gas deposits and of international controversies over the export channels for these strategic raw materials.

Russian policy towards the South aims at coping with the loss of strategic influence in what used to be the southern perimeter of the Russian and Soviet empire and responding to growing international influences in the region. This perspective also has a bearing on Russia’s policy towards a broader South and East (Turkey, Iran, China, former Soviet partners in the Third World, the Middle East).

Increasing competition from the US in the Caspian region in recent years has lent weight to Russia’s call for a creation of multipolar world order. The United States’ ‘Caspian policy’ is based on the idea that this area is not dependent on any regional hegemonic power, promoting a sort of ‘multipolar approach’ to international relations in the region. At the same time the US has itself become a weighty actor in the region.

Russia sees that there is a geopolitical reorganisation going on in the southern periphery of its former empire, which poses a challenge to its traditional status in the Caucasus and Central Asia. On the other hand it sees forces of disorder acting there which, it fears, could destabilise even Russian ‘mainland’. The two main challenges in the South are the orientation of some of the CIS states towards more co-operation with Western partners, and what is perceived as attempts at ‘re-islamisation’ of this predominantly Muslim region. The region witnesses today these integration trends, for example the development of a supra-regional communication system (new Silk Roads) but at the same time there are signs of disintegration due to ethnic
particularism. There are three fields in which Russian politics inter-mesh on the southern flank:

- The inner abroad (the Russian federation’s subjects in Northern Caucasus)
- The near abroad (the states of the CIS)
- The far abroad (the traditional powers with influence in the Caspian region such as Turkey and Iran and new influential powers like the US, the EU and Japan).

The most complicated area is North Caucasus, the southern periphery of the Russian Federation. This area seemed to be drifting farther and farther away from Russian government control as ethno-territorial, socio-economic and cultural-religious issues have become entangled into a knot of problems which neither the federal authorities nor the local regimes are able to resolve. The current crisis in Chechnya underlines this trend, although it could also be seen as an attempt at restoration of the central power in that region. It is quite difficult to see a coherent, concerted and co-ordinated Russian policy in this area. It would mean going too far to discuss the rationale for this, but it is essential to indicate that there might be too many different Russian players in the field.

The Caucasus has become a stage for the formation of partly contradictory foreign and security policies. Besides different attitudes to Russia (at the one extreme Armenia with its close security ties with Russia, at the other Georgia and Azerbaijan with the opposite orientation), pro- and anti-Turkish and pro- and anti-Iranian orientations also clash in the Caucasus.

With the EU and the US attempting to promote and defend their own interests in the Caucasus, it is quite understandable that Russia sees itself exposed in that region. Russian foreign, CIS, regional and nationality policies are particularly closely interwoven in this area. The ongoing conflicts inside and outside Russia, the fact that this area is densely populated and rich in natural resources makes it very important to Russia. Russia has lost its role as the ‘sole arbiter’ for the fates of the Caucasus and Central Asian countries, however, despite the significant spread of international influence and the diversification of the foreign policy of its former ‘brother republics’, it is still a relevant ‘arbiter’.

In addition to the US and Russia, Turkey, China, and the EU have also developed an interest in this region and treat it as important for their foreign and security policy. The European approach to the region, with for instance a transport corridor project (TRACECA), to some extent shows a different emphasis than the American oil and pipeline policy, which seems to subordinate economic and communications targets to strategic considerations. European silk road diplomacy with its call for greater integration will also probably clash with the manifold rivalries and conflicts of interests that have evolved in the Caspian region in the post-Soviet era. Since these also include controversial strategic relations with Russia, Europe may run into some difficulties in its endeavours to pursue its interest in the Caspian region while avoiding any kind of confrontation with Russia.
When it comes to Turkey, it could also be mentioned that the Russian treatment of the Turkic minorities in the Caucasus as well as Russia’s heavy strategic (military and economic) presence in Central Asia may also result in clashes with the pan-Turkish ideology which, according to some researchers, seems to be gaining ground in the region at the end of the 20th century.

Conclusions
The presence of military formations from the West on CIS territory is definitely a sensitive issue in Moscow. The Kremlin will regard most attempts by any Western organisation to get involved as moves to weaken Russian influence.

Much of the anti-Western rhetoric could be a part of pre-election manoeuvres. Since this report was finished in January 2000 it will stick to the following conclusion with regard to Russian concepts and doctrines:

The Russian role in the Security Council, and its attitude to the USA and NATO, and focus on state sovereignty, all suggest that the principle of humanitarian intervention will not win easy approval in the UN Security Council. As the UN or OSCE mandate for CPOs seems to be a *conditio sine qua non* of launching such an operation, chances for this type of co-operation in the post-Kosovo world are relatively slim.

The newly released draft for the Russian military doctrine shows that Russia is more reluctant in its relations with NATO and the USA. This does not create a better atmosphere for CPOs, at least in the short term. It is, however, important not to let the doctrine itself be a barrier, but seek practical solutions through real negotiations. I will discuss this further in the following chapters. The focus on threats in the new military doctrine could also be seen as a request for more funding for the defence sector, and in that way also indirectly improve the Russian peacekeeping capability.

It will be extremely difficult to get Russian acceptance for foreign military involvement within the Russian Federation. The Russian authorities will probably in most cases suspect that foreign states have ulterior motives. This makes any discussion of combined peace operations in for instance Chechnya a purely theoretical task and is the most important reason why I do not discuss this topic in this report. Similar arguments make any Western military presence on CIS territory a real challenge to Russian foreign and security policy in the region.

The Russian focus on the creation of a multipolar security environment that could counterweight a unipolar world led by the USA and NATO indicates clearly that the UN, the OSCE and to some extent the EU have the best potential for CPOs. If the West wants to participate in CPOs in the CIS, the chances for success seem to be slightly greater if efforts are channelled through the UN, the OSCE or even the EU and not through NATO, which has so far been the main Western peacekeeping tool.

Frictions between the political and military establishment (as illustrated by Foreign Minister Ivanov’s ignorance of the capture of Pristina airport by Russian paratroopers) causes a great deal of uncertainty about the Russian attitude to CPOs. A case-by-case basis analysis is evidently behind any Russian decision on co-operation with the West, but one should understand that
even after signing an agreement at the political level there is still a risk of set-back to, confusion over and even cancellation of a possible CPO.

Taking into consideration the conclusions presented in this chapter and the general Russian attitude, it seems that peacekeeping and second generation peacekeeping operations are the relevant options with respect to CPOs in the CIS area. Peace enforcement could under given conditions be applicable only against a threat evaluated as common and very dangerous in both Western capitals and Moscow.
Russian-Western Relations, Consequences for CPOs

Overall Western attitude to CPOs
A discussion of the Western attitude to Russia in general would require an entire report of its own. There are several reasons for this, a decisive one being that major Western powers (and small states as well) have their own policies towards Russia. In addition, organisations such as NATO and the EU constantly change their own ‘Russia policies’. Even though this report mainly focuses on Russia, a positive Western attitude is also a necessary condition to mount a CPO. Based on the experiences from the Balkans, it is pertinent to conclude that the leading NATO and EU countries have regarded it as important to include Russian forces both in IFOR/SFOR and in KFOR.

Furthermore it is possible to assess that the decision on inclusion of Russian troops in the peacekeeping forces was purely political. Russian participation was considered important to ensure credibility of the force among the Bosnian Serbs and Serbs in general.

A second aspect is the presumed positive effect achieved by giving Russia special status in the peacekeeping forces and thereby showing that it was treated as a major European power.

The possible third aspect would be the simple fact that Russia is a key player in any game to achieve peace in the Balkans. So far the West has shown little will to become involved in the ongoing CIS/Russian peace operations in the CIS. In spite of harsh criticism of the second Chechen war, it so far has had little practical impact on the relationship and it seems that much of the rhetoric in the West as well as in Russia is aimed at the domestic audience. The reality so far is that Russia accepted Kosovo and the West accepts to a certain extent the legitimacy of Russian goals, thought not methods, in Chechnya. The West is interested in peaceful, stable and democratic development in the CIS countries, but it also has its own economic interests in the region, not least in the energy and energy distribution sector. In general, the USA and major European powers will look positively on several CIS countries’ (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Uzbekistan [GUUAM]) general orientation towards closer co-operation with the West. It is apparent, however, that the West will not press Russia to self-imposed isolation in order to get access to peace operations on CIS territory. The course of action will be to try to convince Russia in the UN, the OSCE, the G8, the Council of Europe and bilaterally, that CPOs would be beneficial for the region as a whole.

The current trends in Russia
‘The implication of NATO victory in Kosovo will be that Russian paranoia will wonder where NATO will turn next, and rearmament may follow, which is not in Western interest’ (Dick 1999:1). The overall political climate between Russia and the West, and the USA in particular, has implications in several areas of security. One of the most decisive is the issue of arms control. Due to the little direct relevance and the complexity of the subject it will
not be discussed in this report. Arms control will nevertheless always be a subject of discussion in interaction between Russia and other states and organisations. Although there is not a direct link between CPOs and arms control they will probably influence each other. Progress in arms control negotiations can help create conditions for CPO and vice versa.

The practical co-operation between Russian and Western forces in Bosnia and Kosovo has been both fruitful and militarily successful. On the capital level it seems, however, that the optimistic approach towards co-operation characteristic of the beginning of the last decade, has given way to more Cold War-like thinking, especially in Moscow. Typical of this are statements made by the leading Russian military commanders in November 1999:

Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev explained that the West is out to drive Russia from the Caucasus, the Caspian, Central Asia. General Anatoliy Kvashnin, chief of the general staff and Russia’s most visible uniformed soldier, says Western action in Iraq is ‘a prelude’ and Western presence in the Balkans ‘a bridgehead-steps preparatory to a move against Russia’s underbelly. According to the five and four-star generals, by standing against the black devils in Chechnya, the army stands as it has stood for fifty years, against NATO and the Americans (Jamestown, 22 November 1999).

Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Main Directorate for International Military Co-operation of the Russian Ministry of Defence often seems to focus on and stress all the negative aspects related to the Russian-Western relationship and KFOR topics in particular. A first impression is inevitably that the general with his vital position in the Russian-Western relationship related to peace operations seems to be a product of the former epoch and continues the confrontation line.

This can be, on the one hand, a Russian way of playing cards in various negotiations with the West. This impression is strengthened by the fact that Defence Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev seems very constructive in the final rounds, like, for instance, during the Helsinki meeting on KFOR. To underline this even more, on 15 September 1999, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov rejected the idea that Russian troops could leave KFOR. On the contrary, he reiterated his support for the operation and dismissed earlier warnings by a senior Russian Defence Ministry official that Russia would pull out of KFOR. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that ‘despite the extremely difficult nature of regulating the situation it is possible to move ahead with a political solution’. Ivanov said that the UN could count on ‘full co-operation with Russia.’ Ivanov stressed that only the president, the prime minister, and the foreign minister can make foreign policy statements. This could indicate that some Russian military leaders act independently of the official Russia. Thus, one of the most obvious examples of the lack of co-ordination between various Russian policy-making centres was the situation around the Russian capture of the airport in Pristina.

From a Western point of view such confusion related to who is actually in charge makes co-operation with Russia in peace operations complicated and unpredictable. On the other hand, there are also some negative signals sent by politicians as well.

When talking about the Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas agreements signed at the November 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, and about friendly relations
between the West and former Soviet states along Russia’s southern border, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov charged that the West was trying to push - Russia out of the Caucasus and Caspian Sea region (Reuters, 30 December 1999). He said the following: ‘An evident battle for spheres of influence is under way in this area, in which individual states located thousands of kilometres from these strategically important regions have declared them to be zones of vital interest.’ He warned that Moscow would resist the Western efforts ‘to supplant Russia and other states, particularly Iran, in these regions’ and linked Western reactions to the war in Chechnya to ‘attempts to limit Russia’s capabilities in the Caucasus’.

Especially after what is considered as NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, Russia is worried about among other things the GUUAM states’ ambition of replacing the present Russian peacekeeping model with a - NATO-orientated one. In Moscow’s opinion Washington is actively supporting a system of sub-regional security outside the CIS. Moscow anticipates that the West wants to limit the role of Russia in the region by supporting groups without Russian participation, like for instance GUUAM. In the Russian view such groups could develop into regional security and peacekeeping groups of their own. The Russians maintain, however, that they welcome all peacekeeping initiatives from countries outside the region, including the US. The condition is that they take into account Russia’s traditional interests and do not try to push Russia out of the region.

Russia strongly supports and promotes the idea of a multipolar world as a counterweight to dominance by the USA and NATO. This is also reflected in the Russian view on European security: Russia wants an all-European security and co-operation arrangement including all European countries. From the Russian point of view, the OSCE is the true and real flagship of such a principle of collective security for all. Their ambition seems to be to strengthen the OSCE as a security policy frame for Europe as a whole. The main idea in Moscow is to secure the country’s interest in a regional as well as a global perspective. From the Atlantic NATO powers (UK and US) perspective, however, NATO remains the top priority so far. This is among other things presumably caused by fear of extended Russian influence. Germany and France, on the other hand, are apparently interested in developing the OSCE. They want Russian participation but their main focus is to get the European Union in a lead role.

There are probably many economic as well as political limits to Western engagement within the CIS. Russia has, for instance, allowed Western participation in the mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and in observing the developments related to the conflicts in Georgia. Former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev claimed that the Americans realised that conflicts in this part of the world cannot be solved without Russia and that Russia has to act as the locomotive (Knoph et al. 1999: 120). Political and military co-operation between the West and Russia is necessary to prevent and solve many ongoing and potential conflicts in the CIS.
NATO

Russia sees NATO more or less as a remnant from the Cold War period. Even though there are different arrangements between the Western alliance and Russia (NACC, PfP, the Founding Act, the PJC etc.), Russia does not feel that NATO treats it as an equal partner. Combined with the ongoing plans for further NATO enlargement eastwards and NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo, this is definitely provoking Russia. The view in Moscow seems to be that this is a strategy to increase NATO and US influence and power in the near abroad. As already mentioned, the negative Russian attitude to NATO has been severely strengthened as a result of the air campaign against Yugoslavia. This does not leave much room for optimism related to further co-operation in the field of common peace operations as long as the US claims that NATO and not the OSCE should be the mainframe for all-European security. For several reasons it seems obvious that Russia will not become a NATO member in the foreseeable future.

Only recently Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, argued that relations between Russia and NATO must be ‘mutually binding’ so that Russia is able to influence decision-making related to European security (Radio Free Europe, 28 September 1999). He noted that this was a condition for Moscow to restore relations with the Atlantic alliance. Then he added that the proposal was aimed at preventing the recurrence of such ‘unprovoked aggression’ as that against Yugoslavia. He also made it clear that if NATO does not accept this proposal, Moscow would ‘evidently have to seek other ways of developing a comprehensive European security system together with other countries’. Relations between Moscow and NATO have been frozen since the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia earlier this year. Lord Robertson’s visit to Moscow and Putin’s NATO approach can be a turning point.

The question of further NATO enlargement will constantly have implications for the relations between Russia and the alliance. Moscow’s reaction to new members, especially the Baltic states and other former parts of the Soviet Union, will definitely have negative impact on the possibility of launching a CPO in general and with NATO participation in particular. To put it shortly a new round of enlargement could deal a deathblow to a possible CPO.

A positive element might be that the Russian experience from a CPO with NATO participation could in fact create a more positive attitude to NATO, making a new enlargement a less controversial step from the Russian perspective. Such an assumption seems, however, to be too positive as Moscow could look at this quite differently. NATO enlargement has claimed a political price many times higher than originally estimated. While NATO is eager to present the IFOR/SFOR/KFOR as a model for future co-operation in peace operations, in Moscow the prevalent perception is that of a mistake, or perhaps a self-made trap that should never be repeated. The Russian Foreign Ministry attributes this mistake to the ‘go West’ course of 1992, maintaining that in autumn 1995 the only alternative to joining forces with NATO was complete withdrawal from further political games. Russian engagement in the Balkan was caused mainly by a need for getting more financial aid.
from the West and by a will to prevent NATO from playing too independ-
ently in the region.

*The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security signed between NATO and the Russian Federation*

The act was signed in Paris in June 1997. The Act defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, co-operation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia. To achieve the aims of this Act, NATO and Russia will base their relations on a shared commitment to the following principles:

- The development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, enduring and equal partnership and of co-operation to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area
- The acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security
- Refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act
- Respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents
- Mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines
- The prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles
- Support, on a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

Based on the development in Russian-Western relations after Kosovo and during the second Chechen war, the actual value and future of the co-operation within the framework of the Founding Act can be questioned. The NATO office in Moscow is not yet reopened and Russian contacts with NATO are limited to KFOR and SFOR matters, although there are some positive signs of reviving co-operation also in other fields. At present the Russians do not seem to put much weight in for co-operation. There are, on the other hand, still prospects of future positive development. At his 20 October press conference in Moscow (Radio Free Europe, 22 October 1999), Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, commented that the potential for developing NATO-Russian relations is ‘fairly big’. NATO on the other hand, seems to be fairly realistic in its view on Peace Support Operations on the territory of the former Soviet
Union. Chris Donnelly, who is an adviser to NATO’s Secretary-General, told the Georgian parliament’s Defence and Security Committee on 13 September 1999 that NATO will not intervene in Abkhazia (Radio Free Europe, 16 September 1999).

NATO seems to be interested in rebuilding as good relations with Russia as possible at a time when discussion on enlargement and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia have made these relations more complicated than ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is therefore fear that if NATO showed too great ambitions with regard to participation in peace operations in the CIS area, it might sour relations with Russia even further.

The European Union
‘There is a desire in the EU, at least on paper, to work together with Russia, to develop joint foreign policy initiatives in support of common foreign policy objectives. This could include peacekeeping missions together with Russia after the WEU is made a part of the Union. Russia is satisfied with the prospect of stronger co-operation with the EU in conflict prevention, crisis management, and conflict resolution within the UN and OSCE frameworks in the first place’ (Pozdniakov 1999: 98).

