Hans Skotte

TENTS IN CONCRETE

WHAT INTERNATIONALLY FUNDED HOUSING DOES TO SUPPORT RECOVERY IN AREAS AFFECTED BY WAR

The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Dr.Ing Thesis
Trondheim, May 2004

NTNU TRONDHEIM
NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Faculty of Architecture and Fine Art
Department of Urban Design and Planning
MAIN ADVISORS:

Professor Sven Erik Svendsen
Department of Architectural Design and Management,
Faculty of Architecture and Fine Art, NTNU, Trondheim, Norway

and

Professor Dr. Ragnhild Lund
Department of Geography
Faculty of Social Sciences and Technology Management,
NTNU, Trondheim, Norway

ADJUDICATION COMMITTEE:

Professor Dr. Roger Zetter
School of Planning, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK

Professor Emeritus Michael Lloyd
Alicante, Spain

Researcher Dr. Eli Støa
SINTEF, Trondheim, Norway

Administrator:
Professor Bjørn Røe — on behalf of Associate Professor Sverre Flack
Department of Urban Design and Planning, NTNU, Trondheim, Norway

TENTS IN CONCRETE
WHAT INTERNATIONALLY FUNDED HOUSING DOES TO SUPPORT
RECOVERY IN AREAS AFFECTED BY WAR; The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Department of Urban Design and Planning,
Faculty of Architecture and Fine Art,
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

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This one’s for
Sølvi
in Profound Gratitude
Robert Chambers writes in his paper *Responsible well-being – a personal agenda for development:

“For responsible well-being, it is then especially individuals who are powerful and wealthy who have to change. [...] For this, one need is for a pedagogy for the non-oppressed (including ourselves, the sort of people who read World Development), to enable us to think and act differently. There are many disparate domains for analysis and action among them: how we treat and bring up children; how to achieve reconciliation after conflict; how donor agency staff behave on mission [...] *how to rehabilitate those who have suffered a PhD*. (my italics)

(Chambers 1997;2750).
ABSTRACT

This work is about how international housing assistance to societies affected by war contributes toward long-term recovery. Or does not. Current wars are characterized by large, often identity specific population movements causing an extreme and urgent need for shelter. This research does not deal with (emergency) 'shelter', but with (permanent) 'housing', which has come to be one of the largest funding sectors of international aid to countries ravaged by war.

It is my contention that housing re/construction, because of its socio-material nature and high economic value may contribute towards long-term recovery. My research is therefore focusing on the relationship between the overall process of recovery and the way internationally funded housing projects are implemented. Recovery is conceptualized as a time limited, complex and reflexive activity, i.e. guided by past experience, both of pre-war conditions, and of the war itself. This makes recovery an endogenously driven process. In examining the implementation of foreign funded housing programs I submit, aided by prevailing theory, three chief attributes of housing: 1) that of physical object with its technical determinants and functional responsiveness, 2) that of object of meaning, i.e. symbol, which allows for, or even determines human action, and 3) that of vehicle of development, both by its backward linkages, i.e. creating demand and employment, but also by forward linkages, i.e. what people with housing will be able to do. All these attributes refer back to “what houses can do”, not only to “what houses are”.

The New Wars create a new and extremely complex context for international housing interventions. Unlike the indiscriminate mass destruction of housing of former wars, today housing is destroyed as a function of the owners’ identity. The destruction of housing has become an integral part of ethnic cleansing. This fact has lead donors to concentrate on rebuilding the destroyed housing as a means of reintegrating the displaced, an idea that seems simplistic given the meaning of recovery, the nature of housing - and the grave political complexity of the new wars.

Ideology as well as practical considerations have made the international NGOs the major agents of international aid. Their new role comes from that fact that most of the NGOs now receive substantial parts of their income from governments – to carry out government sponsored projects. Housing is a favored sector of intervention in war affected areas. Yet very few NGOs have any experience with housing. They make up for it by hiring building professionals on short-term field contracts. What little there is of theoretical writing that on housing re/construction after current wars, indicate that the NGOs – guided by their donors – apply an emergency approach also to permanent housing. Housing is conceived as shelter, which makes it a logistical challenge to fulfill basic short-term needs. If such an approach is applied, will it still contribute towards societal recovery?

Within this frame I have examined three multi-phased housing projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I explore their performance and capacity to enhance long-term recovery. Acknowledging the endogenous, reflexive nature of recovery, I had to approach it qualitatively,
yet be able to draw theoretical conclusions on a broader scale. I have investigated how the housing projects are performing as physical entities, as generators or inhibitors of social and socio-material interaction, and I have examined how the housing projects have impacted local markets, production and the buildings industry. I do this by applying a societal capital approach which holds (re)development a function of beneficial flows from four societal capitals, i.e. fixed, environmental, human and social capital. Recovery is supported when housing investments also replenish the other capitals modes so that the inhabitants may draw benefits from their enriched interaction.

My cases are 1) set at different times in the reconstruction process, 2) set at different places and 3) executed differently by different NGOs. They yielded different, yet consistent conclusions within the three aspects of housing: physical object, symbol and strategy:

- The long-term nature of housing construction is ignored in that technical solutions, workmanship – and not least – the choice of location reflect an emergency attitude where inappropriate solutions are accepted “because it is war”. There is a reluctance to plan beyond the immediate even for structures that can last generations.
- The symbolic power of housing is reconfirmed for those who are able to reestablish livelihood networks at their place of origin. Return does not make strategic sense, hence is not a “durable solution”, for those whose networks are irreparably destroyed. For those who can return, housing reconstruction becomes a symbolic act, both to reestablish ontological security, but also to demonstrate against former perpetrators. Housing reconstruction in itself is therefore not a vehicle towards reconciliation.
- Housing re/construction in times of war is a way of disseminating purchasing power through employment. There is no production, no social or financial institutions by which the building industry can develop. Internationally funded reconstruction therefore relies on large scale – and tax free - imports of buildings materials. However, my cases show that domestic demand more often than that of NGOs draws upon imports. Recovery momentum is lost in not supporting the (re)establishment of the local building materials industry.
- My cases confirm the recovery powers of local agency. When substantive decisions on reconstruction are transferred from the NGO to the local community as part of the material support to housing re/construction, the community is also entrusted with support from external agents, like their own diaspora. This combination replenishes all capital modes of the community. The validity of this observation is inversely confirmed by another case where the inhabitants were not at all entrusted with decision-making powers, i.e. their human and social capitals were depleted. This also becomes apparent in that fixed and environmental capitals are also eroded.

I have concluded by presenting implications for policy, practice and research.
RESYMÉ PÅ NORSK


Mitt utgangspunkt er boligbygging og bolig-gjenreisning, i kraft av sin sosio-materielle natur og betydelige økonomiske verdi, er spesielt egnet som innsatsområde for langsiktig gjenreisning. Min forskning fokuserer derfor på forholdet mellom de overordnede gjenreisningsprosessene og måten internasjonalt finansierte boligbyggingsprosjekter blir gjennomført på. Gjenreisning blir konseptualisert som en tidsbegrenset, kompleks og refleksiv aktivitet. At den er refleksiv innebærer at den er fornet av tidligere erfaringer, både av forhold før krigen brot ut og av selve krigen. Dette gjør gjenreisning til en prosess som drives fram av 'egne erfaringer', til en 'deltakende' prosess. Ved hjelp av ledende teori fokuserer jeg på tre hovedattributter ved boliger i studien av gjenomføringen av internasjonalt finansierte boligreisningsprosjekter: 1) at det er fysiske objekter med teknisk determinanter og egenskaper for funksjonell tilpasning; 2) at de er meningsobjekter, de er symboler som lager rom for, eller med eller med er bestemmende for, menneskelig handling; og 3) at de er investeringsobjekter, eller verktøy for utvikling, både gjennom å skape etterspørsel og sysselsetting, men også gjennom hva mennesker med bolig vil kunne utføre. Alle disse attributtene er knyttet til "hva boligen gjør", ikke bare "hva boligen er".


Prosjektene jeg har studert er gjennomført til ulik tid i gjenoppbyggingsprosessen, på ulike sted, og gjennomført av ulike agenter (NGOer). Studiet av prosjektene førte til forskjellige, men likevel konsistente konklusjoner angående de tre attributtene som boliger innehar: fysisk objekt, symbol og strategi:

- Boligens langsiktige egenskaper blir ignorert ved at tekniske løsninger, utførelse og, ikke minst, valg av lokaliserings reflekterer en nødhjelpsholdning, der mindreverdige løsninger blir godttatt "fordi det er krig", ikke nødvendigvis fordi det ikke fins alternativer. Det er motstand mot å planlegge utover det umiddelbare.

- Boligens symboliske kraft blir bekreftet for de som klarer å gjenopprette sosiale og økonomiske nettverk på sine opprinnelsessteder. For de som opplever at nettverkene er ujegnedit eller ødelagt, blir det å flytte tilbake 'meningsløst' og oppfattes ingenlunde som en 'varig løsning'. Selve boligreisning blir en symbolisk handling for de som kan reise tilbake, både ved at det gjenoppretter ontologisk trygghet, men også som demonstrasjon mot deres overgivere. Boliggjenreisning i seg selv er derfor intet egnet redskap for forsoning.

- Bolig(gjen)oppbygging i krigstid er en måte å formidle og fordele kjøpekraft på. I krigshjerdede land der produktionsmidlene er ødelagt, og der sosiale og økonomiske institusjoner har kollapset, finst det ingenting for byggebransjen å utvikle seg gjennom. Derfor må den internasjonalt finansierte gjenoppbygningen i stor basere seg på (skattefri) import av byggevarer. Likevel viser de prosjektene jeg har studert at lokalt generert etterspørsel i enda større grad enn den som genereres gjennom NGOene, retter seg mot import. Gjenreisningskraften tappes i vesentlig grad av at ikke bistandsinnsatsen også rettes inn mot (gjen)opprettelse av lokal produksjon av byggeomaterialer.


Jeg har konkludert ved å presentere implikasjoner for planlegging, praksis og forskning.
This work was initiated for no other reason than to explore a field nobody knew much about. My interest was aroused after having seen housing solutions and reconstruction programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina that I felt were highly inappropriate; inappropriate in serving the people they were built for, and inappropriate in serving as ‘vehicles of recovery’. With the better part of my professional career behind me there was no academic ambition underpinning my PhD work. It was simply to learn more about housing in post-war reconstruction contexts, and thereby hope that the added knowledge would be used to improve subsequent housing interventions.

I went into this work with 20 odd years of practice as architect. In addition to having worked on architectural design, my practice also comprised other sectors of the trade, also from working in other countries. It was therefore self-evident to me that approaching post-war housing as an architectural challenge alone would critically weaken my understanding on how housing works in reconstruction. It was necessary to approach the topic in a multidisciplinary way.

I received a grant from the University of Science and Technology (NTNU) to do a PhD, or what at NTNU is called a “Dr.Ing” thesis, within their strategic program on multidisciplinary studies. This way I came to work in a field where architecture, planning and human geography touch. A most rewarding place to be, full of knowledgeable and inspiring people.

But it all started long before I touched upon these fertile cross-disciplinary grounds. It started with my contacts and subsequent friendship with Sultan Barakat, the director the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York, UK. This further led to the establishment of a training program at NTNU, funded by the Directorate of Immigration, on post-war reconstruction planning for exiled Bosnian professionals. This this I got to know Mirjana Nikolic a exiled Bosnian civil engineer whose strength and courage I have come to respect immensely.

But it is my chief advisors, my collaborators, my friends and matchmakers, professor Ragnhild Lund and professor Sven Erik Svendsen, who stand the tallest. Although they came late into the project, as replacements as it were, I have been lost without their patient role as academic navigators. Their patience is admirable. I will remain grateful for their support and guidance as long as I live, nothing less.

Furthermore gratitude is lavishly bestowed upon the Department of Urban Design and Planning who took me in and truly included me in their inner circles. So did the Faculty of Architecture and Fine Art. I cannot name their staff individually, they are all there and I owe my work to them all. Just as much I owe it to the faculty library. They have helped me beyond any call of duty.
Then there are the agents of the field. There is Marianne Øen of the Norwegian People’s Aid, the HQ and field staff of the Norwegian Refugee Council, in particular Lars Silseth, one of the first Norwegian field officers in Tuzla, and there is Kaj Gennebäck of Swedish Rescue Service Agency in Tuzla. This thesis could simply not have been made without their kind cooperation and their letting me rummage through their files and papers. In addition there is Per Iwansson one of the most informed and constructive representatives of the *corps diplomatique* I have ever met.

My alter ego, my assistant, the ‘me’ of my interviews, Mr. Adnan Ahmedbegovic represents so much I am not; he is calm, skeptical, and levelheaded. Perhaps it was because of him and his ways that we were able to extract so much information and understanding out of the people we interviewed. He will always be part of my Bosnia. So will many of the people I met through my interviews. Some of the people I – via Adnan – got to know in Grapska are among my most revered contacts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ekrem Buljabasic must be named. He is unique.

I want to thank my language cleaning lady, Catriona Turner. Her work is commendable, her comments constructive. The same is to be said of my daughter Pernille’s assistance. She helped me immensely as I approached the end, and so did my son Henrik who wrestled a book of sorts out of my stubbornly incongruent files embedded in incomprehensible formats. A feat given the circumstances.

Opening addresses always close by presenting some ‘practical information’. Here is my list:

- Local names are written without the letters č, š, etc. I only use the base letters.
- The term ‘Bosniak’ is being used throughout the thesis. The term is old but its revival is in fact the result of the war. ‘Muslim’ was the term used until recently.
- Cost figures are given in the currency denomination of the source, otherwise either the new Bosnian currency, Convertible Marka, KM, or German Marks, DM, are used. The latter two, of equal value, stood at about US$ 0,6 at the time in question, or EUR 0,5.
- Quotations given from net versions of articles do not have page references, only the overall reference.
- Wherever a primary source’s name is used in the text, it is used by consent.
- All pictures are my own where no other credit is given

Trondheim, March 2004
<table>
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<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<td><strong>BiH</strong></td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CC</strong></td>
<td>Collective Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CRI</strong></td>
<td>Cross Roads International</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DAC</strong></td>
<td>Development Co-operation Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DANIDA</strong></td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DETR</strong></td>
<td>Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions</td>
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<td><strong>DFID</strong></td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECHO</strong></td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU</strong></td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GDP</strong></td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GFA</strong></td>
<td>General Framework Agreement (The Dayton Agreement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GNI</strong></td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GTZ</strong></td>
<td>German Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HVO</strong></td>
<td>Croat National Defense</td>
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<td><strong>ICAHD</strong></td>
<td>Israeli Committee Against House Demolition</td>
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<td><strong>ICRC</strong></td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td><strong>ICVA</strong></td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
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<td><strong>IDP</strong></td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IMF</strong></td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IMG</strong></td>
<td>International Management Group</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INCORE</strong></td>
<td>Initiative on Conflict Resolution &amp; Ethnicity, University of Ulster &amp; United Nations University in Londonderry/Derry</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IWPR</strong></td>
<td>Institute for War and Peace Reporting</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>JNA</strong></td>
<td>Yugoslav National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KM</strong></td>
<td>Convertible Marka</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LWF</strong></td>
<td>Lutheran World Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NATO</strong></td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NCA</strong></td>
<td>Norwegian Church Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NGO</strong></td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NMFA</strong></td>
<td>Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NORAD</strong></td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NORBAT</strong></td>
<td>The Norwegian Battalion in BiH</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NOREPS</strong></td>
<td>Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System</td>
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<td><strong>NPA</strong></td>
<td>Norwegian Peoples Aid</td>
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<td><strong>NRC</strong></td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OCHA</strong></td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ODA</strong></td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ODPR</strong></td>
<td>Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OECD</strong></td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OHCHR</strong></td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PIOOM</strong></td>
<td>Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations, Leyden, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PTSD</strong></td>
<td>Post-traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RRTF</strong></td>
<td>Reconstruction and Return Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RS</strong></td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SDA</strong></td>
<td>Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party for Democratic Action)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SDP</strong></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SDR</strong></td>
<td>Swiss Disaster Relief</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SDS</strong></td>
<td>Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serb Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEA</strong></td>
<td>Scottish European Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SFOR</strong></td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SIDA</strong></td>
<td>Swedish International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SRC</strong></td>
<td>Swiss Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SRSA</strong></td>
<td>Swedish Rescue and Services Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDRO</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Relief Organization, later to be named: DHA, The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, now: OHCA, The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNESCO</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNHCR</strong></td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNPROFOR</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>USAID</strong></td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>VRC</strong></td>
<td>Bosnian Serb Army</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WB</strong></td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WFP</strong></td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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</table>
‘TENTS IN CONCRETE’: AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This work is based on the assumption that permanent housing re/construction funded by international donors in areas affected by present-day wars do not fully exploit the recovery potential embedded in housing re/construction. They remain ‘tents in concrete’.

