Oil and the Two Sudans: A Curse or a Blessing?

Joe Henry Kayombo
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Free2bjo@ yahoo.com

Noragric Department of International Environment and Development Studies
P.O. Box 5003
N-1432 Ås
Norway
Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00
Fax: +47 64 96 52 01
Internet: http://www.nmbu.no/noragric
DECLARATION

I, Joe Henry Kayombo, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature………………………………..
Date………………………………………..
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to God for His sustenance. To Him is the glory. To my family and friends for the encouragement. To Brenda Bukowa my friend and Bernice my girl.

The thesis is also dedicated to the people of South Sudan.
South Sudan gained its independence in 2011 after two long civil wars that claimed about 2 million people and displaced almost 4 million. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005 ended Sudan’s decades of civil war with the South. The causes of the civil wars were underdevelopment, marginalisation of the Southern Region, Darfur, Kordofan, the Blue Nile, the eastern regions, and the Khartoum-led government’s desire to make the entire Sudan and an Arab state with Islam as its religion. At independence, South Sudan went away with 3/4 of the oil that was unified Sudan’s primary commodity. From oil revenues, the government constructed refineries and oil pipelines in the north leaving the South underdeveloped. South Being a landlocked country, it relies on Sudan’s pipeline. Sudan has been charging South Sudan almost $25 per barrel (the most expensive in the world) for the use of the pipeline.

After South Sudan’s independence, many issues remained unresolved with its neighbour, Sudan. Among the unresolved issues include the borderline and the disputed areas like Abyei. This thesis aims at examining how the oil and pipeline have shaped the post-independence relationship between the two nations. The thesis looks at how oil can bring peace between the two countries while highlighting which country is benefiting more from the oil. The Study used a qualitative method with the use of interviews, documents, books and online journals blended to compile data presented in this paper. One on one interviews were done with respondents in April 2015 in Juba, South Sudan. The respondents included University and college lecturers, politicians, embassy officials, researchers, journalists, editors, civil society organisations as well as policy analysts. The findings have been analysed using the offensive realism theory. The Analysis indicates that South Sudan is rich in oil but lacks access to markets, refineries and the oil pipeline. On the other hand, Sudan has less oil but has a well-developed oil industry supported by refineries and the pipeline. To compensate for the shortfall or loss of oil to South Sudan, Sudan is charging high prices that bring to the 50/50 ratio, a ratio that was there during the CPA period. The thesis found that the oil has affected the unresolved issues, especially those concerning the disputed areas. Both are weak states with civil wars going on in their respective territories straining the relationship further. There are accusations of each country supporting the rebels in the other country.
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This research has been a mixture of exciting as well as inspiring experiences. Its successful completion has been made possible by a lot of organisations and individual people.

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Joe H Kayombo

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Oslo, Norway.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BBC…………………………..British Broadcasting Corporation
CIA………………………….Central Intelligence Agency
CNPC……………………….China National Petroleum Corporation
CPA………………………..Comprehensive Peace Agreement
GDP………………………..Gross Domestic Product
GNPOC…………………….Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
GOS………………………..Government of Sudan
GOSS……………………..Government of South Sudan
IDPs……………………….Internally Displaced Peoples
IGAD……………………….The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF…………………………International Monetary Fund
NCP…………………..…….National Congress Party
SAF………………….………Sudan Air Force
SANU…………………....Sudan African Nationalist Union
SDBZ…………..…………saf demilitarized border zone
SPLM/A………………….Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM-DC…………………Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Democratic Change
SPLM-IO…………………..Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition
SPLM-N…………………..Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North
SSLM……………………..Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SRF…………………………Sudan’s Rebel Front

TFA………………………..Transitional Financial Arrangement

UN………………………….United Nation

USA………………………….United States of America
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.2. Introduction
The relationship between Sudan and South Sudan started in 2011 with the independence of South Sudan from Sudan. The two countries existed together as one amidst many grievances often expressed in the form of violent conflict. Before South Sudan’s independence, the relationship between the government in Khartoum and the Southern Region was composed of the oppressor and the oppressed, the government being the oppressor and the Southern Region being the oppressed. The Southern Region was left out in the sharing of resources especially the oil extracted in the South. Khartoum’s historical oppression was the cause of the two protracted civil wars and the secession of South Sudan. After South Sudan’s independence, their co-existence has not been one filled with peace and cooperation. Many people lost their lives due to the two civil wars. The civil war ended in 2005 after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This thesis is going to look at the role of oil and the pipeline in Sudan’s post-independence relationship.

1.3. Background

1.3.1. First Civil War
The unified Sudan got its independence from Egypt and Britain in 1956. Though the country attained independence, it has had relatively a few years of peace. The first civil war in Sudan started in 1955 to 1972 between the predominant Arab-led Khartoum government and the troops based in the Equatoria Province, in the Southern Region. One of the causes of the first civil war was the dissatisfaction of the Southerners with the Arab-led Khartoum government¹. Among the factors that caused the South’s dissatisfaction was the government’s refusal to have a federal system of government. The first civil war led to the government of Sudan to grant autonomy to the Southern Region after the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord in 1972.

1.3.2. Second Civil War

The second civil war, (1983 to 2005) started due to the Southern Region’s lack of socio-economic development perpetrated by the GOS. According to Douglas Johnson, other factors that led to the beginning of the first civil war are Khartoum’s desire to have a national identity based on Arabic culture, language and Islam as well as its involvement and interference in the choosing of the Southern Region’s leaders (Johnson D. 2011). Other grievances highlighted by Douglas Johnson include the planned construction of the refinery outside of Bentiu, the building of the pipeline to Port Sudan as well as the development of the Jonglei canal. The other point of contention was Khartoum’s redrawing of the Southern Region’s borders. The redrawing of the borders was a grievance because it was viewed by the people of the South as a way of making the oil be part of the areas of the North. According to Johnson, other regions within Sudan shared the aspect of underdevelopment. Though the factors listed above prompted the start of the second civil war, the discovery of oil by Chevron, a US-based oil company also fuelled the second civil war.

When the civil war ended, Sudan and South Sudan entered into an agreement called the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA allowed both parties to split the oil wealth in a 50/50 ratio. However, when South Sudan got its independence, the 50/50 oil wealth sharing agreement was annulled. South Sudan took away 380 000 barrels a day of oil production leaving the North with only 120 000 of oil production per day. The CPA also made the GOS to give the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) US$7 billion between 2005 and 2010 (Natsios 2012). The CPA, other than presenting the framework through which oil revenues could reach the South, gave provisions for the formation of the GOSS in Juba. It also allowed the GOSS to use English as the official language and not to be under the Islamic law. In other words, the CPA was a form of addressing the GOSS’ grievances against the government of Sudan while defining a new South Sudan state.
1.4. Statement of the Problem

South Sudan is a 250,000 square mile landlocked country surrounded by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The newest member to have joined the family of nations is potentially an agricultural country though it has various minerals under its soil such as copper, gold, iron in addition to oil. According to Wai Dunstan, South Sudan possesses economic potentials but is challenged by the distance to the markets (Wai 2012). On the other hand, Sudan is now the third largest country in Africa with a total area of 728,215 square miles. When compared to South Sudan, Sudan has a port on the Red Sea, which makes import and export of products easier. The conflict between the GOS and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) did not only result from structural inequalities rather it was printed on the cultural fabric of society. The North with its power centre in Khartoum and the general Arab population viewed the Southerners not as Sudanese but as slaves. According to Yosa Wawa, the Northerners considered the Southerners as ‘abid’ an Arabic name for slaves while the Southerners looked at the Northerners as ‘Mundukuru’, which means foreigner. There has been discrimination between the North and the South that created a stratified society with Southerners being looked upon as not being worthy sons of the land save only the Arabs (Wawa 2005).

There are many unresolved post-secession problems between Sudan and South Sudan, which include among others the border and the oil pipeline. The unresolved issues also include the state called Abyei that has been trying to join South Sudan. According to the report published by Concordis International, the CPA did not adequately address the border challenge. The same report indicates that little attention has been given to the security and safety of the communities living in the border areas. There is also a limited capacity on the side of both states to foster border governance and security, which has rendered the fields around the borderline to be fragile (Concordis International Sudan Report 2010). On the part of Abyei, Sudan has been objecting the region’s desire to join South Sudan with the rejection of the October 2013 held referendum. Regarding oil infrastructure, Sudan has a well-developed infrastructure with three refineries and the oil pipeline. The South Sudan’s oil infrastructure is only limited to extraction though plans are underway to build a refinery and a pipeline between South Sudan and Kenya.
According to Akongdit, Sudan and South Sudan offer a commercially attractive framework regarding how to manage the oil industry. With a good relationship and stable political environment, there are significant opportunities for economic growth in both nations (Akongdit 2013). Akongdit further argues that the South has a lot of opportunities for agricultural development that is enveloped by vast unexploited natural resources. The North has benefited from the oil economy that has led to a well-built institutional capacity and human resources able to attract foreign direct investment. South Sudan is still yet to have its structures strengthened. However, despite both governments having economic opportunities, the relationship has some challenges if not many. This outlook has prompted the desire to carry out research with the aim of examining the role of the oil and the pipeline in the post-independence relationship between the two countries. The program of International Relations at the University of Life Sciences and its literature motivated this study.

Sudan and South Sudan have similar political environments in that soldiers rule both. Concerning Sudan, tracing its political history from the time of Egyptian rule in the 1800s, Khartoum has been the center of power. Sudan’s inherited democracy at independence did not last long. Since Sudan’s independence, regions outside Khartoum have been fighting for inclusion in politics (Cockett 2010). There are more than 18 political parties though there is less chance of removing the National Congress Party (NCP) from power. The NCP is the current party in power under Omar al-Bashir who became president after a successful coup in 1989. He is well known for his brutal tactics of crushing rebellions in both Darfur and other regions.

In South Sudan, the political dispensation has its roots embedded in John Garang’s rebel movement under the SPLA, which later became a political party forming a government. Most of the politicians were soldiers ranging from army generals to officers and commanders. The death of John Garang saw Salva Kiir taking over as the president of the GOSS and leader of the SPLM/A. According to Douglas Johnson, Salva Kiir though a soldier was not a well-known figure. Douglas Johnson adds that Salva Kiir lacked the charisma and qualities possessed by Garang (Johnson D. 2011). There are many opposition parties in South Sudan though the notable ones are the SPLM-DC and the SPLM-IO; both are breakaways from the
SPLM/A. The SPLM-IO is a rebel movement under Riek Machar fighting the current government in power. Lam Akol, who tried to challenge the SPLM and its leadership during the 2010 election, is the leader of the SPLM-DC. He lost and months later went into exile in Sudan due to political intimidation and returned in 2013.

The GOSS has been spending heavily on defence due to rebel and militia activities within the country. The militia activities have resulted in mass displacement of people in some areas causing humanitarian crises. Despite challenges from militias and rebels, South Sudan lacks health facilities, infrastructure development, provision of basic education and the capacity to attract productive foreign investment. South Sudan is also having challenges of law and order, resettlement of the displaced people and food security (Takeuchi 2014). Due to these challenges, South Sudan as a new nation has been left with less or no choice but to depend heavily on foreign aid for relief. These challenges have also created an opportunity for profit and non-profit organisations in areas that include education, health, and transport. The challenges still stand in GOSS’ way regarding providing peace and security for all. Some of these challenges had existed before the country got its independence. However, today, South Sudan has not completely left its past as these challenges still lurk behind like a shadow (Ibid 2014).

1.5. Research Objectives
The following are the research’s objectives:

1.5.1. Objectives
1) To examine the role of oil from South Sudan in the relationship between the two states (South Sudan and Sudan)

2) To explore the potential, the oil has to bring about socio-economic development for both states
1.6. Main Research Question

The main research question is: How has South Sudan’s oil shaped the post-independence relationship between Sudan and South Sudan?

1.6.1. Sub Research Questions

1. How can the oil be a tool for strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries i.e. South Sudan and Sudan?

2. Is Sudan using the privilege of owning the pipeline to influence domestic politics in South Sudan?

3. Which country is benefiting more from the oil in the post-independence relationship?

1.7. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis has six (6) chapters. The first chapter (Chapter 1), the introduction, presents the study’s background, statement of the problem, research question, and an outline of the research’s contents. Chapter two (2) gives the background information on both Sudan and South Sudan before the later got independence. It also describes the economic, political and social composition of both states while narrating the history and causes of the two civil wars. Chapter three (3) looks at the theoretical framework. It discusses the rationale behind the adoption of the offensive realism theory in explaining the oil and the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan after 2011. Chapter four (4) gives the method of data collection. It provides a discussion on what method was used to gather data and why it was chosen. Chapter five (5) discusses and analyses the findings regarding the research question. Chapter six (6) provides the conclusion of the study.
CHAPTER 2: BASIC INFORMATION ON SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

2.1. Introduction

Sudan's population estimate has been a challenge, but the United Nations (UN) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have often estimated it to be between 30 and 45 million before the independence of South Sudan. Sudan’s current population is estimated to be around 30 million and that of South Sudan around 15 million. The two countries do have divergently composed ethnic groups with Sudan being dominantly Arab and South Sudan being African. This chapter provides background information on the two states touching on politics, the two civil wars, ethnic, oil and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as well as how the natural resources affected the conflict. The background of the relationship is from the time Sudan was one to the time South Sudan got its independence in 2011.

2.2. CIVIL WARS

2.2.1. The First Civil War (1955-1972)

Sudan’s independence in 1956 from Britain and Egypt was not out of national consensus expressed through a constitution. There were still disagreements on a permanent constitution with issues such as whether it should be a unitary or a federal state. The other question was whether it should be a secular or Islamic state (Johnson D. 2011). At independence, these issues were not addressed by having a constitution. Douglas Johnson says that most of the Southern politicians wanted a federal system to protect Southerners’ rights. The Northerners refused federalism because they thought it would lead to the independence of the Southern Region. The political, as well as social, economic tendencies by Khartoum, can be viewed from historical practices originating from the Turco-Egyptian era. The Turco-Egyptian era is vital to Sudan not only historically but also politically due to its role in unifying all the small kingdoms and sultanates resulting in a state of Sudan. The Turco-Egyptian era also incorporated the Southern Region as a servile frontier land for resource extraction (Ylönen 2009). Ethnic identities, coupled with histories, reinforced by cultural integration, sub-
regional separation as well as uneven economic and social development inflamed the first civil war. The other causes include the irregular relationship between the developed North and vulnerable underdeveloped South (Rothschild 1997). The government also adopted the education system practiced by the British colonial masters. Sudan educated only the Southerners it needed to fill up junior clerical posts in the government (Johnson D. 2011). It is important to note that it’s not only the Southern Region that suffered marginalisation and exploitation but areas such as the north, Darfur, Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile. In this neglect both Muslims and non-Muslims suffered, which leaves out the argument that the neglect of the South was motivated by religion. However, when it came to recruitment into lower echelons of civil service, the South suffered more because of the lack of education. Also in this area, religion was used to ‘sieve’ the South because of names.

The rulers of Sudan since independence have always perpetuated and strengthened the exploitative relationship between the South and the North. The perpetuation of the selfish tendencies resulted in the violent exploitation of resources from the Southern Regions as well as Darfur, Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile. The tendencies caused the Southern Region’s political figures such as William Deng, Joseph Oduho, Aggret Jaden and Fr. Saturnino Lohure to go into the bush. The Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU), a rebel movement, was born at this time in neighbouring Uganda where the rebels were in exile. The guerrillas became known as the Anyanya Anyanyas, a local term meaning snake venom/poison (Johnson D. 2011). In 1969, an unstable coalition government led by Nimeiri Gaafar (president 1969-1985) sought a peaceful solution to the Southern Region’s problem that resulted in the appointment of Joseph Garang a communist to the cabinet (Khalid 2010) as minister of Southern Affairs. However, Garang could not bring back the people who were fighting in the bush. The 1971 failed coup against the government led to the execution of Joseph Garang and some other communists. Joseph Garang and his group were accused of being part of the coup. Abel Alier, another politician from the Southern Region, replaced Joseph Garang. At this stage, Ethiopia became involved in the civil war due to Sudan’s support for Eritrea’s secession. Israel was drawn into the civil war due to Idi Amin becoming Uganda’s president in 1970. Idi Amin enrolled a lot of Southern Sudanese into his army. The government of Uganda being Israel's friend meant that the guerrillas had a secured regular supply of arms and training (Johnson D. 2011). In 1971, the rebel movement was known as
the Southern Sudan Liberation Front. The liberation movement later became known as the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM).

In 1972, Nimeiri (GOS) and Lagu (SSLM) signed the Addis Ababa Agreement that saw the end of the civil war. The peace agreement was signed with the aim of having a unified Sudan. It did not go with the need to have an independent South Sudan though it saw Lagu and his counterpart Abel Lier getting positions in Nimeiri’s government. Many Southerners exiled and within Sudan, were not happy with the Addis Ababa agreement. The peace accord saw three provinces receiving autonomy. The provinces are Upper Nile, Equatoria, which is present day Al Istiwai, and Bahr el Ghazal. The autonomy was in all matters of governance within the area of the province’ jurisdiction except defence, finance and currency, economic and social planning, foreign affairs as well as issues related to regional affairs. According to Hilde Johnson, President Nimeiri did not respect the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement. There was no economic development in the South while the president continued interfering in the affairs of the South (Johnson H. 2011).

