The revival of Atlanticism in NATO?

Changing security identities in Britain, Norway and Denmark

Nina Græger, Kristin M. Haugevik
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The revival of Atlanticism in NATO?
Changing security identities in Britain, Norway and Denmark

Report to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence

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Executive summary
In this report, we argue that despite major changes in the transatlantic security landscape, ‘Atlanticism’ has survived as a specific national security orientation on the European political arena and within NATO. However, we also observe that the content and implications of Atlanticism seem to have changed. We substantiate this claim through an analysis of the security discourse and practices of three long-term European NATO members: Britain, Norway and Denmark. While geographical location, historical bonds with the United States and Euro-scepticism constituted key indicators of these countries’ Atlanti-cist orientation in the Cold War era, their present-day Atlanticism seems characterized by their readiness to work together with the United States, and to commit troops and equipment to US-led and NATO-led operations. Based on this revised definition of Atlanticism, we argue that all three countries have remained steady in their orientation as ‘Atlanticists first’. On the other hand, we also note that the new administration in Washington and the growing tensions between Russia and the West are factors that might reinforce the traditional geopolitical and historical aspects of Atlanticism, both within NATO and as part of the security identities of European member states. Recent discussions concerning ‘core tasks and areas’ in relation to NATO’s new strategic concept could be seen as indicating such a tendency.
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### Acronyms

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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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1. Introduction

In the year of NATO’s 60th anniversary, transatlantic relations find themselves at a defining moment. Ever since the end of the Cold War, scholars have repeatedly predicted the demise of Atlanticism in Europe, and with it, NATO’s position as the cornerstone of its European member-states’ security policies.1 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was seen as faced with the choice between transformation and termination – to go ‘out of area’ or ‘out of business’.2 About a decade later, the US-led intervention of Iraq revealed seemingly ‘deep and unbridgeable divisions’ between key members of the transatlantic security community.3 Once again, transatlantic relations were put to a severe test. One scholar argued that the transatlantic security architecture had fallen apart, leading to the effective end of Atlanticism.4 Others were less conclusive as to the severity and long-term effects of the crisis.5

In this report, we claim that these rumours of the demise of Atlanticism in European security politics have been exaggerated. On the contrary, we argue, Atlanticism appears to have been revitalized, and

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taken on a new form. With the new US administration of Barack Obama, we even expect the growing conditions for Atlanticism to improve further. We approach Atlanticism as a particular type of security identity and orientation, intercepting a geographical dimension, a historical dimension and a cautious Europeanist dimension. Our working assumption is that recent changes in the international security environment have *not* altered the Atlanticist security identities of long-term NATO member-states in Europe, exemplified here by Britain, Norway and Denmark. We substantiate this claim by showing that both in key situations and over time, and despite significant changes in the international security environment, the Atlanticist identities of these three countries have remained largely intact. This can be seen both in rhetoric and in concrete security practices.

The report consists of three parts: In the first part, we link the concept of Atlanticism to the study of security identities and communities, and identify three traditionally distinctive characteristics of Atlanticism. We then examine how geographical location, historical ties with the United States and relations with Europe and the EU have impacted on the security identities of Britain, Norway and Denmark since 1945. In the second part of the report, we discuss the extent to which changes in the international security landscape the last decade have influenced the Atlanticist security identities of these countries.

In the third part, we conclude from our analysis that, rather than withering away, Atlanticism seems to be reviving and taking on a new form. While geography, historical relations with the United States and cautious relations with Europe and the EU remain central indicators of Atlanticism, they seem less decisive than before. Instead, Atlanticism increasingly seems characterized by the readiness and *de facto* ability to communicate and cooperate with the United States, and to commit troops and equipment to US-led and NATO-led operations. Moreover, the return of great-power politics to the international stage seems to impinge on NATO members’ views on the future role of the Alliance. While some Atlanticist countries have held that NATO should return to its core tasks and areas, others have maintained that NATO should focus more on developing its global role. One key arena where the future of Atlanticism might be carved out is in the ongoing discussions on NATO’s new strategic concept, scheduled for release in late 2010.
2. Defining Atlanticism

Atlanticism is a blurry concept, analytically and politically. In this report, we use the term to denote a specific type of security policy identity and orientation, anchored in geographical location, historical ties with the United States and a wary approach to European integration. A central question in contemporary IR scholarship is how the security identities of modern states come into being and how they are maintained. One approach, anchored in a rationalist style of reasoning, has been to see the strategic choices of states as structurally determined. Their interests and preferences are exogenously given – meaning that they can largely be explained with reference to external structures such as geopolitics, great-power politics and spheres of interest. From this perspective, identities are considered to be of little relevance for explaining changes in state behaviour. Instead, the ideological concerns of states are seen as rooted in structural circumstances, including the prevailing distribution of power.6

While such an approach to security politics can be fruitful in many cases, it is less so in the context of this project, where the purpose is precisely to study potential changes in the seemingly deep-seated Atlanticist identities of three European NATO members. In view of this, our theoretical point of departure in this report is anchored in a constructivist style of reasoning, in which security identities are seen as changeable and continually subject to influence from changing actors and structures in their environment. These security identities, in turn, are held to ‘generate and shape’ both security interests and behaviour.7 As argued by Lene Hansen,

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6 Rationalism is often seen to encompass different variants of realist and liberal approaches, including realism, neo-realism, liberalism, neo-liberalism and liberal institutionalism. These theories have in common that they (albeit to differing degrees) emphasize the anarchic nature of international politics and the materialist interests of states (including security, power and economic gains). For an overview see Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt (2002) ‘Rationalism V. Constructivism: A Sceptical View’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, (eds.) Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage.

[... ] representations of identity place foreign policy issues within a particular interpretative optic, one with consequences for which foreign policy can be formulated as an adequate response.8

In other words, identity sets the framework conditions for and action space within foreign policy. This should be observable at both the formulation and the execution level of the security politics of our three countries. The notion of security communities – clusters of states ‘glued together’ by a notion of shared history, perceptions, values and destiny – is also useful to consider in this regard. According to Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, national security identities and practices are profoundly shaped by such communities.9

In this report, we define NATO as a security community. As argued by Mike Williams and Iver B. Neumann, this security community results from ‘a deep, enduring and profound cultural commonality’, rather than from the Cold War.10 When the Cold War ended and NATO’s relevance and indeed existence came to be questioned, then Secretary-General Manfred Wörner stressed that the Treaty of Washington (1949) had aimed at creating ‘a permanent community of Western democracies to make each other stronger through cooperation, and to work for more peaceful international relations’, and not at deterring the Soviet Union.11 In the post-Cold War era, an important mission for NATO has been to reconcile former adversaries by enlarging its security community through new members and partners. In addition, NATO represents the strongest institutional link between Europe and the United States, and that has contributed to its continued relevance after 1990. In such a representation of the alliance, the military balancing during the Cold War stands out as an anomaly, an unfortunate historical deviation from NATO’s real nature and identity.12

Atlanticism has been and remains an important connective tissue in NATO. Broadly speaking, Atlanticism can be defined as the ‘common

12 Williams and Neumann ‘From Alliance to Security Community: Nato, Russia and the Power of Identity’.
heritage and a shared destiny’ of all the states bordering the North Atlantic. In a more limited sense, however, it can be seen as a collective term for the identities of European NATO members who wish to ensure US involvement in Europe and safeguard NATO’s position as the cornerstone of European security and defence policy. Hence, Atlanticism must be seen in close connection with the US influence on world politics in general since 1945, and on the security identities of European countries in particular. From this latter definition, Atlanticism is seen as the counterpart to ‘Europeanism’ or ‘continentalism’, which aims at reducing US influence in Europe by promoting a more independent security role for the EU.

In this report, we focus on three long-term Atlanticist countries in NATO: Britain, Denmark and Norway. For all these three, Atlanticism can be said to involve a geographical location bordering the Atlantic Ocean, historically close ties with the United States and a cautious approach to European integration. Britain, Denmark and Norway are all located near the North Atlantic. Historically, they have all enjoyed close relations with the United States, bilaterally and through NATO. They were all founding members of NATO, and have all consistently referred to NATO as the cornerstone of their security and defence policy over the last 60 years. This has been observable at the policy level through varying degrees of political and military dependence upon, commitment to and cooperation with the Atlantic hegemon. They have

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15 In a 2003 study of EU member-states’ positions on the Iraq war, Menon and Lipkin identified three different types of Atlanticism in Europe. Traditional Atlanticists have stable, long-term relations with the NATO and the United States. Britain, Portugal and Denmark are cited as examples. Conjunctional Atlanticists, in contrast, are less predictable in their preference for the United States and NATO. The authors place Spain and Italy in this group. Finally, reflex Atlanticists do not have a tradition of putting the United States and NATO at the centre of their security policy, but because of their (communist) pasts they tend to side with the United States. Examples include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Following this logic, NATO’s enlargement in 2004 and 2009 would yield nine more countries as potential candidates to the list of reflex Atlanticists. See Menon, Anand and Jonathan Lipkin (2003) European Attitudes Towards Transatlantic Relations 2000-2003: An Analytical Survey, Paris: Notre Europe. Norway was not included in the original study, but fit the criteria for being a traditional Atlanticist; see Græger, Nina (2005) ‘Norway between NATO, the EU and the US: A Case Study of Post-Cold War Security and Defence Discourse’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1.
also been reluctant to participate actively in efforts to strengthen security cooperation within the structures of the EU. In the following subsections we elaborate on these three aspects of Atlanticism.

2.1. The geographical dimension of Atlanticism

Although geographical proximity to the Atlantic Ocean seems less central than before in the self-definition as an Atlanticist, it could still be argued that Atlanticism in the traditional sense is essentially a geographical identity. In fact, the continued existence of ‘Atlanticism’ as a concept in the transatlantic security community indicates that geography remains an important signifier in NATO. Furthermore, name tags such as ‘Club Med’ for NATO countries like Spain, Portugal and Italy, and the ‘Northwest Club’ for the United States, Canada, Britain, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, signify that these countries share views and policies on a range of political and strategic issues in NATO that can be ascribed at least partly to geographical location. Thus, geography could be seen as a sub-layer of Atlanticism.