This research sets to find out how such housing projects actually contribute towards long-term recovery. I do so by examining housing projects implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

‘Tents in concrete’ is a term highlighting the incongruence between permanent houses being built to solve temporary or partial needs, either to build shelter for IDPs while in displacement (with little or no consideration as to the projects’ long-term urban or regional development potential), or to rebuild houses to enable the displaced to return to their homes (with little or no consideration as to the livelihood or development potential presently available in the region of return).

For references, please see the main text.

PART ONE

The Research Challenge

Few studies have been made on wartime and post-war housing interventions.\(^1\) Empirically based recommendations, ‘theory’ by any other name, have not been able to inform policy and current practice of housing re/construction to any substantial extent. In practical terms, this means that the underlying concepts, i.e. the understanding that guides actions, may fall short of what the current situation in war-ridden fields calls for. Action requires some theoretical structures, beliefs or relevant references within which it can be placed and generated. This often leads to action being informed by inadequate or plainly incorrect theories, simply because this is preferable to having nothing at all to guide action.

At the other extreme there is the process of implementation. Vedung has shown how this carries consequences beyond its perceived instrumental nature. The approach to implementation may shape the outcomes. Given the context of violence, societal disintegration and endemic uncertainty, the action of the implementer, normally an international non-governmental organization (NGO), therefore seems to take on added importance.

I pose the following research question:

How do internationally funded housing projects implemented in war-ravaged areas affect the recovery processes of the societies assisted?

\(^1\) As my work approached its conclusion, ODI published a Network Paper written by Sultan Barakat on Housing Reconstruction after conflict and disaster which has not been included in my references because my writing was complete by the time of its publication. I was a member of ODI’s Board of Referees.
This overarching question is supported by three sets of sub-questions related to: a) the physical setting, present performance and future adaptability of the buildings themselves; b) the strength of local agency, i.e. the social and human capacity of the people affected; and c) the project as a long-term social and economic investment and its impact on local economy and local institutions. I will use Bosnia-Herzegovina as my arena for investigation.

In this thesis ‘recovery’ is conceived as a time-limited, extremely complex (‘messy’ would probably be a more adequate term), and reflexive set of processes. It is invariably guided by past experience, both that of pre-war conditions and that of the violence of war itself. This marks it as an endogenous endeavor, making the engagement of local agency a precondition for an efficient and sustainable outcome.

PART TWO

Theoretical Foundations and Current Practice

HOUSING AS A SOCIO-MATERIAL CONCEPT

Housing constitutes part of the very structure that is society. Consequently, the terms and concepts associated with housing are broad. It is therefore necessary to define the terms, since we have come to see how words such as ‘housing’ and ‘shelter’ guide different actions.

Definitions help in conceptualizing ‘the duality of housing’: housing as both a product and a process, as indicated in the famous statement by Churchill, “We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us”. Housing as an object and a constituting part of social processes and not only backdrops to these processes, gives rise to three core attributes of housing, echoing the subsidiary research questions:

• **Housing as material object.** This covers housing’s physical properties: how housing interacts with nature i.e. how it stands up to the climate and the physical quality of the site; how it interacts with people and their wear and tear. In other words, how the construction masters time. It is also about housing interacting in space, i.e. on location. Lastly, it is about how housing physically responds to changing human requirements.

Housing as physical object is analyzed through the ‘Shearing Model’, which layers the building according to the lifespan of the layer. It is layered into site, structure, skin, services, space plan and stuff, with ‘site’ being the most permanent and ‘stuff’ the most transient.

• **Housing as symbol.** This is about the dweller as agent, about the reciprocity between housing and inhabitant. It deals with housing as a physical imprint – and printer - of worldviews and values, of status, of aspirations, of daily practices, etc. This is how housing becomes home, the central node in people’s network of life. When the dwelling is destroyed and people are expelled the place and the things lost or saved subsequently emerge as true symbols of (lost) home relationships. Choice is a key concept in the context of home, because making choices makes sense, and making sense of a place is necessary for acknowledging it as home. Displaced people have been robbed of this choice.
Recovery will then be about regaining that control. It is about returning to a state of choice, rather than a place, where displaced people are able to choose how - and where - to reestablish their ‘systems of activities within a system of settings’, as Rapoport defines ‘home environment’.

- **Housing as strategy or vehicle of development.** This attribute, as the one above, rests on the familiar Turner quote about ‘what housing does’. It is about the processes activated by housing, about housing as node in the network that constitutes society.

The economic impact of housing works through backward and forward linkages. The former refers to direct employment generated by housing investment and the production of materials, tools transport, etc. Forward linkages refer to the economic activity that stems from the use of housing following its construction.

Housing’s backward linkages, i.e. their multiplier effect, is normally very high, most often more than two, primarily because of the labor intensity of housing construction. This means that ‘for every unit of currency spent directly on house construction, an additional unit of currency is added to demand in the economy’, as stated by UN Habitat. Regarding housing’s forward linkages, studies worldwide indicate that 10–25% of all housing is used for income-generating activities.

Forward and the backward linkages are combined in assisted self-help housing, a housing strategy with a strong post-war related legacy. As John Turner said 30 years ago, ‘Housing achievements consist not only of houses and other material parts of a dwelling environment, but also of the ways and means by which they are sponsored, designed, built, used and maintained’.

**WAR AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HOUSING**

‘New wars’ are different from the former ‘world wars’. Mary Kaldor has identified goals, methods of warfare, and the economy of current wars as the three chief differences. To these, I add the engagement of international actors as a fourth such difference. These characteristics carry consequences for housing, both in terms of their destruction and as a basis for their re/construction.

A) **Goals of New Wars**

These wars are not fought to ‘build nations’. They are about ‘identity politics’, where the state is relevant only in so far as it affects the identity policy. Identity politics are retroactive and emerging in part as a consequence of the loss of power, even relevance, of the state. They emerge in the world’s left-over spaces, the ‘black holes of globalization’ to use an image from Castells. Since, by and large, ethnicity and territory are overlapping issues, wars of identity specifically target housing to ensure expulsion of ‘the other’.

B) **Methods of Warfare**

Rather than ‘winning hearts and minds’, the new wars rely on ‘sowing fear and hatred’. This entails mass killings, expulsion and various forms of intimidation directed
at the civilian population, i.e. the very acts that the 'laws on war' are set to prevent. Once started, these wars are extremely difficult to end.

True to the nature of these wars, houses are targeted individually, ‘executed’ as it were. The ferocity by which ‘the dwellings of others’ are destroyed acknowledges the symbolic properties of housing.

C) The Economy of the New Wars

New wars are financially organized through international networks where enclaves within the ‘black holes of globalization’ interact with the international trade network on diamonds, timber, ivory, drugs, and the like. This is totally different from the old wars which were by and large financed without external resources. The national economic outcomes are devastating: destruction of the economic infrastructure, endemic unemployment and extreme poverty – with small networked enclaves of immense ‘clever people wealth’. It is into these war-ravaged economies that international agents are sent to provide housing.

D) The Attraction of International Response

However peaceful in intent, as a matter of economic logic, international interventions create a local economy concentrated in the major urban areas with high international presence. International agents provide food and employment opportunities. All this results in a process of war-pulled urbanization, supported by a rural push due to falling food prices. Subsiding violence is not followed by a corresponding ‘return’. People whose lifestyles have been urbanized tend to stay put in the urban areas.

In new wars dwellings become ‘identity targets’. They are ‘killed’ rather than ‘destroyed’. This selective demolition of housing in the new wars is therefore not so much about their destruction as it is about the challenge of their reconstruction. This is also totally different from the reconstruction challenges following the old international wars of the last century.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO WAR

There are two principally different sources of, and causes for, international intervention in areas of conflict: the morally grounded, yet media-dependent public urge to help others in need, and the strategically dependent governmental support provided to regions or countries of geo-political importance to the donor country. The former is primarily channeled through private non-governmental organization (NGOs). The latter is political and may take on any form from aerial bombardment to large bilateral material and financial aid packages. In real life these two modes of assistance overlap.

The International NGOs

The new wars have left the aid establishment in disarray. Out of the many causes behind the present uncertainty, two stand out: the nature of the present wars, and the privatization of aid. The former has already been commented upon. The latter refers to the ‘new policy agenda’ that emerged in the late 1980s along the lines of neo-liberalism. Civil society was a term brought to the fore, which in its most rudi-
mentary definition is held to be ‘not of government’ and ‘not of the private sector’. By definition, this leaves a pivotal role to the NGOs.

Theories exist claiming that NGOs emerge where there is a gap in services; they are an institutional response to state and/or market failure. However, Terje Tvedt has shown that the NGOs have reached their present position by acting as organizational vehicles for donor countries’ foreign aid; They became the aid channel of the neo-liberal world. This is not a homogeneous channel. They may be categorized along three dimensions:

a) Categories of Tradition
The ‘Wilsonian’ organizations are characterized by their ‘special relationship’ to their home government. This group is basically composed of US organizations.

The religious organizations emerged out of church-based charitable or missionary work. This group consists some of the biggest NGOs presently working in the field.

The ‘Dunantist’ organizations constitute a group of independent secular organizations trying to stay financially and politically independent.

b) Categories of Urgency
The categories above deal with strategies, these categories deal with tactics: how the organizations address the issues they are set to resolve. In the case of NGOs we distinguish between a relief approach and a developmental approach. Housing is by nature a long-lasting investment, i.e. an developmental object, whereas the reason for it being built in areas of war is one of urgent need, i.e. a relief object. Housing is squeezed between these two approaches.

The attempt in the 1990s to link, in conceptual and practical terms, relief and development rested on the notion of disasters being temporary set-backs on the developmental road to economic progress. The applied concepts had strong references to theories on recovery after natural disasters and traditional state wars of the WW II type. The New Wars seem to have rendered ‘developmental relief’ a term rather than a reality. However, when the chosen approach stands inappropriate to the nature of intervention, failure looms, as was documented in the UNHCR’s housing program in Rwanda.

c) Categories of Staff: Specialist versus Generalist
There has been a watershed in the NGO world since the war on the Balkans. They have now become ‘a force for transformation in global politics and economics’, disbursing US$ 12–15 billion per year according to some sources. Little is known about how the competence and capacities of the NGO staff impacts the implementation – and hence the outcomes – of projects on the ground.

Although there is a tendency in the NGO channel to specialize and professionalize, there are very few NGOs specializing in housing. Therefore most of the housing programs are carried out by cover-all NGOs. They become specialists simply by hiring short-term staff with relevant qualifications. This invariably takes place within a ‘relief framework’ which also entails short-term contracts, frequent changes in personnel, and lack of institutional memory. The more stable environments of the NGO head-
quarters are staffed by all-rounder managers and administrators. What effects this dichotomy in professional qualifications and the apparent tension and frustration this causes, has not been investigated to any length. We know nothing of its possible impact on project outcomes.

PART THREE
Methods and Tools of Analysis

FRAMING RECOVERY
Recovery denotes change that comprises ‘development-like’ activities and processes aiming at creating conditions of predictability, comprising political and institutional growth, economic development, physical reconstruction, and the (re)formation of human and social capital. Recovery thus defined rests within the endogenous growth theory, where the presence of social capital is acknowledged as decisive in terms of efficiency, governance, and in issues of location.

Recovery is distinguished from ‘development’ in basically three different ways: reflexivity, temporality, and complexity.

1) Recovery is Reflexive, Guided by the Past
Whereas ‘ordinary development’ focuses on improving an unknown future, recovery takes place among people who have ‘been there – done that’. This a fundamental difference between ‘recovery’ and (intended) ‘development’.

2) Recovery is Time Limited
Recovery is a phase of ‘development-like’ change borne out of war’s societal and material breakdown. When these no longer determine politics or policies, the recovery phase is over. However, in areas of chronic political emergencies, this phase may simply not be reached through current relief-development approaches.

3) Recovery is Extremely Complex
Recovery is characterized by embedded political bias and psychological tension following violence, personal loss and humiliation, in addition to the many-faceted challenges of the institutional and material reconstruction. At least in degree, this is different from ‘regular development’.

From this, the concept of recovery emerges similar to the term ‘re-development’.

DEVELOPING A FILTER OF ANALYSIS
Entering into the very recovery processes I am to investigate, it is crucial that I find a way of analyzing the dynamic of these processes, not only their components. For this I examine the Capacity-Vulnerability Approach developed by Anderson & Woodrow, the Sustainable Livelihood Approach currently applied by DIFID2, and what I call the Sustainable Neighborhood Approach, borrowed from research on housing in Yorkshire, UK. I argue for the choice of the latter because it structures society in four interacting capital modes, where the fifth mode, financial capital, is seen as an exoge-

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nous resource set to transform the others. The constituting capitals, the layers of my filter, are as follows:

*Human Capital* represents the skills, knowledge, and health, i.e. the ability to work.

*Environmental (natural) Capital* refers to the wide array of the natural assets, from environmental beauty and biodiversity to divisible assets used in production.

*Fixed (physical) Capital* comprises the infrastructure, buildings, plants and machinery, and other means of production required to support livelihoods.

*Social Capital* is defined by the World Bank as, ‘the institutions, relationships, and the norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions’.

This approach is chosen because it allows for an understanding of the societal dynamics through the notion of interacting capitals. Capital replenishment without interaction cannot sustain itself. Depreciation in one invariably leads to depreciation of the others. It is back to the ‘agency of housing’: what housing does, not what it is. If we rephrase this by referring to societal capitals: it is not what they are, it is how we make them interact that brings about lasting developmental change.

**RESEARCH APPROACH AND APPLIED METHODS**

*Justifying Bosnia-Herzegovina*

There are two basic reasons for choosing Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter, ‘Bosnia’ or ‘BiH’) as an arena for research. First and foremost, Bosnia’s war was ‘paradigmatic’ in that it held so many of the features found in the ‘new wars’. Secondly, Bosnia is geographically close, also in practical terms.

*Research Approach*

Investigating housing projects calls for different methods within a multidisciplinary approach. It is a matter of counting and measuring size, cost, numbers, etc. But in order to understand the motives and perceptions underpinning the actions on which these quantities rest, a qualitative approach had to be applied. Close examination of the perceptions, opinions, and experiences of the people directly and indirectly assisted is necessary in order to grasp what long-term effects, or potential, these foreign housing interventions have had, or will have on a broader societal recovery. It is not a matter of what is ‘correct’ or ‘objectively true’, it is a matter of understanding what initiates action, and what gives action meaning.

*The Case Studies*

This research is designed as a case study research. It is part evaluative, trying to find out ‘how’ housing projects do or do not render support to the overall recovery processes, with a ‘why’ extension that seeks to explain the reasons for people acting in ways that support or impede these processes.

*The Choice of Cases*

The cases reflect the central constituents of context, i.e. *time, place* and *agency*. We act differently during war than we do after war, hence the time constituent. Place is similarly important in war, particularly in the new wars since they affect different ar-
eas so differently, creating different platforms for recovery. Thirdly, whoever (agency) decides what and how things are to be done may make projects significantly different in terms of their recovery contribution.

I have chosen three cases, two in Tuzla and one in Grapska 12 km north of Doboj, in what is now Republika Srpska.

**Collecting Data**

It is well worth quoting Cato Wedel’s simple equation \( \text{data} = \text{observation} + \text{concept} \).

We record what we experience, but our senses are calibrated according to our own ‘cultural categories’, or to our own ‘habitus’. Collecting qualitative data becomes constructing data. The reflexivity required in this process of construction, acts like road signs or a rear-view mirror which guide and control the collecting of data as the researcher passes through the social landscape.

There were two types of data collected: physical data (maps, photographs, reports, statistics, etc) and interactively gained data (direct observation and participatory observation). Observation is about using all the senses to make sense of what is observed, because what is observed is interpreted from the observer’s own referential history or preconceived notions, which also implies a central validity challenge in research. Observations remain hypotheses to be confirmed or falsified by other means or sources of information.

To enter into a participatory dialogue depends on trust, which in turn depends on some sort of symmetry. Working with an interpreter makes the interpreter your alter-ego in this dialogue. The role of my assistant and interpreter was therefore crucial in achieving the required symmetry. He was unemployed, and had served in the Bosnian army during the war. It was thus possible for the displaced interviewed to relate to his position.