**Figure 1: Map of unified Sudan.**

2.2.2. Second Civil War (1983-2005)

In 1983, the second civil war started when battalions in three Sudanese garrisons in Bor, Ayod and Pibor mutinied. According to Hilde Johnson, the failure of the Nimeiri government to respect the Addis Ababa agreement also contributed to the start of the second civil war (Johnson H. F. 2011). According to Hilde Johnson, though the agreement had promised self-government it did not grant self-determination neither did the rebels get integrated into the army. According to Sofie Dreef and Wolfgang Wargner (2013), Khartoum abolished the Southern government and legislative assembly. The region was also re-divided into three provinces and its autonomy significantly reduced. The same report stated that in 1983, in the wake of the above developments the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was born led by Colonel Dr. John Garang, de Mabior a Dinka. At first, the movement was not seen as representing the entire Southern Region because of its process of recruiting members mostly from Dinka and Nuer tribal areas.

According to Paul Collier, the SPLM/A was perceived by other tribes in the Southern Region as Nilotic or mainly a Dinka movement whose agenda was to reverse the division of the Southern region as well as destroy Equatoria region and impose Dinka way of life. Despite this opposition, the movement got some support from the people along the banks of the White Nile, as well as Equatoria. At this stage, secession was not the objective but having a reformed and unified Sudan. With the Derg regime in Ethiopia being the chief supporter, the SPLM operated under the theme of establishing a secular, socialist and united Sudan. During the war, some of these objectives shifted but the desire to liberate Sudan remained (Collier 2005). Though there were politicians, intellectuals, university lecturers and students in the SPLM, its political-military command remained in the hands of the soldiers. The end of the Derg regime in Ethiopia in the 1990s was a set back to the SPLM. Sudan’s second civil war came to an end in 2005 with the signing of the CPA.
2.3. Wealth Sharing

According to Luke Patey, the oil boom that fell upon Sudan was one of the most significant developments to occur in the country’s economic history. However, he argues that the petrol dollars coming into the economy during the economic boom were not used for social and economic development. He argues that this was due to “the NCP’s exploitation of oil for political power and personal enrichment” (Patey 2014:186). A large part of the oil was coming from the Southern Region, which lagged behind regarding development. The economic boom also saw the construction of pipelines, refineries and other oil related infrastructures in the North. The building of the pipeline and refineries in the North contributed to the civil war, as the South wanted the pipeline to be constructed via Kenya. The oil companies according to Patey had poor environmental policy management that was a threat to the people’s lives dwelling in the oil areas. This also added to the grievances. The map below shows the new South Sudan with its states.

FIGURE 2: Map of South Sudan showing states and their major towns

![Map of South Sudan showing states and their major towns](http://paanluelwel.com/2014/07/18/). (Accessed on 30 Nov 2015)
2.4. Political Regimes in Both States

2.4.1. Politics in Sudan

Egypt ruled Sudan on behalf of the Ottoman Empire from the 1820s with Khartoum becoming its capital. Richard Cockett describes Khartoum after the departure of Britain as something that has been experiencing power struggles between the distant regions and the power holders within (Cockett 2010). There have been many political parties in Sudan. One such party is the Umma party that owes its origin and existence to the Mahdi’s enduring legend. The Mahdi created the first independent Sudan after opposing the Egyptians and the British (Cockett 2010). Sudan has many opposition parties giving the country’s political scape a semblance of a democratic environment. However, despite the presence of the many political parties, there is less chance for regime change.

The current party in power is the NCP under Omar al-Bashir, who is a military man. His rule has been characterised by the suspension of the cabinet now and then. Since 1989, he has been at the helm of power with his success based on reliance on religion (because of its appeal to many Sudanese) and support from the security forces (Copnall 2014). Sharia law was introduced in 1981 aimed at the Islamisation of the entire country. The USA put the country on the list of terrorists due to Sudan’s Islamisation agenda. The other reason Sudan was put on the terror list by the USA is due to accommodating of Osama Bin Laden and various terror groups. The isolation mainly by America meant that Sudan became a spot on the fabric of international relations. Few countries wanted to make friends with it. According to Copnall, Sudan stands in the eyes of the world as a failed Islamic project.

Despite having terrorists within its borders, Britain did not wholly abandon Sudan neither did Norway. The former due to its historical relations finding its origins in the colonial times while the latter due to its aid services. Regarding economic partners, China has had a vested interest, especially in the oil. According to Andrew Natsios, China and the GOS controlled more than 75 per cent of the country’s oil production. Despite Sudan being on the USA’s terror list, China did not mind. It was one of the significant economic partners in times when Sudan was under sanctions. Malaysia is another country that has interests in Sudan’s oil.
Before the independence of South Sudan, Malaysia owned 8 per cent of the country’s oil production (Natsios 2012). When the US and its allies identified Sudan as a terrorist supporter, the SPLM/A became pro-West. This changed the US and other western countries’ perception of the SPLM/A. The argument is that this support was vital for the formation of an independent South Sudan.

2.4.2. Politics in South Sudan

John Garang’s legacy as a leader during the second civil war and SPLM/A being that rebel movement has had an impact on the politics of South Sudan. The SPLM/A, which later became a political party in power, was an army as well as a political movement during the civil war. The joining of the political and military has led to some people referring to it as the Siamese twins conjoined at the head i.e. inseparable. Most of the politicians are former army generals, officers and soldiers whose political career relies on links with the military. That is to say, if the military looks well upon them, then a political career might be smooth. With this kind of political environment, the obvious challenge is the capacity for fighters who have just buried their two decades of fighting to manage political offices. John Garang’s ‘political party’ was more autocratic and totalitarian, especially during the civil war. Many writers have argued that had it not been for this kind of political structure, progress in the realisation of an independent South Sudan would not have been possible. However, after his death, Salva Kiir Mayardit was chosen as his replacement. “Kiir did not share in Garang’s vision of a united Sudan” (Natsios 2012:176) hence he went straight into having secession through a referendum. Like Garang, Kiir is a lieutenant general and a president, whose roots can be traced from the army. Riek Machar was his vice president who later rebelled against the government in 2013.

Given the background of South Sudan, i.e. emerging from a bloody civil war, the government has managed to create formal state structures. These include the legislature, judiciary and executive in Juba and other state capitals. According to Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014), influential positions have been given to the leading members of the SPLM/A cadres who normally have the challenge of skills for democratic and economic reforms.
The CPA condensed the intricacies of Sudanese politics into a single relationship between the NCP (Sudan) and the SPLM (South Sudan) (Copnall 2014). It also resulted in the formation of the GOSS. The opposition parties were shut out during the CPA negotiations, and when South Sudan was born, the SPLM emerged with it as the only reliable political party. According to Copnall the two countries’ heads of state come from their respective armies and both countries have political parties and civil society organisations without a voice. The SPLM’s primary rivals are the SPLM-IO led by Riek Machar and SPLM-DC led by Lam Akol. At the time of doing research in April 2015, Lam Akol was residing in Juba though media reports indicated that the government was still harassing him.

The SPLM is a dominant party that managed to get an enormous buy-in from the majority of South Sudanese regardless of ethnic identity because of its role in the liberation struggle. The cultivation of the SPLM as a liberation movement for South Sudan as well as emphasising the absence of other political parties during the independence struggle seem to be serving the SPLM well. Many are of the view that if the party could split based on ideology; it would be a welcome and health move to foster a democratic dispensation. However, at the time of writing, the split has been more along tribal lines between the president a Dinka and vice president Riek Machar a Nuer (Dreef and Wagner 2013).

2.5. Ethnic Diversity

2.5.1. South Sudan

South Sudan’s ethnic composition is estimated to have more than 56 ethnic groups, and almost 600 sub-ethnic groups subdivided into tribes, lineages and clans (Dreef and Wagner 2013). These ethnic groups can be divided into three broad groups based on ethnolinguistic affiliation. These include the Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and the South-Western Sudanic groups. The Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk, which belong to the Nilotic group, are considered the most politically prominent. These three ethnic groups are all pastoralist with the Dinka and the Nuer being mobile while the Shilluk are settlers. Cattle are an important aspect of their lives often used as a form of currency for settling debts, bridal price as well as social status. The table below shows South Sudan’s ethnic groups.
Table 1: Names of tribes in South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Dinka</th>
<th>Acholi</th>
<th>Nuer</th>
<th>Tid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adio</td>
<td>Azande</td>
<td>Aja</td>
<td>Toposa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otuho</td>
<td>Anyuak</td>
<td>Didinga</td>
<td>Uduk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atuot</td>
<td>Tennet</td>
<td>Avukaya</td>
<td>Yulu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acholi</td>
<td>Bai</td>
<td>Murle</td>
<td>Woro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baka</td>
<td>Moru</td>
<td>Balanda-Boor</td>
<td>Suri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bari</td>
<td>Bongo</td>
<td>Boya</td>
<td>Sere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didinga</td>
<td>Dongotona</td>
<td>Falata</td>
<td>Peijulo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feroghe</td>
<td>Gollo</td>
<td>Imatong</td>
<td>Nuer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indri</td>
<td>Jiye</td>
<td>Jur</td>
<td>Pari</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurchol</td>
<td>Kakwa</td>
<td>Kara</td>
<td>Nyangwara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keliku</td>
<td>Kuku</td>
<td>Lango</td>
<td>Ngulingule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lokoya</td>
<td>Lopit</td>
<td>Lotuka</td>
<td>Ndogo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lugbwara</td>
<td>Lulubo</td>
<td>Maban</td>
<td>Mundu</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madi</td>
<td>Mananger</td>
<td>Mangayat</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moro</td>
<td>Moro Kodo</td>
<td>Mundari</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Author’s compilation

2.5.2. Sudan

Sudan and South Sudan have diverse ethnic composition. According to the Sudan Embassy website, there are about 600 tribes in Sudan\(^2\). It has Arabs found in central, Kordofan and Darfur regions. The Beja are located on the eastern side while the Mapan and Angassana tribes in Southern Blue Nile. Southern Kordofan is home to the Nubian tribe while Darfur region is home to the Fur, Zaghawa and the Massalit clans. In Darfur, about 90 per cent Africans who are farmers and the rest are Arabs who are pastoralists. Other tribes include Beni Halbeh, Habbaniya, Taisha, Salamat, Mahamis and Ma’alia. The other tribes in the region include the Berti, Bargho, Turjum, Dajjo, Fallatah, and the Bodaya people. The northern part is mainly Arabic, the Berbers being the majority. Below is a map showing the ethnic composition of Sudan.

2.6. Natural Resources

2.6.1. Oil

In 1978, Chevron was the first company that explored for oil in Sudan’s Bentiu area, in Western Upper Nile, Unity State and Heglig (Human Rights Watch 2003). The attack on Chevron’s headquarters in 1984, in Western Upper Nile left three of its workers dead and made the company leave Sudan. It sold its concession rights in 1992 and never returned. In 1993, Arakis Energy Corporation from Canada came to Western Upper Nile where it bought Blocks 1, 2 and 4 concessions (see Figure 4 below). In 1996, China National Petroleum Company, PETRONAS of Malaysia and Sudan Petroleum Operating Corporation joined
Arakis. The companies owned 40%, 30%, 5% and 25% respectively. The four companies together formed the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Corporation (GNPOC).

According to Luke Patey, the oil boom came when Sudan signed the CPA with production going up from 305,000 bpd in 2005 to 480,000 bpd by 2008. During this time, Patey indicates that the price of Sudan oil on the international market rose by 42 per cent (Patey 2014). Due to this increase in production, Patey states that Sudan became the third oil producer in Africa. Concerning revenues, Sudan received US$5.7 billion between 2005 and 2010, which was a representation of 60 per cent of Sudan’s total income for that period. He also states that the country’s economy grew fivefold from 1998 to 2008 largely due to the oil. Despite some economic growth and some money being transferred to the GOSS the large part of the oil revenues was focused on Khartoum and the Nile Valley heartland. During the period between 2005 and 2008, Patey argues that the oil revenues did not transform the economy of Sudan. He argues that mismanagement of petroleum revenues while tendencies of political patronage; corruption and militarization by the elite ruling class in Khartoum continued. It can be argued that Sudan fell victim to “the resource curse, a phenomenon in which countries with a lot of oil and minerals paradoxically suffer from economic underdevelopment, government corruption, and civil war” (Patey 2014:187).

Patey also argues that the NCP did not have interests in ensuring that that the oil revenues were ploughed back into developing Sudan. Between 2005 and 2011, Patey states that the NCP presided over budget deficits and had a total debt of US$41.4 billion. He argues that the NCP used the oil windfall to cement their political power and personal wealth. The lack of developing other sectors away from the oil led to the ‘Dutch disease’. According to Patey, the country’s currency appreciated, and agroindustry export fell from US$677 000 million in 2004 to US$545 000 million in 2008. One of the major grievances argued by Patey is that the oil industry did not bring about jobs or economic development to the oil communities later on the rest of the country. Patey also argues that despite the lack of development in the oil-producing communities, some positive trends such as reduction in the death of the Dinka and

Nuer living in the oil areas were registered. The displacement had also stopped. Though the country suffered the resource curse and the Dutch disease, it can be argued that oil in itself if well managed could have transformed the nation’s economy. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in the resource itself but how it was managed.

2.6.2. Oil Resource and Violent Conflict

Many researchers have explored the relationship between resources and the war in many countries endowed with natural resources. Le Billon argues that the end in foreign assistance led many parties to the conflict to go for private sources to finance civil wars. A civil war financing can be looked at from the scarce resource war or the abundant resource war hypotheses. According to Le Billon, the scarce resource war hypothesis looks at nations or people fighting each other to secure areas to the resources necessary for their survival. On the other hand, the abundant resource of war perspective looks at the conflict from the availability of primary resources that are highly taxable or can easily be taxed. The taxing aspect provides a basis of attraction for both sides to the conflict to ensure that the resources are under each party’s control. According to Le Billon, the abundance of these resources will “increase the risks of greed driven conflict” while having access to the ‘loot’. Once under their control, the ‘loot’ is integrated into the main trade framework, which provides revenue to purchase military hardware. The armed conflict under this perspective tends to have become commercialised with the resources or ‘loot’ being integrated into the economy while the political aspect moves towards private economic agenda. What this entails is that the conflict is driven by a few elites who after gaining control of the loot tend to appropriate the profits for personal gain. In this case, the conflict is sustained because it is beneficial to the elite.

Philippe Le Billon also argues that the given state’s resource endowment often influences the political economy and the governance type. In most cases, states with this sort of economy described above often have poor governance and an erring economy, which leaves other segments of the population dissatisfied. This argument is sustained because the elite generally does not want to share or develop the entire country so that everyone benefits from the

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resources. This often leads to poor governance and corruption because there is less accountability on the part of the government. In the case of Sudan, despite the availability of oil and other natural resources, economic growth and governance was poor at the time the country was one. There was less focus on the need to diversify the economy in Sudan, which could provide the country with alternative sources of revenue. This type of regime with its economy gave rights to the international companies to exploit the local natural resources. The giving of exploration rights to foreign firms is an advantage to the government in power because it secures the political and financial support for the ruling regime from the international companies as well as their countries of origin.

The other characteristic of the regime type under discussion is the tightening of the economic and political control. This is done on a dominant resource in the case of Sudan it was on the oil. The tight control of the oil resource left little room for wealth accumulation on the part of those who were outside the government’s system of patronage. This led the fighting to intensify. Though the fighting intensified, the government during this time had the advantage because it controlled the oil and its proceeds. The proceeds were used to purchase more arms that were used to bomb the southern Region. Though the conflict in Sudan can be seen from the abundant resource war perspective, this analysis has many weaknesses. One of the weaknesses is that it does not take into considerations the socially constructed nature of resources. The socially constructed view of resources looks at the values and roles that have been attached to resources by society. This means that resource abundance does not necessary mean that they lead to violent conflict but can still result in a peaceful nation.

2.6.3. Oil, Land and Secession

Due to the underdevelopment and marginalisation, and the appropriation of the region’s resources by the dominant classes of the North and its allies (Takeuchi 2014) the land issue played a significant role leading the SPLM/A to go for independence. This is due to Khartoum’s bombarding areas in the South leaving thousands of Southerners dead and a lot of them displaced from their indignant land. When the land had been left, or its inhabitants were dead, Khartoum would go and repossess it for oil exploration. Though the bombing would happen in various places of the Southern Region, those areas with oil were heavily bombed
and its people displaced. Which makes many to argue that it’s the oil that played a significant role in the “primitive accumulation” of land by the Khartoum-led government. The slogan “all land in New Sudan belongs to the community” (Takeuchi 2014:32) made all ethnic groups in the South to rally behind SPLM/A during the struggle.

Figure 4 below shows the oil blocks both in Sudan and South Sudan. Oil producing areas in the South are represented by Block 7, which is in Upper Nile State, and Block 5A in Unity State. Block 5A’s production has been affected by the current civil war.

FIGURE 4: Map of Oil Concession Blocks in Sudan and South Sudan

![Map of Oil Concession Blocks in Sudan and South Sudan](www.southsudancivis.info) (Accessed on 28 June 2015)

The starting of mining oil in 1998 saw the government of Sudan collecting US$500 million a year in revenues (Goodman 2004). According to Goodman, 80 per cent of the amount derived from the oil went to purchasing arms mostly from China. The same article indicates that the Government of Sudan used the weapons bought to evict the Nuer and the Dinka from their land near or on oil installations with the aim of denying the rebels a support base. According to the United Nations World Food Program, as of March 2002, an estimated 174, 200
civilians remained displaced due to the violent conflict between the government of Khartoum and the Southern Region. According to Human Rights Watch Report, “there has been an obvious relationship between war and oil to displacement” (Human Rights Watch 2003: 37). The guns, the helicopters and the rifles were bought using oil money. The Human Rights Report also indicates that Sudan increased its military hardware due to the oil revenues in 2001 with the purchase of 12 new helicopters, which were used to kill and displace the southern people from their lands. Human Rights Watch argues that the intensification of oil production changed the face of the North-South civil. It tilted the balances of the conflict in Khartoum’s favour. During this period, the SAF used to take advantage of cattle conflicts mostly between the Arab nomads and the Dinka with the aim of securing and controlling the oil fields in Pariang in Southern Region. According to European Coalition on Oil in Sudan’s 2010 report, Khartoum in the North supplied guns to the Misseriya, who attacked the Dinka.

