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The Role of Allocative Efficiency in a Decade of Recovery*

Kaiji Chen† Alfonso Irarrazabal‡

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Abstract

The Chilean economy experienced a decade of sustained growth in aggregate output and productivity after the 1982 financial crisis. This paper analyzes the role of allocative efficiency on total factor productivity (TFP) in the manufacturing sector by applying the methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to establishment data from the Chilean manufacturing census. We find that a reduction in resource misallocation accounts for about 40 percent of the growth in manufacturing TFP between 1983 and 1996. In particular, a reduction in the least productive plants’ implicit output subsidies is the primary reason for the reduction in resource misallocation during this period. Moreover, these plants enjoyed above industry-average growth in physical productivity, contributing to the overall improvement in efficient TFP after the financial crisis. Our evidence suggests that Chile’s banking reform during the early and mid-1980s is likely to have played an important role in the observed improvement in allocative efficiency.

JEL Classification: E32, O11, G10.

Keywords: Allocative Efficiency; TFP; Banking Reform; Preferential Credit Policy; Chile.

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1 Introduction

Chile experienced a decade-long economic recovery after its 1981-1982 financial crisis. As shown by Panel (a) of Figure 1, after a declining by more than 20 percent relative to the trend level, Chile’s real GDP per working-age population (15–64) started to recover in the mid-1980s and by 1996 was 20 percent above the trend. Similar to the pattern seen in its aggregate economy, a takeoff occurred in the Chilean manufacturing sector after the 1982 crisis. Specifically, in the late 1980s the manufacturing sector began a rapid increase in value-added.

As many researchers have found, total factor productivity (TFP) is one key factor explaining the sustained post-crisis recovery of Chile. This can be seen by the dynamics of Chile’s manufacturing TFP. Panel (b) show that aggregate TFP in the manufacturing sector closely tracked manufacturing value-added during both the recession and the recovery. In particular, aggregate manufacturing TFP, relative to the trend level, increased by more than 20 percent between 1983 and 1996, providing a strong driving force for the aggregate manufacturing output during the recovery. Therefore, understanding the sources of the sustained growth of Chile’s aggregate manufacturing TFP and their connection to the policy reforms in Chile offer a useful lens to understanding the post-crisis recovery of Chile’s aggregate productivity.

This paper studies the role of allocative efficiency in the recovery of Chilean manufacturing TFP after the 1982 crisis. We use establishment-level data from the Chilean manufacturing census to address these three questions: How important is an improvement in allocative efficiency in accounting for the fast growth in Chilean manufacturing TFP after the crisis? What are the key distortions that have mitigated and, thus, contributed to this improvement in allocative efficiency? What Chilean policy reforms might be potentially important in explaining the improvement in allocative efficiency? To these ends, we employ the framework used in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to obtain plant-specific output and capital distortions (wedges), as well as physical and revenue productivity measures (TFPQ and TFPR), for each year between 1980 and 1996.

Our results show that between 1983 and 1996, an improvement in allocative efficiency accounted for about 40 percent of the observed growth in aggregate manufacturing TFP. The key factor behind this improvement is a reduction in the cross-sectional dispersion in output distortions, which accounts for essentially all the reduction in the cross-sectional dispersion of revenue productivity during this period. Moreover, the cross-sectional covariance of physical and revenue productivity shows a similar declining pattern to the cross-sectional dispersion of revenue productivity, suggesting an improvement in resource allocation among plants with different productivity. When plants are grouped into TFPQ quintiles, we find that a reduction in the least productive group’s implicit output subsidy is the single most important factor for

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1We assume that the trend level of real GDP per working-age person is 2 percent per year.
2See, for example, Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and Soto (2007) for a comparison between Chile and Mexico.
the decline in the resource misallocation during this period. Accordingly, factor inputs were reallocated from the least productive plants towards more productive ones.

Another important factor to understand the recovery of Chile’s aggregate productivity is the change in the distribution of physical productivity. We find that, over time, plants with lower initial physical productivity enjoyed faster growth in physical productivity than the industry average during our sample period. As a result, the left tail of physical productivity distribution became thinner. This suggests that Chile’s policy reforms that eliminated the subsidies on the initially unproductive plants contributed to not only an improvement of resource allocation among incumbent firms, but also to their faster productivity growth.

It has been argued that the prevalence of self-loans by Chilean banks toward affiliated firms within the business groups led to credit misallocation and the 1982–1983 financial crisis. We therefore make a first pass to assess the role that Chile’s banking reforms during the early and middle 1980s played in the observed improvement in allocative efficiency and physical productivity. Our regression results suggest that in the early 1980s, Chilean plants with lower revenue or physical productivity had, on average, a higher liability-asset ratio. This suggests that firms with preferential access to bank credit tended to be less productive, and larger than their efficient sizes. Moreover, before the banking reform took place, industries with higher median liability-asset ratio had larger revenue productivity dispersion, suggesting that industries dominated by firms with access to preferential credit were more distorted. Since 1983, however, those firms with higher initial leverage ratio experienced a faster improvement in both allocative efficiency and physical productivity. Such evidence suggests that Chile’s banking reforms during the early and mid-1980s, which largely restricted making self-loans within business groups, are likely important factors in reducing resource misallocation between business group-affiliated and independent firms and in improving physical productivity of the former.

Finally, we developed a model with heterogeneous access to bank credit to illustrate the effect of banking reforms on resource allocation and aggregate TFP. Consistent with our empirical findings, our model predicts that following the banking reform that restricts self-loans, the allocative efficiency improves while the overall leverage ratio of the economy declines.

Our work complements Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) and Oberfield (2013), two recent papers that use the same manufacturing census data to examine the sources of Chilean aggregate productivity changes between 1980 and 1995. Specifically, in Petrin and Levinsohn (2012), the reallocation term is measured by the weighted average of changes in factor inputs across plants, with weights in the above-mentioned gaps for individual plants. Hence, this measure would miss the change in allocative efficiency when both TFPQ and idiosyncratic distortions moves in the same direction, so that there are no changes in individual plants’ inputs. Oberfield

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(2013) obtains measures of both within- and across-industry allocative efficiency by extending Hsieh and Klenow’s approach. Hsieh and Klenow’s method focuses on the wedges and their changes, thus, nesting the changes in allocative efficiency measured by Petrin and Levinsohn (2012). Our results are consistent with Oberfield (2013), which finds that within-industry misallocation did not contribute much to the fall in output during Chile’s 1982 recession.

The TFP decomposition in our paper not only confirms this result, but also finds that the role of allocative efficiency becomes more important in the post-crisis recovery phase. Importantly, Hsieh and Klenow (2009)’s analysis focuses on changes in resource allocation, given a distribution of physical productivity. Our analysis, while adopting their framework, includes changes in both the distribution of physical productivity and allocative efficiency. The evidence in this paper suggests that the evolution of the distribution of physical productivity and allocative efficiency are connected, as a policy that removes an implicit subsidy to an unproductive producer will affect the distribution of physical productivity. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge we are the first to link changes in policy distortions as a result of banking reforms in Chile to the improvements in allocative efficiency achieved after the financial crisis.

This study is related to a rapidly expanding recent literature on the importance of microdistortions for aggregate productivity (Restuccia and Rogerson 2008; Guner, Ventura, and Xu 2008; Buera and Shin 2008; Buera, Kaboski, and Shin 2011; Midrigan and Xu 2010; Moll 2010). It is also part of the empirical literature that uses micro-data to measure the extent of micro-level misallocation. Following the methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), this literature consistently finds large potential aggregate TFP gains from eliminating misallocation. For example, these studies found that Argentina could increase its TFP by 50–60 percent (Neumeyer and Sandleris, 2010), Bolivia by 52–70 percent (Machicado and Birbuet, 2011), Colombia by 50 percent (Camacho and Conover, 2010), and Uruguay by 50–60 percent (Casacuberta and Gandelman, 2009). Furthermore, our paper relates to a growing literature on the role of policy distortions in the investment in physical productivity (See Bello, Blyde and Restuccia, 2011, Hsieh and Klenow 2012, Restuccia, 2013, Bhattacharya, Guner and Ventura, 2013, Bollard, Klenow and Sharma, 2013, Gabler and Poschke, 2013, and Da-Rocha, Tavares and Restuccia, 2014). Our paper focuses on the dynamics of Chilean manufacturing TFP during the period following the financial crisis and the potential policies contributing to such a change. Consistent with the literature, we find that both changes in allocative efficiency and the physical productivity contributed to the recovery of Chile’s aggregate TFP. Moreover, we find that Chile’s banking reforms by restricting self-loans toward group-affiliated firms contributed to changes in both allocative efficiency and individual firms’ physical productivity. A contribution of the paper, thus, is to connect policy changes to changes in idiosyncratic distortions from an empirical perspective.

Our findings provide empirical support for Buera and Shin (2010)’s argument that a reduction in idiosyncratic distortions preceded domestic financial market development in emerging
economies. In their theoretical framework, economic reforms occur in two stages: in the first, idiosyncratic output distortions are removed; in the second stage, borrowing constraints are relaxed. As a consequence, massive capital outflows accompany TFP growth during the first stage of reform. Consistent with Buera and Shin (2010), our evidence shows that a reduction in output distortion, rather than the capital distortion, is the key to explain the improvement in Chilean manufacturing TFP between 1983 and 1996. Furthermore, we show that, for the case of Chile, output distortions may result from preferential credit policy, which is widely available in emerging countries. Consequently, banking reforms, by restricting preferential credit policies, are likely to play important roles in reducing output distortions.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, we briefly describe the monopolistic competition model of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) used to measure the effect of distortion on productivity. In section 3, we describe the dataset used in the analysis and how we compute idiosyncratic distortions at the plant level. In section 4, we present our empirical findings. In section 5, we present the Chilean economy’s institutional background for the period examined. In addition, we assess the importance of the banking reforms in the improvement of allocative and productive efficiency. Finally, an illustrative model is provided to shed light on the role of banking reforms on allocative efficiency that is consistent with our empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes. The appendix describes the data construction and sampling and provides the derivation of aggregate TFP using plant-specific wedges and its decomposition.

2 Theoretical Framework

This section describes the linkage between an economy’s aggregate productivity and resource misallocation resulting from firm-level distortions by using a theoretical framework proposed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) (“HK” hereafter). A representative final good producer faces perfectly competitive output and input markets. The final good producer combines the output $Y_s$ of $S$ manufacturing industries using a Cobb-Douglas production technology with share $\theta_s$. We set final output as the numeraire such that its price $P = 1$. In turn, each industry output $Y_s$ is produced by combining $M_s$ differentiated goods $Y_{si}$ produced by individual firms using a CES technology with elasticity parameter $\delta$. The production function for each differentiated product, $Y_{si}$ is given by a Cobb-Douglas function of firm-level productivity $A_{si}$, capital $K_{si}$ and labor $L_{si}$ with labor share $\alpha_s$. Capital elasticity across firms within a given industry is assumed to be the same as $\alpha_s$. Following HK (2009), we introduce two types of distortions: an output distortion that takes the form of a tax on revenues, and a capital distortion that takes the form of a tax
The problem of a firm $i$ in industry $s$ is described below

$$\max_{P_{si}, K_{si}, L_{si}} (1 - \tau_{ysi}) P_{si} A_{si} K_{si}^{\alpha_s} L_{si}^{1-\alpha_s} - W L_{si} - (1 + \tau_{ksi}) R K_{si}$$

$$st : Y_{si} = Y_{s} \left[ \frac{P_{s}}{P_{si}} \right]^\sigma,$$

where $W$ is the wage rate and $R$ is the gross interest rate. As shown in HK (2009) the output distortion affects the marginal revenue product of both factors in a symmetric manner and, thus, does not distort the capital-labor ratio. By contrast, a capital distortion, $1 + \tau_{ksi}$, makes capital services more costly relative to labor services, distorting the capital-labor ratio below the first-best level.

Following Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008), we define revenue productivity as $TFPR_{si} = \frac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{K_{si}^{\alpha_s} L_{si}^{1-\alpha_s}} = P_{si} A_{si}$ and physical productivity as $TFPQ_{si} = \frac{Y_{si}}{K_{si}^{\alpha_s} L_{si}^{1-\alpha_s}} = A_{si}$. It is easy to show that $TFPR_{si}$ follows as

$$TFPR_{si} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^\alpha \left( \frac{W}{1 - \alpha_s} \right) \frac{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_s}}{(1 - \tau_{ysi})^{1 - \alpha_s}}.$$

Intuitively, the higher that $1 + \tau_{ksi}$ is, and the lower that $1 - \tau_{ysi}$ is, the lower is the output relative to the first-best level. Accordingly, the price $P_{si}$ and, thus, $TFPR_{si}$ are above the first-best level. Recall that without distortions, revenue productivity should be equalized across plants. This is because more resources are allocated to plants with higher $TFPQ$, leading to higher output and lower prices, which then lowers TFPR.

