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Norwegian Sport for Development and Peace:
Donor discourse and local practice

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In 2005 I decided to end my professional football career in preference for academic studies. Even though people have always told me that I quit too early, I have never regretted my decision. This is primarily due to my encounter with Andreas Selliaas, who hired me in 2008 as a research assistant on the research project Sport and reconciliation at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. I’m ever grateful for your guidance, personal support, our academic discussions and friendship throughout these years. You have inspired me to find a path in life – an opportunity to combine my passion for and experience in sport with my interest in academic research.

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discussions on SDP’s past, its current development and future possibilities. I hope it will be possible for us to collaborate on new research projects in the future.

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Anders Hasselgård
Oppsummering

Idrett som virkemiddel i utviklings- og fredsarbeid har det siste tiåret vært et voksende felt i norsk og internasjonal bistand. Idrettsbistand beskrives i dag som en egen gruppe av organisasjoner som har blitt en integrert del av den norske og internasjonale bistandssektoren. Denne gruppen omtales ofte som «the Sport for Development and Peace» (SDP) bevegelsen, og stadig nye aktører har blitt involvert. Sammen med Australia, Canada, Sveits, Nederland og Storbritannia har Norge vært en av de fremste aktørene innenfor SDP-feltet.


Avhandlingens andre del undersøker i hvilken grad de "norske" forestillingene representeres og artikuleres der norske finansierte SDP-prosjekter utspiller seg i praksis – i lokalsamfunn i mottakerlandene. Norges idrettsforbunds (NIF) utviklingsegasjement i Zimbabwe blir brukt som case. Hva skjer i møtet mellom norske og lokale ideer og verdier, og dersom forståelsen av idrett som et verktøy for utvikling er forskjellig? Avhandlingen diskuterer forholdet mellom norske givere og mottakere av norsk SDP.

Det empiriske materialet til avhandlingens første del er hentet fra settinger, miljøer og prosesser der norsk SDP utspiller seg, i Norge. Kildetilfanget baserer seg først og fremst på åpne og offentlig tilgjengelige dokumenter (f.eks. prosjektplans, strategidokumenter, aktørens tilsagnsbrev ved tildelt offentlig finansiel støtte). Kildetilfanget i avhandlings andre del baserer seg først og fremst på feltarbeid og intervjuer av mennesker som er involvert i prosjektene, i mottakerlandene (nasjonale/lokale myndigheter, ansatte, frivillige og deltakerne i prosjektene).

Avhandlingen viser at aktørene i norsk SDP representerer ulik, og i mange tilfeller konkurrende, forståelse av idrett som et virkemiddel i utviklings- og fredsarbeid. Avhandlingen viser også hvordan aktørene har blitt en integrert del av den norske bistandens institusjonelle organisering, men også hvordan dette skaper maktrelasjoner mellom givere og mottakere av norsk SDP. Studiet av NIFs formelle SDP-diskurs (som presentert i prosjektdokumenter) viser at norske idrettsverdier, samt idrettens historiske rolle i norsk samfunnsutvikling, former organisasjonens forståelse av idrett og utvikling.

Mange forskere har beskrevet SDP som en ny form for kolonialisme. Dominerende vestlige ideer, verdier og forståelse av idrett og utvikling blir overført til fattige land gjennom SDP-prosjekter på en slik måte at det undergraver mottakerens egen forståelse og egne behov.
Avhandlingen konkluderer med at dette ikke er entydig og at bildet må nyanseres. Gjennom en empirisk studie av aktører som er involvert i implementeringen av et prosjekt i Zimbabwe vises det hvordan NIFs ideer, verdier og forståelser blir modifisert og transformert på en slik måte at det passer med lokal forståelse, behov og ønsker. Dette skaper imidlertid et avvik mellom norske intensjoner (beskrevet i NIFs policy modell) og faktisk utfall av prosjektet. Dette paradokset reiser et viktig spørsmål: er prosjektet en suksess eller fiasko? Avhandlingen konkluderer med at den transnasjonale giver-mottaker relasjonen i norsk SDP må forstås som et komplekst sosialt system hvor forhandlinger mellom ulike agendae og interesser foregår på ulike nivå, fra policy-design til implementering.
Summary

Sport as a method for development and peace has been a growing field in international and Norwegian development aid over the past decade. NGOs within the field form part of what has come to be defined as the “Sport for Development and Peace” (SDP) movement, with an ever-growing number of new actors. These NGOs have become an integrated part of the international development aid sector. Further, Norway has been one of the leading actors in the field of SDP, along with Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the UK.

The topic of this thesis is the Norwegian commitment to SDP. The thesis examines this commitment from the early 1990s to the present day. The empirical focus is directed towards the two levels on which the Norwegian SDP apparatus exists: (a) the national donor level in Norway and (b) the local level on which Norwegian projects are implemented in practice. The first part of the thesis identifies the diversity of conceptions of SDP articulated at the national donor level and analyses the ideas, values and traditions these conceptions are built upon (e.g. the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF), the Norwegian Football Association, Judo for Peace, Right to Play Norway, Karanba, and Mission Alliance).

The second part examines the extent to which the “Norwegian” conceptions on SDP are represented and articulated where Norwegian-financed projects are being implemented in practice – in the local communities of recipient countries. NIF’s commitment to development in Zimbabwe is presented as a case. What happens when Norwegian and local ideas and values intersect, and are there different perceptions on the use of sport as a method for development? Hence, the thesis looks at the relationship between Norwegian donors and the recipients of Norwegian SDP.

The empirical evidence in the first part has been obtained from settings, environments and processes in Norway. The data collection is primarily based on open and publicly accessible documents (e.g. project plans, strategy documents, and actors’ letters of commitment granting financial support). The data collection for the second part is primarily based on field work and interviews with people involved in the projects, in recipient countries (national and local authorities, employees, volunteers and participants in the projects).

The thesis shows that the NGOs represent different, and in many cases conflicting conceptions of SDP. It also illustrates the manner in which SDP organisations have become an integral part of the institutional arrangement of Norwegian development aid, as well as the manner in which this creates power relations between the donors and the recipients. A study of NIF’s formal SDP discourse (as expressed in project documents) indicates that Norwegian sport values, and the historical role of sport in the development of Norwegian society, both shape how the organisation design their SDP policy model.

Many researchers have described SDP is a new form of colonialism. From this vantage point, dominating Western ideas, values and understanding of sport and development are transferred to impoverished countries through SDP projects, undermining the recipients’ own understanding and needs.
The thesis concludes that this issue is somewhat ambiguous, and that a more nuanced understanding is needed. Through an empirical study of actors involved in the implementation of a project in Zimbabwe, we can see how NIF’s conceptions become modified and transformed in such a way that they adapt with local needs and wishes. However, this creates a discrepancy between Norwegian intentions (described in NIF’s policy model) and actual outcomes. An important question remains: Should this be understood as a success or failure?

The thesis concludes that Norwegian SDP must be viewed as a complex social system. The transnational donor-recipient relationship needs to be understood as a knowledge encounter, where different world views intersect and are negotiated, from policy design to implementation.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FIFA  Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GO   Governmental organisation
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IOC  International Olympic Committee
KRIK Christian sport contact
MDG  Millennium Development Goals
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NFF  Football Association of Norway
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
NIF  Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports
Norad Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SAP  Structural adjustment programs
SDP  Sport for Development and Peace
SRC  Sports and Recreation Commission
UN   United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations’ Children’s Fund
UNOSDP UN Office on Sport for Development and Peace
WB   World Bank
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Part I

1.0 Introduction

Over the course of the last 10 years, sport as a method for development and peace work has been a growing phenomenon within the field of international development aid and peace. Sport for Development and Peace (SDP), which is the international term for the phenomenon, is nowadays apprehended as a movement in its own right within the international development sector. Norway has been one of the foremost actors in the international SDP field. Norway’s contact with the world and other cultures through sport therefore extends beyond its participation in the international sports scene. Since the early 1980s, Norwegians have travelled to Africa, Asia and South America, using sport as a tool in their desire to help people affected by emergencies, conflicts and poverty. This has forged transnational relations between the Norwegian SDP apparatus and the target groups for development intervention in partner countries. However, Norwegian involvement through sport still holds a marginal position in the Norwegian development aid debate. The academic literature on Norwegian development and peace work has also overlooked the role of sport. This thesis aims to contribute to the enhancement of knowledge and understanding of the Norwegian SDP field. The partner relationship between donors and recipients of Norwegian SDP is particularly emphasised.

1.1 Topic, research question and structure of the thesis

This thesis concerns the Norwegian SDP commitment from the 1990s to the present day. The empirical focus is directed towards the two levels on which the Norwegian SDP apparatus exists: (a) the national donor level in Norway and (b) the local level on which Norwegian-funded projects are implemented in practice.

In the first part of the research, in addressing the national level, I am interested in understanding Norwegian actors (authorities, sports organisations, aid agencies) as SDP donors. Through a discourse analysis of the actors’ policy models and strategies, I study (a) the ideas, values and traditions that the actors’ understanding of sport, development and peace are built upon and (b) why some strategies have been accepted and integrated into the Norwegian development apparatus while others have not. The empirical research on the national donor level also includes a case study of the policy discourse of the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF) during the 1990s.
Inspired by post-development theory’s discursive approach to development aid, power effects created between Norway as a donor of SDP and recipients of this development aid are discussed. Post-development scholars describe development as a hegemonic and homogenising discourse effecting development institutions (policy design) and development practice (project workers). The discourse-analytical approach to the study of development has been criticised for reducing reality to concepts and ideas about the reality and for omitting actors in the analyses. In the second phase of the research process, I respond to this critique by shifting the analytical focus to the local practical level of Norwegian-funded SDP projects. Through a combination of discourse and actor-oriented analysis, concrete efforts to promote development through a Norwegian-funded SDP project in Zimbabwe are discussed. Emphasis is placed on studying the encounter between the Norwegian SDP discourse and local knowledge and understanding as articulated by various development practitioners in settings in which projects are implemented in practice and where different world views intersect. The research question for this thesis is:

What conceptions of SDP do we find within the Norwegian development apparatus post-1990, and to what extent are these represented and articulated in current Norwegian-funded projects at both the donor and the recipient level?

Most studies begin with the perspective of SDP as a new and growing international phenomenon and policy field within international development aid as a result of the United Nation’s (UN) and other international development agencies’ legitimisation and policy agenda in the area post-2000. “The international SDP movement” has therefore become a blanket term for actors that use sport in efforts for development and peace. There is currently a dearth of studies that attempt to understand SDP from a national donor level and a local recipient level. In addition, there is a lack of SDP studies based on research, not to mention debates within the academic field of development studies. Two overarching objectives for the thesis are therefore (a) to contribute to a better understanding of the complex context in which Norwegian SDP operates, both in Norway and in local communities in partner countries in the Global South, and (b) to contribute to incorporating the academic discipline “development studies”¹ into SDP research, whilst simultaneously opening up the field of SDP to development scholars.

¹ Development studies are the study of change in developing countries. They deal with international development cooperation from a social science perspective and usually involve a collection of primary data and
The thesis is comprised of two parts. The first part consists of six chapters that together constitute the research framework of the thesis. SDP is still for many an unknown field of development aid. Therefore, emphasis is placed on presenting SDP in an international, national and local context. This is followed by an overview of the sport science literature on SDP. After this, the discourse-agency debate within development studies is presented, along with a presentation of the position of the thesis therein. This is followed by a thorough description of the research processes and the methods used. The first part concludes with a summary and discussion of the findings presented in the articles, followed by a discussion on the implications of the thesis for the field of practice and suggestions for future research. Part two consists of the four individual articles that form the basis for the thesis.

1.2 Abstracts of the four articles

**Article I:** The article is focused on how Norwegian SDP to the Global South has developed within the Norwegian development aid system. It explores the contemporary heterogeneity of Norwegian actors (governmental and non-governmental development agencies, SDP organisations, sport federations) on the national development aid scene and their different conceptual understandings of SDP as articulated in policy strategies and plans (Sport First, Development Through Sport, Development Through Talent Identification, Development First, Mega Sport Events). The article discusses how the different strategies can be understood in the context of distinctive national characteristics and traditions.

**Article II:** Drawing on what can be defined as the first wave of post-development debate, this article identifies the conceptual ideas upon which NIF’s SDP engagement in Zimbabwe is based (identified in Article I). The article identifies how these ideas produce NIF’s SDP reality, give meaning to its SDP engagement and set fundamental conditions when it develops its official SDP intervention models (as articulated through project plans and implementation strategies). Further, this is discussed by asking which power effects arise from the discourse formation produced by NIF throughout the project.

**Article III:** The article draws on what can be termed the second wave of post-development debate. In this article, the analytical focus is moved from NIF’s formal discourses on SDP to local practices and local realities on the recipient side in Zimbabwe. The field studies in different cultural settings (Mikkelsen, 2005). Development Studies have previously been defined as a multidisciplinary branch of the social sciences, grounded on academic disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, political science, economics and history. Today, many consider development studies to be an academic discipline with its own interdisciplinary debate, and theoretical and methodological discussions.
interplay between discourse and agency in the Community Sport Development Programme (CSDP) is discussed by asking how official discourses in the project, influenced by Norwegian donors, are interpreted and given meaning by the recipients in the social context in which the project is implemented.

**Article IV:** This article focuses on the trend of using Mega Sport Events as a catalyst for development and peace (identified in Article I). The aim of the study is to explore Norwegian human rights organisations’ understanding of the Olympic Games as an arena for human rights activism and how “Olympic activism” provides meaning to the organizations’ work.

**2.0 Contextualising “Sport for Development and Peace”**

Over the last 10 years, the field of SDP has become an integrated part of the international development aid architecture, which is the structure of development agencies, institutions and systems that govern the delivery and management of aid (transfer of finance resources and expertise) from donors in the Global North to low-income recipient countries and local communities in the Global South. Today, this architecture has become increasingly complex and fragmented, consisting of different actors such as multilateral institutions (such as the UN and the World Bank, business companies etc.), national donor governments, civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Thus, it could be argued that the systems for supplying development assistance need to be understood and analysed from three interconnected levels that link the transnational donor-recipient relationship: an international level, a national donor country level, and a local level in recipient countries. After a short presentation of the historical relationship between sport and development/peace, this chapter contextualises SDP within these levels. This is also used as a starting point from which the literature on SDP is discussed.

**2.1 The historical context**

There is currently strong support for the use of sport as a tool in development and peace work, in the form of both social and personal development. However, this stance has not developed in a vacuum. The connection between sport and peace is dated by some scholars back to the first Olympic Games in Athens in 776 BC, during which a sacred truce was instituted between

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2 Emphasis will be put on the international level, as the article’s main focus is the national donor level and local recipient level.
the constantly warring Greek city-states (Loland & Selliaas, 2009). The modern Olympic Games are often tied to the international peace movement, which experienced a surge at the end of the 1800s, and the current Olympic Charter is based on the idea that sports and the international sports movement shall serve to develop a peaceful society. Kidd (2008) claims that the understanding of social and personal development through sport has roots that go as far back as the various trends and movements, such as “Rational Recreation”, a trend among the middle- and working-classes of England at the end of the 1800s, the playground movement early in the 1900s, and the workers sports movement, which grew substantially in the interwar period (p. 371). Others claim that international social development through sport in a development context can be traced back to the colonial era, when sport was actively used as a part of a civilising project in the colonised countries for its disciplining nature (Holt 1989; Mangan 1998). This was expressed, among other avenues, through the colonial masters’ introduction of the concept of muscular Christianity. The concept, developed within the Britain boarding school system, drew a connection between physical fitness, the development of Christian morality and the building of “manly” character. Colonial rulers committed to this ideology thus “viewed sport as a vehicle through which they could acculturate the uneducated, uncivilised subaltern to the values and principles of the dominant culture” (Jeanes, 2013, p. 128; see also Mangan, 1987). Further, sport was used as a tool to teach indigenous people about “hygiene, cleanliness and self-control” (Meier & Saavedra, 2009, p.1160).

International institutions such as the League of Nations (the predecessor to the United Nations) and international sports organisations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) exhibited an early interest in social development through sport. For instance, the League of Nations’ International Labour Organisation and the IOC entered into an agreement in 1922. Following the Second World War, at the start of the period of decolonisation and the beginning of the Cold War, sport was systematically used by the great powers in both the East and the West as a political and ideological propaganda tool in relation to the developing countries (Hazan, 1987; Riordan, 1991). As the colonies were politically unstable and thus vulnerable to influence, both the United States and the Soviet Union viewed sport as an important factor in establishing cross-border contact and acquiring partners. The number of development projects using sport increased during the 1980s. But even though the apparent apolitical role of sport was used as a pretext, the connection between sport and politics was

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3 See Bailey (1978) and Holt (1989) for further reading on these trends.
obvious, and the propaganda was still characterised by an attempt to spread both politics and ideology (Riordan, 1991). The political propaganda and power struggle between East and West eventually also manifested in the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) development aid programme, Olympic Solidarity, which distributed financial and technical assistance to national Olympic committees in developing countries (Henry & Al Tauqi, 2008). The early use of sport as development aid must be characterised as elite-oriented, with the objective of developing elite athletes in the developing countries, which were in turn to benefit these countries. The technical instruments were coach and athlete exchanges, fellowships and material assistance, such as the construction of sports facilities for elite athletes (Houlihan, 1994).

2.2 The international context

Since the turn of the millennium, there has been growing international interest in integrating sport as a method in international development and peace work and policy development (Read & Bingham, 2009). For example, this was expressed during the Olympic Aid Roundtable Forum in Salt Lake City in 2002, at which the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued for the integration of sport into mainstream development policies:

“Sport can play a role in improving the lives of individuals, not only individuals, I might add, but whole communities. I am convinced that the time is right to build on that understanding, to encourage governments, development agencies and communities to think how sport can be included more systematically in plans to help children, particularly those living in the midst of poverty, disease and conflict” (cited in Coalter, 2007, p.68).

In 2003, the General Assembly of the UN adopted Resolution 58/5 to acknowledge its commitment to using sport as a tool to promote education, health, development and peace and to include sport and physical education to contribute to achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals. This commitment formed the basis for the continued promotion and institutionalisation of SDP in international development-oriented organs, such as the UN system. It has materialised in several resolutions4 and policy documents,5 as well as being

4 UN (n.d): “Annually between 2003-2007 and bi-annually since 2008, UN Member States have unanimously adopted a series of resolutions all entitled "Sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace", recognizing the potential of sport to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and noting the potential that sport has to contribute to the well-being of societies”.

5 Such as “Sport for development and peace: mainstreaming a versatile instrument” (2012); “Sport for development and peace: strengthening the partnerships” (2010); “Sport for development and peace: building on the foundations” (2008); “Harnessing the Power of Sport for Development and Peace: Recommendations
manifest both in the UN declaration that 2005 be its *International Year of Sport and International Development*, and in the establishment of the *UN Office on Sport for Development and Peace* (UNOSDP). The latest addition to this came in 2013, when the UN General Assembly proclaimed the 6th April as the *International Day of Sports and Physical Activity*.

Explanations for the rapidly growing interest in SDP and its legitimisation in international development agencies, such as the UN and the World Bank, are many and complex. However, it is possible to identify two main factors. Firstly, there has been a shift in general perspectives on development aid from a one-sided emphasis on economic development in the 1980s and 1990s to a greater emphasis on social and personal development at the turn of the millennium. This shift towards human-centred development policy objectives grew out of a general critique of lacklustre results in international development aid after the Second World War, and yielded concrete outcomes in the Human Development Report and Human Development Index, the UN’s Millennium Development Goals\(^d\) and the UN’s Global Compact. This contributed to new actors, institutions, strategies and methods entering the field of development, and also sport (Hayhurst, 2009; Levermore 2009). Many of the new human-centred development objectives could be linked to topics that during the 1990s had already garnered increasing attention in sports policy and research in the Global North, where the social significance of sport had been ascribed ever-growing emphasis (Coalter, 2010; Kidd, 2008). For instance, it was claimed that sport could contribute to strengthening education, improving community safety and social cohesion, helping girls and youth at risk, and addressing issues of public health (Kidd, 2008). These Northern functional claims about the social and transformative qualities of sport have been adopted by international development institution and thus characterises the SDP rhetoric at the international level (Coalter, 2010; Giulianotti, 2004).

The other explanation is oriented more towards the growing focus on human rights and a rights-based approach in the international development discourse during the same period. A rights-based approach to development entails that the framework for the process leading to human development shall be based on international human rights. This shift appealed to sports because the right to sport is recognised either implicitly or expressly in the

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\(^d\) These goals represented a new strategic approach to tackling the issues of development by focusing on ‘people-centered’ objectives and ‘social inclusion’. 

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, UNDHR), the UNESCO International Charter on Physical Education and Sport (1978, ICPES), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979, CEDAW), the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990, CRC) and the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006, RPD). Much of the SDP movement’s current legitimacy can therefore be found in these documents (Coalter, 2010; Darnell, 2012). However, there are two dimensions to sport and human rights within the SDP sector: (a) Sport as a human right, (b) Sport as a tool to promote human rights. The first dimension emphasises that access to, and opportunities for, activity through sport is a right in and of itself. This right must therefore be manifested and protected for marginalised groups and persons in the South. The other dimension emphasises sport “as a tool for the realization of human rights, primarily through the mobilization of funds, the development of infrastructure and as an entry point and catalyst for education, health promotion and youth development” (Darnell, 2012, p. 36-37). In this category, we also find initiatives in which the sports movement has engaged itself in general human rights questions. This is often exemplified by the boycott of the South African sport federations and national teams as a protest against the apartheid regime’s restricting participation in international sport competitions to the white majority. Furthermore, initiatives in which actors outside of sport use it in an instrumental manner to advocate human rights by drawing attention to human rights violation (Hums, M. A., Wolff, E. A., & Morris, A., 2012) also belong to this category. This can be exemplified by protests by human rights organisations surrounding the staging of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing.

Today, SDP needs to be understood as a new policy field within international development institutions. The UN’s legitimisation of SDP and the emphasis on the instrumental or functional qualities of sport in development and peace work have opened up the field to a number of actors (particularly from the Global North) comprised of SDP NGOs, traditional development NGOs, international and national sports NGOs and private actors (Hasselgård & Straume, 2011). These actors constitute what many define as an “International

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7 As one of many Kidd & Donnelly (2000) claim that the international sports movement’s sport boycott against the human rights violations in South Africa was an important contribution to the fall of the regime.
8 Such as Right to Play.
9 Such as the Norwegian People’s Aid, CARE.
10 SDP has become a component of the International Olympic Committee’s concept "Olympism in Action". Other examples are The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (Football for Hope), The US National Basketball Association (Basketball without Borders) and The Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (Sport for All).
11 The football project Karanba was, for instance, initiated in one of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas by the former Norwegian football premier league player Tommy Nilsen.
Sport for Development and Peace movement” (Coalter, 2010; Hayhurst, 2009; Kidd, 2008). What these actors have in common is that they “explicitly engage and organise sport to improve the lives and life changes of the world’s poor and marginalised, often in the Global South” (Darnell, 2012, p. 3). The target groups are often children and youth, and the focus is typically on recreational sport, not elite sport. The engagement is first and foremost tied to development areas outside that of sport, such as conflict resolution and intercultural understanding (including post-traumatic emergency assistance), individual development (empowerment), health and wellness-promoting measures, communication and social mobilisation, equality, economic development and poverty eradication (Grujoska & Carlsson, 2007; Levermore & Beacom, 2009).

Most SDP projects include several of these components, with synergy effects as the objective. As a consequence, sport in relation to development has, on the international institutional level, become understood as an instrument to achieve specific development goals (such as the Millennium Goals) and peace. This Development through Sport discourse also indicates a lower priority for the understanding of development of sport itself as a driving force in development processes. This can be summed up by Coalter’s analytical distinction between Development Plus Sport and Development Sport Plus initiatives, which can be seen as poles of one continuum that describes the main interests of development activities in SDP initiatives. Whereas the first describes projects and programs designed to use sport as an instrument to achieve a range of specific development objectives (HIV/AIDS education, reintegration of street children etc.), the other describes projects and programs designed to enhance participation and performance in sport as an end in itself (e.g. developing formal organisational structures for grassroots sport, education of sport leaders and coaches). Projects at both ends of the scale are designed to promote social or individual development. The boundaries are, however, fluid. Depending on the emphasis and intensity of the development or sport dimension, projects may shift left or right on the continuum. Furthermore, many scholars writing on the issue of sport and development use the term Sport-for-development (SFD) or Sport-in-development (SID). In this thesis I use Kidd’s (2008) definition Sport for development and peace (SDP). Firstly, the term also captures the notion of sport’s role in peace building and conflict resolution, which has had an important role in the Norwegian support of the field. Secondly, this definition has become the official term used by

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12 After 2000, the Norwegian MFA has supported sport and reconciliation projects in the Balkans, the Middle East and in Afghanistan (see Article I).
international development institutions, such as the UN in addition to national development funding agencies, such as the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

There is also a growing trend for multinational companies (e.g. Nike, British Airways, Vodafone) to engage in SDP through their own projects or support of such projects as a part of the company’s corporate social responsibility efforts (Levermore, 2011). In recent years, elite sports initiatives have also been afforded greater space in the international SDP discourse (Hasselgård, 2009). The UN’s Special Adviser on Sport for Development and Peace, Wilfried Lemke, for example, has stated that grassroots sport has played an important role in SDP, but that elite sports and international sporting events, such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, should play an even greater role in the pursuit of achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (Bistandsaktuelt, 2008). Parallel to the increased focus on SDP in international development in the Global South, there has been a boom in sports academies, particularly football academies, in the same impoverished areas. The objective of the academies is to identify and develop football talents, which can pay dividends through, for instance, the sale of footballer contracts in the European football market. However, many of the projects have an idealistic foundation and can be understood as development or peace projects because they often offer academic education or training related to social skills (e.g., health, HIV/AIDS). The overlap between mainstream SDP initiatives and sports academies has gradually blurred the divide between the two. This is reinforced by the fact that UN institutions such as UNOSDP and UNESCO have shown interest in elite sports academies.13 In fact, while there appears to be a tendency for sports academies to be pulled in the direction of the international SDP agenda, there is at the same time a tendency for mainstream SDP initiatives to open up for talent development as an additional element in their projects.14

Large sporting events, also defined as Mega Sport Events, have also become an integrated part of the international SDP discourse. Darnell (2012) argues that such events are no longer arenas that salute the performances of elite athletes and strengthen the international reputations of host cities and countries. They are increasingly “understood to serve a development purpose both soft – ‘building social cohesion’, increasing community participation, positive national identification etc., and hard – mobilising public funds, improving infrastructure, attracting foreign investments etc.” (p. 3). The tendency to connect

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13 UNESCO supports the football academy DIAMBARS. The UN Special Adviser on Sport for Development and Peace, Wilfried Lemke, has visited and promoted the work of several elite sport academies over the last few years.

14 Well known SDP organisations such as MYSA and Edu Sport have started football academies as part of their activity.
Mega Sport Events more closely to international development policy objectives is also reflected in the closer cooperation between the UN and the large international overarching sports organisations IOC and FIFA.\textsuperscript{15} This cooperation applies not only to the UN’s Millennium Development Goals but to a broad range of other global issues, such as human rights and environment.\textsuperscript{16} The growing focus on large sporting events as a catalyst for development is due to the allocation of large sporting events no longer being concentrated in or limited to countries in the Global North. In the case of South Africa’s bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup, it was based on a strategic focus on social and economic development, nation building and reconciliation not just within the country but also on the entire African continent.\textsuperscript{17} The UN claims that such sports events are themselves effective instruments for promoting a culture of peace and achieving development objectives. This was expressed in, for example, the resolution “2010 International Federation of Association Football World Cup Event” adopted by United Nations General Assembly in 2009. It recognised the historical, social and developmental dimensions of the 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup held in South Africa and “drew attention to the opportunity for sport – in this case association football (or soccer) – to support peace, solidarity and socio-economic development in South Africa and across the continent” (Darnell, 2012). In addition, the UN Human Rights Council has addressed several topics at the crossroads of sports and human rights in relation to Mega Sport Events. One example is the adoption of the resolution “Promoting awareness, understanding and the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through sport and the Olympic ideal” in 2011. For instance, it calls for the holding of a “high-level interactive panel discussion to highlight, examine and suggest ways in which sport and major sporting events, in particular the Olympic and Paralympic Games, can be used to promote awareness and understanding of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the application of the principles enshrined therein” (UN 2011, p. 3).\textsuperscript{18} The Summer Olympics in Beijing in 2008 and the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014 clearly

\textsuperscript{15} In January 2008 IOC and the UN agreed on an expanded framework for action to use sport to reach the goals of the UN.
\textsuperscript{16} For example, according to the Rio 2016 Olympic and Paralympic “Sustainability Management Plan” an emphasis is made on the long term social, economic, environmental and sporting benefits of hosting the Games (Organising Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2013).
\textsuperscript{17} This was the first time the event had been hosted on the African continent. The slogan «In Africa, for Africa» indicated that it was hoped that the FIFA world Cup would benefit the whole continent. FIFA also initiated the grassroots SDP project «Football for Hope» that aims to contribute to development and reconciliation through the creation of football projects all over the continent.
\textsuperscript{18} Another example is “A world of sports free from racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance” (A/HRC/RES/13/27) adapted by the Human Rights Council in the context of the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa (UN 2010)
demonstrated that Mega Events have been given a more important human rights dimension, in that the respective countries’ human rights violations were put on the agenda of human rights organisations around the world (the topic of Article IV).

The SDP field can no longer be considered a marginal contribution to the efforts against poverty, conflict and human rights violation; it is structurally and politically integrated into the international development apparatus. However, despite the rapid interest and policy development on sport in international development institutions, SDP should not be seen as a unified field. There has been a growing tendency among OECD countries towards recognising and institutionalising SDP in national development aid strategies and national development aid budgets. Thus, the field of SDP cannot be understood independent of the national context of donor countries.

2.3 The national donor context

Norwegian authorities and Norwegian NGOs have been engaged in development and peace work in different parts of the world for over 50 years. Together, the national level therefore constitutes a subsystem of the international “development aid system”. This subsystem comprises the large group of organisations and institutions that in different ways are involved in the development, implementation and evaluation of Norwegian development aid, both governmental (GO) and non-governmental (NGOs), in addition to research institutes. Even though the Norwegian development aid subsystem form part of the international economic and political context, it is also shaped by the choices and priorities made by the Norwegian government and the various NGOs involved. Norway therefore has its own particular development debate and development discourse, to which Norwegian SDP actors also must relate. Norwegian NGOs concerned with SDP are currently an integral part of Norwegian development and foreign policy as they receive funding from governmental back donor agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad).

Along with Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, Norway has been one of the leading actors in the SDP field. Norwegian development aid has a long history of involvement with international sports exchanges and the use of sport as an instrument for development and peace in partner countries. Some claim that Norway’s engagement can be dated back to the 1970s and the launch of the international football tournament, Norway Cup (Haugsjå & Aarhus, 2003). This tournament, one of the world’s
largest, hosts teams from all regions of the world and is motivated by the vision of sport as an instrument for international solidarity between children and youth. However, Norwegian involvement in the Global South extends back to 1983, when the Norwegian pioneer of SDP, the NIF, in partnership with Norad established the project Sport for All in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Hasselgård & Straume, 2011). In keeping with the Norwegian sports policy of the time, the project’s objective was to benefit everyone in society, but efforts were particularly directed at women, children and persons with disabilities. The manner in which the groups were to be reached was through school programmes, the training of physical education teachers and coaches, and the organisation of sports activities and donation of equipment imported from Norway (Straume, 2010). In particular, there existed two dominating arguments in favour of NIF’s engagement. The first was a desire to contribute to social development and the building of welfare states, with a particular focus on health benefits. The other argument was that sport, as development aid, could serve to counter the negative criticism it was subject to and thereby show that it was more than violence in stadia, corruption, doping and elite competition (Straume, 2010).

Since then, Norwegian authorities have provided funding from the Norwegian development aid budget for sports initiatives in other countries also. For example, the NIF continued its development aid engagement by initiating Sport for All projects in Zambia (1990), Zimbabwe (1991) and South Africa (1993). During this period, building up the capacity and competence of sport organisation was increasingly emphasised. Additionally, the development of sustainable sports structures was clearly the focus of NIF’s development aid work (Hasselgård & Straume 2011). During the 1990s, there was a growing interest in the connection between sport, development and peace in Norway, and several actors wanted to become involved in this field. For instance, the Strømme Foundation and Christian Sports Contact entered into a partnership to use sport and leadership development as an instrument for mobilising youth in the South in 1993. That same year, the humanitarian campaign Olympic Aid was established in the run up to the Olympics in Lillehammer in 1994. In Norway, the campaign garnered particular attention after three-time Olympic skating champion Johann Olav Koss donated his winning bonus from the 1500-meter race to the campaign. Olympic Aid did not initiate its own projects during its earlier work but instead

19 The adoption of the Sport for All concept into SDP needs to be understood as a Nordic phenomenon. Also Sweden and Denmark initiated «Sport for all» projects in Africa in the 1980s (Eichberg, 2008; 2009). However, what separated the Norwegian from the other Nordic projects were the emphasis on organisational sport structure (Straume, 2010).

20 See also Straume (2012) for further discussion on this project in the 1980s.
used famous sports personalities and the sport networks to collect funds for a series of humanitarian projects in war-torn areas (Coalter, 2010). Olympic Aid, which in 2003 changed its name to Right to Play, altered its approach after the turn of the millennium and began to initiate its own SDP projects with the support of, among others, the Norwegian development aid national budget.\textsuperscript{21} The Football Association of Norway (NFF) also initiated development aid projects during this period in, among other places, Mali (1996), Vietnam (2001) and the Balkans (2002). Since that time, NFF has been one of the foremost actors within the Norwegian SDP apparatus. A considerable factor in Norwegian SDP is the development programme Youth Sport Exchange Programme.\textsuperscript{22} Since 1997, the NIF has stationed almost 300 sports volunteers at various partner organisations in southern Africa. Incorporated into the programme is a partnership with the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, which resulted in the academic programme Sports, Culture and Development Cooperation.\textsuperscript{23} Another considerable contribution is Norad’s funding of the Kicking AIDS Out network, which was established in 2001. The NIF manages the secretariat for the network, which currently comprises 29 organisations from 16 countries. However, NIF’s HIV/AIDS engagement has challenged the organisation’s own ideology, which is oriented towards the development of sport in cooperating countries, with the Sport Plus project. (Hasselgård & Straume, 2011; Roser, 2011).\textsuperscript{24}

Several actors have subsequently entered the field (see Article I for an overview). With the growing interest in SDP in Norway and internationally, and the increased transfer of money from the development aid budget to sports measures, the government deemed it necessary to coordinate the interests and activities of the organisations involved. This resulted in two concrete outcomes. Firstly, sport was included in white paper no. 35 2003–2004 “Fighting Poverty Together. A Comprehensive Policy for Development”.\textsuperscript{25} Secondly, in 2005

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} The former speed skater and Olympic champion Johann Olav Koss is the founder and president of Right to Play.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} The Exchange Programme is a collaboration between NIF and the Norwegian Peace Corps. The exchange is fully funded by the Peace Corps, which also finances the exchange of volunteers from countries in the South to Norway and the exchange of sport volunteers between different countries in the South.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} The study program was established to offer the volunteers scientific and professional knowledge about sport and development aid, as well as skills which were considered necessary for work in sports programs in partnering countries.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Little attention is given to the Kicking AIDS Out network (KAO) in this thesis. Today, KAO is registered as a South African NGO and NIF has terminated its administrative role in the network.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Chapter 5.8 states that “Vibrant artistic, cultural and sports sectors help to build identity and give individuals a sense of belonging and roots. An open and inclusive cultural life offers possibilities for participation in social development and strengthens democracy. All development cooperation in the cultural sphere is founded on the recognition that culture has its own intrinsic value and plays a key role in the development of every people (…) Exchanges between Norway and developing countries are based on the conviction that self-expression
\end{itemize}
the MFA continued the pledge to emphasise SDP in development policy through the publication of “Strategy for Norway’s Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South”. In the strategy document, it is stated that the MFA and Norad, among others, shall strengthen, clarify and assure the quality of the cooperation with sports organisations and humanitarian organisations that use sport as an instrument in peace and development work (UD 2005 p. 49). This politicisation of Norwegian SDP has tied the organisations involved in SDP closer to official Norwegian development and foreign policy (see Article I). SDPs are therefore currently an integrated part of what is defined as “the Norwegian model”. The model relates to Norway’s comparative advantage in international development and peace work – a small state that poses no threat to other countries, without a colonial past and which attempts to integrate non-state actors in the state’s proclaimed project of becoming a “humanitarian superpower” (Lie, 2006). In this manner, it has been important to ensure that the Norwegian governmental and non-governmental development and peace actors speak with one voice. Tvedt (2003) argues that the development aid NGOs’ opportunity to raise funds from private donors have been limited due to the Norwegian egalitarian society and low population spread out over a large geographical area. Additionally, because of Norway’s non-colonial history and few strategic and economic national interests in the Global South, the NGOs have been less concerned about distancing themselves politically from the Norwegian government compared to NGOs in for instance Great Britain, USA, and France (2003, p. 86-88). Today, most Norwegian development aid agencies are financially dependent on the funds they receive from the MFA or Norad. The NGOs involved in SDP are no exception.

SDP is not a large item in the Norwegian development aid budget, but the annual grant to the Norwegian actors’ sports measures has doubled since the MFA wrote its sports strategy. In total, the MFA and Norad have allocated almost NOK 500 million to Norwegian through art, culture and sport in itself promotes development (...) Sports activities can often provide broad-based, effective arenas for activities aimed at promoting reconciliation in conflict-torn areas. They also play a vital role in improving health. This type of cooperation on sport is useful, and the sports movement itself is aware of the role that it can play to such ends. There is reason to emphasize the unique nature of sport in development cooperation, in particular the pleasure and opportunity for self-expression, self-development and mastery that a sport offers, particularly for children and young people.” (p. 140)

26 For instance it was claimed that: “The potential of sport as a tool for promoting development and peace is under-utilised. Sport is more than just a side-effect of development; it is a driving force for development. When sports programmes are used effectively they promote social integration, dialogue and tolerance” (MFA, 2005, p. 39).