2.7. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

The CPA brought the 22-year-old civil war to an end and ushered in the government of national unity between 2005 and 2011. Among other achievements, it provided the South with an opportunity to secede leading to the January 2011 referendum that saw South Sudan being born as a new nation (Dreef and Wargner 2013). The CPA was a settlement that paved the way for a new relationship between the government and the warring rebels in the South (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 8). Concerning oil and the oil contracts the two sides agreed that the contracts negotiated by Sudan before the CPA remain as they were before. It also stated that the oil net profit was to be shared on a 50/50 per cent with 2 per cent going to oil producing areas (Comprehensive Peace Agreement p54).

Though the CPA was clear on the sharing of the oil wealth, Patey states that there were delays in the remitting of the revenues by Khartoum to the South. Besides, Patey states that the Khartoum government was not transparent concerning the revenues from the oil. In 2009, Global Witness published a report accusing the GOS of not publishing the real oil production figures. The report stated that the numbers produced by the government did not tally with the China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) figures. The CNPC is one of china’s oil and gas companies in South Sudan. It has been argued that the government in Khartoum was
cheating the South over oil money. The CPA also called for the creation of the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account, which was to receive funds before the 50/50 per cent was shared between the two. Concerning Abyei, the disputed area between Sudan and South Sudan, which comprises of nine chiefdoms of the Dinka ngok was granted the right to determine self-rule through the referendum at the same time as the South (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 65). Since then, Abyei like Kordofan and the Blue Nile are yet to decide whether they should be part of Sudan or South Sudan. The CPA also saw the return of refugees to the South. The UN assisted an estimated 580 000 internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees in 2006 and a further 54 000 in October 2007 (Conference Report 2007). The other condition met by the CPA successfully is that of transforming the SPLM into a political movement, which later become the governing party in independent South Sudan. It also forced the SPLM to transform its military into a national army. Though this became a reality, it has not come without its challenges.
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

Many theories have been constructed in the field of international relations with the aim of understanding and explaining the relations between states in international politics. The objectives of these theories are not only to understand how states relate but also to see how the world can be peaceful. The world system comprises of weaker and stable states perceived to be in competition for survival. This is due to the understanding that states can cease to exist while new states can be born. This chapter provides a discussion on the offensive realism theory regarding the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan and oil as the factor since 2011.

3.2. Theory

Theories can be looked at as abstractions that try to expose the vital elements of explainable behaviour (Webster 2003). They are sentences constructed with the aim of explaining, understanding and predicting outcomes of how elements behave in a given situation. Theories explain given phenomena, but not all can predict results. Therefore, the theory chapter of a social research paper is an essential part due to it being a signpost for the thesis. The challenge in a given research is picking that theory that provides an accurate explanation of the given phenomenon. Good theories tend to stand out due to the ability to predict or explain the behaviour with accuracy. In the case of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan, it is cardinal for the researcher to pick out the theory, which can best help explain the relationship between the two countries. Bryman looks at a theory as that which explains observed regularities (Bryman 2012). According to Bryman’s definition, a theory can be defined as a systematic arrangement of ideas about a given phenomenon in a particular field of enquiry. Theories can be divided into two categories with the first type providing an understanding while the second type is aimed at providing a prediction and an explanation of a given phenomena\(^5\).  

Theories in social science cannot empirically be examined because they happen to work at a particular time setting unlike the laws in natural sciences, which can be universally applied and tested. This is one of the peculiarities of theories in social science when compared to those in the natural sciences. In the natural sciences, a theory is used to predict an outcome based on the observed regularities. Natural science theories can be repeated in different settings over time and may produce exact or similar results. Theories in natural sciences have the ability to predict an outcome with certainty even though the experiment was to be done in a different environment with different timings. This is because natural science theories deal with matters that are constant given certain underlying assumptions. Social research theories are there to explain the behaviour of a phenomenon in the social world but cannot be used as laws because the social setting happens in a given frame of time. The social science time frame cannot be duplicated or frozen so that another researcher can redo the same research and come up with same results. This has made social science research theory to be considered as a model aimed at explaining the behaviour of occurring phenomena.

3.3. New States and IR

There are many reasons why new states are formed in the international politics. In this paper, the international environment means the world as defined by the relations of states. In most cases, states are born when the people constituting a territory desire to be independent and acquire sovereignty. Secession is one of the ways in which states are born through the people’s right to determine their governance. The UN on the right to self-determination has come up with resolutions aimed at addressing issues of secession. According to the UN, it is not acceptable from the international law’s perspective as well as customary that a given state should preside over another geographical territory. That is to say, when a nation or a state presides over a people with whom they have little in common and yet exercises control over them. Thus, the creation of a country brings about the freedom to the people subjugated. Secession thus comes with benefits for the people seceding that among others include resolving injustices and preventing the harm that the secessionist’s population is/was subjected to in the host.
Secession is when an area and its population leave the territory they were part of to create a new state (Pavkovic 2011). The territory or region the new state was part of is called the host. This happens when states in the international community recognise the newly seceded state as an independent state. It also happens when a people declare independence through a referendum. Though secession can happen when the people declare independence, the independence can only be recognised when the host state agrees and allows the seceding territory to go. Although it is the host states that recognise and grants this recognition, in reality, it is when powerful countries like the USA and international organisations like the UN which when they accept a state makes other states endorse as in the case of South Sudan. South Sudan is a good of how powerful states influences the formation of new states.

According to Hilde Johnson, the Troika, a partnership comprising Norway, Britain and the US played a big role in ensuring secession for South Sudan (Johnson H 2011). There are many secessionist insurgents in the world fighting for secession but have not gained independence. One such group is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE was an insurgent group that fought for secession in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 2009 for the Tamil people. Compared to the SPLM, the LTTE did not achieve secession because no powerful state was on their side. It has been argued that the LTTE “was the most disciplined, dedicated and ruthless guerrilla organisation in the world”6. They wanted independence for the north and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. India supported the Tamil Tigers and other military groups in Sri Lanka but was not in favour of creating a new separate state under the Tamil Tigers. It supported the LTTE and other Tamil rebel groups within Sri Lanka due to its strained relationship with the pro-west government of Colombo. Despite being organised and disciplined, the LTTE was banned in many countries due to being viewed as an extreme and violent terror group. The European Union put the LTTE on the list of banned terror groups in 2006. The listing of the LTTE as a terror group led to its downfall when the Sri Lankan government finally crushed the movement in 2009. If the group had good relations with the US, it can be argued that there could have been a new Tamil state.

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There are differences among scholars concerning the understanding of the term secession. Some scholars argue that secession can only occur when there is violence or use of force. Others argue that secession only occurs when the population within a given territory decides to leave the host and become a new state. However, this paper looks at secession to have taken place when a region leaves the host whether the process of doing so was violent or non-violent. Different types of sessions do have challenges that are unique from one seceded territory to the other. In the case of South Sudan, due to its violent process, it was faced with the challenge of coming to terms with IDPs and returnees. Regarding the case of returnees, South Sudan has not been able to manage this problem because of the lack of resources.

There is often an incentive to Secede hence making regions leave the host state. The incentive to secede is often due to perceived benefits gained when the area leaves the host country. Some of the perceived benefits include the gaining of access to the resources located within the territory seceding, the ability to generate own revenues through taxes as well as the exercise of autonomy. When Sudan was a single country, the Southern Region was underdeveloped compared to the North despite being rich in natural resources. When independence was achieved, South Sudan embraced the opportunity to use its resources to develop itself as a new state. This is in line with the view by Pavkovic, which states that the seceding territory has the right to determine its economic and political environment and the process of achieving them (Pavkovic 2011). Secession also means that the new state gains sovereign authority and power over the territory that has seceded. Ideally, the newly formed state’s population takes over government and policies through democratic processes. It also gives the government office holders access to international organisations (Ibid 2011).

Ideally, the population that has seceded takes over its affairs, but in reality, some seceded populations do not have such privileges. This is so in states where leaders are dictators. South Sudan is democratic on paper but in reality, many opposition parties do not seem to be free. According to the BBC, since South Sudan’s independence, the wealth from the oil has failed to transform the new country. This brings the argument whether secession is an automatic passport to development or not. As can be seen in the case of South Sudan, being independent

and having the resources under your soils is no guarantee to development especially when the capacity regarding infrastructure, techniques and organisation lacks. According to the BBC, the current civil war in South Sudan has reduced the country’s oil production from about 240 000 bpd by the end of 2013 to about 165, 000 bpd by the end of 2014\(^8\). The reduction in oil production entails a reduction in revenues.

### 3.4. Offensive Realist Theory

Offensive Realism is one of the many new strands to have emerged from the realist school of thought aimed at understanding and explaining modern day IR. John Mearsheimer has presented this theory in his book ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ aimed at understanding conflicts between great powers in international relations. According to Mearsheimer, the structure of international politics gives incentives for conflicts among states. To describe the relationship among states, he uses the following five assumptions: the world system is anarchical, like the central strand of realism; this means that there is no superior power in the world that can control the behaviour of states. The second assumption is that powerful states do have offensive military capabilities that can be used for other countries. The third assumption is that a state cannot be sure of the intentions of other states’ to use their military capabilities on other states. The fourth assumption is that states have the desire to maintain their survival above other goals in international politics. The last assumption is that states are rational actors in that they think regarding their long-term objectives before taking any action (Dunne, Kurki and Smith 2010).

### 3.5. Tenets of Offensive Realism

#### 3.5.1. The State

These tenets are for realism theory but have been applied here due to the common ground shared by the offensive realists and the realists on understanding international politics. According to Goldstein and Pevehouse, states are a territorial entity controlled by a government and is inhabited by a population. In this understanding of the state, there is the

assumption that it answers to no other higher authority. This means that there is the right on the part of the state to exercise sovereignty over its territory. This exercise of sovereignty refers to the enforcing of laws as well as imposing of taxes within its territory (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2014). Under the arguments given above, there is the understanding that other states recognise this sovereignty through diplomatic relations as well as membership in such organisations such as the UN. In this paper, the state has been used to refer to a territory that is composed of a people with a common identity forming a nation and a government. The leader of the state presides on behalf of the nation in international politics (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2014). The understanding of sovereignty means that other countries need to respect other nations’ right to claim authority over a given territory whether that state has just gained its independence or it's an old state. On the aspect of statism, the state embraces sovereignty as given by Max Weber, which is having the ability or monopoly to the use of physical force within a particular territory (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2014). It also refers to the capacity of the state being supreme in authority to make laws and enforce them.

### 3.5.2. Power

The realists have used the concept of power to explain the interactions of states in international politics (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2014). According to the realists, power is the goal for states. Offensive realists argue that since there are uncertainties in international politics, as such any state can utilise its power to harm another (Williams 2013). With this situation, a state needs to have relative capabilities. In addition to relative capabilities, Mearsheimer argues that in order to secure itself, a state needs to acquire as much power as possible compared to the other state and this power is in having a large army. There is also the argument that the most a state can hope for is regional hegemony if it cannot be the most powerful nation in the world. In this case, offensive realists argue that there should be no other powerful state in the region where the state is. However, states may not achieve the goals of being a global and regional hegemony. When this happens, “states try to maximise both their wealth and military capabilities for fighting ground battles” (Williams 2013:23). According to offensive realists, when a state wants to gain resources it can resort to blackmail, war or try to entice a third party “into coping with the threat” (Ibid 2013:23). The argument presented by Mearsheimer is that states with power fear each other leading to the security dilemma and that they can rely only on themselves for their security. The offensive
realists like the rest of the realists argue that the international system gives incentives for states to acquire power (Sutch and Elias 2007). This is different from the defensive realism theory that explains that states look for only an appropriate amount of power. Offensive realists argue that a country’s security can only be achieved through acquiring as much power as possible compared to other states. According to offensive realists increasing capabilities do not in any way trigger countervailing response.

The definition of power looks at the ability to cause or influence one actor to do what it wouldn’t normally do (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2014). Power in this sense looks at the ability to cause a state to behave differently from its ordinary course of behaviour. According to John Mearsheimer, power is perceived not from outcomes rather from material capabilities. Mearsheimer equates power to military capabilities. According to Mearsheimer it is an important aspect regarding the analysis of international politics. States are referred to be powerful if they can cause other states to do what is not in their interest to do. Power in this view is an explanation of influence. As Goldstein and Pevehouse put it, “it is the ability to influence others”. However, the weakness of the offensive realism in understanding world politics from power’s point of view is that they don’t put into consideration the use of economic warfare as other ways of exercising power. This is due to the overall emphasis on military activities as a means of projecting power. The following are other elements that constitute power: GDP, Population, territory, geography, and natural resources. States can control others using capabilities such as income, armed forces, as well as the size of the population and land (Ibid 2014).

There are situations when some states converge and use their power to check the power of another state. States act together to prevent the dominance of one or more states. This is referred to as the balance of power. The balance of power does not only happen with powerful states putting their power together to deter the powerful state, but it can also happen when weaker states band up with the stronger or powerful states (Sutch and Elias 2007). When this occurs, it is known as bandwagoning. A situation where a state holds a preponderance of power in the international system is called hegemony. This condition gives power-holding states an opportunity to dominate international politics (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2014). The
look at power as having a large army means that for a state to be dominant in the world, it has to project that army throughout the world.

Offensive realists, like realists, argue that great powers pay attention to how many military capabilities they have against the other. The need for power is both to have a state secured as well as being able to make other states behave the way you want them to. Though the offensive realists have viewed military capabilities as a way of exercising power, influencing, other states can be done in many ways. Dominance refers to when a state uses force to change the behaviour of another state. There is also the reciprocity that refers to influencing the state to behave differently from its ordinary course of action due to perceived incentives for a weaker state. The other ability of control is when a weaker state shares in the identity of the stronger nation. In IR, power-holding states don’t want any state to shift the balance of power. It is believed that a state’s number of troops, tanks, ships, etc. can make another state conduct itself differently from how it would behave in the absence of the above-listed items. This will be elaborated further in the discussion, findings and analysis chapter.

### 3.5.3. State’s Survival

Realists are united in the assertion that survival is the ultimate goal for states and that they are rational actors in their pursuing of this goal and other interests. They argue that states persevere to achieve “all other goals” and this could be reached at whether by conquest or by diplomacy. Offensive realists argue that to ensure survival, the best a state can do is being the most powerful among states. Offensive realists like Mearsheimer argue that states will alter existing power distribution if there is an opportunity to do so. This means that any state can be powerful given a chance to do so. It can be argued that that is what states fear hence they have to continue amassing power. Offensive realists argue that states are always competing for power. In the quest to be a global hegemony, they are willing to risk all to improve the state’s position in international politics (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2014).
3.5.4. Self-Help

When it comes to self-help, Kenneth Waltz has brought the understanding that domestic and international politics are the result of the structure. By structure, he states that citizens in the national political system do not need to defend themselves. However, since there is no higher authority to prevent and counter the use of force, states need to defend themselves (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2014). The lack of an overarching authority means that it is upon a particular state to provide for its survival. According to Mearsheimer, this requires a state to arm itself because if it does not, another state will. Security, in this case, is vital for a country’s survival. Powerful states do understand that they live in a world of self-help, which means that they need to rely on themselves for survival. According to Dunne T, Kurki M and Smith S, in a self-help world, other states are viewed as potential threats (Dunne, Kurki and Smith 2010). The other states are a threat because they are perceived to be in the quest to survive. Other states are also a threat because they can prey on a weaker state. This fear of other countries leads others to become more powerful as it is the only way to survive. Here, the understanding is that a powerful state cannot be attacked.

The offensive realism theory has strengths as well as weakness in its effort to explain relations in the international system. One of the strengths is its ability to illustrate states and their interactions in international politics. It outlines the states’ desires and goals while explaining what they ought to do to survive in the world. The theory's weakness is that it paints the world as a place where there is constant competition for survival without room for cooperation. It is pessimistic concerning the relationships between countries. There are instances where states cooperate and exist with mutual benefits for competing nations.
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction
This chapter gives an outline of the data collection process and its techniques. It discusses the study design as well as the research method. It will also give a discussion on the sampling method as well as the reasons why it was adopted. This chapter also discusses the challenges faced and how they were dealt with during the process of data collection.

4.2. Study Design
This research has employed a qualitative approach in trying to examine how oil has shaped the post-independence relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. Studies in the academic world employ qualitative and quantitative methods to understand a given phenomenon. Bryman (2012) argues that in recent times, the distinction between the two modes of study has been diminishing. Arguably, this means that both methods are used in social sciences. That is to say, a given research question can use either or both methods in the process of gathering and analysing data. Though there could be aspects of diminishing differences, quantitative research often involves the strategy that emphasises quantification in the process of collection and analysis of data (Bryman 2012).