2.1 Aggregate TFP

We measure TFP in each industry $s$ as $TFP_s \equiv \frac{Y_s}{K_s^{\alpha_s} L_s^{1-\alpha_s}}$, where $K_s = \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} K_{si}$ and $L_s = \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} L_{si}$. In Appendix 7.2 we show that $TFP_s$ can be expressed as

$$TFP_s = \frac{\left[ \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} \left( \frac{A_{si}}{(1 - \tau_{ysi})^{1/\sigma}} \right)^{\sigma - 1} \right]^{\sigma - 1}}{\sum_{i=1}^{M_s} \left( \frac{A_{si}^{\sigma - 1}(1 - \tau_{ysi})^{\sigma}}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\sigma(\sigma - 1)}} \right)^{\frac{1 - \alpha_s}{\sigma - 1}}},$$

where $M_s$ is the number of firms in industry $s$. Note that if we eliminate all the idiosyncratic distortions, i.e., $1 - \tau_{ysi} = 1 + \tau_{ksi} = 1$, we obtain the efficient TFP, which we denoted as $\bar{A}_s = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} A_{si}^{\sigma - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}$. It is easy to show that the manufacturing TFP at each sector can be
rewritten as

\[ TFP_s = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} \left\{ A_{si} \frac{TFPR_s}{TFPR_{si}} \right\} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}, \tag{2} \]

where \( TFPR_s = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left( 1 - \alpha_s \right) \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} (1 - \tau_{ysi}) \frac{P_s Y_{si}}{P_{YS}/W} \right)^{\alpha_s-1} \left( \alpha_s \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} \frac{(1 - \tau_{ysi}) P_s Y_{si}}{P_{YS}/R} \right)^{-\alpha_s} \). For each manufacturing sector, we calculate the ratio of actual TFP to the efficient TFP and aggregate this ratio across all sectors using the Cobb-Douglas aggregator,

\[ \frac{Y}{Y_e} = \prod_{s=1}^{S} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} \left\{ A_{si} \frac{TFPR_s}{TFPR_{si}} \right\} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}. \tag{3} \]

### 2.2 Log-Normal Case

We want to understand the forces driving aggregate TFP by decomposing it into different components. To this end, we assume that \( A_{si}, (1 - \tau_{ysi}), (1 + \tau_{ksi}) \) follow a joint log normal distribution. Using the Central Limit Theorem and assuming \( M_s \to \infty \), we obtain the following decomposition for aggregate TFP (see Appendix 7.3 for details):

\[ \log TFP_s = \log TFP_s^e - \frac{\sigma}{2} \text{var} (\log TFPR_{si}) - \frac{\alpha_s (1 - \alpha_s)}{2} \text{var} \log (1 + \tau_{ksi}). \tag{4} \]

The term \( \text{var} (\log TFPR_{si}) \) captures resource misallocation across firms, and \( \text{var} \log (1 + \tau_{ksi}) \) captures the distortions that drive the capital-labor ratio, \( \frac{K_{si}}{L_{si}} \), away from the first-best outcome. Notice that under the log-normal assumption, only the dispersion of idiosyncratic distortions matters for resource misallocation, while the correlation between TFPQ and the idiosyncratic wedges is irrelevant for the size of the TFP loss due to misallocation.

Equation (4) implies that changes in aggregate manufacturing TFP come from two sources: first, changes in the efficient TFP or the distribution of physical productivity, captured by the first argument on the right side of (4); second, changes in the allocative efficiency, captured by the second and third arguments on the right side of (4).

In order to further understand the driving forces of the time variation in the TFPR dispersion, we decompose \( \text{var} (\log TFPR_{si}) \) as

\[ \text{var} (\log TFPR_{si}) = \text{var} [\log (1 - \tau_{ysi})] + \alpha_s^2 \text{var} \log (1 + \tau_{ksi}) \]

\[ - 2\alpha_s \text{cov} [\log (1 - \tau_{ysi}), \log (1 + \tau_{ksi})]. \tag{5} \]

The first term on the right side of equation (5) captures the resource misallocation due to output distortion, while the second term describes capital-specific distortion. An efficient resource allocation implies a value of zero for the variance of TFPR and each of the components on the right side of equation (5).
2.3 Size Distribution

Both physical productivity and idiosyncratic distortions jointly determine the distribution of plant size, measured as individual plants’ value added. In our model, the dispersion of firm size translates into a dispersion of firm output,

\[ P_{si} Y_{si} = Y_{si}^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} P Y_{s}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}. \]  

(6)

Since \( \sigma \geq 1 \), equation (6) implies that larger firms should have higher output. Moreover,

\[ Y_{si} = \frac{A_{si}^{\sigma} (1 - \tau_{ysi})^{\sigma}}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_s \sigma}} \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma} \left( \frac{\alpha_s}{R} \right)^{\alpha_s \sigma} \left( 1 - \alpha_s \right) \frac{1}{W} Y_{s}. \]  

(7)

Combining equations (6) and (7), we have

\[ P_{si} Y_{si} \propto \left[ \frac{A_{si} (1 - \tau_{ysi})}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_s}} \right]^{\sigma-1}. \]  

(8)

Absent distortions, more productive firms tend to be larger. If \( A_{si} \) and \( 1 - \tau_{ysi} \) are negatively correlated (or \( A_{si} \) and \( 1 + \tau_{ksi} \) are positively correlated), more (less) productive firms tend to be smaller (larger) than the efficient size. As a result, the size dispersion becomes smaller. This implies that when there are frictions, the efficient size distribution is more dispersed than is the actual size distribution.

Equation (8) suggests that, over time, a shift in the size distribution is driven by changes in the distribution of both physical productivity and the idiosyncratic distortions, which determine the efficient size distribution and the gap between actual and the efficient size distribution, respectively. For example, a faster growth (relative to that of the industry average) of initially less productive plants in physical productivity led to a thinner left tail of the efficient size distribution, whereas a larger fall in idiosyncratic distortions for the less productive plants produced a shift of the actual size distribution closer to the efficient one.

In reality, apart from idiosyncratic distortions, the dispersion of revenue productivity may result from other frictions, such as overhead labor, quasi-fixed capital, idiosyncratic demand and cost factors. Therefore, we follow Bartlesman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013) to compute the covariance between TFPQ and physical output as an alternative measure of misallocation.\(^5\)

Intuitively, in the absence of distortions, more productive firms will produce more. This prediction is robust to a wide range of models. The presence of idiosyncratic output or capital wedges, as implied by equation (7), essentially adds noise to the profitability of plants, thus reducing such a correlation. It is easy to show that the covariance between physical output and

\(^5\)The covariance term is first proposed in the seminal paper of Olley and Pakes (1996) as a measure of misallocation. In that paper, industry-level aggregate productivity is defined as the share-weighted average of firm-level physical productivity. Accordingly, aggregate productivity can be decomposed into two terms: the unweighted average of firm-level physical productivity, and a covariance term that reflects the extent to which firms with higher than average productivity have a higher than average share of activity.
TFPQ is linked to the covariance between physical and revenue productivity.

\[
\frac{\text{cov} (\log Y_{si}, \log A_{si})}{\text{var} (\log A_{si})} = 1 - \frac{\text{cov} (\log TFP_{si}, \log A_{si})}{\text{var} (\log A_{si})}
\]  

(9)

Equation (9) implies that there is a one-to-one mapping between the covariance using TFPQ and physical output and the covariance between physical and revenue productivity, both normalized by the dispersion of physical productivity. For example, without idiosyncratic distortions, the left side of equation (9) is simply the correlation between TFPQ and physical output, \(\text{corr} (\log Y_{si}, \log A_{si})\), and equal to one, which implies \(\text{cov} (\log TFP_{si}, \log A_{si}) = 0\). Such a relationship allows us to proxy the covariance between physical productivity and physical output with the covariance between physical and revenue productivity. We can further decompose this covariance as

\[
\text{cov} (\log A_{si}, \log TFP_{si}) = \text{corr} (\log A_{si}, \log TFP_{si}) \cdot \text{std} (\log A_{si}) \cdot \text{std} (\log TFP_{si})
\]  

(10)

Accordingly, a decrease in the covariance of physical and revenue productivity may result from either a decrease in the correlation between the two, or a fall in the dispersion of physical or revenue productivity.

3 Empirical Implementation

This section describes the empirical implementation of our theoretical model. We first describe the data. We then introduce how to measure various distortions using plant-level information.

3.1 The Data

We use Chilean manufacturing census data from 1980 to 1996. The census is an annual survey of manufacturing plants, collected by the ENIA, which covers firms employing at least 10 workers. The data contain information on plant balance sheets at the 4-digit level of aggregation. The survey reports data on value added, employment, wages, materials, investments, liabilities, assets, and capitals in different categories. Most of the variables are recorded in nominal terms. We employ different deflators, collected from Liu (1990), to compute for real values with 1980 as base year. These deflators include output price deflator, price deflators for different capital goods, intermediate material input price deflator, etc. The appendix 7.1 describes the procedure to construct plant level capital stock and our data sampling.

We use a plant’s employment as measurement of plant labor input. During our sample

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6 In addition, the covariance between TFPQ and physical output is linked to the covariance between TFPQ and employment \(\text{cov}(\log Y_{si}, \log A_{si}) = 1 + \frac{\text{cov}(\log L_{si}, \log A_{si})}{\text{var}(\log A_{si})} - \alpha \cdot \text{cov}(\log L_{si}, \log A_{si}) \cdot \text{var}(\log A_{si})\). Due to the possible movement of the covariance of TFPQ and capital wedge, we prefer using the covariance of TFPQ and TFP as proxy for the covariance between physical output and TFPQ.

7 ENIA stands for Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (Annual National Industrial Survey).

8 See also Bartlesman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013) and Petrin and Levinsohn (2012).
period, Chile experienced a dramatic change in labor unions’ bargaining power. According to Edwards and Edwards (2000), the 1980 labor market reform allowed union affiliation to be voluntary. It also decentralized collective bargaining to the firm-level. For example, the revised labor law stipulated that in the absence of a new collective agreement, the old contract would continue to be in effect while the negotiations proceeded. As a result, the employers’ new contract offer would have to contain a wage adjustment that matched accumulated inflation. Along with the decentralization of collective bargaining, some firm-level unions bargained more successfully than others.\(^9\) The heterogeneity of union bargaining power at the firm level motivates us to use the employment as our measure of plant labor input. A robustness check using the wage bill as measure of plant labor input is provided in Section 4.5.2.

Given that our focus is on tracking the dynamic changes in measures of allocative efficiency, we eliminate plants with incomplete data from the sample.\(^10\) Most of our analysis will focus on the sub-sample labeled “unbalanced panel,” which contains plants for which we have full information on value-added, labor, capital, and wages for all years the plant is in the sample. In other words, we drop the plants from the database that systematically reported negative value added and investment, as well as those that missed information on employees, fixed assets, value added and wages in some year. We also drop plants at the top and bottom 0.2 percent of the wage distribution and those at the top 0.1 percent of investment in each year (see Appendix 7.1 for details). After deleting these plants, we arrived at an average number of 1,437 plants per year. For comparison, we also computed the corresponding statistics for a balanced panel, that is, the plants that survived from 1980 to 1996.

Table 1 compares the number of plants, the employment distribution and the employment share by subgroups in 1983 between the unbalanced panel and the entire sample. As shown by the share of plants in each subgroup, our screening strategy somewhat over-samples the plants with few employees. For example, the share of plants with fewer than 50 employees is 76.8 and 80.6 percent, in the full sample and in the unbalanced panel respectively. In Section 4.5.3, we perform robustness checks using a balanced panel.

### 3.2 Computing Distortions

To calculate distortions, we set the rental price of capital to \( R = 0.10 \) and the elasticity of substitution, \( \sigma \), to 3. We normalize the wage rate to \( W = 1 \). The capital share in sector \( s \), \( \alpha_s \), corresponds to the U.S. capital shares, as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), which are taken from the NBER productivity database.

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\(^9\) According to Table 1 in Palacio (2006), between 1990 and 2004, in Chile unions negotiated 64 percent of the collective contracts and represented 72 percent of the number of workers who engaged in collective bargaining.

\(^10\) We will perform several robustness checks to test the impact of this cleaning procedure.
We compute distortions (or wedges) and productivity as follows:

\[ 1 + \tau_{ksi} = \frac{\alpha W L_{si}}{1 - \alpha R K_{si}} \]  
\[ 1 - \tau_{ysi} = \frac{\sigma W L_{si}}{\sigma - 1 (1 - \alpha) P_{si} Y_{si}} \]  
\[ A_{si} = \frac{Y_{si}}{K_{si} L_{si}^{1-\alpha_s}} = \kappa_s (P_{si} Y_{si})^\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}, \]

where \( \kappa_s = (P_s Y_s)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} / P_s \). Although we do not observe \( \kappa_s \), relative productivity—and, hence, reallocation gains—are unaffected by setting \( \kappa_s = 1 \) for each industry \( s \). \[ \text{[11]} \]

We then use measured \( A_{si} \) to construct

\[ TFP^e_s = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} A_{si}^{\sigma - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} = \kappa_s \left( \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} \left( \frac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{K_{si} L_{si}^{1-\alpha_s}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}. \]

We follow HK and drop 1 percent of the tails of the distributions of TFPR, \( \log \left( \text{TFPR}_{si}/\text{TFPR}_{s} \right) \), and TFPQ, \( \log \left( A_{si} M_s^{-\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} / \bar{A}_s \right) \), for each year and recalculate the firm’s wage bill, capital, and revenue, as well as physical and revenue productivity. At this stage, we calculate the industry shares \( \theta_s = P_s Y_s / Y \).