27 Nustad (2003) has, however, argued against the Norwegian government’s claim that Norway has no colonial past. The twin-state of Denmark-Norway maintained several colonies in the period of the 17th to 19th centuries.
sports projects since 2005.\textsuperscript{28} It is interesting to note that the money transfers increased after the publication of the strategy from an annual grant of NOK 23 million in 2004 to an annual grant of NOK 55 million in 2008 (Hasselgård 2009). Most of the sports measures are currently funded by the Civil Society Division at Norad, first and foremost through one-year project-based partnerships. However, Norad has had a cooperation agreement\textsuperscript{29} with NIF since 2004 and with Right to Play since 2014. Several of the organisations have also received larger funding for sports projects from the various divisions within the MFA. This applies primarily to projects that emphasise sport in reconciliation processes.\textsuperscript{30} In 2009, various sections of the MFA accounted for approximately 75\% of the government funding for Norwegian SDP, while Norad accounted for the remaining funding (Hasselgård, 2009). However, Norad currently accounts for approximately 80\% of the funding.\textsuperscript{31} There has therefore been a shift from an emphasis on concrete sport and reconciliation efforts towards civil society sports projects. Today, the focus of the support from Norway to civil society in the South is on: (a) Democratisation processes, (b) The strengthening of local partner organisations’ capacity in the fight against corruption, in peace and reconciliation processes, as well as the strengthening of their bargaining position vis-à-vis public authorities in recipient countries (Norad, 2011a). In addition, large international organisations funded by the Norwegian government, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and several UN programmes, have also expressed interest in the SDP field. Thus, we can say that a part of the Norwegian engagement also lies here. For example, the MFA funds a secretariat for sport and gender in the UN belonging to the Office on Sport for Development and Peace (1.5 million NOK annually). Norwegian SDP also received a considerable financial boost through the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation’s (NRK) annual television campaign in 2007. It was awarded to UNICEF in cooperation with the NIF and Right to Play. The campaign largely focused on the role of sport in the efforts to provide children with a better future (UNICEF, 2007).\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{28} The figure is based on the SDP actors own estimation of funds received from the Norwegian government between 2005 and 2014.

\textsuperscript{29} Norad offers agreements for three to five years to aid organisations involved with relatively large, long-term development projects. In 2013, 29 organisations had such an agreement (Norad, 2011c).

\textsuperscript{30} The Section for Peace and Reconciliation in the MFA have for instance supported sport and reconciliation projects in the Middle East (implemented by The Norwegian Football Association) and in Afghanistan (implemented by the Norwegian Church Aid).

\textsuperscript{31} Norad is responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of Norwegian development aid, as well as the SDP commitment.

\textsuperscript{32} The Campaign ”Together for Children” raised over US $40 million (at that time the highest-grossing Telethon ever).
Since the beginning of the Norwegian SDP commitment in the early 1980s, NIF and NFF, building their engagement on the Sport for All ideology, have had a hegemonic position in terms of government funding as well as defining Norwegian SDP (Hasselgård & Straume 2011). However, after the entry of new SDP actors after the millennium, this position has been challenged (see Article I).

2.4 Local recipient context
The fieldwork study of the implementation of Norwegian-funded SDP projects in local contexts presented in Article III was undertaken in Zimbabwe. Sport in Zimbabwe needs to be understood in relation to its colonial past, its independence from the British Empire and its economic decline from the 1990s. First, the British colonial rulers used sport to “civilise” and teach the black African majority population about hygiene and fitness. In addition, sport was widely used to strengthen the culture of the minority white settlers (European sports were imported), enhance the national self-esteem of whites, as well as constituting a tool for social control over the black African population (Novak, 2012). However, black athletes in the country, which was called Rhodesia at that time, gradually entered the sports arena. This was particularly evident in the 1960s and 1970s, when several black elite athletes achieved good results nationally as well as internationally (particularly in track and field sports). However, as in Rhodesian society in general, racial discrimination was part of sport. After World War II, football, for example, was “organized along racial lines, with separate football leagues for Europeans, Coloureds and Asians, and Africans” (Giulianotti, 2004, p. 85). In addition, close ties existed between sporting governance bodies in Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. The Rhodesian government never went so far as to establish strict segregationist sporting policies and laws, as was the case in South Africa. Nevertheless, Rhodesian sport was excluded from the Olympic Movement and all international competition in 1975 after evidence surfaced of practiced discrimination in sport. Racial segregation was evident in access to public sporting venues, and in 1968 the Ministry of Education introduced segregation of sport in public elementary schools (Novak, 2012). Further, since the provision of organised sport for children and youth followed the traditional British school sport model (sport organised within the public school system), rather than an after-school club model, and few black children attended public schools, few had the opportunity to participate in organised sport. Additionally, several sports were organised by private membership clubs. This became a huge obstacle for multiracial sport opportunities, as these clubs were not regulated by the sport ministry or
legislative principle that would prohibit racial restrictions. Thus, the racial control of sport was placed in the hands of white club leaders, who mostly excluded non-whites to participate. The segregation was strengthened by the immense economic status differences between the white settlers and the black population, particularly in sports that required expensive or specialised equipment. This was, for instance, the reason for which many blacks did not take part in disability and wheelchair sport (Novak, 2012). However, multiracial sport did occur in unorganised after-school sports activities among children, at the University of Rhodesia and in sports activities organised by mining companies. International business companies in, for example, the tobacco and mining industries became important facilitators of athletic competitions and provided sporting facilities for employees of all races. For instance, football in the country became heavily dependent on “sponsorship from transnational corporations (TNCs) that had established themselves in the old Rhodesia” (Giulianotti, 2004, p. 89).

National sport federations existed but were responsible only for the organisation of national teams and international competitions.

After full independence and the election of Robert Mugabe as president in 1980, Zimbabwe experienced greater stability and economic recovery. Social reforms were introduced, and Mugabe developed one of Africa’s most effective education and health systems to benefit all Zimbabweans. Thus, the country was seen as a pioneer in many Western countries’ eyes and became a major recipient of Norwegian development aid. This also gave rise to the development of a national sports system that could reach the entire population and undermine racial divisions that had characterised the organisation of sport in the past. The financial support given by Norad to the NIF’s pilot project Sport for All Zimbabwe in the capital Harare in the early 1990s must be understood on the basis of this. The Norwegian sport movement’s experience in building a strong national sporting system on social democratic and societal corporatist principles in Norway seemed to fit the state formation model and politics of Zimbabwe. Thus, the emphasis was on strengthening the administrative capacity of the quasi-state organisation Sports and Recreation Commission (SRC) to research the goal of equal possibility for all to participate in sport. Special attention was given to children, women and the disabled (Straume & Hasselgård, 2013). However, the implementation of the project occurred in the same period as the start of the

33 SRC is defined as a quasi-state organisation as it “derives its mandate from the Sports and Recreation Commission Act and reports to the Government through the Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture. Part of the mandate of the Sports and Recreation Commission is to facilitate for the accessibility of sport and recreation programmes to the people of Zimbabwe and to oversee the general running of sport and recreation programmes by the National Sports Associations” (SRC n.d)
economic and social downturn in the country. As a result of international pressure from intergovernmental development institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, the Zimbabwe government implemented economic and social neo-liberal reforms (structural adjustment programs\(^\text{34}\),\(^\text{35}\). The following year, in 1992, the country experienced its worst drought, and the larger part of the population lost livestock, food stocks and other sources of livelihood to an unprecedented extent. These developments resulted in the gradual erosion of the state’s power and the administrative capacity of state institutions (Eriksen, 2010). For instance, there was a severe decline in the education and healthcare systems. This also had direct ramifications for organised sport, which became greatly reduced. Giulianotti (2004), for example, argues that the neo-liberal reforms have had a direct negative impact on Zimbabwean football as it became more dependent on the organisation of activities through private companies and development NGOs: “At grassroots level, there are fewer resources for playing organised football; many of the townships’ youth or community centres, for example, have closed due to local authority budget cuts, or they struggle to secure long-term NGO financing” (p. 95). Thus, it could be claimed that sport, particularly in the poorest areas, is organised through a neo-liberal market logic that undermines the public provision of sport opportunities to children and youth. Giulianotti argues this will become an obstacle to the development of Zimbabwean sports in the future because «it faces the practical problem of finding enough financial investment from the open market while threatening in theory the democratic structures of clubs» (p. 96).

As a result of the abovementioned developments in the country, the Zimbabwean authorities responsible for sports, the Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture, and SRC, have not by their own efforts been able to provide access to sport and recreation programs and structures to people at the grassroots level. In almost all the 59 underlying National Sports Associations, no link to organised community sports activities for children and youth is found (SRC 2008). In addition to the growth in NGO-based provision of sport in Zimbabwe, the legacy of the colonial past and segregation in sport is still present, given that much of the sport in many communities is still only provided in schools and through private member sports clubs (SRC 2008). This excludes children without access to education, but

\(^\text{34}\) Loans were provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to low-income countries, allowing the economies of these countries to become more market-oriented in order to adjust the economy to long-term growth.

\(^\text{35}\) According to Eriksen (2010), several scholars have argued that “when the programme for structural adjustment was approved in 1990, it was mainly a result of internal political changes in Zimbabwe rather than of pressure from the IMF and the World bank” (p. 325).
also more generally, because many schools do not prioritise physical education as part of the curriculum. Furthermore, many private clubs are still reserved for the white population.

The above presentation shows the historical roots of the fragmented organisation of, and complex situation in, Zimbabwean sport. This is also the context in which NIF, together with Norad, has developed its SDP commitment in Zimbabwe over the last 24 years. The SRC has been the partner organisation of NIF throughout the period with the *Sport for All* intervention model as the guiding principle. In 2008, cooperation between Zimbabwe and Norway took a huge leap forward when Norad decided to fund the Community Sports Development Programme (CSDP) developed by SRC and NIF. The goal of the project was to expand the Sport for All intervention model and strengthen the SRC’s administrative capacity to restructure organised sport for children and youth (girls and boys) into one national club model structure with 4,000 community sports clubs throughout all the 10 provinces of Zimbabwe (within a five-year period). It was anticipated that 720,000 young people would benefit from the model. Additionally, it was expected that the participants would learn life skills through “volunteering in their local community, participating as a member of a team and learning how to manage decisions related to social issues, such as HIV and Aids, while developing confidence in their abilities in a fun and safe environment” (SRC, 2008). However, the implementation of the programme occurred at the time when the country was at the peak of its economic crisis, with the world’s highest inflation rate. Further, the CSDP was being brought in at the same time as the increasing trend to use sport as a tool in development efforts by both international NGOs and SDP NGOs operating in Zimbabwean communities (e.g. Sport for Peace, Bulldogs Sports Development Trust, Grassroot Soccer Foundation, Little Sports Organization). Thus, the NGOs’ provision of sport to children and youth through project-based interventions, mainly focusing on individual development goals, could be seen to be creating a parallel structure to the government CSDP collectivistic club development model. It is NIF’s SDP commitment in Zimbabwe that forms the basis for then empirical work presented in Articles II and III.

2.5 Concluding remarks

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36 The CSDP was also partly financed by the money NIF received from the aforementioned Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation’s (NRK) annual television campaign in 2007.
As shown above, organisations concerned with SDP have become an integrated part of the development industry, meaning the activities of organisations such as the World Bank, the UN, national donor governments and NGOs. On the one hand, contemporary Norwegian SDP intervention involves a set of institutions, policies and practices within and between three interconnected levels (international, national, local), illustrated in Figure 1; in this sense, it can be characterised as an industry. On the other hand, development (and SDP) “is also clearly an ideal, an objective towards which institutions and individuals claim to strive” (Crew & Harrison 1998, p. 15). Consequently, an understanding of the flow of SDP ideals (ideas, values) within and between the different levels of SDP is needed. The next chapter elaborates on the lack of academic research on a national and local level.

Figure 1. The three interconnected levels of Norwegian SDP.
3.0 SDP; A new sport science research field

In recent years, we have seen increasing academic interest in the SDP sector through conferences, reports, research projects, books, articles in international journals, academic study programs and PhD projects. The body of academic literature on SDP did not emerge from a vacuum. Cultural and historical sport studies have been preoccupied with the spread of modern Western sport to other parts of the world as a form of cultural imperialism (Guttmann, 1994; Mandell, 1984; Mangan, 1998). Guttmann (1994) uses the expression “the diffusion of sport” to describe the process by which Western sports have been adapted and mixed with local variants in non-Western cultures. Among the first to describe the relationship between sport and development in the Global South in sport studies was Armstrong (1997), Maguire (1999, 2000), Darby (2002), Chapell (2004), Giulianiotti (2004) and Giulianiotti and Armstrong (2004). However, in this literature, SDP is not the centre of the analysis, nor is sport understood as a part of the international development sector. It is rather suggested that sport could contribute to the field of international development aid.\(^{37}\) Since the institutionalisation of sport within the international development aid apparatus, more substantial studies on the relationship between sport and development aid have emerged. Common to this academic literature is that SDP is described as a new research field within sport studies (e.g., Coalter, 2007; Houlihan & Green, 2010; Levermore, 2009; Nicholson & Hoye, 2008). For instance, from 2009 to 2014, fourteen academic books on SDP were published, compared to none before.\(^{38}\)

Given that both the practice of and academic research in the field of SDP is still at an early stage, much of the SDP literature is descriptive. This “mapping the field” literature has been important for the opening up of the practical field of SDP to academic research and critical consideration, describing the origin of the field and how it has developed into a new policy field within development aid, as well as proposing directions for further research.


\(^{38}\) Sport and International Development (Levermore & Beacom, 2009); Social Development in Post-conflict Communities: Building Peace through Sport in Africa and the Middle East (Rookwool, 2009); The Social Impact of Sport – Cross-Cultural Perspectives (Spaaij, 2011); Sport for development and peace. A critical Sociology (Darnell 2012); Sport, Peace, and Development (Gilbert & Bennett, 2012); Sport for development, peace, and social justice (Schinke & Hanrahan, 2012); Sports Governance, Development and Corporate Responsibility (Segaert et.al, 2012); Sport and Peace: A Sociological Perspective (Wilson, 2012); Sport for Development: What game are we playing? (Coalter, 2013); Case Studies in Sport Development: Contemporary Stories Promoting Health, Peace, and Social Justice (Schinke & Lidor, 2013); Strengthening Sport for Development and Peace: National Policies and Strategies (Dudfield, 2014); Sport and Peace-Building in Divided Societies: Playing with the Enemy (Sugden, 2014); Global Sport-for-Development: Critical Perspectives (Schulenkorf & Adair, 2014); Sport, Social Development and Peace (Young & Okada, 2014).
The lack of both scientific evidence and a theoretical framework with which to understand how sports can serve as a tool for positive social change and peace indicates significant gaps between research, theory and practice (Lyra, 2008). However, in recent years, there has been rapid growth in empirically-based studies on the impact of SDP interventions. There are several ways in which this new literature could be categorised. First, much of the literature could be categorised within the abovementioned SDP intervention areas. Some research has focused on the practice of using sport as a tool to communicate broader health objectives, such as HIV/AIDS and safe-sex behaviours, through youth sport programmes (Delva et al., 2010; Kaufman et al., 2012; Maro, C.N., Roberts, G.C., & Sorensen, M., 2009; Njelesani, 2011) and education (Burnett, 2013; Spaaij & Jeanes, 2013). Others have studied the impact of individual SDP projects on individual development (empowerment) in participants, such as increased self-esteem (Coalter, 2013) and social and cultural capital (Spaaij, 2012), as well as examining the role of sport in broader community development (Colucci, 2012; Okada & Young, 2012; Peacock-Villada et al., 2007; Perks, 2007). Several studies have looked at the use of sport and sport initiatives in reconciliation processes, for example in conflict resolution and intercultural understanding (Donnelly, 2011; Giulianotti, 2011; Höglund & Sundberg, 2008, Rookwood; 2012, Sugden, 2006, 2008; Wilson, 2012) and the reintegration of children and youth in society in post-conflict areas (Dyke, 2011). For instance, on the basis of their study of sport as a tool for reconciliation in South Africa, Höglund & Sundberg (2008) identified that the positive or negative effect of such processes needs to be analysed on a national, community and individual level. Further, much attention has been given to gender issues in SDP interventions (Jeanes & Magee, 2014; Meier & Saavedra 2009, Saavedra, 2009). However, as the projects under study often combine several thematic intervention areas, the studies also overlap. This body of literature has moved the research on SDP from a “fairly descriptive outline of the potential of sport to achieve development goals and the possible ways it may do this, to a more critical examination of the capacity of sport to achieve the ambitious goals attributed to it” (Jeanes & Magee, 2013). Coalter (2010) argues along the same lines when he warns against the simplification and overestimation of programme effects expressed in SDP policies and by “sports evangelists” that claim sport to be “an apolitical, neutral and inherently integrative set of social practices that can deliver a wide range of positive outcomes.” (p. 296). When considering the lack of empirical evidence in support of SDP NGOs’ functionalist claims
about sport, development and peace, Coalter (2013a) outlines the need for proper monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

The abovementioned literature is preoccupied with analysis of whether SDP works according to the intended effects or not. Lately, a new line of research has entered the field of SDP research that rather focuses on how SDP works. This body of literature can be divided into two main categories. The first category represents the body of growing critical research that sees “the sport for development movement as essentially a new form of colonialism that provides further opportunities for dominant Global North ideologies, values and beliefs to be imposed on former colonies in the Global South in a way that is disempowering and damaging” (Jeanes et al., 2013, p.129). Thus, these studies take the international perspective as their starting point to critically examine the way in which the SDP sector maintains or increases hegemonic global power relations (Darnell, 2007, 2010; Darnell & Hayhurst, 2011; Hayhurst et al., 2011; Hayhurst, 2009; Hayhurst, 2011; Manzo, 2011). For instance, Darnell and Hayhurst (2011) claim that the “SDP movement and research into the sport/development relationship finds itself at a critical crossroads, pitting a well-intentioned faith in, and desire for, sport to contribute to development against the understanding that sport in development and SDP is not immune from the post-colonial, feminist and post-development criticisms of the past three decades” (e.g., Shiva, 1989; Escobar, 1995) (p. 184).

Hence, this body of literature is concerned with knowledge production within SDP and the transfer of hegemonic SDP knowledge from the Global North to countries in the Global South through project interventions. The literature “therefore presents a strong argument that sport for development programmes are a further outlet for the imposition of Global North beliefs, values and social structures on repressed individuals within the Global South” (Jeanes et al. 2013, p. 132). These scholars can be criticised for underestimating local project staff and beneficiaries’ agency in SDP interventions (Hasselgård & Straume, 2014, Straume & Hasselgård, 2013).

The second category is characterised by ethnographic research in locations where SDP interventions occur, studying local perspectives on SDP (Fokwang, 2009; Guest, 2009; Jeanes, 2011; Jeanes et al., 2013; Jeans & Magee, 2013; Lindsey, 2013; Lindsey & Grattan, 2012; Thorpe & Ahmad, 2013). For instance, through a study of the organisation Olympic Aid (today Right to Play) in Angola, Guest (2009) finds several examples of “disconnection between what sports initiatives are seeking to develop amongst young people and what is actually culturally relevant, meaningful and useful. Guest finds that local coaches were not
familiar with culturally constructed (Westernised) concepts such as self-esteem and self-confidence (empowerment) through sport. He concludes that:

“the idea that it is crucial for children to feel good about an abstract, individual self regardless of actual abilities or competencies is a relatively recent cultural invention. In Pena, most parents and children were much more concerned with developing tangible competencies and skills than with ensuring children have high esteem for an abstract self” (p.1346)

Similarly, Lindsey and Grattan (2012) suggest that there is a need for more ethnographically informed empirical studies on SDP in order to understand SDP from the perspectives of actors in the Global South. Demonstrating the disconnection between the hegemonic international SDP discourse and development practice, they claim that the SDP literature has overemphasised the implication of hegemonic knowledge and understanding applied by the Northern-led international SDP movement to SDP in the Global South. By the same token, Jeanes et al.’s (2013) study of indigenous participants in Global North–led SDP programs concludes that the experiences of female participants did not reflect the neo-colonialist claims presented at such initiatives. Thus, this literature is preoccupied with the voices and agency of Global South participants in sport and development initiatives, and the contexts in which these interventions are implemented. This perspective is also reflected in the specific literature on sport in reconciliation processes. For instance Höglund and Sundberg (2008) suggest that a better understanding of the clusters of factors (e.g. context of the country and local target groups, local culture) determining the success and failure in SDP interventions are needed.

The above presentation shows that the current academic debate on SDP can be separated into two main camps, one that examines this field from a Global North hegemonic perspective and one that seeks to fill the gap in knowledge on the experiences of those people at the receiving end of SDP initiatives (implementers and beneficiaries). Lindsey and Grattan’s (2012) critical comments on the current critical hegemonic structural analysis of SDP have created a heated academic debate between the two camps. For instance, in their rejoinder to Lindsey and Grattan in the International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, Darnell and Hayhurst (2012) state:

Their findings are best understood as complementary, not oppositional, to the critical analyses of ‘the northern-led’ and ‘top-down’ development SDP, particularly as understood through the theoretical deployment of hegemony and postcolonialism. In this way, the agency of community leaders in Zambia in mobilizing sport to support their own local development goals constitutes, amidst the global political
economy of unequal development (Payne 2005), actions that are necessitated by, embedded in, within and/or resistant to, the hegemonic relations that continue to position neoliberalism as predominant contemporary theory and philosophy of development (Darnell & Hayhurst, 2012, p. 112).

This thesis has contributed to this debate. It also seeks to move the debate further by finding inspiration in the long-standing debate in development studies concerning the primacy of Western hegemonic development discourses on development practice. The next chapter presents this debate.

4.0 The discourse–agency nexus in development studies

While the upsurge of sport as a means in development aid is often dated back to the publication of the UN Millennium Development Goals, the contemporary concept of development aid and the aid discourse are usually traced back to the famous speech by US president Harry Truman in January 1949. Truman emphasised the need for a technical assistance program for economic, social and political improvement in what he defined as the "underdeveloped areas" of world:

“we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people (…) The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans (…) Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific knowledge” (cited in Rist 2001, p. 71-72).

The Truman Doctrine on development aid supplemented the separation of world politics in a democratic West and communistic East axis with an economically developed Global North and an underdeveloped Global South.39 Truman’s visions manifested in what is now called modernisation theory, which emphasises the need to transfer technology, capital and knowledge from the developed to the underdeveloped world. Thus, poverty was treated as an apolitical problem that could be explained by a slow or lacking modernistic linear process, as had been experienced in the developed world. These ideas about development, based on the

39 The North–South divide reflects the development gap between economically developed and less economically developed countries. During the Cold War, this divide was referred to as "First World" and "Third World" countries. More recently, the north–south dichotomy has been named “the development continuum gap”.

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historical experience of Western countries, were manifested in the Bretton Woods institutions (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund). The modernisation theory was challenged in the 1970s by *dependency theory*, which claimed that poverty was the result of unequal structural and economic possibilities and relations between the Global North and South:

> “Where the modernisation school saw poverty as due to poor nations’ lack of integration in the world economy, the dependency theory saw it the opposite way around: that rich and poor countries are highly interconnected and that underdevelopment was caused by the poor nations’ factual integration in the world marked on unequal premises when compared to the wealthy nations” (Lie, 2005).

In the 1980s, the field of development was in a state of chaos. After four decades of international development aid, poverty and inequality between poor and rich countries had not changed much. The responses of policymakers to the failure of modernisation theory led to new approaches to development. First, there was the rise of *neo-liberal ideologies* promoting “individualism, markets and flexible managerialism” (Lewis & Kanji, 2009, p. 52). 40 As the state was seen as a part of the problem (inefficient, often corrupt) the main idea was to replace the formerly state-directed development aid (strengthening state structures and bureaucracies) by reducing state control and privatising public services. This is best illustrated by the structural adjustment programs (SAP) imposed by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which replaced state-provided services with market solutions in the development of poor countries. This anti-state discourse opened up for financing development through development NGOs, which were seen as filling important gaps left by the retreat of the state. Further, NGOs were seen as functioning as locally rooted organisations working closely with marginalised people with a higher chance of local-level implementation and community participation; they were flexible and adaptable to changing contexts, and they were considered non-state protectors of the public interest and cost-effective funding channels (Borchgrevink, 2006; Lewis & Kanji, 2009). At the same time as development theory and practice turned away from the state and towards NGOs, recipient-oriented rhetoric such as “local participation”, “development from below” and “development practice” gained in popularity. The small-scale, bottom-up and project-focused development interventions by NGOs were seen to bring the targets of development into the process of planning and

40 This is also often referred to as the “Washington Consensus” that advocates free trade, floating exchange rates, free markets and macroeconomic stability supported by prominent economists and international organisations, such as the IMF, the World Bank, the EU and the US.
implementation. This was, for instance, defined by Chamber (1997) as participatory rural appraisal:

“The essence of PRA is change and reversals – of role, behaviour, relationship and learning. Outsiders do not dominate and lecture; they facilitate, sit down, listen and learn. Outsiders do not transfer technology; they share methods which local people can use for their own appraisal, analysis, planning, action, monitoring and evaluation. Outsiders do not impose their reality; they encourage and enable local people to express their own” (p.103).

While some development scholars used the critique against the dominating top-down modernisation theory to promote new directions by defining “development from below”, parts of development studies took a turn towards a post-structural and discursive approach to development, labelled post-development theory. This rather radical critique of the concept of development has created an interesting debate within development studies concerning the primacy of hegemonic development discourses (dominating conceptions and ideas about poverty) over development practice. The next chapters explore this debate, to which the thesis relates.

4.1 First wave of post-development debate

In the late 1980s, a generation of development critics inspired by post-structuralist analysis, particularly the works of Michel Foucault, emerged within development studies. The development critique put forward in the book The Development Dictionary (Sachs, 1992) is indicative of the post-development critique. In this book, 17 writers, many from the South, confront the industrial model of society that the modernisation theorists had claimed to be the best way to develop the Third World. Forty years of development had led to greater differences between rich and poor countries. Thus, the authors declared development to be “a ruin in the intellectual landscape” (Sachs, 1992, p. 1). It was argued that development was nothing but a constructed term, defined by the apparatus that was established to solve the “problem”. It was presented as a “misconceived enterprise” that implicitly eliminated cultural diversity through the universalisation of development means and goals through Western development institutions established after World War II (Ziai, 2007). Similarly, Escobar (1984; 1995) argues that the concept of development could be understood as having been created by Western ideas and ultimately as an extension of the colonial hegemony. Hence, the development discourse had “created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World” (Escobar, 1995, p. 9).
Development was claimed to create abnormalities such as poverty, underdevelopment, backwardness and the understanding of “the Third World” in the need for Western intervention and expertise. Consequently, the “development problem” had been addressed through a programme that denied value or initiative to the recipients of these programmes:

“Development was - and continues to be for the most part – a top-down ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treats people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of “progress”. Development was conceived not as a cultural process (culture was a residual variable, to disappear with the advance of modernization) but instead a system of more or less universally applicable technical interventions intended to deliver some “badly needed” goods to a “target” population. It comes as no surprise that development became a force so destructive to Third World cultures, ironically in the name of people’s interests” (Escobar, 1995, p. 44).

The concept of development was understood as having been created from Western ideas reproduced in standardised development models imposed by international development institutions (e.g the World Bank and the UN), and that undermined social, cultural, economic and political systems in poor countries. Thus, the development discourse was claimed to shape reality in poor societies and was blamed for suppressing alternative conceptions of development (Nustad, 2004). The post Post-development solution was a total rejection of the concept of development.

Cowen and Shenton (1996) define this as the logical problem of development. In their detailed history of development theories, they argue that “the 19th century resolution of the development problem was to invoke trusteeship. Those who took themselves to be developed could act to determine the process of development for those who were less-developed” (p. 4). Active intentional interference in poor societies, guided by developed countries in possession of skills, knowledge, technical means and funds, had thus created a donor-recipient relationship where the donor was in a position to define what development was and how it could be achieved. According to Ziai (2007), it is possible to extract two main theses demonstrated in post-development literature, which, although sometimes controversial, are generally accepted by most development scholars: (a) The traditional concept of development is Eurocentric, neglecting other possible indicators and measures for a “good life” or “good society” and (b) The traditional concept of development has authoritarian and technocratic implications. Those who get to define what development is and how it can be achieved – usually some kind of development expert – are in a position of power (p. 8).
A clear Marxist critique was reflected in post-development writings. However, post-development scholars “choose to evaluate development in discursive, rather than materialist, terms” (Everet, 1997, p. 138). Through the discursive formation of development, as expressed in development policies, project plans and reports, post-development scholar’s analysed development as a powerful and homogenising discourse. In this sense, the development discourse does not reflect, but constructs the reality and can thus be rendered “as a system of knowledge, technologies, practices and power relationships that serve to order and regulate the objects of development” (Lewis et al., 2003, p. 545). In this way, the development discourse produced by the so-called development experts is presented as totally dominant for those who are exposed to it, be it development planners, practitioners or target groups. Consequently, development knowledge and practice are normalised as development agencies and agents act upon, reproduce and strengthen the established development discourse (Lie, 201; Nustad, 2007). This understanding is evident in, for instance, James Ferguson’s influential book *The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Ferguson (1994) takes post-development theory to the development field through ethnographic studies of the development discourse in practice. Through a case study of a particular rural project in Lesotho funded by the World Bank (1975–84), he shows how the intervention was organised on the basis of the structure of knowledge imposed by the development funders.

“The argument, in brief, is the following: ‘development discourse’ institutions generate their own form of discourse, and this discourse simultaneously constructs Lesotho as a particular kind of object of knowledge, and creates a structure of knowledge around that object. Interventions are then organized on the basis of this structure of knowledge, which, while ‘failing’ on their own terms, nonetheless have regular effects, which include the expansion and entrenchment of bureaucratic state power, side by side with the projection of a representation of economic and social life which denies ‘politics’ and, to the extent it is successful, suspends its effects”(p. xiv-xv).

Ferguson claims that development agents and agencies are being formed by, and act upon, the development discourse, which is reproduced and strengthened through their practices.41 Further, reducing poverty to a simple technical problem that can be solved by technical solutions downplays the real causes of poverty, which is rather rooted in local, national and regional political economy and politics. This de-politicisation of development leads Ferguson

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41 Ferguson define this process as the reproduction theses, meaning that a “structure always reproduces itself through a process” (1994:13)
to define “the development project” as an “anti-political machine” in which development actors are caught: “…the planner’s conceptions are not the blueprint for the machine; they are part of the machine’ (Ferguson, 1994, p. 276). Further, development agencies’ simplified and depoliticised technical solutions to development challenges, expressed through standardised policy models, explain why so many projects fail.

The post-development critique opened up a debate about the concept of development itself, not only its goals and means but also the ideas upon which the models on development were structured (Nustad, 2003). The post-development approach is thus useful to grasp the macro-processes and the formal language of development that development actors relate to. Another strength of the post-development discursive approach is that it makes it possible to separate the moral aspects of development concerns and the critique of the development apparatus that produce solutions to development concerns (Nustad, 2007). However, post-development authors have been accused of promoting anti-modernist ideas and romanticising the community and the local (Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; Schuurman, 2000). Nederveen Pieterse (1998) states that the “...quasi-revolutionary posturing of post-development reflects both a hunger for a new era and nostalgia for a politics of romanticism, glorification of the local, grassroots and the community with conservative overtones” (p. 366). Post-development has also been heavily criticised for its radical call for alternatives to development rather than alternative development (Nederveen Pieterse, 2000). Since no alternatives can be derived from its analyses, it also lacks the instrumentality to direct a way forward for development practice. However, I agree with Matthews (2004) who argues that post-development’s call for alternatives to development do not imply a rejection of the desire or possibility of improving the lives of people. Rather, it calls for “a new way of changing, of developing, of improving, to be constructed in the place of the ruin of the PWWII [post-World War II] development project” (p. 377). Similarly, Nustad (2007) argues that the dearth of instrumentality is not itself a tenable argument against the analysis. The call for alternatives and post-development’s attempts to demonstrate why development interventions do not work can be kept separate.

I think the main objection to the post-development approach is its rather deterministic understanding of development discourse, articulated by international development institutions, and forming a hegemonic and homogenising system of knowledge. Such a strict view on the formative power of development discourse leaves little room for the consideration of individual and collective agency in development interventions. Hence, it fails to offer an analysis of the micro-level practices of development actors and target groups (Lie, 2011). For instance, Everett (1997) claims that:
“Theoretically, post-development has been too concerned with describing development as one homogeneous field, and has overlooked the way in which development interventions have been transformed and given new meaning by those whom they seek to help.” (p. 44).

This train of thought leads us to the second wave of post-development debate.

### 4.2 Second wave of post-development debate

From the late 1990s, a new wave of development scholars modified post-development theory by including analysis of the everyday practice of development aid actors (planners, implementers, beneficiaries) to better understand the relationship between discourses of development and agency at a local practical level (e.g., Arce & Long, 2000; Crewe & Harrison, 1998; Everett, 1997; Green, 2003; Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Lie, 2008; Long, 2004; Mosse, 2005; Nustad, 2007). These authors do not totally reject the development discourse’s formative power but emphasise that development is not a coherent system imposed on a passively receptive target population. Rather, they call for a more nuanced understanding of development practice at different levels. For instance, Mosse and Lewis (2006) claim that the post-development approach is valuable as “ideological deconstructivism” but “fails to examine the relationship between the rhetoric and ‘mobilizing simplifications of policy and politics’ and the world as understood and experienced within the lives of development actors” (p. 5). Instead of viewing development interventions as a top-down transfer of knowledge, following the resources and funds from the Global North to Global South, the second-wave post-development debate is preoccupied with the development intervention as a knowledge encounter where different world views are negotiated by the actors throughout the system (international, national donor and local recipient level). In her critique of Ferguson (1994), Maria Green (2003) claims that: “…those involved in planning development are well aware of the limitations of what they are trying to achieve…” (Green, 2003, p. 124). The analytical focus should rather be on how development discourses are played out in local encounters through human agency. This needs to be studied empirically through ethnographically informed analysis where the intervention takes place. Consequently, development projects could be seen as existing on two levels, a formal level in project documents and an informal local or practical implementation level (Mosse, 2005; Lie, 2007). The researcher’s interest is to unpack the multiple realities determining how development interventions are experienced...
and articulated among different actors, how this affects the project implementation and what the consequences are in local settings.

Arce and Long (2001) suggest an actor-oriented approach to development interventions, the guiding analytical concepts of which are “agency and social actor, the notion of multiple realities and arenas of struggle where different life-worlds and discourses meet, and the idea of interface in terms of discontinuities of interests, values, knowledge and power” (p. 271). An actor-oriented approach seeks to explore the multitude of complexities and local variations among the target group as an insight to understanding the processes involved in knowledge encounters. Important to the approach is the concept of interface, defined as “a critical point of intersection between different life-worlds, social fields or levels of social organization, where social discontinuities based upon discrepancies in values, interests, knowledges and power, are most likely to be located” (Long, 2001, p. 243). Interface research thus implies shifting the analytical focus from formal development discourses or knowledge systems to the arenas where it meets reality and becomes articulated on a local level. From this, Long advocates for “an ethnographic understanding of the ‘social life’ of development projects – from conception to realization – as well as the responses and lived experiences of the variously located and affected social actors” (2001, p.14-15).

The actor-oriented approach has been criticised for neglecting broader issues of power and structure as it has a tendency to narrow the analysis towards actor strategies and consequently downplay broader structural factors (Mosse & Lewis 2006). Nustad (2007), however, calls for a combination of the insight from post-development theory with ethnographic studies of development intervention in practice by including “…an examination of how development interventions are transformed in encounters with target populations…” (p. 480). In the same vein, Lie (2007) utilizes a combination of post-development theory and actor-oriented analysis to study how involved actors face the gap between the formal discursive order manifested in project documents and local practical knowledge. Such an approach enables studies on the two levels at which the development project exists – that is, the formal level in documents and the informal local level – and how these two knowledge systems reflect each other:

“A focus on agency combined with that of discourse allows us to deal with the social dimension of development and how different levels affect each other through the study of interfaces between otherwise dichotomised realms like structure/actor, donor/recipient, or order/practice. (…) Interface and the focus on agency can help us to avoid not only compartmentalising different realms and life-worlds
but also, by facilitating an ethnography of development and aid partnerships, subsuming to a pre-empirical notion of donor power and discursive formation that override agency and practice” (Lie, 2011, p. 397).

For instance, through his studies of the development project “The Integrated Pastoral Development Program” (IPDP) founded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Lie (2007) shows how the project constituted a discourse in line with post-development theory. However, he simultaneously found a discontinuity between the discursive formal order and the local practice among the recipient organisation and actors involved.

In his influential book Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice (2005), David Mosse looks at the complex agency of actors and politics of partnership at all levels (from donor project design to implementation among recipient people) in a British-funded agriculture project in western India. Mosse challenges the assumption that the relationship between development aid policy and practice is top-down hierarchical and linear. Thus, he aims to “revise the false notion of all-powerful western development institutions” (p. 6). He understands the development process as a social process and pays attention to the complexity of policymaking, the relationship of policymaking to project practice and the coexistence of divergent agendas and interests that are negotiated. This analytical focus enables us to better understand how development acts on and through the agency and subjectivity of individuals involved in a project. The individuals may consent to developers’ dominant conceptions and development models, such as participatory planning, but can make something different of them in practice:

“Policy models and program designs have to be transformed in practice. They have to be translated into the different logic of the intentions, goals, and ambitions of the many people [e.g. consultants, local project staff, fieldworkers, beneficiaries] and institutions they bring together” (Mosse, 2005, p. 232).

What people make of these projects, and how they actually use development interventions, is what Mosse shows in this book. The point Mosse makes is that all these different subordinate actors (tribal villagers, field workers, office staff, project managers) create an everyday sphere of action autonomous from the policy models while at the same time working actively to sustain those policy models, because it is in their interest to do so. Consequently, the

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42 ODA/DFID-funded Indo-British Rainfed Farming Project (IBRFP) in western India.
outcomes of development projects are determined by the negotiations between different sets of actors and different institutions. Such research thus:

> Extend(s) study beyond projects to the broader analysis of the social relations operating within the complex institutional arrangements of development, including the constellation of public and private agencies that channel development assistance, such as the inter-governmental organisations of the United Nations, multilateral and bilateral donors such as the World Bank or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the increasingly vast array of NGOs participating in development activities. In doing so, ethnography can examine the various interests and overlapping networks involved in these arrangements (Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 4).