**PART FOUR**

**Three Cases in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

**THE WAR**

The war was the ultimate backdrop to all my data. The profound shift in people’s perceptions caused by the violence and ethnic cleansing is hard to underestimate. The nature of being Bosnian, as Bringa says, is living ‘with others’. These very ‘others’ became mortal enemies in the early 1990s, when the war ripped Yugoslavia apart. A combination of the rapidly collapsing economy and its uneven distribution, the lack of democratic outlets, and the shift in referential frames from that of cooperation to that of the WW II infested identity fear, destroyed the legitimacy of the central state institutions. Yugoslavia collapsed, accompanied by vicious ethno-religious violence.

The war in Yugoslavia, and in Bosnia in particular, allows for two basic interpretations. It was either a war of Serbian aggression, which had to be countered – or it was a war driven by ‘ancient hatred’, which made the war contagious and could, in the worst of cases, spread to other parts of Europe. The international funding for the reconstruction of Bosnia was linked to these two sets of causal explanations. They
were to guide the policies, the priorities and the operational regulations employed by
the foreign donor governments and the implementing agencies. My cases were con-
ceived within this twin, or rather double, frame of mind.

Housing in Displacement, Tuzla 1993 – 1996

Tuzla is (still) Bosnia’s third largest city, located in Central Eastern Bosnia and the
country’s major industrial hub. Its industrial legacy created a non-nationalistic politi-
cal climate resulting in the SDP, a non-nationalistic party, rising to power in Tuzla’s
first elections in 1991. In other respects, Tuzla is a typical Bosnian town with a town-
scape characterized by high-rise housing in the urban center. The building of these
large-scale projects fed a parallel process. Unregulated, often formally illegal, small-
scale private housing was constructed throughout fringe areas on plots of private
land. Many of these private houses were often left incomplete. These were the very
resources utilized by NRC\(^3\) when they initiated their housing scheme in 1993.

The war – and the displaced – come to Tuzla

The war came to Tuzla in the beginning of May 1992. By the summer, already more
than 50,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) had already sought refuge in Tuzla
proper. By the time the fighting stopped in 1995, the Mayor claimed that the Tuzla
region held one-third of the total population of the country.

The administrative and material challenges of managing the IDP influx during 1992
and early 1993 were exclusively handled by local agencies. When the UNHCR\(^4\) estab-
lished offices in Tuzla in the spring of 1993, foreigners took charge. The displaced
were by then either ’self sheltered’ in some private accommodation (c.80%) or they
were placed in ‘collective centers’, i.e. public buildings, schools, hotels, sport halls,
etc. The undignified housing conditions available to the incoming IDPs were so ap-
palling that housing came to be the key sector of external intervention.

CASE I

A SHELTER SCHEME FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA

Implemented by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) 1993-1995

In 1993 NRC proposed a program of completing the many half-finished private
houses in the area so that they could be used for temporarily sheltering IDPs. This
opportunity was not the result of any NRC-initiated capacity assessment, it was a
combination of the professional capacity and a field-based perspective of their Head
of Office in Tuzla. In no way could new housing be constructed in time for the 1993-
94 winter to shelter the steady flow of displaced people – unless what was there al-
ready could be used. This was to become NRC’s ’Tuzla Model’ where the owner of a
‘half-way’ house was given funds and technical advice to complete the building
against allowing IDPs to move into the premises for 30 months. Each IDP was al-
lowed 5\(\text{m}^2\) per person, which meant that the structure and the technical installations

\(^3\) Norwegian Refugee Council

\(^4\) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
were strained way beyond capacity. This was to carry dire social effects, between tenants and between tenants and houseowner.

The Tuzla Model was slightly changed over time, from a purely ‘contractor-built’ scheme, to an ‘assisted self-help’ one. They retained the 30-month contract period, irrespective of how it was affected by the seasonal conditions. Contracts signed in summer resulted in IDPs being evicted in mid–winter, causing strain and humiliation to the evictees, and bringing additional burdens to the local authorities. Although the war was over, very few former tenants were able to return. They were simply forced to move somewhere else.

In total, 647 houses were completed and c.13,000 IDPs were temporarily sheltered.

This projects holds a major contradiction. Housing being a long-term investment, it is the long-term owners who reap the benefit of the NRC projects, not the IDPs. In this respect, it is the house owner who is the primary beneficiary, not the displaced living within. Nevertheless, it was an extraordinarily efficient, albeit short–term, emergency housing scheme.

**Contribution Towards Local Capital Formation**

The Tuzla Model houses were in effect an extension of fixed and environmental capital already in place, i.e. houses, infrastructure, urban fabric etc.

The implementation processes did not produce noteworthy spillovers onto the social capital base. There were however, some areas where the social and human capital was affected:

a) The scheme reinforced the differences between those who received help and those who did not. This individualization of reconstruction assistance might in fact have contributed to the erosion of trust and thereby deflated the social capital on which recovery rests. This conclusion is all the more plausible considering Tuzla’s legacy of solidarity.

b) The scheme caused social strain through overcrowding. There is an apparent link between the attitude of the house owners and the tangible effects on the physical environment caused by the sheer number of displaced people living in the houses.

c) Contextual constraints did not allow the contractors to generate any human capital gains from their engagement, beyond being kept financially and organizationally afloat. Human capital gains were, however, the chief benefits drawn by the tenants, as was the case for the children who were able to return to their schools once the IDPs had moved out.

d) The capital gains achieved by the house owners will in the long run be the project’s most important recovery contribution. In the current situation, most owners are able to draw substantial earnings from the completed flats. Several others have arranged for family or relatives to move in instead.

The long-term recovery contribution, as filtered through the Sustainable Neighborhood approach, brings ambivalent results. In due course, it is to be expected that the highly efficient replenishment of the physical and environmental capitals will nurture the expansion of the other capital modes as well – over time. But it will take place in
an overall recovery context in which many of the targeted IDPs are still left without means, yet knowing fully well that it was their plight – their suffering – that initiated the program.

**CASE II**

**MIHATOVICI, A SETTLEMENT FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA**

**Implemented by the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 1994 – 1996**

When the NPA was called upon to enter the housing scene in Tuzla in mid-1993, the organization was probably the most experienced ‘housing NGO’ in Bosnia. They had provided Norwegian pre-fabricated housing, which by the time NPA moved to Tuzla had proved untenably expensive. They retained the ‘settlement model’, but did so by using local resources whenever possible. This ‘IDP village’ approach made the location a hot political issue because the municipalities in the region envisioned these settlements as permanent settlements of ‘refugees’ who were not likely to return. So far, they have been proved right. None of the settlement projects made any serious planning provisions for their post-war use. This is most evident in their highly inappropriate location, which has made most of them into misallocated social or financial investment.

Mihatovici was the biggest of these settlements, placed 12 km west of Tuzla. The Mihatovici settlement, as a project, falls into a different category when compared to my other two cases. The other two were implemented as support to private house owners, whereas Mihatovici is a public housing project in the traditional ‘provision mode’. It is designed in the garden city mode and consists of 220 flats. In January 2002, there were 1250 living there. It is large and it is remote. People live close together but ‘far away’, its uncomfortable location remaining one of its most prominent features.

Constructing Mihatovici did not seem to contribute towards the enhancement of local capacities beyond that of being a channel for disseminating purchasing power and keeping contractors afloat. In this sense, the Mihatovici experience supports the findings from the NRC case: the emergency context itself hampers any significant industrial or institutional capacity building.

A run-through of the physical properties of the settlement shows a material decay, with the weaknesses situated in its most permanent layers, first of all in its location, but also in the roof and floor slab construction, leakages and bad sound insulation. If the structural weaknesses are not tended to within a few years, Mihatovici will inevitably descend into an arena for the truly marginalized. The decay is in part due to ‘unfortunate’ planning, however much ‘it was done in war’, and is further exacerbated by extreme wear and lack of maintenance. But the degrading physical assets merely reflect the general low level of all societal assets.

**Contribution Towards Local Capital Formation**

The contribution of the Mihatovici settlement towards recovery shows conflicting tendencies, yet indicates clear tendencies of capital depletion. They affect all the capital
modes, and the registered outcomes reconfirm the interdependence of the capital modes. The impact on the various capital assets comes as follows:

1) Environmental capital has been both depleted (in total 12,000 fruit trees were cut down) and enhanced (large areas have been successfully cultivated and provide a means of livelihood for a large number of settlement families). The visual impact of the deteriorating built environment gives character to the place, and the spillover onto the other capital modes signifies poverty and marginalization. This is reinforced by the settlement’s unconnected location.

2) The recovery potential stems from the capacity of the settlement as fixed capital to replenish the other capital modes. During construction, the employment of people from Mihatovici proper contributed to a certain level of trust between the new arrivals and the old inhabitants. This process seems to have been strengthened through the sharing of public facilities built in the settlement.

However, the physical structures are deteriorating due to the technical solutions applied, and the lack of care and maintenance, which in turn is inextricably linked to the lack of social cohesion within the settlement. This, in part, is linked to physical overcrowding combined with the lack of privacy: a potential hotbed for conflicts.

3) Human capital gains are not easily detected. The residents’ health is generally bad, in part due to the high population density, and the highly inadequate water and sewerage systems.

4) The social cohesion and mutual trust is not a notable feature in the settlement. Staying in Mihatovici makes no sense to a large part of its population; and staying in a place with no meaning, makes action meaningless.

For Mihatovici to render any contributions towards the future, two issues have to be tended to in order to regenerate inter-capital cross-fertilization: different terms of tenure, and reinvestment into its physical fabric. Both are required in order to make Mihatovici a meaningful place in which to live. Otherwise, Mihatovici will hamper rather than enhance the recovery processes.

CASE III

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE VILLAGE OF GRAPSKA

Implemented by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency 1999 – 2000

The village of Grapska, located close to Doboi, is a village where there used to live 2,800 Bosniak and Serbs. The Bosniak population was violently expelled in May, 1992. The displaced Grapskanians were scattered throughout the world, although the majority ended up in nearby municipalities on the Federation side of the division line with Republika Srpska. Seven years after the expulsion, and four years after the formal closing of the war, a large number of Grapska’s Bosniaks returned to start rebuilding their village. They were given material support by SRSA (The Swedish Rescue and Services Agency), were guarded by SFOR, and financially bolstered by their own diaspora.
The support for housing reconstruction was validated by the fact that the village had agricultural fields that were large enough to sustain a major part of the returning population, although making a (meager) living from farming was new to most of them.

During displacement Grapska’s Village Board came to play an important role as a social and administrative focal point, very much in line with its pre-war role. Therefore SRSA decided to transfer most of the decision making authority regarding the reconstruction to the Village Board. The Board developed the selection criteria and made the final selection of beneficiaries as well as administered all formal approvals from the local (Serb) political.

The housing reconstruction was done on a assisted self-help basis. The SRSA provided building materials for 188 houses, with all necessary fittings sufficient to (re)build a house with a floor area reflecting the size of the returning family. For most people this meant smaller houses than before, upon which they used whatever means they had, primarily through remittances, to extend the houses to reflect the pre-war situation. About 95% of all the SRSA model houses were altered and extended at the owners’ expense. It had to do with the symbolic content of the house. It was a sign (of warning) to their Serb neighbors saying ‘we’re back, just as strong as before’ It was an attempt to re-establish some of the objective structures of their ‘habitus’.

SRSA spent about 2.8 million KM in building materials in Grapska. In addition, it is estimated that 1.5 million KM has gone into extensions and alterations, funded by the owners. Initially, just about all of these funds originated from abroad. Adding the value of their own labor, the endogenous contribution almost matched the foreign investments into Grapska’s reconstruction, including the school and the infrastructure investments.

**Contribution Towards Local Capital Formation**

No other case shows such a consistent interactive capital reformation as that registered in Grapska. It was the result of common sense on the part of the SRSA’s head of office, underpinned by Sida’s principles of support.

1) The housing contribution carried a transforming impact on the visual environment, by supporting the reconstruction of so many houses, almost one-third of the pre-war total. In addition, more than 50 private houses were under construction. All this shifted the character of Grapska from destruction to construction. However, the donors’ focus on housing neglected two other nodes in the environmental network: a) the agricultural land could have been much more intensively exploited by providing more machinery (for instance, by two more tractors rather than the two last houses); b) the water system was merely replaced, not extended into the Serbian part that relied on individual pumps for water. Reconciliation comes only through mutual benefits.
2) Housing as ‘shelter’ was not a highlighted issue. Housing as symbol was much more apparent. Hence much effort went into housing quality, particularly the interior finishing, into its appropriation as it were.

The consistent capital interaction rests on two issues, the high number of houses reconstructed, and the principle of self-help. In turn, this led to a parallel private investment flow through which many of the returning Grapskanians gained employment, and purchasing power which funded further economic activity.

3) Human capital was replenished from the housing program in three ways: a) confidence was gained by organizing their own return, and administering their own building works; b) the returned tradesmen were again able to practice their skills; and c) the physical and psychological well-being of the population had improved compared to when they were living in displacement, according to the medical doctor.

4) The Grapska community maintained a relatively high level of social capital, even during displacement. This was further enhanced by the responsibilities transferred to their elected Village Board by SRSA. By successfully undertaking the task of selecting those who get materials for a house, and are thus able to return, their authority and legitimacy within the community was reconfirmed. The selection process enhanced social capital formation, as did the re/construction strategy of self-help. As the chairman of the Village Board said, 'It would have weakened the village – or the spirit, if the houses were to have been built by contractors – while the villagers stood watching'.

The social capital within Greater Grapska has been totally eroded because of the war. There were no signs that the housing investments in the Bosniak part, seen as replenishment of fixed capital, had any rub-off effects on any of the other capital modes of Greater Grapska. Reconciliation is definitely beyond housing.

PART FIVE
Closing The Circles’
COMPARING CASES
The cases were chosen on merit of when the project was executed, where it took place, and who managed and/or implemented it. These criteria respond to characteristics of new wars, that of simultaneously being enacted at different stages in different places. The international housing response follows suit. Linking these parameters, time, place and agency, to my three attributes of housing, that of physical object, symbol and vehicle of development, we have a 9-cell matrix which show how the three cases compare. These concluding comparisons do not come out as a net sum of ‘findings’. Qualitative research do not come out that way. Their conclusions are argumentative, not additive (although arguments add to each other), much like in legal practice. The arguments have to build on the evidence uncovered, be consistent and intra-supportive, and yet able to convincingly explain possible inconsistencies.

The main contents of the 9-cells matrix

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1) **Physical Object & Time:** During the war years the emergency culture entailed a practice as if construction was exempted from laws of building physics, the way wars exempt human behaviour from normal social contracts. Initially practically no provisions were made for future alterations and alternative use.

2) **Physical Object & Place:** Evident in all three cases is the impact of location. Case I enabled IDPs to integrate, in Case II its inhabitants are socially segregated, while in Case III the high number of houses rebuilt contributed successfully to recreate a destroyed village.

3) **Physical Object and Agency:** All cases show how the extraordinary power vested in the NGO’s local Head of Office brought about different physical solutions, partly based on how the agency of the main beneficiaries were engaged.

4) **Symbol & Time:** Meaning changes over time. Things come to mean different things (for different people) as time passes. The two Tuzla cases were seen (by NRC and NPA respectively) as a dignified alternatives to living in collective centers, yet now Case I represents a successful investments for the private house owners. Case II has now become a Collective Center which it was built to replace. Grapska now carries an unequivocal signal of collective and personal return to the place of expulsion.

5) **Symbol & Place:** The meaning of the houses changes with the place. Place and house are interlocked. This is most easily shown when comparing the Grapska and The Mihatovici cases. For the Grapskanians it is about returning home, for the Miha- tovicans it is about segregation and marginalization.

6) **Symbol & Agency:** The different approaches of the NGOs brought different symbolic powers into the projects. Whereas Case III enabled the Grapska returnees to saturate their rebuilt houses with symbols, the Mihatovici settlement had the symbolic imprint of a peaceful Norwegian suburb as interpreted by the implementing agency, which once built took on a totally different meaning.

7) **Strategy & Time:** The availability of building materials is time dependent, necessarily much more difficult to obtain in the early Case I years than in the Case III. The early housing interventions were unable to play any significant role in developing a building industry in BiH because of the absence of financial and industrial infrastructures, - and the lack of international support for that sector.