With the enlargement of NATO to include Eastern and Central European states, the emergence of more such ‘clubs’ is possible, and that might challenge the force of Atlanticism within NATO. On the other hand, it could be argued that many of the new Eastern and Central European members could serve to strengthen the Atlanticist dimension in NATO. For many of these countries, Atlanticism has become synonymous with anti-Russian orientations and/or pro-American and pro-NATO policies. Illustratively, the first Atlanticist organization in Eastern Europe, the Bulgarian Atlantic Club, was initiated as early as in 1990, as a think-tank dedicated to fostering the common values of the Euro-Atlantic community. Since then, other similar ventures have followed. Some of these think-tanks have arguably also introduced a genuinely ‘new Atlanticism’, characterized as:

[...] an honest and successful internationalism, which could be used to prevent a return to nationalism and could replace the failed Communist internationalism in an era when interdependence was on the rise. Thus, they have managed to free their Atlanticism from Cold War assumptions, in a way that even NATO would envy.17

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16 Except for Luxembourg, all the original European NATO member states border the Atlantic. Among the non-Europeans, the United States and Canada also fit the bill. Yet, it should be noted that a country like France, while bordering the Atlantic, does not conform to the other characteristics of an Atlanticist country.

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The various Atlantic clubs and councils established in the former East Bloc countries would seem important for upholding and strengthening a self-image as Atlanticist.18

Geopolitics – defined as the impact of geographical location, size and resources on politics – was the benchmark of security policy during the Cold War, with two blocs poised against each other and with proxy wars underway in several parts of the world. In contrast, the 1990s were marked by intra-state conflicts in Europe and elsewhere, in which asymmetric warfare dominated. In this period, the geographical dimension of Atlanticism seemed to become less relevant.

Our three country cases illustrate well how geography can be seen as constitutive of Atlanticism. Britain’s Atlanticist orientation is often put in the context of its geographical location as an island in the North Atlantic, physically disconnected from the European continent. Britain’s traditionally firm preference for the United States and NATO over European alternatives in security and defence has, for instance, been seen in connection with the country’s vulnerability to attacks by air and sea rather than land – as became evident during the Second World War. Britain’s dependence on air and naval defence capabilities is commonly cited as a key reason why the United States after 1945 was deemed a more valuable ally than the countries of central Europe.19 In the post-Cold War era, geographical location has largely disappeared from the British security and defence discourse. While the British Ministry of Defence notes that bordering the Atlantic Ocean continues to imprint on British security politics, its 1998 Strategic Defence Review concludes that Britain is no longer facing any immediate ‘threat of an air or other direct [military] attack’ on British territory. Instead, British security and prosperity are increasingly seen as interlinked with security challenges overseas, and non-military threats are given more attention than previously.20

Norway’s geographical location, bordering the Atlantic Ocean and, especially, the Soviet Union, was the main reason for the country’s Atlanticist orientation and close relationship with the United States.

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18 These clubs were inspired by the West-European Atlantic committees and councils under The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA). ATA is an umbrella organization and an independent forum for political discussions about security policy and NATO and for supporting the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty. See http://www.ata-sec.org/index.php?mod=2.


after the Second World War. As formulated in 1981 by then prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland: ‘Norway is a country with her back to Europe and facing the Atlantic’. More than a geographical description, this statement can be said to have captured a state of mind. Geography is a defining concept or marker of Norway’s security policy identity, reflected in the centrality of Russian politics and Northern Norway in national debates about security and defence, and Norway’s close relationship with the United States. The heavy focus on the High North, in 2005 defined as the core policy area in the coalition government’s (2005–2009) political platform, indicates that Atlanticism has remained central in Norwegian security and defence policy and identity.

Denmark is, like Norway and Britain, located in Europe’s Northern periphery and on the Atlantic. Its relatively accessible terrain, with no ‘natural’ barriers like mountains, makes the country difficult to defend against an external aggressor. During the Cold War, this geographical fact contributed to Danish NATO membership and to a close relationship with the United States. However, because of its vulnerable geographical position and frontline location, during the Cold War Denmark chose a more low-key détente orientation in NATO, or repressed version of Atlanticism, than Norway. This position was discarded in favour of a ‘mainstream Atlanticism’ in the 1990s.

2.2. The historical dimension of Atlanticism

A second key dimension of Atlanticism relates to the historical ties established between the United States and Europe, and between the United States and individual European countries, during the two world wars and in the Cold War era, in many cases even earlier. Many of the European countries that today are seen as having an Atlanticist orientation have long-standing, bilateral relationships with the United States that originated in imperial relations (Britain) or in immigration to North America in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Denmark and


24 Ibid.
Norway). After 1945, European countries were indebted to the United States for coming to their rescue in the Second World War. After the war, a number of European countries, including Britain, Norway and Denmark, benefited greatly from the US Marshall Plan in their post-war economic reconstruction. Atlanticism in this sense can thus be seen to involve also a reciprocal aspect, the consent of the United States to play a role as a guardian of Europe and of the security and prosperity of individual European states.

Both pre-war history and wartime experiences and cooperation constituted a fundamental backdrop to the establishment of NATO in 1949. At the time, security was the driving force in the establishment of NATO – it was about keeping ‘the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down’.25 During the Cold War, the United States was, through NATO, the undisputed guarantor of its European allies ‘territorial integrity, political independence and security’.26 US basing strategy throughout the Cold War years, which also constituted a central part of NATO’s defence strategy, was based on the wartime cooperation among ‘the Allies’. In addition to these bilateral agreements about the pre-stocking of US military equipment on their territories,27 the United States and individual allies in Europe were linked through extensive cooperation on procurement, military education exchange programmes, and military and foreign policy matters more generally.

Regarding the three country cases, the historical context for British Atlanticism was above all the decline of Britain’s imperial power around 1940, with the subsequent transfer of global hegemony to the United States. By the time NATO was founded, Britain’s position as major world power was fading, while the United States and the Soviet Union had gained comparative strength. In 1946, Winston Churchill launched the idea of a ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States for the first time,28 effectively establishing the pivotal position of the United States in British politics for the next half-century. While Churchill later stressed that British foreign policy took

25 A quote commonly attributed to NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay.
place on three arenas – the British Commonwealth and Empire, ‘the English-speaking world’ and ‘United Europe – it soon became clear that the United States took precedence over other partners. Not only had the United States’ entry into the Second World War proved decisive for the victory of the Allies and for British security, but the historical bonds between the two countries and, because of this, similarities in language, culture and political system, seemed to have created a solid platform for cooperation.29

The idea that Britain enjoyed a ‘special’ bilateral bond with the United States gained a foothold in the British security discourse during the Cold War. Today, paying tribute to ‘the special relationship’ is customary when British and US leaders visit and address one another.30 Recent British white papers on security and defence confirm the United States’ position as Britain’s most important bilateral partner, and NATO’s role as the ‘bedrock’ of British security and defence.31 Indeed, the firm bonds with the United States largely explain why it made sense for Britain to promote the idea of a strong transatlantic defence alliance on the European arena, formally committing the United States to the defence of European and British territory. Since the beginning, Britain has been an influential player in NATO, setting the tone both politically and militarily. Out of NATO’s twelve official Secretaries General, three have been British.32 Britain is also a key contributor to NATO in terms of expenditures and personnel, including to NATO operations.33 However, British-US security cooperation goes beyond NATO. On a bilateral basis and within the so-called ‘Anglophone’, it includes military training, procurement, intelligence and the sharing of military bases.34


According to inside sources, Bill Clinton had to be reminded of this prior to his first press meeting with John Major, in 1993. ‘How could I forget? The “special relationship”!’ Clinton reportedly said while laughing heartily. Quoted in Burk Old World, New World. The Story of Britain and America, p. 644.


The Anglophone is common term for the five English-speaking countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Security cooperation among these five includes the ABCA Armies’ Program (armed
The Atlanticism of *Norway* and *Denmark* is generally understood in the context of security. Both countries followed a neutral foreign policy strategy after the First World War, but were nonetheless invaded by Nazi Germany in April 1940. The Danish government and Royal Family chose to surrender and were, as a result, allowed to remain in control of internal Danish affairs. In contrast, the Norwegian government and King Haakon VII refused to accept the Nazi occupation; they escaped to London, where they formed an exile government. Norwegian military resistance lasted for approximately two months before Germany gained political control over the country. The decision to join NATO in 1949 can hardly be seen as a ‘reflex choice’ on the part of either Norway or Denmark. In both countries ‘Never again 9 April!’ (referring to the date of the German invasion) put an end to the dominant position that to ‘lie low’ was the best option for a small country.

For Norway, organized collaboration with the United States and the other NATO countries could easily be perceived as a provocation in Moscow. NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, summarized Norway and Denmark’s entry into NATO as follows:

The position of Denmark and Norway in relation to the Treaty had been uncertain. The separate Scandinavian Pact, which they had been engaged in negotiating, had fallen through because the Swedish policy of full neutrality could not be reconciled with Norway’s insistence that any Scandinavian defence association would have to co-operate with the Western Powers. On the 5th February, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Harvard Lange, started for Washington to enquire about the Atlantic Treaty. A few hours before leaving Oslo he was handed a note from the Soviet Union inviting Norway to conclude a non-aggression pact. Norway made her choice. It was a brave one. She declined the Russian offer, and on the 3rd March decided to join the Atlantic Alliance, while making it clear that she would not allow armed forces of foreign Powers to be stationed on Norwegian territory as long as the country had not been attacked, or threatened with attack. Norway then took part in the latter stages of the negotiations.

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35 Before and during the inter-war period, Britain was Norway’s closest ally. Britain’s declining power status contributed to Norway choosing the United States as its primary ally. It should also be mentioned that the Norwegian Royal Family, except for King Haakon, spent all the wartime occupation years from 1940 to 1945 in the United States, on the invitation of President F.D. Roosevelt. The Royal Family’s friendship with the President and the First Lady may well also account for the close political relationship that developed between the two countries after the war.


As noted above, Norway and Denmark had clear restrictions related to the presence of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases on their territories in peacetime. The only exception was Greenland, where Denmark granted the United States basing rights, including the right to store nuclear weapons. Denmark was lagging behind in the armament process in NATO in the early 1950s and stood out as unwilling to increase its defence budget. Norway, while not escaping criticism entirely, was seen as more ‘constructive’. This could also be ascribed to the fact that the Norwegian government-in-exile had participated in Allied cooperation in London during the war. The notion of an ‘alliance within the alliance’ was often used to describe the close relationship between Norway and the United States in NATO during the Cold War. Later, Denmark’s ‘footnote policy’ between 1982 and 1988, when a parliamentary majority in the Folketing forced the minority government to opt out from NATO policy on nuclear and arms control (through footnotes to NATO communiqués), placed Denmark among the ‘backbenchers’ in NATO. During the same period, Norway enjoyed an important position as NATO’s ‘watchtower’ in the North, on the Soviet border.