Several indications point to the European Union and of course the OSCE as more suitable tools for promoting co-operation between the West and Russia in peace operations. Russia has claimed that it supports the EU’s eastward enlargement, and has even indicated a desire to become a full member of the EU. The European Council at its meeting in Cologne in June 1999 discussed and presented its Strategy for Russia (official text at: http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conelu/june99). When it comes to peace operations the Council has emphasised that the European Union will further develop the co-operation with Russia in the new European security architecture in the OSCE. Furthermore it will consider how to make it easier for Russia to participate in EU-led Petersberg tasks operations, and increase co-operation between the EU and Russia in order to contribute to conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict handling. The European Council specifies that it intends to co-operate with Russia in order to develop a joint foreign policy with regard to third countries and regions, to prevent conflicts and manage crises, especially in areas adjacent to Russia, on the Balkans and in the Middle East.

The 22 October 1999 meeting in Helsinki between the Russian delegation led by the then acting Prime Minister Putin and the official EU delegation was designed to discuss future relations between Russia and the EU. In response to the EU’s strategy vis-à-vis Russia, endorsed in June, Putin presented Moscow’s blueprint for relations with the EU over the next decade. The document is quoted as proposing that the ‘partnership of the Russian Federation and the European Union could include the organisation of a pan-European security system based on European forces, without isolating the USA and NATO, but without the monopoly of these on the continent’. Moscow also stressed that it wants a bigger role in European affairs and better relations with the EU but will seek neither membership nor association with the Union. The Finnish Premier welcomed the Russian blueprint, saying the
EU considers it ‘a singularly important outcome in our evolving partnership with Russia’.

The interests in close relations between Russia and the European Union is mutual. For Russia the EU is the most important partner involved in transformation, modernisation and trade. More than forty per cent of Russia’s foreign trade is with the EU, and after the EU’s future eastern expansion it will be more than 50 per cent. Two issues dominate the Russian perception of the EU. The first one is the growing economic weight of the EU symbolised by the introduction of the euro, the second is the development of a common security and defence policy (which would meet Moscow’s endeavour for multipolarity in international relations).

The European interest in Russia is also obvious as the developments in Russia will strongly influence events on the European continent and the isolation of the country is not possible. A stable Russia could become an active economic partner and constructive joint creator of international policy. A Russia which is inwardly disunited and in economic collapse could destabilise the whole region. Russia has probably realised that the EU will grow even more strongly into the role of an influential, political and creative power in areas like East Central Europe, the Baltic Sea area, the Mediterranean and the Caspian region.

The Union would like to create permanent mechanism for a political and security-orientated dialogue with Russia. It is also interested in including Russia in the EU/WEU missions within the framework of the Petersberg tasks, and in joint initiatives for conflict prevention and crisis management. For several relatively obvious (and some not so obvious) reasons EU membership is out of the question for Russia in the foreseeable future. The EU has, however, promised Russia a relationship which goes beyond an association but remains below the threshold of an option of membership and this would give Russia an additional motivation for adapting its economic system to EU standards and norms.

Despite frictions, the fact that the leading EU states are also NATO members and the recent quite tough arguing around the Chechnya conflict between Moscow and EU capitals, the overall climate between Russia and the Union may create conditions for future co-operation in peace operations. The EU focus on the Petersberg tasks opens interesting possibilities.

**CIS**

The Russian vision of collective security and increased integration in the CIS area was an optimistic dream that is probably not possible to implement. Apart from the newly signed Union Treaty with Belarus, good connections to some other states and positive statements after the CIS January 2000 Moscow summit, there is a clear trend of eastward orientation among some states. As nominally independent states and members in different organisations, they will obviously seek for Western participation in conflict handling on their territory. This is often done with unrealistic expectations of NATO involvement and even membership. Such attempts or even thoughts probably strengthen Moscow’s suspicions. Russia can of course block participation in peacekeeping, especially by using its veto rights in the Security Council or
the OSCE. On the other hand, the constant efforts towards greater integration and acceptance undertaken by some of these more Western-oriented states may result in more Western involvement.

**Informal Alliances of States in the Caucasus-Caspian Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal state</th>
<th>Secondary states</th>
<th>States or entities close to principal</th>
<th>Connection outside region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Armenia and Iran</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Greece, Serbia, Cyprus, Syria, India, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Turkey and Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Israel, Georgia, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Western governments, NATO, Ukraine, Moldova, Saudi Arabia and Jordan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The purpose of this table (Blandy 1999: 3) is to show that the CIS as such is far from being a united organisation. Some of the CIS states (mainly Georgia and Ukraine) have ‘Western ambitions’. Russia has strong concerns about the presence and influences of the United States, Turkey and Israel in the Trans-Caucasus and in particular the Georgian orientation towards NATO with membership as an ambition.

In 1994 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan created the Central Asian Union which in 1998 was joined by Tajikistan. Security issues and peacekeeping have gradually advanced on its regional agenda. The most concrete arrangement is the forming of a joint peacekeeping 500-men-strong battalion in the UN framework. This force has participated in at least one PfP exercise. The current capability of this co-operation is estimated to be nothing more than a contribution from these three states in a CPO.

In 1997 the to some extent Western-orientated states – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova – formed the subregional association GUAM. When Uzbekistan joined in 1999 the association was expanded to GUUAM. In 1998 GUAM decided to establish a peacekeeping force. Ukraine has been willing to send peacekeepers to Transdniester and Abkhazia. Ukraine has furthermore been willing to form a joint unit with Georgia to defend the oil pipeline to Poti on the Black Sea coast. GUUAM has been strongly criticised by Russia because of declared co-operation with PfP and NATO. It is not likely that Moscow will approve GUUAM peacekeeping initiatives, since it has not even accepted any Ukrainian military peacekeepers in conflicts on CIS territory.

The CIS as a subordinate element for CPO in its own area does not seem relevant for several reasons. The organisation has no Western representation and CPO has to be based on agreement reached in the Security Council or the OSCE. The CIS as such has no common military capability but has to rely solely on national resources, in practise Russia and to some extent Ukraine. The CIS is, however, relevant as an organisation for peace operations with forces from its own member states with a UN or OSCE mandate.
The CIS can therefore play a political role in CPOs. The main difference between NATO and the CIS is that NATO has a unique military capability for the whole spectrum of operations. It seems evident that there are several different preferences among the CIS members and that they could be willing to accept other organisations in order in order to avoid Russian hegemony.

Yugoslavia

The Hungarian Ambassador to Norway made the following assessment with respect to Russia’s role in the recent Balkan conflict (Iklódy 2000)

Russia has been playing a kind of champagne diplomacy with a beer budget for many years. Clearly with dramatically reduced resources and in the midst of an extremely deep internal crisis, Russia would have not been able to play a constructive role in Kosovo, even if it had wanted. Therefore the considerations they set for themselves was that of a superpower. First to preserve as much as possible from the country’s superpower role in world politics, and second to counter NATO dominance in the region by weakening its internal cohesion, by preventing it from taking action in a vacuum that Russia’s inability to contribute substantially had created. Kosovo’s and Serbia’s fate could only have a secondary role to play in Russia’s thinking. In addition, Russia’s behaviour was also designed to serve the purpose of internal consumption.

The general Russian perception of NATO as an aggressive organisation has probably been strengthened by events in Kosovo. General anti-Western perspectives have become more common, also officially. Furthermore, Russia works to use connections to the West through bilateral channels, the EU, the G-8, and simultaneously tries to sideline the Alliance. It has been Moscow’s continued belief that NATO acted improperly in the Balkans during the Kosovo crisis. The Russian Defence Minister has criticised the ongoing NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, telling reporters that the operation there had ‘yet to yield real results’ (Jamestown, 14 September 1999). Moscow has joined Belgrade in criticising a UN- and NATO-brokered plan that called for the UCK to be transformed into a semi-civil ‘Kosovo Corps’ seen as an emergency force. Moscow has also criticised the proposal by the chief of the UN mission in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, to set up a customs service on Kosovo’s border with Macedonia. The previously mentioned Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, the chief of the Russian Defence Ministry’s Department for International Military Co-operation, said in Moscow on 14 September 1999 that KFOR has failed to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (RFE/RL Newsline, 16 September 1999). Ivashov warned that Russia would consider withdrawing its forces from Kosovo, arguing that ‘80 per cent of Serbs living in Kosovo have become refugees.’ He also complained that KFOR has not allowed Yugoslav security forces back into Kosovo, ‘As a result, the borders [of Kosovo] remain open and weapons and drugs keep arriving.’

Russian participation seems bound to create disagreements and magnify initial problems created partly by NATO, partly by the Russians. Despite Russian hurt feelings, it seems that co-operation works on the ground level when there is an acute need for solving practical problems. Even though the
relationship is working well on the ground in KFOR, the friction at MOD level will in the long-term tear hard on the co-operation and to a lesser degree serve as an incitement for co-operation in other operations. The West must act according to the intentions in UN Security Council resolutions in order to create confidence.

Related to the conditions for future co-operation with the Russians in peace operations it is important that NATO takes the demilitarisation of the UCK seriously, and besides that uses all available means to fulfil UN Security Council resolution 1244. This resolution requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence and authorises member states and relevant international organisations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo. It outlines the responsibilities of both military and civilian bodies in Kosovo.

On 30 November 1999, amidst mounting tensions between Russia and both Europe and the United States over Chechnya, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov accused Western governments of implicitly condoning a policy of ‘genocide’ against ethnic minorities in the independence-seeking Yugoslav province of Kosovo (Jamestown, 2 December 1999). Ivanov’s accusations with regard to the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo were probably an attempt to shift international attention away from the thousands of Chechen refugees and the situation in North Caucasus in general. Ivanov charged that more than two hundred thousand Serbs and other minorities have been driven from Kosovo since the NATO-led peacekeeping mission began operating there. Reports that the United States may be easing its opposition to independence for Kosovo appeared to be behind a warning that Russia could withdraw its military contingent from the peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo (Jamestown, 6 October 1999). The Russian diplomats warned that acquiescence by the West to Kosovo’s drive for independence could carry ‘exceptionally difficult consequences for the region and Europe as a whole’. If Moscow is not able to reach a satisfactory understanding with the West on this issue, the sources said, ‘the Russian side will have no option but to cease taking part in the peacekeeping operation’.

European governments, moreover, are also reported to be uncomfortable with what they perceive to be Washington’s new views on Kosovo. The commonality of Russian and European views on these issues could over time undermine the relative coherence which has up to now characterised the West’s approach to the Kosovo peace settlement. Such a development would further complicate the peacekeeping effort there, and might conceivably strengthen not only Russia’s diplomatic position vis-à-vis the Kosovo settlement. On the other hand, it could create positive conditions for the future EU role in CPOs in closer co-operation with Russia.

Chechnya
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot on 2 October 1999 expressed understanding for Moscow’s crackdown on terrorists but called for ‘restraint and wisdom’ and advocated dialogue with ‘more pragmatic leaders’ in North Caucasus. Lord Russell Johnston, Chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe, released a statement on 1 October similarly expressing support for the Russian crackdown on terrorism and stressing the need to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms while doing so. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer telephoned his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, on 3 October 1999, and the two ministers agreed that ‘the conflict in the Caucasus can only be solved through political means’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 5 October 1999).

Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev also lashed out at the West during his December 1999 visit to Yugoslavia for its failure to back Moscow’s campaign against the Chechen rebels (Jamestown, 5 January 2000).Replying in particular to criticism of the Chechnya campaign voiced by US Defence Secretary William Cohen on 22 December, Sergeyev said that what Moscow expected from NATO ‘was not the denunciation of the use of force, but effective measures to cut off channels through which terrorists and bandits get aid’. If Russia does not do battle against international terrorism on its own territory, he went on, then ‘similar problems will arise most acutely in Central Asia, Europe and other regions on a much greater scale because terrorists will believe that the world community is unable to confront them’. Sergeyev was also quoted as saying that relations between Moscow and NATO had reached a new low because of Western criticism of Russia’s war in Chechnya.

The ongoing Chechen war can have a great influence on the political will in the Western countries to co-operate with Russian forces even in peacekeeping operations, but especially in peace enforcement operations. The level of criticism from Western capitals against the Chechnya campaign will be important. It is difficult to co-operate militarily with someone you just have accused of conducting a brutal and bloody war with indiscriminate use of force. A second important factor will be the Western evaluation of the Russian armed forces’ conduct in the North Caucasus based on how they actually behave. Massacres and manslaughter will definitely not have a positive impact on the prospects for launching a joint CPO. Thirdly, strong criticism from the West may strengthen the Russian negative attitude towards Western countries which could take part in CPOs.

The OSCE summit held in November 1999 in Istanbul showed that the Russian delegation felt cornered by the harsh criticism of Russia’s conduct in Chechnya. The signing of the deal to build a pipeline from the Azeri capital Baku to Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan is viewed by some in Moscow as evidence of an anti-Russian agenda being encouraged by Washington. Most Western states would argue that Azerbaijan and Georgia, through which the pipeline will pass, have a right to break away from Russian domination if they so wish. Nevertheless, to conservatives in Moscow, this all looks like a deliberate attempt by NATO, and more generally the West, to undermine Russia’s influence in the Caucasus. The Western criticism of Russia’s operation in Chechnya is also very often ‘read’ in these terms. The Russians feel that what they do in Chechnya is in interest of both Russia and the West. The rest of Europe should be grateful because Russia fights the Islamic ‘terrorism’ and Chechen ‘bandits’, who have kidnapped – and brutally killed – Westerners as well as Russians.
Talks between Russian and EU officials held in October 1999 in Helsinki focused on the situation in Chechnya. The Russian delegation ruled out any international mediation. ‘Mediation between the centre (Moscow) and regions of the Russian Federation is something incomprehensible,’ Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeny Gusarev stated in October 1999 (James-town, 11 October 1999). The Chechen conflict is a domestic Russian affair and requires no outside involvement. The European leaders have been careful not to push Russia too hard. In their public remarks, they reiterated that the EU regards Chechnya as an integral part of Russia and the conflict there as a Russian internal matter. They, nevertheless, also restated their concern over the situation in the North Caucasus and urged Moscow to seek opportunities for dialogue with moderate leaders in the region. The two sides apparently made some progress on an offer by the EU to render humanitarian aid to the Caucasus. Few details of the proposal were available, but Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was reported to have given Moscow’s consent to the aid programme. He also emphasised, however, that the Kremlin’s willingness to accept aid should not be interpreted as a sign of any weakening in the federal authorities’ hard line against Chechen separatists.

Moscow has come under criticism by Europe and the United States for its military operations in the Caucasus. Western leaders have expressed concern that the Russian actions could further destabilise the Caucasus region and that the costs of the war effort could undermine Russian budgetary discipline and, ultimately, economic reform as a whole. There have also been suggestions that the West has softened its criticism of Moscow because of certain unpleasant parallels between Russia’s military operations in the Caucasus and those conducted by NATO during its air campaign against Yugoslavia.

The second Chechen war may influence relations between Russia and the West in several ways. When it comes to the impact it could have on a possible CPO, the worst-case scenario is a disclosure of and/or development of brutality and non-compliance with international law and standards in Russian warfare. That could result in the lack of any support for this sort of operation in the West, as it would be difficult to defend the Western co-operation with units, which were recently involved in what was perceived in the West as a brutal and bloody imperial war. The ‘best-case scenario’ (at least with respect to CPOs) would be that the West got the impression that Moscow took their criticism of the Chechen campaign into consideration and sought political rather than military solutions. This would most likely result in a generally more positive attitude to co-operation, also in peace operations. The most probable development is, however, that the West will keep up its disapproval of Moscow’s conduct in Chechnya, which in turn will strengthen the negative Russian attitude to the participation of Western troops in peacekeeping on CIS territory.

**International Terrorism**

In the wake of the explosions that destroyed apartments in Moscow and other Russian cities US Defense Secretary Cohen and Russian Minister of Defence Sergeyev announced in Moscow on the 13 September 1999 that the two countries would work together to battle international terrorism. Cohen
suggested that the two countries would share information about terrorism, and that experts from the two countries would meet to discuss the issue (Jamestown, 14 September 1999).

Interpreted in a positive way, this could be seen as the first small step in co-operation against a common threat also inside the Russian Federation. Utilised in a constructive way and with positive results, this could be a door opener and a platform for extended co-operation. At a large scale this could imply the use of military force and resources, also in a CPO context. Counter-terrorism is mostly a police matter. However, the use of special forces, gathering of intelligence and enforcement are also elements vital to the success of any conceivable CPO. A common threat perception is probably the best way to build further co-operation, and the experience of a joint effort against terrorism could provide the basis for successful co-operation in peacekeeping.

Other areas with possible implications for CPOs
Recently Russia has become a full member of the G8 and the Council of Europe. Even though none of these organisations have a military capability, they can have an impact on the prospects for CPOs. It is important to notice that Moscow sees membership in both these organisations as very important and prestigious.

During the Kosovo campaign when Russia cut contacts with NATO, the dialogue with the central alliance members (USA, UK, France, Germany and Italy) was conducted through the G8 framework. By actively playing on the fact that Russia has the status of an equal partner in G8, the West could use this forum to persuade Russia understanding that the Western participation in a CPO would be beneficial. This of course requires that the West see it as beneficial and necessary to be engaged in that area.

Membership of the Council of Europe requires certain standards related to human rights and other values seen as fundamental in a modern society. The fact that the Kremlin seems to be proud of its membership can be used in negotiations on launching a CPO.

Conclusions
By the end of 1999 relation between Russia and the West is still at a relative low, but there are some signs that co-operation could gain new momentum after the presidential elections in Russia. This does not create ideal conditions for CPO in general, and for CPOs in the CIS in particular. It is important, however, to discuss the issue. The West probably has a positive approach to participation in peacekeeping operations together with Russia if co-operation in this respect promotes the peace process in the conflict. A Western approach to CPOs seems to be based on the idea that Russian acceptance for this involvement is needed.