Under the quantitative approach, a deductive approach is used with the aim of establishing the relationship between theory and research. In other words, quantitative analysis is often used with the intention of trying to test a theory. It also looks at social reality as an external and objective reality (Ibid 2012) i.e. something that can be tested like in the natural world. On the other hand, qualitative research places its thought of understanding reality on the use of words rather than figures. In this case, there is the placing of emphasis on how a group of people or individuals interpret their social reality. An emphasis in qualitative research is on the way people view their reality. From that, the researcher will try to construct meaning using the people’s perceived reality. Though the two are all used, the qualitative research has been viewed as the enquiry process of understanding a given subject based on distinct
methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem (Creswell 1998). According to Creswell, the researcher under qualitative research builds a complex holistic picture, analyses words, reports, and detailed views of informants and conducts the study in a natural setting.

In this study, interviews and document analysis have been used in the process of gathering data. Books, reports and newspapers have also been used as sources of data on the relationship between South Sudan and Sudan.

4.3. Sampling Method

This study used the snowball sampling a type of non-probability sampling method, in qualitative research problem while probability sampling such as happens in quantitative research. Probability and non-probability sampling have advantages and disadvantages in research. Probability sampling is employed in a case where the results of a sample will be used to generalise the entire population. Statistical methods are used both in the process of enquiry as well as in the interpretation of the data to achieve generalisation of the whole population from a given sample; statistical methods are used both in the process of enquiry as well as analysis of the data. The use of statistical methods permits the making of inferences about the population from which the sample was selected (Bryman 2012). On the other hand, non-probability includes all forms of sampling that are not subject to the tenets of probability sampling. There are many types of non-probability sampling that include convenience sample, snowball sample and quota sample. Convenient sample and snowball sampling are similar but not the same. The former looks at sampling that is available to you while the later looks at selecting those respondents who are relevant to the topic under study and uses these to establish contact with others to be interviewed (Bryman 2012).

Snowball sampling is often a good form of sampling especially if one is doing research in an area where it is difficult to locate the subjects to be interviewed. Or in simpler terms, in the case where there is no available sampling frame. This type of sampling was appropriate for a country like South Sudan. Security challenges and mistrusts persist which often make
research interviews problematic. Snowball helped the researcher find and interview people in Juba that could not easily have been reached using other techniques of sampling. In this study, the sampling method was used with a small number of people being contacted first at the University of Juba. These people later recommended other subjects to be interviewed. This type of sampling had the advantage of locating the respondents easily because they often know those who can be of help and are knowledgeable about the topic under study. The disadvantage is that the findings cannot be used to generalise the entire population. There is also the problem of biases due to the respondent recommending those that they share similar viewpoints. The case of biases was overcome by verifying responses with published data on a given topic. Snowball sampling technique also exposes the researcher to a particular network of people in the given field. It means that it can easily be exhausted, and the researcher may quickly come to the end of the recommended list of people to be interviewed. There were moments when the researcher was faced with this reality. However, it was overcome by going back to the people interviewed if they could recommend other people. It was also overcome by stepping outside the recommended network by focusing on other organisations that were relevant to the study. These initiatives had advantages as well as disadvantages. The advantage was that the people already interviewed would add more names that they could have been forgotten. Organisations that were located by the researcher outside recommended line proved difficult.

The respondents interviewed though knowledgeable on the subject had different professions and backgrounds. The sample frame included politicians from the GOSS, academicians from the University of Juba, policy analysts and researchers from organisations such as Ebony Centre and Sudd Institute in Juba, Journalists and editors, civil society activists as well as economists. It also included an embassy official from the Norwegian embassy in Juba. There was no interview from the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining as well as the embassy of Sudan in Juba. Instead of being interviewed, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining provided some published materials.

Snowball Sampling also presents the advantage of enabling the researcher to locate the respondents with certain attributes needed in the study. This method of sampling is mostly
used in the case where the researcher needs to cover an area that is sensitive (Berg 2001). This research's question of oil and the relationship may not be deemed that sensitive, however, the problem was that the information was not readily available hence it needed respondents who are knowledgeable on the subject. The information was not readily available due to the country just gaining independence about four years ago and is trying to establish structures of governance. This means that information is not readily accessible. These respondents, who were interviewed, understood the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan and the various factors affecting it. Their knowledge, for Sudd Institute and Ebony centre, was due to the organisations’ involvement in research on oil and its policies in the country. Others qualified to be interviewed because they have been involved in the relationship either as analysts, lecturers, politicians, journalists as well as diplomats.

On the other hand, the research can be viewed as sensitive because it involved talking about issues that affects the government’s primary source of revenue. The research has had the potential of being misunderstood as having the aim of trying to find out if the government is accountable in the manner of how it spent the money derived from the oil. It also had the potential of being misunderstood as one sponsored by Khartoum or other foreign organisations interested in the information. Some respondents also brought about issues concerning the civil war, which started in South Sudan in 2013 between the president and his former vice, which was affecting the oil production.

4.4. Instrumentation

The process of data collection in social research often relies on various instruments. Lincoln and Guba argue that data collection tools can be put into two categories, which are human and non-human (Lincoln and Guba 1985). The human aspect in the process of collecting data gives the researcher that opportunity of observing and noting the various expressions from the respondents during the interviews. For this research, the researcher did take note of the different expressions of the people interviewed. The different expressions included body and facial languages. It was observed that the respondents had many things that differentiated one from another. Interviews were recorded using a smartphone that provided the advantage of
easy playback and in documenting the responses for analysis. The recording went well in many instances though some offices were not sound proof.

Since the audio recording was involved, the respondents were made aware of it before the interview could start using a consent form. After being informed, they were also told the reason the interview was going to be recorded. They were also told that the data was for academic purposes only. The respondents were told about their right to refuse if they so wished not to be interviewed. They were also given the consent form to sign. One respondent declined to participate because he needed permission from the head office of the organisation he was working for. The other respondent refused to be audio recorded during the interview but agreed to participate in the research provided that the responses were to be written down on paper. The reason the respondent gave was that he had been duped before into being interviewed in the name of academic research only to be called by international media corporations on the subject matter that was supposed to be academic. In both cases, as a researcher, the two respondents’ views were respected.

The non-human instruments used in this research as part of the data collection include an interview guide, consent forms, computer for writing as well as for looking up information. The phone was used both for recording as well as for contacting the respondents.

4.5. The data collection process
In this part, an explanation of how the data collection process was conducted is provided. The method used for collecting the data is in-depth interviews.

Bryman notes that the interview is the most widely used mode of collecting data in qualitative research. Though ethnography is also another method of data collection, which uses a lot of interviews, it comes second to the interviews because of its lack of flexibility. According to Bryman, it’s the flexibility of the interview that makes it attractive in qualitative research. Ethnography, on the other hand, takes a lot of time due to participant observation that disrupts
the researcher due to continued absence from work or family (Bryman 2012). The process of data collection in this research used a semi-structured interview guide with a list of questions known as an interview guide (See Appendix V).

This list did not provide the respondent a form of ‘prison’ indicating that they were supposed to respond according to the list of questions provided. However, the respondents had the liberty to respond freely. This form of an interview has the advantage of allowing the researcher to make follow up questions not included in the interview guide. This research carried out the same list of questions to all the respondents interviewed though the follow-up questions were different from one respondent to other. According to Bryman (2012), the idea is to glean the way in which the respondents view or understand their social world coupled with the advantage of having the flexibility of doing research.

### 4.5.1. Interview legitimacy

Before starting the interviews process, a letter of introduction from the Norwegian University of Life Science (where the researcher was studying) was given to the respondent showing that the university was aware of the researcher’s mission in South Sudan (See Appendix I). The letter also indicated that the mission was an academic one. Many of the respondents took the time to read the letter together with the consent form, which showed that they understood the aim of the research. Many asked the question as to why an African from a different country would pursue research in South Sudan instead of his or her home country. The response was that the researcher’s home country, which is Zambia, has no oil. When answered many would go ahead and give the consent to be interviewed. Interview appointments were mostly made after a phone call. However, there were moments when some appointments had to be made in person by visiting the physical address of the respondents. The visiting of the physical address meant that the researcher had to go to the office and book either through the secretary or the respondents themselves.

Confidentiality and anonymity are factors that are critical in research because the respondent’s identity need to be protected. Though this is paramount, it is something that is
not easy to guarantee. Ensuring the protection of respondents' identity is not easy because factors outside the researcher’s control such as theft of confidential documents make such assurances misleading (Bryman 2012). The documents or the recorder could be stolen which may lead to the informants’ details being in the wrong hands. Though this research did not have what can be deemed confidential information or documents, there was the need to ensure and guarantee that the respondents’ confidentiality was observed. Before the interview, during the introduction, the respondents were told that the information was only for the purpose of writing an academic thesis. Therefore, the highest level of confidentiality was going to be observed on the part of the researcher. This paper has not used real names when identifying respondents.

Berg and Lund indicate that there is no limit to the number of hours the interview should be (Berg 2001). The same authors also suggest that for a researcher to gather a lot of information, there has to be a rapport established between the interviewee and the interviewer. In this research, the researcher did encounter many people from different professions. Others were very critical of the nature of the interview and wanted a short one unlike the average of one hour. The interview on average lasted for about an hour. Interviews were conducted during office hours, which meant that some of the respondents had to take time off from their schedules to be interviewed. The factors that affected the duration of the meetings include the respondents’ desire to add more information when responding to the question asked. The researcher created an environment where respondents could express themselves freely by not cutting them short when they were answering. The researcher also encouraged the respondents by nodding and audio gestures to make them speak freely.

4.5.2. Consent Form
An informed consent is obtained before a researcher can carry out a research interview. An informed consent does not only allow the researcher to interview the respondent but provides the respondent an opportunity to know what and why they were getting into. It gives the respondent an opportunity to either agree or refuse to participate in a research interview. According to Bryman, a consent form is often provided to the research participants before being interviewed. He argues that the informed consent form often provides the respondent
with an opportunity to be informed fully about the type of the research and implications of their participation at the onset (Bryman 2012). Most of the respondents were given a study information sheet and an interview consent form (See Appendix IV). The study information sheet provided information as well as a short explanation about the study. It also highlighted the fact that the interview would be audio recorded. The interview would only proceed after the consent interview sheet was signed. However, some did not see it necessary to sign the form as a way of giving their consent as they expressed knowledge and understanding of the research interview process. All interviews were informed consent was obtained were audio recorded (For a copy of the information sheet, See Appendix III). The information sheet and interview consent form were designed following Bryman’s formats.

4.5.3. The Language Used
The field research was done in Juba the capital city of South Sudan. The country uses English as the official language and Arabic as the second language. Arabic is the language commonly spoken even in offices. The researcher used English as a means of communication. The request was presented beforehand whether the respondent was comfortable having the interview in English. All the respondents agreed and were fairly well conversant with the English language because most of the respondents are postgraduates in their respective disciplines. They used English as a medium of communication for their studies hence interviews were easier unlike if they used Arabic. In the case where a question was unclear, the respondents would inquire for the meaning and then the question would be paraphrased. When the respondents had understood, they would proceed to answer the questions.

4.5.4. Challenges
The research process in Juba was one with its challenges, especially that the subject was oil and the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. There was a lot of suspicion from the government officials. Some government officials perceived the researcher to have been sent by Khartoum. It made some government officials to decline from being interviewed. This was the case with officials from the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining. When the respondents refused to be interviewed, their wishes were respected as they had the right to refuse to participate in a given research. However, efforts were made to ensure that documents that
were published on oil and petroleum were obtained from the Ministry of Petroleum and
Mining. The researcher was perceived with suspicion in most cases. The suspicion was
overcome by introducing himself as having been attached to the University of Juba. After
mentioning the names of the researcher’s supervisor at the University of Juba, only then
would they agree to be interviewed. However, some government ministries did not go ahead
with the meeting despite having been shown the letter as well as having given the information
that the researcher is at the University of Juba.

The other challenge faced was the thought of benefiting from the research on the part of the
respondents. Many thought that the researcher was benefiting financially hence the thought of
why they should participate when they were not going to gain financially. There was the
feeling that taking part in the research was not of any benefit to these respondents. This
challenge was overcome by presenting the letter of introduction from the Norwegian
University of Life Sciences. Though there were those who could not be convinced because of
a letter. These could not be forced to participate. The other challenge was getting permission
to carry out research in South Sudan. The Norwegian University of Life Science did not view
South Sudan to be a safe country. The security and safety concern was due to the USA and
Norway, as well as many western nations, having named South Sudan as a no go country
because of security concerns. This challenge was overcome by waiting till it was safe to go.

4.5.5. Credibility
Other researchers will accept credibility in social research based on how the particular social
reality the researcher is studying is presented. According to Bryman A, “the establishment of
credibility of findings entails both ensuring that research is carried out according to the
canons of good practice” (Bryman 2012:390). Credibility also means that the researcher has
to demonstrate that he or she understands the social reality being studied. Questions were
rephrased so that the respondents understood what the interviewer was saying. The rephrasing
of the questions was done to show that the researcher knew and understood the social reality
under study. When the respondents gave their answers, the researcher rephrased the views
from respondents to assess whether the interviewer got the actual essence of the respondent’s
opinion.
The researcher also avoided asking questions that may lead the respondent to respond in a certain way even though the respondent wanted to respond differently. There was the need to have provided the respondents with the opportunity to go over the audio recordings to see if there was anything they could add on to the interview. However, most of the respondents did not have time as it meant that it would take another hour to listen to their recorded answers. However, before moving to the next question during interviews, the respondents were asked whether what they provided was all or if they could add more. In most cases, it was followed by a pose and many added on views they had left out.

Triangulation in this research was applied following the use of documents to verify what the respondents were saying. It helped in understanding the behaviour of interviewees on how they viewed the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. Some respondents were pro-government, and others were objective with an independent outlook on the relationship. Some cases where respondents were pro-government were about the alleged coup of 15th December 2013. The international like the BBC and Reuters carried the version of the government’s account of the December 15, 2013 incident. Though there has been the government’s narrative in the international media, Radio Tamazuj refutes claims of a coup rather indicating that it was a conflict between the presidential guards. Some respondents who were pro-government held the GOSS’ narrative of the event. The other area where some respondents were biased concerned Sudan’s bombing of South Sudan areas. There are a lot of reports written in the media concerning how Sudan says that it means well for South Sudan, but it bombs and kills South Sudanese people through bombing their areas. These media reports were verified by the researcher and scanned and kept for future reference. The use of a lot of informants in this research also helped in the process of triangulating through the data sources. In this case, the responses and experiences were compared and verified against those of other respondents, which led to having a greater and richer picture of the people’s perception of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. The other factor that contributes to the credibility of the research is the way respondents were approached. The researcher did give the respondents an opportunity to decline if they did not want to be

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interviewed. There were those who refused to be interviewed and could not be forced or coerced into taking part. The author of this research argues that giving the people an opportunity to reflect on whether they should participate or not creates an environment in which truthfulness is generated on the part of the respondents.

4.6. Transferability
According to Bryman A, qualitative research is based on the studying of small groups intensively. Bryman argues that the findings from studying small groups mostly focus on “the contextual uniqueness and significance of the aspect of the social world being studied” (Bryman 2012:392). According to Lincoln and Guba transferability looks at whether the results can stand in another given context or whether they can be applicable at another given time within the same context (Lincoln and Guba 1985). This thought has been argued as a factual issue because qualitative research is concerned with the production of a body of knowledge descriptively. The argument is whether it’s possible to have the findings transferred to other contexts. There are challenges in social research especially when a researcher uses a qualitative method. The challenge among other challenges is the inability to have the findings represent the entire population. This study has looked at how oil has shaped the post-independence relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. For this research, 20 respondents were interviewed who are or have been politicians, editors, journalists, academicians, policy analysts, independent researchers as well as members of parliament. The data was generated using a one on one interview method. The duration of the fieldwork was almost 21 days from the 6th of April to the 26th of April 2015.

4.7. Dependability
This looks at having a form of an audit set in place by researchers to ensure that merit of the research findings is established. This merit concerns trustworthiness and the researcher archives by keeping all records “of all phases of the research process” (Bryman 2012). In other words, it looks at whether the results obtained in a given research study would be obtained should the research be repeated. This is often a challenge in social research hence researchers account for the context within which research is done which is ever changing. According to Lincoln and Guba dependability refers to the process of assessing the quality of
the method of data collection, analysis as well as the coming up of the theory. The aim of having a form of auditing is to ensure other researchers can have a look at how your research has been conducted and peer-review it. This includes the keeping of records of all phases of the research process. In this research, one of the peers was asked to look at the method used in the gathering of data. Though this was the case, the major challenge was that there is less time on the part of the peer reviewer to go through the entire process of research because the amount of data generated.

4.8. Confirmability

Confirmability looks at how objective the researcher is in the process of carrying out research in social sciences. Bryman argues that objectivity in social research is almost impossible. However, the researcher needs to show that he or she acted in good faith during research (Bryman 2012). There is the understanding that research adds value to the body of knowledge. Regarding confirmability, it looks at the degree to which another researcher can confirm the research's results. To ensure this, a researcher needs to use particular strategies such as documenting and rechecking data throughout the research. There is also a detach of personal values that are supposed to be exercised by the researcher so that the results of the study do not in any way reflect the researcher's values. According to Bryman, there is no allowance on the part of the researcher to have his or her research swayed in line with personal inclinations. To ensure confirmability, the researcher kept a diary for all schedules, appointments as well as the keeping of audio transcripts. The field notes containing extra notes made from observations of respondents’ behaviour during interviews was also kept.
CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the research findings. The chapter’s organisation is as follows: Section 5.2 presents and discusses the relationship between the two states and how respondents viewed it. Section 5.3 looks at the power relations between the two countries while Section 5.4 discusses the cooperative agreements between Sudan and South Sudan. Section 5.5 looks at the oil and the economies of the two states. It also looks at the oil reserves in both countries. Section 5.6 discusses the disputed areas while Section 5.7 looks at the civil wars in both countries and how they are affecting the relationship between the two countries in line with the oil.