To sum up, the second-wave post-development debate has challenged the post-development scholar’s understanding of the primacy of hegemonic development discourses (dominating conceptions and ideas about poverty) over development practice. Thus, this debate is preoccupied with local recipient actors’ understanding of development on the one hand, and how donors’ ideas on and construction (hegemonic discourses) of development limit the recipient’s choices and opportunities on the other. The main question that can be derived from this debate for the field of SDP is whether Northern development agencies concerned with SDP, with their knowledge, skills and funding, set the terms of reference for sport-based development initiatives in the Global South.

### 4.3 Incorporating the discourse–agency discussions into SDP research

The previous chapters show that the current debate in the sport science literature concerning hegemonic Global North SDP conceptions versus local perspectives are similar to the discourse-agency discussions among development scholars. However, the SDP debate has not yet been discussed in relation to the broader discourse-agency nexus in development studies.\(^\text{43}\) Even though each article forming the basis for the thesis has its distinctive character and empirical interest, they can all be traced back to the overarching questions raised from the above-presented debates.

My position is that the development of SDP discourse’s totalising power and homogeneous effects throughout the institutional arrangements and practices of the

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\(^{43}\) Both Darnell and Hayhurst (2012) and Lindsey and Gratton (2012) relate their argument to the Post-colonial literature, but not within the longstanding hegemonic discourse – agency debate in development studies. However, even though the post-development critique is specifically directed towards the discourse of development, it shares many of the same arguments and conclusions presented in the post-colonial literature. Thus, some SDP scholars writing under the banner post-colonialism refer to post-development scholars such as Escobar (1995) and Esteva (1992).
development apparatus should be questioned. The critical hegemonic power studies in sport science research have been too bombastic in their description of SDP as a new international social movement, sharing those common traits and rhetoric as are highly influenced by international development institutions, such as is the case with the UN. The understanding of the development industry (of which SDP now forms a part) as a cohesive machine that has an homogeneous effect on SDP policies and practice worldwide, both on national donor and local level, needs to be studied empirically. Thus, the thesis rather seeks to better understand the complexity and diversity of conceptions and ideas (articulations) about SDP on a national donor level (the empirical focus in Article I and IV), as well as local practical level in recipient countries (the empirical focus in Article III). However, whereas my focus is mainly on the diversity in SDP, I simultaneously argue that SDP research should not turn its back on the “ideological deconstructivism” presented by the first wave of post-development thinkers. Despite its limitations, it is a useful starting point from which to understand the production of dominant northern conceptions on SDP, as articulated in actors’ policy framework. For instance, Norwegian SDP actors produce solutions to development challenges expressed through standardised policy models (see Article II). Moreover, and in keeping with the second-wave post-development debate, I further argue that the dominant conceptions found in Norwegian SDP to the Global South, and their homogeneous effects on development practice (involving development planners, practitioners and intended beneficiaries) in Norwegian funded interventions, need to be studied empirically. Through ethnographic research on the interplay between the formal discursive level of SDP and subjects of SDP, in settings in which projects are implemented in practice, the thesis proposes a new direction for SDP research that moves beyond the current dichotomised structure-agency debate (see Article III). The transnational donor-recipient relationship should rather be understood as a knowledge encounter, where different world views are negotiated, as well as in terms of its impact on the implementation process and intended effects. Such an approach to the ethnography of SDP can help us better understand the donor-recipient relationship in the fast-growing SDP sector and how official discourses influenced by Western donors are translated and given meaning by the recipients in the social context in which they are implemented. The next chapter clarifies how the train of thought presented in this chapter laid the basis for the research process and methods used.
5.0 Method

The appropriate research strategy in a particular study is not a priori given but depends on many factors. Patton (2002) says:

“There is no rule of thumb that tells a researcher precisely how to focus a study. The extent to which a research question is broad or narrow depends on purpose, the resources available, the time available, and the interests of those involved. In brief, these are not choices between good and bad, but choices among alternatives, all of which have merit” (Patton, p. 224, cited in Mikkelsen 2005, p. 139).

The research strategy and choice of the method(s) are, however, often determined on the basis of theory and the research questions it is meant to answer (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Further, the researcher’s personal experience and understanding within the field of study can influence the choices made. In this chapter, I begin by presenting my role and experience in the field of SDP. The research process, which is divided into four steps, is then presented. Emphasis is placed on the coherence between the four steps in the data collection process, the different methods used and the challenges I encountered. Specific information is already presented in the Method chapter in the articles (e.g., documents analysed, informants interviewed) are not repeated in this chapter.

5.1 Positionality – part-insider/part-outsider position

To create credible research, a crucial aspect for social science researchers utilizing qualitative methodology is to clarify their position with regard to the field of study. A differentiation is often made between insider and outsider research (see Merton, 1972). *Insider research* refers to a research project where the researcher has a direct involvement or connection with the research setting. Thus, insider researchers study a field to which they belong and a group to which they hold a membership (i.e., they share an identity, language and experiential base with the participants). The advantages of being an insider include (a) easy access to people and information, (b) participants typically being more open with the researcher, potentially affording greater depth to the data gathered, and (c) in-depth knowledge of many of the complex issues that promote both the telling and the judging of truth (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007; Unluer, 2012). However, from a positivist standpoint, insider research lacks objectivity.

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44 There exist a variety of definitions for insider researchers. Two definitions relevant for this thesis are (i) “research by complete members of organizational systems and communities in and on their own organizations, in contrast to organizational research that is conducted by researchers who temporarily join the organization for the purposes and duration of the research” (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007, p. 59), (ii) “research conducted by people who are already members of the organization or community they are seeking to investigate as a result of education, employment, social networks or political engagements” (Humphrey, 2012, p. 572)
The blurring boundaries between the researcher and the researched (role duality) make it difficult for researchers to separate their personal experience and prior knowledge from that of the research participants. This might undermine the validity and distort the results.\textsuperscript{45} Outsider research\textsuperscript{46} refers to a research project where the researcher has neither a direct nor indirect connection to the field and does not share a membership with the group being studied. Outsider research secures a high degree of objectivity to the data and results. On the other hand, “distant” researchers might fail to uncover how the field in question (e.g., organisations, groups of people) “really works” as they have not experienced it (Kerstetter, 2012).\textsuperscript{47}

The insider/outside dichotomy is overly simplistic. Holding an insider position does not mean that the researcher cannot understand as an outsider, or vice versa. Furthermore, the researcher’s identity is usually not static in qualitative research processes; it is relative and changing depending on factors such as (a) where and when the study was undertaken, (b) the personalities of the researcher and informants and (c) the research topic (Kerstetter, 2012). Dwyer and Buckle (2009) argue that:

“Holding membership in a group does not denote complete sameness within that group. Likewise, not being a member of a group does not denote complete difference. It seems paradoxical, then, that we would endorse binary alternatives that unduly narrow the range of understanding and experience” (p. 60).

They use the term “the space between” to propose a dialectical approach by which the researcher occupies the position of both insider and outsider. The focus is rather on the relational and dynamic aspects of the researcher’s position depending on the research context. Brannick & Coghlan (2007) point out that those researchers obtaining an insider or part-insider/part-outsider position can minimize the impact of bias on the research through a process of reflexivity. First of all, researchers need to be “aware of the strengths and limits of their preunderstanding so that they can use their experiential and theoretical knowledge to reframe their understanding of situations to which they are close” (p. 72). Subsequently, the researchers’ task is to make sure that their position vis-à-vis the research process is

\textsuperscript{45} Other potential problems are (i) Participants assume the researcher shares the same knowledge and experience and fail to explain their individual experience fully (ii) Face issues of confidentiality when informants from their own community/group share sensitive information.

\textsuperscript{46} Brannick & Coghlan (2007) emphasise that the discussion on the insider-outside research is a methodological one, focusing solely on the development of academic knowledge. Thus, it should “not to be confused with the long-standing relevance debate between academic theory and practitioner interests” (p. 61).

\textsuperscript{47} Other disadvantages are (i) Difficulty gaining access to information and research participants (ii)
transparent and honest, making it easy for readers to make up their own opinion on the research.

The above discussion is relevant to my position with regard to the Norwegian SDP community (organisations and practitioners) to which this thesis relates. As a former professional footballer in the Norwegian Premier League and with national youth football teams during the period of 1996–2004, I have inside experience and knowledge about Norwegian sports. I have personally experienced the positive and negative aspects of sports, on both an individual and a societal level. Having membership within Norwegian elite sport has given me a broad contact base, including persons within Norwegian sports policy organisations, such as the NIF and the NFF. During my doctoral fellowship, I have also worked within the Norwegian SDP apparatus while managing the Sports, Culture and Development Cooperation study programme at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences (NIH) (during the period of 2010 to 2014). The programme is managed through a partnership with several Norwegian SDP actors that offer placements at Norad and MFA-funded SDP projects in Asia, Africa and South America. The close collaboration with various Norwegian SDP organisations and the close contact with sports volunteers (students) during this period has given me an understanding of how the field works (a) inside the national donor level in Norway (the relationship between the NGOs and between NGOs and Norwegian donor agencies such as the MFA and Norad) and (b) inside countries receiving Norwegian SDP (the relationship between Norwegian NGOs and recipients or local partner organisations). My membership role within the Norwegian SDP community has greatly contributed to my understanding of the field in Norway and in the South, as well as the empirical interest and discussions concerning the current challenges in Norwegian SDP presented in the articles.

A clear parallel can be drawn to the methods discussion in the aforementioned book *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practise* by David Mosse (2005). Mosse combines his own empirical knowledge from the various roles he himself held in the project (from policy design to implementation) with a researcher’s view from the outside. In this manner he achieves a close proximity to the processes at all levels, something he argues is particularly difficult for researchers studying development organisations and their development assistance from the outside:

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During this period I have been responsible for 85 students. The students work as volunteer aid workers for close to one year and thereby engage in the Norwegian development (SDP) apparatus. The main partners are NIF, NFF, Karanba and Christian Sport Contact.
“Certainly for outsiders access to the workings of development agencies is difficult. For one thing, such agencies operate within a nexus of evaluation and external funding which means that effective mechanisms for filtering and regulating the flow of information and stabilising representations are necessary for survival” (Mosse, 2005, p. 12).49

I argue that my part-insider/part-outsider position gives strength to the analyses in this thesis. Throughout the research process, I have evaluated my insider/outside role to find an appropriate role in “the space between”. Proximity to the field has, however, created challenges concerning the research strategy and methodological choices (validity and reliability). The leading interest for the choices made has been my desire to understand the complexity inherent in Norwegian SDP but at the same time to achieve objectivity with regard to the field. Consequently, my experience from inside Norwegian sports and Norwegian SDP does not form the basis for the empirical data material presented in the articles. Research data, analyses and results are first and foremost based on formal policy documents produced by the organisations, formal conversations/interviews and observations when this was pre-arranged in Norway and in the South. However, my experiences and observations as an insider are brought up in Chapter 6.2, which discusses the results in this thesis. Furthermore, the findings and the discussion in the thesis are a result of a multi-method and multi-sited research programme, discussed on the basis of a larger theoretical development aid debate. The next chapter explains the research process, methods used and challenges met.

49 Mosse (2005) also describes how he became unpopular with the leadership of the development organisation under study. They tried to prevent the publication of his research with the argument that the book would provide an “unbalanced and damaging account of the project and will harm the professional reputations of many of those who worked at the project and the future work of the agency with poor tribal communities in India” [p. ix-x].
5.2 The research process

Figure 2: The research process
The presentation of the research question and the theoretical framework indicates that the study presupposes the use of several methods of data collection. Figure 2 show a schematic presentation of the research process that serves as the basis for the thesis. The process incorporates four steps. Each step consists of a sub-question that forms the basis for the choice of methods. The four data collection processes form the basis for the four articles, respectively. However, the articles were written simultaneously and not published in the order shown above. The boxes “Further research” indicates that new research questions can be drawn from the results in this thesis. These are presented in the articles and in Chapter 6.4.

5.2.1 Step 1
The first step in the research process is based on the current dearth of research concerning SDP within the various national development aid donor systems. I was interested in identifying the dominant, and possibly competing, perspectives on the relationships between sport, development and peace within the Norwegian development aid system – as articulated in governmental development agencies’ and NGOs’ policy documents – and interviews with people working in these. The data collection in the first process was conducted in two phases, the first between 2009 and 2010, the second between 2012 and 2013. The second mode of data collection was carried out at the time of writing the article in order to see whether the SDP agencies held the same position as in the first period (some organisations had applied for funding for new projects, others had written new policy documents). The interviews were also conducted in the second phase.

The written sources were open and publicly available documents (policy and strategy documents, the sport and development aid agencies’ letters of assurance from the MFA or Norad). Documents are used as primary source material in textual analyses because they are (a) coherent – containing a certain topic, a common thread and (b) communicative – they have a message to convey (Bergstrøm & Boreus, 2005). Additionally, they are not created for the sake of a particular study. Written texts can therefore offer new and objective knowledge about the phenomenon in question and can lead to new questions (Yin, 2003). Common in textual analysis is the study of human communication. There are a number of different

50 Article II and III were submitted first, as they formed part of (at that time) an ongoing SDP debate in International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics. Additionally, the publication of Article IV before the Olympic Games in Sochi (February 2014) was prioritised, as it was relevant for the discussions on human rights violations in the run-up and during the course of the Games.
methodological approaches in which text is used as empirical material. However, there is room for one’s own development of analytical strategies. A discourse analysis was chosen for the first research process. Discourse analysis is “primarily a qualitative method of ‘reading’ texts, conversations and documents which explores the connections between language, communication, knowledge, power and social practices” (Muncie, 2006, p. 1). The term “discourse” refers to “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 1). However, the term “discourse analysis” covers numerous theoretical approaches and analytical constructs. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) argue that a discourse analysis may consist of a combination of elements from different discourse-analytical perspectives. But the “package solution” must not be theoretically and methodologically inconsistent and must build upon the fundamental premises for the use of discourse analysis as a research method.

The discourse analysis begins with the assumption that the language, whether written texts or oral statements, is not a reflection of reality but a representation that helps to shape it. Instead of perceiving that ideas are of material reality, one can see them as requiring a language, which in turn organises the social reality (Bergstrøm & Boreus, 2005). By constructing the reality in a specific way, certain types of acts are rendered relevant and others unthinkable. This perspective is often associated with Michel Foucault’s work. In what is often defined as his archaeological phase, Foucault was interested in uncovering “the rules that determine which statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a particular historical epoch” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 12). Foucault therefore claims that discourses are relatively rule-bound, setting limits for what is meaningful and what is perceived as truth. In what is referred to as his ‘genealogical phase’, he connects this understanding to power and its relation to knowledge (the power lies in constructing discourses). Most discourse-analytical approaches build upon Foucault’s understanding of discourse, that it is relatively rule-bound and thereby sets limits for what is meaningful. However, many discourse theorists break with his monism, which they replace with a more conflicted image, in which different discourses exist simultaneously or struggle to determine the truth (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). For instance, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe focus on the notion that discourses are established through a struggle between various understandings or representations within a given field. This is also defined as the order of discourse, a “social space in which different

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51 Bergstrøm & Boreus (2005) present several analytical strategies of written texts in social science: Content analysis, argumentation analysis, idea- and ideology analysis, narrative analysis, linguistic analysis and discourse analysis.
discourses partly cover the same terrain which they compete to fill with meaning, each in their own particular way” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 56). Whichever of the competing discourses achieves a dominant or hegemonic position in an order of discourse is therefore central to their analysis. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) use the term “field of discursivity” to define any actual or potential meaning outside the specific discourse that can potentially threaten to undermine the dominating discourse(s) within a given order of discourse: “a reservoir for the ‘surplus of meaning’ produced by the articulatory practice – that is, the meanings that each sign has, or has had, in other discourses, but which are excluded by the specific discourse in order to create a unity of meaning” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 27). Thus, power is also central, but now as a struggle between various discourses. Regardless of the approach to discourse analysis, the point is that the discourse has certain implications. It recommends certain actions and a certain practice (Bergstrøm & Boreus, 2005).

During the first step of the data collection, I found that the Norwegian SDP field comprised a higher number of actors than first anticipated. In addition, it was clear that the actors had different perspectives of, and different approaches to, sport as an instrument in development aid work. I chose to include all the Norwegian SDP actors in the first step of the research process. Through a discourse analysis of the organisations’ policy documents and applications for funds, as well as letters of assurance from Norad and the MFA (from 2005-2013), the various representations (understandings) of the Norwegian international SDP engagement were identified. In all, 55 documents were analysed. I searched for patterns in the statements and the social consequences that the different discursive representations of reality had on the way the various actors conceptualised sport and development aid. The Norwegian SDP area was defined as an order of discourse, and the analysis targeted the way in which individual discourses lent meaning to the SDP field, the truisms they shared, and where it was that open struggles between different representations could be identified. The analysis of the discursive struggles also made it possible to ask what the consequences would be if one were accepted over the other.

In addition to identifying different understandings of SDP and potential conflicts that can arise as a result, I was interested in how the actors themselves experienced this. A total of 10 interviews were conducted with representatives who managed SDP engagements in NGOs that between 2005 and 2013 had received or applied for funding with Norad or the MFA for
SDP projects. The interviewees provided in-depth and specific information regarding the cases and the relevant research question. I chose short, focused interviews (approximately 30 min.). This method allowed me to use a set of pre-prepared questions but at the same time allowed the respondent to contribute with facts and personal opinions on the topic (Yin, 2003). The questions concentrated on two main topics: (a) Do the actors’ descriptions of SDP correspond with the formal organisations’ descriptions of SDP engagement? (b) Do the actors perceive that there is tension between the two different organisations as a result of different perspectives on SDP identified in the analysis of the organisations’ policy strategies?

5.2.2 Steps 2 and 3
The next two steps were narrowly focused on the discourse-agency nexus in development studies and concentrated on the SDP commitment of the Norwegian Confederation of Sports (NIF) to Zimbabwe. As mentioned in Chapter 2.3, NIF had a hegemonic position to define Norwegian SDP in the 1990s. Informed by the first wave of post-structural critique of the development apparatus, in Step 2, I was first and foremost interested in studying the formal NIF SDP discourse as expressed in policy documents, reports and allocation letters to Norad. The empirical and analytical focus was on the project in Zimbabwe in the period from 1990 until 2008 and the power effects produced. I was granted full access to the public archives of the NIF, Norad and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Zimbabwe. Thirty-five documents making claims and contentions about SDP were analysed. As shown in Chapter 4.1, the post-development school of thought was inspired by the Foucauldian discourse analysis and understanding of power. Thus, special attention was given to analysing the patterns in the statements, claims about how SDP should be understood (e.g., values motivating, justifying and governing their work) and hidden relations of power presented in the text (Whose discourses are being presented? How are the recipients of the Norwegian SDP perceived?).

As shown in the theory chapter, post-development analysis has been criticised for reducing reality to concepts and ideas about development and its lack of focus on actors. In the third step, and informed by the second-wave post-development debate, the focus of the research was shifted from the macro-level (national, global) to the micro-level (local) of Norwegian SDP – towards concrete attempts to promote development. In order to empirically study how Norwegian SDP discourses were articulated at an actor level in local recipient

52 Most organisations had an administration working specifically with SDP or a specific department in which the SDP project was administered.
communities, a combination of discourse analysis and an actor-oriented research design was applied. This phase of the research process consisted of fieldwork at various Norwegian-funded projects in Jordan (NFF), Tanzania (KRIK, Norwegian Peoples Aid, Right to Play), Zambia (NIF), South Africa (NIF) and Zimbabwe (NIF), which took four months in total. However, it is the fieldwork at NIF’s development aid engagement in Zimbabwe that forms the basis for the empirical evidence in Article III. The fieldwork was conducted with the use of participant observations and interviews.

Field studies in development studies, often used synonymously with ‘participant observation’, implies studies that “are set among the people, who are the subjects of a study or invention, be this in the South or in the North” (Mikkelsen, 2005). In anthropology and sociology, it is common to refer to such studies as ‘ethnography’. Ethnographic studies describe what people say and do in a context that is not structured by the researcher. The detailed descriptions of people’s reality offer the researcher a greater opportunity to understand the less obvious aspects of the field in question (Fangen, 2010). As with discourse analysis, there are no definitive rules on how to conduct ethnographic research. However, the researcher must reflect upon the role he/she has (or takes) in the field in question and among the people involved in it. The researcher’s role in field work can be divided between two ends of a continuum: Either to observe only what is taking place or to fully participate and interact with those being studied. Fangen (2010) defines different but partly overlapping roles on this continuum: (a) partially participating observer, (b) fully participating observer, (c) non-participating observer, (d) non-observing participant/go native, (e) intervening participant role (p. 74-80). The field researcher usually moves between these roles depending on the purpose of the study. In many cases the choice of researcher role in participant observations depends on the researcher’s theoretical position and research question. However, since the context and the cultural codes are often unknown when the researcher enters the field for the first time, it is difficult to plan the participant role in advance. In addition, the choice of role(s) in field work must be appraised on the validity and reliability of the study. The challenge is therefore to find a balance between participation inside and outside the field in question and to “be able to understand as an insider, but at the same time describe so that outsiders can understand” (Fangen, 2010, p. 73).

Actor-oriented data from the other countries/projects will be used in other articles.
The objective of my fieldwork in Zimbabwe was to get close to the reality of the actors on the recipient side and gain a deeper understanding of the complex social relations in the project. During the fieldwork I assumed primarily a non-participating observer role when I participated in formal settings, such as planning sessions. It was also natural to assume this role in order not to affect the political processes in the project I was interested in better understanding. The objective was therefore to observe the interaction rather than take part in the interaction and the dialogue with participants in formal settings.

There are many challenges associated with the various roles in fieldwork. There may, for instance, be structural differences between the researcher and the persons involved in the field in question. Examples of this are age, ethnicity and nationality, class and gender (Fangen, 2010). In the course of the fieldwork, I continually experienced conflicting roles, in that the participants themselves attempted to involve me in a more participatory role. One example of this is when, at a planning session in advance of a major national sports event, I was asked to contribute my views and advice. In addition, I was asked whether I could obtain football jerseys from Norway to be distributed to the participants at the event. On the one hand, this can be interpreted as my having been accepted by the persons who participated in the study and having thus succeeded in becoming naturally assimilated into their everyday practice, an objective of the field researcher. On the other hand, it can be interpreted as me being perceived as an expert from Norway, by force of my privileged status as white (without possessing the necessary knowledge), and it can therefore be understood as a manifestation of the distorted balance of power between white and black people in Zimbabwe (also in sport). Fangen (2010) points out that such role blurring can yield interesting data and new insight to the field of study. However, in such situations, it is crucial that the researcher reflect upon the potential consequences that the blurring of roles can have for the object of inquiry’s perception of the researcher, which can result in negative reactions. Another important point is that the researcher must reflect upon what consequences the role blurring, or the shift from one role to another, can have for the research outcome itself. In the aforementioned planning session, I politely refused the offer to contribute my own ideas and understanding. In this case, it was important to maintain the role as a non-participating observer to avoid ending up studying processes that I myself had affected. In other contexts, I chose to enter the role as a fully participant observer. For instance, during a visit to a Norwegian-funded SDP event on World AIDS Day in Dar es Salaam, an NIF representative and I were asked to distribute

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54 Funded with money from the TV campaign in 2007 (UNICEF, Right to Play and the NIF).
trophies to the participants. In that role I was perceived as a representative of the donor agencies. This yielded many interesting observations and first-hand experience of the donor-recipient relationship in practice.

Field studies are often conducted as a combination of participant observation and interviews. Since the research question focused on how the actors relate to Norwegian ideas, values and knowledge manifested at the discursive level, the second layer of research in Step 2 consisted of interviews conducted during the fieldwork (in total 26 informants, 16 informants in Zimbabwe). The interviews were semistructured and lasted from 45 to 60 minutes. All interviews were recorded with permission from the informants and later transcribed. Fangen (2010) highlights three main advantages of combining participant observations and interviews. Firstly, interviews can serve as a gateway to establish contact with persons who are involved in the field in question. Secondly, the combination can enhance the validity of the study since the results can be quality assured through a comparison of the results. Thirdly, the researcher can gain in-depth answers by confronting the interviewee with the observation data (p. 172). In the context of the study focus in step 3, the interviews were conducted to explore each interviewee’s own reflections and how he or she interpreted various experiences as a development worker in local communities. Many field studies that combine observations and interviews have been criticised for emphasising the results of the interview data at the expense of the interaction data. Atkinson and Coffey (2003), however, warn against attempts to give participant observation (what people do) a privileged position in relation to interviews (what people say). Clear similarities between the two methods exist. The interview situation, which involves interaction through conversation, must be understood as part of a social act in the field in question – and must therefore be understood in the same way as other observations of social acts. What people do is no more difficult to understand and interpret than what people say they do: “After all, the ‘data’ of participant observation are the events as narrated (written down often retrospectively) by observers, and hence rely on the same culturally shared categories of memory, account, narrative, and experience” (Atkinson & Coffey, 2003, p. 121). Despite the parallels that can be drawn between the two methods, I agree with Fangen (2010), who points out that interview data should not be treated as action data. Interviews should be seen more as

55 The interviews were conducted together with Solveig Straume. She is also co-author on Article III.

56 They distance themselves from the naturalistic research paradigm promoted by the Chicago school in the 1930s which claims that participant observation is the only method of getting close to the social field and giving a neutral or “real” description of the social phenomena.
people’s self-representation because one cannot take for granted that what people say they do is what they actually do. For instance, in Zimbabwe I experienced that what was articulated by some Zambian interviewees often was in line with the Norwegian SDP discourse but not in accordance with my observations of how projects had been implemented in practice. However, mismatches between the interviews and the observations yield interesting data (see Chapter 6.2 or Article III). Thus, observations and interviews are two different types of data collection that can yield different information and knowledge. They can also be used in combination to gain a broader understanding of the field under study. In Article III, the empirical evidence is presented through a combination of observation and interview data. It is, however, important to emphasise that the purpose of the interviews was to ask questions based on the observation data and knowledge I had gained through work inside Norwegian SDP. In this way, quotes from the interviews reflect in-depth answers of observation data.

There are, as with observations, a number of challenges associated with interviews and the interview situation. Examples of what can affect the results include (i) leading questions, (ii) the interviewee experiencing the interview situation as uncomfortable and (iii) the interviewee adapting to the interviewer’s fixed categories. Rapley (2004) is critical of the tendency in the qualitative methods literature towards a “technification” of interviews to gain scientific neutrality. The result is often a clearly distant relationship between the researcher and the informant in an interview situation. Rather, Rapley perceives interviews as “social encounters where speakers collaborate in producing retrospective (and prospective) accounts or versions of their past (or future) actions, experiences, feelings and thoughts” (p. 16). From this perspective the interview process is itself an interaction between interviewer and interviewee and to remain neutral is thus impossible. The objective of such an approach is to prevent an asymmetrical power relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee. I argue, as with observations, that the role of the researcher in interview situations can be situated between two ends of a continuum reflecting the interviewer’s degree of neutrality or interaction in the interview situation: (a) full distance to the informant; to ask only a standardised set of questions in a given order, or (b) full interaction with the informant; to participate in the dialogue. The researcher’s challenge in an interview situation is to find a balance between the two poles of the spectrum that gives relevant information coherent with the purpose of the study.

I found it most appropriate to adopt a more neutral role in interviews when the purpose was to gather specific information about the organisations or projects in Zimbabwe (for
example, the staff at the head office in Harare). When the research focus was on the local perspective on SDP (such as province coordinators and local implementers), *semi-structured interviews* were opted for, in order that I could participate more actively in the dialogue. In semi-structured interviews, the focus of the interview is decided by the researcher. However, the questions are open-ended, allowing new ideas and viewpoints to be brought up and discussed during the interview as a result of what the interviewee says (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Such interaction with the informant places even more stringent requirements on the interviewer’s contextual understanding: one’s location, to whom one is speaking, how one feels, how much of one’s own ideas and attitudes shall be shared etc. (Rapley 2004). This is particularly important in cross-cultural interviews or interviews with people living in poor conditions. In such situations, the researcher’s privileged status in relation to the informant is often strengthened and affects the interview situation.

The social and cultural characteristics of the society the researcher enters might also affect the communication between the interviewee and the interviewer. Thus, to be able to report findings in a way that remains true to the respondents, the researcher needs to develop a sound understanding of the culture and cultural behaviour of the society from which he/she will be collecting and interpreting data (Liamputtong, 2008). An example of a culturally sensitive issue faced during the field work is that Zimbabwe is a highly monitored society where many people are cautious in public places and public buildings. This could create barriers, hindering informants from discussing controversial topics. Thus, most of the interviews were conducted in other settings. Interestingly, this shows how the interaction in the interview situation can be understood as a social act and can therefore *in and of itself* yield valuable research data (Fangen, 2010). Furthermore, the role of language is often fundamental in cross-cultural qualitative research, as the researcher often needs to use a language assistant to translate conversation and interviews. However, language assistants can have a tremendous influence on the knowledge-creation process in the interview situations and thus the data itself (Liamputtong, 2008). To avoid any misunderstandings caused by the translation process, the interviews with Zimbabwean informants were conducted in English. This was possible as English is one of three official languages in Zimbabwe and all the informants spoke English fluently.
5.2.3 Step 4

In step 4, the focus is shifted back home and to the alternative strategy of Mega Sport Events identified in the first research process (see Figure 2). As shown earlier, large sporting events, such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup have gained greater attention within the international policy field of SDP, and are articulated as a catalyst for development, peace and the promotion of human rights. The empirical focus is, as in Articles I and II, on how the engagement is articulated at a national level in Norway. The study sought to identify Norwegian human rights organisations’ (HROs) understanding of the Olympic Games as an arena for human rights activism and how this was reflected in their engagement. First, eight Norwegian human rights organisations that became involved with the 2008 Olympics in Beijing were identified. Second, representatives from each organisation were interviewed. Article IV stands out from the other articles because it relates to the human rights debate and the literature on HRO activism within the academic field of international relations. However, the choice of empirical focus follows the thesis’s general criticism of the post-structural notion of homogenisation of hegemonic discourses through international development institutions that affect both the national donor level and the development practice level. Hence, it is argued that there exists a need to fill the gap in the literature on studies directed at the articulation of Mega Sport Events as a catalyst for human rights change on a national and a local level (how the Norwegian engagement through Mega Sport Events is articulated on a local level is, however, not included in this thesis).

Large sporting events were a new arena for the Norwegian organisations, and none of them had developed a formal policy strategy. As there are few written sources, and since few similar studies on large sporting events have been conducted, structured interviews were chosen as the method. The informants were selected on the basis of their position and responsibility for the organisations’ Olympic Games involvement. Structured interviews are characterised by a rigorous set of questions to which the informants respond in a given/set order (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). This was done in order to identify the HROs’ involvement prior to the Olympics, how they evaluated their involvement subsequent to the Games, and their views on future international sporting events. The structured interviews also made comparisons between the various HROs and between the different interview periods possible. In the follow-up interviews, conducted in 2013, the informants were reminded of the responses they gave in 2009. The informants were then asked to say whether the organisation was currently of the same opinion. The objective was to see whether these organisations still
held the same opinions as in 2009 and whether they still anticipated engaging in future sports events. I also looked at media statements by these HROs in order to check their answers and obtain a broader picture of their total activity in connection with the Beijing Games. I also undertook a number of interviews with human rights experts and researchers in order to check statements made by the organisations.

5.3 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations in the research process affected both the observations I made as a participant inside Norwegian SDP (the insider role) and the observation and interview situations in the formal research process. For example, conversations with the organisations as an insider yielded detailed information regarding internal conflicts within the organisations, between Norwegian organisations and partners in the South and between the organisations in Norway. Much of the information was of interest to the research and concerned the main research question in this thesis. In order to avoid ethical challenges, this information was not used as research data but instead used to draft relevant research questions for the informants in the various organisations.

Ethical considerations in the thesis are related primarily to interview and observation situations. In research processes 1 and 4, I chose to divide the organisations into groups. This was an analytical measure that contributed to a greater degree of anonymity for the organisations and the respective informants. This was also important in regard to my insider position, which was more likely to uncover sensitive material about the organisations and people involved. During the research processes 2 and 3, emphasis was placed on referring to the position of the informants. In research process 3, which looked at SDP at a local level in Zimbabwe, the informants were further anonymised in that neither their regions nor local communities were mentioned in Article III. This was important, as several of the informants themselves brought up controversial topics that related to the SDP projects in question. From the data collecting period until the results were published, personal data was registered anonymous without exception.57

57 Data Protection Official for Research (NSD) specify that for a research project not to be subject to notification “all electronic data processed through the entire research process has to be anonymous” and “no sensitive data can be linked to directly identifiable personal data, nor via code or reference number referring to a separate list of names” (nsd.no). I have searched for guidance at NSD throughout the research process. Based on the way in which personal data have been processed, they have concluded that this thesis is not subject to notification requirements and submitting a notification form has not been necessary.
There are also many ethical considerations with regard to the different roles of the field researcher. Examples of where this may arise include (a) the researcher participating in such a way that it creates confusion and aggression among the participants because the natural interaction has been broken down, (b) the researcher participating with the objects of inquiry in activities that do not correspond with the laws or shared norms in the society and (c) the researcher placing the participants in difficult situations or affecting them in such a way that they become stressed or alter their self-image (Fangen, 2010, p. 86-87; Liamputtong, 2008). Another point is that the researcher, through participation, can reinforce negative self-images. This is particularly important in a development aid context. During my fieldwork I personally experienced researchers that, with good intentions, handed out jerseys and other sports equipment as gifts to the local population in impoverished areas. This can reinforce the power inequality in the donor-recipient relationship. At the same time, as a researcher, one encounters clear expectations of material gifts, money or favours (arranging trials with Norwegian football teams, gaining admission to sport science programmes in Norway etc.). I experienced many challenging situations in terms of balancing these types of expectations whilst maintaining good relationships with other persons involved in the empirical field I was studying. The examples above illustrate ethical dilemmas that can arise in fieldwork in terms not only of how the researcher affects the persons in the field but also how ethical choices can affect the research process and the research outcomes. In other contexts, for example, where sports activities were organised in practice, I participated to a greater extent in the interaction by participating in the practical implementation of the event and in conversations with participants in and around it. This afforded me greater room for manoeuvre and I was able to shift between the various research roles without encountering the ethical dilemmas described above.

Finally, it is important to highlight that this thesis is concerned with questions on conceptual elements of SDP and attempts to address how SDP works, rather than whether it works. Thus, the study cannot be understood as an evaluation of the organisations in question (whether in Norway and in the South), nor of the persons who work in these organisations, nor as a judgement of success or failure.
6.0 Results and discussions

The previous chapters have shown the general context and the theme of the thesis. The empirical impetus is that we currently know little about the complexities of Norwegian SDP at either the national level in Norway or the local level in recipient countries. The general theme of the articles is the specific mobilisation and implementation of sport as a means of meeting the goals and challenges of international development and peace work as seen from a Norwegian perspective (Articles I, II and IV) and the knowledge encounter between Norwegian and local actors (Article III). Thus, all four articles are empirical contributions aimed at filling the gap in the literature on studies that seek to understand the field of SDP from the perspective of an individual donor country and local recipient community context. At the same time, each article has its own distinct and unique character. The next chapter summarises the articles separately. Based on the results presented in individual articles, four main conclusions are presented. These are further discussed beyond the discussions in the individual articles. Finally, the implications of the results on further policy design and research on SDP are discussed.

6.1 The articles and findings

6.1.1 Article I, Norwegian sports aid: Exploring the Norwegian “Sport for Development and Peace” Discourse

Few studies on the contemporary field of Norwegian SDP exist. The first paper is focused on how Norwegian SDP to the Global South has developed within the Norwegian development aid system. It explores the contemporary heterogeneity of Norwegian NGOs concerned with SDP on the national development aid scene, the different policy strategies articulated, as well as how Norwegian SDP can be understood in the context of distinctive national characteristics and traditions.

Based on the organisations’ values, identity and strategies (linking their vision and project activities), the current dominant conceptual understanding of SDP in Norwegian development aid can be divided into two broad categories: Sport First and Development Through Sport. Through an advocacy and transformative role, the Sport First strategy (articulated by NIF and NFF) targets SDP through a welfare-oriented, state-centred, top-down and scaled-up approach. The strategy seeks to bring about a systemic change in societies by transforming the institutional arrangement of public sport services to benefit children and
youth. In the long run, the structures should be governed and funded by the recipient state, administered by national sporting organisations and run by local communities. The mobilisation and organisation of community participation through new national sporting arrangements, recognised by the state, thus creates a foundation for collective action that can empower communities, strengthen individuals’ rights and play a role in enhancing democracy and welfare states. The other strategy, Development Through Sport, is characteristic of SDP NGOs and traditional development aid actors. These actors consider their role to be that of a service provider of sport. Thus, their main focus is to address specific Norwegian official development aid objectives through sport. The strategy is directed towards empowerment of societies from below, as an indirect outcome of the development of individuals through the service delivery of sport activities, life-skills training and awareness building through non-sporting activity programs. In addition, three alternative conceptual understandings of SDP are articulated in Norwegian SDP: Development through Talent Identification, Development First and Development through Mega Sporting Events. Organisations representing these categories are not (yet) accepted within the Norwegian development aid system.