The Kosovo conflict has damaged NATO’s image in Russian eyes. A NATO-led CPO is therefore, mainly for political reasons, not likely at all in the CIS area. It is most probable that Russia would block NATO presence in peace operations on former Soviet Union territory in the UN Security Coun-
This does probably not totally exclude participation of single alliance and PfP states, or of some ‘EU troops’. It seems that a peacekeeping operation near the Russian borders could be launched only with a very strong UN or OSCE mandate and with support of the CIS or the EU. It seems very clear that in the foreseeable future neither Russia would accept nor NATO would consider any direct NATO involvement in peace operations on CIS territory. This does not exclude that individual NATO states could participate in different kinds of missions and operations under other umbrellas. Such a role for NATO is by no means acceptable to Moscow. Russia is incredibly suspicious and reluctant to allow Western involvement, and seems to take it for granted that there always is a second and hidden agenda.

The OSCE and the EU (besides the UN) are the only regional organisations besides the CIS that the Russians under certain circumstances could accept on CIS territory. Even though the OSCE is involved with different kind of civilian deployments in various CIS conflict areas, it is obvious that OSCE’s or EU’s involvement in peace operations would have to be discussed on a case-by-case basis.

It seems evident that in order to gain Russia’s accept for Western peacekeeping involvement on CIS territory, the West should go through the UN and the OSCE and accept Russia as an equal partner. As pointed out in this report, the rationale for this should not be to grant Russia a green card in this area, but the conviction that combined peace operations will have positive effects on the conflict and on the Russian-Western relations in general. One of the assets in these relations is the positive Russian attitude to the European Union and its work on the European pillar of security. Active work vis-à-vis Russia could create conditions for the EU to conduct CPOs in the CIS area. Positive development and peaceful settling of conflict in the CIS area are definitely important for the overall security on the European continent.

There are two decisive questions with respect to the participation of the West in peace operations in the Russian ‘near abroad’:

- Russia must understand that Western participation can be beneficial to Russian security interest in some respects, and therefore accept participation
- The West must be willing to participate and change the general attitude of letting Russia be ‘in charge’ on former CIS territory. The West must have a ‘soft approach’ to the issue and not push for NATO, US or even Turkish participation in the main role. The OSCE, the EU and states that are acceptable to the Russians would probably be a much better solution.

It is not clear who in Russia is responsible for the country’s foreign policy and this makes co-operation in peace operations complicated and unpredictable. Surprises like the capture of the Pristina airport are likely to happen in the future as well. Russia should make the process of making of its foreign policy decisions more clear.

It is also important to identify what in this politics is pure rhetoric and what is *realpolitik*. Experience from IFOR/SFOR and KFOR shows a great
deal of pragmatism when the overall political will is there. This experience shows that Russia can be a constructive partner.

The OSCE and to some extent the UN are already present in almost all conflict areas on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and this presence could be used in order give the OSCE more responsibility for management of peacekeeping operations in the CIS area.

The presidential election in Russia is the first possible milestone in preparations for a CPO on CIS territory. A stable situation in Russia, with focus on co-operation instead of isolation, and good personal relations to Western leaders could form a platform for co-operation. If the presidents of the USA and Russia agree on launching a CPO, other obstacles would probably disappear.

The general positive Russian attitude to the EU compared to the negative one to NATO could create a window of opportunity for the EU to take part in a CPO and to start a closer security co-operation with Russia as envisaged in its official document on relations with Russia adopted at the Cologne summit in June 1999. A stronger EU with more focus on common security and foreign policy could fit the Russian idea on building a multipolar world.

The West should realise and acknowledge that Russian participation in CPOs in general is positive and that NATO is perhaps not the right answer to all challenges. In the foreseeable future Russia will need Western support in many fields. This creates conditions for co-operation also in other areas, such as peacekeeping, and can be discussed in various institutions such as the G-8 and the European Council.
**Russian Internal Operations**

The Chechnya war in 1994-96 and the Dagestan/Chechnya conflict in the second half of 1999 will receive limited coverage in this report. The world community considers the conflict in the Russian republics an internal Russian affair. This goes for the European Union (Radio Free Europe, 1 October 1999) as well as the OSCE. In a meeting in Moscow on 7 September 1999 between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov and the chairman of the OSCE, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Vollebæk, Ivanov stated very clearly that Russia would handle this conflict internally. The OSCE Chairman also accepted this (Norwegian broadcasting 7 September 1999). Chairman Knut Vollebæk stated the following in an interview, with the Norwegian newspaper *Aftenposten*, on 3 October 1999:

> The OSCE will offer Moscow its assistance to solve the conflict around Chechnya. The all-European security organisation, however, will not act without a Russian request. The OSCE condemns terrorism and acknowledges Russia’s territorial integrity. The advantages of the OSCE in this conflict are in our opinion that the organisation can be utilised to create dialogue. However, I have to stress once more that it is up to the Russians to evaluate whether it could be useful for them.

On the other hand the Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov said that he would welcome international peacekeepers on the territory of the Chechen republic (BBC News 3 October 1999). The OSCE’s stance – and the OSCE is the only organisation that could be considered acceptable by the Russians – makes any discussion of multinational peacekeeping based on a UN Security Council resolution inside Russia a purely theoretical exercise.

The internal Russian operations with the main aim of ensuring the security and integrity of the Federation will therefore be discussed in the context of what influence these operations could have on Russian participation in peacekeeping operations outside Russia.

Although the number of refugees from Chechnya surpassed 200 000 by the end of 1999, Russia was reluctant to let even humanitarian assistance into its territory. This attitude has much to do with Russian perception of sovereignty, and it clearly shows that a CPO on the territory of the Russian Federation is a ‘no go’.

There are, however, some developments in the way the Russian army has fought the second Chechen war that can have a rather positive impact on future CPOs. The most important is that the Russian army has shown a certain degree of adaptability and ability to learn lessons from the past. Russian military commanders have drawn parallels between their air operations against Chechnya and NATO’s air campaign against Yugoslavia (BBC News, 30 September 1999).

The Russians are maintaining that the use of air power and precision weaponry aims at reducing civil casualties. It could witness a new approach to the problem of both civil and military casualties, and in general shows that the Russian army can act in a more professional way than in the 1994-96 campaign. This could create circumstances for a better co-operation in the future, also in CPOs. Moscow’s tactics suggests, however, that a successful
consolidation of its control over Chechnya and Dagestan could be followed by stronger pressure on the neighbouring republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan. It could have a negative impact on the possibility of launching a CPO on the territory of these countries as they could fear that Russia could use this framework to realise its own hidden agenda.

Conclusions

Based on the current Russian attitude it is relevant to maintain that CPOs on the territory of the Russian Federation is ‘out of bounds’ for the foreseeable future.

The second Chechen war is still going on and conclusions could be premature. The first Chechen war and its outcome demoralised the Russian army. This could be changed if the second war is perceived as a success by Russian generals, officers, soldiers and, most important, by the public in general.

The increased defence spending resulting from the war could also improve the general standards of Russian formations designated to participate in CPOs.

The participation in the operations in Chechnya increases the combat experience at all levels of chain of command of formations assigned to the specific tasks in this war zone.

On the other hand, the way the operations are conducted in Chechnya - could have a rather negative influence on future CPOs as questions could be raised about the use of excessive power and violation of human rights. The impression that the West at the last OSCE summit seemed to give the Russians free hands in Chechnya, could make the Russians more willing to cooperate in CPOs on CIS territory.
Russian Participation in Peace Operations

Soviet and Russian peace operations outside the CIS and before IFOR

Since 1948 the Soviet Union and Russian military formations have been involved in 13 UN missions (excluding successor missions and airlift support to three other UN operations), in the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo and in four regional missions in the CIS area. The history of United Nations peacekeeping goes back to 1948. From 1956 it became tacitly accepted that the five permanent members of the Security Council would not take part in peacekeeping operations. The fall of the Berlin Wall removed Cold War period obstacles related to peace operations. Several new operations were initiated, often at a larger scale and with an extended task and mandate compared to the earlier period. The conflicts became intra-rather than inter-state, and the use of force even without the full consent of the parties according to UN Charter VII has been accepted. The permanent five members of the Security Council, including Russia, have been taking part in peace operations in this period.

Until the late 1980s the Soviet attitude to UN peacekeeping was one of relative indifference. During the 40-year period from 1948 to 1987, the USSR took part in one observer mission (UNTSO from 1973). In addition the Kremlin provided an airlift for food supplies in support of UNUC (1960) and transported Austrian and Finnish troops in support of UNEF II in Sinai (1973). It provided no practical assistance to the remaining ten UN operations of the period. However, during the last four years of its existence (1988-91), the USSR tried to change the Western perception of it as a threat to peace and security and took part in five of the nine UN peacekeeping operations set up during the period:

- Airlift support for Canadian troops taking part in the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group in 1988
- Electoral supervisors for the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia 1989
- Observers for the UN Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM) in 1991
- Observers for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in 1991
- Military liaison officers for the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (1991)

It is very important to emphasise that the USSR in fact provided observers and airlift to one third of the UN operations 1948-91. The contribution in manpower was on the other hand undoubtedly small, as at no time more than 75 Soviet personnel were on UN peacekeeping duty. Furthermore, the Soviet Union made no contribution to any of the multinational or regional peacekeeping operations during the period and it vetoed the replacement of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut with a UN force in 1984.

Neighbouring countries experienced Soviet out-of-area operations in Budapest (1956), Prague (1968) and of course in Afghanistan from 1979, but none of them had anything to do with peacekeeping although in the official
Communist propaganda these operations were to some extent described as peace operations.

Without going into details I can say that the Russian Federation continued to take a very active part in various UN observer missions in all parts of the world. The new thing is that Russia has provided forces to three UN missions, two NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia and four operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The NATO and the CIS operations will be discussed in detail at a later stage.

It is worth noticing that the sanctioning of operations in the UN Security Council often was accompanied by bargaining. This seems to be the case when Russia backed the UN missions in Haiti and Guatemala (Kellet 1999: 7). The Haiti mission seems to have been linked with Moscow's effort to acquire international approval for its regional peace operations in the CIS. When the USA and its allies tried to get support for the multinational operation in Haiti in mid-1994, the Russian ambassador to the UN threatened to bloc the US initiative if the Security Council did not recognise the Russian peacekeeping activity in the CIS. Russia and the US were among the sponsors of Resolution 937 (21 July 1994) which added to the mandate of the UN observer force in Abkhazia the requirement to observe the activities of, and to co-operate with, the Russian-led CIS peacekeeping force. Resolution 937 was widely regarded as conferring the legitimacy that Russia sought for its Abkhazia operation.

Russian participation in peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia marked a new practice compared with the one of the Soviet Union. UNPROFOR was established in February 1992 and the new Russian Federation decided to join the force, thus also the mainstream of the international community. From Moscow's point of view, this could give the opportunity to influence developments in Yugoslavia, make Russia a more credible partner and open a new chapter in relations with the West. From 1992 to early 1994 the Russian contribution was one airborne battalion in Sector East in Croatia. In March 1994 the Russian contribution was extended to two battalions, including 400 troops in Sarajevo. Russia also donated vehicles, equipment and generators worth $80 000 to the mission in 1994. When responsibility was handed over to SFOR in December 1996 one Russian battalion was sent home (or possibly, but not likely, merged into the Russian IFOR Brigade) and the other became a part of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). This mission ended in the autumn of 1997 and the Russian battalion was withdrawn in November. The Russians kept, however, a guard force until September 1998. During the whole period Moscow provided observers, staff officers and policemen to various missions in the former Yugoslavia.

The overall impression of Russian performance in UN operations in Bosnia and Croatia is both positive and negative. For instance, the UN Secretary-General claimed that UNTAES contributed to peace and stability in the region (Kellet 1999: 11). Because the Russian contribution was one fifth of the mission, they deserve their share of the credit. There were, on the other hand, some definite failures during the UN period, perhaps partly caused by Russian military culture, partly by the 'UN environment'. In April 1995 Major General Alexander Perelyakin, commander of Sector East, was
fired as a result of disciplinary and ethic problems and a failure to prevent Serb troops from entering the area from FRY (Kellet 1999: 11). Among the charges against the Russian troops were unsatisfactory performance of duty, cigarette smuggling, illegal trading in UN fuel, and the organisation of brothels. There was also an emerging perception of Russian partiality and support to the Serbs. It was claimed that the Serbs could fire on Muslim positions protected by the Russian battalion. In 1995, Russian officers allowed the Serbs to conduct exercises with weapons that were supposed to be kept locked in UN depots. An investigation resulted in the dismissal of two senior Russian officers including Colonel Alexander Kromchenko, Commander of UN Forces Sector East. Along with other UN personnel Russian peacekeepers were taken hostage by the Serbs in November 1994 and March and May 1995.

Conclusions
The fact that the main part of the experience and tradition is from the post-Soviet period explains why there is no actual Russian terminology, only a translated Western version.

Russia has demonstrated that it can provide force multipliers, especially strategic airlift and helicopters.

The overall experience is that Russian forces have at least a potential of meeting the demand of code of conduct, impartiality and professional behaviour.

Russian peace operations in the CIS area

Introduction

We overthrow a decent religious and democratic government in Tajikistan. We are backing the popular front of bandits and communists. Carnage, genocide, emigration of the surviving intellectuals. And then our peacekeepers are coming into action. Indeed, if you want peace, you have got to start a war. Between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia and Abkhazia, Pridnestrovye and Moldova. First set them against each other and then come to reconcile them. At least in this way, hopefully, it will be remembered that you came from a great power. Envy us (Novodvorskaya 1999: 47).

This statement by a critical Russian analyst points to crucial questions related to Russian peace operations.

Russian involvement in the CIS seems to differ from what in the West is defined as ‘peacekeeping’. This lack of compatibility between terms and actions can cause serious problems for further co-operation, especially if the term ‘peacekeeping’ is used as a disguise for actions which can be interpreted as pure pursuit of national interests. Russia has, like any other country, the right to defend its own territory and interests, but a ‘spade’ should, however, be called a ‘spade’.
Apart from providing troops to operations in the CIS area Russia has contributed to observer missions in the near abroad. Since 1994 the UN has maintained two small missions in the CIS. United Nations Observers Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan. There also happened to be Russian and CIS peace operations in the same countries.

Despite Russia’s relative unwillingness to take part in multinational peace operations, its worry about local wars on its periphery has ensured that from three to five as many Russian soldiers have participated at any one time in regional peacekeeping missions in the CIS, as have been involved in UN or NATO operations (Kellet 1999: 13).

This chapter will not go into detail about the Russian operations in the CIS area because they are thoroughly covered in various reports listed in the literature list (Kellet, Jonson, Flikke, Baev 1999a, Lynch). The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the conditions for future CPOs in the CIS conflicts where Russia is involved. In addition it is relevant to see whether Russian operations are successful in solving the conflicts, as it is highly relevant for any discussion on the need of launching a CPO.

The security of the Caspian Sea region has become an important issue in world politics during the 1990s. It has been strongly influenced by increased competition among regional as well as several extra-regional powers over the control of the vast oil and gas reserves and transport routes. One of the major obstacles to the exploitation of the Caspian oil and gas resources was the dispute over the existing Caspian Sea legal regime and different approaches to its resolution favoured by the littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan). Another problem is linked to the question of transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Basin to global markets. This conflict of interests among the littoral states has been exacerbated by the growing involvement of the USA and a number of European and Asian countries in regional affairs. Finally, the security of oil and gas transportation routes passing across or located close to zones of local conflicts (in Abkhazia, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh) has become increasingly linked to the resolution of these conflicts. The influence of radical and militant Islamic groups in a number of Caspian littoral states and their neighbours threatens to further destabilise the security of the region. These developments have led to increased military presence and militarisation of conflicts in the region. Being aware of the dangerous consequences for regional security, the littoral countries have tried to diffuse mounting interstate tensions in the region. However, there has been insufficient progress in this direction.

Four ongoing operations and one never launched
It was in the Dniester area and in South Ossetia that post-Soviet Russia gained its first experience in conducting peacekeeping operations on former Soviet territory. In these operations an original method was employed – one unknown in similar operations conducted by the United Nations – as armed
units of both belligerent parties were included in the ‘peacekeeping’ force (Globachev 1999: 44).

Moldova

After Moldova’s declaration of independence on 27 August 1991, the Transdniester region of Moldova declared its own independence. By December 1991 the Moldovan government had mostly lost control over the Transdniester region. In March-April 1992 a quadripartite mechanism, involving Russia, Moldova, Ukraine and Romania, was established to resolve the crisis, but it never became operational, owing mainly to Russia’s objections to its composition.

The Russian peacekeeping units started arriving in the region in the end of July 1992. They included five battalions (2,100 men) and were supplemented by six battalions made up of units from Transdniester and Moldova (three battalions of 1,200 men each). Peacekeepers have confiscated illegal arms and ammunition in great numbers, but the situation in the Dniester area is assessed by the Russians to be calm and controllable, although the conflict is far from solved. The armed conflict was mainly caused by the clashing political and economic interests of the local elites – the supporters of Moldova independent existence or the establishment of a ‘greater Romania’ incorporating the former province of Bessarabia on the one hand, and the adherents of the traditional Soviet way of solving the ethnic and political contradictions on the other.

The conflict also had economic causes, as the area of secession was the best developed part of the former Soviet republic of Moldova. One of the main purely military challenges in the area seems to be the large store of arms accumulated in the Kolbasna depot in the Dniester area during the Soviet period. It occupies more than one hundred hectares and contains, according to the most recent estimates, more than 45,000 tons of ammunition and explosives with relatively high market value (Globachev 1999: 44).

In addition to peacekeeping units, Russia had its 14th Army deployed in the region. It seemed to support the separatists in the Dniester area during the fighting in 1992, and some of its units were latter on transferred to serve as ‘peacekeepers’. The withdrawal of the remains of the 14th Army was to take place to the end of 1997, but has been delayed many times and Russia has still some non-peacekeeping units in the region. The need for finding a solution to the conflict in Transdniester forced Moldavia to closer co-operation with Russia and the CIS, and prevented unification with Romania.