8) **Strategy & Place:** The (re)developmental processes initiated or strengthened by the projects were of different orders, much of which depended on place. The Tuzla cases were primarily urban development projects with seamless integration (NRC-Case I) and spatial and social separation (NPA-Case II). The high number of houses funded by SRSA in Grapska was a strategic move so powerful that it set in motion the construction of more than 50 privately funded houses, confirming the power of place, the power of hope.

9) **Strategy & Agency:** The power vested in gifts, channeled through international NGOs, normally ignores the agency of the people assisted, displaced, destitute and in
dire need of these very gifts. Acknowledging the engagement of local agency as pre-
requisite for sustainable (re)development, we see a stark difference between the
tree cases, with the SRSA’s Case III at one end of the scale, and NRC (Case II) at
the other. NRC (Case I) sits with Case III when viewed as support to house owners,
but lies beyond Case II when viewed as long-term support to the true victims of war.

For recovery to be sustained the primary actors must secure agency in the processes
initiated by these international gifts. My three cases show different levels of such par-
ticipation – and different long-term effects because of it.

Re-Approaching Theory and Practice of Housing Re/Construction

REVISITING THEORY
Based on the findings presented above and filtered through the Sustainable Neigh-
borhood approach theoretical conclusions may be drawn. These are theories of post-
war housing, i.e. theories on the role of housing in current post-war contexts, and
theories in post-war housing, i.e. theories on how to go about implementing post-war
housing in today’s settings. My research deal with both both. I present my small con-
tribution structured as in my theoretical introduction, according to housing’s chief
attributes, wars, and international response to conflicts. Theories in housing will pri-
marily follow as implications for policy and practice.

Housing as Physical Object
What I found in all of my cases, but primarily in my wartime cases, was a tendency
to neglect common peacetime practices of good workmanship – even basic laws of
physics. Physical construction is contextualized beyond anticipation. It is exposed in
three ways:
• The “But-it-was-war” syndrome focuses solely on timely requirements and neglect
the – inevitable – physical deterioration, and the importance of location.
• Very high density of people – inevitably – leads to physical, social and psychologi-
cal deterioration of and in the physical environment.
• Because implementing bodies (contractors or managing NGOs) do not stand ac-
countable towards the beneficiaries, the quality of workmanship tend to suffer.

Housing as Symbol
My research confirms that home is a matter of choice, or discovery. This means that
‘return’ may in fact not be the most ‘durable solution’ – for those who chose other-
wise. The choice seems to rest on the perceived ‘geographical capital’ of the place,
not on housing condition alone.

The dwelling or the house is a symbol in the conflict; houses are not destroyed, they
are killed. Therefore housing when rebuilt stands as a symbol of ‘fighting back’, not
symbols of reconciliation.
**Housing as Strategy**

Housing re/constructions chief effect is to distribute purchasing power. The efficiency of this distribution is embedded in the chosen housing approach. There seems to be a general negligence on the recovery powers embedded in the high multiplier effects carried by housing construction, although their effects were clearly observed. Much is lost because of (tax-free) imports.

The recovery powers vested in the self-help approach has been confirmed, whereas housing as ‘objects of reconciliation’ were not. The Commons were the arena for ethno-religious communal co-operation.

**Housing and New Wars**

Recognizing the power of place and the personal and intimate character of the dwelling, looting and eventually destroying it, is to administer the ultimate humiliation and punishment to the residents and owners. In present-day identity wars, the killing and destruction is individualized, partly to punish, and partly to cleanse and secure territorial supremacy. This continues long after the war has formally ended. Using housing re/construction to strengthen the process of recovery cannot be done without political will and hence military support. Peace cannot be built by houses.

**The International Housing Response**

My work confirms that housing is conceived as ‘shelter’ or ‘protection’, causing a conceptual, but also practical discrepancy between ends (temporary and urgent) and means (permanent and long time in implementing). ‘Tents in concrete’ as it were.

My research has come to highlight the pivotal role of the implementing agent, the head of office of the NGO’s local office. Their capacity to grasp opportunities in an extremely volatile and insecure context is crucial in projects being efficient or not. It will all depend on his ‘professional intuition’. The headquarters staffed by administrative personnel are very much sidelined. The independent role of the field questions the very nature of the “NGO-thing”.

**REVISITING THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND APPLIED METHODS**

The Sustainable Neighborhood Approach has been extraordinarily important in understanding the dynamics played out in the communities I investigated. My observations have reconfirmed the importance of the linkages between its four societal capitals (fixed, environmental, human and social capitals). However, in filtering my findings I have found that housing projects which directly enhanced or extended the environmental capital were those in which human and social capital was replenished the most. This would entail that where the housing project makes up part of a ‘place’ as perceived by the primary actors, the immediate impact of the housing project on people’s physical and social well-being seems all the stronger. It is the meaning attributed to the houses and the location that determines how well they replenish or sustain the other capital modes. Since housing may be defined as both fixed and environmental capital, and since meaning is invariably infused in a similar way into both of them, (which is not the case with the other two capital modes, in fact they are...
source of these projections), the recovery interaction would better understood if enacted within a three-node field: fixed (physical and environ-mental), human and social capitals.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE**

In forging a practical approach to housing re/construction in war affected areas there are three basic premises: 1) housing with its symbolic and strategic capacities is about permanent physical structure that will outlast the contingent needs that called for its urgent re/construction; 2) recovery is an indigenous endeavor; an act of reflexive development on the part of the affected society; and 3) internationally funded housing will always be exogenous assistance, which at best will support local agency. In combining the premises, the first one touches upon issues pertaining to professional planning and construction, the second on tactical issues handled by the implementing agency primarily in the field, and the third on policies and strategies set by donors and NGO headquarters.

**The Object**

Because housing construction is such a prevalent activity there is always bound to be building resources available beyond what the formal structures can provide.

- *Use these, and use the field based opportunities to improvise!*

There is an astonishing lack of building management routines within the NGOs.

- *Develop organization wide quality assurance regimes, and through inter-agency institutions bring forth a uniform cost reporting regime so that costs may be compared!*

My cases all reveal the pivotal role of the field office and the manager-in-charge.

- *Managing the tactical level requires capacities to seize opportunities and avoid risks not detectable by HQ or donor. This requires people with ‘professional intuition’!*  

In the light of the endless settings where home environments and housing are to be (re)created or new ones established there are principles and approaches needed rather than case-bound empirical references. They come out like this:

- *If there is no local and institutionalized policy on housing, housing re/construction should follow in the footsteps of what was there before, bar the issue of location.*
- *Under emergency conditions or under conditions perceived as urgent, construction should strive for simple, basic solutions in line with what local artisans do well.*
- *There is no such thing as an ‘emergency house’ (or tent of concrete): ‘emergency shelter’, yes, but not ‘house’. Houses are permanent structures capable of responding to changing needs over time, and are in need of upkeep.*
- *Houses normally last lifetimes. The single most important issue on post-war housing is location, i.e. where new housing is being built, or destroyed ones reconstructed. This issue is fundamental to recovery.*
The Tactical Approach

Housing is about agency. My cases tell me that for displaced people, housing, perhaps more than any other issue, is saturated with symbolic powers. Meaning is the fundamental basis for action. That is why instilled meaning will determine the potential recovery powers embedded in housing.

- There seems to be no better way of achieving this than through aided self-help.
- Concentrate investments to areas of potentially high geographical capital, to places that can sustain themselves through a sufficiently strong material and social momentum that may also be recognized by others.
- Housing is too personal a symbol to enhance reconciliation between former antagonists. To aim for that, provide investment funds for communal utility functions!

THE STRATEGY

In identity wars dwellings are looted and destroyed in recognition of their symbolic character – their identity. Houses are being desecrated and killed. These realities make up the ‘field’ for any war – and for any ‘post-war’ housing intervention.

Recovery comprises processes of reflexive development. Any housing intervention must therefore be organized in ways that engage the agency of the people for whom housing is being funded to ascertain the necessary spillover from housing investments onto other societal capitals, a necessary prerequisite for sustained (re)development. This implies:

- The practice of housing as free gifts (to the lucky few) must be altered.
- Some sort of housing policy guidelines will have to be developed in order to frame the housing reconstruction, and allow for long-term strategic choices to be made. International assistance must be rendered for these purposes.

In practice the NGO ‘channel’ works more like a ‘string’ with two semi-independent units at either end. The field taking on tactical and operational, and at times strategic challenges, and HQ active in lobbying for funding. The following could be done to widen the string into a channel to enhance the outcomes:

- The NGO HQ forges a strategic partnership with an established housing co-op.
- Provide incentives for expatriate staff to stay on in the field.
- Cleanse the channel for empty words, NGO speak and selected truths.
- State donors should delegate their strategic decisions to diplomatic stations in the field.

THE DONOR

Within the ‘Wilsonian’ tradition, and in particular in Scandinavia where governments fund most of the emergency activities of the NGOs in full, governments have a strong impact on strategies of assistance.

- Housing support should be provided in a principled way, not by chance as is the case today. Societal recovery is a collective effort and support should enhance a sense of fairness among the people who have lost their property.
• Support programs should be established to assist physical planning institutions in furnishing planning guidance on long-term housing investments.
• Housing re/construction should be carried out in ways that maximize its high multiplier potential. This means: Instigate programs for the production of building materials.
• Housing re/construction should be conceived as a community affair rather than a series of individual housing projects. This would entail the funding of community-wide livelihood projects.

The last two issues are for governments only
• Government should refrain from immediately returning refugees from countries ravaged by war because of their important role in providing support, through remittances, to their relatives and to the needy in their home country.
• In post-war reconstruction settings the presence of international military forces may be necessary in creating the level of security required for housing re/-construction to be carried through.

• When in doubt, stick to tents, or at least stick to genuinely temporary arrangements until housing can be provided within a local setting, reflecting its potential powers.

This thesis ends with a series of proposals for possible further research.
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PART ONE
THE RESEARCH CHALLENGE
1 THE PREAMBLE

1.1 INTRODUCTION
This work is about the construction and reconstruction of housing in and after violent conflict. It is about housing’s possible contribution in the recovery processes. To that end, I will investigate how the international assistance to housing reconstruction may have affected the recovery processes after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Post-war reconstruction is a mess. In material terms this is obvious. But it is the fall-out from war’s annihilation of the social contracts, the contracts that constitute the very nature of society, that makes reconstruction such a complex challenge. Reconstructing houses is a simple task in comparison. And yet houses, more than any other physical construction, are manifest parts of the societal web. As homes they are what some writers denote “an extension of the body”\(^1\) or “symbol of the self” (Cooper 1974), and thus the embodiment of the society we are part of. Our dwellings constitute part of life’s ‘objective structures’ in the Bourdieuian sense (Bourdieu 1977), or part of our identity (Korosec-Serfati 1985, Porteous & Smith 2001) – which becomes so horribly manifest in war. This makes rebuilding houses into a process much wider than the mere physical. When the destruction of houses has such a devastating impact, does housing re/construction hold the opposite potential? Does it help reestablish the societal web torn by war and thus contribute towards the social and psychological recovery of society? Or is that beyond the capacity of housing? Since housing is also the largest private investment sector of most societies (Habitat-ILO 1997), its destruction represents a national economic disaster, and housing reconstruction, on the face of it, a significant contributor towards economic recovery.

This investigation into the power of housing sets out on the shoulders of other researchers who have dealt with similar issues (Haas et. al. 1977, Davis 1978, 1981, 1995, Barakat 1994, Zetter 1995, 1999, Ellis 1996, CPCC 1998, Elkahlout 2001). Compared to housing’s large share in international post-war assistance, there are surprisingly few scholarly investigations into this field. Even the claim that housing’s capacity to impact social, psychological and economic recovery – even soothing conflict itself - seem to rest in part on inferences rather than on confirmed research findings. The most recent research shows failures to confirm this assumption – and validates reasons why it did not. Housing’s central role is thus derived at, rather than confirmed through research. Others confirm this linkage either from reconstruction after natural disasters or from reconstruction after national or intra-national wars in political and economic contexts very different from the present day era of ‘post national wars’, as Ulrich Beck calls them (2003).

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\(^1\) From HFH’s Web Site (http://www.habitat.org/hw/dec-jan02/feature_4.html). HFH (Habitat for Humanity) is one of the very few NGOs that specialize in housing construction and that have built more than 100,000 housing units throughout the world (Fuller 2000).
This change in political and economic context has changed the nature of war, how it is fought, how it is institutionalized and financed, and why current wars are fought. These post-national wars have made external actors, be they state or private, into players in these new theatres of war. Regarding housing reconstruction, this is to a significant degree taken on by the growing number of international non-governmental organizations, the international NGOs.

Current wars are complex conflicts in an even more complex political context that emerge from a globalized world. They come out as bandit- and identity driven internal wars aimed at and sustained by the control of resources and trans-border trade. There is not much left of the inter-nation Clausewitzian wars waged as a "continuation of politics\(^2\) by other means". They are ethnic, not necessarily by origin, but definitely by operation. They are not the "9th of April 1940 – 8th of May 1945" type of wars. They develop gradually, are activated intermittently, and taper off often without any one party being decisively victorious. This may be the result of external political and sometimes military intervention; at least that is what some researchers claim (Gurr & Marshall 2003). These are the "new wars", the "spectacle wars", in the lingo of Mary Kaldor (1999, 2002). They are what the practitioners label "complex political emergencies", and Mark Duffield has relabeled 'emerging political complexes' (Duffield 2000; 74).

These fields of emergency warrant international assistance. This rising international engagement, itself a constituent of the new wars, is partly due to the demise of the bi-polar world, and partly due to the weakening of the nation state. This has opened up the field to a growing number of private organizations, the so-called ‘NGOs’,\(^3\) and their conscientious interaction with the media, to call attention to the plight of the true victims of war: the civilian non-combatants\(^4\) (Rieff 2002). The latter are terrorized, maimed, and if not killed, forced to flee – or participate. Their homes are destroyed, or taken over by others. They become internally displaced within their own countries (IDPs), or, when crossing an international border, ‘refugees’. There are an estimated 40 million uprooted people in the world, the vast majority of them displaced by acts of war\(^5\).

\(^2\) A.J.P. Taylor’s translation is ‘continuation of policy – by other means’ (Taylor 1971). Noel Malcolm refers to Howard and Paret’s translation where the famous dictum is presented thus: “war is a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means” (cf. Magas & Zanic 2001; xxiii).

\(^3\) Non-Governmental Organization. INGO would be the proper acronym, as they in effect are International Non-Governmental Organization, i.e. Northern-based NGOs acting internationally. However, since other writers reserve the ‘I’ for Transnational Northern NGOs, I will retain the traditional NGO term. I do so also because of the term’s general usage (most writers use the NGO term directly), and because many of the INGOs are also NGOs in the sense that they also act domestically. In this thesis, however, the term NGO does not apply to local NGOs, only to those engaged in international activities.

\(^4\) According to Dan Smith (2003), 75% of new war casualties are civilians. For years now there has been what amounts to an ‘urban tale’ pertaining to civilian casualties in war: "During WW I 10% of the casualties were civilians, now 90% are civilians". Whereas the WW I figures are correct, there is no evidence to back the latter.

The plight of the civilians in these violent emergencies, and in particular the displaced, has triggered a shift in international aid. Short-term, immediate impact relief has taken a growing share of ODA (Official Development Assistance) at the expense of the long-term development aid.

**Figure 1.1.1 Humanitarian aid as a share of total ODA constant (2000) prices ($US millions)**

**Figure 1.1.2 Total humanitarian aid from DAC donors, constant (2000) prices $US millions.**

The abrupt increase in 1991 was due to the crisis in Iraq and the Balkans – but also the fact the DAC countries started to include the domestic cost incurred by refugee influx (caused by the Yugoslavian crisis). In 2001 32.5% of DAC’s humanitarian aid was spent domestically. Source: Development Initiatives (2003) Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003.

The often desperate lack of housing due to forced displacement and destruction directs much of the growing emergency aid and international media born attention onto housing re/construction. This makes housing part of the immediate, short-term relief aid regime, in spite of its physical longevity, its investment nature and its permanent qualities as ‘nests for human life’. By neglecting these constituting properties, housing becomes victim of perceived short-term benefits.

Here lies an apparent contradiction that merits clarification: long-term means are used to solve short-term needs. Are the short-term needs governing the way we conceive and implement permanent housing? Are we building tents in concrete?
This is where this research sets out. It challenges the blanket assumption that there is an imminent causation between housing reconstruction and development. Given the theoretically based proposition that there is a significant link, what is needed is to uncover the conditions required for it to materialize. I will therefore investigate the field, the tactics applied and the implementation. Not only what is done so much as how and why it is done. This work rests on John Turner's claim that what matters is not so much what housing “is”, but what housing “does”. From this follows that a social science approach is required along with examining and explaining the physical and architectural qualities and consequences of international housing interventions.