5.2. The Relationship Between the Two States

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) described the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan as a volatile one (IMF 2014). Though the relationship between the two states has been unstable, an article published by Sudan Tribune in August 2015 indicated that South Sudan’s aim has been that of building and strengthening diplomatic relations with Sudan. Many factors have shaped this relationship rendering it to have various appearances. That is to say, it is a relationship where both parties don’t trust each other while exhibiting tendencies of needing what the other has. Sudan needs the oil to flow because of the revenues it gets. South Sudan, on the other hand, needs Sudan’s pipeline to transport its oil. At the heart of this volatile relationship, is the need for funds. Radio Tamazuj states that among the unresolved issues, since the independence of South Sudan, are political, military and economical. These factors cause the relationship to be smooth as well as bumpy between the two states. The other factors mentioned above are distinct and yet intertwined at the core driving the behaviour of the two states. The political side looks at the mutual engagement in which the governments strive to achieve their political interests. The military refers to the way in which Sudan and South Sudan arm themselves to secure their territories.

The respondents interviewed (the names given in the thesis are not their real names) gave different descriptions of the relationship between the two states. The descriptions from the respondents reflect pessimism, as well as hope though generally its more pessimistic. The Below is the response from Anwake in his early 40s and a researcher based in Juba, who has conducted studies on various topics within South Sudan.

“The relationship is a rocky one, there are some mutual interests on both sides and also there are some divergent interests that make the relationship a bit rocky. It’s a relationship that at some point seem to be needed at another; people are not sure whether they need it,”

Sudan and South Sudan have mutual interests that include commerce and trade, the border, the oil, security, citizenship, and the White Nile River, which has the potential for water transport. Divergent issues like the high oil charges by Sudan and civil wars in each other’s territories have overshadowed the need to highlight and exploit the areas of mutual interest. The overshadowing of the mutual interests strains the relationship further. This has also brought about mistrusts between the two countries. One of the tenets of offensive realism is that states are often not sure of other states’ intentions thereby generating mistrust. The mistrust between Sudan and South Sudan can be seen in the way in which the two countries behave towards each other. For example, both states are claiming certain areas along the border. The unresolved borderline between the two countries with its disputed areas has compounded security and instability in both countries. At the centre of the disputed lands is each country’s desire to access and control the land and its resources such as oil. In 2012, the desire to own and control disputed areas brought about a military confrontation between the two. The military confrontation further deepened the mistrusts between them. Regarding peace and stability in both countries Conflict Dynamics International indicates that there is a link between peacebuilding within the nations and peace between the two. The link is so because of the internal conflicts within both countries, which have made the other country accuse the other of aiding the rebels in the other’s territory (Conflict Dynamics International 2013). Concerning the issue of supporting rebels on the part of South Sudan, Deng, a politician and one of the respondents in his late 60s gave the following perception below:
“It is a fact that following the independence of the South Sudan, the SPLA north continues to fight the Khartoum government based on the history of the struggle of the South. Sudan is aware that the SPLA/SPLM was one. The SPLM/A in East West and South of Sudan was one until 9 July 2011 when the people of South Sudan went on to a referendum and decided to have their independence. Then the remainder of the SPLM-North continued the liberation struggle from day one, and they are still continuing that. Sudan still sees the government of independent South Sudan as still supporting what they call rebels in Darfur who also call themselves SPLA-North,” Deng.

Ajawang, another respondent who is an academician in his 40s, described the relationship as “a marriage where they don’t need each other, but they can’t let go of each other”. Is there a possibility of having a peaceful relationship between the two states? This question's answer is not straightforward because whether one looks at economic, political or social links, they don’t give an easy perspective. In attempting to respond to the question looking at prospects for a relationship between the two and the contributing factors, Conflict Dynamic International gives a mixed view. According to Conflict Dynamics, there could be advantages if the two cooperated on economic terms. If the economic benefit was to be explored by the two states, it has to be in such a way that both countries benefit rather than only one benefiting from the other. Another respondent described the relationship as a bad one. Below is a view from Lam an economist and researcher in his mid-40s.

“The relationship has been that of a bad kind. Soon after South Sudan got independence, Khartoum felt that it had given up something that it should have owned. Something called South Sudan. Some political elite felt sorry that they let go of the country and out of all those, there is what I can call the ‘umbilical cord’ connecting the two countries. There are a lot of ‘cords’ but the main one is the oil”.

There is also the perception of fear especially on the part of most Southerners who do not view Sudan as a state that is kind to South Sudan. The perceived fear is due to the historical tendencies of exploitation inflicted upon Southerners by Sudan. According to Conflict Dynamic International, though South Sudan has achieved the status of sovereignty “the past legacy seem to have a psychological impact thereby creating a climate of mistrust” (Conflict Dynamics International 2013:12). The same report indicates that there are sections in Sudan, which still view South Sudan within its historical, political setting as a rebel movement fighting with the objective of transforming Sudan. With this view, it is leading or rather
feeding into the already created historical mistrust whereby the people in Sudan feel that South Sudan is supporting the rebels in Sudan (Conflict Dynamics International 2013). The relationship between the two states can be a peaceful and positive one. However, for this to happen, both countries need to be stable and have peace within their borders by ending the civil wars currently going on in both countries.

5.3. Power between the two states

According to the Westphalia understanding of the state and sovereignty, all states need to mutually recognise and respect the sovereignty of the other state. The Westphalia Treaty also promotes non-interference of countries in other states’ territories. Given the Westphalia’s principles of statehood, the two Sudans are not respecting each other’s state and sovereignty as enshrined in the Westphalia Treaty of 1648. At the formal level, the two countries recognise the other’s state and sovereignty but in practice, the supporting of rebels has violated the Westphalia understanding of state and sovereignty. In the international community, it has been believed that security and order can be maintained if the principles of the Westphalia’s understanding of the state are observed. In trying to respect the Westphalia concept of statehood, Sudan and South Sudan agreed to exist peacefully as neighbours. Among the many factors that influenced the agreement between Sudan and South Sudan to exist peacefully is the issue of having been one country before. The other reason being that South Sudan has the oil and depends on Sudan for its export. Therefore, this means that both countries are interlinked. The other link singled out is the oil, which is vital for both Sudan and South Sudan’s economies. Though the oil is an important link, it has been viewed as a source of many misunderstandings. Since independence of the South, South Sudan has been unhappy with the oil transit fees though it agreed to pay Sudan for transporting the oil.

In 2011, South Sudan was calling for a cheaper price in line with international standards but Sudan refused. Patey argues that Sudan was asking for US$36 per barrel in pipeline fees and a transitional financial arrangement with South Sudan to offset the financial loss on Sudan’s part. As a result of Sudan’s demands, Patey states that the talks could not go anywhere and fighting started in disputed areas along the border in the same year. It can be argued that

Sudan’s charging higher fees is in line with offensive realism. The argument is that Sudan needs to protect itself as well as gain economically because of the loss of oil to South Sudan. Oil in itself is not power neither does it secure a state’s survival. However, power is defined through the terms of the revenues derived from the oil by both Sudan and South Sudan. The revenues are used in the maintaining of armies that are used to defend themselves. It appears that Sudan’s monopoly over the pipeline strengthens its offensive position. When the price of oil was at $120 and above, it meant that South Sudan was reaping huge profits out of the export of its oil. From an offensive realist’s mind, South Sudan stood in the eyes of Sudan as a country growing to be powerful provided the oil prices remained high.

Following the independence of South Sudan, oil and the transit fees brought about disagreements between the two nations. According to Patey, Sudan confiscated and delayed shipment of South Sudan’s oil with the aim of claiming its share of revenue of the yet to be agreed upon transit fee. The argument is that under normal circumstances, this is viewed as a wrong move because you cannot confiscate goods for payments that are not agreed upon and in a case in which your neighbour has not refused to pay. However, in realist terms, where there is no morality in the international system, this move is a way of trying to show South Sudan who is in control or who has power over the other. According to Patey, Sudan was also blocking materials and equipment meant for oil industries in South Sudan. Due to Sudan’s confiscation of oil, South Sudan halted oil production in January 2012.

This crisis played on with both sides hoping for the overthrow of the regimes within each state since a resolution to avoid oil shut down could not be reached. In this standoff, one side was of the view that the other would sink economically due to lack of revenues from the oil flow. Sudan was of the opinion that South Sudan would crumble economically and will not have the means to support the rebels in Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile. South Sudan was of the view that Sudan would stop supporting the rebels in South Sudan. The shutting down of oil was a symbol showing who has authority over the oil in South Sudan. When the two states went to negotiate again after the oil shutdown, they also went to the battlefield. Going to the battlefield can be viewed from the offensive realists’ belief in the use of military capabilities to effect change as well as to check the power of the other country. According to Patey,
Sudanese planes bombed the El Nar oil field in Unity State. South Sudan did not sit quietly and watch Sudan destroy its resources. It retaliated in April 2012 and went into the disputed town of Heglig locally known as Panthou. When South Sudan’s army was marching towards Heglig, Patey states that the JEM rebels from Darfur and the SPLM-N in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile, the Sudan Revolutionary Front fought with the SPLA and took Heglig.

The taking of Heglig received a lot of condemnation from the international community that forced South Sudan to withdraw. The attack left Sudan’s oil production from 115 000 barrels per day to almost half (Patey 2014). Though there were these challenges, the agreement on the pipeline and the transitional fees were signed. The fees are indicated in Table 2 below. A total of US$3.028 billion was agreed upon for Sudan’s financial loss as a result of losing oil (Patey 2014). Though the offensive theory focuses on the use of military power, the pegging of charges so high indicates that military power is not the only way of doing warfare. The agreement can be viewed to be in favour of Sudan.

The 2012 oil shut down left both countries economically weak and in dire need of dollars to revive their economies. They both looked to China, but not much came in to change the face of the economy in both states. According to Patey, after the secession, the economy in Sudan almost went back to the miserable situation of the 1980s when Bashir came into power. The loss of the oil left a 70 per cent budget deficit, the civil war in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile further drained Sudan’s economy. The economic situation led to hard-liners blaming Bashir for letting the South go. As a result, Bashir could not compromise on the transit fees. South Sudan has thought of having its pipeline going through Kenya via Port Lamu. Though this is a better option, there have been reports that South Sudan simply has no money to have the pipeline constructed which leaves Sudan with the advantage of having overall say on its pipeline and how much should be paid for using it. It is not just the money that stands in the way of the pipeline but security both in South Sudan as well as in Kenya due to Al Shabab (Patey 2014). This scenario plays in favour of Sudan because as it stands, South Sudan has no alternative. And Sudan will capitalise on this to reap benefits of the pipeline. Patey argues that there is a chance especially with the discovery of oil in Uganda and Kenya that the pipeline through Kenya may go ahead. This may make the three countries to construct
the pipeline and lessen South Sudan’s dependence on Sudan. When this happens, Sudan is likely to lose the current revenues it is earning. When this is done, Sudan will be powerless compared to South Sudan. Sudan’s charging of South Sudan high fees can be viewed as a way of pushing South Sudan to seek an alternative pipeline. The more it becomes unprofitable to transport oil through Sudan the greater the chances are for South Sudan of having an alternative pipeline.

5.4. The Cooperation Agreements

Despite a breakdown in the relationship after South Sudan’s independence, the two countries signed the cooperation agreements in September 2012. Despite signing the cooperation agreement, there have been challenges on the implementation part. One positive outcome attributed to the signing of the accord was the beginning of oil production. Though this was the case, security related matters and disputed areas like Abyei have taken centre stage leaving out other areas in the cooperation agreements. This means that the successful implementation of the cooperative agreements is yet to be realised. The nine agreements signed are, the cooperation, security, border, cross-border trade, banking, post-service benefits, citizenship and the status of nationals, certain economic matters and oil. The first is just a framework of the agreements, and the rest are terms and principles set as reference points for policy making and implementation of the agreements by both states.

The agreement on security required both countries’ commitment to peace by renouncing war while implementing previously signed security agreements. The previous security agreements looked at the safe demilitarized border zone (SDBZ) formed in 2011 with the aim of ensuring that both states withdrew their soldiers from the border areas. This was in particular reference to a territory called the “14-mile area”, an area with fertile grazing lands south of the River Kiir (Sudan calls it Bahar-Al-Arab) in Bahr el-Ghazal State. This is another area, which is under contention and is claimed by the Darfur Riezgat tribe. The Dinka of South Sudan are also claiming the area to be theirs. According to Sudan Tribune online, Al Bashir was assuring the people of Darfur that he will not give up the area to South Sudan. The African Union High-Level Implementing panel formed the SDBZ. According to the agreement, the SDBZ was to be monitored by joint border verification and monitoring process under the
support of United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei. Under the accord on demilitarizing the border, Sudan wanted to have the bases for the SPLM controlled by the SDBZ to be demolished. On the other hand, South Sudan accused Khartoum of harbouring the rebels that were active in the SDBZ areas. Khartoum insisted on its demand to the AU-mediated North-South talks (Crisis Group Report 2015). According to Sudan Tribune online\textsuperscript{12}, both countries have not respected the SDBZ. Sudan Tribune indicates that in 2013, both nations had soldiers in Heglig for Sudan and Kiir Adem for South Sudan. Kiir Adem is a town along the border between Northern Bahr el Ghazal in South Sudan and Darfur in Sudan. This is one of the challenges hindering the implementation of the agreements. Below is Figure 5 showing the states along the borderline with Sudan.

**FIGURE 5: Map showing South Sudan’s states and counties**

![Map showing South Sudan's states and counties](https://erininjuba.wordpress.com/maps-of-south-sudan/)


The other agreement looks at freedom of movement, life, acquisition and disposal of property within the two countries. It also looks at the pursuit of economic activities within the two states. Sudan and South Sudan also agreed to give identity, resident as well as work permit documents to persons from either state residing in either country. The trade agreement looks at the formulation and implementing of trade policy and agreements between the two nations. The agreement on oil and economic matters looks at economic cooperation resulting in continuous oil production on the side of South Sudan. The cooperation agreement also brought about the transitional financial arrangement (TFA). The TFA was a payment by South Sudan to Sudan to cushion the economic impact resulting from the session and oil loss. The two states also agreed on the transit fees, processing and transport costs for the oil. They also decided on monetary and fiscal policy on the commercial banking sectors within their states. On the same agreement, Sudan agreed to take over all the external debt while South Sudan joins an appeal to the international community to reduce Sudan’s debt. The agreement on the postal service, the two states agreed to provide direct provision of pensions and benefits to the people living in both countries (Cooperative Agreement Document 2012).

5.5. The Oil

5.5.1. South Sudan oil economy

Oil in South Sudan is produced in Upper Nile and Unity states and in Sudan, it is produced in the southern parts such as Heglig, Abyei and the Blue Nile regions. South Sudan’s oil production reached about 490,000 barrels a day in 2009. There are two types of oil from both countries, which is Dar Blend and Nile blend. The two types of oil differ in quality with Dar blend being in wax form while Nile blend is light compared to Dar blend. Dar Blend is continually heated to keep it in liquid form all the way to Port Sudan. The difference in quality affects the prices. The GOSS sells Dar blend at a discount of $10. The wax state of Dar blend means that few refineries in the world can refine it. Concerning getting the revenues from the oil proceeds, the government of Sudan signed the Exploration and

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Production Sharing Agreement that spelt out how the profits were to be shared between them. South Sudan inherited the oil-sharing agreements from Sudan. The same companies that were mining oil in unified Sudan are the same ones doing business in South Sudan. The map below shows areas where oil is produced as well as the two pipelines that transport it to the port.

FIGURE 6: Map showing areas where oil is mined and the pipelines

Three producing areas in South Sudan
Transport dependent on two pipelines through South Sudan

In Unity
Production of Nile Blend

GPOC pipeline

GPOC Block 1/4
CNPC 40 %  China
Petronas 30 %  Malaysia
ONGC 25 %  India
Nilepet 5 %  South Sud.

SPOC Block 5a
Petronas 67 %  Malaysia
ONGC 25 %  India
Nilepet 8 %  South Sud.

In Upper Nile
Production of Dar blend

Petrodar pipeline

DPOC Blocks 3/7
CNPC 41 %  China
Petronas 40 %  Malaysia
Nilepet 8 %  South Sudan
Sinopec 6 %  China
Tri-Ocean 5 %  Egypt

Source ECON Consulting.

According to a US Energy Information Administration country analysis brief on Sudan and South Sudan, Sudan’s oil reserves were 1.5 billion barrels compared to South Sudan, which was at 3.5 billion barrels as at January 2014. According to the International Growth Centre’s working paper oil production in the South is estimated to last until the mid-2030s. Sudan’s oil production in 2012 was standing at 115 000 barrels per day. However, the government was putting up mechanisms to raise the production to 140 000 bpd through improving of rates of its field from 23 to 47 per cent according to Arab News online. It is also putting up oilrigs north of Darfur as well as on the borderline between Sudan and Libya. Though there are explorations, most of Sudan’s oil is on the borderline with South Sudan.
Commenting on the oil, the respondents had many views on how they felt concerning South Sudan and its oil. Below is response from Jawol, in his late 50s and lecturer at Cambridge International College Juba branch:

“South Sudan in as much as it owns the oil, it is not benefiting. Most of its money is going to the north (Sudan). This is because of the pipeline and the export point, are in Sudan. They also have to pay for storage in Port Sudan, the facilities used. It’s more like we are working for Sudan”.