Russian troops are still in the area, in violation of a pledge to leave by 1997. The Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) is deployed on the right (eastern) bank of the Dniester River, in a region with a large Russian-speaking population. The OSCE over the years has urged the Russians to leave, and the OSCE Istanbul summit, the Russian government promised to further reduce the Russian military presence in the region (Jamestown, 19 November 1999). Moldova seeks the removal of Russian forces within two years, through December 2001, while Russia proposes a withdrawal calendar of five-and-a-half years. No fewer than eleven OSCE member countries have announced their readiness to monitor the withdrawal and share some of its financial costs.
The deployment of Russian peacekeepers was complicated by the presence of a separatist Russian population and the Russian 14th Army. On their arrival the Russian peacekeepers found that a cease-fire was already in effect, largely because of Moldova’s military defeat. The cease-fire has generally been observed since 1992 and no more people have been killed in combat. However, the presence of the OGRF has by and large relegated the peacekeeping force to a spectator role, and it has failed to keep belligerent troops out of the security zone. This failure, and resort to peacekeeping battalions from the OGRF, give an aura of partiality to the Russian contingent (Kellet 1999: 21).

Abkhazia


Russia sought to act as mediator in the dispute, its efforts culminating in two further cease-fires before a final round of fighting in September 1993 expelled the Georgians from most of Abkhazia. At least 3,000 people died in the conflict and some 250,000 people – mostly Georgians – fled the region. An abortive cease-fire agreement signed on 27 July 1993 established a Georgian-Abkhazian-Russian Joint Commission, which was charged with the task of setting up ‘interim monitoring groups’. Some 200 Russian troops were involved in the activity. On 24 August 1993 the Security Council established UNOMIG, a force comprising up to 88 military observers and mandated to verify compliance with the cease-fire. UNOMIG was still in the early stages of its deployment when the cease-fire broke down in September. It was, however, decided to retain UNOMIG in the region, and in July 1994 the Security Council authorised an increase in its strength. The force expanded rapidly, with Russian observers join in by October 1994. Since then Russia has invariably supplied three observers to UNOMIG.

Georgia was anxious to persuade the UN to send a peacekeeping force to Abkhazia, but the Secretary-General decided that the necessary conditions for such a mission did not exist, and in April 1994 the CIS agreed that Russia should send ‘peacekeepers’ to the region. The warring parties agreed on cease-fire in May, and in late June Russian troops were deployed in Abkhazia. Co-operation with the CIS force is undoubtedly important to the fulfilment of UNOMIG’s difficult mandate, and the UN has periodically praised the collaboration between UNOMIG and peacekeepers, but there were also some problems in this relationship. For example, in October 1998 the UNSG implied that the co-operation could be improved (Kellet 1999:28). At the head-quarters level the working relationship remains good. The CIS force provided UNOMIG with valuable support in February 1998 when four UN observers were kidnapped. This incident led the UN to consider setting up a protective unit for its observers, an idea that did not commend itself to the Russians.
The peacekeeping force has, at least officially, a collective CIS character, but in reality it is maintained by Russia alone – although the United Nations has also its observers there. Personnel for the Russian peacekeeping units was initially provided by the 345th airborne regiment stationed in Gudauta, but troops from Russia proper joined later and the force is made up of servicemen from all regions of Russia. The presence of Russian peacekeepers on the Abkhazian-Georgian front line has an aura of ambiguity, as the deployment of the peacekeeping force was followed by a Georgian-Russian treaty giving Russia basing rights in Georgia and by Georgia’s joining the Russia-led CIS co-operation. Russian military bases in Georgia are located in strategically important regions of the country – near the capital Tbilisi, in the de facto sovereign Abkhazia, in semi-independent Adzharia, and in the region with predominant Armenian population (Globachev 1999: 44).

On 29 August 1999, Georgia’s National Security Council decided to prolong the mandate of the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ force in Abkhazia (RFE/RL Newsline, 28 September 1999). The Russian peacekeepers are probably tolerated due to a lack of realistic alternatives. Georgia’s acquiescence can be portrayed as legitimising the Russian operation in Abkhazia. On a practical level, Moscow maintains that the proposed changes to the mandate (concerning the return of refugees) of its troops would necessitate a massive increase in manpower and funding, neither of which Russia can afford. That argument constitutes a pretext for freezing the conflict, as Moscow opposes any internationalisation of this peacekeeping operation. Georgia also implied that the West had advised Tbilisi to prolong the Russian mandate. Georgia’s hoped also that the NATO operation in Kosovo could form a precedent for a similar reversal of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia. The Georgians complained that the CIS Force stood aside during fighting in May 1998, but intervention could have been costly, and the peacekeepers appear to have tried to protect the population to some degree. The UN has been generally positive to this operation, and the peacekeepers appear to have become less partial with time (Kellet 1999: 26).

South Ossetia

The deployment in the Georgian region of South Ossetia was the first peace operation undertaken by the Kremlin on former Soviet territory. Two-thirds of the region’s population were Ossetians, and by 1990 their aspirations for greater independence from Georgia had escalated to a call for complete independence. Violence broke out in December 1990, and military operations continued until mid 1992, taking the lives of some 1,500 people and creating a refugee exodus. A cease-fire was agreed in June 1994. All armed formations were to leave the conflict zone by 1 July, a 15 to 20 km separation zone was designated, and a ‘quadripartite military formation’, similar to the UN peacekeeping forces, was established along with a mixed control commission, and an observer group (Kellet 1999: 15).

Only Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Georgian counterpart Edward Shevardnadze signed the accord, but North and South Ossetia were also represented at the signing ceremony. The Joint Control Commission (JCC) had a mandate to direct and control the peacekeeping force, but it seems to have operated fitfully over the past six years.
The JCC oversees a joint head-quarters in Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, comprising the Russian, Georgian and Ossetian commanders, a tripartite observer group of some 40 officers, and a head-quarters company. The observers, working in mixed teams, were supposed to visit the force’s post daily. The overall force commander appears always to have been a Russian. Under the cease-fire agreement the peacekeeping force was expected to comprise Russian, Georgian and Ossetian battalions of 500 men each, with a mixed reserve battalion of 900 men. Russia’s contingent was deployed in mid July 1992 and comprised between 900 and 1000 men. Local Georgians protested that the Russian contingent far exceeded the agreed size, and was much better trained and equipped than the other components of the force. The airborne personnel were quickly withdrawn and by mid 1994 the Russian contingent had shrunk to a single battalion, usually drawn from the 45th Motorised Infantry Division.

Following the disbandment of that division, a battalion from the Kantemirovskiy Division took over in 1998. According to the OSCE it was better staffed and equipped than its predecessor (Kellet 1999: 15). In September 1998 the Russian Defence Ministry stated that the contingent numbered 530 men. The Georgians and Ossetians had respectively around 550 men. Despite the cease-fire the, the Russian peacekeepers were attacked upon their arrival in Tskhinvali on 14 July 1992 and during the following weeks suffered a small number of casualties from snipers and mines. The force presence seems to have calmed the situation, and the various armed groups left the area. Crime became normal, followed by the fact that the peacekeepers primary role became law enforcement. The principal activity of the force has been the manning of strongpoint- and checkpoints. Unlike Moldova where checkpoints are manned on a mixed basis, those in South Ossetia are mostly manned separately (Kellet 1999: 16). The deployment of the force quickly showed results. The shelling of Tskhinvali ended and highways that had been closed for nearly two years, opened. In addition, some refugees returned. The military situation has been calm since summer 1992.

In general the OSCE mission has been favourably impressed by the performance of the Russian peacekeepers, assessing that they are superior to the other contingents in quality, training and equipment. In 1994 it commended the Russians for displaying ‘cool professionalism’ and two years later reported that he Russian posts continue to be operated and managed well. In mid 1998 the military situation was reported as calm and the population as having no complaints about the peacekeeping force. On the other hand Russian discipline has not always been exemplary. A research team led by Professor Neil MacFarlane (Kellet 1999: 16) was told of corruption among all three contingents.

The cease-fire has been maintained for seven years, but 40,000 refugees have not returned. Russia’s military doctrine states that the use of Russian peacekeepers is intended to localise conflict and to end it as soon as possible, thereby creating preconditions for settlement of the conflict by peaceful means. The first aim was achieved in South Ossetia, but a political solution has not been found, even after eight years.
Russian Participation in Peace Operations

Tajikistan

Late in 1994 a UN mission – UNMOT – was launched in Tajikistan where a regional peacekeeping operation had been under way for over a year. The roots of the mission can be traced back to the civil war that broke out in Tajikistan in mid 1992. At least 20,000 were killed in the fighting, and about half a million fled their homes. For much of 1992 the Soviet/Russian 201st Motorised Infantry Division based in Tajikistan remained neutral, but by late 1992 the division seemingly abandoned its neutrality and supported the Tajik ruling elite, led by Emomali Rakhmonov, although this support may have been provided reluctantly and under duress (Kellet 1999: 9).

In September 1993 the heads of the CIS states decided to set up a ‘collective peacekeeping force’ (CPF) in Tajikistan, made up of Russian, Kazak, Kyrgyzstani and Uzbek units. The Russian 201st MRD contributed one battalion, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan sent one battalion each, while Uzbekistan dispatched a reinforced company. In order to make this peacekeeping force more effective a series of exercises was organised in 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and in 1998. These international forces played an important role in containing conflict in Central Asia, though they could not be ‘labelled’ impartial, as they seemed to support Tajik government forces in their campaign against the local opposition and served as support to Russian border troops controlling the Tajik-Afghani border.

Opposition forces launched a new campaign in 1993 and 1994, but on 17 September 1994 the warring parties agreed to a temporary cease-fire. A UN fact finding team was sent to Tajikistan to assess the modalities for establishing an observer mission. The cease-fire came into effect on 20 October 1994, and 50 military observers were temporarily deployed to Tajikistan. On 16 December 1994, the Security Council authorised UNMOT to monitor the cease-fire. Russia has not contributed personnel to the 39 persons strong UNMOT. On the other hand it has actively solicited the UN support for its own – and its regional allies – peace operations in Tajikistan. While UN status has not been granted the CIS’s Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPF) in Tajikistan, the Security Council has expressed satisfaction over UNMOT’s close liaison with the CPF and with the CIS border troops in the region.

The ongoing civil war in Afghanistan and the fear of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism created severe concerns to the new Russian Federation and made it support the communist regime in the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan. The Russians supported the regime against the Muslim opposition in a civil war that started in 1992. Russian border troops guard the Tajik-Afghani border. This has been a long and expensive engagement for Russia and the country is probably interested in finding a compromise solution to the conflict. 20-50,000 Tajiks were killed and hundreds of thousands became refugees in the civil war between 1992 and 1994. Around 300,000 of the 380,000 ethnic Russians that lived there in 1989 have escaped or emigrated to Russia (Simonsen 1999).

Although Russia seems to regard the peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan as a model of conformity to international standards, it differs substantially from traditional UN peacekeeping and other Russian missions in the CIS. The deployment of the force predated the first cease-fire by a year, one
of the warring parties was not represented at the CIS summit in September 1993 that established the force, heavy weapons have been used and the requirement for neutrality in the conflict between the Tajik government and the UTO has not been there.

This is probably mainly caused by the lack of clearly defined priorities and goals as the Russian military presence in the region was to defend Russia’s strategic interests and at the same time serve as a ‘peacekeeping’ buffer between the two warring parties. Russia has acknowledged its geopolitical interests in Tajikistan, and the mission assigned to the force has elements of both collective security and peacekeeping. Because of the border guard’s active role in frontier defence the force has avoided fighting for most of the time, allowing it both to understate its collective security role and elements of neutrality and peacekeeping. The Tajik operation is the largest Russian peacekeeping commitment. It is quite ironic that Tajikistan is the only conflict where Russian peacekeepers have been deployed, but fighting has continued long after their arrival. It is also the only conflict in which a negotiated settlement has been achieved mainly through Russian diplomatic efforts. The peace process is still fragile and much has to be done in order to make this mission a real success story.

Nagorno-Karabakh, or the mission that never happened

Even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the two USSR republics Armenia and Azerbaijan, were engaged in a conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh – an enclave in Azerbaijan populated mainly by Armenians. An armistice was brokered by the Russian Federation in 1994. The Russian Defence Minister P. Grachev undertook persistent shuttle diplomacy to negotiate a ceasefire in May 1994 to be guaranteed by Russian troops. It took an enormous effort by the Azeri leadership to prevent this operation (Baev 1999: 84).

The Russian engagement and then defeat in the first Chechen war made, however, a lasting impact on Russia’s conflict management and Russia was forced to abandon its plan for peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh is still complicated, although there are some signs that the parties to the conflict are more willing to find a lasting solution based on negotiations and mediation involving also international organisations and bodies. Armenians still control 20 per cent of Azerbaijani territory and Azerbaijan has more than 600,000 refugees (Simonsen 1999). The widely expected Russian ‘peace’ intervention did not materialise and the mediation efforts remained half-hearted (Baev 1999a: 83). The ceasefire reached in 1994 is still holding, though there has been a number of small arms fire and sniper activities along the line of contact. The situation has evolved into a volatile ‘no war, no peace’ situation with increasing potential for destabilisation (OSCE HLPG 1999). The attempts at resolution of the conflict are co-ordinated by the OSCE Minsk Group - composed of eleven states and co-chaired by the American, Russian and French ambassadors to the OSCE. The OSCE High Level Planning Group (HLPG) is working exclusively with the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh with the task of drafting agreements between the parties, and drafting a mandate.
for a peacekeeping force. Due to the international involvement already at the early stage of the conflict and work on its successful resolution, the possible peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh has the potential of becoming the first CPO on CIS territory.

**Important lessons learned**

Russia’s CIS peacekeeping has not been successful in promoting a resolution of the conflicts (Jonson 1999: 12). It is, however, not unique in this respect, to mention only UNIFIL in Lebanon, which was deployed as an interim force in 1978. Perhaps a strong and active third party could stimulate progress in negotiations. Russia has not been able of fulfil the role of an active, impartial third party. The international legitimacy of the operations could definitely be questioned. Most CIS member states maintain that the UN, not the CIS alone, is the only organisation that can legitimate a peacekeeping operation, also on CIS territory.

Russian leaders have not shied away from associating national interests with peacekeeping. Russian peacekeepers have, however, not been as irregular as some critics have averred (Kellet 1999: 37). By and large they have followed the principle of consent in three of the four operations, and, except from Tajikistan, they seem to have tried to be neutral, usually after at rather partial start. As for the use of force, the Russians seem to behave in the same way as peacekeepers engaged in several ‘chapter VII’ peacekeeping operations around the world. Although there is no UN authorisation for Russian enforcement in the CIS, and there is a tendency among Russian personnel to view peacekeeping in purely military terms, they appear to use relatively little force, perhaps with the exception of Tajikistan.

The Russians regard some of their departures from international standards as a potential innovation. Involvement in neighbouring and historically close states is something they share with Western states. The solo appearance in Abkhazia and incorporation of belligerent parties in Moldova and South Ossetia are definitely a departure from the accepted standards. These solutions are to some extent justified by the fact that they have halted violence (but not solved the conflict) and by the unwillingness of the international community to become involved in peacekeeping in the CIS.

Success, however, is not evident in Russian peacekeeping. At least two of the conflicts are relatively dormant because of military deadlock and in Nagorno-Karabakh a relatively lasting cease-fire was negotiated without the deployment of a peacekeeping force. All told, the Russians role as regional peacekeepers seems to be positive. The USA has also associated peacekeeping with national interests and there are similarities between Russian and US conduct in peacekeeping operations (Kellet 1999: 38). Russia is, however, the only country that mixes collective security and peacekeeping by the fact that their peacekeepers utilise Russian base facilities in for instance Georgia. National interests become inevitably a part of Russian peacekeeping in the CIS area (see Lynch: 2000).

**Russia’s credibility as a peacekeeper**

There are several grounds for criticising Russian traditions related to peace operations. General misuse of the term peacekeeping was the case during the
Soviet period, for instance in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The conflicts on former Soviet territory after the break-up of the empire have resulted in several operations defined by the Russians as peacekeeping. It seems, however, that in the majority of these conflicts, Russia supported one party initially, and so emerged as an ‘impartial’ peacekeeper. It is a pattern traceable in all Russian peacekeeping operations, from South Ossetia to involvement in the former Yugoslavia, where the Russians are considered more or less pro-Serbian, but act, however, at the same time as supposedly ‘impartial’ international peacekeepers.

To engage in peacekeeping and simultaneously ‘shield’ one of the conflict parties is bad policy. The fact that Russia combines its peacekeeping efforts with attempts at gaining some ‘strategic’ advantages in the areas of conflict does not help to improve the country’s credibility. Russia should also realise that it has a responsibility for the conduct of its allies. It is probably much wiser to make them adopt internationally accepted standards than to defend them at all price. The fact that the peacekeeping troops in the CIS often consist of the parties involved in the conflict can also cause some credibility problems. How would I react to a Serbian/Albanian/NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo? The Russian participation in SFOR and KFOR is a means of making the force credible to the Serbian population. A CPO in the CIS should have the same aim and hopefully give the same effect.

**Conclusions**

The Russian CIS operations have been conducted even during internal wars and economic crises. The fact that Russia prioritises military action even in a time of economic and political troubles seems to underline Russia’s preoccupation with the area which it has defined as its exclusive sphere of interest. This could make getting Russian acceptance to Western involvement in peacekeeping in the Russian near abroad a very challenging task.

The ongoing war in Chechnya, in parallel with Russian peacekeeping in neighbouring Georgia, creates questions concerning Russian impartiality. It is not credible to have bases and peacekeeping forces in a country that you at the same time accuse of co-operation with an internal enemy. The peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would increase their credibility if they were conducted as a CPO. Further negative development in Russian-Georgian affairs can create new serious conflicts that would have to be dealt with.

So far the West has shown no or little intention, interest, will and capability to participate in former and ongoing peace operations in the CIS area. The Western intention of participation has to be the first step if such participation is an aspiration for the future. Oil and gas resources in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and also the need for more stability, peace, human rights and democratisation there, could become important incentives for more Western engagement. The challenge for the future is not to negotiate or impose cease-fires, which the Russians have achieved, but to bring an end to the conflict. This would probably be speeded up by Western involvement.