Further, the article argues that the different conceptual understanding of SDP, and potential tensions between the different actors, need to be understood along two axes. The differences and the tension between the NGOs are played out on a horizontal axis (“Big-D”/“little-d” development). Here the analysis identifies varying perceptions of SDP, illustrating how tension among the organisations can arise with regard to the role of sport and NGOs in the development arena in the Global South. The tensions between the NGOs and donor agencies are played out along a vertical axis (“politics in SDP”/“SDP in politics”). The analysis identifies the fact that tension can arise between the organisations’ political mandate and the Norwegian government’s development aid and foreign policy ambitions of becoming a humanitarian superpower. This shows that Norwegian SDP does not exist in a vacuum on the domestic level, but is structurally integrated into the Norwegian development aid system and traditions. It contradicts the assertion in the mainstream SDP literature that the policy field of SDP needs to be understood as stemming from or belonging to an international SDP social movement. The article concludes by suggesting that further studies should move the analytical focus from the SDP NGOs’ official policy strategies to local informal practices on the recipient to better understand the extent to which Norwegian SDP-discourses shape development practice in cooperating countries.
6.1.2 Article II, “They need to get the feeling that these are their ideas”: Trusteeship in Norwegian Sport for Development and Peace to Zimbabwe

The second paper pays closer attention to the dominant *Sport First strategy* identified in Article I. The study focuses on NIF’s discourse in their cooperation with the Sports and Recreation Commission of Zimbabwe, and how this produces NIF’s SDP reality, lends meaning to its SDP engagement and establishes fundamental conditions in the development and implementation of its SDP policies. Further, the article aims to discuss this in the light of the concept of development. The main research questions of the paper are: Which power effects\(^{58}\) arise from the discourse formation produced by NIF throughout the project? How did changes in the formal discourse throughout the project affect the notion of trusteeship?

Informed by the first wave of post-development theory, the analysis identifies two power effects arising from the discourse produced by NIF throughout the Zimbabwean project. The first, *manageable development*, means that NIF viewed SDP through the lens of a Norwegian sports model and thus neglected alternatives other than its own to solve the lack of sports development. The second, *temporal segregation*, means that NIF described SRC on a different evolutionary stage than Norwegian sports, with the de-politicisation of the underdevelopment of sports being the consequence. These are power effects, because NIF positioned itself to define possible and valid solutions for developing sports in Zimbabwe. It was also found that throughout the Zimbabwean project, the discourse changed from a top-down to a bottom-up discourse. Despite this, trusteeship was present throughout the Zimbabwean project, since it was NIF that set the terms of the aid and it was NIF’s own ideas, politics and intentions that were being reproduced in the formal discourse. This shows the relevance of post-development analysis within the field of SDP. It was also argued that it might be insufficient to analyse only the discourse found in project policies and plans as these do not necessarily reflect development practice. Therefore, it was suggested that SDP research in the future needs to relate to the discourse-versus-agency debate within development studies, and examine how development policies developed by the donors are translated and given meaning by the recipients in the local context in which they are implemented.

\(^{58}\) With the term “power effect”, I mean that someone (and in this case NIF) has the knowledge, the skills and the funding to define themselves as developers on behalf of someone else (in this case the Zimbabwean SRC).
6.1.3 Article III, Sport for Development and Peace policy discourse and local practice: Norwegian Sport for Development and Peace to Zimbabwe

The third article follows the two previous articles’ concluding suggestion for further research and moves the analytical focus from the formal discourses on development to local practices and local realities on the recipient side. Informed by the second wave of post-development scholars, the article discusses the interplay between discourse and agency in the SRC-NIF SDP project Community Sports Development Programme (CSDP) by asking how official discourses in the project, funded and influenced by Norwegian donors, are interpreted and given meaning by the recipients in the social context where they are implemented.

The findings show that the sport club and volunteerism discourse, which form the project’s ideological foundation, are modified when the focus shifts from the formal discursive level of CSDP to the practical implementation level of the project. Even though CSDP implementers operate within the CSDP development discourse, they do not always reproduce existing knowledge and discursive formation of CSDP. The study shows that on a practical level, implementers generate local contextual counter-development (local people’s strategic counter-action to the development trends, concepts, methods and ideology that form the intervention) to bridge separate systems of knowledge by implementing the community sport-club model within the local schools where sport traditionally has been organised. In this way, local project staff simultaneously overcomes local challenges, such as the lack of safe spaces, lack of voluntary engagement and sport’s low status among parents. The implemented hybrid sport-club model shows how local project practice differs from its representation as specified in project documents. Hence, the interface between Norwegian SDP values and concepts represented in the CSDP’s formal discourse, and the local realities in the communities we visited, illustrate the nature and significance of ongoing struggles between mainstream development discourses and various forms of counter-development in local realities.

6.1.4 Article IV, Norwegian Human Rights Organisations and Olympic Games

The last paper studies the alternative strategy of Mega Sport Events identified in Article I. It identifies Norwegian human rights organisations’ understanding of the Olympic Games as an arena for human rights activism and how this was reflected in their involvement before, during and after the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008. The question is raised concerning whether the experience of the Beijing Olympic Games could play a role in the Norwegian
HROs’ activist approach in future Games, such as the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Russia. This was a pioneering study, as no such study of human rights organisations in Norway or other national-level settings had been undertaken. Thus, one of the main purposes was to establish an analytical framework in which HRO activism in relation to the Olympic Games could be studied.

The analysis identifies an interesting paradox. On the one hand, the Norwegian HROs recognised that the Olympic Games and the global human rights engagement did not contribute to an improvement of the human rights situation in China, but potentially led to a deterioration of the situation in certain areas. On the other hand, they concluded that their engagement in the Olympic Games was a success insofar as it drew attention to the organisations, and yielded greater legitimacy in the Norwegian population. Further, the paper identifies two main dilemmas that arose from HROs’ involvement in the Beijing Olympics, that they will face when they select a strategy for future Games. On the one hand, the HROs regard it as their duty to conduct *shaming* campaigns against the host nation, in order to prevent it from using a Mega Sport Event to acquire more national and international legitimacy. On the other hand, the shaming strategy can amplify the host nation’s *Olympic stress syndrome* which increases the risk of new assaults on the very people the HROs wish to assist (as was the case in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics). The second dilemma is that, while the shaming strategy can provide the human rights case and the organisation with legitimacy, the HROs’ unilateral negative focus on the host nation might damage their own case and reputation inasmuch as the host nation’s population turns against them (these games are usually popular among host nation’s population). These dilemmas challenge the way in which HROs evaluate the short- and long-term gains compared to the costs when they engage in major sporting events and the extent to which major sporting events are an appropriate arena for human rights activism, irrespective of whether they are arranged by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.

6.2 Concluding remarks: The politics and practice of Norwegian SDP

The thesis offers both empirical and theoretical discussions on the national political donor level and local practical level, as illustrated in Figure 3. When the articles and the results are seen together, a complex picture appears. Contemporary Norwegian SDP is integrated into the

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59 Shaming campaigns are a widely used strategy/tool among HROs to focus international attention on abusive regimes.
complex institutional arrangements of the development aid architecture and needs to be understood as a complex set of interactions between different actors on different levels, with uneven resources and sometimes dissimilar goals and intentions.

Four main conclusions regarding the main research question in this thesis can be extracted from the results:

1. The political national donor level in Norway does not constitute a unified and coordinated field. The agencies providing development assistance using sport as a tool speak with multiple and sometimes contradictory voices.

2. In line with post-development critique, the Norwegian SDP actors produce standardised (Norwegian) SDP approaches and methods, an expression of the top-down identification of problems and standardisation of solutions that follows the flow
of resources (funds, knowledge, technology) from the Global North to the Global South through SDP intervention.

3. Norwegian standardised methods and solutions do not necessarily have a homogenising effect on how Norwegian-funded SDP interventions are articulated in practice, a process that is rather dependent on how actors at the local level interpret, translate and manipulate the formal discourse of donor agencies.

4. The discrepancy between Norwegian intentions and actual outcomes cannot be seen as an expression of project failure. SDP projects’ unintended effects may be more in line with the recipients’ local understanding, traditions and priorities.

The first conclusion indicates that Norwegian SDP stands out as a complex policy field. The diversity of conceptions of SDP articulated at the national donor level break with the Norwegian model, which aims to ensure that the Norwegian development aid apparatus speaks with one voice. One explanation for the lack of coherence could be that the MFA and Norad, which finance SDP interventions, lack expertise in this area on the international, national and local level. My own observations, in addition to formal and informal conversations with people inside Norwegian SDP, support this. Hence, questions reflecting the field’s political dimension are rarely asked. A common aphorism is that sport and politics should not mix. However, the thesis shows that SDP is a field in which sport and politics collide. It is time to move beyond the naïve and simplistic depoliticized notion of sport as a tool in development.

The second conclusion indicates that even though the analysis of the actors’ articulation in project plans and reports reveals a diversity of SDP understandings and strategies, these are also an expression of the same: an asymmetrical power relationship between donors and recipients. The post-development analysis of NIF’s and Norwegian authorities’ SDP policy framework (1990–2013) illustrates this. The standardisation of problems and solutions expressed by NIF is based on the sport experience and expertise built up in Norway after World War II, for example in the form of sport structures building on social democratic and societal corporatist principles. This is claimed to have put Norway in a good position to share experience and offer advice (e.g. MFA. 2005, p. 44-45). Consequently, NIF’s SDP ideas, knowledge and values are a result of the specific historical process by which Norwegian sport has developed. In their discussion on the paternalism of aid, Eggen and Roland (2014) point out that
“Most of the dismantling of traditional, hierarchic structures to create the current features of Western
democratic political cultures, bureaucratic ethos, gender equality and individual autonomy, however,
came about in the West not as a result of planning at all. It is the unintended result of social and political
contest in a rather chaotic historic process where the outcomes were not predicted and could not be
planned. It was certainly not the result of well-designed plans and coherent strategies for good
governance, poverty reduction and civil society development financed from abroad and guided by
foreign experts” (p. 42-43)

The point made by Eggen and Roland is that history cannot be exported. Similarly, this thesis
questions whether it is possible for Norwegian SDP actors to use their own experience to
transform other societies, even if the donor and recipient share the same goal. Furthermore,
this touches upon the “logical problem of development” described by Cowen and Shenton
(1996). For its SDP strategy to succeed, NIF necessarily needs to change the way people think
and act in cooperating countries – an expression of paternalism. This contradicts the bottom-
up planning rhetoric also articulated in NIF’s policy framework. My point is not just directed
towards NIF. My studies of the actors within the Norwegian SDP apparatus, be it
governmental or non-governmental agencies, show that they are not immune to the ghost of
paternalism. They need to be aware of the fact that their SDP ideas, knowledge and values
express a direction for how poor people and societies should develop through sports-based
development interventions.

Through my insider position in the SDP apparatus, I also unexpectedly found myself
experiencing the “logical problem of development” dilemma in practice. My university’s SDP
study program, which has been my responsibility, expresses a desire to contribute to
strengthening human (sport) resources in the South through cooperation with several
Norwegian NGOs. This also means a transfer of (sport) knowledge and values. By dint of my
proximity to the field, I also observed how Norwegian SDP consultants, policymakers and
administrators, on the one hand, promoted their projects to be community driven through a
bottom-up strategy but, on the other hand, worked hard to control the project development
process to fit their own organisations’ understanding of SDP, as well as Norad and MFA
criteria. For instance, this was evident in the collaboration with partner organisations on
applications for funding, which set the terms of reference for the purpose, methods, outputs
and cost of the projects. During my period inside Norwegian SDP, I had the privilege of
discussing this dilemma with consultants, policymakers and administrators. I would claim that
they are not ignorant of the dilemma. However, a general view was that the discussion on
paternalism is old-fashioned, given that contemporary SDP policy discourse articulates what
they hold to be *universal values*. However, as Nustad (2003) points out, values are not neutral. They express the development process from the perspective of those deciding what should be universal (e.g., the NIF’s concept of Sport for All). This shows the relevance of the post-development critique of the development apparatus and of the effort to determine whose voices are expressed through the discourse on SDP. As mentioned in Chapter 4.1, the post-development answer was a total rejection of the international development project in which the current SDP apparatus belongs. However, throughout the research process I have asked myself the question asked by critics of the post-development solution: But what is the alternative?

The results of the post-development analysis in this thesis are similar to the body of SDP literature claiming the current architecture to be a top-down homogenising system of knowledge (see Chapter 3). The main contribution of the thesis, new in the SDP literature, is that it takes this debate further by offering an *empirical* account for such a claim. Conclusion three, on the interrelationship between discourse and agency, shows that recipients of Norwegian SDP cannot be understood as powerless victims. Hence, the thesis also offers a critique of post-development’s assumption that a certain donor articulation of the world leads to a certain type of articulation or action at the local level. Local project staff needs to relate to standardised ways of understanding development through SDP, but also need to exercise *local agency* through translation and reformulation of the intended project design to fit local understandings, practices and traditions. Thus, the reality of Norwegian SDP is not in accordance with a simplistic understanding of a knowledge transfer from North to South. Rather, the transnational relationship needs to be understood as a *knowledge encounter*, where different world views intersect and are negotiated. From my own observations of Norad- and MFA-funded SDP projects, most recipient partners are given considerable autonomy in the implementation phase of projects. In this vacuum, recipient actors (office staff, field workers) create an everyday sphere of action that is *autonomous* of the Norwegian-influenced policy design. Consequently, a *discrepancy* between policy design and practice is produced. An interesting observation is that this discrepancy creates a lot of frustration among the many Norwegians (NIH students) volunteering for partner organisations in the South. Further, this causes many to conclude that Norwegian SDP does not work in accordance with the Norwegian intentions and own expectations.

The above discussion generates three important questions: (a) Why does the standardised policy framework (built on Norwegian self-experience) not take into account the
complexity experienced on the ground by local project staff, beneficiaries, and Norwegian consultants? (b) If the ideas, knowledge and values expressed in policy are not guiding practice, why are the policies sustained? (c) Does the discrepancy between policy intentions and outcome indicate failure? In order to answer these questions, we need to understand that policy and practice represent dissimilar logics. In discussing the practice of policymaking in a British development project in India, Mosse (2005) claims that “policy models which work well to legitimise and mobilise political support do not provide a good guide to action, nor can they easily be turned into practice. The logic of political mobilisation and the logic of operations are different” (p. 16). In the case of NIF, SDP policy is created to build political support for the sports movement, the general assembly of NIF (the supreme governing body of organised sport) and the government development aid agencies (the MFA and Norad). More generally, NIF is accountable to the politics of the Norwegian sports movement and Norwegian development and foreign policy (see Figure 3). Thus, it could be claimed that the main purpose of the models and strategies made by SDP NGOs’ policymakers is not to orientate practice but to legitimise and mobilise political support for their work. Mosse (2005) points out that “most development agencies are bound to a managerial view of policy which makes them resolutely simplistic about (or ignorant of) the social and political life of their ideas” (p. 20). Thus, the policy framework is sustained as project staff at all levels work actively to create an impression of coherence between intention and outcome. From my own inside observation of the Norwegian SDP apparatus, I would claim that the policymakers are not ignorant of the limitations of their SDP ideas. Rather, they have a difficult task striking a balance between allowing partners to practice autonomously and making SDP policy coherent with the political framework of Norwegian sport policy, government development aid policy and Norwegian public opinion (see Figure 3). Consequently, to make SDP projects work at both the political donor level (to maintain political and financial support) and the local practical level (in accordance with local experience and understanding), maintaining a discrepancy between policy and practice seems to be a necessity. As an informant in one of the organisations expressed: “We do not put much emphasis on the policy documents we write in our practical work. But we write them to satisfy the criteria set by Norad” (my translation). This echoes Lewis and Mosse (2006), who point out:

“the disjuncture arising from the autonomy of practice from rationalizing policy is not an unfortunate “gap to be bridged” between intention and action, but is instead necessary and must therefore be actively maintained and reproduced. Since ‘success’ demands that action be interpreted as the execution of official policy, competing logics and contingencies of action become necessarily hidden. The task of
the skilled brokers who work across institutional, cultural, value and other boundaries—such as the managers, consultants, fieldworkers and community leaders involved in development activities—is then to maintain, not blur, this disjunction and to protect the autonomy of practice and policy” (2006, p. 5).

The above discussion touches upon Conclusion 4 regarding the success and failure of Norwegian-funded SDP intervention. A contradiction within the international development aid apparatus is the trend towards local management and increasing recipient autonomy and the simultaneous increase in central donor control systems monitoring and evaluating (M&E) by measuring the extent to which development projects reach the official goals described in policy documents and project plans. This contradiction is also evident within the SDP sector. But what if, as shown in this thesis, the logic of practice of Norwegian SDP constantly contradicts the official policy? The stipulated goals and intended effects presented in policy models work as a guide to help organisations monitor and evaluate projects. However, as the above discussion shows, as well as the results in Article III, unintended effects created through a process of translation can be more in line with local priorities and understanding of SDP. Consequently, it could be claimed that projects are not necessarily successful because policy is turned into reality. This illustrated the need to be cautious when judging success and failure.

The results of this thesis demonstrate the importance of drawing attention to the complexity of policymaking, planning of interventions and practice in SDP. This is also in keeping with Darnell (2012), who warns against the increasing pressure from donors on M&E in SDP. He claims that those interested in SDP should “think of the sector as more than a process requiring ‘monitoring and evaluation’ (M&E) or managerial refinement in order to determine how best it works” (Darnell, 2012, p. 4). During the research process, the most common question I received from colleagues, students and SDP workers (in North and South) was: Does SDP work? The results in this thesis and my personal experience in the field have helped me realise that the best answer is another question: For whom?

6.3. Research implications
The results presented in the thesis are relevant for SDP actors (authorities, sports organisations, aid agencies) involved in future policymaking in this area. As indicated in Article I, the debate on SDP can also be integrated into the ongoing international “post-2015 development agenda” discussions that are supposed to lead to a global development framework beyond 2015. This seems to be of current relevance. After an evaluation of the
The government’s official strategy for Norway’s culture and sports cooperation with countries in the South in 2012, it was suggested that SDP should be removed from the strategy document (MFA, 2013). Sport was thus not included in the government’s white paper on Norway’s international efforts for culture, published in 2013 (Meld. St. 19 (2012–2013)), which is an attempt to strengthen the culture sector’s role in Norwegian development aid efforts in the South. At the moment of writing, no official Norwegian strategy for SDP exists. For instance, the “Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence” has expressed the need for a comprehensive and coherent approach to sport and development cooperation with partner countries in the South, both at the political and administrative level (MFA, 2013). Despite this state of affairs, the Norwegian NGOs concerned with SDP are still receiving funding from different sections within the MFA and Norad. In fact, they have increased their share of the development aid national budget over the last year. Additionally, new NGOs concerned with SDP have received funding over the last two years, and others have indicated that they will apply for financial support in the near future (see Article I). This thesis could thus be used as a starting point for a discussion on the current political and practical dimensions of the Norwegian SDP commitment, as well as its future in Norwegian development and foreign policy.

The aforementioned evaluation of the Norwegian SDP strategy concludes that knowledge is needed concerning different factors that influence the outcome of Norwegian SDP projects (Norad, 2011b). The thesis’s discussion on the inconsistency between what the local project staff in the Global South require and prioritise and the Norwegian donors’ own agendas and values is a contribution intended to fill this knowledge gap. This thesis’s looking towards a better understanding of the process between planned effects (articulated in donor policy models) and real effects (articulated in recipient communities) is also relevant to Norad’s call for a debate on future subsidies to civil society in the Global South. In a letter from Norad’s Civil Society Department to all Norwegian organisations receiving funds, it is stated that

“Much of the Norwegian work towards the civil society in the Global south is about striking a balance between what partners in the south wish and prioritise, and Norway’s own agenda and values. The increasing number of recipients of aid is critical to how the countries in the north prioritise and formulate their support to civil society in the South” (Norad, 2012, my translation)

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60 The MFA Section for Cultural Affairs, responsible for the Norwegian cultural development cooperation argues that the field of SDP is not within their subject area. Sport is seen as a quite different tool in development and peace work compared with other cultural fields such as music and theatre (MFA 2013).
Although Norad’s call for a donor-recipient discussion is by no means new in international and Norwegian development aid, it still seems to be a main issue. Thus, the thesis could help the MFA, Norad, SDP practitioners and academics to better understand the multiple realities determining how Norwegian SDP is experienced by different actors and people’s conflicting interests and intentions, which affect the way that SDP projects are implemented in practice. First of all, the thesis shows the importance of including the voices of practitioners from the South in the process of writing a new official Norwegian strategy on SDP.

6.4 Implications for further research

Today, SDP scholars almost invariably belong to sports science research. Sports science is an academic discipline characterised by a multidisciplinary approach in which sub-disciplines (e.g. sport history, sport physiology, sport pedagy, sport philosophy, sport sociology, sports anthropology, sports management, sport medicine etc.) use already-established theories, methods and debate from their respective mother disciplines (Renson, 1990; Loland, 2000). Until now, research and knowledge about SDP have arisen out of several of these sport science sub-disciplines (particularly sport sociology and sport management). As pointed out earlier, one of the overarching objectives of the thesis is to contribute to the incorporation of development studies into sport science SDP research. Thus, the thesis is not rooted within one already-established sport science sub-discipline. Based on the theoretical and empirical discussions in the thesis, I would suggest that SDP could constitute a sub-discipline within sport science that applies theoretical and methodological inspiration from development studies. This is needed, given that the academic discussions and debates within development studies have affected the different trends within the development aid sector of which SDP is now a part. Further, for sport to be considered a serious research field, scholars need to engage with these debates. Levermore (2009) claims that the low status of SDP in development studies can be partly explained in that “sport has been viewed as being exclusive, male-dominated and somehow problematic because of its association with large-scale popular culture (despite the popularity of sport at the moment)” (p. 16). Additionally, the many exaggerated notions of sport’s potential as a means for development and peace, which have largely been put forward by the sports industry itself, is probably an important explanation as to why sport has not been taken seriously among development scholars.

(Coalter 2010). Hopefully, the thesis can inspire others interested in the field of SDP to engage with established mainstream development study theories and debates, allowing research on SDP to earn the academic respect it deserves.

The thesis has contributed to opening new research questions. In the first part of the research process, five strategies were identified, two of which were researched further (the Sport First strategy and Mega Sport Events). Suggestions for further research based on these studies are presented in the articles and can be summarised as follows (see also Figure 2):

1) On a national donor level, further studies should focus on cross-national comparative analyses of how SDP operates within different national aid systems (e.g. the Norwegian and the Swedish system), but also how these form part of the international aid system.

2) The thesis’s research at the local level is limited to the translation of the project’s formal discourse to its practice as seen from the perspectives of local project staff. Further ethnographic SDP research should also focus on the intended beneficiaries (children and youth) enrolling in SDP projects. They represent an important perspective regarding the dynamics of “knowledge interfaces”. Their world view and understanding of SDP can have a tremendous impact on the implementation of projects in local realities.

3) The Norad and NIF-funded Community Sport Development Programme, building on the neo-corporatist and social democratic Norwegian sports model, should also be analysed in more depth in relation to the literature on state formation and the politics of the Zimbabwean regime and the gradual erosion of state power since the 1990s (e.g. Eriksen, 2010; Edward, 2006; Moore, 2003).

4) Furthermore, studies of Norwegian human rights organisations and Mega Sport Events should move the analytical focus from the national level (organisations’ conceptual understanding of these events) to the micro-level of Norwegian Mega Sport Event engagement as a concrete effort to promote human rights within the context of target countries. Thus, it is possible to study the knowledge encounter between Norwegian HROs and local partner organisations or local people’s conceptual understanding of Mega Sport Events as an arena for activism.62

62 An interesting case is the cooperation between the Norwegian Union of Journalists and its Russian partner organisation to use the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics as a catalyst to extend the right to freedom of expression for Russian journalists.
The other three strategies identified (Development through Sport, Development through Talent Identification, Development First) are also interesting research areas that should be studied further. The transformative potential of the Development through Sport strategy can be studied on the basis of the discourse-practice nexus presented in the thesis. Further, an interesting finding is that four of eight NGOs within this group are Christian-based organisations. Thus, an interesting study would be to look at the relationship between sport, development and Christian missions in Norwegian development aid. The increasing interest in elite football academies as a tool for development, both in Norway and internationally (Development through Talent Identification), can be studied on the basis of research on the new role of business in development, also defined as the philanthro-capitalist turn in development aid. Such development studies look at the increasing “engagement of the private sector in development programmes through public-private partnerships (PPPs) and new financing mechanisms” (Banks & Hulme, 2014, p.188). Also, football academies could be analysed through the lens of dependency theory that sees rich nations of the world as being in need of a peripheral group of poorer states in order to ensure their wealth (are these projects promoting development through football in low-income countries or development of football in Europe?). The Development First strategy can be studied on the basis of the growing literature in development studies on “Brand Aid” initiatives, where celebrities “provide compelling stories to capture public interest and to legitimise development ‘causes’” (Banks & Hulme, 2014, p. 190). Based on his studies of celebrities’ role in development Scott (2014) concludes that “the results provide little evidence to support a celebration of the role of celebrities in cultivating of a cosmopolitan engagement with distant suffering” (p. 2). Sport celebrity-driven international aid and development campaigns could be exemplified by UNICEF Norway’s fund-raising campaign for the project Schools for Africa, for which sports celebrities are used as project ambassadors. Research on sport celebrity aid can focus on how sports celebrities are used both for branding and supporting more traditional development issues and initiatives and to promote and justify the role of sport within development (Darnell, 2012).

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63 “Superstar footballer and UNICEF Norway Goodwill Ambassador Ole Gunnar Solskjær recently visited Angola to witness the educational reconstruction still required in a country devastated by a civil war that ended nearly six years ago. Full primary school enrolment, school construction and rehabilitation, as well as teacher training, are crucial to Angola’s future (…) As Mr. Solskjær discovered, the needs are profound but there is hope for the future.” (UNICEF, 2008).

64 E.g., Right to Play Norway uses high-profile sport celebrities as ambassadors for different projects.
Finally, this thesis does not make an explicit differentiation between civil society sports projects and projects aimed at reconciliation (not necessary for the aim of the study). However, further studies should engage with Norwegian SDP projects specifically using sport as a means in reconciliations processes. Such studies should, in the same way as this thesis, find theoretical inspiration outside the sport science literature. For instance, Höglund & Sundberg (2008) have, amongst the few, demonstrated how theoretical knowledge from social identity and reconciliation theory can be applied to sport and reconciliation initiatives.
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Part II

Articles
Article I
Norwegian Sports Aid
Exploring the Norwegian ‘Sport for Development and Peace’ Discourse

This article focuses on Norwegian ‘Sport for Development and Peace’ (SDP) aid to the Global South and how it works within the Norwegian development aid system. The analysis shows that the two dominant strategies of Norwegian NGOs concerned with SDP can be viewed from two different standpoints. The first considers NGOs’ role to be that of a service provider of sport and Norwegian official development aid objectives. The second maintains that a more transformative role is needed by addressing structural causes of inequality of the provision of sport in poor communities. It is argued that this duality in the role of NGOs in Norwegian SDP reflects distinctive national characteristics shaped by complex domestic processes and traditions that have formed the different NGO’s conceptual understanding of SDP. This stands in contrast to the mainstream literature that has typically studied Northern NGOs concerned with SDP and their strategies as part of an international social movement. The article calls for a research agenda that seeks to understand SDP NGO’s policy models and strategies in the context of distinct national characteristics and traditions in individual donor countries in the Global North.

Keywords: Sport for development and peace; NGOs; Norwegian development aid system; donor; ‘Big-D’ development, ‘Little-d’ development
Introduction
Since the turn of the century considerable attention has been given to what has come to be defined as the international ‘Sport for Development and Peace’ (SDP) movement within the international development aid sector. This was especially evident in 2005, declared by the UN as the International Year of Sport and Physical Education, recognizing sport to be a cost-effective and functional tool to achieve development and peace. Since that time, participation in the initiative has grown to include intergovernmental bodies such as the UN and the World Bank, national governments worldwide, non-governmental and civil society organizations. These actors, mostly from the Global North, in different ways are involved in funding, policy development, implementation, and evaluation of the international SDP commitment in the Global South within thematic development intervention areas such as peace building, health, education, and economic development. The adaption of sport in development policy agendas and mandates among international and national development-oriented organs and development NGOs is often explained by the shift towards human-centred development policy objectives at the turn of the millennium (e.g. the UN’s millennium development goals) (Kidd 2008, Levermore 2008). Many of these objectives are in accordance with functional claims about the social and transformative qualities of sport (e.g. strengthening education, addressing issues of public health and helping girls and youth at risk) already institutionalized within international sports policy organizations such as the IOC.

Mainstream literature on SDP can be placed in two categories: one that seeks to understand the field of SDP from an international level and one that seeks to understand it from a local level in recipient countries (Hasselgård and Straume 2014). Less attention has been given to understanding the field of SDP from a domestic context in individual donor countries. A donor–state–SDP NGO research agenda can, however, help us to better understand how SDP has developed within donor countries; the different notions of SDP among NGOs competing for funds within national aid systems as well as the relationship between domestic funding agencies and the NGOs; and the similarities and dissimilarities between SDP operations across various national development aid systems.

This article focuses on Norwegian SDP assistance to the Global South and how it works within the Norwegian development aid (NDA) system. Since the early 1980s, Norway has been one of the leading countries within the field of SDP (Levermore 2008). Currently, Norwegian commitment consists of a heterogeneous group of actors including the Norwegian government, traditional aid agencies, SDP organizations, sport federations, and private initiative. I consequently examine the different policy strategies in contemporary Norwegian
SDP, and how can these be understood in the context of distinctive national characteristics and traditions. Hitherto, only a few SDP scholars have shown interest for research in individual donor countries (Eekere 2006, Hayhurst and Frisby 2010). These studies touch upon the relationship between SDP NGOs and their funding partners. However, none of these studies explores the complexity of the SDP scene within individual countries (e.g. in political, religious, institutional, and financial terms), nor do they identify systematic conflicts and power relations between SDP actors. In this article, I am not only interested in looking at the tensions that can arise between Norwegian SDP NGOs and funding partners, but also those between different Norwegian organizations working in the field as a consequence of different conceptual understandings of SDP.

The next section establishes an analytical framework for the study. Following a discussion of methods, the Norwegian actors’ different conceptual understandings of SDP are categorized and discussed. The different notions of SDP are further contextualised through a discussion of characteristics of Norwegian Sports and Norwegian foreign and development policy. The conclusion summarises the findings and suggests directions for further research.

**SDP – an international movement?**
The objectives of aid through sport would initially appear to be non-controversial and non-political. Today, however, the field of SDP is institutionalized within the general structure of the international development aid sector and aid architecture. Several scholars have thus called for a better understanding of how actors involved with SDP are incorporated into the international hegemonic development discourse since this might influence and shape the construction of policy models developed by NGOs concerned with SDP (e.g. Darnell and Hayhurst 2012). Mainstream research asserts that development actors using sport as a development tool compose part of a new international SDP social movement within development aid. The movement is claimed to share common traits and rhetoric, as reflected in SDP policy models and strategies (Kidd 2008), and which are woven into the hegemonic international neo-liberal development policy agenda (Hayhurst 2009). Thus, most research concentrates on how SDP is played out on the international development scene. For instance, Hayhurst claims that ‘there is a clear neo-liberal ideology underpinning SDP policies, one that places the onus on individuals to be responsible for their welfare, “healthify” and help the state to cut expenses by participating in these projects’ (Hayhurst 2009: 221). She concludes that the construction of policy models and strategies within the movement needs to be understood in relation to UN’s release of several policy documents on SDP after the
millennium. These are claimed to have ‘launched a promising policy community of practitioners, scholars, government officials and international working groups, many of whom are attempting to sustain the SDP agenda through its integration into domestic and international development policies’ (p. 205). This is in accordance with the post-structural critique in development studies in the 1990s which criticized the homogenization of hegemonic discourses through international development institutions that affected both donor policy level and development practice level in the Global South (Nustad 2003). In the case of sport, the international SDP movement has been described as moving towards an instrumental understanding of sport to achieve specific development goals outside that of sport (such as the UN Millennium Goals) (Coalter, 2010, Kidd, 2008). The analytical conceptions ‘Development Sport Plus’ and ‘Development Plus Sport’ have been widely used to illustrate this. The first describes policy strategies ‘in which sports are adapted and often augmented with parallel programmes in order to maximize their potential to achieve developmental objectives’. The second ‘in which sport’s popularity is used as a type of ‘fly paper’ to attract young people to programmes of education and training (a widespread approach for HIV/AIDS prevention programmes)’ (Coalter 2013:24). Thus, the construction of policy models and strategies within the movement are often classified on a continuum based on the relative emphasis given to sport to achieve specific international development objectives.1

The above presentation shows that Northern NGOs concerned with SDP and their policy strategies have been understood as forming part of an international social movement, highly influenced by international development institutions such has the UN. In this article, however, it is argued that this ignores the fact that most of these organizations do not work independently of, but are integrated into national development aid funding systems and policy framework in individual donor states. Some scholars have claimed that research on how SDP NGOs exists, as part of individual donor states is less important. Kidd (2008) states that ‘while most governments have national aid policies and many contribute funds to international projects, very few have developed a concerted policy framework to conduct or assist SDP at the international level through legislation or clear regulatory guidelines, explicit and dedicated programs, and of course, committed budgets’ (p. 375). However, the fact that more governments in the Global North have integrated SDP into national development aid

1The boundaries are, however, fluid. Depending on the emphasis and intensity of the development or sport dimension, projects may shift to the left or right on the continuum.
strategies and funding systems in recent years, and that few questions have been asked, is an argument in favour of a donor–state–SDP NGO research agenda.

The above discussion reflects Tvedt’s (2002, 2007) concept of the international development aid system. This is a complex system that structurally integrates donors, NGOs (in both North and South), and beneficiaries through funding mechanisms and communication exchange (Tvedt 2002). Tvedt argues against the previous literature’s description of development aid NGOs as constituting an international civil society movement. This creates an illusion of a homogeneous group of actors who share similar agendas and development strategies and together represent a critical democratic alternative to the state or its politics:

The main weaknesses of those concepts are that the international civil society system they describe is without power and conflicts, not only between different types of NGOs with opposing value agendas, but also between states and NGOs, between NGOs and society in general, and between different developmental strategies. Most importantly in this context, they tend to disregard the power of international and national donors in shaping and contextualising the work of development NGOs, the integration of state offices and NGOs, and the way in which this entire system affects civil society. (Tvedt 2007: 34)

The international development aid system cannot be regarded as a single unified whole. It consists of individual national subsystems that are influenced by ‘particular national histories and shifting international relations, but form[s]parts of a bigger multinational NGO system, together with and mingling with other subsystems having different donor states as the reservoir or core’ (Tvedt 2002: 368). Thus, development NGOs needs to be understood in relation to both national subsystems and the international aid system (or multinational NGO system), and their interaction. This is because ‘their working style, proximity to the state, degree of integration into society, and the public sector, reflects cultural traditions, national institutional environments, and the dynamics between the organizational landscape and the international aid system’ (Tvedt 2002: 373). This echoes the point of departure in this article that one should be careful in treating SDP as a new international social movement. It is important to take into consideration that Northern SDP NGO values, strategies, and methods, and the projects they aim to generate, might also reflect distinctive national characteristics shaped by complex domestic (political) processes, traditions, and development aid politics within different donor countries. Furthermore, different NGO’s identity and mandate, their historical and sociological roots, as well as politics in sport in individual donor countries, can affect how they understand, justify, and implement their development aid efforts.
One possible criticism of the system model is that only those NGOs which receive, use, or dispense government donor money, belong to the system. There are, of course, development organizations working outside the system, also in the field of SDP. However, by comparing actors inside and outside the governmental funding system, it is possible to identify the NGOs and SDP strategies that are accepted (receiving funds) or rejected by the official donor agencies within individual countries. Thus, this article also considers those NGOs working outside the NDA system and representing alternative conceptual understandings of SDP.

The role of NGOs in development

The neo-liberal development agenda and move towards people-centred development approaches in the 1980s started a trend among many Western governments and international development institutions to shift larger proportions of their funding towards NGOs. NGOs were regarded as ‘development alternatives’ to the failure of the former state-led, top-down development strategies in the 1960s and 1970s (Lewis and Kanji 2009). Accordingly, it was claimed that they had two important roles: to offer innovative bottom-up (people-centred) approaches to the delivery of basic services to people in need (e.g., health and education); and through advocacy (to change structural inequality) and empowerment (of individuals and communities), to give disadvantaged people and groups a stronger voice vis-à-vis the state (Banks and Hulme 2012). These ‘comparative advantages’ enabled the NGOs to bypass the state and public service delivery structures, thus filling the increasing gaps between state institutions and disadvantaged groups or individuals. However, over the last decade, the status of NGOs in development has been under pressure. There has been a slight shift away from the neo-liberal language towards a ‘good governance’ discourse, putting the state once again at the centre of development strategies. This re-governmentalisation of development aid has led to a recognition of a new partnership incorporating donors and national government ‘to target poverty alleviation through a more interventionist, welfare-oriented, state-centred and scaled-up approach’ (Banks and Hulme 2012: 5). The emphasis on building a greater sense of recipient government ‘ownership’ of national policy reforms and poverty reduction interventions have not placed the NGOs on the side-line. Rather, their role and strategies are expected to be more oriented towards governments and the development of government-owned development strategies within different public sectors such as health and education. Further, as the good governance agenda also emphasizes the language of human rights,
democracy, and public participation, the NGOs have consolidated their role by adopting a rights-based approach to their policy strategies (Murray and Overton 2011).