## 4 Main Results

In this section, we first decompose the aggregate productivity growth and quantify the contribution of improvement of allocative efficiency in aggregate TFP growth. We then describe the evolution of various measures of productivity dispersion and plant-size distribution over time. After this, we explore the resource misallocation and reallocation of factor inputs among plants with different productivity. Finally, we conduct a robustness check of our main results.

### 4.1 Decomposition of Aggregate Productivity Growth

We now decompose aggregate TFP growth to explore the contribution of different components. As equation \( 4 \) suggests, an improvement in both efficient TFP and allocative efficiency contributes to aggregate TFP growth. Table 2 provides the percentage TFP gains from removing idiosyncratic distortions in each industry. It is clear that the magnitude of such TFP gains has a downward trend over time: in 1983, the aggregate manufacturing TFP would gain 76.1 percent by moving to efficient allocation in each industry; by 1996, it dropped to around 47.8 percent. Therefore, allocative efficiency improved by 19.2 percent (1.761/1.478-1) between 1983 and 1996, or 1.47 percent per year. The aggregate manufacturing TFP grew at an annual rate

\[ \text{[11]} \] Since the level of aggregate TFP in each period influences the growth rate of TFP, we multiply the TFP calculated under the assumption \( \kappa_s = 1 \) by \( (P_s Y_s)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} / P_s \) to obtain the actual TFP in each period.
of 3.83 percent per year between 1983 and 1996. Thus, our results suggest that 38.5 percent (1.47/3.83) of aggregate manufacturing TFP growth during this period may be attributed to better resource allocation. The remaining 60 percent of aggregate TFP growth can therefore be attributed to the improvement in efficient TFP.

An alternative approach to examine the contribution of improved in allocative efficiency to the within-industry manufacturing TFP growth is to run a panel regression of the log difference in aggregate TFP against the log difference in our measured allocative efficiency, \( \frac{TFFP_{a,t}}{TFFP_{e,t}} \). The regression includes year dummies to capture the aggregate shocks, while a constant is included to capture the trend growth rate. The empirical specification is as follows

\[
\Delta \log TFP_{a,t} = \alpha + \beta \Delta \log \left( \frac{TFFP_{a,t}}{TFFP_{e,t}} \right) + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{s,t}.
\]

The estimated \( \beta = 0.328 \), and is statistically significant at 5 percent. This implies that between 1983 and 1996, a 1 percentage increase in allocative efficiency would, on average, contribute to 0.33 percent increase in aggregate TFP.

### 4.2 Productivity Dispersion

As discussed in section 2.3, the growth in efficient aggregate TFP stems from changes in the distribution of physical productivity, while improvement in allocative efficiency originates from changes in the dispersion of revenue productivity. Therefore, in this section, we report changes in the distribution of both physical and revenue productivity. We also report changes in the firm size distribution, which is jointly determined by the distribution of both physical and revenue productivity.

To characterize the dynamics of productivity and plant-size distributions, we choose two years, 1983 and 1996 to report the various measures of productivity dispersions and other statistics. The initial year 1983, corresponds to the peak of the financial crisis, while 1996 is the last year in our sample.

Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots the distribution of TFPQ, \( \log \left( A_{s,t}M_{s,t}^{\frac{1}{2}}/\bar{A}_s \right) \), for 1983 and 1996. The distribution of TFPQ in 1983 has a fat left tail, which is consistent with policies in place during 1983 that favored the survival of (relatively) less efficient plants. Over time, the TFPQ dispersion became narrower, indicating that these inefficient plants either exited the sample or increased their physical productivity faster than the industry average. Table 3 shows that this pattern is consistent across several measures of dispersion: the standard deviation of TFPQ.

12 Note that the degree of resource misallocation somehow increased in the 1990s. This could be potentially due to the fact that our sample missed those plants which were newborn after 1981 due to a lack of data on their initial capital stocks. The fraction of those plants in total plants increases from about 20 percent in the 1980s to about one half in the 1990s. Accordingly, we are likely to under-estimate the improvement of allocative efficiency when resources were reallocated towards these plants. However, as we show below, missing those observations would change little our findings about the main source of the improvement in physical productivity and allocative efficiency, especially before 1990.

13 We thank one of the anonymous referees for suggesting this empirical formulation.
fell from 1.463 to 1.341 between 1983 and 1996; the ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentile of TFPQ dropped from 2.148 to 1.923; and the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentiles dropped from 3.839 to 3.582. Clearly, the change in the left tail of the TFPQ distribution contributed to the fast growth of efficient TFP.

Panel (b) of Figure 2 plots the distribution of TFPR, log \( \frac{TFPR_s}{TFPR_a} \), for the same two years. Similar to that of physical productivity, the distribution of revenue productivity is less dispersed in 1996 than 1983, reflecting an improvement in allocative efficiency since 1983. Moreover, over time, the left tail has become significantly thinner, implying that the less-productive plants’ revenue productivity became closer to the industry mean. Again, Table 3 suggests that this pattern is consistent across different measures of the dispersion in revenue productivity. Note that, consistent with our model, revenue productivity is less dispersed than physical productivity, as our model predicts that prices and physical productivity are negatively correlated. The numbers in Table 3 are also consistent with greater distortions in Chile than in the United States. The standard deviation of TFPR in 1996 is 0.86, much larger than the level of the United States in 1998, which was 0.45. Note that a thinner left tail of both TFPQ and TFPR in 1996 could be the result of the same policy reform. This is because a policy that removes a subsidy to an unproductive producer will potentially encourage the manager to make more effort to increase the productivity of a plant, while reducing its output toward the efficient size.

We now explore the evolution of the covariance of physical and revenue productivity and its various components. Table 3 shows that physical and revenue productivity are positively correlated. For example, in 1983 the correlation between physical and revenue productivity was 0.898. In Panel (c) of Figure 2, since 1983, all its three components decline steadily until the early 1990s, which jointly contributed to a significant fall in the covariance between physical and revenue productivity. In particular, a potential explanation for the decline in the correlation between physical and revenue productivity, as Table 3 suggests, is an increase in the correlation between physical productivity and \( y \) (–0.906 in 1983 versus –0.876 in 1996). This fact provides additional evidence in favor of an improvement in resource allocation.

Both the improvement in allocative efficiency and physical productivity led to changes in the size distribution after the crisis. In Panel (d) of Figure 2, we plot the efficient versus actual plant size distribution in both 1983 and 1996. Consistent with the evolution of the distribution of physical productivity, the efficient plant size distribution became less dispersed and by 1996 had a thinner left tail, which suggests an improvement in efficient TFP. The actual plant size
distributions in both years are less dispersed than their corresponding efficient size distribution. Interestingly, the gap between the actual and efficient size distribution is mainly on the left tail. This suggests that many small plants were implicitly subsidized and produced more than their counterparts that did not receive implicit subsidies. In contrast to the efficient size distribution, overtime, the actual size distribution shifts slightly to the left. This implies that for the less productive plants, while their physical productivity increases faster (relative to the industry mean), they also experienced a drop in the implicit subsidy and were downsized.

Finally, to quantify the changes in the gap between efficient and actual plant size for plants of different sizes, we follow the approach of Hsieh and Klenow (2009). In Table 4 we show how the initial relative size of big versus small plants would change if there were no idiosyncratic distortions within each industry. The rows are the initial (actual) plant size quantiles, and the columns are bins of efficient plant size relative to actual size: 0–50 percent, 50–100 percent, 100–200 percent, and 200+ percent. We see that the column with the most plants is the 0-50 percent for every initial size quantile. In particular, most small plants (those in the bottom quantile) should have shrunk by half or more compared to their actual size in 1983. The actual plant-size distribution in 1996 is closer to its efficient distribution than it was in 1983, especially on the left tail. Specifically, in 1996, the fraction of small plants that should shrink by at least 50 percent has dropped to 19.1 percent. This pattern is consistent with the fact that, over time, the correlation between physical productivity and \( 1 - \tau_{ySi} \) increases. Accordingly, less productive plants were downsized, while more productive plants produced more.

We now quantify the contribution of various components of the improvement in allocative efficiency under the joint log normal assumption of physical productivity and idiosyncratic distortions. We ask to what extent is the improvement in allocative efficiency attributable to the change in the variance of revenue productivity, as opposed to a change in the capital-specific distortion? To answer this question, we re-order equation (4) as follows:

\[
\log TFP_s^e - \log TFP_s = \frac{\sigma}{2} \text{var} (\log TFP_{sSi}) + \frac{\alpha(1 - \alpha)}{2} \text{var} (\log (1 + \tau_{ksi})). \tag{14}
\]

Accordingly, total allocative efficiency can be decomposed into two components as captured by the right side of equation (14). Panel (a) of Figure 3 plots the evolution of these two factors over time. Clearly, the dispersion of TFPR tracks the total resource misallocation closely, as both measures decline steadily since 1983. By contrast, the capital-specific distortion barely changed. Panel (b) of Figure 3 plots the secular movement in \( \text{var} (\log TFP_{Si}) \) and its different components in equation (5). It is clear that almost all the decline in the dispersion of revenue productivity can be accounted for by the decline in the dispersion of the output distortion. Therefore, from here on we focus on the variations in dispersion in revenue productivity and the output distortion.
4.3 Misallocation across Plants of Different Productivity

In this section, we quantify the improvement of resource allocation among firms with different levels of physical productivity. To this end, we classify firms into quintiles based on their physical productivity in each year. We then decompose the variance of log TFPR into between- and within-group variation as follows:

\[
Var_s(\log \text{TFPR}_{si}) = \frac{1}{M_s} \sum_q \sum_i N_q (\log \text{TFPR}_{sqi} - \bar{\log \text{TFPR}}_s)^2
\]

Overall variation

\[
= \frac{1}{M_s} \sum_q N_q \text{Var}(\log \text{TFPR}_s)_q + \frac{1}{M_s} \sum_q N_q (\log \text{TFPR}_{sq} - \log \bar{\text{TFPR}}_s)^2,
\]

Within-group component

\[
\text{between-group component}
\]

where \(\log \text{TFPR}_{sqi}\) is the log of TFPR for plant \(i\) that belongs to the \(q\)th TFPQ quintile in the \(s\) industry; \(\log \text{TFPR}_s\) is the mean of \(\log \text{TFPR}\) for industry \(s\); and \(\bar{\text{TFPR}}_s\) is the mean of \(\log \text{TFPR}\) for the \(q\)th TFPQ quintile within industry \(s\). Similar to the aggregate TFP decomposition, the above decomposition suggests that, over time, changes in allocative efficiency both within and between groups originate from changes in the gap between actual and efficient resource allocation, given the distribution of physical productivity.

The between-group component captures the dispersion of revenue productivity across groups of firms with different physical productivity. By definition, this component eliminates the idiosyncratic factors that may potentially drive the dispersion of revenue productivity (e.g. a reduction of measurement error over time or volatility of idiosyncratic demand shocks) and provides a clear picture of the degree of resource misallocation across different productivity groups. By contrast, while the within-group component may still capture the degree of resource misallocation within each quintile, it may be driven by other idiosyncratic factors.

Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that the decline in the variance of revenue productivity since 1983 is mostly accounted for by the between-group variance, which is responsible for 84.8 percent of the decline in the variance of revenue productivity.\(^{16}\) This finding suggests that improvements in resource allocation across firms of different productivity, rather than a reduction in the measurement error or volatility of idiosyncratic shocks, played a crucial role in driving the decline of the dispersion in revenue productivity.

To further show the direction of resource reallocation, we plot the different elements of the between-group variance in Panel (b) of Figure 4. The average TFPR of the bottom quintile experienced the fastest convergence to the mean, followed by the top quintile.\(^{17}\) This result

\(^{16}\)We compute the contribution of the changes in the between-group component between 1983 and 1986 in changes in variance of TFPR of the same period as \(\Delta \frac{1}{x} \sum_q N_q (\log \text{TFPR}_{sq} - \log \bar{\text{TFPR}})^2\), where \(\Delta x = x_{1996} - x_{1983}\).