It will take time for Russia to make others believe in Russia’s impartiality. The only way to achieve this is to adopt an impartial approach from top
to bottom in the official political and military hierarchy. Military impartiality on the ground seems achievable, but the peacekeeping forces in the CIS should be balanced better with respect to composition. There has been a clear improvement in the Russian conduct of operations in the CIS area. They have to a larger extent adapted such principles as impartiality and the minimum use of force. This creates conditions for the integration of Western and CIS forces in operations, and shows that Russian forces under the right conditions can act according to ‘Western standards for peacekeeping’. The announced withdrawal from Moldova indicates that Russia under given circumstances is willing to give the OSCE a role in the CIS area.

Russia in combined peace operations in a NATO frame

The overall political background for Russia’s participation in two NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia, SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo, is covered in the two chapters on ‘Russian concepts and doctrines related to peace operations’ and ‘Russian-Western relationship and its consequences for CPO’. This subchapter focuses on the experiences and conclusions from the field in the Balkans that can be useful in future CPOs, for instance in the CIS area. Especially in the KFOR context, which I deal with in detail, the political agreement between the USA and Russia on KFOR is mentioned.

IFOR/SFOR

The SFOR Russian Brigade (RUSBDE) is part of SFOR and participates in the Partnership for Peace programme. About 40 per cent of its 1,500 personnel are combat veterans. The RUSBDE area of Responsibility covers 1,750 square kilometres. The 1st Airborne Battalion is responsible for 35 kilometres of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and the 2nd is responsible for the remaining 40 kilometres. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Paris in December 1995, the Security Council authorised the establishment of IFOR under UN Charter Chapter VII. Russia probably realised that it had to accede to NATO initiatives in order to retain any kind of role in the Balkans. After Moscow refused to place its troops under NATO command and the US threatened to go on without Russia, the then Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev finally accepted a compromise. Russian troops were to be subordinated to SACEUR. SACEUR was to command the Russian contingent through a Russian general based in Belgium. In Bosnia, the Russian contingent was to be under tactical control of the US-led Multinational Division North (MND North).

Russian deployment began in mid January 1996 and proceeded quickly, and the force was in position by the beginning of February. Before deployment the units were given mission specific training (Kellet 1999: 12). The force was made up of an independent airborne brigade drawing upon 76 and 98 Guards Airborne Divisions with around 1,500 personnel, 116 armoured combat vehicles and eight artillery pieces. The Brigade was deployed in the Posovina corridor close to the Yugoslavian (Serbian) border. Main task of the RUSBDE was to run 12 control and checkpoints and patrol the area of responsibility. Initially there were some frictions and the first commander was sent home after irritating NATO by meeting Bosnian Serb general and
war crime indicted Ratko Mladic. Most frictions seem to have been solved without fuss. IFOR met most of its objectives and it is obvious that the Russian contingent also contributed to the relative success of the military mission in Bosnia. A US liaison officer with the RUSBDE had the following experience (Russian soldiers are) Less available than his own (US) countrymen to call on available legal, civil affairs and other specialist assistance, but (they) tended to deal more on a personnel level (Kellet 1999: 12).

Among the strong and weak points of the Russian troops in SFOR, their partners usually mention the following points:

- Co-ordination problems
- No 24-hour planning and operations cell
- Excellent communications
- Well-informed on activities in own sector.

Russia has had its brigade-size unit in SFOR since 1997. There is considerable co-ordination with US troops in the Posovina region, but some NATO initiatives, such as the seizure of Serbian television transmitters in October 1997 and the arrest of a Bosnian Serb Corps commander in December 1998 caused Russian unease and Russian units tried to avoid taking part, even though it was in their own area.

At the official level NATO seems to be very satisfied with the Russian contribution. The participation of Russia in IFOR and SFOR is very important and is an example of how NATO and Russia can work together in a fruitful manner. It was at that time a major step in the evolving NATO-Russia co-operative relationship. Russian forces joined IFOR in January 1996 and Russia continues to contribute to SFOR. Russia’s participation is subject to special arrangements between NATO and Russia. The Russian contingent was directly subordinated to Colonel General Leontiy Shevtsov, as SACEUR’s deputy. In theatre, the Russian brigade is under the tactical control of the US-led Multinational Division North (MND N).

The practical military experience with the Russian contingent in SFOR is positive. When the special command and control arrangement was in place, co-operation on the ground went smoothly. The US division commander under whom the Russian brigade serves in the field has been satisfied with the proficiency and capability of Russian soldiers in this particular peacekeeping mission. This is also based on experience from joint US-Russian patrolling. The local public and the Republika Srbska forces in the Russian sector also seem to have little complaints. There have been no rumours of corruption, black market arrangements and other negative things which often are mentioned in connection with for instance Ukraine’s contingent.

Conditions for such good military co-operation have been created through dialogue and co-operation in establishing peacekeeping procedures, techniques and tactics within the Partnership for Peace framework and bilateral arrangements, especially Russian-US.

It can be maintained that the Russian Brigade in SFOR not always has acted in a completely impartial way. Russian sympathy to the Serbs is well known. This leads to a very close monitoring from those who are responsible for the impartiality of the troops. However, it is important to have in mind
that this claimed Russian partiality is to some extent balanced by the fact that the MND North also comprises a Turkish brigade showing some pro-Muslim sympathies.

A Norwegian flag officer serving at Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe (SHAPE) during the initial phase of IFOR expressed a generally positive attitude to the Russian effort in the IFOR period. This covers the troops on the ground in Bosnia as well as the Russian representatives in the command chain up to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The Russians had a professional attitude and they acted in accordance with international standards. It is important to have in mind that Russia kept its brigade in the US-led multinational division North in SFOR also during the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia. However, they made some changes in the command and control arrangements, taking orders from the Russian Chief of the General Staff instead of SACEUR (Sherr 1999: 8).

**KFOR**

The CPO concept that Russia and NATO have chosen for KFOR is relatively new and still working. It is therefore presented in detail as it can serve as a conceptual framework and platform for CPOs in general. The US Secretary of Defence, Cohen, and the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergeyev, agreed on the following points on Russian participation in KFOR after long negotiations in Helsinki in mid June 1999 (NATO homepage):

- To accept the Agreed Principles attached as the basis for Russian participation in the international peacekeeping force (KFOR) in full compliance with Security Council Resolution 1244.
- To provide for participation of one to two Russian battalions operating in Kosovska Kamenica in the US sector according to the attached command and control model. A Russian officer will serve as the representative to the Sector Commander for Russian forces.
- Additionally, the US will recommend that NATO agree that Russian forces also participate in the KFOR forces deployed in the German and French sectors. According to the command and control model specifically that Russia provide one to two battalions to be part of the KFOR force in the German sector, to operate in the area near Malisevo. One battalion to the KFOR force in the French sector, to operate in the area near Lausa. A German company and a French company will also operate in the Malisevo and Lausa areas respectively. Russian officers will serve as Representatives for Russian Forces to the sector commanders in the German and French sectors, respectively.
- The total Russian deployment in Kosovo will not exceed five battalions with a total strength not exceeding 2,850 troops, plus up to 750 troops for the airfield and logistics base operation combined, plus 16 liaison officers. The level of Russian participation will be reduced in proportion to reductions in the overall size of KFOR.
- To resolve the Pristina (Slatina) airfield issues on the basis of the allocation of responsibilities described in attachments. All KFOR participants will have access to the airfield, under procedures to be
established by KFOR. Details to be determined by Commander, KFOR in consultation with Russian representatives.

- That Russia will have the right to establish a logistics base with an appropriate site security in the vicinity of the town of Kosovo Polje, as agreed with COMKFOR, to support Russian forces in KFOR.
- To send a Russian military representative to SHAPE and to augment his staff and expand his responsibilities to include Russian participation in KFOR, and to establish liaison and planning cells at AFSOUTH and KFOR as rapidly as possible.
- To convene consultations as soon as possible to develop details for implementation of these agreements.
- That these points, including determination on which sector the Russians will participate in, will be confirmed by the NAC for NATO and by the Government of the Russian Federation. The scheme of deployment of the Russian of KFOR may be reviewed and adjusted in the light of the prevailing circumstances by mutual agreement of the confirming parties, keeping in mind all aspects of a continued, appropriate Russian presence.
- All command arrangements will preserve the principle of unity of command. It is understood that the Russian contingent in Kosovo will be under the political and military control of the Russian Command.

The following principles were accepted as the basis for Russian participation in a militarily effective peace enforcement operation in Kosovo:

- Common mission/purpose
- Common rules of engagement
- Single airspace management
- Single system of ground movement control
- Intelligence sharing and exchange
- Co-ordinated public information process
- Single system to co-ordinate national logistics and KFOR base support

KFOR freedom of manoeuvre and operation
Allocation of responsibilities between Russian Armed Forces and KFOR at the Pristina (Slatina) Airfield should follow the rules described below:

- The Overall direction for the operation of the airfield and airspace in the KFOR AOR will be provided by the Director of Kosovo Air Operations working for the KFOR Commander.
- The Chief of the airfield is a Russian officer, while the Chief of Air Movement, who is a representative of NATO. They will carry out their functions in the name of the Director of Air Operations in Kosovo and KFOR Commander. In the agreement their functions are listed in detail (NATO Homepage).
- In each of the created functions assigned to NATO, a group of Russian representatives will be created. Detailed development of plans for these
representatives will be accomplished after the Russian aviation group arrives at Pristina airfield.

**Command structure:** The command structure depicted on the chart (Russian Participation in KFOR) will be the command structure for Russian participation in KFOR (NATO homepage).

![Diagram of command structure]

A = Allied, Partner, or other non-Russian Contingent

The following details the agreed liaison arrangements for Russian forces in KFOR:

- Russia will return the Russian Military Representative to SHAPE, augment his staff and expand their responsibilities to include Russian participation in KFOR. The Russian representation will consist of up to 10 officers.
- Russia will establish a liaison group with head-quarters AFSOUTH. The Russian liaison group will consist of three officers.
- Russia will temporarily establish a liaison group with CAOC to co-ordinate the initial strategic deployment of Russia’s peacekeeping contingent.
- Russia will establish a military representative at KFOR head-quarters (six to eight officers for planning and support) for matters pertaining to the planning and employment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in
KFOR. Regarding co-ordination of Russian activities in KFOR brigade zones (2-3) officers per zone where the Russian peacekeeping contingent is located.

Practical experiences in KFOR

Two incidents related to the Russian contingent in KFOR at the end of August and the beginning of September 1999 are worth mentioning. At first glance these incidents seem insignificant, but they are, nevertheless, relevant positive indications related to Russian participation in international peace operations.

On 23 August 1999 Russian peacekeeping troops were supposed to take over the town of Orahovac from Dutch and German peacekeepers. They were, however, blocked by the Albanians accusing them of supporting and favouring the town’s Serb population. The Russians tackled this difficult situation according to the rules of engagement and adapted peacekeeping principles.

The second, and probably from a psychological view even more important incident, was the Russian killing of three Serbs on 6 September 1999. The Russians shot back when fired on by Serbs caught beating two wounded Albanians in the village of Korminjanje.

According to NATO General Secretary Javier Solana this proved that the Russian peacekeepers behaved according to the obligations of all KFOR troops.

‘Therefore they deserve the same respect that KFOR troops from any other country deserve. I have one KFOR, and not two KFORs. I think today is the proof of that’ (BBC News, 7 September 1999).

The Russian Colonel Mikhail Kovtunenko had the following comment: ‘This incident is a good example of how Russian peacekeepers came to Kosovo with a peacekeeping task in mind to normalise the situation in the region. I are fighting against criminals no matter nationality, Serbs or Albanians’ (BBC News, 7 September 1999).

In the short term this could serve to improve the reputation of the Russians among the ethnic Albanians. Seen from a wider and longer perspective, the incident could be a vital brick in the creation of general conditions for a CPO. It shows that in September 1999, when the overall agreements with the Russian Federation had been reached at the top political level, securing impartiality and action according to international standards, intentions, RoE and SOP, Russian KFOR units had the potential of behaving as an impartial and credible peacekeeping force.

Russian anger related to the KFOR mission in Kosovo, voiced more by political and military officials in Moscow than by Russian commanders in the field, is still present. Aside from the situation in Orahovac, Moscow has also continued to lambaste NATO more generally for what it says is the NATO’s failure to enforce order in Kosovo and to protect the province’s non-Albanian inhabitants. Moscow has protested particularly against what it describes as NATO’s coddling of the KLA. This friction between the West and Russia on the political level underlines even stronger the necessity of having an overall agreement at the highest political level prior to the launching of a peacekeeping operation on the ground.
On 16 September 1999 Russia’s permanent representative to NATO, Ambassador Sergei Kislyak, stated that NATO and Russian diplomats agreed the previous day that it was necessary to demilitarise the UCK by 19 September (RFE/RL Newsline, 20 September 1999). He added that both sides also agreed and worked on deployment of Russian peacekeepers in the town of Orahovac. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at ambassador level met on Wednesday, 15 September 1999 at NATO Headquarters to discuss the situation in and around Kosovo and exchange views on NATO-Russia co-operation in the international peace operation (KFOR) (NATO Homepage). Stressing their commitment to full implementation of the provisions and goals of Security Council Resolution 1244, NATO and Russia commended the co-operative and professional relationship among NATO participating states and Russia within KFOR and discussed ways to further improve the security situation in Kosovo. NATO and Russia also stressed the importance of the 19 September deadline regarding the UCK demilitarisation. NATO and Russia agreed that the international community should keep this process under close scrutiny and ensure its proper completion. Close co-operation between NATO and Russia resulted also in the lifting of Albanian barricades around Orahovac.

Conclusions

The Yugoslav conflict shows that it is possible to include Russian forces in NATO-led operations outside the CIS as long as the operations are mandated by UN Security Council resolutions and that NATO and Russia may work together in order to find pragmatic solutions for organisational command and control arrangements.

In IFOR/SFOR Russian airborne troops have shown that they have the ability to act as professional second generation peacekeepers and meet international norms and standards. This organisation and the structure, command and control arrangements, and experience create a constructive military platform for possible CPOs in the CIS area. The fact that the West and Russia could find a working solution in the former Yugoslavia once more emphasises that the challenge of mounting such a combined operation is first of all of a political nature.

Co-operation between the West and Russia in any kind of peace operation must be based on specific, overall binding agreements ensuring that the overall intention for the operation and the basic principles of peace operations are agreed upon. These agreements should be signed at the highest possible level (at least MFA, MoD). The KFOR model describing Russian representation, participation and command and control arrangements in a very detailed way and on all levels of responsibility is a very useful example to follow. The detailed agreement concerning allocation of responsibilities between Russian forces and KFOR at Pristina Airfield is another document to be used as a ‘pattern’ for possible CPOs. It is therefore important to build on this positive experience when preparing or launching a CPO on CIS territory. The IFOR/SFOR and KFOR combined peace operations have shown that command and control arrangement can function in practice at least as long as the operation does not develop into an enforcement operation. The experience is that the Russians airborne officers and other ranks seem to be
very professional and dedicated peacekeepers. It is important to focus on development of common, or at least compatible, procedures, doctrines, techniques and tactics as well as joint exercises within the framework of bilateral and multilateral co-operation as it would improve the chances of making a CPO a success story. It could result in a substantial improvement of the military capability for CPOs, and other, even more requiring forms of co-operation could also be considered. The main challenge with respect to combined peace operations seems to be of a political nature. If Russia and the West could agree on and draw clear lines on the governmental and military-political level, smooth co-operation on the ground would be possible.
Russian Military Capability Related to Combined Peace Operations

The experience with Russian forces participating in CPOs in Bosnia and Kosovo is in general positive. They are primarily fulfilling their tasks according to mandate and intentions. Operations in the CIS area also seem to have a positive development to the observance of underlying principles of traditional peacekeeping. Moscow has, however, so far drawn peacekeepers to IFOR/SFOR and KFOR from a quite limited source, namely the airborne units. If the overall evaluation in MoD and the General Staff is that they are the only qualified international peacekeepers, the capability to participate is limited to the 5 airborne divisions (plus one division for training purposes), each with 2 parachute regiments. On the other hand, within the CIS units from motorised rifle divisions have been successfully deployed in the areas of conflict and served as peacekeepers.

There are several uncertainties related to Russian conventional military capability. This is especially the case for rather small-scale operations like CPOs. In this context it is not relevant to discuss neither nuclear capability nor conventional full-scale war. These uncertainties are based on the experiences and results of the first Chechen war that became a disaster for the Russian Army. When writing this report the second Chechen war is still going on and the final result is not given. This conflict has, however, shown a few interesting aspects:

- Strong political and military will
- Capability to concentrate ground troops (approx. 100,000 men) and air forces and furthermore allocate a wide spectrum of resources to the campaign
- Operational concept and tactics adapted to experiences from the first Chechen war and NATO operations in Kosovo
- Commanders who intend to avoid humiliation at almost any cost.

It seems, therefore, that Russia in a given situation and with necessary political and military will, could be able to mount a considerable military force for CPOs. The fact that the Russians still are present as peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo despite Chechnya and verbal attacks on NATO and the West indicates a will to co-operate. The fact that Russia has not withdrawn its peacekeeping forces deployed abroad indicates a considerable capacity, as it shows that Russia is able to engage its best troops in two difficult missions running at the same time.

The conclusion will therefore be somewhat superficial and general: if the Russians were to base their commitment solely on airborne formations they should be able to mount 2 divisional headquarters and approximately 4 airborne regiments. If Moscow decides to use other formations the number of troops available for missions will be higher. So far only airborne troops have been deployed to serve in integrated units with Western participation. For command and control purposes they total 5 Army and Corps headquarters (Military Balance). At least one of these could be used for CPO. According to the Military Balance and taking into consideration operations in Chechnya there should be a reasonable amount of Combat Support and Combat Service
Support to support one to two airborne divisions abroad. Chechnya gives evidence of available combat aviation. What will probably be the most important constraint on potential Russian engagement in CPO-like operations is not the number of troops, equipment, materiel and units, but the ability to finance forces abroad.