The shift towards state-led development strategies has placed the role of NGOs in a state of confusion, but may also have created a momentum for critical research and debate on the future role of NGOs. Central to this debate is the analytical distinction between ‘Big-D’ development and ‘little-d’ development:

‘Big-D’ development sees ‘Development’ as a project-based and intentional activity, in which tangible project outputs have little intention to make foundational changes that challenge society’s institutional arrangements. In contrast, ‘little-d’ ‘development’ regards development as an ongoing process, emphasizing radical, systemic alternatives that seek different ways of organizing the economy, social relationships and politics. (Banks and Hulme 2012: 8)

Following this, small-scale, project-based, target-oriented NGO programs underpinned by the neo-liberal policy agenda are placed within the ‘Big-D’ development category. Such NGOs see increased access to resources or services as the main driving force in eliminating poverty. Critics emphasize that the priorities of the NGO’s role as agents of service delivery have strengthened civil society in the Global South, but at the expense of the centrality of the state in the provision of welfare in developing countries as well as the role of NGOs as advocates for the poor. Hence, ‘Big-D’ development interventions ‘make no attempt to change the underlying structures and processes underlying limited and unequal access in the first place’ (Banks and Hulme 2012: 13-14). The ‘Big-D’ development paradigm has been criticized for leading to the erosion of broader social objectives and the political nature of operations, drawing the development activities of NGOs ‘into the safe professionalized and often depoliticized world of development practice’ (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 18). From this, their ability to transform state–society relations in poor societies, or to assume a role as governmental or public service consultants, has been questioned. Rather, NGOs could be accused of creating competing or parallel structures that undermine public service provision, the sustainability of their development programs and increased dependence of poor societies on foreign NGOs and future funding (Lewis and Kanji 2009). Banks and Hulme (2012) claim that development NGOs should preferably move towards their political nature and ‘little-d’ development strategies, and play a supportive role in building and strengthening the systems and structures at the grassroots level to address the politics of poverty and inequality that need long-term structural change. Reducing the gap between the state and citizens, NGOs could assist disadvantaged groups and communities in demanding their rights, also in sport.
The dichotomy between ‘Big-D’ and ‘little-d’ development has been questioned. Many development aid NGOs do not see their role in service delivery as an end in itself. Through people-centred and participatory approaches, service delivery is rather seen ‘as an instrument to catalyse and empower the community’ (Banks and Hulme 2012: 9-10) that influences broader social structural processes in the long run. Others combine service-driven development models with advocacy initiatives vis-à-vis government institutions. Nevertheless, the two analytical categories serve as a good starting point from which the different Norwegian NGOs understanding of SDP and their role as development agents can be discussed.

Method
The research was conducted in three stages. First, NGOs concerned with SDP within and outside the NDA system from 2000-2013 were identified. The actors within the subsystem can be categorized according to three main categories: (1) those that are part of organized sport (Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sport, Football Association of Norway, Norwegian Judo Association); (2) those where SDP is the core or an important part of the organizational activity (Christian Sport Contact, Karanba, Norway Cup, Right to Play Norway); (3) traditional development aid organizations including sport in their portfolio (Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian People’s Aid, Plan Norway, Strømme Foundation). Organizations representing actors outside the subsystem include a trade organization (Virke Enterprise Federation of Norway), a professional football club (Molde Football Club), a football academy (Diambars), and fundraising organizations (UNICEF Norway, Aid to Play, Long Pass to Africa, Friends of Mathare Youth Sports Association). Two government agencies funding SDP initiatives include the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad).

Second, policy documents, project plans, project reports, and instruction manuals produced by the organizations as well as applications to the MFA and Norad, and letters of assurance were examined. A discourse analysis was applied to study the documents. The field of Norwegian SDP is understood as an ‘order of discourse’ – a ‘social space in which different discourses partly cover the same terrain which they compete to fill with meaning, each in their own particular way’ (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 56). Consequently, different discourses exist side by side and compete for the right to define the truth. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) use the term ‘field of discursivity’ to define any actual or potential meaning outside the specific discourse that can potentially threaten to undermine the dominating
discourse(s) within a given ‘order of discourse’. The analysis identifies the dominant representations or discourses and discusses the different layers of meaning ascribed to these as well as alternative meanings or understandings challenging the present dominant discourses in Norwegian SDP. The study does not trace how the discourse(s) has evolved over the years. However, the dominant contemporary discourses will be contextualised and discussed with historical references to Norwegian sport and the development aid system to highlight the distinctive national character that has shaped Norwegian SDP.

In the third stage, the documentary sources were supplemented with ten interviews with representatives from different organizations (leadership level) in all the groups within and outside the development aid system. These interviews served two main purposes: (1) to acquire a better understanding of the similarities and the differences in the organizations’ formal SDP policy strategies; (2) to reveal whether different understandings of SDP have created tensions between the different actors, and if so, why. My interest in SDP and how it works in Norway stems from my practical experience of working with several of the Norwegian organizations involved with SDP. This experience has given me valuable observational data and knowledge concerning the importance of understanding the complexity of SDP on a national level. Thus, observational data, informal conversations, and diaries are also sources of data in the study.

Norwegian SDP strategies

Based on the organizations’ values, identity, and strategies (linking their vision and project activities), the current dominant conceptual understanding of SDP in Norwegian development aid (NDA) can be divided in two broad categories: Sport First, and Development through Sport. The SDP activities provided by NGOs in both categories are financed by the Norwegian government, either by the Norwegian MFA or by Norad. In addition, Norwegian SDP employs alternative strategies (conceptual understandings of SDP) that can be divided into three categories: Development through Talent Identification, Development First, and Development through Mega Sport Events. Organizations representing these categories are not

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2 I have five years’ experience of cooperating with several Norwegian organizations working with SDP through managing the practical study program ’Sport, culture and development cooperation’ at the Norwegian School of Sport Science (NSSS) (aimed at providing young Norwegian students with experience in voluntary sports-related work in the Global South).
as yet integrated into the NDA system. Table 1 shows that all strategies are designed to use sport as a means in development efforts. Additionally it illustrates the complexity of Norwegian SDP and the different conceptual understandings of sport as a means in development and peace work. The classification of strategies into five categories should not be seen as absolute or totally separated. The boundaries are fluid. However, as discussed in the next chapters, the actors’ policy models and strategies within the different categories share some core characteristics that distinguish them from the others.

Table 1: The different policy model framework and strategies in Norwegian SDP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDP policy mode/strategy</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Countries (since 2009)</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sport First</td>
<td>Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sport; The Norwegian Football Association; Javelin for Peace</td>
<td>Sport for all; sustainable national sport structures; Empowerment of communities</td>
<td>Rights-based approach; Strengthening governance through development of national democratic grass-roots sports structures for children and youth; the Norwegian sport model is the guiding principle; develop national sport policies on grassroots sport; Enhance expertise in sport community; sport leaders, coaches, officials and administrators; social development (health, PM, AIDS, education) incorporated into the above means.</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, Moldova, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Burundi, Mali, Vietnam, Thailand, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa.</td>
<td>NFA, Norad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development through Sport</td>
<td>Right to Play Norway, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian People’s Aid, Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee, The Norwegian Football Association, The Norwegian Sports Confederation</td>
<td>Provide sport and play opportunities for children and youth; Empowerment of individuals and (indirectly) communities; Address official Norwegian development objectives.</td>
<td>Rights-based approach; Service-delivery in sport; Education and awareness raising through sport programs; Health and Nutrition; HIV/AIDS, malaria, build self-confidence, gender relations, conflict resolution, social inclusion, leadership training in sport (coaches, administrators)</td>
<td>Burundi, Brazil, Vietnam, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jordan, Uganda, Mozambique, Palestine, Lebanon</td>
<td>NFA, Norad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development through Elite Sport</td>
<td>Disemars, Urte Enterprise Federation of Norway, Modin Football Club</td>
<td>Develop and train elite players to the European/Norwegian sports market; individual and community development.</td>
<td>Sport talent identification; Football academies; critical trade of players; Education, CSA</td>
<td>Uganda, Senegal, South Africa</td>
<td>No government SDP funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development through Sport Events</td>
<td>Amnesty International Norway, The Norwegian National Committee, The Red Cross Norway, PEN, the Norwegian Union of Journalists, Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee, The Norwegian Committee for Human Rights in China, The Norwegian Bumsen Committee</td>
<td>Human rights reforms in host countries in a short and long perspective.</td>
<td>Using large international sport events, and the media spotlight that follows, to exert direct and indirect influence on host state human rights practice through “shaming” (put national authorities in a negative light to realize a global moral debate).</td>
<td>China (Beijing), Russia (Sochi)</td>
<td>No government SDP funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sport First**

The **Sport First** strategy is primarily associated with the group of NGOs which hold a formal position in Norwegian sport. Three discursive and interconnected constructions form the basis for the strategy: the intrinsic value of sport, sport for all, and development of sport. A clear ideological distinction between the intrinsic and utilitarian value of sport is made. It is believed that sport in itself promotes development, and the intrinsic value of sport thus forms the basis for all SDP activities. Developmental effects beyond sport itself (utilitarian value) are a consequence of this. Using a rights-based approach, the organizations work to ensure
that sport is available to all. However, the strategy is limited to grassroots sport initiatives for children and youth (boys and girls, with or without disabilities). This implies that to reach this goal, three aspects have to be developed: (1) formal national grassroots sport structures (sport organizations, clubs, and facilities), (2) national sport policies (e.g., gender equality, equality for the disabled, child safeguarding), (3) and expertise in sport (formal education of leaders, coaches, referees, and training of volunteers). Its ideological framework is evident, for instance, in the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sport’s (Norwegian abbreviation: NIF) application to Norad for funds in 2012, where three factors which act as the pillars in NIF’s SDP objectives and operational methodologies were mentioned: ‘Sport must be of good quality, organizational structures need to be in place, and with good quality sport and strong supporting structures, sport can be used as an effective tool for peace and development’ (NIF 2011: 5).

The Sport First organizations hold national governments and national sport institutions in the Global South accountable and responsible for the provision of grassroots sport to secure sport as a fundamental right for children and youth in communities, thus preventing structurally entrenched inequality of participation in sport. The Sport First NGOs are therefore not directly involved with intervention projects in the service provision of sport activities in poor communities. Instead, they play a supportive role in strengthening governance through the development of national grassroots sport policy models, the organization of sporting systems from national to community level, and negotiations between sport organizations and state and public agencies responsible for sport. The Sport First advocacy approach attempts to bring about a systemic change in societies by transforming the institutional arrangement of public sport services benefitting children and youth, funded by the state, administered by national sporting organizations, and run by local communities through member clubs. Furthermore, closing the governance gap between state institutions and communities through hierarchical sporting structures is claimed to enhance communities’ capacity to organize sport activities and strengthen the bargaining power of disadvantaged communities to defend young citizens’ rights to participate in sport. Mobilization and organization of community participation through new national sporting arrangements, recognized by the state thus creates a foundation for collective action that can empower communities, strengthen individuals’ rights, and play a role in enhancing democracy and welfare states.

The Sport First strategy accords with ‘little-d’ development and sets conditions for key partners in the Global South: regional or national sports councils, national sport
associations, and government ministries for sport, health, gender, and education. NIF also engages in partnerships with other organizations working with sports in the Global South (e.g., sport and development NGOs). But in line with the Sports First discourse, NIF advocates that these organizations should play a role in the development of grassroots sport in their countries: ‘Where official partnerships are not developed with the national sports councils, NIF maintains a close dialogue to ensure the efforts of our partners are acknowledged by the political structures within the individual countries’ (NIF 2011: 34). Consequently, a fundamental principle is that their SDP engagement should not create parallel or competing sport structures to already existing formal sport structures in countries in the South. The above discussion shows that the Sport First strategy seeks long-term structural change. For instance, with financial support from Norad and with the Sport and Recreation Commission of Zimbabwe (SRC) as the implementing body, NIF supported the Community Sport Development Program (CSDP) from 2008 to 2013. This aimed at building 800 community sports clubs in all ten provincial regions of the country, train 6,500 community leaders and provide opportunities for over 30,000 children and youth to participate in sport on a regular basis (NIF 2011). In addition, the sport structures have been used as a platform to address official Zimbabwean development goals such as gender equality and the reduction of HIV and AIDS through educational programs (Hasselgård and Straume 2014). NIF also worked to increase the capacity of SRC to be in a bargaining position between the state and the SRC member clubs throughout the country. Similarly, together with the Iraq Football Association and with financial support from the MFA, Norwegian Football Association (Norwegian abbreviation: NFF) implemented a football club system in 2008 for children at the grassroots level in all 18 provinces of Iraq. In both projects, the organizations have played a supportive role in government policy-making on regulations that protects women’s rights in sport as well as those of people with disabilities.

Development through Sport

The Development through Sport strategy is characteristic for NGOs in the two categories defined by: ‘SDP is the core/important part of the organizational activity’ and ‘Traditional development aid organizations including SDP in their portfolio’ (see Table 1). Three discursive and interconnected constructions form the basis for the strategy, but which differ from the Sport First strategy: the utilitarian value of sport, sport as a human right, and development of individuals through sport. From a rights-based perspective, these organizations also claim that sport is a right for every child, but one that needs to be secured
through grassroots level project-based sport interventions. The priority of these organizations is to provide small-scale project-based services for sport participation for individuals, mainly children and youth. However, service delivery in sport is not seen as an end in itself but rather a means to achieve predetermined development objectives within areas such as healthcare (reduction of malaria, HIV/AIDS), education (increased participation in schools, improvements in academic results), peace and reconciliation (dialogue and tolerance), gender equality, and alternatives to drug use and crime. Additionally, most organizations promote leadership training through sport. These ‘utilitarian values’ of sport can be summed up by quoting the policy of the NGO Right to Play Norway that uses sport and play to address different development issues:

Right to Play’s mission is to use sport and play to educate and empower children and youth to overcome the effects of poverty, conflict and disease in disadvantaged communities (...) The UN recognizes play as the right of every child. Play is NOT a luxury; it is a tool for education and health. It can bring entire communities together and inspire every individual. A game of football can teach children about tolerance and peace, and a game of tag can teach about malaria. Play helps teach important life lessons and develop skills like cooperation, leadership and teamwork (Right to Play Norway 2013).

The Development through Sport NGOs seek ‘empowerment’ of societies from below as an indirect outcome of development of individuals through the service delivery of sport activities, life-skills training, and awareness building through non-sporting activity programs. Thus, these NGOs adapt new forms of development intervention but do not aim to challenge existing institutional structures by engaging in processes and structures of systemic change in the provision of sport. Poverty is rather seen as a technical problem that can be solved by bypassing the state, placing these organizations firmly within the ‘Big-D’ development category. For instance, the SDP project Karanba that helps children and youth from the favelas in Rio de Janeiro through sport and educational programs states in its strategy:

Even if football as such is extremely popular in Brazil, the junior football structure as we know it from Norway does not exist here. Young people living in favelas are left out of organized football because of their social backgrounds. The Karanba Project offers a possibility for these youngsters from poor city areas to play football in an organized way (Karanba 2013)

Thus, instead of their rights-based approach leading to empowerment strategies vis-à-vis the state, the right of children to engage in sport has itself become a means of service delivery.
**Tensions**

Banks and Hulme (2012) claim that ‘improved agency through increases in individual collective assets is not enough to promote empowerment, which is a process that must be accompanied too by wider changes in the structural environment that improve the terms of recognition of poor and excluded groups’ (Banks and Hulme 2012: 10). Thus, it could be argued that the two dominant strategies within the Norwegian SDP subsystem complement each other. The Development through Sport intervention strategy is bottom-up oriented. However, these NGOs depoliticized practice of SDP distances them from the state, impairing their ability to advocate for systemic change. In contrast, The Sport First ‘little-d’ development strategy is top-down. However, seeking government partnership distances the Sport First NGOs from the local community and local realities that might affect their ability to address or advocate for local communities’ ‘real’ needs. Nevertheless, the observational data and the interviews indicate that the two opposing value agendas on SDP in the NDA system have rather culminated in an ideological conflict. The Sport First NGOs accused other SDP actors of bypassing the national political sport structures, thus creating parallel or competing sport structures which undermined the gap-filling structures the Sport First NGOs assisted. Further, it was argued that the Development through Sport strategy made sport in the Global South dependent on unsustainable, short-term and project-based interventions. Hence, from a Sport First perspective, Development through Sport NGOs is redundant. On the other hand, the Development through Sport NGOs typically portrayed the state as part of the problem of underdevelopment, arguing that few public sport structures existed and that where they did, the focus was only on talent identification. In addition, national governments and sport institutions were accused of being only interested in organizing and developing elite sport and incapable of organizing sport activities at the grassroots level due to corruption and lack of funding. Some organizations also questioned whether the Sport First strategy should be defined within the concept of international development aid. For instance, one informant stated:

>I have followed NIF’s work for a long time. They argue that development of sport itself is good enough. But I feel there is a gap between what they do and what the government [MFA and Norad] wants to do through development work. It has therefore been necessary to redefine sport and development towards ‘sport for development’. Sport in itself is not good enough and does not provide a safer society. One has to have clearly defined outcomes that are aimed at development goals such as the millennium development goals (my translation).

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3 See Hasselgård and Straume (2014) for further discussions on this point regarding NIF’s SDP to Zimbabwe.
One conclusion that can be drawn from the above discussion is that tensions between the NGOs are deeply rooted in ideological differences. This stands out from the Dutch SDP subsystem where tensions have been mainly explained by the competition for funds (Eekeren 2006).

**Alternative SDP strategies**

In recent years, we have seen the beginnings of three new strategies of SDP in Norway. The *Development through Talent Identification* strategy is characteristic of NGOs starting sport academies for athletic talent development in the Global South. These academies, mostly for football, are used as an institutional instrument to transfer talented athletes to the European sports market (Schokkaert et al. 2012). Many football academies are recognized as SDP initiatives as they often integrate developmental assets into their activities. In Norway, two such initiatives have attempted to become a part of the NDA system through meetings with the MFA and Norad and applications for funding. The French–Norwegian Diambars Institute is a NGO football academy in Senegal and South Africa. In cooperation with UNESCO, Diambars has developed ‘education-through-sport institutes’ which promote academic and vocational training through awareness campaigns and educational programs. The sustainability of the operation of the academy and the educational programs is partly dependent on transfer fees of players to the European football market (Schokkaert et al. 2012). For instance, several players from the Diambars Institute have been sold to top-level clubs in Norway. The second initiative is the cooperation between the Enterprise Federation of Norway (Virke) and Molde Football Club which aimed at developing a football academy for approximately 400 players in Kampala, Uganda. Four objectives served as the basis for the project: talent development and coaching development in Uganda, general development of the participants (including focus on education), increased sale of local products to Norway, and ethical sales of players to Norwegian clubs (Virke 2008). Thus, it was anticipated that the initiative could be attractive as a social corporate responsibility investment for Norwegian companies. Molde Football Club also expressed an interest in the project since it could provide access to good players who, in the long-term, would provide the club with revenue from resale. It can be argued that NGOs representing solutions to social problems through market-based approaches could fall under both ‘Big-D’ and ‘little-d’ development. They are

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4 The French registered NGO Diambars is represented in Norway through a Norwegian executive committee which works to spread information about the project, fundraising and help transfer players to Norwegian premier league clubs.

5 VIRKE represents over 17,000 businesses in Norway.
underpinned by neo-liberal ideology (competition, efficiency and self-governance). At the same time they are ‘premised on an ideology of inclusion, seeking to democratise access to markets and to extend opportunities for finance capital, income and affordable goods and services to those who have been excluded from these or included on unfavourable terms’ (Banks and Hulme 2014: 188). However, it is likely that such interventions do not result in any deep structural transformations since poverty is only viewed as a product of market failure. Thus, only those problems for which the market can produce a solution are recognized (Banks and Hulme 2014). The above-mentioned organizations’ attempt to become a part of the NDA system has, however, failed.

The Development First strategy is associated with fundraising NGOs which use sport or high profile sport ambassadors to brand development organizations already-existing development projects. One example is Plan Norway which started the campaign ‘Football for Africa’ on the occasion of Norway’s national game against Senegal at Dakar Stadium in 2006. With the publicity of the game and the attendance of the minister of Norwegian development aid, Plan Norway’s goal was to reach 10,000 new plan sponsors (to sponsor a child). UNICEF Norway uses several sport celebrities in their fundraising campaigns for the project ‘Schools for Africa’. Thus, sport in itself has no value since the organizations do not focus on mobilizing participation through sport programs or addressing developmental concerns through sport.

The last strategy is Development through Mega Sport Events. Mega Sport Events have become a part of the international SDP discourse as result of an increasing number of international events being awarded to countries in the Global South (Darnell 2012). For instance, the UN Special Advisor on Sport for Development and Peace, Wilfried Lemke, has expressed that international events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup should be used as a catalyst to a greater extent in promoting reconciliation and development in the pursuit of achieving the UN’s millennium development goals (Bistandsaktuelt 2008). In Norway, Mega Sport Events have primarily been used by human rights organizations in protests against violations of human rights in the host countries, as was the case before and after the Summer Olympics in China and Winter Olympics in Russia. The organizations have primarily used these events to advocate changes in human rights practice in the host country by holding accountable not only the country’s authorities but also the International Olympic Committee – the proprietors of the games (Hasselgård and Selliaas 2014). This politicization of Mega Sport Events in order to achieve changes in the area of human rights can be placed in the category of ‘little-d’ development.
Understanding SDP from a Norwegian context

The Sport First strategy represents the historically dominant conceptual understanding of SDP within the Norwegian aid system. This can be understood in the context of distinctive national characteristics and traditions in Norwegian sport as well as its resemblance to the history of Norwegian development aid. In Norway, all organized sport for children and adolescents is the responsibility of the umbrella organization – the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF) – under which both the Football Association of Norway and Norwegian Judo Federation are organized. Politically, NIF is organized under and financed by the Ministry of Culture which is also responsible for financing sport infrastructure. Represented in all 428 municipalities of Norway through nearly 12,000 local and volunteer-driven sport clubs, NIF is the largest voluntary democratic organization in Norway and has held a hegemonic position in terms of defining Norwegian sport in Norway as well as internationally. The term societal corporatism (or Norwegian sport corporatism) is often used to describe the institutional landscape of Norwegian sport and the historically close relationship between NIF and the Norwegian Ministry in the provision of sport opportunities for all (Bergsgard and Rommetvedt 2006). Such institutional arrangements ‘facilitate the linkage between state and society through the privileged participation of particular organized interests in policy, and through mutually supportive arrangements between the machinery of government on the one hand and centralized interest organizations on the other’ (Enjolras and Waldahl 2007: 201). In this way, NIF, with representational monopoly of sport, has been in a privileged position to influence state government sport-policy-making on behalf of the sport federations and sport clubs’ members nationwide, bridging the distance between the state and society within sport. At the same time, NIF is tied to the state administration, which provides the opportunity for the Norwegian government to influence NIF and its members. Thus, the Norwegian sports model constitutes a social contract between the state and its’ citizens. The development of a hierarchical sport structure, from community clubs upwards to the state apparatus, is in itself understood as an important development and democratic factor in Norwegian society. The Sport First NGOs also justify their role as agents of ‘little-d’ development in the Global South by referring to their historical role in Norwegian society (NIF, 2012).

The activities of NIF and subordinate sport associations are also founded on social and humanitarian values influenced by the strong social-democratic society in Norway (Säfvenbom et al. 2013). For instance, the principle of ‘Sport for All’ has been the mantra of
Norwegian sport policy since the 1970s, making NIF, along with political and financial support from the government, responsible for providing sporting opportunities for all children and adolescents through *organized* sport and ‘to instil positive values for individuals and communities, thereby strengthening its position as a popular movement and motivation force in society’ (NIF 2011: 1). The egalitarian and social-democratic rhetoric in Norwegian sport policy has legitimated organized sport’s important role as a promoter of the Norwegian welfare state, and is still evident today. Thus, there is a clear link between the Norwegian experience in sport and the Sport First strategy’s welfare-oriented, state-centred, scaled-up approach to SDP.

The legitimization of the Sport First strategy within the Norwegian aid system also needs to be understood in its congruence with Norwegian development aid traditions. In Norway, which has no colonial history to speak of, the ethical justification for development aid was afforded a stronger emphasis than economic or political self-interest as opposed to many other European countries after World War II (Tvedt 2003). This generated involvement across political divides within the Norwegian debate on development from 1960s and onwards. The emphasis on the humanitarian arguments for Norwegian aid was congruous with both the social-democratic idea of solidarity (equality, fraternity) that characterized the Norwegian political left, and the Christian–humanist ideals of the centre-right parties. The Sport First strategy’s mass-sport and non-competitive rhetoric was consistent with these ideals and is the main reason that in 1983 Norad commenced funding the NIF project ‘Sport for All’ in Dar es Salam, Tanzania (Straume 2010).

The Sport First ‘little-d’ development discourse does not harmonize with the mainstream international social SDP movement perspective, but rather needs to be understood in light of distinct national characteristics and traditions. In contrast, the Development through Sport ‘Big-D’ development discourse seems to be congruent with the assumption that the SDP movement is wedded to the neo-liberal development agenda. However, the recognition of and allocation of funds to this group of NGOs within the NDA system, as well as the diversity of organizations, needs to be understood in relation to a politicization of Norwegian SDP after 2004 (Hasselgård 2009). During this period, the government was interested in incorporating the cultural sector into Norwegian development aid and foreign policy. Since 1973, sport in Norway sport has been defined under what is referred to as an ‘expanded concept of culture.’ As sport was recognized as one of several cultural fields, the Norwegian MFA requested that in the report ‘Sport for Peace and Sustainable Development’, the level of ambition of SDP in development aid and foreign
policy was defined (Haugsjå and Aarhus, 2003). The report recommended that the MFA should continue its support of ‘development of sport’ in cooperating countries. However, influenced by international SDP processes in the UN, the report also recommended the Norwegian MFA integrate and support a more instrumental use of sport (Development through Sport) as a means to achieving predetermined Norwegian development aid policy priorities, such as the UN’s millennium development goals. By supporting these two strategies, it was stated that Norway had the potential of becoming a focal point for SDP efforts. In 2005, the MFA continued the government’s commitment to the cultural field in Norwegian development and foreign policy expressed in a publication ‘Strategy for Norway’s Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South’ (MFA 2005) – considered to be the world’s first national strategy on SDP. The strategy followed the recommendations in the report ‘Sport for Peace and Sustainable Development’. Thus, a distinct characteristic of the Norwegian official policy framework on SDP is that it incorporates both a traditional Sport First discourse and a UN-inspired Development through Sport discourse. This can be illustrated by the following quotes:

Cooperation with NIF and NFF will continue to be given priority. The focus will be on building sports structures and on capacity building in partner countries (...) The structures and expertise already built up in Norway put us in a good position to share experience and offer advice (...). The government will integrate the sports dimension in the sectors of education, health, HIV/AIDS, civil society, and peace building/conflict prevention, and will work strategically within the UN system to promote the sports dimension. (MFA 2005 pp. 37-45)

The politicization of Norwegian SDP from 2000 and the interaction between national traditions and international trends has moved the field of SDP in Norway closer to Norwegian official development aid strategies and thematic priorities (Hasselgård and Straume 2011). Even though the Sport First NGOs still hold an important position, they have lost their hegemonic prerogative to define Norwegian SDP. The fact that approximately the same amount of government funds are allocated to projects in the two categories illustrates this (Hasselgård and Straume 2011). This also explains the heterogeneity of SDP actors accepted within the NDA system. The duality in Norwegian SDP stands in contrast, for instance, to the official Australian SDP strategy that state: ‘With this strategy, the Australian aid programme is implementing an approach it calls “Development through sport”. Development through sport identifies development objectives first and then identifies how well planned sport-based activities can contribute to these’ (Australian Sports Commission (ASC) and AusAID 2013: 3). Consequently, the strategy explicitly articulates an instrumental use of sport to reach the
predetermined development objectives funded within in the Australian development aid system.

Although the NGOs within the Development through Sport category seem to reproduce the mainstream international SDP discourse, they also differ. For instance, an interesting characteristic of this group is the large number of Norwegian Christian-based development organizations receiving government funds for their SDP work. While some claim their development work is not used with the intention of influencing people’s religious affiliation but is instead part of their Christian faith-motivated charity work (diaconal mission), others combine sport, development work, and Christian missions. Christian mission organizations have traditionally had a strong position within the NDA system. From the mid-1850s, the missionary movement in Norway grew to become one of the strongest in Europe. Experience and extensive relationships with foreign countries in Africa and Latin America, along with knowledge about local conditions and their relationships with communities, have made the mission organizations valuable partners for the Norwegian government ever since the inception of development aid in the 1960s (Simensen 2003). These organizations, now transformed into professional NGOs, still constitute an important dimension in the NDA system. Hence, the government’s support of Christian-based NGOs’ SDP interventions should be understood as a distinctive characteristic of Norwegian SDP.

**SDP as foreign policy**

An interesting feature of Norwegian official SDP strategy is that it also establishes closer ties to Norwegian foreign policy (see MFA 2005: 11). This should be understood in connection with Norwegian authorities’ attempts to coordinate development policy and Norwegian foreign policy since the early 1990s. Following the end of the Cold War, there was a call for a new foreign policy objective for Norway to become a ‘humanitarian superpower’ (Leira, 2007). This was to provide Norway with a clear and holistic foreign policy profile, in which ambitions for the Norwegian peace and development engagement would become more closely associated with broader foreign policy interests (Tvedt 2003). Thus, the branding of the Norwegian peace and development efforts on the global scene has become a means of providing Norway with a stronger voice in international politics. Norwegian NGOs that work for peace and development have been central to this, and consequently it has been a conscious objective to coordinate the interests and activities of the government and the development aid NGOs receiving funds. This cooperation, often defined as ‘the Norwegian Model,’ is claimed to formalize NGOs as foreign policy actors, something that has been
manifested through ever-increasing funding from the Norwegian government to Norwegian NGOs (Lie 2006). This has led critics to question the NGOs’ autonomy vis-à-vis the state.

Norwegian SDP also needs to be understood within this context. Since 2005, and a redoubling of government funds to sports-related initiatives, there has been a growing interest in using the field of SDP and NGOs to promote Norwegian foreign policy interests (Hasselgård 2009). One example is the attempt by the MFA to establish a football and reconciliation project in Iraq through collaboration with the Iraqi Football Federation in 2008. The Iraqi national football team’s victory in the Asian Football Confederation’s Asia Cup in 2007 received much international attention because it was seen as an important contribution to the reconciliation process, and since the team had great support among the population across religious and ethnic divides. By engaging NFF and providing financial support for both the national football team and grassroots football projects for children, the MFA wanted to sustain football’s symbolic role in the reconciliation process in the country. The other ambition pertained to the interest in bringing greater visibility to the Norwegian peace and reconciliation engagement in the Middle East, strengthening Norway’s reputation in the region (Norway had just ordered its armed forces to withdraw from Iraq), which could contribute to building trust in Norway’s role as a peace broker in the region (Hasselgård 2009). The MFA-financed project, Karanba, is another example. The project has been used by several Norwegian ministers during diplomatic visits to Brazil to promote Norway’s development assistance and foreign policy interests in the country. This has been especially visible in the run-up to the FIFA World Cup 2014. These examples illustrate how Norwegian SDP engagement may not always be independent of Norwegian foreign policy ambitions. Norwegian SDP has therefore also been developed amidst a tension between Norwegian authorities’ foreign policy ambitions and the organizations’ own perspectives and ambitions, demonstrating the manner in which an NGO’s politics in SDP may conflict with Norwegian authorities’ use of SDP in politics.

Rejection of alternative strategies
The alternative SDP strategies have no roots in distinctive national traditions and represent new international SDP trends not as yet accepted within the NDA system. The rejection of applications for funds for football academies could be explained by for-profit enterprises not having traditionally been accepted by the NDA system (Tvedt 2002: 369). In addition, there seems to be a consensus within the system that elite sport should not be part of the SDP agenda. The Norwegian official SDP strategy states: ‘The strategy targets grassroots sport.
Competitive sport is not included’ (MFA 2005: 37). Both the Sport First NGOs (also responsible for Norwegian elite sport) and the Development through Sport NGOs strongly warn against talent identification SDP initiatives. This is similarly expressed in an article by NIF in the development aid magazine Bistandsaktuelt where the plan to build a football academy in Uganda is described as ‘destructive business’ that would harm Norway’s good reputation in the field of SDP in cooperating countries and among local partners (Ødegaard et al. 2008).

The Development First strategy (using celebrities to attract attention to development issues), as well as Mega Sport Events strategies, also seems to be rejected by the NGOs within the NDA system. An interesting feature of Norwegian SDP is that all organizations within the system (Sport First and Development through Sport) have access to Norwegian sports celebrities but rarely use athletes to ‘brand’ SDP projects. For instance, the Sport First organizations argue that further exposure is unnecessary as their commitment to SDP is financed and legitimized through funds from Norad or the MFA. The same argument seems to be the reason for the low attention given to Mega Sport Events. Darnell (2012) claims that these events are predominantly attractive arenas for SDP NGOs that need to increase exposure to and justification for their projects ‘to maintain access to funds from donors and sponsors interested in, and attracted to, high-profile and politically palatable support for international development’ (p. 114). Again, the ‘safe’ funding from Norad or the MFA seems to be the explanatory factor. Although these new trends need to be studied in greater depth, they illustrate the importance of understanding the interplay between national and international discourses on SDP and how they encroach upon each other.

**Concluding remarks**

The above discussion shows that Norwegian SDP does not exist in a vacuum at the domestic level. It constitutes its own tradition or SDP subsystem influenced by the actors’ traditions, identity and mandate, values, available development tools, Norwegian development, and foreign policy priorities and international trends. Accordingly, the policy field of SDP cannot be understood solely from an international SDP social movement perspective. Furthermore, the Sport First actors’ understanding of development of sport itself as a driving force in development processes does not fit into the predominant Plus Sport/ Sport plus conceptions in SDP literature. As previously discussed, this analytical tool only classifies strategies based

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6 Right to Play Norway is an exception. This organisation uses sport celebrities as project ambassadors.
on the relative emphasis given to sport to achieve specific international development objectives. Hence, the analysis shows the importance of understanding SDP policy models and strategies in a broader perspective.

Figure 1 summarises the main findings in this article. The tension that can arise within the SDP subsystem should be understood along two axes. The differences and the tension between the NGOs are played out on a horizontal axis (‘Big-D’/‘little-d’ development). Here, the analysis identifies varying perceptions of SDP, illustrating how tension among the organizations can arise with regard to the role of sport and NGOs in the development arena in the Global South. The tension between the NGOs and donor agencies is played out along a vertical axis (‘politics in SDP’/‘SDP in politics’). The analysis identifies that tension can arise between the organizations’ strategies and the Norwegian government’s development aid and foreign policy ambitions.

Figure 1: The Norwegian Sport for Development and Peace subsystem and flow of funds.

The ideological conflict between the NGOs is interesting seen through the current post-2015 Development Agenda discussions within the development sector. The need for coordinated development efforts for building institutions and structures that meet the needs for a social contract between the state and its citizens is at the forefront of the discussions (Banks and Hulme 2014). How can this affect the Norwegian SDP? First, the post-2015
rhetoric is compatible with the Sport First (corporative) strategy. Thus, the Sport First NGOs can regain their hegemonic position which they lost following the influence of the UN-led neo-liberal SDP trends after 2000. Second, it can compel the Development through Sport NGOs to adopt advocacy strategies vis-à-vis the state. Third, it can encourage cooperation between Sport First and Development through Sport NGOs in which they work together to develop poor societies through a coordinated top-down (governance capacity building) and bottom-up (service delivery) SDP strategy. For instance, in the interviews, Right to Play admitted that they were in a process of integrating advocacy work in their strategies as this was needed to receive future funding. A joint project between NIF and Right to Play Norway in Burundi, supported by Norad, is an example of the latter outcome. In this programme, NIF’s responsibility is to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Culture and advise on developing strategies and implementation plans that support national, regional and local sport structures. Right to Play, on the other hand, works through these structures to build the capacity of local organizations providing sport and play, as well as providing a platform to address Burundi national development priorities (Right to Play 2011). If this hybrid SDP strategy represents a shift towards a new paradigm in Norwegian SDP, we could see more attempts to coordinate ‘little-d’ and ‘Big-D’ development strategies and an erosion of the duality that has characterized the Norwegian SDP subsystem over the last ten years.

Further studies on the politics of Norwegian SDP should engage with the discussions on the development NGOs’ degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the governmental funding agencies. Furthermore, the focus of this article has been on SDP as seen through the Norwegian actors’ policy models and strategies. Figure 1 also illustrates that further studies should move the analytical focus to local informal practices and local realities on the recipient side to study the extent to which Norwegian SDP policy discourses shape development practice in cooperating countries (see Hasselgård and Straume 2014 for an empirical example). Such studies could find inspiration in the established policy-practice debate among anthropologists in development studies (e.g. Lie 2007, Mosse 2005). Ethnographic studies of the transition from SDP policy to practice could reveal the complex social life and agency of actors in Norwegian SDP interventions: how different worldviews are negotiated, how actors at different levels translate their interests into the project and how this affects the implementation in practice. Further studies should also be concerned with cross-national comparative analyses of different Northern SDP subsystems. Research on these systems’ unique features and similarities will help us to better understand the complexity of the fast-
growing field of SDP and how these subsystems form part of the international development aid system.

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‘They need to get the feeling that these are their ideas’: trusteeship in Norwegian Sport for Development and Peace to Zimbabwe

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This article analyses a Sport for Development and Peace organization’s production of discourse in the light of the concept of ‘development’. In particular, the idea of trusteeship and the power-effects that lie within this idea are addressed – meaning that someone has the knowledge, the skills and the funding to define themselves as developers on behalf of someone else. Through a single case study of the Norwegian Confederation of Sports’ development cooperation with the Zimbabwe Sport and Recreation Commission, we show how trusteeship was reproduced in the project’s formal discourse in policy documents and project plans.

Keywords: discourse; post-development theory; power-effects; Sport for Development and Peace; trusteeship

Introduction

During the last decade, considerable attention has been given in sports science literature to the Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) sector. Several researchers have addressed a variety of issues that are analysed from different theoretical and methodological angles. Many of these relate to research within the field of development studies, but there is an insufficiency of analysis and discussion which addresses different perspectives of the concept of ‘development’ that has evolved from the development debate. This has been pointed out by Darnell and Black (2011), Hartmann and Kwauk (2011) and Levermore and Beacom (2012). For instance, Levermore and Beacom emphasized the importance of ‘engaging with the established mainstream development discourse that provides an extensive body of theory through which to construct a critical assessment of sport-for-development’ (p. 125). Among other topics, they highlight power relations in SDP as a key issue for further SDP studies.