Ideally, this should not be such a great leap for an architect, placed as s/he is between the technical and the social sciences. Architecture has not developed a theoretical platform of its own. Most of it is borrowed and translated from other disciplines into normative theories - often to the level of ideology, according to Støa (1996), “fashion”, claims Steward Brand (1994). Their research approach is therefore inherently vague (Lund 2001, Mo 2003) when compared to the natural sciences or the traditional social sciences.

1.1.1 The Duality of housing

Housing as a pure physical entity is an abstraction. It only exists because someone intended it to be built. Building it takes place under conditions defined by place and time. Acting within a certain context is what gives that action importance, gives it meaning. This is all the more so since the physical nature of housing, being built or being lived in, extends into the future, beyond our own life time. This very process establishes a certain relationship between man and house (Støa 1996, Sartre 2001; 457-532). As agency we have to deal with housing in an ‘irreversible time’ perspective, i.e. strategically, according to Giddens (1984). This alone will shape the relationship between man and dwelling. Housing exists as a physical object because it is a meaningful object – and visa versa. Even for those only professionally involved, a completed building is a manifestation of work done, and will forever be part of the participants, and thus shape future action. My own experience tells me so.

This leaves the house, or any building, in a duality between the physical and the symbolic. The physical adheres to the laws of nature, while the symbolic links up to what is meaningful, emotionally or rationally, for the people involved. The ultimate benefit will be achieved when these two aspects support each other. Not only does this represent the ultimate challenge to any planner-architect, it also represents the criterion of excellence for any building.

1.1.2 Housing as vehicles of recovery

Houses are to be lived in, that is their ‘function’. In fact, houses are for homes: for generations, for life – or in cases where houses are provided for displaced people, for an interim period, “until they go back home”. But a house is still, however temporary, a “still point” of life. There is this very special relationship between housing
The Research Challenge and its people, born from meaning projected into matter. This is what makes housing reconstruction seem such a potent vehicle for recovery.

The other reason why housing interventions are presumed important for recovery is the financial weight and labor intensity of housing construction. It contributes significantly to any country’s GDP, by 2–8%, according to Habitat-ILO (1997). And it is generally low-tech. Both of these characteristics support the assumption that housing could be a key start-up sector in war-ravaged economies.

This is further supported by the fact that a significant portion of the emergency assistance rendered by donor nations to countries ravaged by war is in support of permanent housing re/construction. In the late 1990s about 20% of all aid to Bosnia was for housing re/construction. Even in Rwanda, where housing destruction was hardly noted in the press, the UN administered 100,000 housing repair and construction cases in the latter half of the 1990s (UNHCR 2000).

For these assumptions to materialize depends on the implementation process. When things turn out as they do, they are not merely the result of prior planning decisions and a straight follow-through on the part of the implementer (Vedung 2000). The forces acting upon the situation will determine tactical and operational choices. From these will come outputs that are the results of the way the context is perceived by the people making these decisions. There are risks and opportunities available in all situations of uncertainty. Project failure is most often the result of not contextualizing the tactics in project planning and implementation (Samset 1998). Contextualization is therefore the very essence of working in the field under extreme uncertainty – as in a war-affected society.

Most of the direct funding for emergency aid including housing reconstruction to war affected regions comes from the North, from the 30 member states of the OECD. Not only do mostly Western donor countries provide the funding for these activities, they are also the ones to manage its implementation. Since the Biafra conflict in the 1960s, there has been a steady growth in numbers of international relief and development organizations (NGOs) that have been entrusted with the responsibilities of executing the work in the field. By being field-oriented and thus able to report from crisis areas, their appraisals have become influential in donor policies and strategies of assistance. Anyone reporting back after having experienced the plight of the displaced, calls for the provision of shelter. The plastic sheeting, various ‘housing kits’ and other short-term rickety constructions that emerge as relief provisions are not what my research is about. My work is about permanent housing, housing meant to last beyond the emergency phase.

Beyond the financial inputs, the outcome of an international housing intervention depends on three contributing elements. Firstly, the validity of the intervention theory, or the assumed causation between a specific intervention and the resultant change; re. the popular assumption that rebuilding houses directly or indirectly in-

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6 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
duces peaceful behavior between former adversaries. The second element is the nature of the setting, in our case the theatre of war; the way it is conducted, the structure of the actions, the nature of the violence, the part played by external actors, etc. Framing the project within such a context will guide its implementation. The third element is the ability, knowledge and commitment of the intervention instigators and implementers – international donors and NGOs in carrying out the intervention.

This means, in theory, that in any international intervention it is the donor’s intervention theories, their assumptions, that forge the strategies, make the choice of weapons, as it were. When, say, a housing program has been decided upon, it is normally left to some NGO as the implementing agent to develop suitable tactics and undertake the practical realization. For this the NGO will have to rely on its field staff’s professional competence and perception of the situation to ensure that projects are carried through according to the donor’s set goals. In contexts as uncertain and as complex as those of present-day wars, it would seem improbable that such a straight structure would prevail. This is also part of the challenge of this work: to examine how projects on housing - within a war-torn context - are born, set up, and carried through, and how decisions in this multi-staged process affect the long-term outcomes.

1.2 FRAMING THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The arguments for entering this field of research was submitted in the previous section. It is worth adding that as I was completing this work, I was given some new ‘facts from the field’ to further support the relevance. I was informed from Bosnia that out of the 116,000 internationally funded houses physically identified by February 2003, 8,000 were completely abandoned. One would imagine that the donors providing millions of their own public funds, as well as the country in question, plunged into poverty by a devastating war, would have made sure that the funds available were spent to enhance recovery. But, in the case of housing, something like $US 75 million have been made into symbols of waste. Now why is that?

The preceding chapter ended by focusing on the overall implementation, what guides the international actors working with housing in areas of conflict. It is their theories or perceived ‘truths’, professional competence and mode of interaction with the people they are to serve that guide the action. Executing internationally funded housing re/construction in areas affected by war depends, in other words, on understanding 1) the nature of housing, 2) the context with its embedded risks and opportunities, and 3) the management of the building operations.

This leads on to a set of propositions:

7 Confirmed by the Housing Verification Mission of the Office of the High Commissioner in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), February 2003. The number of empty houses is expected to rise as the counting continues. Perhaps as many as 160,000 houses have been built as part of the international housing reconstruction efforts in BiH. There are other claims for higher numbers, but no one knows for sure.

8 Based on IMG’s figure of KM 18,000 per housing unit (IMG 1999).
THE RESEARCH CHALLENGE

- WHAT
  
  *Housing* encompassing a range of reciprocal psychological, social, economic and technology bounded attributes. Together, they hold the potential of creating social and economic dynamics conducive of recovery.

- THE CONTEXT
  
  *War* in a ‘post-nation’ world where wars are waged just as much out of private gain as for building nations; where peace is just as much the outcome of international intervention as from conflicts being resolved by its antagonists, all of it taking place under the duress of economic hardships and diluted social cohesion.

- THE IMPLEMENTER
  
  International implementing agencies acting within the professional field of housing and housing construction, a field where there seemingly exists little institutional capacity beyond what, at best, is brought in by short-term field staff.

From this I am now able to state the main research question:

**How do internationally funded housing projects implemented in war-ravaged areas affect the recovery processes of the societies assisted? I will use Bosnia-Herzegovina as my arena of investigation.**

The answer is sought through posing three sub-questions:

The physical

a) *How does housing perform as physical objects?* How are houses located, designed and constructed to accommodate immediate objectives and inevitable change, be it caused by expanding internal needs and or new external requirements? Who made what decisions and why?

The social - internal

b) *How has the housing project extended the human and social capacities of the people directly involved?* How have they participated in and how have they committed themselves to the planning and execution and the subsequent management of the project? To what effect and why?

The social & socio-economic - external

c) *How has the housing project interacted with the context?* How has the project, its planning, implementation and its prime beneficiaries interacted with the host community, local markets and political institutions? To what effect and why?

The recovery processes are the key parameters of my investigation. Within the realm of housing these are conceived to depend on the physical setting, present performance and future adaptability of the buildings themselves (sub-question a), the strength of local agency, i.e. the social and human capacity of the people affected (sub-question b), and on how the project as a long-term social and economic investment has impacted the local economy and local institutions (sub-question c).

Whatever else is required to ensure a successful recovery is beyond the capacity of externally funded housing. But then, how is recovery to be defined, particularly in
reference to ‘development’ and other terms used in the post-war reconstruction context?

Recovery is a process or a series of interacting processes where people, or societies, having had their normal societal development processes broken or perverted, regain their capacities to function on their own. It is a healing process that might be self-ordained or made dependent on support from others, to borrow from the field of medicine which also uses the term in a similar manner. It is limited in time and affects all of society’s constituent capitals, although the cause of the breakdown may be related to specific ones. The recovery process is therefore not limited to merely social or material, economic or political, it encompasses the whole body of society, and depends, as will be shown below, on how the various elements, or capitals, interact in these processes.

In the literature, ‘reconstruction’ is often used for these processes, but I see the recovery processes as wider and overarch ing societal and material processes following war or disaster, i.e. both the material and institutional reconstruction – and the subsequent spill-over processes following these initial activities. This brings the term “recovery” to the level of its sibling, “development”.

Recovery is related to, but not the same as, ‘development’, “this shapeless amoeba-like word [which] cannot express anything because the outlines are blurred”, as Sachs describes it (Sachs 1992; 6). In her recent book, Joanna Macrae argues that, as has Terje Tvedt done before, applying a long-term developmental approach to war ravaged societies is impossible where no state or other legitimate institutions are functioning. And these are in among the current wars’ very targets according to Tvedt (1996), Macrae (2001), Duffield (2002) and others. This comes as a response to what was the reigning conceptual model during the 1990s: ‘developmental relief’ (IDS bulletin 1994), a concept framed within the continuum model, indicating a temporal string of stages from the first emergency stage through intermittent reconstruction stages on to the final development stage. This linear time model draws on experiences from natural disasters or traditional inter-state war where reconstruction could be organized without the vulnerable political complexity of present-day intra-state wars.

By definition, recovery comprises ‘development-like’ activities and processes that take place after war, or in cases during war, when action is aimed at enhancing the post-conflict state. This is irrespective of whether institutions are functioning or not. Recovery is distinguished from ‘development’ in basically three different ways:

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9 Cowen & Shenton (cf. Nustad 2003) have tried to reshape the amoeba by defining development as either ‘imminent’ or ‘intentional’. Imminent development is what takes place as a matter of course over time, whereas intentional development is an intervention into a certain situation made in pursuit of intended results.

10 Kates & Pijawka define four stages of recovery: 1. emergency response; 2. restoration of the restorable; 3) reconstruction of the destroyed for functional replacement; 4. reconstruction for commemoration, betterment and development, each phase lasting 100 times longer than the preceding one (Kates & Pijawka 1977).
• **Recovery is time limited.** It is a phase of development where the activities are borne out of the consequences of war’s societal and material breakdown. When these no longer determine politics or policies, the recovery phase is over. This may be long after the material or purely economic setbacks have been surmounted.\(^{11}\) The constituting activities will hence change with time. So too will appropriate interventions, but not necessarily in a linear fashion as the consequences of conflict are spatially and temporally dependent. Timeliness will be crucial. Yet the interventions in themselves will change the context and thus affect what is appropriate and timely.

• **Recovery is reflexive, guided by the past.** Whereas ordinary development focuses on an unknown future, recovery takes place among people who have ‘been there - done that’. Recovery will be directed, guided or influenced by pre-war/pre-disaster perceptions – either to recreate, or make new. International assistance normally holds no formal political mandate to make choices for future change, therefore assistance tends to be biased in favor of restoring the past – as perceived (or intentionally interpreted). The informed references held by the people directly affected by the conflict represent a strategic platform for participation not present in ordinary development assistance.

• **Recovery is extremely complex.** It is characterized by embedded political bias and psychological tension following violence, personal loss and humiliation, in addition to the many-faceted challenges of the institutional and material reconstruction (Barakat 1994, Zetter 2001). The complexities are all the more apparent in a society at war with itself. Interventions must in some way reflect and address these complexities. Borrowing tactics from non-violent conflict, planning in these circumstances would subscribe to small projects addressing practical improvements where few value-based decisions are required (Sager 1994).

To reiterate: these processes interact. Any reconstruction project is either shaped by, or has its outcomes shaped by them. The complexity of the situation is time dependent but also dependent on how the post-war intervention is perceived in respect to the pre-war conditions or vice versa.

Building permanent housing is a physical intervention contributing to the community’s fixed capital base. But it is much more than that. Its very existence and physical constitution is inextricably linked to human choices in pursuit of some defined or ideal goal (Støa 1996, Rapoport 1969). What houses are capable of doing beyond providing physical shelter, may be exemplified by the following: if houses are planned and built by local people, the fixed capital provision also enhances human capital by way of enabling people to work, to maintain and perhaps improve their skills. If the project in question is located in response to environmental requirements or efficient resource husbandry and without depleting visual or biological properties, the project positively links up to and in effect replenishes the environmental assets of the area. If the permanent housing projects are planned and

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\(^{11}\) In Norway, the recovery phase following WW II was officially over by 1960 (Danche 1986). By then, Norway’s economy was way beyond the pre-war level. The 1939 figures were already surpassed by 1948, according to Maddison (1982).
implemented in response to needs and priorities set by people or legitimate authorities, and the projects are perceived by most of the local population as transparent without kick-backs or hidden agendas, then the physical projects have supported social capital (re)formation of the affected society. This is but a simple example of how the concept of recovery is operationalized through a societal capital approach. I will use this approach, what I call a ‘capital filter’, in assessing the recovery gains and recovery potential in the housing projects I examine.

The research challenge is hence focusing on how international housing projects affect the (re)formation of societal capital, and in determining the flow from their interaction. If the intervention has contributed towards capital formation in all modes of capital in a manner that provides what the affected people consider to be long-term benefits, then the intervention has contributed positively to the recovery of the communities in question.

This is an analytical approach that seriously simplifies the complexities of society, but which is required in order to make investigations into isolated interventions – and in trying to understand their output and outcomes. Its almost mechanistic nature requires an alert observation as to what segment of society is empowered by the interventions. During my investigations the people concerned were never addressed about this capital model, only on what seemed relevant and important in order to understand the ever-changing context and the reasons behind decisions made and actions taken: first the ‘what’, then the ‘how’ – and so the ‘why’ (Kvale 1996).

This ‘capital approach’ rests on the writings of Anderson and Woodrow (1989), Institute of Development Studies’ work for DIFID (2001-ongoing), and housing studies done by the Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University & York Research Partnership (Stafford et al. 2001). Their writing gives rise to a ‘filter’ through which the response to the research questions will be analyzed. This will be further clarified in a later chapter.
Figure 1.2.1 A conceptual sketch showing how housing as material (object) is shaped through meaning (symbol) by way of strategy within a contextual flow. The outcome is being analyzed by means of a four-split target, or filter, comprising four societal capitals.

Cf. Figure 8.2.3, page 302
PART TWO
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE
2 HOUSING

2.1 HOUSING AS A SOCIO-MATERIAL CONCEPT

2.1.1. APPROACHING HOUSING RE/CONSTRUCTION THROUGH THEORY AND PRACTICE

During the first year of WW II, while the Nazis were victoriously advancing on all fronts, journals and pamphlets started to appear in the UK on the ‘Post War Questions’. In “Reconstruction of Bombed Buildings” from 1941, the author looked for lessons learnt, and presented what he considered two ‘outstanding examples’: the Great Fire of London in 1666 and the reconstruction of French and Belgian cities after WW I (Townroe 1941). Townroe’s pamphlet highlights two pertinent issues regarding reconstruction of housing after war: context and practice.

The early planning of post WW II reconstruction was part of a professional and public discourse on an anticipated post-war state, but at the same time creating that very anticipation. In most armed conflicts today, there is no one opening up that kind of discourse, let alone visioning a post-war state. The wars are different. They are mostly internal, protracted and in poor countries, or in countries impoverished by war. It is also worth noting that these early British WWW II initiatives came from UK nationals. In current wars no similar role is played by the nationals. That is the very nature of current wars. Today, due to the collapse of the domestic institutions, most post-war visioning, accompanied by concrete reconstruction activities, is executed by foreigners, by foreign agencies and humanitarian organizations – under the watchful eye of external governments.