\(^{17}\)Again, for each quintile \(q\), we calculate its contribution to the overall change in between-group component.
implies that the main reason for the decline in the between-group variance is that the average revenue productivity of the bottom and top quintiles converged to the mean. Moreover, given the positive correlation between physical and revenue productivity in 1983, the convergence of both the bottom and top quintiles of revenue productivity to the mean implies that the revenue productivity of the least (most) productive plants became larger (smaller).\footnote{In contrast to the pattern of between-group variances, elements of within-group variance across all quintiles follow similar dynamics. The results are available upon request.}

We would like to measure the extent to which the decline in the dispersion of output distortions is attributed to the changes in the distribution of idiosyncratic distortions among plants of different TFPQ. Accordingly, we decompose the variance of output distortion into between- and within-group components in a similar fashion as what we did for the variance of log TFPR. This variance is computed as follows:

\[ \text{var}_s \left[ \log \left( 1 - \tau_{ysi} \right) \right] = \frac{1}{M_s} \sum_{q} \sum_{i} \left( \log \left( 1 - \tau_{yi} \right) - \log \left( 1 - \tau_{y} \right) \right)^2, \]

\[ = \frac{1}{M_s} \sum_{q} N_q \text{Var} \log \left( 1 - \tau_{yi} \right) + \frac{1}{M_s} \sum_{q} N_q \log \left( 1 - \tau_{yi} \right) - \log \left( 1 - \tau_{y} \right)^2, \]

Panel (c) of Figure 4 shows that the between-group variance still plays a dominant role in the decline in the dispersion of output distortions. The contribution of the between-group variance to the decline in the variance of total output distortion is 86.5 percent\footnote{We compute the contribution of between-group variance to the decline in total output distortion as \[ \frac{\Delta \text{var} \log \left( 1 - \tau_{yi} \right) \sum_{q} N_q \log \left( 1 - \tau_{yi} \right) - \log \left( 1 - \tau_{y} \right)^2}{\Delta \text{var} \log \left( 1 - \tau_{yi} \right)} \]. The measured contribution of the bottom and top quintiles to the between-group component are 58.9 and 28.1 percent, respectively.}

As suggested by Panel (d), this decline is mainly driven by the convergence of the output distortion of the bottom quintile to the industry mean, followed by that of the top quintile\footnote{We compute the contribution of each quintile \( q \) to the changes in between-group variance as \[ \frac{\Delta \text{var} \log \left( 1 - \tau_{yi} \right) \sum_{q} N_q \log \left( 1 - \tau_{yi} \right) - \log \left( 1 - \tau_{y} \right)^2}{\Delta \text{var} \log \left( 1 - \tau_{yi} \right)} \]. Accordingly, the contributions of the bottom and top quintiles are 53.7 and 31.0 percent, respectively.}. Such a change in output distortions would naturally trigger resource reallocation across firms with different productivity, as we examine in the next section.

4.4 Reallocation of Factors

As mentioned before, changes in both physical productivity and idiosyncratic distortions have an impact on resource allocation. We now provide additional evidence that capital and labor
were reallocated across firms of different productivity. We first examine the distribution of capital and labor between 1983 and 1996, plotted in the top two panels of Figure [5]. Over time, the distribution of both capital and labor became more dispersed. In particular, the density of small plants in terms of capital and labor increased significantly. This result is consistent with the above finding that the implicit subsidization of less-productive plants decreased significantly over time.

The bottom two panels of Figure [5] plot the dynamics of capital and labor, respectively, for the bottom TFPQ quintiles. Between 1983 and 1990, the bottom quintile’s labor input declined significantly relative to the industry mean, while after 1990 this process slowed down. The corresponding changes in capital stock exhibit a similar pattern, though this process accelerated in the late 1980s.

A decline in capital and labor of plants in the bottom quintile results from a decline in the idiosyncratic distortions they face relative to TFPQ. This can be seen from the following decomposition of the resource reallocation of the \( q \)th TFPQ quintile:

\[
\alpha_s \Delta \left( \log K_{si} \right|_q - \log K_s) + (1 - \alpha_s) \Delta \left( \log L_{si} \right|_q - \log L_s) \\
= -\sigma \Delta \log \left( \log \frac{TFPR_{sq}}{TFPR_s} \right) + (\sigma - 1) \Delta \log \left( \log \frac{A_{si}}{A_s} \right),
\]

where \( \log X_{si} \mid_q = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N_q} \log X_{si} \right) / N_q \), \( \log X_s = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \log X_{si} \right) / N \) for \( X = A, K \) or \( L \). The first argument on the right side of equation (15) denotes in change in idiosyncratic distortions and the second shows the changes in TFPQ, both relative to their corresponding industry average. An increase in the TFPQ of plants in the bottom quintile, as we found previously, tends to increase the bottom quintile’s demand for capital and labor, whereas an increase in the idiosyncratic distortions work in the opposite direction. Our evidence about the decline in both capital and labor of the bottom TFPQ quintile suggests that in terms of resource reallocation, the magnitude of the decline of their implicit output subsidy dominates the increase in their TFPQ for those least productive plants.

To summarize, our evidence suggests that between 1983 and 1996, around 40 percent of Chile’s aggregate manufacturing TFP growth is attributable to the improvement in allocative efficiency, shown as a fall in the dispersion of revenue productivity. Among those wedges, the reduction in the dispersion of output distortions plays a dominant role in the reduction of the revenue productivity dispersion. In particular, a reduction in the least-productive plants’ implicit output subsidy and, to a lesser degree, the most-productive plants’ implicit output tax constitutes the most important factors that explain the reduction in resource misallocation.

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21 See Appendix 7.2 for the derivation.
22 A reordering of equation (15) suggests that the increase of revenue productivity of plants in the bottom quintile can be decomposed into two components: changes in TFPQ (holding constant the relationship between TFPQ and idiosyncratic distortions) and changes in idiosyncratic distortions relative to TFPQ, shown up as resource reallocation. We find that around 30 percent of the increase in the average TFPR of plants in the bottom quintile is attributable to a faster decrease of their implicit subsidy relative to their TFPQ.
4.5 Robustness Checks

In this section, we conduct robustness checks for our main findings. We first restrict our sample to a balanced panel of plants. We then link revenue productivity with a plant’s exit probability to shed light on the main source of revenue productivity variation in our sample. After that, we vary the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods. Finally, we measure plant labor input as wage bills.

4.5.1 Balanced versus Unbalanced Panel

In our benchmark sample, a plant could enter or exit at any time. To examine the quantitative importance of the extensive margin versus the intensive margin in terms of efficient TFP and allocative efficiency and their improvement over time, we now restrict the sample to plants that survived the whole period (1980–1996), which we denote as the balanced panel. The total number of observations for the whole sample period is now 9,129, with 537 in each year.

The right column of Table 5 reports the TFP gains of moving to efficient allocation under the balanced panel. Compared with the benchmark case, under the balanced panel the TFP gains are now smaller, suggesting that part of the resource misallocation comes from the extensive margin. However, the declining pattern of TFP gains over time still holds. Between 1983 and 1996, Chilean allocative efficiency increased by 9.2 percent, or 0.71 percent per year. These numbers are again smaller than their counterparts in the benchmark case (19 percent and 1.47 percent), suggesting that about half of the overall improvement in resource allocation comes from the extensive margin. Aggregate manufacturing TFP for the balanced panel grew by 2.92 percent per year. Therefore, an improvement in allocative efficiency contributed to about 24.3 percent (0.71/2.92) of the total TFP growth in Chile that took place between 1983 and 1996, a magnitude about two-thirds of its counterpart in the benchmark case (38.5 percent).

Another margin we examine is whether changes in the distribution of physical productivity between 1983 and 1986 originate from the extensive or intensive margin. Intuitively, both the exit of less productive plants and their faster growth of physical productivity than the industry average would lead to a thinner left tail. To this end, we plot the distribution of physical productivity for the balanced panel in Figure 6. We find that changes in distribution of physical productivity share a similar pattern with the unbalanced panel, that is, over time the left tail of physical productivity became much thinner. This indicates that firms with different physical productivity initially in 1983 had a different growth rate for physical productivity between 1983 and 1996. To confirm this conjecture, we classify firms in the balanced panel into quintiles accordingly to their physical productivity in 1983. We then compute the average growth rate of physical productivity between 1983 and 1996 for each quintile. Consistent with Figure 6,
plants with lower initial physical productivity had enjoyed faster growth in TFPQ during our sample period (Table 6). This suggests that between 1983 and 1996, changes in idiosyncratic distortions, especially on the initially low TFPQ plants, not only contributed to an improvement of resource allocation among incumbent firms, but also to their faster productivity growth.

Finally, for the unbalanced panel the positive correlation between TFPQ and TFPR in the data may be driven by selection effects, as firms with high implicit taxes are induced to exit unless they also have high TFPQ. Hence, even if plant-level efficiency and idiosyncratic distortions are uncorrelated, the observed plant-level frictions and efficiency could potentially exhibit positive correlation due to selection. As a result, the fall the positive correlation in the data may simple reflect the selection effect. As a robustness check we compute the covariance and correlation between physical and revenue productivity using the balanced panel. We find a similar magnitude in the decline for correlation and covariance of physical and revenue productivity. This result suggests that the main driving force for the observed decline in covariance of physical and revenue productivity is a fall in the underlying correlation between efficiency and micro-distortions.

4.5.2 Selection and Productivity

Our model assumes homogeneous markup across firms. Accordingly, revenue productivity dispersion reflects the dispersion of idiosyncratic distortions. In reality, however, within-industry dispersion in revenue productivity or prices may reflect idiosyncratic demand shift or market power variations (see Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson 2008). To distinguish the source of TFPR dispersion, we next look at the correlation of TFPR with plant exit.

To this end, we define exit as $\xi_{ijt} = 1$ if plant $i$ in industry $j$ at year $t$ exit at $t+1$. We then run the following pooled Probit regression$^{23}$ (with industry and time dummies)

$$Pr(\xi_{ijt} = 1) = F(\beta_0^R + \beta_1^R \log(TFPR_{ijt}) + \beta_1^Q \log(TFPQ_{ijt}))$$

If the revenue productivity dispersion is mainly driven by idiosyncratic distortions, the estimated coefficient for TFPR tends to be positive, $\beta_1^R > 0$, suggesting that low TFPR firms are less likely to exit. If, instead, variations in market power dominate revenue productivity dispersions, then the estimated coefficient for TFPR tends to be negatively, since low TFPR firms tend to have less market power and thus are more likely to exit.

Table $^8$ shows that lower revenue productivity is associated with a lower probability of exit. A one-log-point decrease in TFPR is associated with 40.9 percent lower probability of exit. On the other hand, lower physical productivity is associated with higher probability of exit, consistent with the prediction of the standard model. The fact that a lower TFPR plants have a lower probability of exit suggests that the main driving force of revenue productivity

$^{23}$We thank one of the anonymous referees for suggesting this analysis. See Yang (2012) for a similar test.
dispersion across Chilean manufacturing plants is the presence of idiosyncratic distortions.

4.5.3 Elasticity of Substitution

We now check the sensitivity of the TFP gains resulting from removing idiosyncratic distortions to alternative values of the elasticity of substitution of differentiated goods. Table 5 reports the TFP gains by removing idiosyncratic distortions within-industry for \( \sigma = 3 \) and \( \sigma = 5 \). As expected, TFP gains increase for all years when \( \sigma = 5 \). Between 1983 and 1996, the allocative efficiency increased by 21.5 percent (2.12/1.74-1), or a gain of 1.66 percent per year. This increase is more than its counterpart (19 percent or 1.47 percent per year) under \( \sigma = 3 \). As equation (4) suggests, when \( \sigma \) is larger, changes in the variance of TFPR has a larger impact on the allocative efficiency.\(^\text{24}\)

4.5.4 Labor Input Measured by the Wage Bill

In our baseline calculations, we use employment to measure plant labor input. Our logic is that in the presence of collective bargaining, wage bills would conflate the quantity of labor with idiosyncratic wage rates at the plant level. However, plants may differ in hours worked or worker skills, which could mean that wages per worker are a better measure of the plant labor input. In this section, we examine the robustness of our main results by using the wage bill as the measure of plant labor input.

Table 7 reports the TFP gains of moving to efficient allocation across years. It is noted that the TFP gains are smaller than their counterparts in the baseline calculation. For example, in 1996, the TFP gains from removing idiosyncratic distortions are 40.3 percent, as compared with 47.8 percent in the baseline calculation.\(^\text{25}\) A smaller degree of resource misallocation suggests that part of the wage difference in data may capture the idiosyncratic distortions in labor market.\(^\text{26}\) Accordingly, using wage bills to proxy for labor inputs tend to understate the dispersion of idiosyncratic distortions. Despite such a difference, between 1983 and 1996, the allocative efficiency improved by 21 percent, or 1.64 percent per year, which is larger than the growth rate of allocative efficiency (1.46 percent per year) under our baseline calculation.\(^\text{27}\) Therefore, we conclude that our main results are robust to alternative measures of plant labor input.

\(^{24}\) We find that the magnitude of the change in \( \text{var} (\log TFPR_{si}) \) between 1983 and 1996 is very similar between \( \sigma = 3 \) and \( \sigma = 5 \) (\(-0.222 \) versus \(-0.230\)).


\(^{26}\) For example, more productive firms have to pay a higher wage.

\(^{27}\) Moreover, the dominant role of the decline in the variance of TFPR and output wedge in the improvement of allocative efficiency is robust to the measure of plant labor input as wage bills.
5 Banking Reforms and Changes in Allocative Efficiency

What are the potential sources of resource misallocation among Chilean manufacturing plants and what policies might have led to an improvement of allocative efficiency observed during the 1980s? It has been argued in the literature that, in Chile, the presence of business groups (so called “grupo”) might have distorted the allocation of bank credit between firms owned or controlled by business groups and independent firms before and during the financial crisis. It is also noteworthy that Chile conducted a series of banking reforms in the 1980s. Therefore, we make a first pass in linking the preferential credit policy by Chilean banks to our measured idiosyncratic distortions and assess the potential roles that Chile’s banking reforms might have played in the observed improvement of resource allocation after the 1982 financial crisis.

5.1 Preferential Credit Policy and Distortions

In this section, we first document the widespread presence of preferential credit policy among Chilean banks towards the affiliated firms to motivate our following empirical exercises. We then characterize the link between our measures of idiosyncratic distortions and a plant’s leverage position and the link between the degree of resource misallocation and an industry’s leverage position.