Norway’s foreign policy predisposition is towards Atlanticism, manifested in strong ties with the United States and loyalty to NATO. NATO is seen as the cornerstone of Norwegian security, with the commitments under Article 5 as the means of securing allied and especially US assistance in case of an armed attack. While security remains important in legitimizing and explaining Norway’s Atlanticism, its historic foundation – the ‘common heritage and a shared destiny’ with the other countries that constitute the (trans-)Atlantic security community, and with the United States in particular – has become more prevalent. Norwegian authorities often emphasize that this ‘community of destiny’ was in place long before the creation of NATO, as common cultural bonds and values between Norway and the United States were established during the large-scale Norwegian emigration to North America in the 19th century:

Norway has through the years had a special relationship with the USA. This is about basic economic, political and security policy relations constituted by count-

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less family ties between Norwegians and Americans of Norwegian ancestry. We are building on close historical bonds and shared basic democratic values.42

Because of its historical roots, there is little room for questioning the ‘special relationship’ that Norway is seen to enjoy with the United States, even in times of political disagreement. During the Iraq crisis, for instance, when criticism of US policy was harsh among central Norwegian politicians, the government stressed that the country’s bilateral relationship with the United States: ‘builds on basic mutual dependency and common values that go deeper than politics and economy. [...] The old community of destiny from the Cold War is changed but not gone’.43 Norway’s Atlanticist foreign policy orientation is deeply rooted and not easily challenged, let alone changed.

In Denmark, the Bush Administration’s Iraq intervention had less impact on the relationship with the United States – in the eyes of the government. In Danish public opinion, however, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen and his government’s unconditional support for Bush’s policy unleashed heated debate and criticism.

2.3 The ‘cautious Europeanist’ dimension of Atlanticism

A third dimension of Atlanticism can be referred to as its ‘Other’, namely Europeanism. The distinction between Atlanticism and Europeanism (or ‘continentalism’) in West European foreign and security policy was frequently made during the Cold War. In response to continentalism, smaller European states like Norway, Denmark and Iceland sought to balance the power of the European great powers through Atlanticism. A hegemon and ally located ‘far away’ (the United States) could seem preferable to the hegemony exercised by powerful European neighbours (like France) so much in evidence in the European integration process. From this viewpoint, tying the United States to Europe through Atlantic cooperation was portrayed as political balancing, based on the wish to prevent marginalization of influence, rather than threat balancing.44 Traditionally, Britain has been seen as the main representative of Atlanticism in NATO, whereas France has been the foremost advocate of Europeanism or continentalism.

44 This was underlined by, among others, Henry Kissinger in 1965, see Mouritzen ‘Denmark’s Super Atlanticism’, p. 158.
When NATO was established, the European integration process had already begun. Here too, security played a central part. A key motivation for establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 was the belief that closer economic interdependence among the member-states could help to prevent another world war. Plans for closer and more coordinated security cooperation among the European countries also flourished, the stated aim being that Europe should be able to take on more responsibility for its own peace and security. After the Cold War, when NATO transformed itself militarily and politically, a parallel transformation process took place within what was then the European Community (EC). In 1991, the NATO countries agreed to establish a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the structures of the Alliance. This move was commonly seen as indicating US consent for Europe to assume greater responsibility for the security of its own ‘backyard’. By the turn of the century, the final steps to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the EU were completed. In view of this, many scholars have claimed to see a ‘Europeanization’ of the security and defence identities of some NATO countries as a result of the ESDP – also in non-EU members like Norway. The United States has been in favour of the ESDP as long as it does not threaten NATO’s position as cornerstone of European defence, and as long as NATO retains the ‘first right’ to operations, as established implicitly through the 2003 Berlin Plus agreement.

Britain’s historical relationship with Europe, and with France in particular, has been marked by rivalry, conflict and estrangement. Together with Britain’s island position outside the European continent, this turbulent relationship constitutes an important part of British exceptionalism: the idea that, due to its history, geography, culture and national identity, Britain is different from the rest of Europe. Churchill famously voiced this when he declared that Britain was ‘with Europe, but not of it’ – ‘linked, but not combined’ and ‘interested and


associated, but not absorbed’.\textsuperscript{49} In addition, anti-federalist sentiments were and continue to be strong in Britain, which can help to explain its preference for strictly intergovernmental cooperation in Europe. Along with Britain’s strategic decision to preserve its wartime security alliance with the United States, this mindset sheds light on why Britain initially chose a ‘wait-and-see’ approach to the European integration project. Although the British Foreign Secretary at the time, Ernst Bevin, was among the first to propose a ‘western union’ between core European states in the mid-1940s, he did so with the blessing of the US administration. Eventually, Britain remained outside both the ECSC and later the EC.\textsuperscript{50} Even after Britain finally joined the Community in 1973, it maintained a reputation for being ‘an awkward partner’ on the European arena.\textsuperscript{51} Since then, maintaining the balance between being an active player in Europe and a loyal Atlanticist has been a recurrent dilemma for British governments. While British state leaders from Harold Wilson to John Major had varying strategies for how Britain best could manoeuvre between Europe and the United States, Britain’s identity as an Atlanticist first and a European second largely remained stable throughout the Cold War.

\textit{Norway’s} relationship with Europe and the EU integration process has, like that of Britain, been somewhat strained. With two negative referenda (in 1972 and 1994) on Norwegian EEC/EU membership, and opinion polls that continue to show a considerable majority against Norway joining the Union, few expect the country to become an EU member in the near future. Since 1994, Norwegian governments of various political colours have defined EU membership as a non-issue, and have instead conducted a policy of active adjustment and accommodation as part of the European Economic Agreement (EEA) and on a case-by-case basis in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and within Justice and Home Affairs.\textsuperscript{52} Norway has, for instance, participated in ESDP operations as far as the EU permits and by stretching the 1994 referendum mandate.\textsuperscript{53} In the Norwegian dis-

\textsuperscript{49} Churchill ‘Sinews of Peace’.

\textsuperscript{50} In the late 1950s, Britain applied for membership twice, together with Ireland, Denmark and Norway. Yet, France’s President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the British application both times, reportedly because he had doubts about Britain’s commitment to the European project.


\textsuperscript{52} In 2006, the government launched an action plan aimed at pursuing a more systematic and efficient policy towards the EU in those areas where Norway has access, notably the EEA and the Schengen Agreement; see ‘On the implementation of the policy on Europe’, \textit{White Paper} no. 23 (2005–06). Oslo: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

\textsuperscript{53} For an analysis of Norway’s relations with the ESDP, see Græger, Nina (2007a)
course, the dominant view is that participation in the ESDP has few direct security and defence policy implications for Norway. Norway’s support for the ESDP (e.g. in NATO) is rather based on the idea that a stronger European defence capability would strengthen the transatlantic relationship and overall Euro-Atlantic crisis management capacity. The government expressed similar attitudes in response to the European Security Strategy of 2003, which was seen as ‘a useful contribution to improve transatlantic relations.’ This is very close to the US premises for accepting ESDP as a European – but not exclusively EU – project independent of NATO. The transatlantic framing of ESDP also reflects Norway’s enduring focus on transatlantic relations in the context of European and national security.

Although Denmark joined the EC with Britain in 1973, membership has not changed its fundamental predisposition to Atlanticist foreign policy. As mentioned above, Denmark turned in the 1990s from a repressed version of Atlanticism (as expressed in the ‘footnote policy’) and became a mainstream Atlanticist. While not wishing to embrace a Europe dominated by Germany and France, Denmark has supported Europeanism in the form of EU (and NATO) enlargement. With regard to its EU membership, Denmark opted out of several policy areas when the integration process was deepened with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. As in non-member Norway and in ‘cautious’ EU member states such as the UK and Ireland, this reflected scepticism towards European federalism and the pooling of sovereignty in core policy areas of the nation state. The Danish opt-out on foreign and security policy in connection with the Maastricht Treaty and its subsequent opt-out of the ESDP, were also due to concerns about the role of NATO. The ‘US connection’ and Washington’s disapproval of a European security and defence policy outside NATO also played into this.

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54 Utenriksdepartementet (2000-01) ‘Norge Og Europa Ved Inngangen Til Et Nytt Århundre’, Oslo, Utenriksdepartementet.
56 Mouritzen ‘Denmark’s Super Atlanticism’.
bly, after the Cold War, Denmark shifted from NATO ‘footnote’ to EU ‘footnote’.

As in Britain and Norway, Atlanticism is a central feature of Denmark’s foreign-policy orientation and identity, irrespective of the government in power. The importance attached to this Atlanticism may differ from time to time, however. Denmark’s recent propensity to support US foreign policy, even when this policy is highly controversial (as during the Iraq crisis), is the primary expression of its Atlanticist identity.

3. Atlanticism in the 21st century: Responding to a changing security landscape

The end of the Cold War altered not only the international security environment but also the security practices of Western European countries and the security organizations to which they belonged. In the early 1990s, a new security role was gradually fashioned for NATO, involving new tasks and new operational theatres. The Alliance’s 1991 New Strategic Concept made it clear that NATO was no longer to engage itself only in the military defence of its member-states: it should also face up to broader and more complex threats in order to ‘preserve the strategic balance within Europe’ more generally. With its military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and, especially, in Kosovo in 1999, NATO demonstrated its willingness (if not necessarily readiness) to take on a role ‘out of area’, in the broader Euro-Atlantic region. This was manifested in the adoption of the revised strategic concept at the NATO Summit on 25 April 1999 in Washington, while the air bombings of Kosovo were still ongoing.