The second issue raised is on the weight of practice. Townroe had looked back at the reconstruction of London almost three centuries earlier, analyzed what was done, compared it to what the French did a mere generation earlier and presented his conclusions in a set of recommendations – just the way most research and literature on post-war reconstruction do today. It is mostly a matter of choosing valid cases. Post-war reconstruction is an urgent endeavor, involving people often unprepared and personally affected by the violence. This sharpens the focus on practice, on issues of implementation and management. Theory in this field, however, is often normative, focusing on outcomes, similar to what architectural theory is held to do (Lund 2001). As the nature of conflicts change with developments in geopolitics, technology, and economic development, and modulated by local idiosyncra-

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1 In 1941 these included "Castles in the street" by E. Mannin, "The post-war reconstruction of Liverpool" by A.E. Shennan and "Reconstruction of bombed buildings" by B.S. Townroe. In 1942 came "Post-war homes" by H.V. Lanchester, and somewhat later the Labour Party issued "Your home planned by Labour". During WW I the Labour Party also published pamphlets on housing. "A million homes after the war" was issued as early as 1917. Re the LSE library http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/pamphlets/SocialPolicy/socialpolicy_pamphlets/housing.htm

2 The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) together with the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) of the University of York, UK, held a workshop on Post-War Reconstruction in Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1999. The feedback from the participants concentrated on the fact that this was the first time since the internal fighting began that the participants allowed themselves to systematically imagine an after-war state.
Theoretical Foundations and Current Practice

The nature of recovery, be it post-war or post-natural disaster, restricts comparative theoretical applicability. Theory is logically argued propositions backed by empirical evidence, made within a mutually held paradigm. It is a way of understanding phenomena and their interrelationship. It is commonly accepted that architectural theory is normative, bordering on ideology (Lund 2001, Støa 1996), which, as do ideologies and fashion, change with the ‘vibes of the times’ (Brand 1994; 54). However, Preston contends that this is also the case with development theory, highly relevant in a post-war recovery discourse. Political change changes intervention modes and funding policies, ‘inspiring’ or requiring a change in theory, either to legitimize the changes, or as a result of new experiences or new interpretations. This must be so. Theory is ideally informed by practice just as much as the other way around. (Preston 1996). Our understanding of what is observed is guided by our theories, our observations are ‘theory-laden’, as Sayer would say (Sayer 1992; 73). The set of theories we apply in our quest for understanding, is discreetly chosen according to our world view, as seen from our ontological observation post.

It is also necessary to emphasize the over-arching and consistent experiences, also raised in Townroe’s pamphlet. Take housing, for instance. Houses, places where people live, have always been tactical targets in war. The advent of aerial bombing allowed for their mass annihilation (Lindqvist 2000, Glover 2001). Firebombing of Japan’s major urban centers during WW II destroyed 40% of their housing, some 3.1 million homes, made 15 million homeless, and killed about 1 million people, mostly civilians (Weber 1997). Housing was the chief target in the recent war in former Yugoslavia, where some 35% of Bosnia’s housing was damaged or destroyed (IMG 1999). Aside from the horrible killings in Rwanda in 1994, houses were destroyed to such an extent as to leave almost half million families without a place to stay (UNHCR 2000).

This was because housing holds such a fundamental place in the lives and livelihoods of man. Housing constitutes part of the very structure that is society (Oliver 1969, 1977, 2003, Danto 1990). Consequently the terms and concepts associated with housing are broad, and all-encompassing. The same term may mean different things for different people in different circumstances, much the same way as ‘culture’, a central feature of human life, has come to mean so much. It is therefore necessary to define the terms – before entering the world of housing.

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4 In the field of current post-war reconstruction, however, it seems that practice is almost exclusively being informed by practice.
2.1.2 HOUSING: A CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

Housing is a term in an enigmatic family of words like ‘shelter’, ‘dwelling’, ‘house’, ‘habitation’, ‘home’, ‘residence’, ‘building’, ‘abode’, ‘domicile’, etc. It is necessary to define them relative to each other and in absolute terms; particularly for those of us not having English as our mother tongue. Since these terms carry different meanings; their use might lead to different actions.\(^5\) An etymological clarification is a way of defining these vague terms. This I shall do in the following. Such an etymological run-through also illustrated how words change, how they take on new meanings with changing contexts over time. Arguing for the reintroduction of their root meaning is like reintroducing pre-industrial society (– which sometimes seems to be the call). Heidegger is close in his writings on dwelling, building and being, yet he transcends time: “What, then”, asks Heidegger, “does ‘Bauen’, building, mean? The Old English and High German word for building, ‘buan’, means to dwell” […]\(^5\) Bauen, to which the ‘bin’ belongs: ich bin, du bist, mean ‘I dwell, you dwell’” (Heidegger 1971 cf. Leach 1997; 101).

To be is to dwell. ‘Dwell’ and ‘dwelling’ are the core concepts. To dwell means to live in or in a place,\(^6\) referring both to the process of living and the physical structure embodying this process. The ‘house’, deriving from the concept of ‘domus’, primarily takes on a meaning of ‘ruling place’, in the ‘my-home-is-my-castle’ vein. “To have a house is to possess symbolic authority. […] The house is the embodiment of our dominance”, according to Danto (cf. Taylor 1990; 9). ‘Housing’ holds a dual meaning. It is both a functional category referring to houses as physical objects in plural, but also to activities “which are important to personal life; i.e. those which can act as vehicles for personal fulfillment” (Turner 1972; 153).

‘House’, as in the Old English term ‘hus’,\(^7\) translates exactly into the word ‘shelter’ according to Arthur Danto. “It cognate (sic!)\(^8\) with ‘huden’ – to hide, conceal, cover; and it expands into […] terms [that are] tied to dwelling as a condition of survival” (Danto 1990 cf. Taylor 1990; 9). In the context of this particular research, the way he further defines the ‘hus’/shelter term is particularly pertinent: “This is the fragile, threatened, exposed side of our self-image as dwellers; beings that need protection, a place to crawl into if only a hole or cave – and our walls announce our vulnerability” (ibid).

‘Home’ is a highly emotive word referring to place, be it house, village, even country (as in ‘homeland’); it can also connote refuge or asylum. Different languages lead to slightly different meanings, highlighting the fact that ‘home’ conveys a multitude of meanings. While ‘place of residence’ primarily refers to physical structures, ‘home’ is

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\(^5\) This was the key message in the evaluation report on UNHCR’s shelter program in Rwanda. The fact that there was no conceptual demarcation between ‘housing’ (which was the nature of their activity) and ‘shelter’ (which was what their mandate contained), a confusion appeared which led to an emergency (shelter) approach when in fact 69% of the $38.6 million budget referred to housing construction (UNHCR 2000; v; 4). This lead to a significant loss in developmental spin-offs (ibid; 25-28). All this in could, in turn, be a ‘language problem’, in that the officer responsible was not English, but then neither were the evaluators, although they were the ones who discovered the discrepancy.

\(^6\) Paul Oliver adds: “To dwell is to make one’s abode: to live in, or at, or on, or about a place” (Oliver 1987; 7).

\(^7\) For the record: ‘hus’ is the present-day Norwegian word for ‘house’.

\(^8\) I interpret this obvious printing error as ‘conforms with’ or ‘refers to’
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE

held by many to refer to “home as territory or a locus in space [or] place of self-identity or as a social or cultural unit” (Hayward 1975 cf. Porteous & Smith 2001). Since ‘home’ is such an emotive word, it has been hijacked by moralists, claims John Berger, by the bourgeois defending the sanctity of family life and property, and by the political elite of the ‘homeland’ where men were left to fight wars defending the privileges of the ruling few (Berger 1983):

"Home", Berger says, "was the center of the world because that was the place where the vertical line crossed with the horizontal. The vertical line was a path leading upwards to the sky and downwards to the underworld. The horizontal line represented the traffic of the world, all the possible roads leading across the earth to others". (ibid;462)

This is a most illuminating description in the context of this research. Listen: “Without a history of choice no dwelling can be a home” (ibid; 463). People displaced by war have no such choice. It is a matter of dispute whether they have one when returning. Their benefactors, i.e. ‘the international community’, may be among Berger’s hijackers, disallowing the choice a second time. This will be discussed in due course.

Many of these terms have dual meanings: both as objects and processes, both as nouns and verbs. As nouns, they refer to the physical construction with certain properties (- water leakages, for that matter). As verbs, they comprise two interacting processes; one relates to the dweller, “the act of dwelling” gives the physical object meaning, or symbolic stature; the other relates to the object’s embedded external spillovers, giving the object developmental stature. In all circumstances they are place specific.

2.1.3 THE SOCIO-MATERIAL DUALITY OF HOUSING

This etymological exploration has uncovered the socio-material nature of dwelling and housing. This duality lies at the heart of most architectural research. To what extent the physical determines emotional and social action has always been contested. It always will be. The famous statement by Churchill, “We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us” is as far as architecture comes. Bourdieu comes to our rescue.

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9 In the US, ‘homes’ are what the real estate agents deal with, not houses, highlighting Berger's claim. The recent introduction in the US of the term ‘homeland’ (as in Department of Homeland Security) is etymologically consistent, yet politically opportunistic by the logic of Berger.

10 From the presentation above, the two terms are not synonymous, although they substantially overlap. In the following I will only use the term ‘housing’ except where ‘dwelling’ refers to “the act of dwelling”.

11 This Churchill statement has been slightly ‘edited’ over time. According to Brand, the initial statement was put forward by Churchill at an award ceremony at the AA School of Architecture in 1924. Here he said: “There is no doubt whatever about the influence of architecture and structure upon human character and action. We make our buildings and afterwards they make us. They regulate the course of our lives”. He used the Parliament building as a case in point. This was even more pertinent in 1943 when he used the same statement to propagate the rebuilding the Parliament exactly as it was. He said: “We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us” (Brand 1994: 3).
**1) Habitus**

Bourdieu's concept of habitus may help explains this duality. ‘Habitus’ is a system of long-lasting (but not permanent) transposable dispositions acting as schemes or schemata that structure perception, conception and practice of a given group or society. Habitus consists of a network of historical relations ‘deposited’ within each of us. These deposits, invisible to outsiders as well as to ourselves, empower us to act and interact in a way that makes sense to us and to others within the ‘social field’ in question. ‘Field’ is the second concept Bourdieu developed. The social field is the environment which structures a specific habitus and which, in turn, is structured by it. Societies are composed of numerous social fields, a few fairly autonomous, most interacting and overlapping. Such fields may be a social class, a village, a ‘homeland’, a family or a clan. A professional guild is another such field. Each field is tied to a habitus guiding our perceptions and steering our motivations. It is what underpins the pertaining ‘rules and regulations’. The relations of the field are determined by prevailing bundles of ‘capital’. The notion of ‘capital’, initially ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu 1996), is the third element in Bourdieu’s conceptual system. ‘Capital’ will not be further explored here, but examined when I analyze my cases, cf. Chapter 5.2.

Habitus deposits objective structures or relations in society, be they tangible or institutional, buildings or rituals. These objective structures ‘celebrate’ the field and reproduce and reinforce the group’s habitus. The built environment, and in particular the dwelling, constitutes an essential objective structure. Callewaert describes the relationship between habitus and the objective structures of the dwelling thus: “It is [...] most of all the dwelling that is the foundation for the generative schemata because the dwelling, both physically and culturally has been shaped by these schemata” (Callewaert 1992; 181). He goes on to show how the physical elements, down to the most minute objects, the structuring and zoning of the house make the schemata manifest through the accompanying practices which again reproduce the schemata, i.e. Churchill all over again. Bourdieu explains Churchill by stating that objective structures tend to produce subjective dispositions that produce structured action which tends to reproduce the objective structures that tend to produce …, and so forth. (Bourdieu 1990; 52-65) The notion of habitus/field/capital is set to explain why a society begets the buildings it does. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (and field and capital) emerged from studying life in a Berber village, and he fully acknowledged the difficulties in transferring the concepts to modern, highly (mostly upward) mobile, post-industrial societies. Such “complex” societies are characterized by a multiplicity of fields with an accompanying set of embedded heterogeneous habituses.

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12 In his own notes, Bourdieu further explains the word ‘dispositions’ much to the benefit of those whose mother tongue is not English. “The word disposition seems particularly suited to express what is covered by the concept of habitus (defined as a system of dispositions). It expresses first the result of an organizing action, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also designates a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination” (Bourdieu 1977; 214).

13 The world of architects seems like a perfect social field, a little broader, as does the University.

14 Dwelling takes on this central role particularly in societies without “the symbolic-product-conserving techniques associates with literacy”, says Bourdieu (1977; 89).
John Friedmann has raised a number of critical and clarifying issues pertaining to
habitus and the growing intra- and international mobility, and the uncertainty and
conflicts stemming from the development of new habituses. Friedmann says that
"whether the culprits are called modernization, urbanization, "development" [...] the
evidence suggests that the twinned concept of habitus/field is a great deal more
malleable than Bourdieu suggests" (Friedmann 2000; 9). Bourdieu seems not to
have worked actively with the physical environment beyond investigations into social
space, not so much physical space, according to Friedmann. Friedmann does ac-
knowledge, though, Bourdieu’s explanation for the 'slow progress' of social change:
the historically bounded collective habituses are, and will always be, part our lives.15

An example would be the immediate public reaction in the aftermath of the Janu-
ary 2003 fire in Trondheim, Norway, where a large area of the center of town was
destroyed. In most surveys and interviews, inhabitants of the city wanted the old
buildings rebuilt,16 or at least the ‘old atmosphere’ recreated. ‘Progress’ will not ren-
der recreation economically feasible. The reconstruction of the burnt-out villages in
Northern Norway after WW II is another case in point. Those were times with stable
communities, stable habitus and fields, which brought about a recreation-like recon-
struction as a matter of course. The policy of the international agencies to rebuild
war-destroyed villages is grounded in the same perceptions (cf. my case on the re-
construction of Grapska, chapter 4.5). But habitus changes as the physical environ-
ment changes (and vice versa). Habitus is the product of history, and so may be
changed by history.17

.2) Man-Made Environments as Social Constituents: What Housing Does
In his writing on urban sociology, Dag Østerberg (1998a, 1998b) highlights the in-
teractive role of the built environment on social life. “The material structures are not
simply something primordial and physical”, says Østerberg, “They are socio-
material, i.e. they carry a social signification mediated through materiality” (1998;
3). The structures are active participants, not simply a backdrop or ground (Petti-
grew 1990; 268). The material structures are constituent and active parts of "real
life". Again, the recent fire in Trondheim and the call for rebuilding ‘the way it was’
exemplifies this. The buildings took on the role of participant in the discourse on
urban development in Trondheim – even as burnt-out shells. This was not as physi-
cal objects, but as objects of meaning, albeit somewhat different for different peo-
ple, depending on their ‘field of reference’ to paraphrase Bourdieu.

A somewhat similar concept was brought forth by John Turner in the 1960s and
1970s, on ‘what housing does’. “To those for whom housing is an activity [it is ab-
surd not to] distinguish between what things are, materially speaking and what they

15 Bourdieu underpins Zetter’s contention that refugees try to make sense of their lives through percep-
tions of the past projected towards the future, or visa versa, but always modulated by their present life
conditions, not least their housing conditions (Zetter 1999).
16 Some of the smaller political parties even made recreation part of their election manifestos. With time
the public fervor of recreation diminishes, leaving the reconstruction debate to the politicians.
17 "It may be changed by history, that is by new experiences, education or training (which implies that
aspects of what remains unconscious in habitus be made at least partially conscious and explicit [...]
They may be changed by historical action oriented by intention and consciousness and using pedagogic
devices (Bourdieu 2002; 29).
do in people's lives”, says Turner (1972: 152). Turner, on the shoulders of other self-help ideologues before him, in particular Jacob L. Crane, saw housing as a vehicle of personal, family and social growth or development emerging in the relationship between the physical object and the user and “the roles which the process plays in their life history” (ibid; 159): “Ich bin, I dwell!”.