5.1.1 Preferential Bank Loan towards Affiliated Firms

Before the banking reform occurred during the early and mid-1980s, all the major business groups in Chile were organized around one or more banks, which were used to channel credit to the firms they owned or controlled. For example, in 1979 business groups directly controlled 10 major banks, whose equity represented more than 80 percent of all private bank equity. Accordingly, firms in business groups were in a relatively favored financial position. This is evident in the rates of debt growth. In 1980 and 1981, independent firms absorbed debt at a real rate that exceeded their operating earnings rate by only a few percentage points. Yet, the group-affiliated firms absorbed debt at rates that exceeded their returns on equity by close to 30 percent over the two-year period (Galvez and Tybout, 1985). In late 1982, the proportion of credit that banks had granted to the firms directly related to the controlling business groups became alarmingly high. In fact, some of the banks had granted almost half of their loans to the controlling grupos (Table 4-2 of Edwards and Edwards, 1987).

The preferential credit access by group-affiliated firms is reflected by the drastically different investment growth that occurred in 1981 in the presence of high interest rates. According to Galvez and Tybout (1985), in 1981 independent firms reduced the rate of fixed capital investment from 7 percent in 1980 to −6 percent. By contrast, group-affiliated firms reduced

28 According to Tybout (1986), in 1978, when Chile’s capital accounts were still relatively closed, group-affiliated firms enjoyed financial costs that average 14 percent a year, while independent firms were paying an average of 22 percent.
the rate of fixed capital investment from 11 percent in 1980 to 8 percent in 1981, suggesting these firms adjusted their investment plan by too little in reaction to rising interest rates and financed the continuing expansion with additional debt.

Another potential channel for preferential access to bank loans by group-affiliated Chilean firms to translate into output distortion is through working capital used to finance the purchase of intermediate inputs. Edwards and Edwards (1987, pp.65) argue that in late 1970s there was a strong credit demand, by all sorts of firms, to finance working capital. Also, according to Corbo and Sanchez (1985), all the firms in their survey ranked the increasing cost to finance working capital as the number one negative shock during the 1981–1983 financial crisis, suggesting the major role bank loans played in funding of working capital. In addition, the findings of Oberfield (2013) suggest that during Chilean financial crisis, deteriorating financing conditions increased the cost of working capital required to purchase imported intermediates inputs.

5.1.2 Leverage Position and Distortions

Even though in our data it is not possible to identify which plants belong to the business groups, in this section we make a first pass of relating a plant’s leverage position to measured distortions. Intuitively, group-affiliated firms had a larger leverage position. To establish the linkage between leverage and distortions, we regress TFPR, different wedges, and TFPQ on the liability-asset ratio, \( \frac{\text{total liability}}{\text{total assets}} \), with sectoral fixed effects. For example, for TFPR, we specify

\[
\log \frac{\text{TFPR}_{si}}{\text{TFPR}_s} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log \left( \frac{\text{total liability}}{\text{total assets}} \right) + \varepsilon_{si}.
\]

If the preferential credit access by group-affiliated firms is the main distortion driving our results, we should observe that firms with a higher liability-asset ratio are less productive, and have higher revenue productivity and a higher output wedge, \( 1 - \tau_{si} \). Table 9 reports estimates of \( \beta_1 \) for different measures of distortions. We see that for both 1980 and 1981 plants with a higher liability-asset ratio had a higher output subsidy and a lower \( \frac{\text{TFPR}_{si}}{\text{TFPR}_s} \). Moreover, these plants tended to have lower physical productivity. Thus, our finding points to preferential credit policy as one plausible source of the observed idiosyncratic distortions.

Similarly, if group-affiliated firms are disproportionally represented by some particular industries, we should observe that those industries tend to be subject to greater resource misallocation before the banking reform, assuming that the preferential credit policy is the main policy distortion. We therefore check the cross-industry correlation between an industry’s median liability-asset ratio and the different measures of its misallocation. Table 10 shows that during 1980-1981, industries with a larger median liability-asset ratio had, on average, a larger variance of revenue productivity, output distortions and physical productivity. This positive correlation got strengthen as Chilean economy moved towards the financial crisis. Therefore,

\[29\] According to p-values, all the correlation coefficients in 1981 are significant at 10% level, while in 1980 only
our evidence suggests that before the banking reforms, bank’s preferential credit policy towards affiliated firms were likely to be an important driver for resource misallocation among Chilean manufacturing plants.

5.2 Banking Reforms and Changes in Distortions

Is it possible that banking reforms in Chile played a role in the observed improvement of allocative efficiency? In this section, we first document Chile’s banking reforms that took place in the early and middle 1980s and their impact on the banks’ self-loans. We then assess the role of banking reforms by examining at the industry level the relationship between the industry’s initial leverage position and the change in the allocative efficiency since 1983.

5.2.1 Chile’s Banking Reforms

In response to the alarmingly large share of bank loans made to affiliated firms, Chile conducted a series of banking reforms started in the middle of a banking crisis. In the late 1981, the Superintendency of Banks adopted measures that limited the amount of bank exposure to a single enterprise and to a bank’s own subsidiaries. But it was not until 1982 that a set of comprehensive measures were approved that tightened bank supervision. The regulation included a more precise definition of the limit on loans to a single enterprise that took into account the interlocking ownership of firms. In June 1982, the Superintendency of Banks announced a new self-loan limit of 5 percent of a bank’s total loans, meaning a 100 percent of a bank’s equity. Two weeks later, the target was changed to a complete ban on self-loans to shell companies, and the limit on self-loans to productive companies was reduced to 2.5 percent of total loans.

Meanwhile, for the first time in the early 1980s, the Superintendency attempted to classify loans on a risk scale. In April 1981, its required the classification of the 300 largest debtors. However, it turned out that as of June 1982, when the overall result of the classification procedure was published, only 6 percent of loans were considered to be at risk. According to Held (1989), the Superintendency of Banks did not review the classification of loans made by at least some important banks, and self-loans among the business groups comprising the respective banks had simply not been classified.

Chile’s new banking legislation was enacted in 1986 (Law No. 18,756) and supplemented in 1988 (Law No. 18707) and 1989 (Law No. 18818). A major issue in the new banking law was the establishment of stringent restrictions on the power of banks to do business with related parties. The various loans granted to firms owned by the same group of shareholders were viewed as a single individual loan subject to relevant loan limitation —5 percent or 25 percent of the bank’s equity, depending on whether valid guarantees were involved (Article 84, No. 2). In addition, \( \text{var} \left( \log(1 - \tau_y) \right) \) is significant at 10% level.
the agreed-upon terms for such debt had to be made at market value. The Superintendency of Banks was also legally empowered to object to various kinds of contracts executed by the bank and the related parties (Article 19 bis).

Following the series of banking reforms, the preferential credit access by group-affiliated firms in Chile was largely eliminated. Figure 8, which replicates Figure 7 of Held and Jimenez (1999), illustrates the substantial reduction of self-loan between June 1982 and 1998, both as a proportion of bank’s equity and as a proportion of banks’ total loans. The ratio of self-loans to banks’ equity dropped from 160 percent in 1983 to about 20 percent in 1986 and has remained at that level since then. Similarly, the share of self-loans in banks’ total loan portfolio declined from 16 percent in 1983 to around 2 percent by 1988. Such an outcome suggests that the Superintendency of Banks succeeded in preventing business groups from advancing preferential credit access to their affiliated firms.

In addition, the reorganization of the banking sector led to a severe curtailing of banking cartels. Between 1982 and 1985, the government intervened in 21 financial institutions; 14 were liquidated and the rest were rehabilitated and privatized. A vigorous bank recapitalization program was carried out in 1985 and 1986, based on selling stocks in those banks to small-scale stockholders. In the late 1986, the Herfindahl concentration index for Chile’s banking sector was 0.102, compared to 0.082 in late 1988. During the same period, the share of the five main institutions in total loans fell from 61 percent to 55 percent.

5.2.2 Leverage Position and Improved Allocation

To assess the contribution of banking reforms to improved allocation, we explore the link between the magnitudes of different measures of an industry’s improvement in allocation and its initial leverage position during 1980–1982. Our evidence suggests that plants with initially higher liability-asset ratios had lower physical and revenue productivity initially. Accordingly, industries with higher liability-asset ratios before the banking reforms are likely to be subject to more severe resource misallocation due to the presence of self-loans. Therefore, if the banking reforms were important for the allocative efficiency gain in Chile after the financial crisis, we should observe a larger improvement in allocation for industries with higher initial liability-asset ratio.

Table 11 reports the cross-industry correlation of the initial liability-asset ratio during 1980-1982 with the allocative efficiency gain between 1983 and 1996, and changes in dispersion of physical and revenue productivity. We use the industry’s value-added shares in the manufacturing sector as weights when computing correlation coefficients. The correlation of the initial leverage position with the allocative efficiency gain during this period is 0.64, and its correlation with the decline in the dispersion of TFPR is 0.58. This suggests that the banking reforms in Chile are likely to be important in the resource reallocation via the stringent restrictions on the
power of banks to do business with related parties.

Another interesting finding is that industries with a higher initial liability-asset ratio in 1980–1982 also experienced a faster decline in the dispersion of TFPQ between 1983 and 1996, with a weighted correlation coefficient of 0.55. A possible explanation is that according to the new banking law, the Superintendency of Banks requires all banks to rate the quality of all loans above a certain size according to their risks. In addition, the Superintendency receives this information monthly and can compare risk ratings given by different banks to the same companies. This reform would tend to increase banks’ incentive to monitor and screen the business groups’ self-loans, raising the intermediation cost for business-affiliated firms. Accordingly, managers in group-affiliated firms would exert more effort to increase their plants’ productive efficiency by, for example, better inventory management, streamlining production lines, closing inefficient plants, and reassigning workers. All these process innovations would likely contribute to an increase in TFPQ.

Apart from the banking reforms, other policy reforms Chile implemented during this period might also have contributed to the allocative efficiency gain established in this paper. For example, the 1984 corporate tax reform lowered the tax on retained earnings and eliminated the preferential treatment of a firm’s debt liabilities. By eliminating the taxation of retained profits, this policy reform might have allowed larger and more productive firms to accumulate more internal funds for further investment, rather than to distribute these funds as dividends from retained earnings. As a result, larger firms expanded their production scales. The contribution of corporate tax reforms to better resource allocation in Chile is clearly an interesting issue for future research.

5.3 An Illustrative Model of Chile’s Banking Reform

A positive relationship between the industry’s initial leverage position and improvements in allocative efficiency is puzzling from the perspective of standard models of financial frictions with idiosyncratic distortions (e.g. Buera and Shin, 2010 and Moll, 2014). According to these models, an increase in an economy’s overall leverage ratio implies an improvement in resource allocation. To reconcile this puzzle, we develop a simple model to formalize the idea that banking reforms lead to both an improvement in resource allocation and a lower overall leverage position of an economy. The key ingredient in the model is the heterogeneity in access to the credit market: a fraction of them own both a bank and a project while the remaining entrepreneurs only own a project. Accordingly, the collateral constraint on the project belonging to the entrepreneur who also owns a bank is essentially not binding, while it is binding for a project belonging to the independent entrepreneur. This creates idiosyncratic distortions that resemble output distortion. And banking reforms, by restricting the share of self-loans in the net worth of the entrepreneur who owns a bank, leads to a decline in the dispersion of TFPR.
To fix idea, we sketch the key ingredients of the model in this section and refer the readers to the model details in the online Appendix. Consider an economy inhabited by two types of entrepreneurs: type-E and type-F, with share \( \eta \) and \( 1 - \eta \), respectively. A type-F (financially integrated) entrepreneur owns a bank, while a type-E (independent) entrepreneur does not. Both types of entrepreneurs need to finance their working capital each period before the production takes place. Specifically, a type-\( j \) entrepreneur’s problem is

\[
\pi^j_t \left( s^j_{t-1} \right) = \max_{L^j_t, K^j_t} \left[ \left( K^j_t \right)^{\alpha} \left( L^j_t \right)^{1-\alpha} \right] - \left( W_t L^j_t + R_t K^j_t \right) \left( 1 + i_t \right)
\]

subject to

\[
\left( W_t L^j_t + R_t K^j_t \right) \left( 1 + i_t \right) \leq \eta^j s^j_{t-1}, \quad \eta^j \geq 1.
\]

where \( \mu < 1 \), \( Y^j_t \equiv A^j_t \left[ \left( K^j_t \right)^{\alpha} \left( L^j_t \right)^{1-\alpha} \right] \), \( K^j_t \), and \( L^j_t \) denote the output, capital stock, and labor of a type-\( j \) project, respectively. \( i_t \) is the interest rate for working capital loan, \( s^j_{t-1} \) is the net worth for a type-\( j \) entrepreneur. \( \eta^j_t \) is a choice variable by the bank, as will be specified below. \( \eta^j_t = 1 \) implies that the project is self-financing.