Two pipelines that transport oil to Port Sudan. Their fee structures together with other costs paid by South Sudan are indicated in Table 2 below. The costs include US$15 per barrel to be paid until the amount reaches US$3.028 billion in compensation for the loss of oil due to South Sudan’s secession. This amount was to be settled in full by 2016 whether there was oil production or not. The table below shows a breakdown of the fees paid by South Sudan. When the costs are added, they bring to a total of $50 per barrel that makes some sectors of society to argue that Sudan has gained part of the oil it lost to South Sudan. The purpose of pegging the oil fees so high is to ensure that Sudan recovers what was lost through secession.

5.5.2. Structures of the Oil Fees

Table 2: The table is showing the fees paid by South Sudan for transporting the oil through

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper Nile (Dar Blend)</th>
<th>Unity (Nile Blend)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Transfer (USD/Barrel)</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing fee (USD/barrel)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transit fee (USD/barrel)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Tariffs (USD/barrel)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (USD/barrel)</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Oil Sector in South Sudan Report 2015 by Econ Consulting.
According to an article published by Radio Tamazuj in April 2015, South Sudan’s earning was about $10 per barrel despite oil prices being above $50 per barrel\(^{15}\). The same article indicates that the earning of $10 per barrel is due to the production costs paid to oil companies in addition to the transit fees paid to Sudan. South Sudan’s earning from the oil is affected by the oil transit fee agreement made with Sudan which is a ‘fixed’ cost instead of a ‘sliding’ cost. The fixed agreement means that South Sudan has to pay Sudan the agreed upon prices even if the oil prices drop on the international market. The sliding agreement means that South Sudan pays Sudan in line with the international oil prices. According to the sliding agreement when oil prices rise, the costs also go up and when drop the fees also drop. The figures shown Table 3 above indicates that Sudan is gaining a total of $50 per barrel compared to South Sudan that is earning only $10 per barrel at the time of capturing this information.

Regarding how this has affected the economy of South Sudan, Radio Tamajuz’s article cited above shows how the budget for 2014/2015 financial year was. According to the article, this particular fiscal year was planned with a budget of 11.7 billion SSP being optimistic that the oil price will be constant at $101 on the international market. The prices dropped to almost half the projected prices. This meant that the government had a budget reduction of 46 per cent. According to the analysis presented by Radio Tamazuj, the government had a budget deficit of SSP 5 billion. Having the current scenario where the oil prices are less than $60 the government of South Sudan is operating under a budget deficit.

5.5.3. Oil Reserves

Table 3: Oil reserves for South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million barrels</th>
<th>Total reserves</th>
<th>Production 1999-2014</th>
<th>Remaining reserves 1.1.2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2318</td>
<td>1242</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MPM
Own assumptions made for production in 2013 and 2014

Sudan’s oil reserves are not much compared to South Sudan though the shortfall is compensated for by the developed oil infrastructure, i.e. refineries and pipelines that South Sudan does not have. The pipeline line gives Sudan an upper hand in the relationship compared to South Sudan regarding infrastructure. It is this infrastructure that Sudan translates into power politics because it knows that South Sudan has none. In this way, Sudan is more powerful on the negotiating table and South Sudan has less bargaining power. According to the report, ‘Sudan Whose Oil’, the oil refinery in Khartoum, a 50/50 venture between the government and CNPC can produce 100 000 bbl./d. The other refinery is located at Port Sudan with an output capacity of 21 700 bbl/d. The third refinery is in Abu Gabra (Sudan’s Oil Industry 2008). Other than that, the oil pipeline is in Sudan, which is the only gateway for Sudan and South Sudan’s oil to the sea.

The report cited above indicates that the oil industry in Sudan is profitable or, at least, Sudan is gaining more compared to its neighbour in the South that lacks oil infrastructure. This gain is in financial terms as well as in power - in power because Sudan can use this position to
influence politics in South Sudan. This lack of infrastructure on the part of South Sudan has left the country vulnerable in the relationship between the two. South Sudan has to comply with what Sudan demands. South Sudan will depend on Sudan for the pipeline for a long time to come until it develops an alternative pipeline. This vulnerability means that South Sudan has no choice but to cling on to Sudan as the only way of accessing the sea transport for its oil. Looking at this from an offensive realist perspective, Sudan as a state is being rational towards its neighbour in the South while maximising opportunities. The maximisation of opportunities by Sudan is in charging South Sudan high prices for the use of the pipeline due to the latter lacking an alternative oil pipeline. The fixing of prices so high that South Sudan remains with little can be viewed as a rationale and strategic move to maximise the basic need of survival.

5.5.4. Oil Revenues for South Sudan

The oil shutdown has had effects on the economies of Sudan and South Sudan. When South Sudan got its independence, it was supposed to spend or prioritise its health, education as well as other economic sectors. These are deemed to promote short and medium-term economic growth (Sachs 2007). South Sudan suffers from the results of having a lack of economic diversification while heavily relying on the oil. When South Sudan gained independence, it did not focus on these areas that could have helped revamp its economy. Instead, there were austerity measures implemented by the GOSS when the oil production was shut. These measures could not offset the lack of development of the key sectors cardinal to the development of the state. The lack of critical sectors necessary for development meant that South Sudan is likely to remain underdeveloped despite having oil. This is so because the oil figures in the table below indicate that production is declining.

South Sudan with the help of international partners thought of establishing a fund to be used when the oil is depleted. Weinthal and Luong (2006) have highlighted the thought of setting up such a fund. However, South Sudan’s current challenges override the need to save for the future. These challenges include lack of transparency, accountability, civil war and corruption. However, due to the challenges highlighted above, the oil fund has not been receiving money. Instead, the government has been spending a lot on security. The heavy
spending on security is necessary at the moment because the country has been engulfed in a civil war. As Radio Tamajuz’s article indicates, the GOSS has been operating a budget deficit, which makes South Sudan more vulnerable in the relationship with Sudan. The table 4 below shows South Sudan’s oil production and its revenues from 2011 to 2015. Econ Oil and Gas have compiled the figures.

**Table 4: South Sudan’ oil Production and Revenues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Oil to government</th>
<th>Oil revenues to government</th>
<th>Transfers to Sudan</th>
<th>Net oil revenues to gov.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mill barrels</td>
<td>Mill barrels</td>
<td>Mill USD</td>
<td>Mill USD</td>
<td>Mill USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 (Jul-Dec)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3 919</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1 846</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>1 415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3 248</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>2 383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1 268</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Compiled by ECON

According to the table above, total oil going to the government has been declining as indicated in oil to government column. The government received the highest amount of oil and revenues in 2011. The column under production gives the sum of oil produced in the given year while the oil to the government column shows what the government receives after remitting to the producing companies their due in oil barrels. For example in 2011, the government received 39 million barrels after having produced a total of 59 barrels. The oil producing companies got the difference that is 20 million barrels. In 2011, production was indicated to have started in July due to the reason that South Sudan officially became a state in July. The same year shows that there was no remittance to Sudan due to non-agreement concerning what should be paid to Sudan for the pipeline. In 2012, the net revenues were $375 million with total oil production being at 10 million barrels. Oil production in 2012 was affected by the oil shutdown from January to April the same year. Despite having total
production being at 58 million barrels in 2015, South Sudan has managed to collect a net of $566 million against $2 383 million in 2014. Factors attributed to this fall in revenues include the civil war and the falling oil prices, which have been around $50 per barrel.

According to Lynn T. Karl, the major obstacle to development that is pro-poor is when a country does not diversify away from the oil to sustaining economic undertakings such as agriculture (Karl 2007). When diversification is attained, a country prevents the resource based extractive sector from overshadowing other essential sectors in the economy (Weinthal and Luong 2006). South Sudan is rich in various minerals, water and land that could be harnessed for economic diversification. However, the country needs to diversify away from the extractive to the none extractive sectors. Many challenges have hindered the South Sudan’s process of diversification. One of the challenges is corruption, which has resulted in the country having about $4 billion stolen according to media reports. Due to the lack of an operating oil fund, diversification, growth in other sectors of the economy, civil wars and dropping oil prices, South Sudan is unlikely to develop. As shown in Table 4, oil production and revenues are declining. With the oil production and reserves in decline, South Sudan should have had measures in place to cushion against the dwindling oil’s impact. However, the civil war has made the country to deepen its dependence on oil revenues and loans thereby lacking the capacity to invest in the needed sectors.

Figure 7 below shows the expected oil production levels in South Sudan. Shaded areas from 2 to 6 are the expected production levels should foreign companies make more explorations. That is to say, if more companies will invest in South Sudan’s oil, production will hit close to 800 000 barrels per day. If this projection can be a reality, and oil prices rise, South Sudan will be far off better than Sudan economically. If South Sudan can be economically powerful, Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile regions would fight harder for secession. Since these regions fought as one under the SPLM/A, certainly South Sudan would support them directly or indirectly. The eventual result would be the end of Sudan as a state. If this happens, South Sudan could influence power politics in Sudan. The economic gain can be translated into having a better army, and weapons. This could be viewed as one of the reasons inciting Sudan to raise the charges so that it protects itself against South Sudan. It can be
argued that the high costs by Sudan are having an impact on South Sudan more than the use of military means. It is crippling the economy of South Sudan. Under the current state of affairs, it is very unlikely that South Sudan can afford maximum support to the SPLM-N. However, few companies are interested in doing oil exploration in South Sudan because of the security situation. In the absence of new oil explorations South Sudan’s oil sector is not likely to improve and will probably continue to decline. This situation would favour Sudan. That is why some respondents believe that Sudan does not want to see a prosperous and stable South Sudan. Sudan’s profit margins were also attributed to the agreements made between the government of Sudan and the oil companies. These agreements were signed in the early 90s when the oil prices were less than US$20 per barrel. However, this was before South Sudan seceded. It can be argued that it is profitable at present because of the revenues generated from the transportation of South Sudan’s oil. Economically, this tilts the balance in Sudan’s favour. Figure 7 below shows expected trends in oil production up until 2036.

Figure 7: South Sudan’s projected oil production till 2036

Source: MPM, Investment conference December 2013
To stand on equal terms with its neighbour in the north, South Sudan needs a cheaper mode of transporting its oil to the market as well as high oil prices on the international market. When this is achieved, South Sudan can look at building oil refineries and pipeline via Kenya, as well as use the surplus revenues to diversify the economy. When this happens, South Sudan will reduce if not end its dependence on Sudan. However, South Sudan’s total independence from Sudan is being overshadowed by the current economic and security challenges. According to BBC online, the cost of constructing the pipeline was estimated to be about $4 billion. The BBC also indicated that the duration to complete the construction of the pipeline was more than three years\(^\text{16}\). Regional interests from Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia, are likely to play a significant role in determining the start and successful completion of the pipeline. Uganda and Kenya that discovered oil pose a threat to Sudan because they stand to gain should the new pipeline be constructed via Kenya. These countries are currently involved in the IGAD peace negotiating team between the SPLM-IO and the GOSS. Sudan knows that if South Sudan gets an alternative pipeline, it will lose. This will benefit Uganda and the rest of the countries. Uganda still supports the GOSS in their quest to suppress the rebellion led by Riek Machar by sending troops to South Sudan. These regional dynamics have influenced the peace between Juba and Khartoum and are likely to affect the plans for an alternative pipeline. Figure 8 below shows pipeline to Port Sudan and the proposed route for South Sudan’s pipeline.

5.5.5. Sudan’s economy

On the part of Sudan’s economy, Sudan saw a loss of 50 per cent of the country’s budget as well as a loss of 80 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange that increased the gap in the balance of payment. In a program by Al Jazeera entitled ‘Sudan: Fight for the Soul of the North’, Sudan’s former state Minister for Information, Sana Hamad said that the economy of Sudan was expected to suffer due to the secession of South Sudan.

“There will be some suffering, but I don’t think it will shake the Sudanese economy. The North has oil, and gas fields have been discovered. Sudan also exports around 70 tonnes of gold per year”, said Sana Hamad State Minister for Information (2010-2013).

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However, the former state finance minister, Abda Al-Mahdi, reacting to the notion that the North has a lot of gold to replace the loss of the oil said that the country’s gold export was about a billion dollars for the year 2010. She also mentioned of the expected rise in the gold export. She said that although there is gold in the country, the minerals could not replace the oil revenues that accounted for 90 per cent of export earnings. She argued that drastic measures were to be implemented in order to address the loss. However, she added that at the heart of resolving the economic problem are the political issues that include areas of the ‘new south’ referring to the conflict in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile. The former finance minister also argues that the debt problem sits on Sudan’s economic progress. She argues that the debt was supposed to have been taken care of when the petrodollars were flowing. According to the World Bank, Sudan’s debt at the end of 2014 stood at US$45.1 billion. Most of the loan was from China, which brings about the fear of what would happen if China stopped giving the loans. Below is Abda Al-Mahdi’s statement:

“The government is talking about gold, but our gold exports so far are about a billion dollars for 2010. Projections are that they will rise but they cannot definitely replace the oil revenues, which account for 90 per cent of our exports. So there will be dire adjustments needed by the government. In order to do these adjustments, it will need to resolve its political problems,” Abad Al-Mahdi, former State Minister of Finance 2003-2005.

From the statements given above, Sudan’s economy suffered due to the South’s secession. To improve the economy, Sudan tried to implement austerity measures by cutting down on subsidies. A lot of economic sectors suffered as a result of South Sudan’s departure with its oil. This brought about anxieties in certain areas of Sudan as a result of economic hardships. Trade along the border areas dropped due to the military build-up. Local producers were hurt by this sudden economic shock, especially those in the South border areas experienced high prices (Conflict Dynamics International 2014). It can be argued that this economic outlook could have brought fear to Sudan. This is because a weak economy means Sudan could not manage to have a good army to protect itself against insurgents. This could have resulted in regions like Southern Kordofan, Darfur and the Blue Nile seceding.

19 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WSFHohZW80k](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WSFHohZW80k) (Accessed on 26 October 2015)
A state’s survival is paramount in an anarchical world system where there is no overall authority to call for help when in need. Therefore, to survive above other nations, a state has to use available means. Economic survival here entailed that Sudan had to apply available means to ensure it gains or recover losses incurred as a result of South Sudan’s departure. According to a report by the BBC, Sudan confiscated South Sudan’s oil worth $815 million in 2012. This made South Sudan to stop oil production to show Sudan that the oil belonged to South Sudan. In response, Sudan hiked the oil charges on the use of the pipeline. It can be argued that Sudan did this deliberately knowing that South Sudan has no option but to oblige. Before the discovery of oil, Sudan mainly survived on farming and other agro-related activities. According to the US Library of Congress Sudan’s exports before the dawn of the oil era was composed mainly of agricultural products. Agriculture not only employed about 80 per cent of the country’s population, but it also contributed 35.5 per cent to the country’s GDP in 2006 (US Congress Report 2015). However, the document cited above indicates that the agricultural sector’s contribution to the GDP declined with the coming of the oil era. On the other hand, Sudan has been under sanctions since the presidency of Bill Clinton in 2007. President George Bush and Barack Obama maintained the sanctions. The sanctions forbid American companies from trading with Sudanese oil companies. Though the sanctions have been in effect, it has been difficult to implement them fully because the oil fields are in the South while the refineries and the oil pipeline are in the north. It can be argued that US oil companies together with their allies from Europe have less interest in investing in the oil sector in South Sudan. This is due to the sanctions imposed on Sudan. The argument presented above indicates that Sudan’s agricultural sector cannot contribute much to Sudan’s GDP neither can it replace the oil. This thought explains why Sudan would need as much oil revenues as possible even if the oil were in independent South Sudan.

5.6. Disputed Areas
Since South Sudan’s independence, Sudan and South Sudan do not have an official borderline between them. This is because of the many areas along the border being disputed. The two countries are claiming certain areas to belong to either side. According to the Human Security

Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan\textsuperscript{21} the borderline has not been demarcated. Oil and the fertile lands are making the borderline contested. There have been clashes before between the two states due to the border issue. Both countries have used military capabilities as a means to settle the border issue. According to the website cited above, the use of military capabilities by the two countries was a strategy to tilt negotiations in their favour for the disputed areas. If there was no oil in the border regions, it can be argued that the areas wouldn’t have been contested. Some areas like Abyei are significant because of the historical ties. Abyei has the Dinka Ngok and the Misseriya that have political as well as security significance to both Sudan and South Sudan. Sudan used the Misseriya by arming them to fight and displace the Dinka in Abyei. On South Sudan’s part, the people of Abyei were also members of the SPLA during the civil war period. The use of military capabilities is in line with the offensive realism. Sudan used its army against South Sudan to have Abyei. If Sudan acquires Abyei, it will mean that more oil and fertile grazing lands will go to Sudan. Thus, oil and fertile land will be translated into economic power. When this happens, Sudan will gain some amount of authority over South Sudan. Below is the map showing some of the disputed areas. According to the map, there are nine (9) areas that are being contended for by the two countries. As it has been highlighted above, most of these areas are under the oil blocks. When the areas finally belong to either side, it will change the oil dynamics. Either side will gain by having that area or lose when the particular area falls on the side of the other country.