Similarly, the 21st century has seen major changes in the European and transatlantic political and security environment, which must be expected to affect the basis for Atlanticism in NATO and as part of the security identity of its members. Starting with the European dimension of Atlanticism, the gradual emergence of the EU as a security actor since the early 1990s has clearly impacted on Atlanticism. In recent years, the EU has acquired capabilities enabling it to take on a more active role in security and defence. While the capabilities in the EU toolbox continue to be mainly of a ‘soft’ character, the EU has also developed military capabilities of its own, has launched autonomous EU operations and is currently in the process of developing a European strategic culture. Yet, NATO undoubtedly remains the military

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big brother of the two. Although NATO officials as well as US officials have taken care to emphasize that NATO and the EU should not develop competing structures and capabilities, the two organizations have been seen to duplicate each other’s efforts.\textsuperscript{62} The Berlin Plus agreement between the two organizations allows the EU to draw on NATO resources in operations, but only when NATO as a whole does not wish to take action.\textsuperscript{63} Disagreements over non-EU members in NATO (read: Turkey) and non-NATO members in the EU (read: Cyprus) act to hamper cooperation between the two organizations.\textsuperscript{64}

Notably, the Berlin Plus has so far only been effectuated twice.\textsuperscript{65} Inasmuch as the EU’s emergence as a more credible security actor challenges the role of NATO and creates internal debates in both organizations, it can be said to represent a challenge to the future role of Atlanticism – both at the institutional level and in the security identity of specific European countries.

Second, when it comes to historical bonds with the United States, the changes in US foreign policy after 2000, including the launch of the global ‘War on Terror’ and the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, have undoubtedly affected Atlanticism in Europe. In response to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001, the North Atlantic Council invoked NATO’s Article 5 for the first time in the history of the Alliance, in solidarity with the United States. Yet, when the Bush Administration decided to intervene militarily in Afghanistan,\textsuperscript{66} it did not take up on NATO’s offer, instead initiating a ‘coalition of the willing’ that took action in the operation called \textit{Operation Enduring Freedom} (OEF). This incident aroused a
The revival of Atlanticism in NATO concerning its relevance as a security organization and function as the key arena for transatlantic security cooperation. The main premise for Atlanticism – the US commitment to the transatlantic security community – was once again questioned, as it had been in the immediate years after the Cold War.

Later in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a multinational force authorized by the UN Security Council, became operational on the ground. In August 2003, NATO took over institutional responsibility for this operation. To date, all the NATO allies as well as several non-NATO countries have contributed troops to the operation. As of July 2009, ISAF encompasses some 65,000 military troops, making it NATO’s largest-ever operation.\(^{67}\) The operation in Afghanistan has revealed many challenges for NATO as a security actor, including the need for a more comprehensive approach to crisis management and to improve cooperation with other actors present in the field (especially the EU and the UN, but also non-governmental actors).

The US-led intervention of Iraq in 2003 became an even more momentous point of conflict for US–European relations and Atlanticism. The hefty transatlantic and internal European disagreements in the prelude to the war became a test to the unity of NATO as a security actor as well as to the future of Atlanticism. Seven long-term NATO members, among them Britain and Denmark, supported the US-led invasion,\(^{68}\) whereas four others strongly opposed it.\(^{69}\) Other long-term NATO members such as Norway were against the invasion, but remained less outspoken in their criticism of US policy. This split among European countries formed the backdrop for US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s famous distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe,\(^{70}\) as well as claims that the Iraq crisis had led to ‘an effective end of Atlanticism’.\(^{71}\) It is no exaggeration to say that, during the years of the Bush

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68 The other five were Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. All these countries were listed as coalition partners by the United States in a press release of 27 March 2003. Furthermore, the state leaders of Britain, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain signed a public declaration calling for the disarmament of Iraq and expressing their support to the United States. See Aznar, José Maria et al. (2003) ‘Letter of Eight’, *The Times*, 30 January.


70 Referring to the disagreements over Iraq, Rumsfeld pointed out that he considered Germany and France to be part of ‘old’ Europe, whereas the US allies in Iraq represented ‘new’ Europe. See Rumsfeld, Donald (2003) ‘Briefing at the Foreign Press Center’, Washington D.C., 22 January.

71 Daalder ‘The End of Atlanticism’.
administration, relations between the United States and key European partners became historically strained.

Finally, when it comes to the geographical dimension of Atlanticism, Europe and NATO’s relations with the former East Bloc have remained a central issue after the Cold War. NATO’s enlargement from 16 to 28 member-states since 1999, most of them former members of the Warsaw Pact, can be seen to have altered the collective identity of NATO.72 At the same time, many of these new NATO members appear to have become ‘reflex Atlanticists’,73 in that their Communist pasts seem to encourage an active orientation towards the United States in their current security policies. This was notable in the prelude to the Iraq war, where several of these countries sided with the United States. At present, NATO also has 22 partner countries in the broader Euro–Atlantic partnership, some of which have expressed a clear interest in full NATO membership.74

NATO has also been an important forum for integrating Russia into Western security cooperation structures, and the prospects for a close partnership appeared quite good in the 1990s.75 The NATO–Russia Council was created in 2003 as a forum for cooperation, consultation and dialogue. Since then, however, issues such as NATO enlargement, Kosovo’s independent status, US missile defence in Europe and the Russian-Georgian conflict have contributed to obstructing NATO-Russia relations. As a direct result of the latter conflict, NATO froze its cooperation with Russia, to which Russia responded by putting all bilateral defence collaboration between the two on hold (except for certain lower-level contacts).76 Russia’s withdrawal from the CFE Treaty, which regulates the military presence on the ground, ensures

74 At the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on 2–3 December 2008, the decision on whether Ukraine and Georgia should become part of NATO’s Membership Action Plans (MAP) was postponed. The United States pressured for an upgrading of these countries’ status and for granting them MAP status, but this was not accommodated by the majority of NATO countries.
76 The EU responded by putting negotiations with Russia about a renewal of the existing cooperation agreement on hold, but re-opened them in December 2008.
mutual inspections etc., has further reduced the number of common arenas for cooperation and dialogue. According to Oksana Antonenko, the NATO–Russia Council is filled with process but little substance and is therefore of little value to Russia.77 Russian analysts and politicians alike have stressed that Russia considers itself a strategic partner to NATO and that future cooperation as seen from Russia needs to be based on recognition of this. The substance of being a ‘strategic partner’ is not easily definable, but it signals that Russia wants to be seen as an equal partner to NATO and not merely as part of a cooperative structure.78 NATO and Russia agreed to re-open their cooperation in late January 2009. In his first press conference, the new NATO Secretary General stressed the importance of developing a true strategic partnership with Russia and of extending practical cooperation.79

While it is difficult to generalize on the basis of one conflict, and especially of the kind in Georgia, the conflict has nevertheless triggered substantial debates about NATO’s relevance and role towards Russia. Above all, it demonstrated that Russia is capable and willing to use military force to pursue its political goals, irrespective of international law and despite protests from the international community at large and NATO. At the same time, it represents a challenge to legitimacy and trust, if the West conducts a policy towards Russia where cooperation fora like the NRC are open only as long as Russia behaves in a manner that pleases NATO. These fora could be particularly useful for discussing difficult and controversial issues.80 Whatever happens in the future, relations with Russia have been a recurrent key dimension of Atlanticism – its geopolitical dimension in particular.

In sum, various developments and events in the 21st century have influenced the international political climate and affected the premises for Atlanticism within NATO as well as in the security identities and practices of NATO member-states. In the next sections, we explore how these changes have impacted on the Atlanticist security identities of Britain, Norway and Denmark.


79 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh (2009) NATO Press conference, 3 August, Brussels, NATO HQ.

3.1 Britain: Steady Atlanticist under pressure

Despite the changes in international security politics, several of which have influenced transatlantic security relations, Britain has remained a steady Atlanticist throughout the first decade of the 21st century.

Indications of a change in Britain’s cautious approach to EU security policy could be observed from the mid-1990s onwards. Following the establishment of the CFSP in 1993, references to ‘Europe’ and ‘the EU’ gradually became an integral part of the official British discourse on foreign, security and defence policy. While Atlanticism continued to hold precedence over Europeanism throughout the 1990s, the governments of John Major (1990–1997) and, especially, Tony Blair (1997–2007) called for a more active approach to Europe, including on issues related to security. Jolyon Howorth notes that the international failure to deal with the war in Bosnia in the 1990s convinced Major that Europe could not depend on the United States to ensure European security: ‘some type of European solution had to be found’. In 1997, Blair and the Labour Party ran for election on a manifesto calling for a more active approach to Europe. Blair’s signature tune as prime minister was that Britain did not have to choose between its allies in Europe and the United States. Instead, Blair envisioned that Britain could act as a bridge across the Atlantic, and that the two relationships could reinforce one another. This approach to British security and defence, Timothy Garton Ash suggests, could perhaps be described as a case of ‘Euroatlanticism’.

In 1998, however, the outbreak of the Kosovo war put Britain’s middle position between Europe and the United States under pressure. Blair soon marked himself as a strong advocate of international intervention in Kosovo, based on values rather than national interests. His key ally, however, US President Bill Clinton, was initially more aloof, especially on the question of committing US ground troops to the area

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following NATO’s air bombings.\textsuperscript{86} Reportedly, the debates over Kosovo were a major reason why Blair in 1998 called for a more active British approach to the EU’s plans for security and defence.\textsuperscript{87} Britain, he concluded, would have to be a player in Europe and not just an observer.\textsuperscript{88} In 1998, his words were followed up by concrete action. In a historic joint declaration, France and Britain stated that the EU needed ‘strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to new risks’ and be able to act autonomously in response to international crises.\textsuperscript{89} The declaration made possible the establishment of the ESDP within the structures of the EU. Arguably, it also marked the beginning of a more hands-on British approach to European security and defence. In 1999, Blair noted that

We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own back yard. The European Union should be able to take on some security tasks on our own, and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own.\textsuperscript{90}

At the same time, he took care to emphasize that the ESDP would merely play a complementary role to that of NATO. In other words, Britain’s identity as an Atlanticist first and Europeanist second had not changed.

Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC in 2001, Britain demonstrated its unyielding loyalty to the United States. Both in the immediate response and in the subsequently launched ‘War on Terror’, the Blair government kept its promise to ‘stand shoulder to shoulder’ with the United States.\textsuperscript{91} Britain contributed with personnel and equipment at all operational levels to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and has also been a steadfast contributor of troops to ISAF (second only to the United States). As of July 2009, the British contribution to ISAF encompassed some 9,000 troops, with the majority deployed to the turbulent south.\textsuperscript{92}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{86} See Ellison, Michael and Michael White (1999) ‘Blair and Cook Deny Rift with Clinton over Kosovo’, \textit{The Guardian}, 17 May.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Blair, Tony (2000a) ‘Committed to Europe, Reforming Europe’, Belgium, Ghent City Hall, 23 February.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Britain and France (1998) ‘Joint Declaration on European Defence’, Saint Malo, 3-4 December.
\item \textsuperscript{92} http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html
\end{itemize}
The weightiest proof of Britain’s deep-seated Atlanticist orientation and loyalty to the United States, however, is still Blair’s support to George W. Bush over the Iraq war. Christopher Hill notes that Blair was ‘willing to sacrifice the support of many other parties, at home and abroad’ to support the United States, notwithstanding his own reported preference for the ‘UN route’.93 In March and April 2003, the British contribution to *Operation Iraqi Freedom* encompassed some 46,000 military personnel, the last of whom left in July 2009.94

The transatlantic and European controversies over Iraq put Blair’s new approach to Europe and partnership with Jacques Chirac to the test.95 As pointed out by Ash, it was once again on the European side that the transatlantic ‘Blair bridge project’ collapsed.96 Blair also faced severe criticism over the Iraq issue at home – not only from the British press and public, but also from colleagues inside the Labour party and in his own government.97 In the end, the Iraq war was a major reason for Blair’s resigning in 2007. When Gordon Brown took over, he signalled that his was ‘a new government with new priorities’.98 The appointment of a foreign minister who reportedly had opposed the Iraq war privately; diplomatic visits to Paris and Berlin before going to Washington DC and Brown’s avoidance of the phrase ‘special relationship’ at his first press conference with Bush, were factors indicating that this

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94 The original number included support personnel stationed outside the Iraqi border. See http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/Operations/Factsheets/OperationInIraqFactsandFigures.htm. A small number of personnel will remain in Iraq to take part in the training of Iraqi security forces.

95 In 2002, in the midst of discussions over Iraq and following tough negotiations over the EU’s common agricultural policy, newspapers described relations between Blair and Chirac as tense. See Kettle, Martin, Christophe Boltanski, and Véronique Soulé (2004) ‘The Odd Couple’, *The Guardian*, 5 April.


97 Among the most prominent critics was former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. In July 2003, BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan claimed that the Blair government had intentionally ‘sexed up’ a 2002 intelligence report on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Not long after, the man identified as the journalist’s source, government scientist David Kelly, took his own life. Yet, a public judicial inquiry into the matter found no evidence that Tony Blair himself had deliberately distorted the truth.

The revival of Atlanticism in NATO: Changing security identities in Britain, Norway and Denmark

Two years later, it seems clear that the British security identity has not changed substantially. Brown quickly returned to the ‘special relationship’ phrase in meetings with Bush, and the 2008 British National Security Strategy confirmed the position of the United States as Britain’s single most important bilateral partner, ‘including through its engagement in NATO’. For Brown, Britain’s withdrawal of troops from Iraq and the change from Bush to Obama have undoubtedly lowered, if not reversed, the costs of enjoying close relations with Washington. Although some commentators claim to have observed a lack of interest in Britain on Obama’s part, both sides have insisted that the special relationship remains strong.

The geographical dimension of British Atlanticism also continues to be relevant, albeit in a somewhat different manner. The current British security and defence discourse focuses less on the security implications of the country’s geographical location, as the risk of a military attack on British soil is deemed ‘very low’. Instead, Britain has shifted its focus towards a wider definition of security, when it comes to the nature of threats as well as the geographical radius of concern. Official documents repeatedly point out that national security involves more than freedom from military threats alone, and that security ‘at home’ is inextricably linked with security ‘overseas’. In NATO, Britain advocates the view that NATO operations ‘out of area’ and operations as defined in Article 5 are two sides of the same coin (see below).

In a geopolitical context, it is worth noting that Britain’s relations with Russia have become noticeably strained in recent years. The two coun-

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tries experienced a diplomatic crisis during the summer of 2007 when Russia refused to extradite the man suspected of the murder of a former Russian agent, Alexandr Litvinenko, in London. Following Russia's refusal to hand over the suspect, and allegations that Russian authorities had approved of the assassination, the British government expelled four diplomats from London. Russia responded by expelling four British diplomats from Moscow and by closing down British Council offices in Russia. As a direct consequence of these events, British–Russian diplomatic relations were reported to be at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. British–Russian intelligence cooperation on counter-terrorism was effectively frozen, and accusations of state espionage have been made on both sides. In July 2008, The Times reported that ‘British security services have identified Russia as the third most serious threat facing the country’, preceded only by Al Qaida and Iran. Moreover, the British government was a strong critic of Russia’s invasion of Georgia in the summer of 2008. Recently, the British Foreign Secretary noted ‘a clear deficit of trust’ in the relations between Russia and the West. The complication of British–Russian relations is, potentially, a factor that could reinforce the geopolitical dimension of Britain’s Atlanticism.

In sum, it could be argued that while Atlanticism remains a key pillar of the British security identity, its contents have been modified. The narrative of Britain as a ‘reluctant European’ is less valid than before, and its position as an island in the Atlantic Sea, physically disconnected from the European continent, matters less to the formulation of its security policy. At the same time, the ‘special’ US–British relationship endures, despite analysts and observers’ repeated observations and/or predictions of their death. Similarly, NATO’s position as the cornerstone of British defence has been maintained, but Britain also takes part in military operations outside NATO structures. Arguably, a key marker of present-day British Atlanticism is its contribution of troops not only to NATO-led operations, but also to US-led operations outside the structures of NATO.

3.2 Norway: Still a steady Atlanticist

Norway has a genuine and long-standing Atlanticist orientation in security and defence policy, manifested in its close relationship with the United States and its strong commitment to NATO. NATO is the cornerstone of Norwegian security, so maintaining NATO’s relevance for European security is a key security concern for Norway. The Norwegian defence reform, which has been controversial at home, has been conducted and justified largely with reference to NATO’s ongoing military transformation as well as alleged expectations from Norway’s allies. As expressed in the Defence Plan for the period 2005–2008:

Norway’s most important contribution in this respect [to maintaining NATO’s relevance] will be to follow up on the allied intentions realized through the work with NRF, a new command structure and PCC, to ensure NATO remains an efficient security political tool seen from both sides of the Atlantic.

NATO is also the only European arena where Norway participates with full membership rights in discussions and decisions about European security and defence with European allies. A NATO that responds efficiently to security needs and crises may serve to reduce the competition from the EU, which seen from a non-EU member’s point of view would be favourable. Norwegian concern about marginalization vis-à-vis the EU is also founded in concerns that the role of the EU in security issues, as well as the European core in NATO, will grow stronger. Because the country is not a member of the EU, Norwegian governments work hard to keep security and defence issues within NATO and – where this is not possible – to obtain the best possible access to the ESDP. As part of this anti-marginalization policy, Norway has strongly supported closer EU-NATO cooperation, although the Berlin Plus agreement has been a disappointment. The Norwegian government also gave high priority to the negotiations that led to the agreement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2006. This policy could be seen as a reflection of Atlanticism but

113 Græger ‘Norway between Europe and the Us’.
also as a practice that contributes to upholding Norway’s Atlanticist security policy and identity.

Should NATO be unable to live up to the expectations of its members, and especially the United States, then transatlantic relations could become embodied in the EU–US relationship. This problematique has popped up on the agenda from time to time. For instance, in 2005 German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder claimed that NATO was no longer the primary arena for transatlantic consultations and coordination, and called for reform of Europe–US relations.114 The Norwegian foreign minister at the time stressed the negative consequences for Norway, should such a development materialize:

[...] an axis between Washington and Brussels within security policy [would] mean[s] that the four NATO countries, which stand outside [the EU] . . . fall completely on the sideline in the efforts to put their mark on this transatlantic cooperation. It means a further marginalization of Norway.115

So far, closer cooperation across the Atlantic (for instance, in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 and Europe in 2004) has not strengthened the EU at the expense of NATO. However, closer US–EU cooperation is on the foreign policy agenda of the Obama Administration and developments are expected.116 Hence, the spectre of marginalization has also become visible in relation to NATO. Norway has been working hard to prevent NATO from ‘developing into a forum that confirms the agreement that has already been reached in other and more closed fora’.117 This is also a typical small-state concern. In the context of NATO, greater use of ‘coalitions of the willing’ could, over time, turn NATO into such a forum, marginalizing the influence of smaller members like Norway. It is also a considerable challenge for NATO itself, should the alliance become a ‘force pool’ for members that seek to avoid the pitfalls of and time-consuming consensus processes in NATO.118 Schreer and Noetzl ar-
gue that NATO has already embarked on this way and has developed from a ‘two-tier NATO’ into a fluid ‘multi-tier NATO’. To avoid disintegration, they argue, NATO should become an ‘alliance à la carte’ or introduce the principle of ‘variable geometry’ where consensus is no longer an absolute demand. For Norway, such a development would require an even stronger focus on coalition building and alliance building than today, and being outside the EU would be a considerable disadvantage. Should NATO’s role as a forum for political consultations be diminished, so would its relevance as a security organization.

The ‘War on Terrorism’ had a direct impact on the transformation and use of the Norwegian armed forces in international operations, such as the OEF and ISAF. Both politically and militarily, ISAF is Norway’s most important international operation, with a contribution of some 485 personnel. The Norwegian government generally presents the Norwegian contribution to ISAF as being more substantial than many other NATO allies tend to see it. Military circles have stressed that it is the level of competence, not the sheer number of soldiers deployed, that is the central point (for instance, Norway’s Special Operations Forces have proven highly attractive to allies in Afghanistan). The major part of the Norwegian contingent has been deployed to the northern part of Afghanistan, in Meymanah and Mazaar-el-Sharif, as well as in Kabul. Since the autumn of 2008, Norway has also covered parts of the North Western region, Gormash, which has been marked by unrest as well as heavy fighting.

The ISAF operation is controversial in domestic politics in Norway, where the geographical location of the Norwegian forces has become a key issue. The Norwegian ISAF contribution has on several occasions challenged the political unity of the Red/Green coalition government in Oslo. One of the coalition parties, the Socialist Left Party, has been opposed to the deployment of forces to the southern part of Afghanistan. Although justified with reference to an already considerable contribution (in relation to the number of inhabitants in Norway) and lack of capacity, Norway’s unwillingness to deploy forces to the South are de facto national caveats that may weaken its position in NATO. Arguably, this has also contributed to reducing the goodwill that Norway


120 http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf

enjoyed in the years of the Bush administration through its military contributions (especially the Special Operations Forces) to Operation Enduring Freedom.