At present around 100,000 troops from several power ministries (mainly MoD and MoI) are involved in the operation in Chechnya. Even after the end of hostilities it is quite probable that Russia will have considerable formations deployed in the region to ensure full control over the area. This could mean that Russia will be short of forces available for peace operations abroad. It could have either a positive or a negative impact on potential CPOs. Positive, because it will make Russia more willing to allow troops for the West to take part in CPOs; negative, because Russia could use all the opportunities available (Security Council or OSCE) to block launching an operation in the area which is still perceived as the country’s exclusive sphere of influence.

**Resources**

Reform of the Russian armed forces is suffering from a definite lack of resources. A complete reform of the military would require between 150 and 300 billion US$. (Russlands Perspektiven. Kritische Faktoren und mögliche Entwicklungen bis 2010, 1999). This indicates that they can afford a total force of 550,000 to 600,000 men, which is half of today’s strength.

Russia can probably not afford large military involvement in the CIS or elsewhere. It is important to bear in mind that while traditional UN peacekeeping operations are paid by the UN, in all other operations the participating states usually have to bear the costs themselves. The Russian involvement in SFOR, supported economically by the UN, has been an exception. The cost of having the 1,200-men Russian brigade in Bosnia amounts more than 20 million US$ a year (Kuchin 1999: 47). The cost of the KFOR contingent, which it seems like the Russians have to pay for, is estimated to around 65 million US$ a year. The lack of funding necessary to conduct peacekeeping operations could be a very strong limiting factor when it comes to - Russian participation in different kinds of operations. The West could of course pay for Russia if it considers its participation necessary from a political and economic point of view. It is, however, important to know whether Russia will accept such an offer, what effect it could have on Russia’s attitude to the West and whether Russian would not see it as an offence to its national pride. The delicate question of financing Russian participation has to be carefully examined by the West in an open dialogue with Russia on a case-to-case basis.

The conflict in Chechnya and Dagestan, at least in its early phase, has shown the poor co-operation between troops from Russia’s various ‘power ministries’, and the apparent failure of the government to equip Russian troops with the latest weaponry and military hardware.

This is linked to a broader debate over budgetary priorities which seem to favour the country’s strategic forces rather than its conventional ones. Marshal Igor Sergeyev is himself a former rocket forces commander, and as
The head of the Defence Ministry’s Budget and Finance Department, Colonel General Georgii Oleynik, told on 24 September that because of the conflict in Dagestan, the government has boosted by 2.5 billion rubles the ministry’s 8.3 billion ruble spending limit for September. Oleynik said he hopes that as a result of the conflict, the amount of money allotted to defence in the 2000 budget will be increased by 25 billion rubles (RFE/RL Newsline, 28 September 1999).

The then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told the Duma on 28 September (RFE/RL Newsline, 29 September 1999) that it is time to ‘centralise federal budget allocations for the armed forces’ and to transform the military into a professional army. He added that national security ‘costs a lot’ and this programme ‘should not be regarded as cheap.’ Under the current draft, 119.3 billion rubles are devoted to national defence and 77.8 billion rubles to law enforcement out of a total spending of 803.0 billion rubles. According to Colonel General Georgiy Oleynik, Director of the Defence Ministry’s Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Finances, the funding of the armed forces remains ‘complicated’, despite some signs of improvement. While 60 per cent of the military’s needs were met over the past three years, that figure stands at 75 per cent for 1999. The state’s, however, owed the military some 52 billion roubles by the end of August.

The conciliatory commission has worked out a compromise version of the 2000 budget. In the new draft, revenues amount to 791.3 billion rubles ($31.4 billion) and expenditures to 849.2 billion rubles. The previous draft, which the Duma rejected on 28 September 1999, provided for revenues totalling 745.1 billion rubles and outlays of 803 billion rubles. More than half of the additional 46.2 billion rubles added for expenditures will be devoted to defence needs. This represents a 22 per cent hike in the defence budget (RFE/RL Newsline, 12 October 1999).

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin promised to rebuild Russia’s military power. ‘The government has undertaken to rebuild and strengthen the military might of the state to respond to new geopolitical realities, to both external and internal threats.’ Putin said that military spending would be increased by 57 per cent next year, to 146 billion rubles (Jamestown, 29 October 1999). The government has already increased military spending to provide additional means to conduct the operation in Chechnya. Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov said that US$160 million would be added to the 1999 defence budget to purchase planes, helicopters, communications equipment and night vision goggles for use against Chechen guerrillas.

Although the conciliatory commission has already approved a 26 billion ruble hike in defence spending in the 2000 budget, former Defence Committee Chairman Roman Popkovtich suggested that even more funding is necessary. He called for expenditures totalling 37 billion rubles, which would represent a 31 per cent hike over the figure proposed in the draft budget (RFE/RL Newsline, 12 October 1999).

These financial decisions can increase the general capability of mounting headquarters and forces to CPO and improve the material situation in the
armed forces in areas such as combat aviation, communications and night vision equipment.

The latest developments with high oil prices on the world market have provided Russia with some extra incomes which could be used to finance the Chechen campaign. In the long term, however, Russia’s ability to finance its armed forces and participate in peace operations will depend on the implementation of so needed structural reforms.

Taking into consideration the economic constraints limiting Russia’s ability to participate in CPOs, it is important to investigate other concepts for CPOs funding.

**Interoperability**

When discussing the interoperability of forces taking part in a military operation it is important to focus on the areas, which could have a decisive impact on the success or failure of the possible CPO. These areas are:

- Language
- Materiel and equipment
- Operational concept, tactics, procedures and techniques
- Command and control infrastructure, concept and techniques
- Lack of common training and exercises in enforcement operations.

The above-mentioned areas are all decisive factors in military operations and seem to pose a challenge even in operations including only NATO states. More than 50 years of standardisation in most aspects of military operations has not overrun the fact that NATO is made up of 19 independent states with different languages, culture, military tradition and to a large degree national equipment. A peace enforcement action which in most cases would be an offensive joint military operation including at least ground, air, and perhaps naval elements is very complex. It is therefore from a military point of view relevant to maintain that CPOs should in the foreseeable future be limited to second generation peacekeeping as the highest ambition.

This limitation does not exclude mutual support to peace enforcement. Such support implies that for instance NATO forces are not an integrated part of the Russian force, but have a separate mission to support the operation. The other possibility is Russian support to a NATO enforcement operation. Relevant examples of such co-operation between Russia and the West in the field of mutual support could be:

- Russian strategic air lift capacity would be a vital asset in any military operation
- Russian operational and tactical lift with fixed or rotary wing aviation
- Intelligence
- Western support with delivery of smart weapons
- Western sea lift support
- Logistic support
- Western financial support
- Rear area and flank security
• Support operations in other directions as a separate, but co-ordinated force.

When discussing potential Russian-Western co-operation in peace enforcement operations it is necessary to underline that the above-mentioned aspects are seen from a strictly technical military perspective. The prospects for a Combined Peace Enforcement Operation or even mutual support to such action are at the moment rather grim, as there is still a deep mistrust between the Kremlin and the Western capitals.

Personnel

‘In war, the relative strength of forces count ¼, and the morale ¾’.
Napoleon Bonaparte

The rate of attrition among career officers in the armed forces is ‘significantly exceeding’ the rate of planned cuts. There are reports that every 10th officer post is vacant and that there is a 20 per cent shortfall among platoon and team commanders, with that figure rising to 30 per cent in some eastern military districts. This development is believed to be caused by the fact that one-third of officers with more than 20 years’ service are seeking to retire, while almost half of newly graduated officers opt for resignation upon completing their education. In all, almost 20,000 officers under the age of 30 resigned last year (RFE/RL Newsline, 15 October 1999).

The Defence Ministry’s inability to retain in the service its best young officers is not a new phenomenon. It has a devastating impact on the army’s morale and capabilities. It has contributed to a ‘greying’ of the officer corps, the result being that older, more conservative officers stay in the service while their often more dynamic junior colleagues leave the army. In practical terms, the demographics underlying this loss of officers have meant especially difficult staffing shortages among platoon and unit commanders, contributing directly to the decline of the army’s combat capabilities.

The difficulties of life in uniform and the lack of prospects in the army contribute greatly to this drainage. Participation in peacekeeping operations seems to be one of the effective ways of alleviating the problems of the army personnel. According to available and reliable data there are four to five persons applying for each peacekeeper position among the Russian airborne troops (Koldbodskaya 1999: 4), which so far are only formation used in SFOR and KFOR. The main reason of this interest in peacekeeping missions is without any doubt the pay offered to those who are chosen. Ranks earn approximately 800 US$ a month, and officers from 1000 to 1200 US$. In the short term this will obviously promote recruitment of well-qualified servicemen. In a longer perspective, however, such differences could create envy and serious frictions within the Russian armed forces and even corruption and nepotism, as participation in peacekeeping missions can become the sole material incentive for those serving in the army.

The Ministry of Finances reports that armed forces personnel are still owed 8.7 billion rubles in back wages, while Prime Minister Putin has
pledged that soldiers in combat zones will earn $1,000 a month rather than the usual $300. After meeting with Putin and Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev to discuss funding for the Chechen conflict, Central Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko promised that the bank will issue new state securities to fund the war effort.

Another important problem the Russian authorities have to deal with is economic crime in the armed forces. Military Prosecutor Yuri Demin proclaimed that economic crime is steadily rising in the armed forces and other military branches of the Russian Federation. Crimes uncovered by military prosecutors in the first six months of this year cost the armed forces more than 4.7 million US$. The number of officers found guilty of theft and graft leaped to 1,017 in 1999, compared with 185 over an unspecified period up to 1993 while the number of known cases of bribery in the army rose by 82 per cent in the same period. In August 1999, Demin announced that some 20 lawsuits against generals and admirals are being considered by the military prosecutor’s offices around the country (RFE/RL Newsline, 11 October 1999).

Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow-based Centre for Strategic and Technological Analysis, claims that of the 1.2 million members of the Russian armed forces, no more than 100,000 are combat ready (RFE/RL Newsline, 11 October 1999). The Russian military is largely composed of military conscripts who serve for two years. Defence experts claim that those conscripts spend the first year on training and the last six months preparing to leave.

The current Chechen campaign is in fact a decisive turning point for the morale among Russian generals, officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and conscripts. If the general public concludes that this war was a failure and another humiliation, then it is very probable that it will cause severe, long-lasting damage to all groups of personnel in the Russian armed forces. If, on the other hand, the second Chechen war is to be considered a success, it can give a distinct boost to the armed forces and personnel.

Notwithstanding the problems they face in their duty, Russian soldiers in both Bosnia and Kosovo have shown that they can act according to overall intentions and RoE when they are a part of a multinational peacekeeping force.

**Military Reform**

During most of the 1990s there has been an ongoing planning process to reform the military system (Knoph & Leijonhielm 1999:217). The need for such a reform has been evident since the Soviet period, but the responsible national authorities have not been capable of systematically approaching this challenge. By the second half of 1997 a reform plan was authorised, and the work on changing the Russian military system started. There are, however, indications of disagreement within the leadership of the armed forces concerning the implementation and goals of reforms. The plan is to implement the ongoing reform in two steps to 2005. The intention is to have armed forces with the standard operational ground, air/space and naval elements. The total personnel strength shall not exceed 1.2 million with a mix-
ture of volunteers (professionals) and enlisted (conscripts). The number of military districts is to be reduced from eight to six. Four of these districts are to be reorganised to strategic/operational commands with responsibility for command and control of all forces within their area of responsibility and two are to become territorial commands with the task of preparing and conducting mobilisation of reserves. The reform is also meant to cover the paramilitary forces from the other power ministries and the military-industrial complex. The General Staff will have the overall co-ordinating responsibility for all forces. Some elements of the reform have already been implemented, especially on the organisational part. The financial situation will, however, decide whether the plans of the reform progress will be implemented. Besides the reorganisation of the structure, research and development are prioritised, but procurement of new military equipment will be limited due to economic constraints. Not until some years after 2000 will there be an increase in equipment investments and from 2005 an extended increase in procurement. The ambition is that Russia should have an optimally equipped and trained defence force by 2025.

The drive for military reform in the Russian Federation has been led by economic pressures and the need for savings on operations and for modernisation of the armed forces rather than by changes in Russia’s threat assessments, dramatic as they have been (SIPRI homepage). For a short period after the spring of 1997, after the appointment of Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, some momentum built up for cuts and reorganisation. Since reform involves rather high costs, caused mainly by demobilisation and reequipping of the armed forces, and Russia has not yet recovered from the financial crisis of August 1998, it is unlikely that the country will now meet its target for reduction in troop numbers to 1.2 million by 1999 or transform its forces into a professional army by the end of 2000.

The Russian budget allocation for ‘national defence’ for 1999 was 93.7 billion roubles, 2.3 per cent of GDP, or about 120 billion roubles (3.2 per cent of GDP) if some other budget items such as military pensions and international activities are added. This represents a nominal increase over the 1998 budget but will not cover the costs of demobilisation, promised salary increases, payment of wage arrears or the accumulated Ministry of Defence debt to the arms industry (19 billion roubles in early 1998). Procurement and R&D have been particularly hard hit. Implementation of Russia’s commitments to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons is threatened. Above all, it is generally agreed in Russia that the nuclear forces should have highest priority in the Russian defence posture to compensate for the weakness of the country’s conventional capabilities. The nuclear forces serve as an ‘umbrella’ for implementing military reform and as the only remaining element of the Soviet superpower status.

The main challenge related to CPOs will be to find necessary economic resources to equip and train forces capable of operating and, if necessary, leading multinational formations. There is probably also a requirement for standing formations with professional soldiers. However, it is not likely that in the foreseeable future the military reform will make the Russian armed forces capable of conducting operations with higher ambitions than in
Bosnia and Kosovo, where they were, at least partly, financed by the international community.

Conclusions
The Russian prioritisation of the strategic branch of the country’s armed forces at the expense of the conventional forces and the army in particular gives the Russians little freedom of action when it comes to assigning forces for peace operations. This freedom of action is further limited by the relatively high-profiled Russian internal operations in Chechnya and Dagestan. The lack of co-ordination between the ‘power ministries’ creates difficulties in optimising Russian forces’ contributions to peace operations in general.

The capability of the Russian army at present is limited to combined peace operations in a second generation peacekeeping scenarios, like KFOR or SFOR. For military, financial as well as political reasons it is difficult to expect that the country will have combined peace enforcement capability in the near future. The coming discussion of possible CPOs in the CIS will therefore focus on traditional peacekeeping.

Russian short- and mid-term financial shortcomings as well as internal needs in the Caucasus region limit the amount of forces available for CPOs. Assuming that Russia will limit its contribution to CPOs to airborne troops, the capacity, given political, military and financial conditions, could be two airborne divisions consisting of two regiments each (three battalions) with headquarters and necessary combat support and combat service support. At a higher level one army and/or one corps head-quarters with combat support and combat service support could be available. The options discussed below are based on those numbers.

The financing of Russian participation has to be examined carefully by the West and discussed openly with Russia on a case-to-case basis. The SFOR UN-sponsored model could be an alternative solution. From a strictly financial point of view, the traditional UN peacekeeping operation fits the Russian economy best.

Even though Russian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia seem to be well-paid, lack of payment according to agreements could further demoralise soldiers and officers. Higher wages promote the recruitment of qualified officers and other personnel. At present this is mainly applied to the selection of airborne troops. The long-term effect of creating ‘A’ and ‘B’ teams can have a devastating impact on the morale of the armed forces. This could have a decisive effect on the efficiency and capability of the Russian armed forces in general, and therefore also on the forces taking part in CPOs. On the other hand, a positive Russian contribution to CPOs (as in Bosnia and Kosovo) can have positive spill-over effects on the armed forces in general. The development has to be monitored closely as the negative development will inevitably have a negative impact on Russian peacekeeper behaviour and their ability to act in compliance with international standards.

Even though the conclusion is that conditions for CPOs in a peace enforcement context are not present, this does not exclude mutual support in peace enforcement operations. Possible areas of co-operations are men-
tioned in this chapter. Peace enforcement as such will not be discussed in this report, except for mentioning the option in the overall conclusion.

Experiences show that it is decisive to extend common training, education and exercises to improve capability of both Russian and Western troops to conduct operations within the CPO framework.
**Possible CPOs in the CIS**

The discussion in this chapter is primarily based on arguments and conclusions presented in the previous chapters with comments based primarily on author’s own experience as peacekeepers.

It must be emphasised that the use of military force, also in peace operations should not be an objective *per se*. On the other hand, it has recently (in Bosnia and hopefully Kosovo) been shown that troops on the ground can be a basic tool to create conditions for a peaceful and stable development. The necessary, but ambitious goal of any peace operation should be to achieve that the force has no *raison d’être* and can withdraw (or more realistically, be systematically downsized). In all Russian or Russian-led peace operations in the CIS cease-fires were achieved, only to be followed by a political stalemate. The main purpose of introducing CPOs as an interesting alternative should be to end this stalemate and start working on lasting solutions. A joint Russian-Western peacemaking effort could probably bring about some positive effects, but there is at least one important obstacle to overcome – the lack of political will to find solutions at the highest level in Moscow and Washington (Brussels) to establish the overall political framework including a mandate from the Security Council and/or the OSCE as the legal foundation for joint operations. Sensitive areas, such as command of national forces and command and control in general will probably also have to be dealt with at the highest level.

The experience from the establishment of KFOR showed clearly the importance of high level Russian-American involvement. With this in place, the establishment of the force seemed to tune smoothly on the military level. In the near future co-operation between Russia and the West will probably be based not on an overall agreement but on a case-by-case principle.