\textsuperscript{21} http://www.smallarmssurveyssudan.org/facts-figures/borderdisputed-areas.html (Accessed on 11 November 2015)
5.6.1. Abyei

Endowed with oil and fertile soils, Abyei is an area about 4000 square miles along the border between Sudan and South Sudan. Other than the fertile soil and oil Abyei has the River Kiir, which runs throughout the year, it is not a seasonal river. This attracts the Arab nomads who...
frequent the area for their animals’ grazing lands (Hamilton 2010). Abyei area is one of the post-independence issues yet to be resolved. According to the findings, there was a mission called the Abyei Boundary Commission in the CPA to establish the boundary. The purpose of the boundaries commission was to come up with the areas to be included under Abyei administration. According to Douglas Johnson (2008), Abyei was instrumental in the forming of the SPLA and has been viewed as its birthplace. This made the Dinka Ngok take a significant role in the SPLA during the civil war. According to Johnson, this is one of the reasons why the SPLM/A cannot leave Abyei to Sudan because doing so is like betraying a loyal old friend. Currently, Sudan is in control of Abyei. There is the argument that Sudan’s NCP has been meddling in the affairs of Abyei so as to avoid a referendum that will allow the people to join South Sudan. According to Johnson (2008), Abyei is also special to the Dinka because it has been their land for almost two centuries. The Misseriya are settlers of the Northern Kordofan area but travel to Abyei for grazing during the dry season. The South Sudan government still has people who are Dinka Ngok from Abyei, who are also interested in seeing that the area gets its independence. Below is a response from another respondent, lecturer and policy analyst; Mayay is a lecturer at the University of Juba.

“The people of Abyei needed to have a referendum and peace agreement, Sudan decided not to allow the people of Abyei to have their referendum. The African Union came up with the proposal to have the referendum conducted in October 2013. Sudan refused the people of Abyei to conducted their own referendum,” Mayay.

Another respondent by the name of Kuol, in his mid 30s, an environmental policy analyst and researcher gave similar views.

“So these people were natural friends of South Sudan, they were with us together. The peace agreement that gave South Sudan peace incorporated their aspirations, and their interests. They have been with us, their leaders have been comrades with our leaders,” Kuol.

The Abyei Protocol gave an outline of the administration, the sharing of local oil revenues as well as access to the grazing lands for the Dinka and the Misseriya. This protocol according to Johnson was drafted and presented to the people by Senator Reverend Jack Danforth, a US envoy. The drafting of the protocol was done to break the impasse in the negotiations. Sudan’s interest among many is the desire not to lose the oil fields found in Abyei. Though
most of the oil areas have been given to Sudan, Abyei has not yet been given an opportunity to hold a referendum. Sudan’s action could be viewed from the desire of not wanting to lose more territory to South Sudan. If the people of Abyei, are given an opportunity to determine whether they should join South Sudan or not, they would join South Sudan. They have more in common with the South than the Arabs in Khartoum. They have a lot of Dinka in South Sudan whom they associate with culturally as well as politically. The two states did not agree on how Abyei could be settled and referred the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The result was a redrawing of the boundaries, which saw Abyei being reduced, and areas rich in oil like Heglig going into the hands of Sudan.

According to Douglas Johnson (2008), the government of Sudan said that it’s the Misseriya who resisted the report of the Abyei Border Committee. However he argues that the Khartoum government mobilised the resistance in Abyei. The GOS has been meddling in the Abyei affairs to stop the area from holding a referendum and then accuse the Misseriya as the perpetrators. Since Sudan cannot allow the people of Abyei to hold a referendum, it means that they cannot secede and join the South. This situation is likely to be as it is because Sudan considers the Misseriya as an important political element in the ruling party. Sudan’s behaviour over Abyei goes in line with the offensive realism’s tenet of self-help in international politics. According to the tenet of self-help, a state needs to use available means to help itself. The use of the Misseriya is one of the ways to avoid losing more land and oil in Abyei to South Sudan.

The government in its quest to destabilize Abyei and other regions have also used the Misseriya tribe as mercenaries. This means that if Sudan allows Abyei to go, it will lose the support of the Misseriya that may also lead to a revolt by the Misseriya further weakening the regime. On the other hand, the Dinka ngok feel marginalised because the oil despite having been mined by the GOS does not benefit them. According to the report by Small Arms Survey on Abyei, there is an indication that South Sudan may not wish to align itself to Sudan concerning Abyei because doing so will be viewed as betraying the Dinka ngok. If South Sudan let go of Abyei, with the current situation of the civil war in the South, Abyei area may join the fighters against the government of Juba. This may further exacerbate the situation in
South Sudan. The situation in Abyei according to the Small Arms Survey report favours the government of Sudan. This means that since there is no current political resolution, Sudan continues to reap the profits from Abyei’s oil. In line with offensive realism, Sudan has been rational regarding the tactics of hindering Abyei’s referendum.

The current situation is also beneficial to the government of Sudan because it gives the Misseriya more room to manoeuvre during their seasonal migration into Abyei’s grazing lands. The report cited above indicates that before the stalemate on Abyei, the Misseriya used to hold meetings with the Dinka which would result in them being given routes to use by the Dinka. The same meetings would be used to settle outstanding issues such as theft, deaths as well as other problems. However, at the moment, the report indicates that the Misseriya move freely in and out of Abyei and use any route they want when going to the grazing lands. This has further annoyed the Dinka Ngok. Though the UN is available in Abyei until a political solution is found, the report cited above indicates that the UN now acts as the bodyguards for the Misseriya. There are reports that the SAF and SPLM forces are in and around Abyei area indicating that the two sides may engage each other.

5.7. Civil Wars

Conflicts within South Sudan between various competing factions and ethnic groups have been more brutal destabilising the country compared to the confrontation between Sudan and South Sudan (McNamee 2012). Some battles have been bloody while others have been less bloody. For example, before gaining independence, there was Lieutenant General George Athor a Dinka who after having been left out by the SPLM went into the bush and launched a rebellion in Jonglei State in 2010. David Yau Yau also led a revolt due to similar reasons (Crisis Group African Report 2014) from May 2010 to June 2011. These two examples show how fragile South Sudan is. Though the country is vulnerable, there is a relationship between civil wars and the oil in South Sudan. This linkage between civil war and oil is also applicable to Sudan. This relationship between Sudan and South Sudan has also been affected by the geographical locations of civil wars in both countries. The geographical positions of the civil wars are rich in oil. In South Sudan, though the cause of the civil wars is viewed to have been about political power the fighting is concentrated in areas rich in oil away from Juba, the
centre of political power. In South Sudan, the oil states have been more prone to fighting compared to non-oil states. It can be argued that the oil is a factor in South Sudan’s civil war. According to Le Billion, the geography and political economy of the resources like oil inflames the conflicts, often as an outcome of the level of resource dependence fostered in such societies (Le Billion 2001). The civil wars in South Sudan have often centred on the desire to have access to the oil wealth. Currently, Unity State has experienced heavy fighting thereby affecting oil production.

Oil has been a factor in South Sudan’s civil war because it is a source of revenue to the government. The rebels under Riek Machar have been fighting in Unity State, one of South Sudan’s oil producing states. The reasons for the fighting in Unity State could either be the aim of acquiring total control of oil-production thereby collect revenues or disrupt the production and harm the revenue flow to the government. According to Reuters Online, oil production in Unity State was intrepreted when the civil war broke out in 2013\textsuperscript{22}. The same article indicates that the rebels’ aim was to capture and shut down the oil wells. The article cited suggests that only two oil wells are operating in Upper Nile State. Both the government and the rebels want to control the oil-producing areas because doing so means access to money, which can be used to finance the civil war. However, if the rebels want to shut the oil wells, it means that their aim is to cripple South Sudan economically. These reasons show how oil is a factor in the conflict in South Sudan. The desire to control oil-producing states explains why states rich in oil have been the centres of fighting. Paul Collier has also highlighted the relationship between civil war and natural resources given above. According to Collier, natural resources help finance and motivate conflict (2008). Other factors that make society prone to conflict include low income, slow growth as well as dependence on a primary commodity like oil in the case of the two Sudans. Oil is likely to continue being a factor in the stability of South Sudan. This will dependent on how the revenues from the oil will be to the producing areas. There is a possibility that the states rich in oil within South Sudan will desire autonomy and control over the revenues from the oil. This is likely to be the case especially when the oil revenues cannot bring a significant economic transformation in

\textsuperscript{22} (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/06/uk-southsudan-unrest-oil-idUKKBNOOM0NP20150606 (Accessed 7 October 2015).
such areas. If they are not granted the autonomy, they may fight for it thereby plunging the country further into civil war.

In Sudan, the end of the civil war with the South did not end civil wars within the country. There are many areas currently engaged in civil war. Sudan’s civil wars are similar to those in South Sudan. In Sudan oil has been at the centre of fighting in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile. This is because; in as much as oil is being extracted in these areas, the revenues do not benefit the people in these areas. This has been one of the grievances aired by the SRF rebel group. They are both resource-influenced wars though the difference is that one is within a nation that just gained independence. In Sudan; the government is fighting various rebel groups under the umbrella name of the SRF. The understanding that the two parties could not cause the civil wars in each other’s states is due to the reason that the wars in Sudan started before the South seceded. While the civil war in South Sudan has been attributed to misunderstandings between the president and the vice president. However, Sudan and South Sudan have taken advantage of each other’s civil war.

The respondents had mixed views on the issue of one country supporting the rebels on the other side. According to Benny, an economist and researcher in his early 40s, the reason for South Sudan’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war is historically tied to the South’s struggle for independence.

“When South Sudan was fighting the war, there were those who were fighting with us, when South Sudan separated they could not come with us, so South Sudan has some sympathy towards them-the SPLM-North. So there is some support and Sudan is saying we are supporting them but also Sudan is supporting the rebel of Dr. Machar. You are helping the enemy of my friend. They are pointing fingers at each other. Like this week, in my home area, Northern Bhar el Ghazal, Bashir bombed my home area and the whole world does not say anything. And if they say that they have no verification. Sometimes its one of those times.” Benny

According to Mayay, in his mid 40s, lecturer and policy analyst at the University of Juba:
“The other thing that is going to create the problem also is the way in which Sudan is handling the issues of Nuba Mountain and the Blue Nile because these are the people who fought the war with the people of South Sudan. And they were supposed to have what is called popular consultation and Sudan could not comply with that one and as a result there is war, and even the issue of Darfur is very particular to the people of South Sudan.” Says Mayay.

Another respondent by the name of Puoch, a lecturer at the University of Juba indicates that the support of rebels by the two governments is just allegations.

“The issue of supporting the rebels is not with clear evidence. That is why I mentioned it earlier you allege that they are doing that (support rebels). There is no clear evidence and this needs to be proven by security experts and independent bodies that really Sudan is supporting the rebels and in what ways, they may be helping but they are also particular that oil is benefiting both of us.” Puoch

Though this is the understanding by the respondents, it can be argued that the situation in both countries has been taken advantage of by each nation to ensure power and authority are exercised. Both states’ armed conflicts have turned to be proxy wars in which each state is participating. For example, when Riek Machar rebelled, Sudan’s President Bashir had a meeting or an audience with him in Khartoum. He was a welcome guest to the president of Sudan sending a bad diplomatic signal to Juba. The leader of the SPLA-IO has been a good friend of President Bashir. This shows that the conflicts do have links to both states indirectly as well as directly. However, there is no official line from both states accepting any involvement in any civil war going on.

5.7.1. Sudan’s Civil Wars

Sudan has been experiencing armed conflict aimed at either fighting for independence or just trying to address the marginalisation caused by the government in Khartoum to the people of Darfur, South Kordofan, the Blue Nile and other regions. As mentioned above, Sudan’s civil
wars have been caused by historical factors engraved in the lack of sharing of the country’s wealth, Arabization and Islamization of the country (Ylönen 2009). The Arab Muslim dominated the social and political hierarchy resulting in discontentment in other regions like the South, the Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile. The country’s conflict has been commonly referred to as a ‘civil war of interlocking civil wars’ with causes that are interwoven. These causes are cultural, religious, economic, resource based, ethnic with an international dynamic. These factors have been playing a role with certain areas having different elements emerging more important than others. On top of these factors is the state’s questionable legitimacy and it being the entity for economic exploitation (el-Battahni 2006).

It has been mentioned above that the secession of South Sudan did not end the civil war in Sudan, but it can be argued that it changed the face of it. This change in the civil war in Sudan is in the way the rebel groups consolidated and formed the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF). The group has been fighting for one objective that is the restructuring of Sudan. There is also the argument that the goals are likely to shift due to the different rebel groups making up the SRF. Currently the regions, which are involved in the conflict, are Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. The Blue Nile and South Kordofan areas are commonly referred to as the two areas or the ‘new South’. “The SRF is a composition of groups from the ‘New South’ which are the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid, SLA-AW, SLA-MM, JEM, the SPLM/A-N as well as small unarmed groups” (Crisis Group Report 2015: 4). These rebels do continue shifting their allegiances depending on the agenda and perhaps the price attached. According to a report by Crisis Group International, the rebel groups have often mutated since the civil war started in Sudan. This has often seen some factions going to the government side and others becoming more of a threat to President Omar al-Bashir.

5.7.2. South Sudan’s Involvement in Sudan’s Civil War and Vice Versa

Crisis Group 2015 Africa Report indicates that the SRF has had contacts and receives support from the GOSS. The same report shows that there have been bases for Darfur rebels in South Sudan’s Unity State. It further states that the SPLM/A-N receives vehicles, fuel and ammunitions from the government in Juba. There has been a lack of acknowledgement on the part of the GOSS concerning their involvement in Sudan’s rebels. The typical narrative from
some of the respondents, as well as the government officials, is that South Sudan only has refugees, not rebels. In other words, South Sudan denies supporting rebels in Sudan.

However, it is possible for this support to exist because some sectors of the government or the government may consider it a moral duty to support the people who fought and died for the liberation of South Sudan. These people especially those in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile were instrumental in the SPLMs struggle for a reformed Sudan, which ended in seeing South Sudan being independent. This goal, the rebels in these regions, still have and wish to achieve someday. The oil link in the case of the civil war in Sudan is due to underdevelopment in the areas where oil is produced. An article published by Dabanga Radio states that the rebels’ aim at capturing the oil wells in order to deprive the government of Sudan of revenues\(^{23}\). This affects the mode and geography of the civil war in Sudan. Oil is Sudan’s major revenue source that means that if there is destabilization, there will be less or no revenues for the government. If South Sudan supports the rebels, they will have the strength to take over the wells or disrupt the oil production. When the rebels disrupt Sudan’s oil production, the revenues from transit fees may not be enough. This argument is also applicable to South Sudan’s rebels. If this happens, it may hinder the GOSS from supporting rebels in Sudan. On the other hand, if oil stops flowing from South Sudan, then Sudan will not have revenues. This situation has made the two states to cooperate to ensure that oil continues flowing. So oil flow and disruption affect both countries. More oil flow means more money for both countries. If the oil is shut, then both countries suffer. This scenario suggests that Sudan would be the least country interested in ensuring that oil production is destabilised. On the other hand, if Sudan supports the rebels and they control the oil in South Sudan, it could mean that Sudan has control of the oil. This is the same situation with South Sudan. If the rebels supported by South Sudan control the oil, then South Sudan would gain. The civil wars have implications for both countries. One of the implications is that there are political risks for foreign investors. It is difficult for foreign companies to invest in both countries because of the security risks involved.

5.7.3. The South Sudan Crisis

South Sudan is engulfed in a violent crisis creating widespread general instability. This has resulted in the oil resources being the centre of focus for both parties involved. The civil war has brought about corruption, as well as made the country unattractive for foreign investment. Instead of spending on development related projects, the GOSS is diverting funds to the army to fight the rebels (Global Witness 2014). Most of the respondents called the civil war that started in December 2013 as ‘the December 2013 crisis’. The crisis erupted due to President Kiir accusing his vice president Riek Machar and imprisoning 13 political figures of attempting the coup. This led to mass killings of Nuer civilians in Juba that resulted in reprisals in Dinka areas (African Affairs 2014: 193). According to Crisis Group International, the December 2013 incident led to appraisals in Unity State where Nuers took on Dinkas leading to a lot of bloodshed. This crisis quickly escalated into what has been termed a tribal civil war. The political prisoners arrested included other tribes even the president’s in addition to the Nuers. Many respondents have viewed this crisis as having been an advantage to Sudan in trying to fix South Sudan. Many respondents said Sudan was behind Riek Machar and his militia group. Despite this being the view of respondents, academicians and international writers have questioned the government’s narrative of the coup. Others have argued that it was a ploy to give legitimacy to the sacking of the vice president. Whether this was an attempted coup or not, the result of the December 2013 event had led to a civil war that has turned to be between the Dinka and the Nuer.

Crisis Group Africa Report indicates that when the SPLA-IO took over most areas in Unity State, the government soldiers were helped by the SRF taking Mayom and Panakuach (areas in Unity State) in January 2014. The report indicates further that the SRF helped the government to take Bentiu-Rubkona and other areas that were in the hands of the opposition forces. As of June 2015, the Sudan Tribune reported that the rebels were in control of the oil wells in Unity State. However, the oil fields captured were shut down further reducing oil production as well as foreign revenues to the government. The presence of the SRF in South Sudan could be an advantage to Sudan. It could be argued that it lifts pressure off Sudan’s government, as the fighting will be concentrated inside South Sudan rather than Sudan. This may weaken the SRF movement because they cannot fight two wars at the same time.