A recent debate in International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics has been concerned with local actors’ perspectives in SDP on the one hand (Lindsey and Grattan 2012), and broader structures of knowledge and power on a global scale, which limits the actors’ choices and opportunities, on the other (Darnell and Hayhurst 2012). Thus, it enters the standing debate in development studies concerning the primacy of structure over agency in development interventions. We contribute to this debate by analysing a northern SDP organization’s production of discourse in the light of the concept of ‘development’. In particular, we address the effects of trusteeship, meaning

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that through active intervention, those who define themselves as ‘developed’ determine the process of development for those they define as ‘less-developed’ (Cowen and Shenton 1996). Drawing on Nustad’s book *Gavens Makt* (*The Power of the Gift*) (2003), we investigate power-effects lying within the idea of trusteeship. In this context, power is not to be understood as something a dominant group has and consequently executes in interaction with someone else, prior to action. From a power-effect perspective, however, power is a result of actions between groups or individuals (Latour 1986 in Nustad 2003). What needs to be understood is not how a dominant group executes power over those who are subjected to it, but – through interaction – how someone is capable of creating power-effects. Thus, power needs to be explained, and is not an explanation in itself. As Nustad (2003) points out:

One of the most important aspects in this definition of power is the power to define reality (Latour 1986). The possibility to define what constitutes the most important bricks of society, and the relations between these, are fundamental in executing power. (p. 27)

In this article, we address some of the power-effects that are produced through SDP intervention. Through a single case study of Norwegian SDP cooperation in Zimbabwe, we show how trusteeship was reproduced in the project’s formal discourse in policy documents and project plans.

Since 1991, the Norwegian Confederation of Sports (NIF) has supported the Zimbabwe Sport and Recreation Commission (SRC) through an SDP project. The initial objective of the cooperation was to contribute to the development of mass-sport structures and systems throughout the country, and to implement the idea of ‘sport for all’ in Zimbabwe based on a so-called ‘Norwegian sports model’. In the long run, the project was intended to contribute to broader social development such as a focus on democracy, human rights and gender issues. Thus, the focus of the cooperation has been both the development of and through sport. The fact that this project has been supported for more than 20 years makes it particularly interesting as an object of study since it can be analysed in light of changing trends in the general development debate.

Our two main research questions are: (1) Which power-effects arise from the discourse formation produced by NIF throughout the project?; and (2) How did changes in the formal discourse throughout the project affect the notion of trusteeship? In our analysis, we draw on a post-development theory which focuses on discursive formations produced by the development apparatus itself and ‘how it constructs and order the reality in which it seeks to intervene’ (Nustad 2007, p. 41). Therefore, this article is about conceptual elements of development and attempts to address how SDP works rather than whether it works (similar distinctions are made by Hayhurst (2009) and Lie (2007)). It is important to emphasize that on the recipient side, discourses are also being produced. Consequently, how a project is implemented in practice is a result of negotiations between donors and recipients. We need to keep this in mind although this article focuses mainly on NIF’s production of discourse. We have structured the article in the following way. First, we aim to place our study within the established SDP literature. Second, we introduce some basic notions surrounding the concept of ‘development’, and place these within the established development debate. Third, we describe NIF’s involvement as an actor in the SDP field. Before embarking on the analyses and discussion, we outline the methods utilized. We conclude with suggestions for future research.
Placing the study within the SDP literature

Since the turn of the century, there has been increasing international focus on SDP projects. This was especially evident in 2005, the year declared by the UN to be the International Year of Sport and Physical Education. In the wake of this, organizations using sports as a tool in development work grew considerably. Currently, large international organizations like UNICEF and the Red Cross, sports organizations like FIFA and the IOC, multinational corporations like Adidas and Nike, and smaller private organizations, are all concerned with SDP (Hasselgård and Straume 2011).

In line with this, the body of related literature has increased. Until recently, this literature was characterized by descriptive approaches to the field and ‘mapping the territory’. However, scholars are now turning towards analyses rooted in the established development theoretical debate. In their article Reassessing sport-for-development: moving beyond ‘mapping the territory’, Levermore and Beacom (2012) suggest three areas that need increased attention in future research on SDP: the power and authority located in development processes; the increasing role of sport INGOs as key actors in SDP; and the challenge in evaluating SDP processes. In this article, we address the first issue by studying the power-effects manifested in the discursive formation in NIF’s policy rhetoric.

Some researchers have studied discursive formations in SDP. Coalter (2010) explores the rhetoric in a variety of SDP policies published by central stakeholders in the SDP movement (e.g. UN, UNICEF, UK Sport, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NIF and Kicking Aids Out). Coalter argues that an exaggerated belief in the binary relations between sports and its anticipated benefits characterize the policy discourse. Darnell (2007, 2010, 2012) studies the discursive formation produced by young Canadian SDP volunteers. He argues that a hegemonic discourse of neoliberal development is being reproduced in SDP and that ‘SDP in practice constitutes a site in which colonizing knowledge of the other can be constructed, or reconstructed’ (Darnell 2012, p. 55). Giulianotti (2011) explores the reflexive discourses of SDP officials, which have crucial roles in planning, implementing and evaluating SDP projects. He demonstrates the transnational complexity of the SDP sector, for instance through exploring relationships within the SDP sector, and between the sector and the donors. Hayhurst (2009) analyses six central SDP policy documents produced by the SDP International Working Group (SDP-IWG), and argues that ‘SDP policy models are wedded to the increasingly neoliberal character of international development’ (p. 203). She further draws attention to the power that lies in the discourse by asking who were the agents of knowledge in the SDP policy agenda, and on whose behalf they were speaking. Like Darnell, she places her argument within the post-colonial framework of development studies. Both Darnell and Hayhurst refer to post-development scholars (e.g. Escobar 1995). However, they do not place their analyses within the post-development critique of development. Hartmann and Kwauk (2011) state that in order to understand and theorize SDP, one needs to dwell on the concept of ‘development’ and how this is understood in development interventions. They argue that ‘dominant conceptions of development colour the lenses from which many sport-based intervention and development program officers approach their social-change endeavour’ (p. 297). Consequently, existing structures and power relations are reproduced. None of the above pays attention to the formal policy rhetoric produced by SDP organizations like NIF. Guest (2009), however, shows how the ‘universal language of sport’ discourse is translated into practice through an SDP organization in Angola. He argues that the community residents did not uncritically diffuse the donor discourses and the solutions prescribed to them. The residents ‘participated in sport and play on their own
terms and employed their own meanings’ (p. 1347), thus demonstrating local agency. We acknowledge the importance to study the relationship between formal discourse and agency in development interventions. However, in this article, we aim to contribute to the debate concerning discursive formations within SDP studies. We mainly focus on the post-development critique to analyse a single Norwegian SDP organization and its policy development.

We continue by introducing some basic notions surrounding the concept of ‘development’, and place these within the established development debate. This has been outlined by a variety of researchers, also in relation to SDP (e.g. Levermore 2009, Darnell 2012).

**Development, aid and its apparatus**

Today’s discourse on ‘development’ is complex and difficult to grasp. It includes many different debates and covers many different areas. Thus, we may speak of a diffusion of different theoretical perspectives within the study of development, where old conceptions on development conveyed by the classical theorists have been mixed with new ideas and issues (Cowen and Shenton 1996, Bull 2006). However, in order to understand the development apparatus and its changing development rhetoric and politics, it is important to comprehend the basic notions of ‘development’ extracted from the classical theoretical development debate.

**The development aid discourse**

The number of initiatives that focused on how poor countries could develop economic structures and increase material wealth grew rapidly after World War II. Consequently, a need for an explanatory model that could provide answers to the questions ‘What is development?’ and ‘How can it be achieved?’ was created. The dominant voice in the development debate in the 1950s and 1960s was that of the modernization school. The school had three related assumptions: these assumptions equated development with economic growth, industrialization and modernization; they viewed development as a linear process with several stages that all Western industrialized countries had been through; and they claimed that the developing countries would ultimately follow in the same path of development as experienced by the Western industrialized countries (Bull 2006). Modernization theorists defined the lack of development in areas such as illiteracy, the low division of labour and the lack of communication and infrastructure as an internal problem. Intervention in these areas could speed up the modernization process so that the developing countries could catch up with the West. Consequently, the solution to poverty was a transfer of ‘elites, nation states, capital, technology, democracy, education and the rule of law’ (Nustad 2001, p. 75) from the West to the developing countries. From an analytical perspective, it is useful to distinguish between what Cowen and Shenton (1996) term ‘immanent’ and ‘intentional’ development. Immanent development is characterized by a ‘historical process of social change in which societies are transformed over longer periods’ (p. 7) and thus is ‘natural’. Intentional development, on the other hand, is characterized by an active intervention to create the desired change in a society or situation. However, a premise for intentional development intervention is that it necessarily needs to be governed by someone familiar with the development objectives, thus already developed. Nustad (2004) summarizes this: ‘[It] was when development in the immanent sense was seen as creating problems that could be solved by active intervention, that intentional development was created’ (p. 14).
In the 1970s, a neo-Marxist response and criticism of modernization theories’ models rose in the development debate. The critique, defined as dependency theory, claimed that the national economies in the developing countries could not be understood independently from the capitalist world system (Bull 2006). According to dependency theorists, Western industrialized countries were at the core of this system whereas former colonized regions were in the periphery. The two were tied together in a dependent relationship that contributed to underdevelopment in the periphery due to unequal economic distributions. Thus, the argument put forward by the modernization theory was turned on its head. Consequently, it was not possible to understand development as a linear process through different phases. Development was just possible if the industrialized countries’ dominant role in the world economy was reduced.

The focus on economic development was further elaborated as many developing countries entered a severe debt crisis in the early 1980s. This in turn paved the way for neo-liberalism as an economic prescription for developing countries which increasingly viewed the market as the only means to promote development. Neo-liberalism shared many of the premises proposed in modernization theories with the most obvious being the belief in economic growth as the main road to development. However, neo-liberalism postulated a different path to economic development – an integration of low-income countries in international economy through free trade. Simultaneously, it was claimed that in the developing countries the state exploited its own people. As a result, the development aid foci moved from state-to-state cooperation to an increased emphasis on supporting NGOs’ which were believed to be a counterweight to the state since there were fewer formal demands attached to them, and since they apparently operated close to the people themselves. Along with this was a focus towards local participation in the development process, also referred to as a bottom-up approach to development. This meant that the intended recipients of aid were supposed to do the planning and make the decisions (Chambers 1997).

Neo-liberal trends also affected major development institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which went from supporting debt- and crisis-ridden developing countries with loans for specific projects, to general budget support known as Structural Adjustment Programmes. This support did not come without strings attached, but depended on the recipient countries’ fulfilment of certain conditions (Stokke 1995). Thus, the period and its structural politics came to be known as the ‘first generation conditionality’. In the second half of the 1980s, other like-minded governments followed suit and imposed conditions on the recipients who, with a few other sources of income, had no other choice than to accept the conditions. Initially, the conditions were given in respect of economic issues, but eventually several other areas were also subject to donor demands. In the following period that came to be known as the ‘second generation conditionality’, the issue of ‘good governance’ was brought onto the agenda. As Stokke (1995) points out, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, ‘pursuance of predominant Western political norms and interests (. . .) replaced security policy considerations as the primary concern’ (p. 9). In particular, the so-called ‘universal’ ideals in areas such as governmental systems, which emphasized democracy and the rule of law and human rights, were emphasized and added to the Structural Adjustment Programmes. This change in discourse towards universal ideas established its roots and is still normative in development aid today.

The two discourses, local participation versus conditionality, were further strengthened in the 1990s. As Nustad (2003) argues, this nexus produced an interesting paradox: the right to govern one’s own development was strengthened at precisely the same time as donor countries began intervening in the recipient states.
Although the theories outlined above were different in many ways, they also had their similarities: ‘They are theories about how the problem of under-development can be solved based on abstractions from a historical process that have already taken place in the Western world’ (Tvedt 1990, p. 25). Accordingly, they were all creating divisions between modern and traditional; core and periphery; the first and the third world; and additionally expressed a desire to move from one pole to the other, towards modernization.

Post-development and its criticism of the development apparatus

After four decades of international development aid, poverty and inequality between poor and rich countries had not changed much, and it became clear that the explanatory models of development had not lived up to their expectations (Sachs 1992). According to Escobar (1984), the concept of ‘development’ could be understood as created by Western ideas and ultimately was an extension of colonial hegemony. This opened up for a debate about the concept of development itself, not only its goals and means, but also about the ideas upon which the models on development were structured (Nustad 2003). The scholars, who came to be known as post-development scholars, analysed development as a powerful discourse through focusing on ‘the way in which discourses of development help shape the reality they pertain to address, and how alternative conceptions of the problem have been marked off as irrelevant’ (Nustad 2004, p. 13). Post-development theorists thus asked questions like ‘what is development?’ and ‘what may be the consequences of speaking of a “development problem”’? Consequently, the discursive formation of development was the centre of attention for post-development scholars. This approach was inspired by post-structuralism and especially Michel Foucault who argued that those phenomena under study were constituted in language and distributed through institutions (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). Similarly, post-development theorists argued that ‘development’ was nothing but a constructed term, defined by the apparatus that was set to solve the ‘problem’. In particular, they criticized the modernization school which had made a distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘under-developed’, and – they argued – had produced a notion about a universal development discourse where the problem and the solution to the problem were rendered as ‘one size fits all’ (Nustad 2003). Post-development scholars aimed at creating a better understanding of the discursive formation of development as ‘a discursive area, an apparatus that decides what is possible and valid expressions about poverty, and thus supresses alternative visions of the world’ (Nustad 2001, p. 75).

We have seen that post-development scholars criticize the discursive formation of development as expressed in development policies, plans and reports, and how discursive power is manifested in these. This means that whoever is in a discursive position to define what ‘development’ is and how it can be achieved – the so-called development expert – is also in a position of power (Ziai 2007). Cowen and Shenton (1996, p. 4) argued that ‘the nineteenth-century resolution of the development problem was to invoke trusteeship’. This development paradox created a power-effect that we can define as manageable development – an intentional change by the use of development projects guided by the ‘developed’ world that is in possession of skills, knowledge, technical means and funds, with a relation of trusteeship as the main effect.

Another power-effect that can be subtracted from the basic notions of development presented above is what Nustad (2003) calls temporal segregation. By that, he means that the difference between the developer and the development subject (the rich and the poor) is
explained by stating that the poor are at a different stage of development than the rich. This temporal shift led to cutting every causal relationship between the poverty of the developing world and the wealth of the West. Consequently, wealth is not responsible for the poverty, and the reasons for, and solutions to the problem are presented as internal to the country. This image of the poor suppresses alternative representations that could have viewed the world as one society with extremely unfair sharing of resources (Nustad 2003).

An important contribution to post-development criticism was by Ferguson (1990) who modified the discursive approach by studying development projects produced by development discourses. In his book, The Anti-Politics Machine, he showed how these outcomes were a result of the developers’ limited conditions. Because social realities are complex, he argued that developers simplified and constructed the realities in such a way that intervention was possible. Ferguson claimed that development agencies primarily had technical means at their disposal, and political analyses to approach development challenges were, therefore, replaced by technical solutions to the ‘problem’. Thus, it can be argued that development agents, who set the terms for development policies, often end up treating the symptoms rather than the causes of poverty, with de-politicization of poverty as an outcome.

We will keep the above power-effects in mind as we proceed to analyse the NIF–SRC relationship. First, however, we provide a brief outline of NIF’s SDP engagement prior to the Zimbabwean project.

**Sport on the Norwegian development aid agenda**

In 1983, NIF started an SDP project in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. Inspired by the current European and Norwegian sport politics, the project had ‘sport for all’ as an ideal. ‘Sport for all’ policies, first emerging in Germany and the Nordic countries in the 1960s, were built upon the idea that the health and well-being of the citizens was a governmental concern, and needed to be emphasized in order to facilitate social development. ‘Sport for all’ policies corresponded with a European society experiencing social challenges caused by post-industrialization, and thus they were eventually adopted by a number of European governments whose heavy investments yielded increased sports participation in the 1960s and the 1970s. As a result, the number of international governmental institutions involved in sports both at the global and the regional levels increased significantly (Houlihan 1994). ‘Sport for all’ policies were further adopted by global institutions such as the Council of Europe and UNESCO which emphasized the need for sport and physical education and affirmed that sport was a human right that should be encouraged in all societal levels. This was formalized in the International Charter of Physical Education and Sport (UNESCO 1978), adopted by UNESCO’s General Conference in 1978. The idea of ‘sport for all’ became an ongoing motif within these institutions as it specifically aimed at being a means of achieving greater unity between the member countries, and to safeguard the ideals and principles they had in common of facilitating economic and social development (Jackson 1978, Houlihan 1994). NIF clearly followed the rhetoric of the time, and took a great interest in the ‘sport for all’ idea. Thus, when initiating an SDP project in Tanzania, it was this idea that NIF aimed to spread through the project called Sport for All. Straume (2010) argues that NIF had several reasons to become involved in the SDP arena. First, there was an idea that, despite the lack of international results, one was in a prime position in sports compared to the developing world and therefore had something to provide; however, without further elaborating what this ‘something’ was. Further, it was believed that an SDP project could contribute positively to sports by showing that sport was more than...
hooliganism, violence, black money and the emerging number of doping scandals that characterized the international elite sports. Another dominating argument was the focus on societal development and the building of a welfare state, with a special emphasis on health benefits. To a large extent, these arguments reflected the Norwegian society in general where, for years, sports had been used to address health issues by building the Norwegian welfare state and integrating sports and public health (Straume 2012, Straume and Steen-Johnsen 2012).

After gradually reducing its involvement in the Sport for All in Tanzania during 1989–90, NIF expanded its development engagement by moving to Zambia and Zimbabwe. Through the interest that the Tanzanian Sport for All had generated, it was considered that Norway and NIF could acquire a unique coordinating position in the development of Sport for All in Sub-Saharan Africa. ‘NIF can become an “operator” in the area of sports in a country where the needs and interests are particularly grand, and where a sports tradition is rooted in its people’ (Samuelsen and Wigum 1988, p. 2). The projects should all have the same aim and scope, but should be adapted to local conditions (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 1989). Thus, the main areas of priority were education, sports organizational development, activities, facilities and equipment. In order to reach their goals and implement the Sport for All projects, NIF established partnerships with existing sport structures, in Zambia in 1990 and Zimbabwe in 1991. It is the cooperation between NIF and its Zimbabwean counterpart, the SRC that is the base of this study.

One can divide the NIF–SRC cooperation into two phases. In the first phase lasting from 1991 until 1999, the focus was on implementing and incorporating Sport for All in the SRC system. In the concept of all was an emphasis on children, women, disabled people, refugees and other disadvantaged groups, especially within the black majority community. The second phase commenced in 1999 and continues to this day. This phase is characterized by programmes that target specific groups (Sport for the Differently Abled/Sport for People with Visual Impairment and Sport for Women (1999–2008)) as well as the initiation of the Community Sports Development Programme (CSDP) (2008 to date). The CSDP aims to implement a system with activities at every level from specific community sports clubs (football, netball, athletics and volleyball) to teams competing at the national level. According to NIF, SRC has developed over 800 clubs since 2008, trained over 6500 community leaders and provided opportunities for over 30,000 youths to participate in sport on a regular basis through the CSDP (NIF 2011).

Methodology
This study is a part of a larger research project on NIF’s SDP engagement in Southern Africa, and particularly the relationship with SRC. The aim of the project is twofold. First, this article studies NIF’s formal discourse and, consequently, the power-effects produced. Second, in a forthcoming article, we will study how the discourses are translated, given meaning and implemented by the SRC.

The production of discourses takes place through written and spoken statements. We understand a discourse as a particular way to speak of, and to understand the social world (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999), as a system, or model, of expressions and practices that construct the reality of its carriers and have a certain amount of regularity in a set of social relations (Neumann 2001). Because different discourses recognize different actions as possible, logic and relevant given a certain situation, the discursive understanding has social consequences since the various discourses define what is considered to be the truth and knowledge, produce meaning and thus constitute the basis for our understanding of the
world and how we think and act (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). In our analysis, we seek to identify different understandings in NIF’s SDP engagement in Zimbabwe. Discourses produce NIF’s SDP reality, give meaning to its SDP engagement and set fundamental conditions when it develops its official SDP policies.

The study was carried out through a combination of archive and documentary research supplemented by interviews. Public archives at NIF, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and the Norwegian Embassy in Harare were visited and form the empirical base. The majority of written sources are policy documents, project plans and reports. In analysing the formal discourse, we have identified thematic clusters in order to structure our findings. We have searched for patterns in the documents, specifically regarding different conceptions of SDP. The documentary sources were supplemented with three interviews of Zimbabwean and Norwegian representatives involved in policy-making processes carried out during a field trip with both authors to Harare in February 2012.

As a single case study, no explicit comparison is made with other cases. As stated by Yin (2008), the use of single cases does not exclude analytical generalization. However, the discursive formation studied here was framed within a specific historical and cultural context. Consequently, empirical results may not be generalized to other contexts. Nonetheless, this article aims to use the case as an entrance in a study of an SDP organization’s production of discourse in the light of the concept of ‘development’. Hence, generalization is not the objective. In the following section, we explore how power-effects can become visible in an SDP context, specifically in the relationship between NIF and SRC.

NIF as managers of development

As shown, within NIF, there was an idea that it was important to continue its sports for development engagement after moving out of Tanzania. The cooperation with SRC was intended to strengthen sport structures and systems throughout the country through the introduction of modern mass sports and the concept of ‘sport for all’. Broader development goals were also included, such as health, culture and economic development, reconciliation and strengthened national pride (NIF 1993). The aim to assist national and local sports authorities in Zimbabwe was something that NIF was familiar with, and as it did in Tanzania, it clearly expressed a belief in its own suitability for aiding Zimbabwean sports: ‘The way sport is organized in Norway could provide examples for the rest of the world. Norway has one unitary organization, the Norwegian Confederation of Sports in which democracy and independence are essential principles’ (NIF 1993, p. 4). This organizational structure is referred to as the ‘Norwegian model’, one which sets the terms for NIF as a development agent. As emphasized in the Strategy for development assistance, ‘Sport for All’ (1993):

On paper, sport in the cooperating countries is independent and democratic. The realities are different. People are aware of this disparity between ideal and practice, and those involved in sports are clearly supporters of the Norwegian model. The NIF contribution is important in this development because of the democratic traditions that NIF stands for, combined with the good results Norwegian sport has achieved both in regards to elite and mass-sports. Therefore, NIF is in a very suitable advisory position to the sport movements in the cooperating countries. (p. 4)

Clearly, this statement shows NIF’s image of itself as a supplier of terms on SDP intervention in developing countries. The rhetoric of both these quotas followed NIF through the first phase, and seems to be the rationale for development cooperation. Here, we see an example
of NIF’s need to simplify and construct the realities of sports in Zimbabwe through the lenses of a Norwegian sports model in order to intervene. As we will show below, this discourse is manifest in several documents from this phase.

The image of oneself as supplier of terms for SDP was also evident in a Nordic context. In a Nordic strategy document regarding a common platform for SDP interventions in Africa, the NIF stated:

Through our way to organise sport in the local communities, we wish to give the countries of interest knowledge and guidance in organising sports efforts as well as models for cooperation and motivation. ( . . . ) Our training programs and organisational development contribute to building democracy in the country, and to promoting human rights for all regardless of race, religion, gender and political opinion. The Nordic sports federations should accept their part of the responsibility to develop international sports building on value norms based on democracy and co-determination. (NIF 1999, p. 9)

Ideals of democracy, independence and human rights would clearly be difficult to argue against, and something that needed to be adopted by the rest of the world. This is in line with Tvedt (2003) who argues that Norwegian development aid has been marked by what he defines as ‘the Goodness Regime’, meaning that giving aid is an expression for acts or policies that are inherently good. This has made it extremely hard to criticize and it has also become the main argument for Norwegian development politics. The ‘Goodness Regime’ has also influenced the Norwegian self-image as a bearer of values and norms which Tvedt argues are often mistaken to be universal values. Hence, a particular language with specific concepts, understandings and forms of communications has been created.

The above quotation reveals a universal understanding of sports and development in the developing countries and shows how NIF, through its presumed superior Norwegian model, positions itself to define what SDP should be, and how it could be achieved. This is bolstered in documents where NIF suggests actions to be taken to improve the situation of sports in Zimbabwe. In several documents, NIF described Zimbabwe in the first phase as lacking sport structures and systems, a problem that NIF could remedy. In the application to Norad (1995), one can read the following under the chapter describing reasons for using NIF personnel in foreign aid:

On every level sport is in complete lack of competence; Sport lacks administrative competence on every level below the top, both at the government level and within the sports themselves; it is still necessary to be in control of the funds and make sure that the progress goes according to plan; attempts to pressurise efforts to get Sport for All integrated in all official plans, among other things, to try to secure future governmental financial allocations; attempt to transfer competence and knowledge from NIF to all levels of sports. (p. 5)

In the above, it was shown that NIF describes Zimbabwe as lacking something that Norway has, and is willing to share through ‘expert knowledge’. This is supported through NIF’s definitions of its representatives as ‘experts’, ‘sport for all experts’, ‘the Norwegian sports experts’ and ‘experts from abroad’ which is articulated in several of the documents. Thus, it is evident that NIF positioned itself as a trustee in the relationship with the SRC by introducing a solution to the development problem – ‘sport for all’. In practice, this meant transferring sports knowledge and technology governed by the experts. This included working to promote sports at various levels within the Zimbabwean school system, educating coaches and referees, developing the Zimbabwean sports organization, providing sports
equipment, and stimulating and organizing the production of sports equipment (Norad 1989).

NIF stated that it needed to be cautious in approaching the Zimbabwean recipients so as to avoid an asymmetrical relationship between itself and the SRC. In an assessment report prior to the engagement in Zimbabwe, the following was stated: ‘It’s important not to push too hard. The ideas need time to mature and people need to get the feeling that these are their ideas’ (NIF 1991, p. 6). In the same document, NIF concludes that it ‘It will be a big task to get Sport for All in Zambia and Zimbabwe into shape’ (p. 8). Although it took the recipients into consideration, it reproduced the power-effects implicit in the concept of trusteeship as alternatives to NIF’s concepts and expert knowledge was not considered. This was also pointed out by our informants.

Temporal segregation

In several of the above quotations, there was an idea within the NIF that the Zimbabwean sports organization was at a different stage of development than the Norwegian one. The temporal segregation was made particularly visible in the assessment report prior to the engagement in Zimbabwe where NIF introduced four strategies to bridge the increasing sports gap between the industrialized and developing countries. The reproduction of modernization theory rhetoric where poor and rich countries are at different evolutionist stages is evident. NIF presents the developing countries at a pre-industrial stage when it comes to sport. They are lagging behind and intervention is necessary in order for them to catch up with the West (NIF 1991). In order to progress in sports, it is stated that they need to improve their standard of living. In a chapter describing ‘The relationship between industrialized and developing countries, economically and culturally’, it is stated that: ‘If the standard of living remain the same or decrease, then chances are limited for introducing modern mass sports’ (NIF 1991, p. 2). In addition to pointing at temporal segregation, this quote reveals NIF’s conception of ‘sport for all’ as a modern expression (as opposed to the pre-modern sports). It is important to note that this rhetoric also seems to have been reproduced within the Norad system. In a letter of assurance in February 1990, the anticipated impact of NIF intervention is expected to be ‘sustainable sports activities on the grass root level based on modern principles’ (Norad 1990, p. 2; our emphasis).

As the above analysis reveals, NIF describes the problem of sports development in Zimbabwe as internal and not in relation to NIF’s own wealth (by dependency theorists explained as extreme unfair sharing of resources and power). This was evident in several of the NIF documents, both when concerning the development of mass sports and professional sports. It was stated that in order for the developing countries to reach the level of the industrialized countries within Olympic sports, the standard of living and economic conditions within sports in developing countries needed to improve considerably (NIF 1991). Like the modernization theorists, NIF explained the lack of development in sports as lack of immanent historical progress; hence, sports development was being de-politicized.

Researchers within sport studies have also attempted to politicize the development of sports in developing countries. They do so by explaining under-development in sports in terms of disparate political and structural relations between the developing and developed countries, specifically through grand international sports institutions. In his book, Africa, Football and FIFA: Politics, Colonialism and Resistance, Darby (2002) shows how FIFA politics have been characterized by unequal political power relations which have favoured European members, and have thus been an obstacle to the development of football in Africa.
Through the discursive formation produced by the NIF in the first phase, we have identified two power-effects. First, NIF had an idea of what sports development should be and presented a model and practical solution to Zimbabwean sports development based on the Norwegian conception of what sports development should entail. Thus, it made sports development manageable. Second, it described the Zimbabwean sports organization as being at a different temporal stage to the Norwegian organization, with the de-politicizing of the under-development of sports in Zimbabwe as a consequence. On a discursive level, NIF positioned itself to define possible and valid solutions for developing sports in Zimbabwe. Consequently, it neglected any other alternative knowledge and solutions to sports development than its own.

Changes in NIF’s formal discourse: same effects?
In the following section, we explore the formal discourse from the second period of NIF’s cooperation with SRC. As the SDP sector grew considerably after the year 2000, the discursive formations in the documents are professionalized accordingly. We need to see the changes in the formal discourse in the light of changes within the international development discourse, and the local participation versus conditionality nexus in particular.

We see traces of changes in the formal discursive already in NIF’s strategy for development assistance from 1998 to 2003. For instance, we see a change in rhetoric when NIF describes its own role in relation to the recipient. No longer do we see NIF speaking of itself as an expert, but rather, as a consultant or facilitator in a partnership that should be defined by the recipients:

In line with NIF’s idea of sports built on broad participation at the grass roots level, it is necessary that the projects are rooted in the local communities: the projects shall be built from below with participation from local organisations that are firmly planted in the local community (. . .) In accordance with the recipient orientation and the conditions for sustainable development, it is a premise that the need for aid is defined by the recipients. Simultaneously, it is necessary to take NIF’s priorities into consideration. That NIF manages development aid on the principle of recipient orientation does not mean that certain conditions as to how the funds are used are inappropriate. NIF’s philosophy on what is understood as proper aid and its opinions as to what knowledge is important to pass on, needs to be explicitly expressed in the projects that are developed. (NIF 1998, p. 10)

This discourse reveals a contradiction, however. On the one hand, we see a change in the formal discourse towards recipient orientation through ‘bottom-up’ development and local participation as NIF stresses the importance of SRC guiding their own development. On the other hand, NIF is very clear that its philosophy on what is understood as ‘proper aid’ and what knowledge is important to pass on needs to be the guiding principles for its intervention. Thus, conditionality is still present. Nustad (2007) points out that the idea of ‘bottom-up’ development rejects the notion of trusteeship as it confuses the means and goals of development. In order for someone to govern one’s own development, there needs to be knowledge of possible means and goals, and desire and capacity to reach them. Similar statements to the above can be found throughout the documents from this phase, and illustrate the development paradox. Thus, we argue that trusteeship is still to be recognized in the discursive formation in the initial stages of this phase, although in a different wrapping.

As a result of a recipient orientation, SRC’s role as a participatory partner in the project was strengthened as it took on the task to further develop its own projects. This was particularly evident in the framing of the CSDP implemented in 2008. Whereas NIF had
traditionally been developing the programmes, highlighting its own ideas and principles, the CSDP was developed by SRC alone, although with NIF’s approval and with Norad’s financial support. Since SRC had become the owner of the project with the responsibility to develop the CSDP, its policy and implementation plan, the matter of trusteeship seems not to be as present in the discursive formation in documents from the latter part of the second phase. This reflects the strong focus on recipient orientation among many actors in the SDP sector today (see, for example, Giulianotti 2011).

However, the development apparatus is highly reluctant to change and, in effect, it reproduces itself. Through the CSDP, one can see that NIF’s ideas and conceptual understanding of SDP were reproduced by the Zimbabwean counterparts. One of the reasons for this can be that although the discursive shifts and the recipients are emphasized, the hierarchal aid structures and actors remained similar. This discussion is taken up in Lie’s (2005) study of the World Bank and its counterparts. Lie argues that ‘as development assistance always comes with certain strings attached, this shift [towards recipient orientation] represented more a rhetorical than practical shift regarding both the policy content and the way of organizing development’ (p. 13). In the case of SRC, although they were in control of the plans and implementation of the CSDP, the relationships to the donor institutions, the NIF and ultimately Norad, stayed more or less the same. NIF and Norad (responsible for accepting the CSDP) knew what they wanted, and SRC (which developed the policy) knew what the donors desired. This is supported in documents from the programme planning and its implementation. This was also clear in interviews with representatives from SRC where it was stated that they knew ‘the Norad format and adapted and designed the projects to fit the Norad policy and focus areas. As one interviewee put it: ‘We make our proposals in line with Norad policies (. . .), we know how our activities fit in the global Norad policy, so we convince Norad, through NIF, that this activity is going to be implemented in this and this way.’

We have shown that throughout its engagement in Zimbabwe, NIF’s formal policy discourse changed. This change corresponds to the general aid rhetoric and approaches that strengthened their emphasis on bottom-up planning, human rights, environment, good governance and gender. However, as Nustad (2003) points out, these new approaches have the same power-effects as before: ‘If their poverty is a result of “bad governance”, a lack of respect of human rights and a lack of gender equality, then again we have cut all causal links between their poverty and our wealth’ (p. 29). Consequently, the poor are still described as being at a different temporal stage than the rich as they are in lack of something that we have – it is because they are not like us, with our sports democracy, focus on equality, good sports governance and sports ethics that they are as poor as they are.

The idea of development itself implies trusteeship, meaning that someone would know in advance in which direction the development process should go. In fact, Cowen and Shenton (1996) go as far as to argue that ‘development and trusteeship are a part of each other; without trusteeship there is no development doctrine’ (p. 57). With regard to the logical problem of development, they further argue that:

[To] seek recourse in the rhetoric of ‘empowerment’ is not to solve the development problem, but to replicate it. Either people have power to exercise choice, in which case there is no cause for empowerment, or they do not and the task of empowerment is that of the logical problem of development. (p. 4)

It is possible to argue that even though bottom-up development has come to be the leading discourse in development, also in SDP, any development requires knowledge on how to
become developed. Consequently, bottom-up development is not possible. As Nustad (2003) indicates, ‘this strengthens the argument that the problem is not caused by a lack of good policy formulation, but rather in the apparatus producing policies’ (p. 41). The power to define what constitutes good or bad development is, therefore, important in the donor–recipient relationship.

We have shown that throughout the engagement in Zimbabwe, NIF has had the leading role in defining the aid. Despite NIF’s shift towards recipient orientation, the decisions made by recipients (and consequently the aid given) are only valid if NIF approves them. This has had the effect of making the recipient responsible for NIF’s policies. As Lie (2005) states in his studies of the World Bank:

Current development practice still reflect the patrimonial legacy of the modernization theory, but now in a more subtle manner: it is no longer stated explicitly that the donor knows what is best or not – recipients are those who are supposed to do and plan development initiatives. As these initiatives need Bank approval, the Bank and its knowledge system still prevail in international development discourse. (p. 18. See also Lie 2011)

According to NIF representatives, they do not approve SRC’s policy unless it corresponds to the Norwegian and NIF conceptions of aid, and especially the focus on sport for all. As stated by one NIF representative when asked whether they could support the development of elite sports if requested by SRC, he replied: ‘No, we could never have agreed to that.’ The reasons for this were twofold. First, this conflicted with NIF conceptions of sport for all; second, it would be against the Norad policy and thus Norad would never support it financially. This conspicuous practice, with evident trusteeship, shows the problematic relationship between NIF and SRC.

Conclusion
In this article, we raised two initial questions. The first dealt with those power-effects arising from the discourse formation produced by NIF throughout the Zimbabwean project – meaning that someone (and in this case NIF) has the knowledge, the skills and the funding to define themself as a developer on behalf of someone else (in this case the Zimbabwean SRC). Drawing on Nustad (2003), we identified two power-effects: manageable development and temporal segregation. First, NIF viewed sport and development through the lens of a Norwegian sports model and hence neglected any other alternative knowledge and solutions than its own. Second, it described SRC as being at a different temporal stage than the Norwegian, with de-politicization of the under-development of sports as a consequence. These are power-effects because NIF positioned itself to define possible and valid solutions to develop sports in Zimbabwe.

The second question dealt with how changes in the formal discourse throughout the project affected the notion of trusteeship, which we have argued was latent in the relationship between SRC and NIF. We argued that despite changes from a top-down to a bottom-up discourse, trusteeship was present throughout the Zimbabwean project. Thus, the ‘development’ paradox and how the development apparatus is organized may explain why it is still important to study the donor–recipient relation in SDP regardless of changes in formal discourses towards partnership, ownership and participation. These findings thus contribute to the mentioned debate in International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics concerning the structure versus agency dilemma in SDP.
Our empirical study assesses one of the few long-term development projects with sport at its heart, and illustrates how a northern SDP organization is in a hegemonic position to determine the process of SDP in cooperating countries in the Global South. We have shown that NIF’s development assistance, or ‘gift’ to Zimbabwe, came with strings attached because imposed ideas and certain kind of knowledge manifested in the formal discourse reflected the Norwegian development politics and intentions. Hence, our findings correspond with those of both Hayhurst (2009) and Darnell (2012) who argue that Western hegemonic discourses are being reproduced in SDP. Further, our findings show that it is important to analyse the power-effects and trusteeship latent in the SDP discourse despite new ‘buzzwords’ in development aid today, demonstrating the importance of critical studies on the broader structures of knowledge and power. However, in this article, we have only discussed trusteeship and power-effects in the project’s formal discourse. Such a post-development approach has been subject to criticism as it is questioned whether the social world is created in the image of the developers only. Several writers have criticized post-development authors for painting a caricatured image of development discourses as ‘almighty’, as if they had the ability to completely dominate the people who are exposed to them (Ziai 2007). Grillo (1997) claims that post-development scholars describe development as ‘a monolithic enterprise, heavily controlled from the top, convinced of the superiority of its own wisdom and impervious to local knowledge, or indeed common-sense experience, a single gaze or voice which is all-powerful and beyond influence’ (p. 20). As Nustad (2003) summarizes, post-development theory mixes the effects of the image drawn from reality in development reports and plans with what is actually happening in practice. Thus, post-development literature can be criticized for focusing too much on the conceptual ideas of development and too little on what happens at the grass-roots level. This corresponds with Lindsey and Grattan (2012) who, in their critique of SDP literature, claim that SDP scholars have overemphasized northern hegemonic SDP concepts in the implementation of SDP programmes, and thus call for research on agency to understand SDP from the ‘perspectives of actors’ in the Global South. Similarly, Hayhurst (2009) points out that it is important to ‘uncover how those on the “receiving end” of SDP policies are affected and challenged by taking up the solutions and techniques prescribed to them’ (p. 223). An important contribution to this is the ethnographic study by Guest (2009) of how the westernized ‘universal language of sport’ discourse was resisted and reshaped by the local residents in an SDP project in Angola. The effects of development are often modified when the focus is shifted from the discourses of development to the practice of development (Nustad 2007). Development language does not necessarily reflect development practice. Consequently, further research needs to look to the structure versus agency debate within development studies where several scholars (e.g. Arce and Long 2000, Mosse 2005, Lewis and Mosse 2006, Lie 2007, Nustad 2007) have examined how development policies developed by the donor are translated and given meaning by the recipients in the social context where they are implemented. Hence, we acknowledge the importance of studying the relationship between formal discourse and agency in development interventions. However, in this article, we have aimed to contribute to the debate concerning discursive formations within SDP studies by analysing a single Norwegian SDP organization and its policy development.