As to the other dimension of Norway’s Atlanticism – the relationship with the United States – good relations were furthered into the 21st century under President Bill Clinton. In the days after 11 September 2001, the support and commitment expressed by the Norwegian government was firm and unreserved. Norway expressed its moral and political support to the United States – ‘our primary ally’, as Defence Minister Bjørn Tore Godal put it – as well as Norway’s willingness to contribute militarily if needed.122 Norway contributed air support and ground personnel to OEF in an early phase.123

However, the international controversy over Iraq also affected the Norwegian–US relationship. According to the official position, Norway did not support or participate in the intervention in Iraq in 2003, because there was no UN Security Council mandate for the invasion. This position showed that Norway’s foreign policy tradition – where international law, multilateral cooperation and the UN’s central role in international security are seen as vital for long-term security – trumped any immediate concerns for its bilateral relations with the United States, as well as for Atlanticism. Of course, there were few direct security risks related to the decision not to participate in the Iraq operation, and that probably facilitated Norway’s position. Once a UN mandate was in place, Norway sent an engineer squadron and later also staff officers to assist in the rebuilding of post-war Iraq. Although Norway was not on the official list of US coalition partners in Iraq, the Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold, stated that Norway was ‘not neutral’.124 Norway’s contributions and this statement created confusion about the country’s position on Iraq. In his 2004 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush included Norway on the list of US coalition partners in Iraq.125

The fragile support from the Storting for Norway’s participation in post-war Iraq was dealt a serious blow by revelations that the United States had fabricated evidence of Iraq’s ability to produce WMD came to the fore in the US hearings. The negative developments on the ground in Iraq also put the whole operation into question in parts of

123 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_deploy-col.htm
the political community. The Norwegian Iraq contribution was brought to an end in late 2005, as promised by the Red/Green coalition during the election campaign. While the message that Norway did not intend to participate in the Iraq invasion in March 2003 had allegedly been received with a certain degree of understanding from President George W. Bush, Norway’s decision to terminate its troop contributions to both OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom was not. The official reason for not renewing the Norwegian troop contributions to OEF and the staff officers in Iraq was the decision to step up Norway’s military contributions to UN operations (especially in Africa) and to NATO operations, rather than to ‘coalitions of the willing’. Norway also wanted to strengthen NATO as a multilateral organization, militarily and politically. To this end, Norway would give priority to the ISAF operation, and its ‘bilateral cooperation with the United States should as a rule go through the alliance’. Norwegian government officials have stressed that Norway wishes to have good relations with the United States and that political disagreement has not altered the long-standing bilateral ‘special relationship’. However, the view that these relations were damaged has often been expressed in non-official settings. For example, that the withdrawal from the US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is the reason why Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg was never invited to the White House during the Bush presidency.

Regarding the geopolitical dimension of Atlanticism, Norway has gradually become a firm supporter of NATO enlargement. Concerns that Norway could become politically and militarily marginalized, because NATO’s focus would shift to the East and the South, were often expressed in the domestic discourse prior to 1999. Norway has supported the principle that the alliance should be open to states that qualify, and that this is security through integration. In addition, the majority of the new NATO members also support a strong US presence and interest in European security, which strengthens Atlanticism – and that is clearly in Norway’s interest.

However, it is also in Norway’s interest that NATO should have a good and workable relationship with Russia. Traditionally, the triangle

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126 Ole Berthelsen has claimed that Bush accepted Prime Minister Bondevik’s moral reservations against the invasion, because of their common Christian beliefs. Berthelsen, Ole (2005) *En frelser, en prest og en satan*, Oslo: Cappelen.


128 State Secretary Espen Barth Eide stated this in an interview with Forsvarsnett (www.mil.no) in November 2005.

of powers influencing Norwegian security has consisted of USSR/Russia, the United States and leading European states. Whereas Russia was economically and politically pacified in the 1990s, a recent shifting of power patterns has brought old and new constellations of powers to the fore again. Current global developments and especially Russia’s return as a great power give rise to the question of how Norway should relate to them. How to attract the attention of NATO allies towards Norway’s security challenges in the High North has become particularly challenging. Energy security was added to the NATO mandate only recently, at the NATO Summit in Riga in 2007. Even the assumed interest in the High North in an energy context from international actors like the EU and the United States appears somewhat exaggerated.130 Similarly, improving NATO’s relationship with Russia has de facto priority over NATO enlargement in Norwegian policy. This is the main reason – although not the official one – why Norway was among the NATO countries that did not support a MAP to Ukraine and Georgia at the ministerial meeting in December 2008. Its proximity to Russia also partly explains why Norway opposed the US plans for a missile defence in Europe in NATO. Establishing and preserving good relations between Russia and the West are simply in Norway’s national security interests.

In sum, Norway has retained its strong Atlanticist orientation, its preference for a close relationship with the United States – despite some political controversy – and its firm commitment to NATO. Norwegian security concerns have predominantly been related to marginalization, not only towards the EU but also within NATO. NATO enlargement, the use of ‘coalitions of the willing’ for specific missions and, not least, a fluid ‘multi-tier’ alliance based on an ‘alliance à la carte’ are trends that seem likely to reduce the impact of smaller NATO countries like Norway. These developments also represent a threat to NATO’s importance as the major arena for transatlantic relations and political consultations. For a non-EU country like Norway, and in view of heightened Russian military activity in the High North, that would be a regrettable development.

3.3 Denmark: From mainstream to Super Atlanticist

Denmark’s relationship with the United States and its commitment to NATO and Atlanticism has grown stronger in the years since 2000, whereas its relationship with the EU within security and defence has

remained more or less the same. Starting with the latter, the Danish opt-outs from the EDSP mean that Denmark does not take part in the drafting, implementing and financing decisions of EU policies within defence. These opt-outs from the ESDP also affect national defence policy. When the EU took over operations in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from NATO, the Danish forces had to be withdrawn. Non-participation in the ESDP also means that Denmark is not part of the Nordic battle group or the EDA. Consequently, Denmark contributes with troops only to UN and NATO operations, and to ‘coalitions of the willing’ as in Afghanistan and Iraq. To draw a comparison, Britain has contributed financing and personnel to ESDP operations since 2003, and non-EU member Norway has participated in EU-led operations, as well as in the Nordic battle group and in the EDA.

Denmark opted out of the ESDP on grounds of wanting to preserve its national autonomy. However, in a recently published report that has attracted considerable attention in Danish politics, analysts claim that the opt-out ‘is judged to limit Danish freedom of action more than protect Danish autonomy’.131 For example, even if Denmark were participating in the ESDP, the Danish Parliament (the Folketing) would have the right to decide on the country’s involvement, including the deployment of forces to an EU-led operation, and could even veto such operations. Denmark’s policy seems to be one of active participation within the limits set by the opt-outs, a strategy similar to that of Norway. For both countries, such a policy of autonomy entails that neither is entitled to veto against the further development of the military dimension of the ESDP – including the creation of a European army, should the (other) EU member-states agree on such a development.

Denmark’s influence on the civilian dimension of ESDP remains intact, so the country is able to influence the conceptual concretization of the security strategy – at least in principle. However, the ‘whole of government’ (EU) or ‘comprehensive approach’ (NATO), in which civilian and military aspects are seen as a whole, puts this influence into question, according to the 2009 DIIS report (in ch. 2.3.4). Interpreting the opt-outs in relation to specific tasks and in the ESDP military institutions (like the Military Committee and Military Staff) is becoming more and more challenging as the ESDP develops, the report argues (ch. 2.1.1).

The opt-outs also affect Denmark when acting in the capacity of EU Presidency. This position is generally seen as a valuable opportunity

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for the smaller member-states to exert influence on EU positions and policy. However, during Denmark’s EU presidency in 2002, the incoming presidency (Greece) had to step in when the EU discussed military and defence issues. The authors of the DIIS report argue that if the opt-outs – including those regarding the European Monetary Union, Union citizenship and Justice and Home Affairs – remain intact, they are likely to render the Danish EU Presidency in 2012 difficult. The main reason is that the context for the EU opt-outs has changed considerably since 1993, with extensive changes at the global European and national levels, including changes in the EU’s political agenda (the EU’s military role not least).132

With regard to Denmark’s relationship with the United States, the mainstream Atlanticism in Danish foreign policy of the 1990s (as in Britain and Poland) was replaced by Super Atlanticism after the turn of the century and especially after the events of 9/11.133 ‘Super Atlanticism’ implies that Denmark has supported even controversial US foreign policy like the Iraq war in 2003. Denmark signed the ‘letter of the eight’ and participated with troops to the Anglo-American ‘coalition of the willing’.

Denmark’s Super Atlanticism has manifested itself in considerable troop contributions to the US-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Danish soldiers have been deployed to the violent Helmand province in the South, as well as in an acceptance of military losses that could be unthinkable in the Norwegian domestic context (or in Sweden, for that matter). Given Denmark’s traditional UN ideology and the increased risk of exposing Denmark and Danish citizens to possible terrorist attacks this is surprising, according to Hans Mouritzen. The new Danish activist policy could be seen as a fundamental breach with Denmark’s passive foreign policy of the past and ‘footnote policy’ in NATO, and a demonstration of the country’s willingness and moral obligation to defend shared values together with its allies.134 As noted by the Danish foreign minister, the United States remains ‘the fundamental alliance partner […]’, whose values and global democratic goals we share, even if there from time to time can be disagreement about strategy and methods.’135 According to the min-

132 Ibid.
133 Mouritzen ‘Denmark’s Super Atlanticism’.
135 Møller, Per Stig (2008), introduction at the debate/seminar ‘Foreign Policy Challenges in the 21st Century’, DIIS, 26 June.
ister, a transatlantic split, on the other hand, may strengthen counter forces, which is not in the security interest of Denmark.