Duncan Maclennan (1988) has approached housing in industrialized countries in a somewhat similar manner but with different references, taking his cue basically from the endogenous growth theories,\(^\text{18}\) which give prominence to innovation as a source of development and industrial location. Innovative environments are also social environments (Maskell et al. 1998), and as such are wide, complex, and by nature somewhat unpredictable as they are non-codified systems\(^\text{19}\) linked to human reflexivity and thus make systems interact in a manner of ‘spillovers’. These systems impact upon each other and often cause subtle and powerful feedbacks over time. “The integrated perspective on housing”, says Maclennan, “has to consider who else will be involved and what else will be required. There is no longer interest in ‘housing’ but in ‘housing and’ (the actors) and ‘housing with’ (the outputs)” (Maclennan 1998; 11). This echoes John Turner – although not so elegantly phrased. Whereas Turner’s ideas were tested and informed by working in the barrios in Latin America, Maclennan tries to impact contemporary British housing policies through research. On the one hand, his research shows “positive effects of housing investment on subsequent industrial investment at more local levels” (ibid; 6). On the other, he still has to acknowledge that there is no confirmed causation in the relationship between poor housing, bad health, crime, drug abuse and the like. So how can housing be part of, and contribute towards, an increase in human and social capital? Maclennan confirms only what others have said before: strategic location, participation in decision-making, mixed income groups and tenure, all for the purpose of creating trust and good neighborliness. His contribution is not these suggestions, but his showing how housing – within the emerging economic paradigm, is ‘connected’ through spillovers to economic development. He shows ‘what housing does’, or rather, ‘what housing is capable of doing’ in modern Europe.\(^\text{20}\) And he has been heard. In dealing with regeneration, the “Principles for a New Housing Policy” as presented by Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) marks a “significant shift […] away from simply improving the physical fabric of the dwellings and immediate environment to increasing the opportunities for the households living in the area” according to Kleinman & Whitehead (1999; 79). At least in the UK there is an emerging appreciation for ‘joined-up thinking’ that encompasses more than the

\(^\text{18}\) These theories focus on innovation rather than technology, innovation being deemed an endogenous activity, while technology has been regarded as an exogenous one.


\(^\text{20}\) Underpinned in part on Maclennan’s writing, Stafford et al (2001) undertook an investigation into former mining communities in Yorkshire, UK, on the regenerative effects of housing investments in these communities. They brought unequivocal conclusions to the table: “Housing investment is at the heart of any strategy to improve the asset base of a neighbourhood. It directly improves residents’ quality of life and indirectly enhances the other forms of capital necessary to sustain community life”. Further, “Housing investment contributes to endogenous economic growth. It helps to increase labour productivity and participation and to improve income, employment and performance of a regional economy”. I will return to this research when presenting my analytical framework.
house per se. It is about “promoting social cohesion, well-being and self-dependence” (ibid; 79).²¹ It is about what housing does.

Starting out this chapter by clarifying terms with reference to their etymological origin has inadvertently exposed how habitus changes. Language is a constituent property, an objective structure, of habitus, the way buildings may be. So when words ever so slowly take on new meanings, this simultaneously signifies a change in habitus – and yet, the origin may still be traced. It is like families who move from their ‘place of origin’ to new environments where they see their children adjust and change. Over the years so much of the old is ‘lost’ that it may be difficult to communicate across generations²²: “The past is another country, they do things differently there”.

I have dwelt with the ‘habitus’ concept at some length because it enters the socio-material field trying to explain the reciprocity between man and his environment. This is the central issue in architecture and planning, if there ever was one. The reason for introducing the concept of habitus (and those of field and capital) is that I believe it will help us understand how external housing interventions in post-war circumstances may interact with the people assisted²⁴.

2.1.4 SUMMARY
All the authors I have discussed above are proponents of ‘joined-up thinking’, where interventions in one sector have broad, often unforeseen and time-lagged, impacts on other sectors. They emphasize different aspects across the spectrum from the baseline statement of Heidegger, “I am = I dwell”, through Bourdieu’s relationship between the dweller and his dwelling, on to Turner’s housing as strategy for development depending on and enhancing social capital. This is further exposed by Maclennan in the context of housing in the post-industrial world, with Østerberg overarching all by revealing the interactive role of our material environment in constituting social life. These theories overlap in understanding and they are informed by practice that spans time and space.

To extract the more applied attributes of housing from the ‘joined-in thinking’ of the writers above, three overlapping arenas of interaction emerge which echo the subsidiary research questions developed earlier:

²¹ Regeneration has become a hot issue in British politics. National newspapers carry separate sections on the issue. It’s relevance to post-war reconstruction is so obvious that the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York makes their students do field studies in marginalized areas in Manchester and Newcastle.

²² The debate on ‘integration’ (‘domestication’ seems sometimes to be a more appropriate term) of immigrants contains such issues (see Wikan 1995).

²³ The quote is initially from the Go-Between by J.P.Hartley, yet the substance of the statement is better exemplified in V.S.Naipaul’s In a Free State (Norwegian translation I en fristat 1973). Here, V.S. Naipaul tells about growing up as a grandchild of Indian immigrants in the West Indies. His family was very conscious about not reproducing any traits of the old caste system they left behind in India. But still, Naipaul refers to his inexplicable reverence for water and cleanliness, and toward certain groups of Indians (people of high casts it later proved). These were attitudes guiding his everyday, un-reflected childhood behavior, as inherited from his family – in spite of their persistent attempts to crush these remnants of the ‘past country’.

²⁴ It certainly explains why ‘technology transfer’ – and the theories behind it - has proven such an extremely difficult challenge in all development arenas.
• Between housing and the environment: **housing as material object.** This covers the interaction between housing as a physical entity and elements of nature and people as physical bodies. It deals with how housing stands up to the climate with its changing physical and functional requirements, in effect, how the construction masters time. It is also about housing interacting in space, i.e. on location. Lastly, it is about housing as a physical object in terms of ‘utility’, how it stands up to wear and tear, how it accommodates change, maintenance and changing human requirements. This attribute is primarily on the formation or depletion of fixed and environmental capital.

• Between people and their dwelling and immediate environment in the sense of housing as carrier of meaning: **housing as symbol.** It is about the dweller as agent, about the reciprocity between housing and inhabitant. It deals with the appropriation of the environment, it encompasses housing as a physical imprint – and printer - of worldviews and values, of status, of aspirations, of daily practices, etc. And it deals most of all with housing as home, as the central node in people’s network of life. Since symbols are material representations of meaning, what happens when the reference object is destroyed, and what guides its recreation? Much will depend on the bundle of human and social capital the people commands.

• Between the wider society and housing, i.e. **housing as vehicle of development.** To realize the duality of housing, a building has to be constructed. Through this, housing activates processes beyond those of the dweller, it is about reciprocal relations to livelihoods, to economic development, to regional development. In effect, it is about housing as node in the network that constitutes society where “everything is linked to everything”, as Mrs Brundtland\(^{25}\) once quipped. It is about activating and extending capacities, either through contingent spillovers, or focused economic and material targeting. All modes of capital are affected and all modes of capital provide inputs.

Attributions of housing differ among writers. Housing, being such an over-arching constituent of human life, lends itself to being categorized in many ways. To me, the categories above present the most potent attributes when examining what housing does – ‘does’ in terms of contributing towards the reformation of societal assets necessary for a lasting recovery to take hold.

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\(^{25}\) Bruntland of the Brundtland Commission, Norwegian Prime Minister, and later Head of WHO.
2.2. HOUSING AS PHYSICAL OBJECT

2.2.1 INTRODUCTION. ON ARCHITECTURE

Any building is a piece of architecture as all buildings are physical – and all build-
ings are built for a purpose. Any building is the result of human action however
much it still remains a physical object. This duality of matter and meaning is what
constitutes architecture. We do not need architects to make architecture. But in the
best of cases architects are able to make architecture that better serves the in-
tended purpose; they are able to use the opportunities better in order to make
cheaper, more adaptable, more efficient – and more beautiful buildings (Hamdi
1995): “Bad architecture is a violation” says professor Brantenberg (cf. Nuttgens
1998;4). But to insist that only architects make good architecture, is in itself, if not
a violation, a gross overstatement (Støa 1996). Rudolfski, with his “Architecture
Without Architects” exhibition in 1964, made that fact abundantly clear (Rudolfski
1964). And besides, as will be made just as evident throughout this work, “Archi-
tecture, to state the obvious, is a social act – social both in method and purpose”
(Kostof 1995;7).

When post-war housing reconstruction is perceived to be a social act alone, which is
very often the case (Zetter 1995, Solberg 20022), there is a deficiency in profes-
sional inputs; “A knowledge embargo”, says Nimpuno (1995) after visiting settle-
ments for refugees and displaced people in the Great Lakes region in the mid-
1990s. In the North architects and planners are engaged as a matter of course in
large-scale housing projects because there is value added from their contribution.
There are but a handful of architects engaged in the field of post-war reconstruction
in spite of the enormous volume and impact of the housing reconstruction taking
place in all over the world. In Bosnia successive heads of UNHCR’s ‘Shelter Unit’
were military officers and economists.3 Sida made an exception by heavily relying
on architect-planners in developing their assistance strategy on housing reconstruc-
tion. Their contribution was favorably evaluated (Sandgren 1999).

Architecture as such will not be dealt with in this work. Although it will come out as
a composite of my three designated housing attributes: physical object, symbol,
and strategy for development. These attributes overlap the constituent parts of
architecture as presented in the first treatise on architecture, “De Architectura”,
written around 25 BC by the Roman architect-engineer Vitruvius. The three con-
stituents of architecture ‘firmitas’, or ‘structure’, and ‘utilitas’ or ‘function’ ( covered
by my ‘physical object’) and ‘venustas’, ‘beauty’ (in part covered by my ‘symbol’).4

1 In his introductory notes to the Norwegian edition.
2 Solberg, a political scientist evaluated NRC’s housing activities in the Balkans undertaken without archi-
tect-planner competence at HQ. In 2001 NRC employed a seasoned architect, Terje Bodøgard, who sub-
sequently initiated the Solberg-report.
3 In 2002, with activities down, a Swiss architect was engaged. Prominently posted on the wall behind
him, was written: “Construction is my religion, the site is my church, the tender is my bible” – not much
of a socio-material approach in that.
4 These English terms were reformulated at the early 17th century by Sir Henry Wotton into what today
is acknowledged to be the three pillars of architecture: “Firmness, Commodity and Delight”. Vitruvius’
Architectural discourse and education still recognize these as their grounding principles, which tend to leave ‘the obvious’, that architecture is a social act, outside their main concern. In architecture there is more room for ‘joined-up thinking’ as Maclennan would have said.5 In his reader on architectural theory Neil Leach (1997) made his selection of texts to show that there is more to architecture than what architects are primarily concerned with, namely physical design.

2.2.2 PHYSICAL PROPERTIES AND TIME: HOUSING SHEARED

Architecture in terms of physical object/‘firmitas’ is determined by ‘action’, ‘time’ and ‘space’, according to Thiis-Evensen (1992). Since the ‘action’ is already defined as the many ‘acts of dwelling’, this particular section will focus on ‘space’ and ‘time’, i.e. locally available materials, prevailing technology, tradition, ‘styles’ – and how these are affected by time. I will do so by applying the ‘shearing layers’ model6 initially proposed by Francis Duffy (1990) and further developed by Steward Brand (1994). This will clarify both the interaction between building and the external elements acting on the specific site, and the reciprocity between the building and the user as physical, or rather, physiological body.

![Brand's Shearing Schemata](image)

**Figure 2.2.1 Brand’s Shearing Schemata, (From Brand 1994)**

Brand is primarily concerned about how buildings interact with time, “how buildings learn”, as it were. To quote Duffy again “The unit of analysis […] isn’t the building, but the use of the building through time” (ibid:13). In so doing, we first have to examine the outset, the site, or ‘space’ in the time-space perspective.

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5 The Aga Khan Award for Architecture has therefore included ‘social relevance’ as a key criterion in their architectural competition. The Aga Khan Award this largest architectural award in the world in terms of competing entries.

6 These layers have different rates of change. In Brand’s schemata, the layers of a building comprises, in descending order of permanence: 1 Site, 2 Structure, 3 Skin, 4 Services, 5 Space plan, 6 “Stuff”.

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book in English is titled: “Ten books on Architecture”. About 1500 years later Leon Battista Alberti came up with another ‘ten books’, "On the Art of Building in Ten Books", while the great renaissance architect, Palladio, made do with four a century later, in 1570: “Four Books on Architecture”. All these books are still in print and are still central texts in architectural discourse.
.1) Site

This is the permanent geographical setting, with its lasting characteristics, the climate and the environmental features. Traditional architecture has shown the myriad of different physical responses the act of dwelling has entailed in various climatic zones in the globe (Rudolfski 1964, Oliver, 1969, 1977, 1987, 1997, 2003). Industrialized architecture’ tends to uniform these responses along a Mid-European template. In the ‘development-aided’ housing projects of the 1960s this was often the case. Even in the late 1990s the Word Bank’s housing projects on the Palestinian territories bore the imprint of the ‘international housing model’ (Elkahliout 2001).

Choosing and building on a site is a decision where consequences will normally outlast the decision maker. Building on a site is a reflexive act. It will irreversibly alter the site, and thus be the basis for subsequent decisions, making new premises for yet other decisions to follow. Choosing sites therefore stands out as the principal strategic act in urban or regional land-use development. Yet, in due course, the ‘functions’ that initiated the building are outmoded, leaving the physical building alone to act as guardian of the site. In this way the purely physical structure (objectifying memories and (changing) habituses) starts acting as agent of development. Both Aldo Rossi (1982) and Spiro Kostof (1992) see this tension between the physical building and ‘changing functions’ as a major developmental force in urban, and undoubtedly also in regional, development. Places will be abandoned, be ‘reborn’, and be gentrified. The way old abandoned industrial structures and sited have been utilized recently in support of urban development is a case in point. When time is brought into the equation, “form” – does not – “follow function”, as the Modernist slogan would have it. With time, it is just as much a matter of “function follows form”.

‘Sites’ become places through social constructions, just as much as anything physical and environmental. This will not be discussed here, but dealt with later.

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7 It is a shortcut to conclude that the indigenous response is superior to ‘modern approaches’. The tradition of using horizontal boards as cladding on houses along the Norwegian West coast tend to rot much more easily than the modern vertical boards introduced as a result of building research.
8 There is a hitch to this though. With increasing site costs in the major cities, developers destroy buildings rather than re-use them. New structures are in most aspects much more ‘efficient’ than the old. The high-rise Phillips Building in Oslo was torn down to be replaced with a building of about the same size and shape, but built and run in a way that made economic sense of the demolition. Other examples abound. Probably the most famous example of this ‘function follows form’ has been the art colonies in New York, starting out with the Village in downtown Manhattan, passing through Tribeca and East Village, and presently making Brooklyn the hot spot of art in New York. Along the way, the old structures, warehouses and cheap apartment blocks, were converted, first to artist studios and flats, than into galleries, fancy shops and restaurants, and then upper class housing.
9 ‘Site’ refers to specific geographical and physical properties of a point in space, whereas ‘place’ is space perceived.
.2) Structure
These are the foundations and the load-bearing components, including the roof, which normally last the lifetime of the building. There are basically two ways of constructing buildings: either with load-bearing walls, i.e. the walls carry the weight of the floor(s) and the roof above, or by means of a primary structure of columns and beams with independently placed external and internal walls. Nature makes for an apparent congruence between available indigenous materials, mode of building and the requirements set by the climate. In hot and arid climates houses are built with solid, load-bearing walls with large heat-capacity (releasing stored heat at night, remaining cool inside during day), whereas in hot and humid climates, the construction is made out of wooden poles: light and open, allowing for maximum air circulation.

The two construction principles entail two different ways of accommodating change. With load-bearing walls change must come either through rooms changing function, or external add-ons. With an independent load-bearing structure, room sizes and functions may also be changed within the building: ‘Additive’ and ‘subtractive’ change as Rapoport calls it (1994; 555-562). The Modernist movement made the latter their trademark. Within a steel-concrete structure walls were to be dismantled and shifted. This is most elegantly exemplified by the Domino House from 1915 by Le Corbusier.10

Fig. 2.2.2 Le Corbusier’s Domino House, first proposed in 1915, see fig. 2.2.4 for the ‘contemporary vernacular’ version.

The choice of principle is basically a matter of location and context. Rural buildings, at least the traditional ones, primarily depend on add-ons for change, whereas urban structures confined to a set perimeter depend on internal re-division, and verti-

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10 He had visions made long before the concept of habitus was introduced into development discourse: “If we eliminate from our hearts and minds all dead concepts in regard to the house, and look at the question from a critical and objective point of view, we shall arrive at the "House-Machine", the mass-production house, healthy (and morally so too) and beautiful in the same way that the working tools and instruments which accompany our existence are beautiful” (Le Corbusier 1987;7). The Domino House was actually proposed as a mass production housing system for housing reconstruction after WW I.
cal add-ons, i.e. added floors. In crowded cities both principles of growth and change are implemented often with detrimental effects on spatial and functional qualities. The encroachment of open spaces and the humiliating and structurally unsound vertical add-ons in Palestinian refugee settlements in Beirut is a case in point.