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Notes
1. Over the years, the rhetoric has shifted from sports aid, sports development aid, development through sport, sport-in-development and sport-for-development. In recent years, as the field has grown both in practice and in regard to research, Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) has become a common term, referring to what some researchers call a movement emerging after the year 2000. The case reported in this article was initiated in the early 1990s and is still running. As this article also relates to the SDP field today, the abbreviation SDP is consistently used throughout this article.

2. The common terms of the 1990s, developing country and developing world, will be used consistently in this article.

References


Article III
Sport for development and peace policy discourse and local practice: Norwegian sport for development and peace to Zimbabwe

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This article is an analysis of a Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) project. Specifically, it investigates how SDP discourses influenced by Western donors are translated and given meaning by the recipients in the social context where the intervention takes place. Through a single case study of Norwegian SDP cooperation in Zimbabwe, we demonstrate how practice at the informal local level does not always fit the project’s formal discourse found in policy documents and project plans, initially developed under strong influence by Norwegian donors. It is argued that when the attention is shifted from formal discourses of development to local practices on the recipient side, a more nuanced picture of development discourse appears. Recipient organizations or local project staff do not necessarily uncritically accept the formal SDP discourse imposed on them, but are able to translate, reformulate, resist or manipulate discourse through a process of transformation and contextualization.

Keywords: actor-oriented analysis; discourse; post-development theory; development practice; sport for development and peace

Introduction

In recent years, increased attention has been given in sport literature to the new policy field, Sport for Development and Peace (SDP). This research field has addressed a variety of issues that have been analysed from different theoretical and methodological angles. Whereas early SDP research tended to be grounded by perspectives from the sport literature, the broader academic debate on SDP has moved towards considering the relevance of established positions in mainstream development studies debates (Levermore and Beacom 2012). One example is the recent discussion (Darnell and Hayhurst 2012, Lindsey and Grattan 2012, Straume and Hasselgård 2013) in International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics (IJSPP) concerned with local actors’ perspectives within SDP on the one hand and, on the other, broader structures of knowledge and power on a global scale, which consequently limits actors’ choices and opportunities. Thus, the IJSPP discussion is allied to the ongoing debate in development studies concerning the primacy of hegemonic development discourses (dominating conceptions and ideas about poverty) over development practice, which is informed by the structure-agency dilemma in social science (Lie 2007). In the development literature, the post-structural critique of development, also defined as post-development theory, stands out as an important contribution to this debate. Post-development scholars studied development as a powerful hegemonic discourse and claimed development interventions and practice to be a reflection of dominant Western ideas and knowledge. However, critics of the discursive approach to the study of development have emphasized the importance of including ethnographic studies of actors in
development interventions, since the spread of hegemonic development discourses ‘is always played out in local encounters and through human agency’ (Nustad 2007, p. 42).

As a contribution to the SDP discussion in IJSPP, we have previously analysed the Norwegian Confederation of Sport’s (NIF’s) conceptual understanding of its SDP engagement in Zimbabwe, as articulated in the Confederation’s formal discourse of policy documents and project plans (Straume and Hasselgård 2013). It was argued that NIF’s development assistance, or ‘gift’ to Zimbabwe, came with strings attached, because imposed ideas and certain kinds of knowledge manifested in the formal discourse reflected its SDP policies and intentions (implementing a Norwegian sports model). In this article, we move the analytical focus from formal discourses of SDP to local informal practices and local realities on the recipient side in Zimbabwe. By including an analysis of actors at the practical implementation level, we study the extent to which Norwegian SDP discourses shape development practice in the Community Sport Development Programme (CSDP). This project is funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) through NIF and implemented in partnership with the Zimbabwe Sport and Recreation Commission (SRC). Our main research question is ‘How are Norwegian-influenced “official” discourses in the CSDP translated and given meaning by the recipient organization or local project staff in the social contexts where it is implemented?’

Through a combination of post-development theory and actor-oriented analysis, we demonstrate how informal practice at the local level does not always fit the formal discourse initially developed under strong influence of Norwegian donors. Our research findings will be used to stress the importance of studying the interplay between discourse and local agency in SDP interventions, and, as such, they contribute to the discourse–agency debate within academic research on SDP.

We have structured the article as follows. First, we aim to place our study within the literature of both development studies and SDP, and then proceed to outline the method employed. Before embarking on the analysis and discussion, we provide an interpretation of the so-called Norwegian sports model on which NIF’s SDP values, concepts and ideas are based. We show how NIF’s SDP engagement is clearly linked to Norwegian self-experience in the role of sport for social development in local communities and further how NIF’s discourse is reproduced in the Zimbabwean SDP project’s formal discourse. Further, we illuminate the project’s local informal practices before proceeding to discuss the importance of studying the interplay between discourse and agency in SDP projects. We conclude with suggestions for future ethnographic research.

The discourse–agency debate in development studies
In the late 1980s, accompanying increased scepticism towards the international development apparatus, the post-structural critique of the development apparatus, or post-development theory, emerged within development studies. Post-development scholars (e.g. Escobar 1984, Sachs 1992; Ferguson 1994), inspired by Foucauldian discourse analysis, rendered development as a powerful discourse. Through their analysis of the discursive formation of development, as expressed in development policies, project plans and reports, the post-development critique enabled a debate about the concept of development itself, not only its goals and means, but also the ideas upon which the development models were structured (Nustad 2003). According to Escobar (1995), the concept of development could be understood as created by Western ideas, and was ultimately an extension of the colonial hegemony. Hence, the development discourse had ‘created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World’ (p. 9).
From a post-development perspective, countries and development actors from the Global North, who regarded themselves as developed, guided the process of development in the Global South. This suggests that ideas, knowledge and values on what development is and how it should be achieved follow the resources from the Global North to the Global South through development interventions (Cowen and Shenton 1996, Nustad 2003), thus constraining debates on these issues. To sum up, post-development scholars focused on the discursive formations of development produced by donor countries in various policy statements and ‘how it constructs and orders the reality in which it seeks to intervene’ (Nustad 2007, p. 41).

Post-development scholars’ strict understanding of discourse and its formative power has been criticized for leading to a static presentation of development actors and their agency (Grillo 1997). Human agency is neglected since actors’ knowledge and understanding of the development process is supposedly constructed by the development discourse in which they are embedded. Thus, actors in development interventions ‘are seen as mere representatives, bearers, and reproducers of the development discourse, which is the post-development explanation as to why many development projects seem to fail’ (Lie 2008, p. 123). Development practice is therefore rendered as a reflected image of prevailing development discourses.

Several scholars have modified post-development theory by including an analysis of agency to provide a better understanding of the relationship between discourses of development and agency at a local practical level, showing everyday practice of aid workers and the intended beneficiaries (e.g. Arce and Long 2000, Long 2001, Green 2003, Mosse 2005, Lewis and Mosse 2006, Lie 2007, Nustad 2007). Nustad (2007) suggests that the way forward for development studies is to ‘examine how development interventions are transformed, reformulated, adopted, or resisted in local encounters’ because ‘development interventions might not in practice function as an expression and concretization of the ideological baggage on which it is built’ (p. 41). Hence, these authors are not only interested in studying the recipient side of the aid relationship. Combining insights from the post-development literature with studies of development actors, they examine the interplay between the formal discursive level of development and practice, and how this affects the implementation process and the intended effects of development interventions in local contexts. It is this approach which is the inspiration for our research.

Applying Norman Long’s (1992, 2001) concept of interface, Lie utilizes a combination of the insights from the post-development theory and actor-oriented analysis, to provide ethnographic studies on how particular texts are consumed by development organizations and agents, how they relate to or feed into a development discourse and how these influence and interact with project practices as communicated by local development agents. (2007, p. 57)

Long defines interface as ‘a critical point of intersection between different life-worlds, social fields or levels of social organization, where social discontinuities based upon discrepancies in values, interests, knowledge and power, are most likely to be located’ (Long 2001, p. 243). In interface situations, local people may counteract the development intervention’s concepts, methods and ideologies, also defined as counter-tendency by Arce and Long (2000); Lie (2007, 2011) argues that the development arena, which is usually characterized by a partnership between a donor and a recipient, is one where donors’ knowledge and formal discourse are linked with local knowledge and practice.
Thus, the concept of interface is a useful analytic starting point to empirically study the interplay between development discourse and agency, and how development actors ‘receive, translate, interpret, resist, manipulate, or embody development discourse’ (Lie 2011, p. 75).

In this article, we explore the interplay between the CSDP project’s formal discourse, which is the flow of SDP concepts, policies and ideas, influenced by Norwegian development expertise, in relation to the heterogeneity among local project staff in Zimbabwe and their local practical knowledge. The fact that NIF has supported SDP interventions through SRC for more than 20 years, and with few other actors involved, makes it particularly interesting as a study object.

The discourse–agency debate in sport for development and peace literature
SDP scholars have only recently started to explore the discourse–agency debate in relation to research on SDP interventions. Lindsey and Grattan (2012) rightly suggest that there is a need for more ethnographically informed empirical studies on SDP. In their critique of the emerging SDP literature, they claim that SDP scholars (e.g. Hayhurst 2009, Darnell 2010) have overemphasized Northern input into the implementation of SDP programmes in the Global South since there ‘may be a significant gap between the political agendas advanced by Northern development agencies and their impact within local contexts in the Global South’ (p. 95). Lindsey and Grattan call for research on local agency to understand SDP from the perspective of actors in the Global South. However, in line with Lie (2011), we argue that research on agency should not only focus on what actors do in practice, but also ‘how they challenge aspects pertaining to the discursive realm, showing that the outcome of such interfaces needs to be decided upon empirically’ (p. 17). This is also emphasized by SDP researchers such as Hayhurst (2009), Darnell and Hayhurst (2012), Darnell (2012), and Straume and Hasselgård (2013), who suggest that their critical studies on the broader structures of knowledge and power should be seen as a starting point from which to examine the transformation of development interventions in local encounters. For instance, in her discourse analyses of six central SDP policy documents produced by the SDP International Working Group, Hayhurst (2009) shows how SDP ideas and knowledge are discursively framed and produced within the United Nations. She concludes by suggesting that further SDP research should involve ethnographic perspectives in order to illuminate how the recipient part of SDP relationships is influenced and challenged by formal SDP policies entailing solutions and techniques on how best to achieve development. An important contribution to this in SDP literature, although not discussed in relation to the discourse–agency nexus within development studies, is Andrew Guest’s (2009) study of an SDP project in Angola, implemented by Olympic Aid (now Right to Play). Through a combination of historical analyses and ethnographic studies, he shows how the community residents did not uncritically diffuse the donor discourses and the solutions prescribed to them by Olympic Aid but ‘participated in sport and play on their own terms and employed their own meanings’ (p. 1347), thus demonstrating local agency.

Method
This study is part of a larger research project on NIF’s SDP engagement in Zimbabwe. The interest in post-development theory’s discursive approach, combined with a focus on actors and their everyday practices, stems from the authors’ practical and administrative
experience from NIF’s SDP engagement in Southern Africa. This experience has given us valuable insight and knowledge on not only the importance of understanding the different levels on which SDP projects exist, but also how these levels impinge on each other.

The study was carried out employing a combination of archive and documentary research, interviews and field observations. Public archives at NIF, the Norad (December 2011) and the Norwegian Embassy in Harare (February 2012) were visited and scrutinized. Written CSDP documents were retrieved from SRC’s headquarter in Harare. The majority of written sources – illustrating the formal discourse – are policy documents, project plans, project reports, Norad applications and letters of assurance as well as instruction manuals and education material produced by SRC.

In February 2012, both authors conducted field work in Zimbabwe. We visited local communities in three provinces in Zimbabwe (one urban, two rural), resulting in 16 interviews with informants who were involved in the NIF–SRC cooperation. Additionally, two informants who had been involved in the NIF–SRC cooperation during its initial days in the 1990s were interviewed. The Zimbabwean informants included SRC leaders and staff at the head office (five informants), project implementers in the communities in our study, such as province coordinators, local project staff and volunteers working as coaches (seven informants). These were supplemented with four interviews of Norwegian NIF volunteers working in the local communities we visited. We were able to contact the SRC leadership through NIF, which also put us into contact with officials at the local level. We were not able to get in contact with local volunteers before our arrival in Zimbabwe. They were identified through snowball and purposive sampling. As the main focus of our research in Zimbabwe was the transition from project design to practical implementation in different local contexts, it was important to have both formal and informal conversations with a variety of persons involved at different levels on the Zimbabwean side. The voices of Zimbabwean staff at the head office and implementers in the communities of our study thus provide important perspectives on the matter. The Norwegian volunteers gave us valuable information on the interface between the Norwegian SDP ideology and the local reality.

The visits to the various locations provided valuable information. Field observations in the communities of our study enabled us to acquire a fuller picture of the daily life of the project. These field observations varied from attending a formal meeting at one of the province offices, attending the official launch of one of the provincial youth tournaments, visiting locations where sports activities were carried out, as well as informal conversations and discussions with people involved in the project. We did not interview children enrolled in the project or parents, as this will be the scope of further studies. Nonetheless, our main objective is to illuminate the two interconnected levels on which the project exists by examining how local project staff relate to the project’s formal discourse and how this, in turn, affects the implementation of the project at the local level. Consequently, this article mainly reflects the perspective of the project’s local staff.

It is important to mention that we have only visited communities in 3 of the 10 provinces of Zimbabwe where the CSDP project has been implemented. Thus, our observations and findings are not necessarily representative for the situation in all communities in the provinces of our study or other provinces in the country. However, several of our informants had leading positions in the SRC and were able to provide us with valuable information regarding the current status of CSDP in the provinces of our study as well as for the whole country. Additionally, we do not intend to use our empirical findings to make conclusions about the effects of the CSDP, but rather to discuss the discourse-agency debate within development studies and its relevance for empirical studies on the SDP sector.
Understanding the Norwegian sports model

Founded in 1861, NIF is the largest voluntary sports organization and has sole responsibility for organized sport in Norway. All 54 national sports federations are represented under the unifying NIF umbrella. These federations comprise the regional confederations within each of Norway’s 19 counties, including 366 sports councils consisting of almost 12,000 sports clubs in the municipalities. Altogether, these clubs have more than 2 million members (in a country with 5 million inhabitants) (NIF 2009a). According to Gunnar Breivik (2011), NIF’s legitimacy rests on the idea that elite sports and children’s sports are connected organizationally and ideologically, and therein lays the foundation of the Norwegian sports model that NIF manages.

The Norwegian sports model is built on the idea of Sport for All as the goal for public sport policy, meaning that the health and well-being of the citizens is of governmental concern and needs to be emphasized in order to facilitate social development. The emphasis on Sport for All has a long tradition in Norway and may essentially be linked to public sports politics in the post-World War II years where the bond between NIF and the state was firmly planted in the conception that everybody, irrespective of where one lived in the country, was entitled to the same rights and opportunity to share the common good of the welfare state, including that of sport. Further, in order to achieve the goal of Sport for All, sport consists of both public and voluntary bodies underpinned by state economic support (Goksøyr et al. 1996, Hanstad and Skille 2010).

Lorentzen (2007) argues that traditionally, Norwegian civil society organizations, which in turn are credited for building the social–democratic Norwegian welfare state, were built around principles such as voluntarism, philanthropy and democracy. As a civil society organization, NIF joined this tradition through its efforts to reach the masses and provide everyone with the opportunity to participate in sport activities. One means of reaching this goal was through the after-school sports clubs, which took the role as facilitators for sport activities, an area where the school system played an insignificant role (Skirstad 2011). Traditionally, in Norway, sports clubs were multidisciplinary, with several sports codes that supplemented each other in order to be an all-year activity (for instance, skiing in the winter and football in the summer). These multidisciplinary clubs were formed by the local community and often bore their names, symbolizing the strong association between club development and social–democratic principles such as collectivism, fellowship, equality and solidarity. Because the sports clubs were primarily organized within their local communities, they depended on parents and other volunteers who ran the activities. These included coaching, judging, serving as board members, baking cakes for lotteries, providing transport to practice sessions and games and washing team jerseys. Consequently, club development had an important role in civil society through fostering such democratic participation and organizational skills, linking development of and through sport (Goksøyr et al. 1996). Hence, the link between Sport for All and developing multidisciplinary sports clubs was manifest in the Norwegian social reality.

The formal discourse

Over the years, NIF has been granted considerable funding by Norad to implement SDP projects in the Global South. The Norwegian SDP engagement commenced in 1983, when NIF initiated the Sport for All programme in the Tanzanian city of Dar es Salaam. This programme lasted for 6 years, during which time the NIF aimed to implement common ideas rooted in the Norwegian sports movement (Straume 2010). After reducing activity...
in Tanzania in 1989–1990, NIF moved its engagement further south. In 1991, NIF started supporting the Zimbabwe SRC through an SDP project. The project in Zimbabwe followed the same course as that of Tanzania, and thus the initial objective of the cooperation was to contribute to the development of mass-sport structures and systems in the capital city of Harare and to implement the idea of Sport for All, based on a so-called ‘Norwegian sports model’ (Straume and Hasselgård 2013). Hence, NIF’s SDP engagement is clearly linked to Norwegian self-experience in the role of sport in contributing to social development in local communities. In the long run, the Sport for All project was intended to contribute to broader social developments such as democracy, human rights and gender issues. The focus of the cooperation has therefore been both the development of sport and development through sport. This discourse is also central to NIF in its SDP engagement today.

NIF’s priorities in working with its partners is to support the development of quality mass sports, organizational development of sport structures and use these elements as a forum to advance and promote gender equality and women’s rights, the prevention of HIV and AIDS and the fight against stigma and discrimination through life skills and leadership education. (NIF 2009b, p. 1, our translation)

The quote also reveals the most central aspect of NIF’s SDP ideology: a combination of quality mass sports (Sport for All) and that sustainable sport structures must be developed and be in place for sport to become a means for broader social development. This is also supported by the Norwegian Government. In the ‘Strategy for Norway’s culture and sports co-operation with countries in the South’, published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), it is stated that:

The most important contribution Norwegian sport can offer in connection with international peace and conflict resolution efforts and development co-operation, is to help build sports structures in partner countries. The structures and expertise already built up in Norway put us in a good position to share experience and offer advice. (MFA 2005, pp. 43–44)

The project in Zimbabwe expanded when, in 2008, Norad decided to fund the establishment of the CSDP developed by SRC, in partnership with NIF and UNICEF. In the following section, we see how NIF’s discourse is reproduced in the CSDP project’s formal discourse.

The community sport development programme

The CSDP aims to implement a system with activities at every level, from specific community sports clubs (football, netball, athletics and volleyball) to teams competing at the national level. According to NIF, SRC has developed over 800 clubs since 2008, trained over 6500 community leaders and provided opportunities for over 30,000 youths to participate in sport on a regular basis through CSDP sports clubs (NIF 2011).

The CSDP has two main functions: first, to establish multidisciplinary community sports clubs in four priority sport disciplines (football, netball, athletics and volleyball) in all 10 provinces of the country; second, to expand the Youth Education through Sports (YES) programme, which is a youth-driven programme aiming to educate young people about HIV/AIDS and other issues affecting their lives, while simultaneously instilling a sense of community responsibility. Traditionally, sport in Zimbabwe has been organized on a number of platforms such as schools, colleges and universities, government agencies, local agencies (such as farms, councils and mines) and single-sport clubs (SRC 2008a, p.
The CSDP Implementation Manual (SRC 2008a) describes the current sport system at the community level as isolated and uncoordinated. The main objective of the CSDP is therefore to become a superior national sport system under which all current mass sport activities are unified, ultimately under SRC as the umbrella organization. This sport structure is claimed to be fundamental in the delivery of broader social development.

The essential principle with regard to increased physical activity (health-related objectives) and community development (e.g. democracy-related objectives) is that after-school community clubs shall be self-driven through local engagement, meaning that people from the communities, such as parents and other volunteers, are responsible for running the sport activities and governing the sports clubs through its elected board members (SRC 2008a, p. 14). The life skills element, delivered through the YES programme, consists of three activity areas that are equally important: sport, peer education (focusing particularly on a healthy lifestyle, but also on cooperation, democracy and similar issues) and community service projects such as tree planting or picking up garbage (which is related to the ‘community responsibility’ argument). The objectives of these clubs are to train their members in YES activities throughout the year, ensuring that the participants are prepared to take part in all three activity areas at the regional YES games which take place twice a year. Consequently, participants in the regional YES games are recruited from the community clubs. Such is also the case with participants going to the Paralympic Games and Youth Games, which are additional games arranged by SRC and supported by Norway. This sports club discourse is evident in a variety of CSDP policy documents and project plans and is summarized in the following:

The provision of the community sports club systems in this case becomes a vehicle to achieve the sport for all system and for it to claim its undisputed space in addressing social, political and economic development. The promotion of sport for all in the country through the community sports club systems is one of the major social, political and economic phenomena which needs to be resourced as it has worked extremely well in countries such as Norway, Australia, England and other European countries. (SRC 2008a, p. 13)

Further, the link between the community sports club model (development of sport) and the delivery of social development programmes (development through sport) is manifest in the formal discourse produced by SRC:

The SRC has focussed its efforts over the next four years on developing a proficient community sports system incorporating a community sports club model as a medium for the delivery of YES and other social development programmes. As the community sports club programmes and YES work in tandem, the SRC will be capable of expanding its reach and creating opportunities for all young people to advance their sport skills, leadership capacity and social commitments to their communities. (SRC 2008b, p. 4)

In implementing the CSDP, volunteerism is presented as a fundamental principle and the ‘sport volunteer facilitator’s role is a key to the success of the programme in a community’ (SRC 2008a, p. 24). A volunteer is defined as ‘a person who voluntarily undertakes a task or other services without the motive of getting paid [and] is intrinsically motivated by the challenge to assist and work for the growth and development of individuals and the community’ (SRC 2008a, p. 36). The voluntarism discourse presents parents and other volunteers as fundamental in governing the sports clubs and running the daily sport activities, and corresponds with volunteerism as it is understood in the Norwegian sports model.
In the formal discourse regarding the CSDP, it can be seen that NIF’s SDP ideas, conceptions and understanding of sport’s social democratic function are reproduced by SRC. The fundamental principles of the CSDP also correspond with the Norwegian Government’s main goals for supporting NIF. This can, for instance, be seen through a letter of assurance from Norad to NIF in 2008, where it is stated that multidisciplinary sports club development and Sport for All are suitable tools for promoting health, learning to follow the rules of democracy and peoples’ commitment to communities through volunteering in sport (Norad 2008).

Local informal practices
We have shown that the flow of SDP concepts and ideas in the CSDP project is influenced by the Norwegian donors and manifested in the project’s formal discourse. However, what we need to understand is how these ideas and concepts ‘are transmitted, contested, reassembled and negotiated at the points where policy decisions and implementations impinge upon the life circumstances and everyday life-worlds of so-called “lay” or “non-expert” actors’ (Long 2004, p. 26). Using two examples, we proceed to examine the interface between the formal CSDP discourse informed by Norwegian SDP expert knowledge, and the informal practical level, where this knowledge is translated and given local expressions by local project staff in the communities we visited.

The sports club discourse
One of the main objectives of the CSDP is to establish after-school community sports clubs, which offer training for children and youth in the four priority sport disciplines. In the communities in our study, the emphasis on establishing after-school sports clubs was implemented in different ways and adapted to local conditions. There are two main reasons for this: first, the traditional organization of sport in Zimbabwe and, consequently, society’s lack of interest in forming new after-school clubs and, second, contextual challenges.

One of the characteristics of sports in Zimbabwe is that it has been traditionally organized through schools. In all the communities in our study, informants reported that the school sport system is working fairly well, which in turn makes implementation of a new sport system, such as the CSDP (based on a Norwegian sports model), challenging. Thus, organizing additional after-school sports clubs is seen to be redundant from a local perspective. In the communities in our study, the CSDP concept gets its local expression by being integrated in the school system. As one of the province coordinators said: ‘the kids who are participating in the school sports are those in the community clubs. So sometimes the schools are the centre of the community club’. An important reason for the CSDP to integrate the project within the local schools is that schools have the infrastructure and facilities needed to implement the CSDP. More importantly, however, such cooperation gives the CSDP access to the children enrolled in the schools, since many parents or guardians do not want their children to participate in after-school sport activities, when sport has already received much attention in the school curriculum.

Local project staff expressed that implementation of the CSDP within the local school system has had several positive effects. First, there is a perception that both the local schools and the CSDP benefit from the cooperation. The local schools benefit from the cooperation with the CSDP, as they receive instruction in teaching sports. The CSDP complement the school sports by providing sports opportunities for the children during school hours on a
regular basis, at the weekends and in school terms where, sports is less of a priority. As one informant said, ‘the CSDP has rejuvenated school sport even though the emphasis was community sport (…) most of the coaching development is with the teachers’.

It is evident that some implementers translated and adapted the after-school club development discourse to their local context by organizing CSDP in strong cooperation with schools and teachers in their community, creating a *hybrid sports club model*. This shows that instead of relying on parents and volunteers, some communities relied increasingly on schools and teachers’ time and interest for sport. However, for some, this dependency on the school system was also an obstacle to the implementation of the CSDP, since sports were not always prioritized by the schools. Others reported that the CSDP initiative had even created tensions between the implementers and local schools, because the CSDP interfered with school sport activities which were already organized or because the schools demanded money and equipment to run the activities.

Several contextual challenges were also reported to set the premises for how the CSDP intervention model was translated and adapted to local circumstances. Some informants claimed that recruiting children to after-school clubs was not easy because in many communities, particularly in the rural areas, there are often long distances between the schools and homes. Consequently, most children were not able to get home before dark, after practice, and transport home after practice was not available to most children. Additionally, the early darkness in Zimbabwe was also an obstacle in the realization of after-school activities, since sports grounds were seldom illuminated and facilities and sports grounds in schools were mostly locked in the afternoon. The assumption that the after-school club model did not create a safe environment for the children clearly set the premises for how the CSDP was implemented in the communities we visited. This was pointed out by several informants as is illustrated by the following quote from an implementer:

> One should question whether the Norwegian [after-school] club structure should be the ideal for Zimbabwe. There are different challenges here, such as the early darkness, lack of illuminated areas and that many children live far away from where the activities are run. If children need to stay at school for after-school activities, how will they get home before dark? There are no parents driving their children to and from practice here. Ultimately, this is a matter of safety for the children.

Although these challenges were particularly the case in rural areas with scattered settlements, the urban areas we visited were also affected by the darkness, a situation exacerbated by extremely unreliable power supply. Nevertheless, there seems to be more after-school club activities in the urban rather than in the rural areas. Even though it was reported that school sports were strong also in these areas, after-school community sports club systems were expressed to be easier to establish in urban areas due to people’s time to participate in leisure activities, the status of sport and shorter travel distances between the sports clubs and home.

The strong connection between the schools and the CSDP is especially visible in the selection of teams for the YES games. According to the CSDP project’s implementation manual, the participating teams to the YES games must be registered in a CSDP club. However, as one informant said, many of the YES games teams ‘are a result of what they call a community club, but, in reality, it is a school team’. Several other informants made similar comments. For instance, one team was selected from a school on the basis of their ability to fund their own transportation to the tournament. It was also reported that since
the games usually take place at a long distance from the schools, those who owned a bus were often selected to go to the games by the province office. Teams were also recruited from venues other than the schools. For instance, one province was reported to have selected a team from a specialized football academy to represent it at the games. Also, in selecting participants for the Paralympic Games, some provinces picked people from the streets and offered a place on the team due to a lack of organized teams. Thus, in reality, many YES teams are recruited from venues other than the community clubs.

Interestingly, the way in which CSDP was implemented in practice made it difficult for local project staff to use the CSDP standardized reporting forms (Club Registration Form and Club Activity Report), which are tools for monthly reporting to SRC and which form the basis for SRC’s annual report to NIF and Norad. One implementer explained that, in his province, school teams and players were registered by the regional office and that very few after-school clubs teams existed within the province: ‘The registered players are from the schools. The schools function as clubs and as an arena to recruit players before the YES games’. To be able to send teams to the Yes games, some implementers also had to report fictitious or temporary after-school community clubs and teams to create an illusion that sustainable after-school activities, through clubs, had been developed. Additionally, many of the registered community sports clubs and teams provided the activities only for a short period of time before sending the teams to the games. Neither did they carry on the practice after the games. Further, several of the Norwegian volunteers stated that they worked with schools because most of the registered clubs had no activities or did not even exist. This shows that the CSDP, as articulated through project reports, reproduces the Norwegian sports model discourse, whereas, in reality, the reproduced discourse may rather be a result of a strategic act by local project staff. From this, it is possible to question the CSDP impact analysis and whether the club activities reported to NIF and Norad are organized according to the CSDP intervention model.

The above findings show how the implemented hybrid community sports model is an attempt to bridge the CSDP ideology and the school sport systems through which sport traditionally has been organized. However, it clearly breaks with the community sports club ideology, where sustainable self-driven after-school clubs, community engagement (e.g. through club members and elected Board members) and regular attendance all year round are a means to foster sport skills, democratic participation, leadership capacity and social commitments to the local community.

The volunteerism discourse

Another fundamental principle of the Norwegian sports model is its focus on volunteerism. An SRC representative expressed that they were greatly inspired by this element of the Norwegian sports model in the development of the CSDP. On a visit to Norway, he had been informed about a number of programmes that were based on voluntary effort. In particular, he noted the engagement of parents as coaches in their children’s activities: ‘I liked the way the parents support the community activities. Even the highly placed people, the president of NIF, on a Wednesday would go to his community to assist girls to play football.’ Based on this, he presented volunteerism as a fundamental principle and it was stated that the ‘sport volunteer facilitator’s role is key to the success’ (SRC 2008a, p. 24) of the Zimbabwean CSDP.

However, several informants pointed out voluntarism, both among parents and other adults, as one of the core challenges in the implementation of the CSDP. There were several explanations for this. First, in 2008, the year CSDP was implemented, Zimbabwe
was on the verge of a financial breakdown. The country had the world’s highest inflation rate and experienced an exponential unemployment rate. The informants stated that, in times of hardship, parents had limited time and resources to prioritize engagement in their children’s sports and to run the clubs. Second, as pointed out above, sports have been institutionalized in schools, and teachers have mainly been engaged in children’s sports. Hence, there has been no tradition for sport-related volunteerism amongst parents. An additional point raised in the interviews is that some parent’s attitudes towards sports is that it is considered less important than academic studies. As one Zimbabwean volunteer working as a coach expressed:

Some of them [parents] do not understand the importance of sports; they view it from the wrong perspective and have this old understanding that sports as being played by unsuccessful people. So, if you fail to do well in school, you can play sports.

These findings correspond with earlier SDP studies showing that parents may be a cause of resistance to SDP programmes. Families may, for instance, resist participation in sport programmes because short-term needs are more pressing (Kay and Spaaij 2012).

In order to translate this idea of volunteerism to become a fundamental principle at the grass-roots level of Zimbabwean sports, one component of the CSDP is to train local volunteers to manage the project in the different communities. As stated above, the original principle of volunteerism in the Norwegian sports model was based on collectivism, although as one informant stated:

There are few volunteers who really understand what volunteerism is all about, and they expect retentions from the SRC or the organizations which they work with. Some of the times we do lose volunteers because they’ll come on board expecting to get some benefits. But when they discover that they are not benefiting, they quit. So, volunteer dropout is a problem.

Our findings show that volunteerism, as it is understood from the Norwegian sports model, was not easily transferrable to the local communities we visited. Although some of our informants stated that they wanted to bring something back to the community through engagement in sports activities, for many volunteers, the expectations seemed to be more at an individual rather than a collectivist level. The reasons for this vary. However, the economic crisis in Zimbabwe and high unemployment rate seems to be an important factor. A general understanding in the communities we visited was the possibility of benefiting, economically or in other ways, through voluntary work.

To sum up, the sports club and volunteerism discourses originating from the Norwegian sports model are modified when the focus is shifted from the formal discursive level to the practical level of CSDP. We need to keep this in mind as we proceed to further discuss the connection between discourse and practice in the CSDP.

Discussion

‘Bottom-up planning’ and ‘local ownership’ have become leading discourses in the international development sector, meaning that the intended recipients and beneficiaries of aid are supposed to do the planning and make the decisions (Chambers 1997). The bottom-up development discourse is also evident in NIF’s international development policy today. Where NIF previously saw itself as an expert acting on behalf of the poor with clear ideas of what it wanted to achieve and how, the responsibility for the overall policy-making and
implementation process is today articulated as the responsibility of their partners in the Global South (Straume and Hasselgård 2013). However, like the development apparatus, the NIF–SRC relationship is still structured through a donor–recipient relationship, although now referred to as a partnership. Lie (2007) questions whether this shift towards recipient orientation represents a more rhetorical than a practical shift regarding both the policy content and the way in which development apparatus is organized:

Project documents – which constitute a project’s formal order and establish the aid-chain linking donor and recipient institutions – are thus to be produced by the project’s beneficiaries. However, as project documents require donor acceptance to become effective, it is an implied necessity that the documents reflect donor’s policy and wishes and feed into the larger discursive whole. (p. 49)

The quote indicates that the problem is not necessarily caused by the lack of good policy formulations, but rather in the apparatus producing policies (Nustad 2003).

Our analysis of the CSDP’s formal order, as codified in project plans and policy documents, shows that the NIF–SRC partnership implies a transfer and flow of knowledge, concepts, ideas and values which largely follow the resources from donor to recipient. At the formal discourse level we see, for instance, that the traditional idea of organizing sport through the Zimbabwean school system has been given up in favour of the Norwegian club model strategy, governed by SRC as the unifying umbrella organization. According to the post-development critique of development, this reproduced discourse represents the knowledge that development actors act upon and is formed by consequently normalizing, imposed expert knowledge and practice (see, for example, Ferguson 1994). From this point of view, one could expect that practices on the recipient side feed into and strengthen the discourse, consequently suppressing alternative knowledge and practice. However, in accordance with Arce and Long (2000), our case shows that, on a practical level, implementers generate local contextual counter-tendencies to bridge separate systems of knowledge by implementing a hybrid community sports club model within the local schools where sport traditionally has been organized. In this way, local project staff simultaneously overcome local contextual challenges, such as the lack of safe spaces, lack of voluntary engagement and sport’s low status among parents. Hence, the interface between Norwegian conceptual ideas of SDP (reproduced in the CSDP) and local realities in Zimbabwe shows how local project staff may consent to the imposed ideas, values and concepts, but, in practice, need to make something quite different of them. The post-development static presentation of development actors and their agency did not correspond with our findings. Rather, our findings are in line with Lie (2008), who claims that:

In encountering the development discourse, local project staff on the recipient side of donor-recipient relationships can be manipulative and strategic with regard to imposed discourses and expert knowledge systems. By applying techniques of knowledge translation and brokerage (cf. Bierschenk, Chauveau, and Oliver de Sardan 2002; Lewis and Mosse 2006), they can thus have a tremendous impact on the local articulation and implementation of donor’s development discourse. (p. 119)

The way in which the CSDP is adapted to local needs and local knowledge should not be seen as a criticism of the CSDP leadership or local implementers and the implemented hybrid model, but rather as a positive example of local agency and how CSDP works in practice. It is important, however, to not forget that, in other communities, particularly in urban areas, the project was reported to be implemented more in line with NIF’s SDP
ideology due to less traditional and contextual challenges. This shows how development work at a practical level can constitute a discourse in line with the post-development theory simultaneously as, in some communities, this demonstrates a discontinuity between the project’s formal discursive level and the practical implementation level. Further, this illustrates the complexity of implementing a ‘one-size-fits-all’ development project design within a diverse and complex society as the Zimbabwean.

The above discussion demonstrates that even though CSDP implementers operate within a specific development discourse, they do not always reproduce the donors’ understanding of SDP. The development effects created by the hybrid model do not correspond with NIF and Norad’s SDP ideas and concepts. Thus, the CSDP can be described as having other functions in the local community than the intended social democratic function, as it is claimed to have in Norway. The gap between the ‘ideal world’ presented in the official discourse and practice from the donor’s point of view will often be seen as a disjuncture between intention and outcome, frequently explained in terms of bad planning or lack of resources (Lie 2011). This reveals a contradiction, however. Whereas NIF and Norad, from the perspective of their ‘external’ knowledge and indicators regard the CSDP as failing, local project staff seem to understand the implemented hybrid model as a success since it is strengthening sport for the local community where this is natural. This emphasizes the important question of who should set the terms of reference for what is to be measured as success and failure in SDP projects. Further, our analysis shows that the disjuncture between the donor’s intention and the project outcome seems to place CSDP implementers in a position where they frequently have to mediate between the local realities and the Norwegian donors’ requirements through standardized project reports to NIF and Norad. Thus, on the one hand, local project staff use their practical knowledge to translate, modify and reshape the formal discourse, thus exercising local agency. On the other hand, they do not work independently of – but rather relate to – the formal discourse in order to secure an apparent correlation between the project’s discursive and practical levels. Additionally, this illustrates how the structures in the CSDP are sustained despite the discrepancy between the Norwegian intention and the local outcome. This is in line with Mosse (2005) who, through his ethnographic studies on a development project in Western India, demonstrates how local project staff’s practice contradicted the instructions in project plans, simultaneously, as they strategically worked hard to maintain and protect the project’s official discourse. This was done to justify their own work and secure project success as seen from their donor’s side.