This report has previously concluded that a CPO has to be based on a UN Security Council resolution or decision taken by the OSCE. The most relevant and challenging area for CPOs is at present the the CIS area. The two sides are today engaged in two ongoing CPOs in Bosnia and Kosovo. Experiences from the Yugoslav conflict so far indicate that it should be possible to implement a similar concept if (or when) new conflicts should arise in the Balkans. The recent East Timor conflict exemplified that Russia is willing to support operations outside the CIS and Europe if they are mandated by the UN Security Council. The limits on Russian participation in the foreseeable future are due to the lack of resources necessary to deploy large contingents overseas. East Timor is a good example where the Russians supported the decision on the Australian-led peacekeeping force in the Security Council, but did not provide troops to the peacekeeping force. At present the Russians seem to prioritise deployments in the Russian Federation, the CIS and Europe (so far the Balkans).

It seems that CPOs outside the CIS or Europe are rather unthinkable in the foreseeable future. The real challenges are located in the CIS area, but CPOs on Russian ground are ruled out for political reasons. Russia is already involved in four operations in the CIS area and some of them (for instance in Nagorno-Karabakh) could be seen as potential target areas for a CPO.

The conclusions drawn so far in this report indicate quite strongly that cooperation between Russia and the West at present and in the foreseeable
future should be limited to preventive deployment and traditional peacekeeping operations. In other words, peace enforcement does not seem to be relevant at present. This is primarily because:

- From a military point of view, the interoperability (human, linguistic, C2, conceptual and material) between Russian and Western countries to conduct combined joint offensive operations is not yet achieved.
- Politically it is very unlikely that Russia and the West (especially NATO and the US) will be able to reach an agreement on conducting such an operation, especially if I take into consideration the Russian ideas on creation of a multipolar world and the fear of US and NATO dominance, particularly in the ‘near abroad’.

It could, however, be possible to see the West and Russia co-operate in minor-scale operations against terrorism they consider as a common threat. So far there has been no military co-operation, but according to news sources there has been intelligence and police co-operation and discussion of these matters at minister of defence level (Jamestown, 14 September 1999). This area of common interest could be further exploited to establish a base for extended co-operation and increased confidence.

**Force composition including Russian contribution**

A basic assumption in discussing force composition and configuration is that every CPO in the CIS area will be unique and require specific political as well as military measures. A solution that could be acceptable in Moldova could be totally unacceptable in Abkhazia. Furthermore, the question of force composition and configuration will be so important to the Russians (and the West) that it probably would have to be orchestrated before decision in the Security Council or the OSCE. Seen from a Western point of view, this is an important element in discussions with Moscow before eventually mounting a CPO in the CIS area. Based on IFOR/SFOR and KFOR experience, it would be very relevant to point out that Russia will have great difficulties in participating in multinational peace operations above brigade level. Operations within the Russian Federation or on CIS territory will be in the foreseeable future conducted with Russia in the lead chair. Practice in KFOR has shown the Russian peacekeepers have been very eager to show that they are just as impartial as soldiers from the Western major powers. SFOR has operated with three Multinational Divisions (MNDs) dividing Bosnia in their respective Area of Responsibility (AOR). The MNDs are lead by respectively the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The Russian Brigade is a part of the US-led division, made up in addition of the Nordic-Polish Brigade, the Turkish Brigade and US formations.

It could be tempting in order to build more confidence between parties to have at least the ambition of giving the Russian troops greater responsibility. The point of departure should, however, be the SFOR model with independent Russian formations, in most cases with their own AOR. When it comes to command and control, Russia should be able to provide higher echelon head-quarters with necessary infrastructure.
From a military point of view, multinationality has its limitations. As a rule of thumb in peace enforcement, division level should be the lowest one in any multinational operation. This would, however, be very difficult to obtain, so it is perhaps necessary to lower the ambition level to brigade. Most of the European smaller states (like the Nordic ones) are not able to maintain more than a battalion-size force in international operations at any time. Concerning peacekeeping it is important to say that a lower level of intensity of the conflict would require a smaller international (multinational) force to handle it. Battalion level is ideal, but for instance in Moldova company level could be accepted. The problem is that multinational companies seem to not function very well, mainly due to the fact that the responsibility of the commander in personnel matters is pulverised. The SFOR multinational Nordic-Polish Brigade (1996 to 2000) with independent national battalions has proven quite successful by integrating units from a former Warsaw Pact state (Poland) with units from NATO countries (Denmark and Norway) and neutral states (Finland and Sweden). This indicates visibly that if there is a positive will, multinational brigade formations can solve advanced peacekeeping missions. The PfP concept and framework seem to have played a crucial role in creating this capability.

**Mandate – responsibility – type of peace operation**

As previously concluded, it is natural to base the discussion in this report on peace operations based on resolutions in the UN Security Council. Operations without mandate will most probably look like Kosovo or for that matter Chechnya with the West or the Russians operating ‘on their own’ and under strong criticism from the ‘other side’.

As it seems that the CIS will remain in the foreseeable future out of bounds for NATO as an alliance, no peace operation in this area, even approved by the UN Security Council, can be led by NATO. This leads to the next conclusion that if the West want to have influence or participate ‘east of the Balkans’, the OSCE is the organisation to emphasise. Operations on or close to Russian territory will be regarded as ‘internal affairs’ by the Russians and they will not be willing to let others, let alone NATO, to be in charge.

Russia has more or less reluctantly accepted that NATO was allowed by a UN Security Council resolution to be responsible for the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. At present there are few reasons to believe that such arrangements should not be possible in the future as long as:

- The operation is based on a UN Security Council resolution or a decision by the OSCE
- Russia is not a party to the conflict
- The conflict is outside the Russian zone of vital interests
- Russia and the West have a common perspective on the conflict
- The West treats Russia as a serious and equal partner in the diplomatic, political and military actions leading to the peace operation.
By supporting the UN Security Council Resolution 1264 on East Timor Russia has accepted Australia as the leading state in the East Timor peace operation. The resolution also states that the multinational force led by Australia as soon as possible should be replaced by a traditional UN peacekeeping force. It is also interesting to point out the fact that China is mentioned as a potential participant in the Australian-led force (BBC, 16 September 1999). Such a step on the part of China could be a sign of future Russian considerations related to their own participation in joint operations, as it would establish a precedent to be followed in future joint operations.

If the situation so permits, the Russians could accept a peace operation led by other states as well as a traditional UN peacekeeping operation. It is important to bear in mind that while traditional UN peacekeeping operations are paid for by the UN, in all other operations the participating states have to bear the costs themselves. Taking into consideration the poor shape of the Russian economy, this could be a very strong limiting factor with regard to Russian participation in CPOs not financed by the UN. The report has previously mentioned that an alternative to CPOs could be development of a corps of observers or monitors within an OSCE or UN frame. Their organisation would include representatives from Western countries and the task would be to monitor and observe peace operation forces from Russia and/or other CIS states, as it is case already today in Georgia and Tajikistan.
### Responsible organisations in CIS area operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN</th>
<th>OSCE</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>PfP</th>
<th>(W)EU</th>
<th>CIS</th>
<th>GUUAM</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAPABILITY</td>
<td>TRAD. PEACE-KEEPING</td>
<td>FULL-SCALE PEACE ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>TRAD. PEACE-KEEPING</td>
<td>SECOND GEN.PEACE-KEEPING</td>
<td>PEACE-KEEPING/ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>PEACE-KEEPING?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIAN ATTITUDE</td>
<td>EQUAL PARTNER</td>
<td>NEGATIVE</td>
<td>NEGATIVE</td>
<td>NEUTRAL POSITIVE?</td>
<td>POSITIVE</td>
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<tr>
<td>US ATTITUDE</td>
<td>NO MILITARY ROLE</td>
<td>POSITIVE</td>
<td>POSITIVE</td>
<td>POSITIVE?</td>
<td>NEGATIVE</td>
<td>POSITIVE</td>
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<tr>
<td>REMARKS</td>
<td>SHIRBRIG AS PART OF CPO</td>
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<td>GROWING MILITARY POTENTIAL</td>
<td>NOT LIKELY AS PART OF CPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIVES LEGITIMACY</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>DOUBTFUL</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXTERNAL NEEDS</td>
<td>PROBABLY</td>
<td>MILITARY CAPABILITY</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>FROM NATO</td>
<td>FROM NATO?</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POTENTIAL ROLE IN CPO</td>
<td>POSSIBLE/ PART (SHIRBRIG)</td>
<td>POSSIBLE</td>
<td>VERY DOUBTFUL</td>
<td>DOUBTFUL</td>
<td>EXITING POSSIBILITY</td>
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<td>NECESSARY CONDITIONS</td>
<td>CHANGE IN US ATTITUDE</td>
<td>CHANGE IN US ATTITUDE</td>
<td>CHANGE IN RUSSIAN ATTITUDE</td>
<td>CHANGE IN RUSSIAN ATTITUDE</td>
<td>INCREASED MILITARY CAPABILITY</td>
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When developing its military capability, the European Union should exploit the actual window of opportunity created by the surprisingly positive Russian view on THE Union, also in defence matters. Invitations to incorporate Russian forces in EU-led peace operations is in fact the most interesting challenge I have discovered while working on this report.

### Examples of current peacekeeping solutions

There are some recent very relevant examples of different solutions which could be used in a CPO context:

- Australia as leading state in East Timor
- The United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL), traditional peacekeeping
- NATO tasked by the Security Council in SFOR and KFOR
- The Multinational Force and Observers is an independent (non-UN) peacekeeping mission, created as a result of the 1978 Camp David
Accords and the 1979 Peace Treaty. The MFO’s expenses, less the contributions of Germany and Japan, are funded in equal parts by Egypt, Israel and the USA. Since 1982, various states have contributed military and civilian personnel to serve in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula as part of this highly successful organisation. The ten currently participating states are Australia, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, the United States and Uruguay. Norway, while not a participating state, provides the MFO with four staff officers.

Both the lead state concept and MFO in Sinai are interesting solutions. The purpose of this presentation is to underline that there are several solutions to a peacekeeping challenge, also in a CPO frame. Bearing in mind the conclusion that the question of CPO is first and foremost a political one, creates a wide spectrum of options. Especially THE MFO concept has some noteworthy aspects. It is a force explicitly formed and organised for a specific mission related to one conflict. Perhaps a similar force concept could be agreed upon under the control of Russia, USA and the European Union with the task of conducting a peacekeeping operation in one of the relevant CIS conflicts?

**Contributing states**

In a CPO in the CIS area the need for overall political acceptance of the involved states and Russia in particular will totally overshadow the ideal military requirements related to participating states. The above-mentioned Russian struggle for a multipolar world instead of a US-NATO dominated unipolar one, creates some basic restrictions. The history of the Turkish dominance in the region is a second condition that makes it difficult for non-Muslim states, and Russia especially, to accept NATO member Turkey as a lead nation. Even though the Russian-German relations have developed positively in the last decades, WW II experiences will probably still have an impact on the general attitude to German troops on the former Soviet Union territory. On the other hand, German troops are accepted in the former Yugoslavia (where they also have a bad record from WW II) and KFOR is even commanded by a German general. If an agreement is reached between Russia and the US at the highest political level, many states could be involved in this theoretical operation.

Traditional peacekeeping states like the Nordic ones, and especially the non-NATO but EU members Sweden, Finland and Austria, could be the most acceptable ones from a Russian point of view (even though all of them have a history of turbulent relations with Russia). Reliance on small states in a CPO could lead to continuing Russian domination in the CIS area. The participating small Western states could as a result of this become Russian ‘hostages’. However, if the West wants to participate in CIS peace operations, a ‘soft approach’ through the smaller non-NATO states could be adopted, which in the next turn could create conditions for participation of larger states and NATO members. Such an approach could also help convince the Russians and other involved CIS countries that there is no hidden
agenda or offensive objectives behind deployment of Western forces in a CPO in the CIS area.

The challenge of participating states is also closely related to the organisation in charge of the single operation. The difference in the Russian attitudes to the EU and NATO creates conditions for the EU to play a part in future CPOs in the CIS area. As an element in this positive attitude to the EU, the member states including larger countries such as France, Italy and Spain and perhaps the UK have slight potential as participants in CPOs in the CIS area. Besides the USA, the UK, France, Germany and Turkey have the military capability to play a role of lead state in a complex peacekeeping operation. Spain and Italy probably have the capability to be the leading state in a low-intensity peacekeeping operation, such as for instance Moldova. Peace enforcement would require a US or NATO lead role.

Russia also seems to have a more positive attitude to some Western states. Greece, which happens to be a NATO member, but also a close Russia co-operation partner and an Orthodox nation, is perhaps the most obvious choice. Moscow would probably also have positive views on France, judging Paris as a counterbalance to Washington in European security. Besides the overall Russian and Western preferences it will be necessary to take into consideration the views of the states and/or organisations involved in the conflict. A peacekeeping operation, whether it is traditional or second generation, requires consent of the parties. The report has so far shown that second generation peacekeeping is the highest relevant ambition for a CPO in the CIS area. A possible approach from a Western point of view seems to suggest contribution from one of the great powers supplied with uncontroversial small states. A relevant example would be France plus Greece/Italy and Benelux and/or Nordic countries.

The ideal ambition would be that every unit and single peacekeeper in a peacekeeping force was considered impartial by all parts involved in the conflict. Regrettably this is a totally unrealistic aim. This would in fact exclude most of the states and organisations with military capability. It is therefore much more important to see the whole force or parts of the force as a whole. The force composition must be balanced so the parties to the conflict could see it as impartial, even though some of its elements could be perceived as closer to one of the parties.

**Military requirements**

The composition of forces will depend on whether the operation has a UN Security Council mandate and under what ‘umbrella’ (UN, OSCE, NATO, CIS) it would be conducted. Furthermore, the choice of a traditional multinational UN-led operation or ‘lead nation/organisation’ concept will also have an impact on the composition of forces. From a military point of view the ideal solution would be an operation based on a clear mandate, taking into consideration the determinants of the conflict and geographical conditions under which the force would operate. The force should be built in close cooperation with participating states and if possible approved by Russia and the US. The states will provide the troops necessary to conduct this operation. Unfortunately, the reality will probably be that the commander of the force would have the force structure decided before taking on his duty.
When putting together different states in a multinational peace operation it is important to have in mind what sort of tasks this force would have to handle, whether it will be assigned a peace enforcement role or whether its deployment has a more preventive character. Here follows a brief analysis of various challenges confronting the force in various types of operations.

- Peace enforcement poses many challenges. Military operational requirements seem to be high and solidarity among the participating states is also an important prerequisite. For instance, during the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein tried to split the coalition between the West and the Arab countries by trying to force Israel into engagement. Also in Kosovo Milosevic and some forces in Moscow tried to split the Alliance. The main limitation for a joint peace enforcement operation seems to be the lack of interoperability in complex joint operations and air operations particularly. This can in the future be improved by building on experience from joint peacekeeping and training and exercises under the PfP programme.

- Traditional peacekeeping requires the trust of all parties involved in the conflict, the creation of a force that could be impartial as a whole and sufficient military capability to deter potential threats to the force itself and to the peace process that the force is supposed to protect. SFOR in Bosnia is a relevant example.

- Second generation peacekeeping, including preventive deployment, requires sufficient military capability to be deterrent and have credibility in the area of deployment (UNPREDEP Macedonia). It should not be regarded as having offensive ambitions by the local actors, but should, however, be effective in containing potential conflicts. The deployment area must not be assessed as a bridgehead for operations against the potential ‘aggressor’. It is interesting to notice that the UNPREDEP in Macedonia is in fact one of the few successful UN peace operations. The force fulfilled the intentions of the deployment until China halted the mandate in the UN Security Council. This shows the weakness of the UN Security Council, but it also indicates that preventive deployment can be an underestimated approach to conflict prevention.

Experiences from UN peace operations, in contradiction to the two NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia, give clear evidence of the necessity of a potent and well balanced force. This implies that the force must consist of tailor-made capability in:

- Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I).
- Manoeuvre force trained and prepared for the explicit mission (Ref. underlying principles for peacekeeping)
- Combat Support including combat aviation (CS)
- Combat Service Support (CSS).

In addition to the assets of the force, the commander must have other assets available at the operational and to some extent the strategic level. These assets could include, depending on the needs, air power, amphibious forces,
Possible CPOs in the CIS

naval assets and logistics. The force must be potent enough to deter the belligerent parties. A challenge with Western forces in the CIS area is to find the right balance between deterrence in the area of responsibility and assurance to Russia. Concerning intelligence this has been one of the important lessons learned in the transition from UN- to NATO-led operations in the Balkans. Even though the UN, in order to act impartially, used the term information instead of intelligence, not only the name was inappropriate. A military commander depends on adequate intelligence to fulfil his mission and take care of his personnel (force protection). Obviously there is less need for high-level intelligence in peacekeeping operations than in peace enforcement. On the other hand, it should be up to the force commander to decide what intelligence he or she needs to protect his soldiers and achieve tasks in the best way. Intelligence co-operation in a potential CPO will probably pose a huge challenge. On the other hand, intelligence co-operation seems to function rather smoothly in SFOR and KFOR. Undoubtedly the NATO countries have a well working integrated regional intelligence, but the Russian experience and know-how from the CIS will be vital. Taking into account the pragmatic approach visible in military co-operation, this should also be possible in this field.

Command and control arrangements (C2)

C2 needs a separate paragraph because these elements play a decisive role in any modern military operation. The fact that in peace operations, what a civilian does at the crossroads in Pec only few minutes later can have implications in Moscow and Washington, indicates that this has to be met with a ‘top-down’ approach. In other words, for each mission there has to be developed a specific C2 wiring diagram that regulates responsibility between the participating forces (KFOR being a good example).