Denmark attaches great importance to the transatlantic relationship, which manifests itself in NATO on a daily basis. The commitment to NATO and the United States is also reflected in Denmark’s contribution to ISAF. As of 12 January 2009, the Danish contribution to ISAF was approximately 700 troops (as compared with 490 troops from Norway). Denmark’s primary contribution is and will continue to be a flexible battalion group under Task Force Helmand. While Denmark has suffered considerable losses in Afghanistan, the government has been firm on its commitment to ISAF. With the new Obama administration in Washington, Denmark’s Super Atlanticism may find expression through a greater push for enhanced EU–US cooperation in strategic areas, as well as extended bilateral Danish–US cooperation. Domestically, continued Super Atlanticism is likely to become less controversial among the Danish general public now than during the years of the Bush administration.

Regarding the geopolitical dimension of Atlanticism, Denmark has been a firm supporter of NATO enlargement and a ‘Europe whole and free’, including a stronger relationship with current and new partners. This is also in line with US policy on NATO enlargement. At the same time, Denmark – like Norway – is also aware of the potential marginalization risks involved in further enlargement, of both NATO and the EU. Denmark’s response to the potential consequences for national security of a multi- or non-polar international system has been less territorially focused than Norway’s. While Denmark does not share a border with Russia, it has interests in the High North because of Greenland. Denmark’s emphasis on ‘core areas and tasks’ is nevertheless far more implicit than that of its Nordic neighbour.

In sum, Super Atlanticism is expected to become less controversial in Denmark with the Obama presidency than during the Bush years. Regarding the EU, current debates in Denmark indicate that the opt-out from the CFSP/ESDP may soon be re-evaluated as part of the country’s anti-marginalization policy. All the same, NATO is likely to remain the core in Denmark’s security and defence policy.

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138 Ibid.
139 See e.g. Gade, ‘Beyond the Trans-Atlantic Relationship’.
140 Mouritzen ‘Denmark’s Super Atlanticism’.
4. Atlanticism and the new strategic concept

Indications as to the future of Atlanticism in NATO and as part of member-states’ security identities might perhaps be extracted from the early discussions on the revision of NATO’s strategic concept. NATO has issued six strategic concepts since 1946 – some the result of long and demanding processes, and others after more straightforward negotiations. The organization’s current strategic concept was adopted in 1999, with a revised concept scheduled for adoption at the NATO Summit in Lisbon in late 2010.

Strategic concepts identify potential threats to the NATO countries, and suggest how to approach and deter them militarily. There is typically a political section describing the overall strategic landscape and challenges, including the ‘Fundamental Security Tasks’; and a military section outlining the implications for the armed forces of NATO members.141 As such, the concept could be seen as a core document or working programme for NATO and its members, also establishing and reflecting the transatlantic consensus. An important function of the strategic concept is to formalize decisions and communiqués previously issued, as well as practices that have emerged since the previous revision. As noted by the new NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen,

Since the last Strategic Concept was adopted, 10 years ago, [NATO] has almost doubled in size and taken on missions and threats no one could have imagined at the time. The moment has come for the theory to catch up with the practice, and for all the members of the Alliance, old and new, to chart a common way forward. And that is what we’ll do.142

In line with the ‘Declaration of Alliance security’ of April 2009, the Secretary General has appointed an expert group of twelve people who, in consultation with the member states, will prepare the ground for the new strategic concept. The group is chaired by former US Sec-

141 For a close reading of NATO’s previous strategic concepts, see Ringsmose, Jens and Sten Rynning (2009b) ‘NATO’s næste strategiske koncept: globalt engagement eller Artikel 5?’ Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), March.
retary of State, Madeleine Albright. The process that leads to a new strategic concept will have three phases: the reflection phase, the consultation phase and the drafting and final negotiation phase. NATO is currently in the reflection phase and, hence, it is still too early to tell what the revised strategic concept will look like. Some of the discussion points raised at an early stage, before the NATO Summit in April 2009 are nevertheless likely to have implications for Atlanticism in NATO.

These early discussions indicated that NATO’s ‘near abroad’ will again become important, following what many analysts see as the return of geopolitics and great-power games. The more forward Russian foreign policy – as demonstrated in the conflict with Georgia, the sharp increase of regular Russian naval and air activity in the High North and the heavy political pressure on Ukraine and Belarus in relation to the conflict over Russian gas prices – indicates a return to geopolitics. This is potentially bad news for small and medium-sized states like Norway and Denmark. In a constitutional order based on the rule of law and binding institutions, small states may appeal to international norms, rules and practices, should they become subject to political and/or military pressure from other states. International organizations play an important role in such a system by restricting states’ legitimate use of power and, hence, their room for manoeuvre. Although imposing sanctions on countries that do not respect the rules of the system may be difficult, the political costs paid by an aggressor through shaming and other reputational mechanisms may at least encourage norm compliance. Ad hoc diplomatic arrangements between great powers, informal institutions like the 19th century Concert of Europe, a hegemonic order or geopolitics on the other hand, generally reduce the political space for small states. The Russian–Georgian

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143 NATO (2009) ‘Declaration on Alliance Security’, Strasbourg/Kehl, 4 April. Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg was among those heads of states at the Kehl/Strasbourg NATO Summit who stressed the role of NATO ambassadors and, hence, all NATO members, in the work on the strategic concept.

144 To engage the wider public and make the process as inclusive as possible NATO has created a discussion forum on its homepage where people can offer their opinions on the future strategic concept. See http://natostratcon.info/forum/.


conflict could at least be seen as an illustration of the geopolitical view that great powers live by different rules than other states and have ‘spheres of influence’.

To a large degree, the preliminary debate on NATO’s strategic concept reflects the changes in the international political system where interstate conflicts have returned to the agenda. This is undoubtedly putting NATO’s operational and political capabilities to new tests. With regard to tasks and missions, some have argued for a revised strategic concept that can ensure a better balance between NATO’s ends and means, calling for ‘a scaling back of NATO ambitions in line with its political will and military capability’. Briefly, this line of thought is built on two basic premises. First, as a military alliance, there are clear limits to what NATO can and should do; consequently, NATO should try to integrate its actions with those of (other) international actors. Second, outside NATO, the alliance is by many seen as the prolonged arm of ‘the West’ and of a Western security agenda. As pointed out by Mats Berdal and David Ucko, some states also view NATO as an instrument of US foreign (and hegemonic) policies. To counter such attitudes, they argue, NATO should focus more on stabilization and wider peacekeeping operations in the future. This would include the provision, assistance and coordination of capacities such as headquarters in the field, strategic lift capacity, logistics support and other specialized units, security sector reform and, finally, rapid reaction forces.

Views differ within NATO between those who want the alliance to continue to focus on its global role, and, on the other hand, those who want NATO to ‘come back to Europe’ or at least to its ‘core areas and tasks’. These differences are also reflected in the preliminary debates about the new strategic concept in Britain, Norway and Denmark.

4.1 British priorities for the new strategic concept

As one of the most influential member states in NATO, politically and militarily, Britain’s viewpoints must be expected to weigh heavy in discussions over the new strategic concept. The British point of departure has been that the timing is right for a new or revised strategic concept, in order to incorporate lessons learned and prepare NATO for new threats and challenges. Britain’s principal position has been that NATO’s global role should be at the centre of the new strategic con-

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148 Ibid.
cept, and that this should be seen as an extension of or supplement to Article 5 rather than a departure from it.\textsuperscript{150} According to former Defence Secretary, John Hutton, Britain sees the antagonism between NATO’s core tasks and areas as defined in Article 5, and its new global role, as a constructed one:

Article 5 remains at the core of the Alliance’s purpose. The notion that providing security outside NATO’s boundaries somehow competes with or detracts from our responsibilities in this respect is misguided.\textsuperscript{151}

Foreign Secretary Miliband has made a similar observation, noting that NATO and the other Europe-based security organizations must be ready to address both ‘traditional concerns’ and ‘new global fears’. While Article 5 was initially established to secure the territorial borders of NATO’s member-states, he argues, today’s security environment ‘demands a more expeditionary and more comprehensive approach’.\textsuperscript{152} This mindset was most likely a key reason why Britain initially responded somewhat unenthusiastically to a Norwegian non-paper that proposed a return to NATO’s core tasks and areas (see next section).\textsuperscript{153} At the informal meeting of NATO defence ministers in Krakow in February 2009, however, Britain seemingly made a turnaround on this matter,\textsuperscript{154} signalling a more active approach to the issue of NATO’s core areas and tasks. At the meeting, Defence Secretary Hutton presented a proposal for the establishment of a NATO rapid reaction force of 3,000 troops reserved for the defence of ‘NATO territory’. The idea would be to ‘underpin NATO’s Article 5 commitment to the mutual defence of any member state’. It is noteworthy; however, that the rationale offered for establishing such a permanent NATO ‘homeland security force’ was that it could resolve differences over the planned NATO Response Force. Briefly put: some member-states’ concerns over national defence issues have prohibited them from committing troops to NATO operations, especially in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{155} In view of this, the latest British suggestion can be seen as a compromise, or way of accommodating member-states on both sides in the process of revising of NATO’s strategic concept.

\textsuperscript{150} Interviews at NATO HQ, Brussels 27-28 October 2008.
\textsuperscript{151} Hutton ‘Nato at 60: Towards a New Strategic Concept’.
\textsuperscript{152} Miliband ‘Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance: Addressing Insecurity in 21st Century Europe’.
\textsuperscript{153} Interviews at the NATO HQ Brussels 27-28 October 2008.
4.2 Norwegian priorities for the new strategic concept

The changes in global power patterns – especially with a more self-confident and ambitious Russia – have potential security implications for Norway. The threat of invasion may lie in the past, but a possible scenario, according to Norwegian authorities, could be Russian political and military pressure on Norway to enforce a change of its policy positions or give in to Russian demands. Consequently, it is argued, Norway should be able to establish a military threshold that would raise the costs of using military power and reduce the room to manoeuvre for a potential aggressor. In view of increased Russian military exercises and tests in the region, although these have hardly been directed against the small Nordic neighbour, the Norwegian defence minister has stressed NATO’s importance to Norway: ‘(…) we see that the High North will still be of great strategic importance. This underlines NATO’s continued relevance for stability in the North.’