The above discussion highlights not only the importance of ethnographic studies on actors and their practice in SDP interventions, but also how actors’ practice contests or reproduces the flows of values, ideas and concepts that pass through and around the fast-growing SDP sector. Thus, the main argument in this article is that the outcome of struggles between mainstream SDP discourses and various forms of counter-tendency need to be studied empirically. However, future studies should not only analyse the translation of formal discourses to practice seen from the perspective of local project staff, but also include the ‘voice’ of the intended beneficiaries (for instance, children, youth and parents). These individuals’ worldview and understanding of SDP represent important perspectives regarding the effects and consequences such a development intervention would have in communities, but also on how the local communities make use of the intervention.

Conclusion
In this article, we have discussed the interplay between discourse and local agency in a Zimbabwean SDP project. By studying the complex social life and agency of actors
within this project, we have demonstrated how different worldviews may be negotiated in SDP. We have shown that Norwegian-influenced ‘official’ discourses of the CSDP are translated and given meaning by recipient organization or local project staff in the social contexts where it is implemented. This does not mean that the actors operate outside prevailing discourses. Actors relate to them and work actively to sustain them, because it is in their interest to secure further project support from their donors.

Lindsey and Grattan (2012) rightly conclude, in their critique of the emerging SDP literature, that there is a ‘significant need for methodologically justified research that seeks to understand sport-for-development from the perspective of actors in the Global South’ (p. 96). In this article, we have developed their argument and claim that further research on SDP should not be preoccupied with a dichotomized structure vs. agency debate, but rather should explore the relationship between hegemonic discourses of SDP and practice. Such an approach to ‘the ethnography of SDP’ can help us to better understand the donor–recipient relationship in the fast-growing SDP sector. This will enable SDP scholars to ask new questions such as: How does SDP work in practice and how are projects adapted within local realities? Are there divergent agendas and interests in the partnership and how are they negotiated? How is success and failure seen from the perspectives of implementers and the local communities? (Even projects that ‘fail’ can have positive effects in the community seen from a local perspective). How do different actors make use of SDP interventions? Such questions can help us unveil the multiple realities determining how SDP is experienced by different actors and people’s conflicting interests and intentions which affect the way in which SDP projects are implemented in practice.

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Note
1. Hasselgård has 5 years’ experience of coordinating the study programme ‘Sport, culture and development cooperation’ at the Norwegian School of Sport Science (NSSS). The programme is a collaboration between NSSS and NIF, and is primarily aimed at providing young Norwegian students experience from voluntary sports-related work in one of NIF’s partner organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2000, Straume worked as a sport volunteer for one of NIF’s partner organizations in South Africa.

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Article IV
Norwegian Human Rights Organisations and Olympic Games

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Abstract

In this article, an analysis is made of Norwegian Human Rights organisations (HROs), their involvement in the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, and consequences for their involvement in subsequent Games. We attempt to identify the organisations’ understanding of the Olympic Games as an arena for human rights activism and how “Olympic activism” provides meaning to the organisations’ work. The analysis exposes an interesting paradox. On the one hand, HROs recognise that the Olympic Games and the global human rights engagement did not contribute to an improvement of the human rights situation in China, but possibly led to a deterioration of the situation in certain areas. On the other hand, the conclusion was drawn that the Olympic Games engagement was a success in so far as it drew attention to the organisations and yielded greater legitimacy among the Norwegian population. The question is raised as to whether the experience of the Beijing Olympic Games campaigns could play a role in the Norwegian HROs’ activist approach in future Games such as the approaching winter Olympic Games in Russia.

Key words: human rights, Olympic Games, transnational activism, international sporting events, China, shaming
Introduction

In recent years the international human rights movement has increasingly focused on large international sporting events as an arena for activism with a view to promoting political change in the host nation.\(^1\) An important reason for this is that an increasing number of such events are being held in countries where human rights have been breached as well as in developing countries where the various human rights organisations (HROs) already have a strong engagement, for example China (Olympic Games 2008), Indian (Commonwealth games 2010), South Africa (Football World Championship 2010), Russia (Winter Olympic Games 2014 and Football World Championship 2018), Brazil (Football World Championship 2014 and Olympic Games 2016), and Qatar (Football World Championship 2022).

Large international sporting events present an arena for political confrontation, protests and dialogue, not only for states but also for transnational actors such as HROs. Transnational activism in connection with sporting events such as the Olympic Games has received relatively little attention. Consequently, we know little about the engagement of HROs. Prior to, and during the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, the international human rights movement utilised the event as an arena for human rights activism. The Beijing Games therefore provides us with an excellent opportunity to examine activism by HROs in connection with a major international sporting event.

In this article we examine Norwegian HROs’ engagement prior to, during, and following the Olympic Games in Beijing. The aim was to identify the organisations’ understanding of the Olympic Games as an arena for human rights activism and how this was reflected in their engagement. This is interesting for a number of reasons. First, no similar analysis of Norwegian HROs has been undertaken previously. A study of the HROs’ comprehension of their own engagement thus provides us with a new understanding of the success criteria adopted by the various organisations in the Beijing Olympics. Second, the experience of the Beijing Games will probably have a bearing on HROs’ campaigns in connection with future Games and other international sporting events. Third, the experience of the HROs will provide sports politicians (and

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\(^1\) The Olympic Games is awarded to host cities. However, we use the term “host nation” to indicate that human rights issues are national concerns and that political pressure is usually directed towards the national authority.
others interested in sport politics) with an indication on how much “noise” may be assumed when making preparations for future Games and other sporting events. Moreover, we will get an indication on what may be expected from actions and counter-actions in future Games.

The purpose of this article is three-fold. First, we want to fill a gap in the literature of HROs activism. Second, we want to establish a theoretical framework in the study of HROs activism in relation to Olympic Games. Third, we want to contribute to an understanding of the mechanisms of activism in relation to Olympic Games and other international sporting events with special reference to Norwegian HROs. The article commences with a review of the literature on protest and activism in connection with the Olympic Games. We also provide an account of the circumstances whereby the Beijing Games was a political landmark for the Olympics. Following a discussion of methods we introduce two success objectives for the Norwegian HROs’ Olympic efforts, and place this within a theoretical framework. The analysis identifies the characteristics of the HROs’ activism and how the Olympic activities came to distinguish the organisations’ work. Based on this analysis, two dilemmas confronting the HROs when selecting the strategies to be employed at major sporting events are described. In conclusion, the experience gained from the Beijing Games is discussed with a view to involvement in future Olympic Games with special reference to the International Olympic Committee (IOC).

Olympic protests

The history of the Olympic Games shows that the event has always been an arena for political contention and protest. The literature on the Olympics and political activism can be divided into four broad categories: (a) boycotts of host nation by IOC member states, (b) terrorist attacks by individuals or groups, (c) symbolic protests by athletes and (d) protests by domestic or transnational network organisations. The boycott literature has typically focused on states’ use of the games to promote political and ideological views. The Olympic Games in Berlin 1936 and Games during the Cold War, particularly Montreal 1976, Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984, were characterised by boycott discussions and actual boycotts (Houlihan, 1994; Hulme, 1990; Kruger, 2005; Mason, 2007). Political protests by athletes and their contributions to the human rights or civil rights
struggle are also well documented. Smith’s and Carlos’ black power salute during the medal ceremony at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico is an example (Bass, 2002; Hartmann, 2003). They did this to support the black athletic protest movement Olympic Project for Human Rights which had grown out of the black civil rights struggle in the US in the 1960s (Hartmann, 1996; Edwards, 1979; Henderson 2009). There is also a growing body of literature on the interplay between the Olympics and terrorism. The academic interest for this topic often relates back to the 1972 Munich summer Olympics and the Palestinian Black September group’s terrorist attack against Israeli athletes and coaches (Selliaas, 2012). Later research on Olympic terror has become preoccupied with Olympic host nations’ security approaches, surveillance and control during the event (Bennett & Haggerty, 2011; Richards et al., 2011).

The last category, protests by domestic or transnational organised groups or network organisations, has also been subjected to academic analysis. Lenskyj (2000), for instance, looks at community-based movements’ anti-Olympic campaigns and resistance in connection with the Atlanta 1996 and Sydney 2000 Olympic bids, and protests prior to and during the Games. Thus, the research focuses on domestic protests against the Olympics and the negative economic and social impacts hosting such an event (see also Zervas, 2012). Other studies have concentrated on how domestic protest groups within the host nation used the games as a showcase for their domestic political struggle to the international audience. One example is Neilson’s (2002) study of indigenous Aboriginal groups’ activism surrounding the Sydney Olympic Games (see also Bruce & Wensing, 2012 and O’Bonsawin, 2012). There are, however, few studies on transnational activism by international or national organisations in connection with international sporting events, and the Olympics in particular. Reinan and Davidi (2009) studied how exile Argentines in Israel formed protest groups before the 1978 Football World Cup to protest against human rights violation by the military junta. However, the literature on Olympic protests has failed to discuss how and why transnational actors, such as human rights organisations, make use of the games as an arena for activism and political change. Although political activism and protests are also discussed in recent literature on the Olympic Games and politics (Bairner & Molnar, 2010; Sugden & Tomlinson, 2011; Lenskyj & Wagg, 2012), no such analysis is made. The present empirical study of the Norwegian HRO’s Olympic activism is thus a contribution to filling this gap.
Studies of the interplay between Olympic Games and transnational activism seem to be more important than ever. The international human rights engagement during the Beijing Olympics is an indication that the Olympics, as a political tool, has entered a new era. Cottrell and Nelson’s (2010) empirical study of protests in connection with the Olympics from 1896 until 2008 shows that “protest has grown substantially over time and evolved from a tendency toward state-based boycotts and domestic demonstration to a tendency toward protest over an increasingly broad range of issues [such as human rights, poverty, environment] by transnational networks and social movements” (p. 745). The international human rights engagement and protests prior to and during the Beijing Olympics are an extension of this pattern. Rather than encouraging a boycott restricting dialogue between China and the rest of the world, the human rights movement took advantage of the opportunity to focus the limelight on a broad spectrum of human rights violations for which the Chinese regime was accountable. China was accused of the persecution of minority groups and political opponents, breaches of human rights and for supporting non-democratic regimes (Economy & Segal, 2008; Hwang, 2010).

Beijing Games – One world, one dream?

The Chinese authorities had as their objective that of showing the world the major economic and political power status of their nation, to promote its international reputation and to develop national identity and pride at home (Brownell, 2008; Martinez, 2010; Xu, 2006). The increasing level of protest, particularly in connection with the torch relay, was thus regarded as a threat by the Chinese authorities, not only to China’s reputation but also to its internal stability (Hutzler, 2007; Selliaas, 2012). The Communist leadership therefore introduced special security measures to prevent the Chinese opposition taking advantage of the external pressure. This has been referred to as the Olympic stress syndrome (Selliaas, 2012). This contributed to a deterioration of freedom of expression and speech (individual human rights), something that was also documented by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Amnesty, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2008). On the other hand, we saw some counter-actions against the “Western” global human rights protests. Many Chinese, also those in exile, were offended by the protests and considered
that the international society had harmed the festivities which they were looking forward to in anticipation for a long time and which they deserved (Hwang, 2010; Jacobs & Wang, 2008; Mahbubani, 2008).

The Beijing Olympic Games was also a crossroads for the Olympic movement. The IOC had to react in accordance with the human rights situation in the host nation in a different manner than was done at previous Olympic Games. Both the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee and the IOC promised improvements in the human rights situation when China was awarded the games in 2001. As the Beijing Games approached, however, references to China’s many infringements of human rights became increasingly vague. IOC president, Jacques Rogge, argued that the IOC was not a political body, neither was it an NGO, and consequently not in a position to become involved or criticise the internal circumstances of a host nation (Kidd, 2010). The Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF) followed the IOC guidelines. Even though the NIF entered into dialogue with the HROs, they were nevertheless clear that it was not the function of sport to change the political situation in China (ABC News, 2007).

The slogan of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games was “One World, One Dream”. However, there were two different perceptions of this slogan. China saw itself as part of the developed world and HROs wanted China to adapt to international Human Rights standards. The IOC, who had commenced offensively and guaranteed improvements in Chinese human rights practice, disclaimed all responsibility by avoiding political confrontation with both sides.

Method

The study is based on interviews with eight Norwegian HROs in 2009. They were chosen because (1) all organisations were engaged in Human Rights questions in China, (2) the organisations under study represent a broad spectrum of human rights issues in China, and (3) the organisations have different approaches to Human Rights standards in China. Their approaches can be split into three different categories: (a) a group of *generalists* engaging in Human Rights questions in China along with their engagements in other parts of the world (Amnesty International Norway, The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, The Rafto Foundation); (b) *issue
oriented organisations which focus on certain issues in China as in other parts of the world (Norwegian PEN and The Norwegian Union of Journalists); (c) a group of regional organisations with direct or close relations to China focusing on Human Rights questions in China and their neighbour country, Burma) (The Norwegian Tibet Committee, The Network for Human Rights in China, The Norwegian Burma Committee). This categorisation was used for two reasons. Firstly, we could easily identify the different Human Rights issues of each organisation, and secondly, we could identify relevant organisations for future studies of Olympic engagement more easily.

Our analysis is limited to each organisation’s own understanding of its involvement in the Olympic Games and its evaluation of the human rights situation in China prior to, during and following the Games. Our main concern has not been to investigate what they actually achieved in China. The informants were leaders or Olympic campaign managers of their respective organisations. It was taken for granted that these individuals represented the views of the entire organisation concerning its involvement in the Beijing Olympics.

The selected interview technique was structured interviews based on specific questions to be presented in a given order (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). This was done in order to identify the HRO’s involvement prior to the Olympic Games, how they evaluated their involvement subsequent to the Games, and their views on future major sporting events. Structured interviews also enabled us to conduct follow-up interviews four years later and to compare the responses. Four of five organisations in the “generalist” and the “issue oriented” group were selected for follow-up interviews in 2013, and the respondents were reminded of their replies given in 2009. The regional organisations were excluded from the follow-up interviews because they have no interest in future Games outside China. We have no special competence in Chinese politics or foreign relations. Furthermore, in this study we have not made a detailed control of the HRO’s statements regarding the factual situation in China. To check certain statements and factual claims, we nevertheless undertook a number of interviews with experts and researchers who were specialists in Chinese politics. We also undertook a brief study of media statements to cross-check claims made by the organisations in the study.

The study focuses solely on the Norwegian HROs’ Olympic Games involvement, and it is difficult to know whether the findings are relevant for other countries and organisations. They may nevertheless be relevant
to HROs outside Norway since the majority of such organisations are linked to an international network of HROs, or are a division of a larger global organisation.

**HROs and goal achievement**

We have looked at the human rights organisation’s own evaluation of their Olympic Games involvement (strategies employed) and their own evaluation of the results of this involvement (goal achievement). The objective of the work done by NGOs such as HROs is structured on a value-based and moral framework also defined as “Advocacy for social benefits” or “Advocacy for social change” (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2012). Based on this we can expect that Norwegian HROs measure their success of the Olympic engagement by the specific improvement in the human rights situation and the improvement of the life of the Chinese population.

The same organisations also have another institutional logic, defined as “advocacy for organisational benefits” (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2012). This suggests that in addition to taking into consideration those who they are assisting, they must also make a strategic choice so as to ensure the organisation’s legitimacy and continued existence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Ensuring the legitimacy of the organisation and resources through publicity campaigns, attracting new members and applying for state grants can, as such, be a goal in itself. The organisation’s original values and goals can thus be changed or complemented with values and goals which are essential to the organisation’s ability to survive but which do not necessarily contribute to improving the human rights situation. Based on the HROs’ strategic philosophy, we can expect success to be measured on the basis of attention, income and legitimacy acquired during the period of the Beijing Games. There is no clear distinction between these two success criteria. They can occur simultaneously, independently or sequentially. It is most natural to believe that the HROs attempt to achieve both objectives simultaneously.
HRO activism and shaming

Normally, the human rights debate is concerned with states and the state’s response to external pressure from the international community, including HROs. An HRO’s strategy for exerting such influence is often called “Naming and Shaming” (hereafter “shaming”). Since states are concerned with their international reputation, HROs work actively with directing global attention towards states in breach of human rights. In this manner, they hope to realize a global moral debate which focusses on the national authorities in a negative light. Shaming is therefore used to persuade states to change their attitudes so as to reflect their identity as part of the world community (Risse & Sikkink, 1999). In our analysis it is the HROs which apply pressure on China to introduce changes to human rights practice by using the world’s largest sport and media event. Shaming can thus be associated with our study of the Norwegian HROs Beijing involvement.

How external pressure affects – or fails to affect – individual states is one of the main questions within the study of international relations. There are two initial positions, which may be taken when this is to be discussed, social constructivism and realism. The social constructivist perspective (Adler, 2003; Finnemore, 1996) suggests that HROs can influence human rights in practice within the state by encouraging state leaders to introduce reforms through a socialisation process. The argument is that one is excluded from the international community and loses the ability to negotiate within this arena if one does not conform. Risse and Sikkink (1999) use a spiral model as an explanation as to why states change human rights practice through three processes of change and which frequently overlap. First, this model describes how states adapt to human rights norms and introduce reforms as a result of that which they consider to be rational and strategic choices arising from international or national pressure (the process of instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining). The process is initiated with a moral discussion and dialogue on the international stage between the repressive state and its critics (processes of moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue and persuasion). A state is dependent on a good international reputation in order to main-

2 The Spiral model is an expansion of the “boomerang effect” by Keck & Sikkink (1998) which explains how “non-state actors faced with repression and blockage at home seek out state and non-state allies in the international arena, and in some cases are able to bring pressure to bear from above on their government to carry out domestic political change.” (Sikkink, 2005, p.154).
tain its international status and is therefore sensitive to moral pressure from the international society (Risse & Ropp, 1999). This provides an opening for a discussion of fundamental human rights. Risse and Sikkink (1999) suggest that this socialisation process might result in a state, which originally adapted norms as a tactical move, gradually accepting the premises of a change in policy and therefore starts to yield to external pressure. The last process (processes on institutionalisation and habitu-alisation) results in a change in attitude whereby external demands are embraced and “rule-consistent behaviour” is internalised (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 239). The HRO’s shaming strategy must be understood on the basis of the process of norm socialisation described in the spiral model (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005; Murdie & Davis, 2012; Risse & Sikkink, 1999). Thus, this position maintains that “countries placed in the global spotlight for human rights abuses adopt better practices and legislation afterwards” (Hafner-Burton, 2008, p. 694). From this point of view we could expect that Norwegian HROs use the Olympic Games as the appropriate arena in which to exert pressure on the Chinese authorities to introduce changes in the course of time.

Some claim that shaming of oppressive states by the international human rights community is simply not enough. The shaming strategy should also seek to raise the “moral consciousness” of third-party actors (states, intergovernmental organisations, individuals) and support HROs within the target state, thereby increasing the pressure on oppressive regimes (Murdie & Davis, 2012; Risse & Ropp 1999). In a qualitative study, Murdie and Davis (2012) show that third-party actors can amplify the shaming effect. They maintain that the results of this strategy are dependent on which third-party actors HROs manage to organise when exerting pressure on a target-state from above. Similarly, Risse and Ropp (1999) maintain that the shaming strategy can intensify the presence of HROs within the country that is shamed through pressure from below by mobilising local opposition. With this as the point of departure we can expect Norwegian HROs to use the Olympic Games as a practical arena by cooperating with a sister organisation, external organisation or internal opposition.

The standpoint of realism, however, maintains that states always act in their own best interests, based on rational calculations. Thus, international human rights conventions, laws or activism are not able to affect the attitude of a state to any noticeable extent. Human rights activists are therefore something which some states choose to overlook or approach
depending on whether this ensures the national interest, such as survival (Waltz, 1979), or maximises its power position in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2001), or not. Thus, the HROs and the media have the ability to place injustice on the agenda, but states can choose to ignore these since the actors do not have authority or a formal position in the international arena which necessitates that these demands shall be met. From this position HROs shaming strategy may be considered as “cheap talk” because regimes “do not change their human rights practice or legislation after they are shamed” (Hafner-Burton, 2008, p. 691). From this viewpoint we should expect that the Norwegian HROs do not wish to use the Olympic Games as an arena for fighting for human rights since “shaming” will not change the host nation’s human rights practice.

Following the realist perspective it is possible to include into the calculations the unintended negative effects of the HRO’s shaming strategy whereby more human rights abuses follow when the country is shamed (Hafner-Burton, 2008). National authorities can interpret international publicity as a threat to stability and their own power position in so far as it will stimulate opposition in the local population. Such a situation can provide regime leaders with new incentives to commit human rights violations through, for example, conducting a more aggressive national policy and to react more severely towards citizens and the opposition’s possibilities for expressing their opinion before they are able to mobilise further (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Based on this we should expect that the Norwegian HROs would not use the Olympics as an arena since they fear that the host nation would make the human rights situation worse as a consequence of shaming.

The HROs we interviewed had little or no experience with major sporting events as an arena for human rights activism. It is therefore interesting to identify the organisations’ comprehension of the Olympic Games as an arena and how this reflects the different viewpoints of HROs shaming of oppressive states presented in this paper. Did any regard shaming in connection with the Olympic Games as cheap talk or did they hold the opinion that “Olympic shaming” would result in a change in China’s human rights practice? Did the HROs operate through a third party or the local opposition? Did they include unintended consequences of shaming in their calculations?
The Norwegian HROs’ involvement

Conflict cases

A number of human rights questions were raised prior to the Beijing Olympic Games. These included the situation of the China opposition, freedom of expression, particularly on the internet and in terms of journalists’ working conditions, employees’ rights, arrests without charge or trial, death sentences for journalists, authors and dissenters, the Tibetan conflict, injustice against the Uighur minority group (Xinjiang region) and persecution of Falun Gong practitioners. All these themes were touched upon by the Norwegian HROs.

Journalists and athletes comprised the main target group for the Norwegian human rights community. A much-discussed initiative was the handbook *Arven etter OL i 2008. Håndbok for journalister* (The 2008 Olympic Games heritage. Handbook for journalists), prepared by Amnesty International Norway in association with the Norwegian Union of Journalists and Norwegian PEN. The mobilisation of journalists was a part of HRO’s shaming strategy, according to one informant. The aim was to arouse the interest of Norwegian journalists to criticise Chinese infringements of human rights and thus expose other matters than just sports. In connection with the publication of the handbook, the general secretary in Amnesty International Norway, John Peder Egenæs, stated the following:

> The media have power: both the sports organisations and the Chinese authorities know this. What the media choose to take up – or not to take up – can be decisive in determining whether the Olympic Games inheritance is human rights reform (Amnesty International Norway 2007).

Norwegian HROs also looked to the NIF and sports president Tove Paule in order to attract the attention of the sporting community on a broad spectrum of matters. Some athletes became involved in various Amnesty campaigns. Others gave their support to the work being done by the organisation Human Rights in China on behalf of Falun Gong. The Norwegian Tibet Committee also worked actively to enter into dialogue with NIF.

The HROs handed out fliers from stands and participated actively in the Norwegian debate on the situation in China. Several organisations
organised protest demonstrations, which in a number of instances were coordinated from outside the country. For example, the Norwegian Tibet Committee and Human Rights in China held alternative torch relays in Oslo while Norwegian PEN arranged a “poetry relay” on the internet. Several HROs contacted members of parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to encourage them to exert greater pressure on China. A number of meetings and seminars were also arranged prior to the Games. One example is The Rafto Foundation who invited the Uighur and previous Rafto award winner, Rebiya Kadeer, to the human rights seminar “China, human rights and the Beijing Olympics” in order to draw attention to the infringement of human rights concerning the Uighur people. None of the Norwegian HROs were themselves present in China before or during the Games.

Self-confident HROs

Only two of the eight HROs we interviewed were opposed to the Olympic Games being held in China when the Games was awarded in 2001. The other organisations either had no opinion on this, or saw the Games as an opportunity to put China under the spotlight. As the Games approached, all eight HROs saw this as a possibility and a platform for human rights activism. Most organisations considered that the Chinese population deserved the Olympic sporting event and that a boycott was not an alternative. Additionally, the majority of HROs regarded it as an obligation to contribute to applying joint pressure to prevent China from using the Olympic Games for propaganda purposes.

Prior to the Olympic Games, all the Norwegian HROs had considerable belief that the Olympic Games could be used as a leverage to enforce changes in Chinese human rights practice. Their work was part of a global campaign which had as its objective that of forcing the Chinese authorities to introduce human rights reforms in conjunction with the Olympic Games. The view of one informant provides an example of the train of thought:

The considerable international attention and spotlight provided unique possibilities to exert pressure and to improve the human rights situation in China, particularly because this was a propaganda measure, an advertisement (…) It was obvious that we had to make it quite clear to the Chinese authorities that something had to be done about the human rights situation. Otherwise, the advertising effect would be dam-
aged, and we had to say to the authorities that they could no longer
avoid the responsibilities of human rights. (Our translation)

These viewpoints were expressed by all eight HROs, and the Olympic
Games provided them with an unrivalled opportunity to use the sham-
ing strategy to encourage a global moral debate on the human rights
situation in China. Employing the concept of shaming during Olymp-
ics would encourage the Chinese authorities to obligate themselves to
changing human rights practice since they would lose face and emerge in
a poor light internationally. Statements released by the organisations to
the Norwegian media confirm this. This understanding of the Olympic
Games as an arena for human rights activism is in accordance with the
“process of norm socialisation” in the spiral model. Thus, the Norwegian
HROs regard the Olympics as a useful arena for exerting pressure on the
Chinese authorities to introduce reforms which can result in changes in
the long term.

Most organisations emphasised that the campaigns had contributed
to make the Norwegian population and Norwegian politicians aware of
the human rights situation in China. Further, they thought that they had
achieved considerable understanding for their cause among the Norwe-
gian population. This had given the organisations and the causes they
were working for greater legitimacy. One informant stated:

We have seen a greater understanding by the majority of persons for
the objectives towards which we are working. Further, we have noticed
– something encountered on the street after the Olympic Games – that
the public impression of China is less favourable. Many we encounter
have a much clearer impression of what the objectives of this totalitar-
ian regime are and are less impressed by the fact that they have become
so affluent. (Our translation)

In addition, several organisations pointed to the fact that the Olympics
was a successful mobilisation theme internally within the organisation.
For example, Amnesty International had never engaged so many people
as during the Olympic campaign. They maintained that membership in-
creased, and knowledge of the organisation and its objectives increased.
Amnesty’s own opinion polls showed that for the first time there was a
majority of men, more so than women, who were aware of the organi-
sation. Other organisations also pointed to increased awareness among
both new and old members. A spokesman for one of the organisations
said, for example, that:
For us as an organisation, it was a successful campaign. In Norway, we had achieved increased awareness and membership. I believe that it was important for our organisation since we were clearly able to show what the organisation stood for, for example, that we were opposed to a boycott. Through debate, we were able to make known what we stood for regarding human rights and what we considered should be given priority. That which I am more uncertain about, and which the future will show, is how much all this meant to the Chinese people.

(Our translation)

All the organisations stated that they were pleased with their own campaign. They were also clear about the fact that it was an important and correct decision for the organisation to engage itself in the Beijing Games. We can conclude that the Norwegian HROs considered the Olympic Games investment a success.

What about the situation in China? All the organisations we interviewed stated that the situation had deteriorated prior to and during the Olympic Games in spite of all the attention resulting from a united international human rights movement, and especially for the Uigur people, imprisoned authors, members of Falun Gong and the Tibetans. One informant reports:

It is more problematic to say that we achieved something on the situation in China concerning the human rights situation we are working towards. Right from when China was awarded the Olympic Games and up to today, it has gone from bad to worse. Seen in this light, we have to say that we have scarcely reached any goals at all. But we must recognise that human rights demand a long-term effort. (Our translation)

All the HROs acknowledged that the global human rights engagement could have contributed to creating the Olympic stress syndrome. Thus, they admitted that the “stress” created by shaming before the Games had led to increased surveillance and control of Chinese citizens rather than pushing Chinese authorities in the direction of new Human Rights reforms. It is important to emphasise that even though the HROs admitted that the Beijing Olympics also had some negative consequences in the short term, most maintained that in the long-term the effects could be positive. However, this argument stands in contrast to the logic of the norm-socialisation process as argued prior to the Games. The long-term process of change assumes that new reforms are first introduced in the short term as a result of the shaming strategy, something which the
HROs deny having occurred before, during or after the Olympic Games. As such, they contradict themselves. In addition, some organisations mentioned that it was difficult to get support for their campaign among Chinese people both in Norway and China. This was explained in so far as for most Chinese the Olympics had become a prestige project fostering feelings of national pride. Thus, it was difficult to reach the ordinary Chinese with their message and, for some, the HROs’ endeavours were regarded as an attempt to tarnish the Chinese image.

The analysis above rather supports the assumption that the human rights situation becomes worse after the “target state” has been shamed. This view was still held when we undertook follow-up interviews in 2013. In the interviews, the HROs stated that they continue to regard the Olympic Games engagement as a success. At the same time they continue to hold the opinion that the human rights situation in China has deteriorated. In addition they see no sign of a long-term effect of the Olympic pressure applied more than four years previously, that they had expressed optimistically in the 2009 interviews.

In spite of the fact that the HROs have not observed any noticeable effects in the human rights situation following massive and direct global campaigns against China, of which they were a part, the Olympic endeavours whetted the appetite. In response to the question whether they thought that they could become similarly involved in future events, the response was affirmative. All the organisations considered that similar sporting events should be used as an arena for activism in the future. For some, only the Olympic Games was of current interest; others preferred to consider each arrangement individually while yet others were only interested in becoming engaged in events held in countries where they had a specific interest. While organisations with direct or strong links with China were only interested in engaging themselves with the event in China, the generalist and niche organisations mentioned that they wanted to use the Sochi Olympic Games in order to focus attention on Russia and the Caucasus. This was expressed by one informant:

When the Olympic Games comes to Russia, then it is clear that we will be strongly engaged in acquiring information and disseminating information about the situation in Russia, and not least in the Caucasus region. (Our translation)

One of the organisations interviewed in 2009 had already commenced preparing for the Sochi Olympics. A special group had been established
which was to work objectively to put the human rights situation in Russia on the agenda.

**New Shaming**

Even though they were satisfied with their own campaigns during the Beijing Olympic Games, the organisations acknowledged that the counter-actions by the Chinese authorities were more extensive than they had previously expected. This has resulted in several HROs considering other means for future Games or other international sporting events. One of the lessons learnt was that rather than targeting the host nation, greater pressure should be exerted on the Olympic movement which, some expressed, had failed the Olympic charter. They recognised that excessive pressure on the host nation created a counter reaction and appeared counter-productive. Several HROs argued that the IOC and national Olympic committees were in a better position to exert pressure on the host nation than the organisations themselves, since they had a written agreement that had to be upheld and in time can be part of the host nation’s human rights practice. In addition, it was emphasized that the IOC has direct contact with the host nation’s leaders and organisers in advance as well as during the event, and that this should be used as an opportunity for political pressure. Furthermore, some organisations emphasised the importance of mobilising and cooperating with associate organisations in the host country, something which the HROs reported as difficult to achieve in connection with the Beijing Games. These reflections satisfy the perspective which maintains that shaming can have an effect on “target states” when this is supported by pressure from strategic third-part actors (from above), and through the mobilisation of the local opposition (from below). The interviews in 2013 showed that the HROs continue to want further pressure to be applied through third parties and local opposition in the future. The Sochi Olympic Games were seen as a possible arena to realise this (see Table 1, overleaf).

**HROs Olympic dilemmas**

The above discussion shows a development occurring in three phases: optimism, changing the goal, and a new strategy. In the first phase – the period before the Games – the HROs were optimistic and had seen the
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**Table 1: Summary of the Norwegian HROs’ assessment of the Beijing Olympic Games and their own involvement.**
Olympic Games as an attractive arena for human rights activism. They believed that the Olympic Games would have a positive influence on the human rights situation in China in both the short and long terms. This led to an internal mobilisation and large and smaller campaigns. In the second phase – the period after the Olympic Games – the HROs realised that their campaigns only served to strengthen the Chinese (Olympic) stress syndrome and contributed to a worsening of the human rights situation. In this phase the HROs changed their understanding of goal achievement and success from value-based to organisational objectives. The HROs can therefore conclude that the Olympic Games input was a success in that it provided the organisation and their banner greater legitimacy within the Norwegian population. In the third phase, the HROs look to future major sporting events and have realised that approval of value-based goals indicates that they must change the shaming tactics by applying less pressure on the host nation and more on third party actors such as the IOC.

Our findings from the original interviews and the follow-up interviews show that the HROs consider the Olympic initiative as a success regardless of the deterioration of the human rights situation in China. This is even more paradoxical in so far as future events are considered a potential platform for action. Even though there is no clear boundary indicating where the HROs’ original moral objectives finish and self-interest starts, the HROs’ Olympic paradox raises an important question concerning their understanding of success when they become engaged in major sporting events.

One claim that can be made from these findings is that the main goal for Norwegian HROs would be to make the Norwegian population aware of the Human Rights situation in China, which was reported by the HROs to be a success. Further, that broader engagement by Norwegian population and the Norwegian Government (together with similar pressure from other countries) would help to improve the situation in China in the longer perspective. Based on this claim, this cannot be called a paradox, but rather a natural development. Our findings – based on interviews of four HROs with an interval of four years – counter such a claim because we cannot see that such a development has occurred. After four years, all organisations under study remain satisfied with their campaign, but they continue to accept that the Olympics resulted in a worsened Human Rights situation in China. Neither do they see any signs of future positive effects. This shows the HROs’ paradoxical un-
derstanding of success criteria and their virtually naïve understanding of Olympic Games as an arena for action. It is, however, important to remember that the Olympic Games in authoritarian states is a new arena for HROs.

Another paradox is that HROs’ “successful games” may have contributed to weakening the legitimacy of the human rights struggle among the Chinese population. The majority of Norwegian HROs reported that many Chinese regarded the campaigns as provocations – a desire to spoil the party. To be negatively associated with an event which many Chinese were proud of may well have resulted in many – who potentially could have contributed to advancing the HROs’ values – turning their back on them. At the extreme, it may possibly have resulted in many supporting the regime’s leaders and boosting their legitimacy.

The Norwegian HROs’ experience from the Beijing Games indicates that they are facing two difficult dilemmas when they are to select a strategy for future engagement. On the one hand, the HROs regard it as their duty to shame in order to prevent the host nation using a major sports event to acquire more national and international legitimacy. On the other hand, the shaming strategy can amplify the Olympic stress syndrome and establish insensitivity towards new assaults on the very people they wish to assist. The second dilemma is that on the one hand the shaming strategy can provide the human rights case and the organisation with legitimacy. On the other hand, the HROs’ unilateral negative focus might damage their own case and reputation in as much as the host nation’s population turns against them. These dilemmas challenge the way in which HROs evaluate the short and long term gains compared to the costs when they engage in major sporting events and the extent to which major sporting events are an appropriate arena for human rights activism, irrespective of whether they are arranged by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.

Concluding remarks

In this article we have presented different perspectives on shaming by HROs seen from the theoretical approaches of social constructivism and realism in order to understand the organisations’ comprehension of the Olympic Games as an arena for human rights activism and how this was reflected in their work. The literature on shaming shows that this can
have a positive effect on human rights reform and practice, but also results in further assaults (Hafner-Burton 2008). In our study, we show that the HROs exaggerated the significance of the Beijing Olympics and underestimated the negative consequences of shaming China. Further studies on the international HROs’ Olympic activism should build on this theoretical debate to empirically study host nations’ responses to HROs’ “Olympic shaming”.

We have also shown that it is important to discuss whether these Games have contributed to a change in the international human rights movement’s approach to the Olympics as an arena for activism. We see that Norwegian HROs have learnt from their experience with the Beijing Games and have recognised that the negative consequences also have to be put into the equation of strategic shaming of host nations of a major sporting events. If we are to believe the responses of the HROs, we can expect that they will engage less in direct confrontation with host nations and rather focus their activities on third-party actors (especially raising the “moral consciousness” of the IOC) and local opposition. This view was also emphasised by the Amnesty International’s British project manager for sport and Human Rights, Brian Dooley, during the international conference “Play the Game” in 2009. Dooley admitted that Amnesty International focused too much on the Chinese authorities and too little on IOC’s role as the proprietor of the Games and IOC’s criteria for assigning the Games to a certain host nation. In future, according to Dooley, the HROs would have to target the IOC and apply pressure on this body to introduce a fourth pillar in the assignment criteria – human rights (in addition to sport, culture and the environment). Dooley pointed out that the official sponsors of the arrangement must also be held responsible. Sponsors could therefore be understood as important third-party actors which the HROs could influence (Play the Game, 2009). The participant nations’ Olympic committees (NOCs) may also be considered as third-party actors of strategic interest. They represent the athletes who, on account of their celebrity status and direct contact with the host nation’s athletes and leaders, can contribute to the overall pressure. Before and during the Beijing Games, we saw that the IOC, NOCs and athletes were particularly reserved in making comments regarding questions of human rights. But if we are to believe the Norwegian HROs, then the Olympic movement should expect more pressure from the human rights movement at future events. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that increased pressure through third parties and
local mobilisation, to the advantage of massive shaming of the host nation, can give the HROs and their core interest less attention and press coverage. In that situation their PR-value would be lost.

Another point is that increased pressure from the international HRO movements on the IOC could result in fewer Olympic events in states with repressive governments. First, assignment criteria heavily based on human rights would strongly favour those nations with the best human rights records, thus determining the premises by which countries can be assigned the Olympics. Second, it could result in fewer applications from non-democratic countries since the negative consequences of hosting the Olympics would out-weigh the positive results. In this manner, the Olympics could lose its significance as an arena for global human rights activism.

The next major international sporting event is the winter Olympics in Russia in February 2014. The host city, Sochi, is located near the Caucasus region and Georgia – a political minefield. Further, Russia has introduced laws which conflict with international human rights conventions (for example, laws relating to homosexuals). Thus, the Games provides HROs with the opportunity to apply pressure on the Russian authorities. This is interesting seen through the eyes of Norway and other Nordic countries. Compared to the Beijing Games, Norway’s position in the sports arena during the Sochi Games will be different. Norway is a “super power” in the winter Olympics and a neighbouring country to Russia. Based on the Olympic dilemmas presented in this article it will be of considerable interest to analyse the Norwegian HRO’s engagement before, during and after these Games.

References