Consistent with \( (12) \), we can define the output distortion as

\[
1 - \tau^{j*}_{yt} \equiv \frac{W_t L^j_t}{(1-\alpha) \mu Y_t^j} = \frac{1}{(1 + i_t) \left( 1 + \lambda^j_t \right)}, \quad j = E \text{ or } F.
\]

where \( \lambda^j_t \) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with \( (16) \). Similarly, we define the revenue productivity as \( TFPR^j_t \equiv \frac{Y^j_t}{(K^j_t)^{\alpha} (L^j_t)^{1-\alpha}} \). The revenue productivity can be expressed as

\[
TFPR^j_t = \frac{1}{\mu \left( 1 - \tau^{j*}_{yt} \right)} \left( \frac{R_t}{\alpha} \left( \frac{W_t}{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha} \right).
\]

The dispersion of TFPR can be proxied by the ratio of TFPR between the two groups of entrepreneurs

\[
\frac{TFPR^E_t}{TFPR^F_t} = \frac{1 - \tau^{F*}_{yt}}{1 - \tau^{E*}_{yt}} = \frac{1 + \lambda^E_t}{1 + \lambda^F_t},
\]

which implies \( \text{var} \left[ \log \text{TFPR}^j_t \right] = \text{var} \left[ \log \left( 1 - \tau^{j*}_{yt} \right) \right] = \text{var} \left[ \log \left( 1 + \lambda^j_t \right) \right] \).

Now consider the bank’s choice of leverage ratio for each types of project, \( \eta^j_t \). For a type-F project, since the bank and the project are owned by the same entrepreneur, there is no conflict of interest. This implies that the bank would like to set \( \eta^F_t \) sufficiently large to maximize the type-F project’s profit. By contrast, a type-E entrepreneur, since it does not own the bank, has incentive to default on the bank loan. The optimal contract per Hart and Moore (1994),

\[ \text{We can also define the capital wedge as } 1 + \tau^{j*}_{k,t} \equiv \frac{\eta^j_t}{\tau^{j*}_{yt}} \frac{W_t L^j_t}{R_t K^j_t}. \] The online Appendix shows that \( 1 + \tau^{j*}_{k,t} = 1 \), \( j = E \text{ or } F. \]
determines $\eta_{it}^E$, which implicitly is positively related to the recovery rate of the collateral value. Assuming that the constraint (16) is binding ONLY for a type-E project, we have $\lambda_{it}^F > \lambda_{it}^E = 0$, which implies that $\tau_{it}^E > \tau_{it}^F$.

A banking reform sets the self-loan to be a fraction of the bank’s (the type-F entrepreneur’s) net worth. In other words, the banking reform places an upper bound on the bank’s leverage ratio, $\eta_{it}^F \leq \eta_{it}^F$. This is captured in our model by a decrease in $\eta_{it}^E$, such that the type-F projects are subject to a binding borrowing constraint. Accordingly, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with working capital constraint becomes positive, $\lambda_{it}^F > 0$. This implies that $1 - \tau_{it}^F = \frac{1 - \eta_{it}^F}{1 + \lambda_{it}^F}$ will fall. Since the working capital constraint for a type-E project is unaffected by the banking law’s restriction on self-loans, the leverage ratio for the type-E entrepreneur, $\eta_{it}^E$ will not change. Accordingly, the dispersion of output distortion and TFPR, as measured by $\frac{1 + \lambda_{it}^E}{1 + \lambda_{it}^F}$ will decline. In the meantime, the overall leverage ratio of the economy will decline as a result of banking reform. Therefore, consistent with Chile’s evidence found in this paper, our model predicts that following the banking reform that restricts self-loans, the allocative efficiency improves while the overall leverage ratio of the economy declines.

6 Conclusion

Chile’s aggregate TFP grew spectacularly and became the country’s engine of output growth in the decade following its 1982 financial crisis. In this paper, we use micro data on manufacturing firms to assess the role that changes in allocative efficiency played in aggregate productivity growth during this period. We find that the cross-sectional allocative efficiency significantly improved and contributed to about 40 percent of the aggregate TFP growth between 1983 and 1996. Moreover, a reduction in the least productive plants’ implicit output subsidy and the corresponding increase in their average revenue productivity were the most important reasons for the reduction in resource misallocation during this period. Furthermore, less productive plants enjoyed faster productivity growth than the industry average during this period. This suggests that Chile’s policy reforms that eliminated the subsidies on the initially unproductive plants contributed to not only an improvement of resource allocation among incumbent firms, but also to their faster productivity growth.

We have provided a first pass in linking a series of Chile’s banking reforms during the early and mid-1980s to the observed improvement in resource allocation. The regression results suggest that in the early 1980s, Chilean plants with higher implicit output subsidy and thus lower physical and revenue productivity had, on average, a higher liability-asset ratio, suggesting preference credit access by these firms. Moreover, industries with a higher average liability-asset ratio in the early 1980s enjoyed a faster improvement in allocative efficiency since 1983, with a correlation coefficient of 0.64. Such evidence suggests that Chile’s banking reforms during the early and mid-1980s, which largely restricted self-loans within business groups, were likely
important factors in reducing the resource misallocation between business group-affiliated and independent firms. We provide a model to illustrate the mechanism for banking reforms to improve resource allocation, which predictions are consistent with the above evidence.

Given the importance of output distortions in the improvement of resource allocation, the next question is: what are the origins of these distortions, and what is the quantitative importance of banking reforms in reducing such distortions? A related issue is why similar reforms have not happened in other countries after a financial crisis—for example, in Japan and Mexico. Answers to these questions are important for shedding light on how Western economies can emerge from their current recession as Chile did in the mid-1980s. We address some of these issues in our ongoing research.

\[^{31}\] To our knowledge, Buera, Moll, and Shin (2011) is the first attempt to provide a theory for idiosyncratic distortions. They show that well-intended policy intervention during a period of market failure may evolve into idiosyncratic distortions.
References


7 Appendix

In this appendix, we first describe the procedure for data construction and sampling. We then derive the aggregate TFP and decompose it into various components. Finally, we present a simple model to capture the idea that banking reforms, by restricting self-loans, contribute to the improvement in allocative efficiency.

7.1 Data Construction and Sampling

The construction of capital series follows Liu (1990). There are five categories of capital good: buildings, machines, vehicles, furniture and others. First, we deflate investment and capital for each category using category-specific deflators. Most plants in our sample that existed before 1982 have capital stock available for two years 1980 and 1981. However, some plants may have missing capital information in later years. For plants having capital available in 1980, we use the perpetual inventory method to update forward the capital using real investment following the law of motion for capital. For the plants without capital in 1980, we generate their capital backward starting from the year when capital and investment information is available. We assume a depreciation rate of 5 percent for building, 10 percent for machines and 20 percent for vehicles, and zero for furniture and others. Finally, the aggregate real capital series for the manufacturing sector is the sum of capital stock for each category using the 1980 base series. For those plants where the 1980 capital information is missing, we aggregate using the 1981 based series.

In our original data, all plants have at least 10 employees. We clean the dataset in the following steps. First, we drop the plants which enter/exit more than twice, and those that stay in the sample for less than five consecutive years. Second, we drop those plants at the top 0.1 percent of investment in each year. Third, we drop those plants with negative value added and investment, and missing information in employment, fixed assets, value added, and wage. Finally, we drop plants within the top and bottom 0.2 percent tails of wage distribution in each year.

7.2 Derivation of Aggregate TFP

In this section, we derive (1) and (4). Again, we use the growth accounting $TFP_s = \frac{Y_s}{K_s L_s^\alpha}$.

The first-order conditions of a firm $i$ in industry $s$ imply

$$MRPL_{si} = W / (1 - \tau_{ysi})$$

$$MRPK_{si} = R (1 + \tau_{ksi}) / (1 - \tau_{ysi}),$$

\[32\text{Our results are robust to the order of the data cleaning steps.} \]
From the first-order conditions, we obtain

$$\frac{K_{si}}{L_{si}} = \frac{W}{R} \frac{\alpha_s}{1 - \alpha_s} \frac{1}{1 + \tau_{ksi}}. \quad (20)$$

We can express $L_{si}$ and $K_{si}$ as functions of $Y_s$. Equation (19) implies

$$\alpha_s [(1 - \tau_{ysi}) P_{si}] \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} A_{si} \left( \frac{K_{si}}{L_{si}} \right)^{\alpha_s - 1} = (1 + \tau_{ksi}) R. \quad (21)$$

Note also:

$$P_{si} = \left( \frac{Y_{si}}{Y_s} \right)^{-\frac{1}{2}} P_s = \left( \frac{A_{si} K_{si}^{1-\alpha} L_{si}}{Y_s} \right)^{-\frac{1}{2}} P = \left( \frac{A_{si} (K_{si}/L_{si})^\alpha L_{si}}{Y_s} \right)^{-\frac{1}{2}} P_s \quad (22)$$

$$= \left( \frac{A_{si} (K_{si}/L_{i})^{\alpha_{1}\alpha} K_{si}}{Y_s} \right)^{-\frac{1}{2}} P_s. \quad (23)$$

Plugging (22) into (21) and using (20), we get

$$L_{si} = \frac{A_{si}^{\sigma-1} (1 - \tau_{ysi})^\sigma}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_{1}(\sigma-1)}} \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma} \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_{1}(\sigma-1)} \left( \frac{W}{1 - \alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_s(\sigma-1) - \sigma} Y_s. \quad (24)$$

Plugging (23) into (21) and using (20), we get

$$K_{si} = \frac{A_{si}^{\sigma-1} (1 - \tau_{ysi})^\sigma}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_{1}(\sigma-1)+1}} \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma} \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_{1}(\sigma-1)-1} \left( \frac{W}{1 - \alpha_s} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(\sigma-1)} Y_s. \quad (25)$$

We now compute $Y_{si}$

$$Y_{si} = A_{si} \left( \frac{K_{si}}{L_{si}} \right)^{\alpha_s} L_{si}$$

$$= A_{si} \left[ \frac{W_s}{R} \frac{\alpha_s}{1 - \alpha_s} \frac{1}{1 + \tau_{ksi}} \right]^{\alpha_s} L_{si}$$

$$= A_{si}^{\sigma-1} (1 - \tau_{ysi})^\sigma \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma} \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_{1}(\sigma-1)} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha_s}{W} \right)^{\sigma(1-\alpha_s)} Y_s. \quad (26)$$

Using (24) and (25), we can rewrite $L$ and $K$ as

$$L_s = \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} L_{si} = Y_s \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} A_{si}^{\sigma-1} (1 - \tau_{ysi})^\sigma \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma} \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_{1}(\sigma-1)} \left( \frac{W}{1 - \alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_{1}(\sigma-1)-\sigma}, \quad (27)$$

$$K_s = \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} K_{si} = Y_s \sum_{i=3}^{M_s} A_{si}^{\sigma-1} (1 - \tau_{ysi})^\sigma \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma} \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_{1}(\sigma-1)-1} \left( \frac{W}{1 - \alpha_s} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(\sigma-1)}. \quad (28)$$
Plugging \((30)\) and \((28)\) into the definition of TFP, we get

\[
TPF_s = \frac{1}{\left[ \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} A_{si}^{-\frac{1}{\tau_{ysi}}(1-\tau_{ysi})^{\frac{\alpha_s}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_s(1-\sigma)-1} \left( \frac{W}{1-\alpha_s} \right)^{(\alpha_s-1)(\sigma-1)} \right) \right]^{\alpha_s}}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\left[ \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} A_{si}^{-\frac{1}{\tau_{ysi}}(1-\tau_{ysi})^{\frac{\alpha_s}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_s(1-\sigma)-1} \left( \frac{W}{1-\alpha_s} \right)^{(\alpha_s-1)(\sigma-1)} \right]^{\alpha_s}}
\]

\[
= \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left( \frac{W}{1-\alpha_s} \right)^{1-\alpha_s} \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_s} = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{M_s} A_{si}^{-\frac{1}{\tau_{ysi}}(1-\tau_{ysi})^{\frac{\alpha_s}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_s(1-\sigma)-1} \left( \frac{W}{1-\alpha_s} \right)^{(\alpha_s-1)(\sigma-1)} \right]^{1-\alpha_s} .
\]

\[
\text{(30)}
\]

Substituting \((30)\) for \( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left( \frac{1}{1-\alpha_s} \right)^{1-\alpha_s} \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_s} \) in the numerator of \((29)\), we get equation \((1)\).

To derive equation \((15)\), we rewrite TFPR for an individual plant as

\[
TFPR_{si} = A_{si}^{-\frac{1}{\tau_{ysi}}} \left( K_{si}^{\alpha_s} L_{si}^{1-\alpha_s} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} P_s Y_s^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}
\]

\[
= A_{si}^{-\frac{1}{\tau_{ysi}}} A_{si}^{\frac{1}{\tau_{ysi}} \left( \frac{1}{1-\tau_{ysi}} \right)^{\alpha_s} \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{R}{\alpha_s} \right)^{\alpha_s} \left( \frac{W}{1-\alpha_s} \right)^{1-\alpha_s}} .
\]

\[
\text{(32)}
\]

Equation \((32)\) implies that if an increase in \( \frac{1}{1-\tau_{ysi}} \) is accompanied by a proportional increase in \( A_{si}^{-\frac{1}{\tau_{ysi}}} \), then changes in TFPR show up as an increase in TFPQ (holding constant the relationship between TFPQ and TFPR). On the other hand, when \( \frac{1}{1-\tau_{ysi}} \) increases while \( A_{si} \) stays unchanged, then the relationship between TFPQ and idiosyncratic distortions (TFPR)
changes. Taking log difference to \[(31)\], we have

\[
\Delta \log \text{TFPR}_{si} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right) \Delta \log A_{si} - \frac{1}{\sigma} [\alpha_s \Delta \log K_{si} + (1 - \alpha_s) \Delta \log L_{si}] + \Delta \log P_s Y_{si}^{\frac{1}{2}}. \quad (33)
\]

Taking average of both sides of \[(33)\] across all firms for the \(qth\) quintile and across all firms in the industry \(s\), respectively, and subtracting each other, we obtain equation \[(15)\].