Some respondents have indicated that Sudan supports the SPLM-IO by training and supplying them with arms. This claim is supported by Crisis Group’s Report that shows that Machar’s rebels have often carried out attacks from inside Sudan’s borders. This accusation the GOS denies and has fired back at the GOSS as the one supporting rebels in Sudan. The respondents said some rebels have been captured and have disclosed information that they are trained in Khartoum. The other reason is that when the government attacks the rebels, they run into Sudan territory and the Government of Sudan neither disarms them nor deports them. Verifying the claims is hard. However, there are reasons why Sudan would support the rebels. One reason is that the SPLM-N was once part of the SPLM/A currently in power in South Sudan. To say there is no connection between SPLM in South Sudan and the SPLM-N is to deny the historical connection. They fought and shed their blood trying to liberate and transform Sudan. Sudan is afraid of this relation and is trying to do what it can to help itself. The other reason is that South Sudan is being supported by the rebels in fighting the SPLM-IO as reported by Crisis Group International. The narrative of Sudan supporting the rebels is prominent in the minds of most respondents interviewed.

The article in the Sudan Tribune online quotes South Sudan Minister of Foreign Affairs accusing the president of Sudan as having pledged support to ensure that Machar is president by the power of the gun. Whether this is just political talk or not, it cannot be verified. It can be argued that regime change in South Sudan, by Sudan, is possible but not its priority. It can be argued that it may not be the agenda. This has huge regional security as well as political implications. Uganda would not be in favour of such a move due to its support for the current regime. The other reason is that if the regime changes, the rebels and those in support of President Kiir will unite with the SRF to fight the government in Khartoum. Khartoum would fall within days. Thus, the regime change in South Sudan may not take place, not anytime soon. So far what Sudan seem to be doing is to add ‘stress’ on South Sudan through supporting the rebels. This would be viewed, as a way of trying to weaken South Sudan economically so that the GOSS’ links with SPLM-North are cut.

Sudan’s interests in supporting the rebels can be seen from different perspectives. One of them is that it feels unhappy by South Sudan’s departure with its oil resources. Again if it were not happy, why would it sign the cooperative agreements? Considering the implementation process, only the agreement on oil has been implemented. Most of the other agreements are yet to. This means that Sudan signed the agreements because it needed the revenues from the oil fees and taxes paid by South Sudan. It needed to have the oil flowing. This is so because oil started flowing from South Sudan after the signing of the cooperative agreements.

Crisis Group indicates that Khartoum has benefited from the civil war in South Sudan. The instability in South Sudan has obscured some vexing bilateral issues such as the status of Abyei. The same report indicates that Khartoum is playing its cards by asking for oil from SPLM-IO while asking Juba to give up Abyei. This has also made Juba to spend its oil money more on rearming itself, supporting militias and the Ugandan soldiers with little going to the people where oil is coming from. Considering the security situation, any normal state would rearm itself with the hope that doing so would ensure securing the state. Though rearming can be viewed as a means to secure a state, the report by Crisis Group considers this move “as mortgaging the future of the country to finance the war” (Crisis Group African Report 2015:20). South Sudan is mortgaging the future because the areas that are not being developed are potential sources of conflict due to the lack of development that will lead to grievances. In a nation where the gun has been viewed as a way in which grievance are aired, it may lead to another civil war. This may result in a situation where South Sudan will be weaker and have no power to stand against the dictates of Sudan.

Though Sudan supports the SPLM-IO, it is also on the mediation team led by IGAD trying to broker a peace deal between the SPLM-IO and the GOSS. This could be viewed as double standards or rather as the offensive realists put it, being rational. It has been argued that the support for the SPLM-IO is mainly because of Uganda as well as the fact that the rebels in Sudan are on the side of South Sudan. Sudan’s support for the SPLM-IO can be viewed as a mechanism to force Juba to stop supporting the SRF rebels. This brings in the thought that Sudan could not encourage the destabilisation of South Sudan because doing so would lead to
destabilisation of Sudan. This may cause the rebels to organise and march towards Khartoum. On the other hand, supporting Machar would bring more revenues to Khartoum through oil and concessions. The other argument could be that the support could come at a cost, i.e. if Riek Machar gets the presidency, Khartoum would get Abyei. The arguments given above are trying to argue out why Sudan would support Riek Machar.

The December crisis in South Sudan has had economic repercussions for the new state. According to Global Witness’ report of 2014, the budget for 2014 was 750 million South Sudanese Pounds. Out of the 750 South Sudanese Pounds, 500 million South Sudanese Pounds going to the army (Global Witness 2014). Though spending on the military is justified, the problem is that it’s a non-productive sector. That means that it is not engaged in producing goods and services that can bring revenues to the country. As long as the civil war continues, South Sudan’s expenditure on the army will continue. This means that South Sudan will not have the surplus revenue to invest in other sectors of the economy. It also means that the oil pipeline proposed to pass through Kenya may not be constructed shortly rendering the country more dependent on Sudan.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This research was carried out with the aim of examining the relationship between South Sudan and Sudan since the former got independence. Though it reviewed the relationship since the independence of South Sudan, a study of the history of the relationship before the independence was also given. By then the relationship was between the government in Khartoum and the Southern Region and its rebel group, the SPLM/A. The relationship between the two countries has a history that is full of mistrust, conflict and marginalization. The two nations now exist as two sovereign neighbours though their relationship finds its origin from the historical setting of the civil war. Although the two are sovereign states, historical factors such as the oil and disputed areas still affects the relationship.

6.1. The Offensive Realism Theory

The theory, presented in this thesis, is aimed at understanding and explaining the behaviour of great powers in the world today. Concerning the two states discussed above, they are not great powers in the world but neighbours with Sudan being powerful compared to South Sudan. Offensive realism theory presents the world as anarchical. The theory also presents states as having the ultimate goal to survive above other states. Like realism theory, it looks at power as a factor in understanding international politics. When it comes to states trusting each other, the theory indicates that a state cannot be sure about the intentions of other states. In other words, there is always mistrust between states.

Military capacity is important in the eyes of the offensive realists. They believe that a country possesses some form of military capabilities. The military capability stems from the understanding that states face uncertain international environment. This means that any state can attack another at any given time (Williams 2013). The theory is helpful in the explaining of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan highlighting the tendencies exhibited by both countries. These tendencies are the lack of trust, being rational, use of military capabilities, and having the goal to survive above other objectives. It has been argued that the two countries do not trust each other while they use the oil as a source of revenue. The income is used to buy arms, which they use to protect each other. Offensive realism indicates
that states can use weapons to exert power influence. The two Sudans went to war in 2012 with South Sudan aiming at reclaiming some of the disputed areas. At the time of writing this thesis, Sudan and South Sudan have soldiers along the border. Concerning military capabilities, Sudan can be viewed to have more compared to South Sudan. This is so because of the acquiring of military hardware before the South seceded. However, the South has had military capabilities especially in the form of soldiers and militias. State survival has been viewed from the economic as well as military point of view. The economic point of view is explained through Sudan’s charging South Sudan high oil transit costs. The high transit charges demanded by Sudan have been perceived to be aimed at ‘chocking’ the South economically. This is viewed to be a more powerful way of crippling South Sudan than the use of military capabilities.

There are few challenges to the understanding of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan when viewed through the eyes of the offensive realists. Dunne, Kurki and Smith (2014) argue that realists do not put into consideration aspects or opportunities that come about when states cooperate with each other. Globalisation is steadily increasing state inter-dependence, which may reduce tendencies of competition for survival by states. However, despite the economic prospects of inter-dependence, the dawn of globalization has not stopped wars. Hence, offensive realism still stands as a theory that is contributing to the body of knowledge in IR (Dunne, Kurki and Smith 2014). Although realism, in general, presents the world as anarchical, the cooperation may exist between the two states. However although there is this cooperation, it is at levels where the factors causing distrusts outweigh the benefits of cooperation. Sudan and South Sudan's relationship is critical and affected by many factors with oil being the core issue.

6.2. The CPA
South Sudan separated from Sudan under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Among many achievements of the CPA, the most significant one is that it resulted in the South achieving independence. The process towards 2011 was not a smooth one. Sudan bombed the South severally as if to send a message that it should not secede. According to the article published in the Sudan Times November 2010 edition, the SAF warplanes raided...
South Sudan killing four soldiers and two civilians in the same year (Sudan Times Newspaper Nov 2010:3). However, despite the bombings, Sudan agreed to let the South hold a referendum, which led to them having independence. The CPA did not settle all the problems that were between Sudan and South Sudan before independence. These problems include the demarcation of the border, how to deal with the Abyei area, as well as the rebels that fought alongside the SPLM/A that became the SPLA-N. These problems continue to haunt the two countries and have contributed to the bad relationship.

During the signing of the CPA: Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile were supposed to determine their future through a referendum. At the time of writing this thesis, Sudan has neither respected nor shown interest in allowing the regions to choose where they would want to belong. It is clear that Abyei, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile would join the South if they were given a chance to do so. It is this thought that the researcher views as disturbing to Sudan. It is clear Sudan will lose further if the regions secede. Since Sudan does not want these regions to secede, it means that the conflict in the ‘new South’ may continue.

6.3. The Oil
The oil is as vital for Sudan as it is for South Sudan accounting for more than half of the country’s revenues. Cooperation between the two states is viable especially where oil is concerned. However, the secession of South Sudan led to a loss of export earnings that were accounting for almost 90 per cent on the part of Sudan. Before secession, the South had no power or voice concerning the oil, its revenues and how it was to be used so that the region could develop. This suggests that the desire to own oil fuelled the South’s secession. On the other hand, this desire left Sudan unhappy because oil was Sudan’s economic backbone.

Regarding oil, the differences in the two states lie in how developed the oil infrastructure is and the reserves. Sudan has a well-established petroleum industry with many oil related facilities that lack in the South. The lack of a well-developed oil industry has made Sudan be an indispensable ‘partner' for South Sudan as far as oil is concerned. This dependence, seem to have shaped the relationship in that Sudan views itself as a powerful state that can control and
influence South Sudan. On the other hand, South Sudan is vulnerable because there is no other option of transporting oil despite Sudan’s oil transit and other fees being the most expensive in the world.

The oil is a resource that can bring peace and cooperation between the two states. Since the signing of the cooperative agreements in 2012, the two countries have been cooperating in that oil is flowing. Though there is this cooperation, it is only on the oil with other areas yet to be implemented. This presents a picture of a suspicious relationship where Sudan and South Sudan are only interested in the revenues from the oil. The current oil agreement sees Sudan gaining more from the fees. When it comes to negotiations, Sudan seems to have more say over South Sudan knowing that there is no alternative pipeline for the South. The only way to break this vulnerability on the part of South Sudan is to have an alternative pipeline. However, the major challenge for South Sudan is the cost involved in the construction of the new pipeline. Currently, South Sudan seems not to have the financial capacity to develop the new pipeline.

Both countries do have oil reserves that are in decline according to many oil observers. Sudan’s reserves could be depleted faster than those in South Sudan because they are less than that of the South. The challenge is the oil prices on the international market that are fluctuating. The oil at the time of writing was fetching between $40 and $60 per barrel. If the production costs, oil fees paid to Sudan as well as the amount that goes to the companies is deducted, South Sudan remains with little dollars. Compounded with the civil war, it means that most of the revenues goes to the arming of the state leaving other sectors like agriculture to suffer. In other words, South Sudan will continue to depend on Sudan for a long time to come. This dependence is likely to weaken South Sudan further.

6.4. The current civil wars and disputed areas
The disputed areas include the Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan and Darfur regions as well as Abyei. These do have oil, fertile land as well as minerals. Rebels are fighting with the aim of seceding in and around these areas. There is the perception that the
secession of South Sudan is but the beginning of what is yet to come. This language seems to be resonating in the minds of the North, who are playing it down. Rebellions have also plagued South Sudan with the latest one that started in 2013 still having no end in sight. There are accusations that the South supports the rebels in the ‘new South’, and South Sudan accuses Sudan of supporting the rebels in South Sudan. The oil stands in the middle of the conflict whether it’s in South Sudan or Sudan. These two states are drawn to fight the proxy war because whoever controls these areas will gain economically through the revenues generated from the oil in these fields. Due to this reason, it is very likely that both states will not stop and allow the other to control the other areas. Concerning the contended areas, the two countries have continued being haunted due to them not having been given proper attention. Overshadowed by factors such as the civil wars going on in both states, the status quo is likely to prevail for some more years. Though various reasons are attributing to the contentions of the areas, oil has been at the heart because most of the areas along the borderline sit on oil reserves. Sudan and South Sudan are not likely to give away areas considered rich in oil easily. It can be concluded that other than being a blessing, the oil and the pipeline is a curse in the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan.
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Appendices

Appendix I: NMBU’s introductory letter used during fieldwork

Confirmation of student status and fieldwork in South Sudan

I hereby confirm that Joe Henry Kayombo, born 10.09.1982, citizen of Zambia, is currently enrolled as a full-time student at the Master programme; International Relations (M-IR) at The Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU).

The student was admitted at NMBU 02.08.13, and is expected to finish his studies by the end of 2015. All students who attend this programme must go for fieldwork and collect data, and do their own research for their final Master thesis. Mr. Kayombo’s research question is: How has the oil shaped the post-independence relationship between Sudan and South Sudan?

According to the plan, the student will conduct his fieldwork in South Sudan, in collaboration with the University of Juba, in April 2015. The research proposal has been treated and approved at the Department of International Environmental- and Development Studies (Noragric), and by the main supervisor Nadarajah Shanmugaratnam.

We ask you kindly, to assist our student and help him to accomplish his work if necessary. Please contact me if you have any further questions.

Sincerely yours

[Signature]

Ingunn Bohmann

Study coordinator, Department of International Environment and development studies, NMBU
Appendix II: Letter of invitation from University of Juba

Directorate of International and Alumni Affairs

09 March 2015

Mr. Joe H. Kayombo
Department for International Environment and Development Studies
Norwegian University of Life Sciences, NMBU
P. O. Box 5003, 1432 AS
Norway

Dear Kayombo,

Re: Invitation

The University of Juba is pleased to invite you to Juba so as to collect data for your Master's thesis during the months of April and May 2015.

As you conduct fieldwork in South Sudan, the Center for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS) at the University of Juba, which is collaborating with the Department of International Environment and Development Studies at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences and Hawassa University under the NORHED Programme, will grant any possible assistance that you may require.

We look forward to welcoming you.

Dr. Leben Nelson Moro
Director
Tel. +211 (0)927121540 or +211(0)956595716
Email: leben_moro@yahoo.com or lebenmoro@hotmail.com

CC Dr Luka Biong Kuol, Director of CPDS
Dr. Darley Jose Kjosavik, NMBU

Directorate of International and Alumni Affairs, Univ. of Juba, P. O. Box 82, Juba, South Sudan
Appendix III: Information sheet used during research (Designed according to Bryman’s format)

Information Sheet

Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this research. This information sheet explains what the research is about and how I would like you to take part in it.

This interview’s purpose is to generate information that I will use in my masters thesis. Upon completion and grading of the thesis I will be conferred a qualification of Masters in International Relations.

In order to get your views, I will be grateful if I can interview you as a student from Norwegian University of Life Sciences in Norway. If you agree, I will audio record the interview, which I estimate, will last not more than an hour.

The information, which you will provide in this interview, will be used for research purposes. Since this is for research purposes, the information will not be used in a way, which will allow the identification of your individual responses.

When the thesis is published, a copy will be at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences in Norway and will be accessible in both hard copy and soft copy by whoever wants to read it.

The Norwegian University of Life Sciences is aware of my research, as you have seen the letter of introduction. Thank you for accepting to be interviewed. If you have any questions concerning the interview or the research at large you may ask now.

Researcher: Joe H Kayombo

Phone: +479 399 4203

Email: free2bjoe@yahoo.com
Appendix IV: Interview Consent form used during research (Designed according to Bryman’s format)

Interview Consent Form

1. I, the undersigned have read and understood the study information sheet provided by the researcher, Joe H. Kayombo
2. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study
3. I understand that taking part in the study will include being interviewed and audio recorded
4. I have been given adequate time to consider my decision and I agree to take part in the study.
5. I understand that my personal details such as name and employer address will not be revealed to other people.
6. I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages and other research outputs but my name will not be used
7. I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any material related to this project to Joe H Kayombo
8. I understand that I can withdraw from the interview any minute and I will not be asked questions about why I have decided no to take part

Name of participant: .............................................. Date: 04/04/15

Signature of Researcher: .............................................. Date: 04/04/15
Appendix V: Interview Guide

1. How do you view the bilateral relationship between Sudan and South Sudan?
2. Has the relationship between the two countries improved since South Sudan gained independence?
3. If yes what factors have made it improve?
4. If no, what factors affects the relationship?
5. How has oil production been since the signing of independence?
6. How has the South Sudan oil shaped the post independence relationship between Sudan and South Sudan? If so in what ways?
7. How can the oil be a tool for strengthening bilateral relations by the two countries i.e. South Sudan and north Sudan?
8. Do you think the transporting of oil through Sudan has been of benefit to Sudan only, South Sudan only or both?
9. If yes in what ways?
10. What has Sudan/South Sudan done in order to ensure that it benefits from the oil?
11. What law or policy governs the oil production and marketing in South Sudan?
12. Is Sudan using the privilege of owning the pipeline to shape politics in South Sudan?
13. If yes in what ways?
14. Is South Sudan benefiting from more from the oil in the post independence relationship with Sudan?
15. If yes, what are the benefits?
16. Are there things that should be or could be done in order to ensure South Sudan benefits benefit from the oil?
17. How was the oil production before the gaining of independence by South Sudan?
18. What are the major oil companies involved in oil drilling in South Sudan?
19. Are these companies also found in Sudan?
20. Are there oil workers from north Sudan working in South Sudan on the oil fields? If so how many?
21. Looking at the region, are there countries that have played a major role on the oil production?
22. What role/s have the US and China played in oil sector before and after the independence?