The C2 arrangement must be sanctioned at MoD level in the major capitals involved. A C2 arrangement in any kind of military operation should follow ‘One level – one commander principle’. The Russians have not accepted being under NATO command neither in SFOR nor in KFOR. They have negotiated C2 solutions that have been acceptable to NATO. The UN force to East Timor has also an interesting C2 arrangement with Australia as the lead nation. This complies with the principle of simplicity, is quick to establish and is less bureaucratic than a traditional UN peacekeeping operation. On the negative side one should mention that it could create challenges related to impartiality and credibility of the force. Unity of command and simplicity of C2 are decisive in a peace enforcement operation. In preventive deployment and peacekeeping it is strongly desirable from a military point of view, but if the political situation requires more complex and multinational C2 arrangements (not talking about integrated NATO C2), it could be accepted. KFOR and SFOR have shown that politically motivated command and control arrangements work satisfactorily in a peacekeeping operation.
Possible deployments

Moldova
It could become possible to replace the Russia-led peacekeeping operation in Moldavia with an international one. This operation could be a testing ground for the OSCE. This organisation is the one preferred by the Kremlin. This force could be deployed without a political solution of the conflict and as such create conditions for a breakthrough in the work on conflict solution. This would be a classical peacekeeping operation with the following tasks:

- Observe cease-fire
- Support the withdrawal of Russian troops
- Guard Russian ammunition storage sites
- Support the demolition of old Russian ammunition.

The force requirement is estimated at one reinforced battalion task force with extended demolition capacity and competence. In addition movement control competence would be required. The OSCE could serve as a political and military umbrella and costs should be covered by the participating states. The main risk or challenge would be to establish working co-operation with the Russian troops and with the local Russian-speaking population. An important ambition in a CPO would be to let Western Countries Movement Control and EOD (Explosive and Ordnance Demolition) teams support the Russian force withdrawal and ammunition demolition.

Abkhazia
This conflict could evolve into a situation where an international force would be requested. Georgia is very critical of the current Russian operation in Chechnya and may demand the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia as well as troops based there. The CIS mandate might not be prolonged after mid 2000. Georgia then might request a NATO, OSCE or UN force to be deployed there. The most realistic and constructive alternative is probably a UN force. There is already the small-scale UNOMIG deployed in the area of Russia-run peacekeeping operation there. It could be possible to expand UNOMIG to UNPFG without adopting a new Security Council resolution as Russia could of course block such a resolution. Relevant tasks are:

- Monitoring cease-fire
- Ensure safe return of some 250,000 refugees to Abkhazia.

It cannot be taken for granted that the parties to the conflict will be able to reach a peace accord. The Abkhazian side might create all sorts of difficulties for the operation, including direct resistance. A robust force at heavily armed and reinforced brigade level with combat and vertical transport aviation and naval support might be needed to face the challenges in that area. There is also need for an amphibious capability at battalion size within the

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1 These examples were discussed with Pavel Baev, at an informal meeting at PRIO 3 December, 1999
force. Primary risk would be mining and terrorist attacks. The geographic and strategic conditions for such an operation are quite good with the possibility of logistic exploitation of the Black Sea and the fact that the Abkhazians could not count on the support of troops from the Northern Caucasus, as was the case during the fighting in 1992-93.

**Nagorno-Karabakh**

The OSCE has a commitment from the Budapest summit in 1994 to undertake a peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, provided that a peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan is reached. Detailed plans have been developed, but they have not been implemented due to the lack of a peace agreement. The prospects for such an agreement are grim, and even if it is reached, implementation will be difficult. There are great logistic challenges and some of the field commanders are not entirely controllable. A cease-fire would be fragile and often deliberately violated. The political stability in both states is shaky, the leaders may be replaced by coups, tripping up the peace process.

The OSCE hardly has the military capabilities needed to launch such an operation. However, there might be a request for a different ‘peace operation’ aimed primarily at securing the oil pipelines. The international consortium operating in Azerbaijan has started oil delivery from the Caspian Sea and other projects are developing, though slowly. Until now, oil has been delivered to the port of Supsa in Georgia but a new pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan is planned. On Azerbaijan’s territory both pipelines will go less than 100 km north of Nagorno-Karabakh. This can make the oil facilities vulnerable to terrorist attacks and raids. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia are highly interested in international help protecting the pipeline. The OSCE HLPG Planned options are:

- Three classic peacekeeping options supplied with military observers, varying from a 3,917 to a 1,667 strong forces
- One purely military observer option, with altogether 830 men.

All options are based on the same concept, as the basis and the main effort are to be concentrated in the lines of communication (LOC). They furthermore envisage the creation of an area of separation (AOS), monitoring of heavy weapons and special area, flight exclusion zone (FEZ) and certain airfields.

The three peacekeeping alternatives call for a traditional infantry type force supported by engineering troops and aviation. The command and control is divided into three levels.

1. The politico-military strategic level corresponds to the OSCE Ministerial Council/Senior Council/Permanent Council and Chairman in Office.
2. The operational level is the OSCE Head of Mission (HOM) who is the senior command in theatre
3. The tactical level is the military force commander or in OSCE language: Head of Military Force (HMF).
When it comes to financing of the operation, it is assumed that the troop contributing states will be reimbursed for the use of troops and equipment. This concept could help Russia send its troops in spite of economic constraints.

Comments
Two Russian officers serve at the OSCE HLPG as special advisors. This indicates that Russia is willing to at least investigate the possibility for OSCE peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh. It is also a point that the head of HLPG is a French brigadier general, and he might perhaps be an acceptable force commander. It seems, however, that even the most robust force proposed by HLPG would be insufficient. The force should have combat aviation and air support available, at least in theory. The command and control arrangement can imply direct interference from high level and little freedom of action for the military commander on the ground. There are many logistic and infrastructure challenges that could complicate deployment, maintenance and withdrawal. The most important objection is the fact that the OSCE never has set up a large mission with formed military units. The first OSCE mission is probably better served by being launched in the less complex Moldova. My suggestion concerning Nagorno-Karabakh would be an EU French-led CPO with Russian units included and of course massive Russian support units.
Overall Conclusions

Peacekeeping, including second generation peacekeeping, is the highest CPO ambition for the next five years. Several political as well as military factors strongly limit the possibility of launching a peace enforcement operation. The current operations within the SFOR and KFOR frameworks show clearly that Russian-Western military co-operation in peacekeeping operations works well when the overall political issues are settled. Both Russian and Western commanders, officers and other ranks generally behave pragmatically in negotiations and according to internationally accepted standards in the field. The question of combined peace operations is a political question and that only. CPOs have to be based on UN Security Council resolutions or OSCE decisions. It seems evident that the main obstacle is the lack of political will in Moscow, Washington, Brussels and other capitals. At present there are two political and one politico-military major uncertainties that will have major influence on the prospect of launching a CPO on CIS territory:

- Russia’s course under Putin
- The priorities of the American president and administration from January 2001
- The outcome of the second Chechen war.

With respect to CPOs on CIS territory the main challenge will be to convince Moscow that such operations can promote peaceful and stable development, and that it is not a bridgehead for ambitious Western military intervention and policy in the Russian near abroad. Western leaders are aware that they have to have Russian acceptance for such an operation. Time and patience are crucial elements in achieving Moscow’s recognition of Western participation. The obvious paradoxical situation related to CPOs in the CIS area is that the best military solution, NATO, seems totally unacceptable from a Russian political point of view. The development in the Alliance of Combined Joint Task Forces as headquarters for Peace Support Operations and closer cooperation with Russia through the Partnership for Peace programme could ease tensions between the potential partners in a CPO. It is obviously relevant to ask whether a CPO in the CIS is possible at all in the foreseeable future.

The CIS is promoted by Russia as a relevant framework for peace operations within its own area, and is in fact already operating with Russia in peace operations. It does not seem credible that Western states would join this special CIS/Russian peacekeeping concept. There are several obvious political as well as military reasons for this. The most important political one is the risk of acting as a guarantor of Russian (or other CIS states) near abroad policy and conduct. It would also be very difficult to solve problems related to the establishment of command and control routines. UN has a well-tested but so far not successful concept for peacekeeping. In this organisation, Russia and the West are equal partners, which opens possibilities. The UN plays a role in Georgia, and could play a larger role in a small-scale operation using for instance its SHIRBRIG capability. After several UN failures in the former Yugoslavia it is doubtful whether the major West-
ern powers once more would be involved in traditional UN operations in the vicinity of its borders.

The lead state concept utilised by the UN in East Timor can be held open as an option with for instance France taking on that role. The OSCE plays an active monitoring role in the CIS, a role that could be extended to peacekeeping. Not wanting to end up like the UN, the organisation must achieve a success in its first peacekeeping operation. Since the OSCE lacks almost completely military capability it should be a small-scale operation. The OSCE has for years been planning for Nagorno-Karabakh, which actually might be too large-scale, if the operation is to be conducted without NATO support or without a major European power as lead nation. Moscow would most probably veto the first option, and it will probably be difficult to find candidates for the second alternative.

A European Union with its own defence identity and capability might turn out to be an interesting new peacekeeping option, also in the CPO in the CIS area. The Kremlin might see a strengthened Europe as a step towards a multipolar world. This positive Russian attitude to the EU compared with the negative perception of NATO could actually become a window of opportunity for the EU in peace operations. This could be what they are searching for with their Petersberg tasks and independence of USA. In the next five to seven years it will, however, be very difficult to expect the EU to be capable of launching anything more than a second generation peacekeeping operation.

**Positive conditions**

The positive practical results from for instance Bosnia, Kosovo and to some extent the OSCE summit show that behind the rhetoric there is an acceptance of the common dependence on co-operation in order to protect, preserve and develop security in Europe. In the final phase of the Helsinki negotiations prior to the deployment of KFOR, Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev appeared very constructive. Even though it may be hazardous to rely solely on such limited experience, it is an important indication.

Some of the newly independent states in the former Soviet Union have a westward orientation. Georgia, which also has unresolved issues with ongoing Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations, will probably constantly drive the process of implementing Western forces in the operations. Even though Russia at present is very negative to the GUUAM initiatives, this group can conflict positively on the Western will to be involved in the CIS area.

Taking into account economic interests, mainly oil production and distribution, the West can become increasingly interested in ensuring a stable development in the Caucasus and in the Caspian area. It seems evident that this can be achieved most constructively in co-operation with Russia.

Russia needs economic and other support. Its participation in the G-8 and the Council of Europe creates possibilities for the West to advocate in these organisations a joint effort by the West and Russia in achieving peace, stability and human rights in the former Soviet states.

There are clear indications of a lack of Russian military capability to handle several conflicts with adequate forces in the CIS area. This might
lead to the conclusion in the Kremlin that a CPO is an acceptable solution to hinder the spread of conflicts to Russian territory.

**Negative conditions**
There are very few signs of Russian movement towards the acceptance of Western peacekeeping troops in the CIS area. They do not even accept Ukrainian forces. Simultaneously the West has shown no or little intention, interest, will or capability to participate in former and ongoing peace operations in the CIS area.

The media are full of evidence of friction and harsh statements made by Russian leaders commenting on relations with the West. This has been the case both during the Kosovo and the Chechnya conflicts. From the Russian side leading officers in the MoD (Marshal Sergeyev, Colonel General Ivashov) and General Staff (General Anatoliy Kvashnin, Colonel General Valeriy Manilov) have spoken with at smell of Cold War thinking. This has been documented in writing through the draft military doctrine published in October 1999. It is quite difficult to see a clear-cut overall strategy from the Russian side. Discrepancies between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff make Russian actions unpredictable. Surprises like the capture of the Pristina airport are most likely to happen in the future as well. The Russian friction between the political and military establishment could impact negatively on co-operation. It could in fact imply that a CPO in CIS will be judged as too a risky a project by the major Western powers.

The West has so far shown little will to send its military forces to peacekeeping operations in the CIS. It has been more or less silently accepted that the area is a zone of Russian vital interests. It is perhaps a good approach to avoid dangerous confrontations with the Russians, but in the long run it might not be a good way to ensure peaceful and democratic development in the region.

**The way ahead**
This report concludes that there is a slight potential for combined peace operations in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Assuming that there is a positive attitude to CPOs in the major Western capitals, the overall challenge will be to convince Russia that CPOs in the CIS also could be in Moscow’s interest. In order to achieve this it is necessary to focus on the need of getting out of the stalemate and finding political solutions to the conflicts. It should help Russia understand that stability in the region is definitely in its interest.

Both the West and Russia should be interested in launching combined peace operations. Such operations provide an opportunity to develop confidence, trust and ethically and morally high performance standard of single soldiers, NCOs, officers and units in joint peace operations. They also serve as a good school for the participating parties. Such operations can help create conditions for better mutual understanding and confidence between
the military of Russia and the West and in a longer run improve relations between authorities, politicians and peoples in general.

The Russian attitude to NATO and the USA and Russia’s struggle against a unipolar world dominated by Washington nonetheless give rise to some difficulties. It would be rather difficult to see Russia accept NATO military presence and action on CIS territory, as it would be interpreted as encroaching on Russia’s vital interests rather than a friendly support for solving problems in Russia’s neighbourhood. Russia’s preoccupation with creation of a multipolar world with several centres of power could on the other hand create better conditions for the involvement of the EU with a more integrated military structure based on the CFSP and ESDI. In the shorter term it seems though that the UN and the OSCE are the only security organisations with some potential of involvement in combined peace operations in the CIS area.

This option is perhaps less tempting from a Western point of view, but it can give a possibility of ensuring higher standard of peace operations and their compliance with UN and OSCE requirements. The West could participate in the following ways:

- Observers and monitors following the Russian and/or CIS operations
- Western force provisions to Russian/CIS-led operations on a bilateral level

The following points are crucial when assessing the possibility of Russian-Western co-operation in peace operations on CIS territory:

- Western participation in the CIS area needs Russian acceptance and a political will from the West to be involved. The West must have an indirect approach and limit its ambitions. Initially the main aim for the Western participation in the CIS area should be to stabilise and improve relations with Russia and other CIS states.
- The operation must be sanctioned by the UN Security Council or by the OSCE. Bilateral and/or multilateral agreements could be an alternative, but it less probable that Russia would accept this option.
- The West must have the will to participate in the CIS area, which has not been seen so far.
- If the West wants to participate and not let Russia run the show it is better to adopt a policy of small steps according to a policy that one has more influence with one participating battalion than with none.

It might be possible for the West and Russia to co-operate in minor-scale operations against terrorism they both consider a mutual threat. This area of common interest could be further exploited to establish a base for extended co-operation and increased confidence.

There is an overall necessity for combined Russian-Western training, exercising and education of units and single officers in combined peace operations. The PfP concept should be exploited for this purpose. This is not only for strictly military reasons, but also for development of officer codes,
ethics and morale necessary in future peace operations in a complex environment, where impartiality and code of conduct will be essential.

The prospects of ‘keeping the peace together’ in the Commonwealth of Independent States are rather thin in the nearest future. On the other hand they are present and should be used as a brick in the construction of a peaceful and secure environment we all want to live in.
Literature

Most of the information used in this report comes from newspapers, television, radio and the Internet. My primary sources have been the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, Norwegian and Swedish Broadcasting, the BBC, CNN, Euronews, Deutsche Welle and Russian NTV.

The main Internet sources have been:

The Jamestown Foundation at: www.jamestown.org
Radio Free Europe at: http://www.rferl.org/newsline/fulltext.html,
Stratfor Global Intelligence at: http://www.stratfor.com/
Russia Today at: http://www.russiatoday.com/

Other sources:
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European Union Homepage at: http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=en
Cologne: Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien.


MFO Canadian contingent homepage at: http://www.iaw.on.ca/~awoolley/mfo.html


*NATO STANAG aap6 Glossary of Terms and Definitions* http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap6.htm

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Database of the Centre for Russian Studies at: http://www.nupi.no/russland/russland.htm


OSCE Homepage at: http://www.osceprag.cz/indexe-fa.htm


SHIRBRIG at: www/shirbrig/dk


UN glossary at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/

UN Homepage at: http://www.un.org/


Abbreviations

AFSOUTH  Allied Forces South Europe
AOR    Area of Responsibility, military term
C2    Command and Control
C3I Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
CNR Commission on National Reconciliation, Tajikistan
CPF CIS’s Collective Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan
CPO Combined Peace Operations, including Russian and Western (NATO/EU) forces
CS Combat Support including combat aviation
CSS Combat Service Support
CST Collective Security Treaty of the CIS
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ESDI European Security and Defence Identity
EU European Union
GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova
IFOR Implementation Force, the first NATO-led CPO peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
HLPG High Level Planning Group, OSCE Military Planning Group, explicitly for Nagorno-Karabakh
JCC Joint Control Commission, North Ossetia
KFOR Kosovo Force, the NATO-led CPO in Kosovo
MND (N) Multinational Division North SFOR, US-led with RUSBDE
MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MoD Ministry of Defence
MoI Ministry of the Interior
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC Nuclear, Bacteriological and Chemical (anti) warfare
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NUPI Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OGRF Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKO Peacekeeping Operation, UN term
PLANELM Permanent planning element to exercise all the pre-deploy- ment functions of SHIRBRIG, and on deployment, to become the nucleus of the deployed brigade head-quarters.
PARP Planning and Review, process within PfP
PCC Partnership Co-ordination Cell, NATO partner countries
PfP Partnership for Peace
PSEs PfP Staff Elements
PSO Peace Support Operations, NATO term
RoE Rules of Engagement
RUSBDE SFOR Russian Brigade
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US General
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force, the follow-up CPO to IFOR</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operations Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observers Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observers in Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observers Mission to Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia II</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTO</td>
<td>the United Tajik Opposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Summary:
The main goal of this study is a detailed discussion of various possible scenarios for future Russian-Western co-operation in the field of peace-keeping on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

In order to place the topic in a proper context the author takes a closer look at various political, mental, historical and not least purely technical determinants limiting the potential scope of the joint peace-keeping.

The study contains a detailed analysis of international (UN), Western (NATO, Canada) and Russian peace-keeping terminology. It also discusses the importance and relevance of various international frameworks determining the field, the scope and the geographical dimension of the potential Russian-Western co-operation, as well as the practical experience from the joint peace-keeping missions in the former Yugoslavia. The study gives a good insight in the history and practice of joint Russian-Western peace-keeping efforts. It also outlines and analyses various practical and political challenges linked with development of this relatively new and still challenging field of co-operation between Russia and the West. As such, it is relevant for both theoreticians of peace-keeping and for those who work with peace-keeping in the field.