### 7.3 Decomposition of Aggregate TFP

Under the central limit theorem, as \(M^s \to \infty\), equation \[(1)\] becomes

\[
\log \text{TFP}_s = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \log \int \left( \frac{A_{si}}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_s}} \right)^{\sigma - 1} - \alpha_s \log \int \frac{A_{si}^{\sigma - 1} (1 - \tau_{ysi})^\sigma}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_s (\sigma - 1) + 1}} - (1 - \alpha_s) \log \int \frac{A_{si}^{\sigma - 1} (1 - \tau_{ysi})^\sigma}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_s (\sigma - 1)}}. \quad (34)
\]

Assuming that \(A_{si}, 1 - \tau_{ysi}\) and \(1 + \tau_{ksi}\) are joint log normal, we have

\[
\log \int \left( \frac{A_{si}}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_s}} \right)^{\sigma - 1} = (\sigma - 1) E[\log A] + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} \text{var}[\log A] + (\sigma - 1) E[\log (1 - \tau_{ysi})] + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} \text{var}[\log (1 - \tau_{ysi})]
\]
\[
- \alpha_s (\sigma - 1) E[\log (1 + \tau_{ksi})] + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2 \alpha_s^2}{2} \text{var}[\log (1 + \tau_{ksi})]
\]
\[
+ (\sigma - 1)^2 \text{cov}[\log A_{si}, \log (1 - \tau_{ysi})]
\]
\[
- \alpha_s (\sigma - 1)^2 \text{cov}[\log A_{si}, \log (1 + \tau_{ksi})] - \alpha_s (\sigma - 1)^2 \text{cov}[\log (1 - \tau_{ysi}), \log (1 + \tau_{ksi})]. \quad (35)
\]

\[
\log \int \frac{A_{si}^{\sigma - 1} (1 - \tau_{ysi})^\sigma}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_s (\sigma - 1) + 1}} = (\sigma - 1) E[\log A] + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} \text{var}[\log A] + \sigma E[\log (1 - \tau_{ysi})] + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \text{var}[\log (1 - \tau_{ysi})]
\]
\[
- [1 + \alpha_s (\sigma - 1)] E[\log (1 + \tau_{ksi})] + \frac{[1 + \alpha_s (\sigma - 1)]^2}{2} \text{var}[\log (1 + \tau_{ksi})]
\]
\[
+ (\sigma - 1) \sigma \text{cov}[\log A, \log (1 - \tau_{ysi})]
\]
\[
- (\sigma - 1) [1 + \alpha_s (\sigma - 1)] \text{cov}[\log A, \log (1 + \tau_{ksi})]
\]
\[
- \sigma [1 + \alpha_s (\sigma - 1)] \text{cov}[\log (1 - \tau_{ysi}), \log (1 + \tau_{ksi})]. \quad (36)
\]
\[
\log \int \frac{A_{si}^{-1} (1 - \tau_{ysi})^\sigma}{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_s (\sigma - 1)}} = (\sigma - 1) E \log A + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} \text{var} \log A + \sigma E \log (1 - \tau_{ysi}) \\
+ \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \text{var} \log (1 - \tau_{ysi}) - \alpha_s (\sigma - 1) E \log (1 + \tau_{ksi}) \\
+ \frac{[\alpha_s (\sigma - 1)]^2}{2} \text{var} \log (1 + \tau_{ksi}) \\
+ (\sigma - 1) \sigma \text{cov} [\log A, \log (1 - \tau_{ysi})] \\
- (\sigma - 1) \alpha_s (\sigma - 1) \text{cov} [\log A, \log (1 + \tau_{ksi})] \\
- \sigma \alpha_s (\sigma - 1) \text{cov} [\log (1 - \tau_{ysi}), \log (1 + \tau_{ksi})]. \tag{37}
\]

Plugging (35), (36) and (37) into (34) and rearranging, we have

\[
\log TFP_s = E \log A + \frac{\sigma - 1}{2} \text{var} \log A \\
- \frac{\sigma}{2} \text{var} \log (1 - \tau_{ysi}) - \alpha_s + \alpha_s^2 (\sigma - 1) \text{var} \log (1 + \tau_{ksi}) \\
+ \alpha_s \sigma \text{cov} [\log (1 - \tau_{ysi}), \log (1 + \tau_{ksi})]. \tag{38}
\]

To see the relationship between equations (41) and (38), note that in (41), the first two arguments are

\[
\frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \log \sum \frac{A_{yi}^{-1}}{1 - \tau_{ysi}} = E \log A + \frac{\sigma - 1}{2} \text{var} \log A. \tag{39}
\]

\[
\text{var} (\log TFP_{rsi}) = \text{var} \left( \log \frac{(1 + \tau_{ksi})^{\alpha_s}}{1 - \tau_{ysi}} \right) \\
= \alpha_s^2 \text{var} \log (1 + \tau_{ksi}) + \text{var} \log (1 - \tau_{ysi}) + 2 \alpha_s \text{cov} [\log (1 - \tau_{ysi}), \log (1 + \tau_{ksi})]. \tag{40}
\]

Plugging equations (39) and (40) into (41), we have

\[
\log TFP_s = E \log A + \frac{\sigma - 1}{2} \text{var} \log A \\
- \frac{\sigma}{2} \text{var} \log (1 - \tau_{ysi}) - \alpha_s + \alpha_s^2 (\sigma - 1) \text{var} \log (1 + \tau_{ksi}) \\
+ \alpha_s \sigma \text{cov} [\log (1 - \tau_{ysi}), \log (1 + \tau_{ksi})],
\]

which is the same as (38).
7.4 A Simple Model of Banking Reforms

In this section, we develop a simple model to formalize the idea that the preferential bank loan access by group-affiliated firms creates idiosyncratic distortions that resemble output distortion. The model abstracts from many ingredients such as the entrepreneurial saving decision and the household’s problem to highlight the asymmetric access to bank loan by different types of firms and the effects of banking reforms on such asymmetry. In particular, we would like our model to match the following facts found in this paper:

1. Before the banking reform, firms having a higher implicit output subsidy, $1 - \tau_y$, were less productive in terms of physical productivity and had a higher debt-to-asset ratio.

2. The banking reform, which had restricted the ratio of self-loans in the bank equity, has led to a decline in $1 - \tau_y$ for firms with low physical productivity (and initially higher $1 - \tau_y$).

3. After the banking reform, the variance of output distortion and, thus, revenue productivity declined steadily, while the covariance between physical and revenue productivity declined.

Consider an economy with a continuum of entrepreneurs with unit mass. Entrepreneurs have access to the technology of operating projects and are residual claimants on the profits. Each entrepreneur can operate only one project. Entrepreneurs are classified into two types, type-E and type-F, with share $\eta$ and $1 - \eta$, respectively. A type-F (financially integrated) entrepreneur owns a bank, while a type-E (independent) entrepreneur does not.

7.4.1 Technology

The revenue function of a type-$j$ project is given by

$$y_t^j = A_t^j \left[ \left( k_t^j \right)^\alpha \left( l_t^j \right)^{1-\alpha} \right]^\mu, \quad j = E \text{ or } F,$$

where $y_t^j$, $k_t^j$, and $l_t^j$ denote the output, capital stock, and labor of a type-$j$ project, respectively. For simplicity, we assume away the within-group heterogeneity and time variation in physical productivity, i.e. $A_t^E = \chi^E$, $A_t^F = \chi^F$, where $0 < \chi^F < \chi^E$ reflecting that the technology of a type-E project is more efficient than that of a type-F project.

---

33 A fully fledged model is available upon request.
34 In an appendix, available upon request, we extend the model to allow for entrepreneurial effort choices and the fixed banking intermediation costs, thus endogenizing a project’s mean TFPQ. The banking reform forces the bank to exert more strict screening or monitoring on a self-loan. This would incur a fixed intermediation cost to type-F entrepreneurs. With a negative wealth effect, type-F entrepreneurs would exert more effort, which enhances their TFPQ.
7.4.2 Working Capital Finance

Both types of projects need to advance working capital before production takes place. Entrepreneurs finance working capital with their net worth or a bank loan. A type-E entrepreneur has only limited access to bank lending due to limited enforcement of debt repayment. By contrast, a type-F entrepreneur can borrow freely from the bank, reflecting the preferential policy of Chilean bank loans toward affiliated enterprises. Accordingly, credit is misallocated between the two types of entrepreneurs.

7.4.3 The Type-$j$ Entrepreneur’s Problem

At time $t$, a type-$j$ entrepreneur with net worth $s^j_{t-1}$ solves

$$
\pi^j_t \left( s^j_{t-1} \right) = \max_{l^j, k^j, b^j_t} \left[ \left( k^j_t \right)^{\alpha} \left( l^j_t \right)^{1-\alpha} \right]^\mu - b^j_t \left( 1 + i_t \right)
$$

subject to

$$
\left( W_t l^j_t + R_t k^j_t \right) \left( 1 + i_t \right) \leq b^j_t,
$$

$$
b^j_t \leq \eta^j_t s^E_{t-1}, \quad \eta^j_t \geq 1.
$$

(42) is the working capital constraint in that the size for working capital is constrained by the value of bank loan. (43) is the borrowing constraint, stating that the bank loan is constrained to be a fraction $\eta^j_t$ of entrepreneur’s net worth. $\eta^j_t$ is a choice variable by the bank, as will be specified below. $\eta^j_t = 1$ implies that the project is self-financing. Implicitly, entrepreneurs have incentive to default on the factor payment. Accordingly, the size of their working capital loans is constrained to be proportional to the individual entrepreneur’s net worth, which serve as the collateral for bank loan. It is easy to see that the working capital constraint (42) is binding.

Accordingly, the entrepreneur’s problem can be rewritten as

$$
\pi^j_t \left( s^j_{t-1} \right) = \max_{l^j, k^j, b^j_t} \left[ \left( k^j_t \right)^{\alpha} \left( l^j_t \right)^{1-\alpha} \right]^\mu - \left( W_t l^j_t + R_t k^j_t \right) \left( 1 + i_t \right)
$$

subject to

$$
\left( W_t l^j_t + R_t k^j_t \right) \left( 1 + i_t \right) \leq \eta^j_t s^j_{t-1}, \eta^j_t \geq 1.
$$

(44) is the binding working capital constraint. The first-order conditions for labor and capital are

$$
MRPL_t^j \equiv (1 - \alpha) \mu A_t^j \left( k_t^j \right)^{\alpha \mu} \left( l_t^j \right)^{(1-\alpha)\mu-1} = (1 + i_t) \left[ 1 + \lambda^j_t \right] W_t,
$$

$$
MRPK_t^j \equiv \alpha \mu A_t^j \left( k_t^j \right)^{(1-\alpha)\mu} \left( l_t^j \right)^{1-\alpha} = (1 + i_t) \left[ 1 + \lambda^j_t \right] R_t.
$$

39
where $\lambda^j_t$ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (44). Moreover, consistent with equation (12) in the main text, we can define the output distortion as

$$1 - \tau^j_{yt} = \frac{W^j_t}{(1 - \alpha) \mu^j_{yt}} = \frac{1}{(1 + \iota^j_t) (1 + \lambda^j_t)} , \quad j = E \text{ or } F$$

Similarly, we define the capital wedge as

$$1 + \tau^j_{kt,t} \equiv \frac{\alpha \mu^j_{kt,t}}{1 - \alpha R^j_{lt^j}} ,$$

and revenue productivity as

$$TFPR^j_t = \frac{y^j_t}{(k^j)^\alpha (l^j)^{1 - \alpha}} .$$

Equations (45) and (46) implies that

$$1 + \tau^j_{kt,t} = 1; \quad j = E \text{ or } F :$$

The revenue productivity can be expressed as

$$TFPR^j_t = \frac{1}{\mu (1 - \tau^j_{yt})} \left( \frac{R^j_t}{\alpha} \right)^\alpha \left( \frac{W^j_t}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{1 - \alpha} .$$

The dispersion of TFPR can be proxied by the ratio of TFPR between the two groups of entrepreneurs

$$\frac{TFPR^E_t}{TFPR^F_t} = \frac{1 - \tau^E_{yt}}{1 - \tau^F_{yt}} = 1 + \lambda^E_t / (1 + \lambda^F_t) ,$$

which implies $\text{var} \left[ \log TFPR^E_t \right] = \text{var} \left[ \log \left( 1 - \tau^j_{yt} \right) \right] = \text{var} \left[ \log \left( 1 + \lambda^j_t \right) \right]$ . Finally, the covariance between physical and revenue productivity is

$$\text{cov} \left( \log TFPQ, \log TFPR \right) = \eta (1 - \eta) \left( \chi^E - \chi^F \right) \log \frac{1 + \lambda^E_t}{1 + \lambda^F_t} .$$

Note that the fact that more productive projects (type-E projects) are more likely to be financially constrained implies a positive covariance between physical and revenue productivity.