In the case of a bilateral dispute between Russia and Norway, the role of established security structures such as NATO and bilateral partnerships is not obvious, however. As noted above, for most other states than Russia, the region has remained either marginal or peripheral. A major violent conflict in the region invoking NATO’s Article 5 is unlikely for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, NATO has no formal role in conflicts or incidents over territorial claims in disputed areas where sovereignty has not been permanently established according to international law. Should a situation involving a NATO ally occur in the disputed areas of the High North, NATO involvement is therefore questionable. NATO’s role as a forum for transatlantic political consultations is nevertheless vital to Norway in the case of such an incident. However, the fact that NATO is being challenged in this capacity by the EU and by closer bilateral cooperation between the EU and the US, to mention two important challenges, adds to the problem.

158 In 2007, Norway observed 88 Russian planes off the coast of Norway, both large formations of fighter planes and strategic bombers, while the figure for 2006 had been 14.
These concerns constituted the immediate backdrop for Norway’s preliminary position on NATO’s new strategic concept. In a ‘non-paper’ sent to all NATO delegations Norway proposed that NATO should focus more on its ‘core areas and tasks’, like the security challenges already evident in NATO’s core territory. NATO should expand its ‘situational awareness’ and ‘geographical knowledge’ about the regions in NATO’s periphery on a daily basis. According to the Norwegian view, NATO has a weak profile on alliance territory and on its periphery. A stronger focus on NATO territory and the ‘near abroad’ would also heighten the relevance and legitimacy of NATO in public opinion, the Norwegian government has maintained.

This Norwegian non-paper, also referred to as the ‘near abroad initiative’, was presented as being relevant beyond the High North, including in areas like the Black Sea region and the Caspian Sea region. However, the initiative was initially supported by countries who share the challenges facing Norway in transforming static armed forces to fit with ‘out-of-area’ operations, like Greece and Turkey (and Poland). The Norwegian initiative was also interpreted as supporting a return to Article 5 operations in NATO, since it was presented immediately after the Russian–Georgian conflict, although that had not been foreseen by the government.161 Later, such key NATO countries as Britain, Denmark, Germany and the United States also expressed their support for the Norwegian initiative.162 The Norwegian ‘near abroad initiative’ (non-paper) also speaks to those who argue that NATO should ‘come home to Europe’ and reclaim its role as a Euro-Atlantic security organization, rather than cementing its role as an organization for global security. The negative developments and challenges in Afghanistan may make such a view more attractive to NATO countries that are suffering casualties in the ISAF operation. The Norwegian government has continuously underlined, however, that it fully supports NATO’s out-of-area or international operations, and that the focus of the non-paper is on how to find the right balance between engagements ‘at home’ and ‘abroad’. Hence, it is not a question of either/or. The degree to which the Norwegian ‘near broad initiative’ manages to impact upon the new strategic concept remains to be seen.

4.3 Danish priorities for the new strategic concept

While Norway was eager to promote the issue of national defence through security in NATO’s ‘near abroad’ on the alliance’s agenda in the preliminary discussions about the strategic concept, Denmark

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seems to have had less at stake regarding territorial security, as noted above.

Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen stood shoulder to shoulder with the United States throughout the presidency of George W. Bush, including the crisis over Iraq. There is little reason to believe that Denmark will choose a different strategy vis-à-vis the United States under the present administration. It is the American position that security is indivisible, meaning that security at home and security abroad are tightly connected.\textsuperscript{163} And this position is also NATO’s position. In his new capacity as NATO Secretary General, Fogh Rasmussen seems to promote the Danish view that NATO should strengthen its role globally. Hence, NATO should continue to transform the military capacities of its allies: ‘It is thought-provoking that 70 per cent of the armed forces in Europe are stationary. That is a form of inflexibility and static military, which does not suit our time’.\textsuperscript{164} As former PM, Fogh Rasmussen has often met with and still has access to the heads of state and government in the NATO countries to a degree unprecedented among former Secretaries General. He would probably also be able to draw on the goodwill he built up vis-à-vis the United States in earlier negotiations about the strategic concept. These personal experiences could also prove useful for Danish positions in NATO, insofar as Danish alliance policy continues along the policy lines carved out by Fogh Rasmussen.

\textsuperscript{163} This position was stressed by US ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, at a seminar in Oslo on 17 August 2009.

5. Conclusion: Atlanticism revisited, revived or replaced?

‘Atlanticism’ as a security identity and orientation must be seen in light of structural conditions, central events and the policies of specific governments and individual politicians. In recent years, the dynamics of the transatlantic security architecture, including the role of Atlanticism, has been challenged both from the outside and from within. This report has argued that, despite these major alterations in the transatlantic security landscape, Atlanticism has survived as a security identity on the European political arena and within NATO.

The security policies and identities of three long-term NATO members examined here – Britain, Norway and Denmark – remain solidly anchored in an Atlanticist tradition. From 1945 and throughout the Cold War, the Atlanticism of these countries was characterized by their geographical location bordering the Atlantic Ocean, their close bonds with the United States and their cautious approaches to the process of European integration. Since the end of the Cold War, the dynamics of the transatlantic security architecture and the role of Atlanticism have been challenged both by external and internal developments. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, geopolitics and territorial defence were seen as being of less immediate concern to Europe. This, in turn, made Atlanticism less topical and less relevant as part of a security strategy. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, processes and events such as NATO’s transformation and ‘out-of-area’ operations, the EU’s emergence as a security actor, EU and NATO enlargement, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the transatlantic rift over Iraq further changed the foundations of Atlanticism in Europe.

Despite these developments, Atlanticism has remained a key pillar of British, Norwegian and Danish security identities, as can be seen both in discourse and in concrete practices. In the face of growing pressures at home and on the European arena, Britain has remained a steady Atlanticist under the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Similarly, following a tensioning of relations with the United States under the years of the George W. Bush administration, Norway now appears as a steady and even revitalized Atlanticist within NATO. Finally, with its firm support to the United States over a controversial issue like Iraq, Denmark seems to have strengthened its Atlanticist identity further, going from ‘mainstream’ to ‘super’ Atlanticist.
The continued existence of Atlanticism could be seen as indication that structures like geography, regional power constellations or geopolitics and history, including long-term bonds with the United States, play a major role in shaping and upholding national security identities. On the other hand, it is also worth noting that the contents of Atlanticism have been somewhat modified recently, and that geographical location, historical bonds with the United States and Euro-scepticism are less decisive indicators of Atlanticism than previously. Instead, Atlanticism seems increasingly characterized by de facto readiness and ability to work together with the United States, and to commit troops and equipment to US-led and NATO-led operations. At the time of writing, all three countries studied here have continued to provide solid troop contributions to NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, ISAF, as they have done from the beginning. With the shift in the White House from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, there should be even more reason to expect a continued Atlanticist orientation for the three countries, anchored in strong bilateral relationships with the United States. Obama, it has been argued, stands for ‘a more humane, balanced, multilateral, consultative and diplomatic approach to foreign policy’ than his predecessor. The new Washington administration also hold views that coincide more with those of the EU and individual European states on foreign policy issues where the former administration disagreed – including climate change, multilateral cooperation and missile defence in Europe. This change of atmosphere is already reported to have eased cooperation within NATO and revitalized some of the lost energy of the transatlantic relationship, thereby presumably also strengthening the basis for Atlanticism in Europe.

Parallel to this, new global power patterns and the renewed focus on great-power politics – including the growing tensions between Russia and the West – are factors that could reinforce Atlanticism ‘old style’ in Europe and NATO. Interestingly, ongoing discussions over NATO’s New Strategic Concept indicate a return to geopolitics as well as to the Alliance’s ‘core tasks and areas’. However, there are also indications of somewhat divergent views among Atlanticist states regarding NATO’s future role, if not in content then at least in framing. While Norway has actively advocated that NATO should focus more on its core tasks and areas, including its ‘near abroad’, Britain’s main focus has been on developing NATO’s potential to play a global role, seeing this as an extension of its Article 5 tasks. The same goes for preliminary Danish discussions on the strategic concept, where the focus on NATO’s defence commitment has been more implicit.

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6. Summary of main findings

While specific policy implications – for Norway as well as for the other country cases – may be difficult to pinpoint at present, our main findings can be summed up as follows:

Atlanticism prevails, despite the challenges from an emerging EU security actor (especially the ESDP) and from an enlarged Euro-Atlantic security community. While the latter has created a more heterogeneous NATO, several of the new NATO members also seem to contribute to a strengthening of Atlanticism. Keeping Atlanticism alive is also important for maintaining NATO as the primary arena for transatlantic relations and consultations.

The election of Barack Obama as US president has contributed to restoring transatlantic dialogue and cooperation, thus strengthening the basis for Atlanticism in NATO. It has also, however, improved the possibilities for strengthening bilateral US–EU relations, which might act to remove security-related issues (especially wider security issues) from the NATO context. This could prove particularly challenging for non-EU states like Norway.

The ‘near abroad’ has returned to NATO’s core agenda after more than a decade of absence. Growing tensions between Russia and the West, as well as new patterns of global power, have heightened the relevance of geopolitics for NATO and for individual member-states. These concerns, brought to NATO’s agenda in Norway’s ‘near abroad initiative’, are important in the on-going revision of NATO’s strategic concept.

The alleged contradiction between NATO’s core tasks and areas as defined in Article 5, and its new global role, seems to be one of framing and rhetoric more than content. Still, Norway will have to work hard to keep alive NATO’s new attention to ‘core areas and tasks’ in the strategic concept negotiations.

The appointment of former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as new Secretary General in NATO may help to strengthen Atlanticism and the transatlantic relationship, given his government’s Super Atlanticist orientation over the past eight years.

For Britain, a question is whether NATO should remain its preferred forum for international transatlantic security and defence cooperation,
or whether *ad hoc* bilateral and multilateral constellations will increasingly be considered acceptable alternatives. This issue is closely linked to developments in Britain’s ‘special’ bilateral relationship with the United States, not least in view of the change of leadership in Washington and the upcoming British elections.

Norway’s biggest challenge in the NATO context will be to attract the allies’ attention to what Norway considers as alliance challenges in the Northern region (the High North). The Norwegian authorities might also want to consider whether a new focus on NATO regions like the High North, the Black Sea region and the Mediterranean might have a negative aspect as well. One side-effect of such regionalization of security in NATO might be a strengthening of various ‘clusters’ of countries within the alliance, which could make coalition and consensus building even more demanding than today.

With Barack Obama in the White House, transatlantic relations and Atlanticism in general are likely to become ‘normalized’ within the Norwegian general public and in the political community. This should serve to facilitate the work done by the Norwegian government in the NATO context.