### 7.4.4 The Bank’s Problem

Each period, the bank draws deposits $d_t$, which is the sum of deposits from type-E entrepreneur, $s^E_t$, and from the foreign lender, $s^I_t$. The bank promises to pay a deposit rate $1 + i_{t+1}$ at period $t+1$. The bank’s assets, which are the sum of the bank’s deposit and its net worth ($s^F_t$), are then lent to each type of entrepreneur at an lending rate $1 + i^j_{t+1}$. For expositional simplicity, the lending rate for both types of firms is the same. Moreover, we assume that banks commit to repay all the deposit. The bank solves a two-stage problem: in the first, it chooses the amount of deposit.

$$\pi^B_{t+1} d_t \equiv \max_{d_t} \left( 1 + i^j_{t+1} \right) \left( d_t + s^I_t \right) - (1 + i_{t+1}) d_t$$

where $d_t$ is bank demand for deposits. It is easy to see that the first-order condition implies that the equilibrium deposit rate equals the lending rate, that is $1 + i^E_{t+1} = 1 + i_{t+1}$. As a result, the bank profit is $\pi^B_{t+1} = (1 + i_{t+1}) s^E_t$.

\footnote{Note that in equilibrium $i^E_{t+1}$ is such that the bank loan market clears $s^E_t + s^F_t + s^I_t = b^E_{t+1} + b^I_{t+1}$.}
Given the bank’s demand for deposit, \( d_t \), the bank sets a financial contract with each type of projects. For a type-F project, since the bank and the project are owned by the same entrepreneur, there is no conflict of interest. This implies that the bank would like to set \( \eta^F_t \) sufficiently large to maximize the type-F project’s profit. Without tight banking regulation, as was the case in Chile before the banking reform, the bank simply sets \( \eta^F_t \) such that the borrowing constraint (13) is essentially not binding. By contrast, a type-E entrepreneur, since it does not own the bank, has incentive to default on the bank loan. As a consequence, the bank would advance the loan based on the collateral of the type-E entrepreneurs, that is, their bank deposit. The optimal contract per Hart and Moore (1994), determines \( \eta^E_t \), which implicitly is positively related to the recovery rate of the collateral value. Assuming that the constraint (44) is binding ONLY for a type-E project, we have \( \lambda^E_t > \lambda^F_t = 0 \), which implies that \( \tau^E_{yt} > \tau^F_{yt} \).

A banking reform sets the self-loan to be a fraction of the bank’s (the type-F entrepreneur’s) net worth. In other words, the banking reform places an upper bound on the bank’s leverage ratio, \( \eta^F_t \leq \eta^F \). This is captured in our model by a decrease in \( \eta^F_t \), such that the type-F projects are subject to a binding borrowing constraint. Accordingly, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with working capital constraint becomes positive, \( \lambda^F_t > 0 \). This implies that \( 1 - \tau^F_t = \frac{1 - \eta^F_t}{1 + \lambda^F_t} \) will fall. Since the working capital constraint for a type-E project is unaffected by the banking law’s restriction on self-loans, the leverage ratio for the type-E entrepreneur, \( \eta^E_t \) will not change. This implies that the overall leverage ratio of the economy will decline as a result of banking reform. Accordingly, the dispersion of output distortion and TFPR, as measured by \( \frac{1 + \lambda^E_t}{1 + \lambda^F_t} \) will decline. Correspondingly, the covariance between physical and revenue productivity also declines.
### Table 1: Number of Plants and Employees by Subgroups (1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
<th>All plants (shares)</th>
<th>Unbalanced panel (shares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#plants</td>
<td>Share of Total (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–19</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–49</td>
<td>1447</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–99</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–249</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250–499</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500–999</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: TFP Gains from Removing Idiosyncratic Distortions within Industries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFP gains</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFP gains</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Entries are \((Y^e/Y - 1) \times 100\), where \(Y/Y^e = \prod_{s=1}^S (\sum_{i=1}^{M_s} \left( \frac{A_{si}}{\sum_{i=1}^{M_s} A_{si} TFP_{si}} \right)^{\sigma - 1})^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}}\). This table is based on HK (2009)’s table IV.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Distribution of Wedges and Productivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \log TFPQ_{si} )</th>
<th>( \log TFPR_{si} )</th>
<th>( \log (1 - \tau_{ysi}) )</th>
<th>( \log (1 + \tau_{ksi}) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.463</td>
<td>1.341</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90–10</td>
<td>3.839</td>
<td>3.582</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75–25</td>
<td>2.148</td>
<td>1.923</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation with ( A_{si} )</td>
<td>1.482</td>
<td>1.568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>0.971</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90–10</td>
<td>2.538</td>
<td>2.206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75–25</td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>1.204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation with ( A_{si} )</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.491</td>
<td>2.150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>1.273</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.906</td>
<td>-0.876</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.931</td>
<td>2.223</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>-0.458</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: For each plant \( i \), \( TFPQ_{si} = \frac{Y_{si}}{K_{si}^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha}}} \), \( TFPR_{si} = \frac{P_{si}Y_{si}}{K_{si}^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha}}} \). S.D. = standard deviation, 75–25 is the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles, and 90–10 the 90th and 10th percentiles. Industries are weighted by their value-added shares. The first column is based on HK (2009)’s table I and II.

Table 4: Percent of Plants: Actual Size vs. Efficient Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>0–50</th>
<th>50–100</th>
<th>100–200</th>
<th>200+</th>
<th>200+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top size quantile</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd quantile</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd quantile</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom quantile</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: In each year, plants are put into quantiles based on their actual value added, with an equal number of plants in each quantile. The hypothetically efficient level of each plant’s output is then calculated, assuming that idiosyncratic distortions are removed. The entries above show the percent of plants with efficient/actual output levels in the four bins: 0%–50% (efficient output less than half of actual output), 50%–100%, 100%–200%, and 200%+ (efficient output more than double actual output). The rows add up to 25%, and the rows and columns together to 100%. This table is based on HK (2009)’s table V.
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis: TFP Gains from Removing Idiosyncratic Distortions within Industries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$\sigma = 3$, Unbalanced Panel</th>
<th>$\sigma = 3$, Balanced Panel</th>
<th>$\sigma = 5$, Unbalanced Panel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>111.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>80.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>76.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: See notes in Table 4.
Table 6: Average Growth Rate of TFPQ by Quantiles of TFPQ in 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile of TFPQ (in 1983)</th>
<th>$g_{TFP}^{q}$ mean of y-by-y growth 83-96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: TFP Gain by Removing Idiosyncratic Distortions (L= Wage Bill)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFP gains</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFP gains</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: See notes in Table 4.

Table 8: Regression of Exit on TFPR and TFPQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>w/o. Time Dummy</th>
<th>w. Time Dummy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exit on TFPR</td>
<td>0.409***</td>
<td>0.406***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exit on TFPQ</td>
<td>-0.434***</td>
<td>-0.452***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variables are dummies for exiting plants. The independent variables are the deviation of log(TFPR) and log(TFPQ) from their industry means. Entries above are the estimated coefficients on log(TFPR) and log(TFPQ), with standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include sector dummies and, for the right column, time dummies. Results are pooled for all years between 1983 and 1995. This table is based on HK(2009)’s table VIII.
Table 9: Regression of TFPQ and TFPR with Liability-Asset Ratio (OLS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>log(\frac{TFPR}{TPFPR})</th>
<th>log ((1-\tau_Y))</th>
<th>log ((1+\tau_K))</th>
<th>log ((A_{si}))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\beta_1)</td>
<td>(\beta_1)</td>
<td>(\beta_1)</td>
<td>(\beta_1)</td>
<td>(\beta_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>-0.418***</td>
<td>0.200*</td>
<td>-0.822***</td>
<td>-0.386***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-0.394***</td>
<td>0.471***</td>
<td>-0.132***</td>
<td>-0.683***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(1.135)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust Standard error in brackets. *** if significant at 1%; ** if significant at 5%; * if significant at 10%.

Table 10: Cross-Industry Correlation of Liability-Asset Ratio with Measures of Distortions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>log (\frac{TFPR}{TPFPR})</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>0.518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(var_s) (log (TFPR))</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(var_s) (log ((1-\tau_Y)))</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(var_s) (log (TFPQ))</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are cross-industry weighted correlations between industry median liability-asset ratios and different measures of resource misallocation.

Table 11: Cross-Industry Correlation of Liability-Asset Ratio (1980–1982) with Changes in Allocative Efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \log \frac{TFPR}{TPR})</td>
<td>0.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta var_s) (log (TFPR))</td>
<td>0.580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta var_s) (log ((1-\tau_Y)))</td>
<td>0.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta var_s) (log (TFPQ))</td>
<td>0.549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are weighted correlations between the industry’s median liability-asset ratio in 1980–1982 and changes in various moments during 1983–1996. For each industry, the liability-asset ratio is computed as the simple average of the median liability-asset ratios across 1980-1982. \(\Delta\) for each moment in the left column denotes its 1983 value minus its 1996 value. The weighted correlation is computed using industry value-added shares as weights.
Note: Panel (a) shows Chilean GDP and value-added (referred to as “VA”) for the manufacturing sector, while panel (b) shows value added and TFP for the manufacturing sector. Measured TFP is \( \frac{VA}{K^{\alpha}L^{1-\alpha}} \) with \( \alpha = 0.3 \). Both GDP and the value-added for manufacturing sector are detrended by 2 percent per year and normalized such that their 1980 values equal to 100. The manufacturing TFP is detrended by 1.4 percent per year and normalized in a similar way.

Source: authors’ calculations.
Note: Panel (a) plots the distribution of TFPQ, $\log \left( A_{si} M_{si}^{-1} / A_s \right)$, while panel (b) plots the distribution of TFPR, $\log \left( TFPR_{si} / TFPR_s \right)$, both for 1983 and 1996. Panel (c) plots the time-series of correlation between logTFPQ and logTFPR. Value added share is used as the weight for computing the industry mean. Panel (d) plots the efficient and actual plant size distribution, $\log \left( P_{si} Y_{si} / P_s Y_s \right)$, where $P_s Y_s$ refers to the mean value-added of industry $s$.

Source: authors’ calculations.
Figure 3: Decomposition of Resource Misallocation

Panel (a): Total Distortion and its Components

Panel (b): var(logTFPR) and its Components

Note: Panel (a) plots total misallocation and its two components, variance of TFPR, measured as $\frac{1}{2} \text{var} (\log TFPR_i)$, and the dispersion on plant-specific distortion to capital-labor ratio, as captured by $\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} \text{var} [\log (1 + \tau ki)]$. Panel (b) plots variance of TFPR and its various components between 1980 and 1996. Variances and components plot in the graphs are the weighted mean across sectors. Value-added share, $\theta_s$, is used as the weight for computing the mean, and $\alpha = \sum_{s=1}^S \theta_s \alpha_s$.

Source: authors’ calculations.
Figure 4: Quantile Analysis of Dispersion in TFPR and Output Distortion

Panel (a): Components of $\text{var}(\log \text{TFPR})$

Panel (b): Quintiles of $\text{var}(\log \text{TFPR})$

Panel (c): Components of $\text{var}[\log (1 - \tau_Y)]$

Panel (d): Quintiles of $\text{var}[\log (1 - \tau_Y)]$

Note: Panel (a) plots TFPR dispersion, $\text{var}(\log \text{TFPR}_{si})$, and its within-group and between-group components. Panel (b) plots the quintiles average of $\text{var}(\log \text{TFPR}_{si})$, together with its between-group component. Panel (c) plots the dispersion of output distortion, $\text{var}[\log (1 - \tau_{yi})]$, and its within-group and between-group components, while panel (d) plots quintile averages of dispersion of output, together with its between-group component. Variances and components plot in the graphs are the weighted mean across sectors. Value-added share, $\theta_s$, is used as the weight for computing the mean.

Source: authors’ calculations.
Figure 5: Capital and Labor Allocation over Time

Panel (a): Distribution of Capital

Panel (b): Distribution of Employment

Panel (c): Capital in 0-20 Quintile

Panel (d): Employment in 0-20 Quintile

Note: Panel (a) and (b) plot the distribution of capital and labor, measured by $\log(K_{si}/\bar{K}_s)$ and $\log(L_{si}/\bar{L}_s)$ for 1983 and 1996. Panel (c) and (d) plot the time series of capital and labor in the bottom quintile, measured by $\log(K_s |_{1} / \bar{K}_s)$ and $\log(L_s |_{1} / \bar{L}_s)$. $\bar{K}_s$ denotes the mean of capital for $s$ industry. $K_s |_{1}$ denotes the mean of capital for the bottom quintile of $s$ industry. Similar definition applies to labor.

Source: authors’ calculations.
Figure 6: Distribution of TFPQ in the Balanced Panel

Notes: The figure plots the distribution of TFPQ, \( \log\left(A_{si}M_s^{\frac{1}{t}}/\bar{A}_s\right) \), for the balanced panel.
Figure 7: Self-Loan as a Fraction of Banks’ Equity and Total Loans

Figure 8:

Note: The dash circle line refers to the ratio of self-loan to banks’ equity; the dash dot line refers to the ratio of self-loan to the banks’ total loan. The data comes from Held and Jimenez (1999).