Buildings in which the structure is flawed gradually degrade the other ‘layers’ of the construction. So when the roof are allowed to leak or structures allowed to subside, floors, windows, walls, etc. will be damaged. This will inevitably lead to inferior living conditions. We are now in a house that make people sick (Whitehead 1998, Marsh et al. 2000 cf. Bratt 2002;6).

For housing to be structurally safe and yet adaptable to future alterations it has to be planned and prepared for future change. This is where the skills and experience of architects and planners come in, and it is at its most decisive at the ‘structure’ layer.

Two aspects related to structure destruction are worth mentioning. The first is on the recycling of materials. This has been done throughout time. Castles or fortifications of the conquered have been reused for other purposes, or the materials simply lifted from the site by the general public. Many a new symbolic building is built

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11 A most relevant example is the “Svenskehusene” (The Swedish Houses) that were built in Norway (and Finland) during the war. They were two-storey wooden pre-fabs covering a ground area of 50m². Initially they sheltered two families, but gradually changed into one-family houses. Today, most of them, in cities like Molde, Boda, Åndalsens, and Narvik, have add-ons defaming their architectural qualities, but are sought after dwellings as most of them were initially integrated into the then existing village or urban fabric. (Rikskommittén 1942)
from materials of similarly significant buildings of the conquered. Nowadays, the recycling of building materials from bombed or destroyed buildings has been systematically done since the post WW II reconstruction, partly for logistical reasons, partly for reasons of resource scarcity. The new Central Business District of Beirut is built on debris, so too was the 1962 Olympic complex of Munich.

The other aspect relates to the way housing is built and the type of materials used – as a response to the natural hazards of the region, recurrent storms, and floods or earthquakes. This has been an intrinsic part of traditional architecture, but often wavered in the present-day, high-activity building works (Jigyasu 2002; Oliver 1987, 2003). This has brought forth a ‘domesticated’ yet international Domino House tradition, best labeled ‘contemporary vernacular’: a primary structure of concrete columns, beams and slabs with non-bearing walls and partitions of bricks of blocks makes up much of today’s man-made environment throughout the world. This building type appears in the Katmandu valley as it does in Iran, in Lebanon and in the Balkans. I have seen them all. This is an inevitable consequence of modernization, and in effect amounts to a kind of ‘architectural entropy’. This ‘uniformation’ is, as a matter of course, evident in most post-war reconstruction environments, where so much is to be accomplished in a short time – and by international agents.

![Contemporary Vernacular. The Domino House principle applied in Grapska, Cf. Chapter 6.5](image)

**3) Skin**

The skin is the outer layer of the house which is set to protect the load-bearing structures, ensure their capacity, and to enclose the building as such. This also al-

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12 The Quwwat ul-Islam mosque just outside Delhi built in the 13 Century was built using beautifully carved stone from a number of destroyed Hindu temples. There are numerous other examples (Kostof 1992;234-265).
allows for signaling contended status to outsiders\textsuperscript{13}: “By choosing to live in a home having a certain external appearance, a person may also be expressing how they wish to be seen” (Porteous 1976:384).

Traditional architecture is often constructed with composite layers. The skin is part of the structure, is part of the space plan, etc. But as the skin has to fend against both the natural elements and the wear and tear of people, it requires constant maintenance in order to prevent destruction of the underlying, composite structure.\textsuperscript{14} The skin is therefore normally changed much more often than the structure. This way, the physical and aesthetic quality of the skin, and the house, may be improved when conditions allow. This will also permit new status signals to be played out. It is a well-documented phenomenon in true vernacular architecture (Larsson & Larsson 1984, 1996; Bourgeois & Pelos 1983; Guidoni 1978; Oliver 1977, 2003),\textsuperscript{15} and when its prevalence in contemporary American architecture was finally recognized, the issue of the skin, became an important constituent in the theory of post-modern architecture. (Venturi et al. 1972; Jencks 1977, 2002).

The ‘contemporary vernacular’, referred to above, add their skin incrementally much in the same way as the building is constructed: according to economic capacity and personal capability. External plastering, i.e. the skin, is often the last addition to the building, making these buildings, as a type, so easily recognizable throughout the world.

4) Services

Services are the “working guts” of the building as Brand describes it (1994:13). This refers to piping, wiring, ventilation systems, and all the ‘intelligent components’ that make up more and more of buildings built in the North. In Norway the services layer makes up some 20\% of an urban housing project’s total costs, excluding site.\textsuperscript{16} Since it comprises components that are easily outmoded,\textsuperscript{17} the services are therefore laid out in such a way as to make upgrading and renewals easy to realize.

In other areas of the world, this layer is not that important, although running water, sewerage and electrical power are the manifest symbols of progress. In these cases it is not so much an issue of preparing for renewal as for its very installation and easy access of maintenance. This is brought to head in reconstruction projects. Implementing agencies are squeezed between upgrading (where previously there

\textsuperscript{13} In Gaborone, Botswana, there used to be a housing area called “the white city”, where the front walls of the perimeter houses were painted white along the route of visiting dignitaries.

\textsuperscript{14} The walls facing the sea of Norwegian log houses had a skin of horizontal boards. As these inevitably rotted, they were inevitably changed. The same pertains to thatched roof structures where these were used, not to mention the continuous ‘reskinning’ of adobe or mud walls. These tasks were in fact part of the ‘objective imprints’ of (gender specific) habitus in many traditional societies, to revisit Bourdieu.

\textsuperscript{15} In our part of the world, the solid status of brickwork housing has often been alluded to by plastering a fine mesh fixed to the outside of a ‘basic’ wooden construction. These are still evident in the Balkans.

\textsuperscript{16} Figures collected from architects in Trondheim, June 2003.

\textsuperscript{17} The Phillips Building demolition (cf. footnote 8 above) was demolished not least because of the large investments required to modernize the ‘services’ layer.
was no water or electricity) – and reducing the number of potential beneficiaries (because of increased unit cost).

.5) Space Plan
This refers to internal walls, ceilings, doors, corridors, etc., what in effect make up the spaces for ‘the many acts of dwelling’. Particularly in non-industrial societies, housing is spatially organized in a set way, as an imprint and printer of habitus, not to be easily changed, re. Bourdieu’s Kabyle house (1977). In urban settings in the industrial world present-day housing is also built and spatially organized in ways that may make alterations difficult, primarily because of ‘housing market priorities’, i.e rather change address than modify the building (Røe 2001). Where capacity and technology allow, there is still a constant flow of changes in most housing throughout the world (Tipple 2000, Rapoport 1994;533-562, Goldstein 1998).

Space plans reflect the relative importance paid to the different functions of the dwelling. As these change, the house changes with it. If not, conflicts arise, like overcrowding and conflicts of privacy. These are relative to cultural and personal perceptions – but also related to time. Privacy means the ability to control unwanted interaction, be it visual, smell, sound, heat, physical presence. Beyond physical barriers, relative to cultural modes, these may be handled through manners, rules, time scheduling – and spatial organization (Rapoport 1994;184-186). The latter is what space plans do. According to Bratt (2002;18), there is little research on the consequences of (over)crowding and the associated effects of conflicts of privacy. What little there is points in different directions: that negative social behavior stems from overcrowding (Fisher et al. 1975 cf. ibid), and that “no effect of aggregate density on the behavior of individual people” (Shlay 1995;696 cf. ibid). That crowding increases the wear and tear of the dwelling is self-evident. This calls for increased maintenance or – where this does not take place – to a gradual dilapidation of the environment.

Housing in high uncertainty situations call for flexible space plans. There are admirable examples from the WW II reconstruction in Norway. The “Svenskehusene” (The Swedish Houses) were pre-fabs donated by Sweden, initially built for two families but in such a way as to allow one family to take over when circumstances – and the economic conditions – allowed. By the end of the 1950s most of them were converted to one-family houses. (Rikskommittén 1942, Brantenberg 1996). A simi-

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18 It does not mean that traditional housing is not altered. The ability to modify is a requirement to achieve this congruence between housing and people. It is just that it takes place on a much slower scale than it does in industrial societies of today.

19 Normally when structuring a flat, the spaces requiring services by means of piping, heavy wiring, air extraction and the like (kitchen, bathroom, etc.) are fixed together in order to allow maximum free alterable space in the other rooms. A recent master’s thesis at NTNU shows that in a large housing estate built in the early 1970s it was these heavily serviced spaces that were changed and extended, not the changeable ones (Kyllo, 2001). This is part of a national trend. Each year well over 4 billion USD is spent on home improvements, alterations and extensions in Norway, mostly on improving bathrooms and kitchens (Aftenposten/Prognosesenteret 22.09.03).

20 And these, of course, come out differently, for example in Norway where dwelling area pro capita stands at more than 50 m² as compared to Hong Kong where is stands at about 7m² (Sullivan & Chen 1997).
lar approach was applied in recent proposals for housing for refugees and asylum grantees in Norway. They address the uncertainty their residents face by proposing flexible floor plans (Husbanken 2001). Rapoport (1994) rather prefers the term ‘open-endedness’ for this potential of change where he takes in the dialectic process between people and setting over time. But focusing on the physical, ‘flexibility’ is a more feasible term.\(^{21}\)

Fig 2.2.5 a “Svenskehusene” showing the initial floor plans from 1941.

Fig.2.2.5 b ....and as built on the farm of the my parents during the summer of 1941

\(^{21}\) Rapoport distinguished six different reasons why people would choose to change their setting: instrumental, expressive/latent (e.g. meaning), social, cultural, demographic, economic (Rapoport 1994:533-562).
6) Stuff

"God is in the details" may be reinterpreted to refer to Brand’s ‘stuff’. This is the rest, the stuff that can be moved about: chairs, tables, pictures, lamps, rugs, beds, utensils, and all sorts of memorabilia. In this context it is about the place they take and how they interact with the inhabitants. This ‘stuff’, these ‘things’, are constituent parts of people’s identity. Sartre presented this claim in his “Being and Nothingness”, and has been further studied by Belk (1992 and earlier). Still, stuff requires space and certain physical settings to function and to serve their intrinsic role (ibid, Sullivan & Chen 1997). In a telling moment of a film shown on Norwegian television, a displaced Serbian professor presents his dearest belongings: a row of books lined up in a wet windowsill: “I have a home, but no house to put it in”. For people made to flee their homes, the things they are able to bring with them take on incalculable importance (McCracken 1988 cf. Belk 1992).

In the evolution of the Western dwelling, it was the change and development of these items, be they bedpans or washing machines, that in effect made the present-day dwelling what it is, thereby what a dwelling means in the lives of people in the Westernized world (Rybczynski 2001). Only when acknowledging how our ‘acts of dwelling’ have changed and how these relate to the introduction of ‘new stuff’, do we fully recognized the impact of stuff on housing. From a totally different perspective, Bourdieu explains the importance of ‘stuff’ in organizing space in the Kabyle houses. It is as if the house is constructed around the stuff. So when stuff is not accounted for in the planning of housing, we witness yet another of Brantenberg’s violations. In housing for displaced people in war zones we are more than mere witnesses (Cf. my Mihatovici case, Chapter 6.4).

22 Attributed to Mies van der Rohe in extension to his “less is more” slogan. In the architectural world of van der Rohe, ‘stuff’ was a bore.
23 They become part of peoples’ self, 1) when we master of control them, 2) when we create (or purchase) them, or 3) through knowing them. Belk (1992) adds a fourth: through habituation.
24 As part of a TV campaign for the Norwegian Refugee Council September 1999.
25 All architects have stories to tell of clients who want their new house built around a particular set of furniture, a special table, an inherited cupboard or the like.
2.2.3 SUMMARY

When it comes down to it, housing does not exist as a physical object. All the constituting physical layers are embedded with meaning. But for it to retain or serve a meaningful purpose the physical solutions must abide with the physical laws that act upon the building. The most painstakingly cared for space can be defamed with sinking floors or leaking roofs. And what good are separate rooms when the dividing walls are so thin as to allow no privacy? What good are housing units that do not allow for alterations to accommodate new ‘stuff’ or small children? These are all related to the physical capabilities of the housing construction in question. And the question is addressed to the planner-architect. As the late Samuel Mockbee told his students: “It’s got to be warm, dry and noble”, (cf. Dean & Hursley 2002; cover).

The Shearing Model that has been used here to describe the physical constituents of a building is also a model for change: how to prepare for the inevitable.26 The way the layers are assembled determines the capabilities for physical change. What

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26 “We limited rebuilding to the available resources. In the future, I am going to add another floor on the roof”, said MR Y when he first reconstructed his house in al-Burjain after it was destroyed in the 1975-1991 war in Lebanon (El-Masri 1999)
drives them and how they will be interpreted and accommodated will be left to the inhabitants. They, and not the planner-architect imbues the construction with meaning\textsuperscript{27} and carry out the alterations they deem meaningful. “Alterations are communal acts within the family” says anthropologist Margrethe Aune.\textsuperscript{28} They are manifestations of who we are, or rather what we now want to be. The house has become a symbol of ourselves. This is what the next chapter is about.

\textsuperscript{27} This is actually not correct. Buildings carry meaning for architects, very much so, sometimes to the extent that any change by the user is interpreted as an interference with the architect’s property.

\textsuperscript{28} Associate Professor Aune of NTNU, Trondheim in an interview in \textit{Adresseavisen} 22 September 2003.
2.3 HOUSING AS SYMBOL

2.3.1 A SYMBOLIC INTRODUCTION

A house is a physical object endowed with meaning. The object stands for something else, or rather, something more than a mere object. It becomes a symbol. It is symbolic because it represents a (positive or negative) quality recognized and comprehended by the observer. Housing may carry a message on behalf of the greater society, or most commonly, on behalf of its owner as part of that greater society. The capacity for housing to do so confirms its ‘socio-material’ or ‘socio-physical’ nature. When housing as a physical entity is destroyed, the duality of this relationship is also destroyed, threatening the affected people’s self-definition (Brown & Perkins 1992). “I have a home but no house to put it in”, as the professor said in the previous chapter.

2.3.2 HOUSING AS SYMBOL OF PROGRESS AND PERCEIVED ACCOMPLISHMENT

From the post WW II reconstruction of Europe and well into the 1970s housing was, in most countries, a political matter. What was achieved in the housing sector was treated as a symbol of national progress, national pride. When countries presented themselves internationally, their achievements in housing were part of that very image. Housing achievements were symbols of progress (Diefendorf 1990, Rassegna 1993, Reiersen & Thue 1996, Nygaard 1984, Gligoric 1974, The Housing Directorate 1947, Bullock, 2002). This was later repeated by the governments of the newly independent states as they, albeit for a brief period, took on the role as providers of housing or at least executors of housing policies (Obondo-Okoyo 1986). As governments left housing to the market – or rather, when governments entered the market, housing still remained a collective symbol, not for governments, but for the various lifestyle segments. The promotion of ‘gated communities’ is directed at one such segment, the prospective inhabitants/investors of places like Seaport may be another. At the very opposite, at the end where the homeless, the displaced and ethnically cleansed reside, there are also symbolic opportunities. A plethora of Annual Reports from the world’s major NGOs who have been active in war zones depict the contributions they make by showing houses being built or completed. DIFID even presented Mihatovici, the very case study settlement I investigated, as a celebratory example of the housing achievements reached by ‘the international community’. In the case of Mihatovici, cf. Chapter 6.4, we shall see what it symbolizes for the inhabitants of the settlement.

1 In the open global economy of today governments are left to present themselves as inviting ‘environments of investment’. When my hometown of Trondheim celebrated its millennium in 1997 the mayor – at the very opening – primarily proclaimed the event as a gigantic “public relations opportunity” aimed at future investors.

2 Rapoport referred to 47 housing market segments being used (Land Use Digest 1994 cf. Rapoport 1985).

3 A famous settlement in Florida based on the principles, or rather the ideology, of “New Urbanism”.

4 Developments, Fourth Quarter 2002; 6-7
The traditional theories on urban development, on urban form, deal with housing as a matter of course since housing makes up most of the land in urban areas. They start out with von Thünen of 1826 go through Hallett, Hudson and Rhind, Maclean-nan and others (see Balchin et al. 1995 for a detailed summary of these theories). In these theories the location of housing is primarily explained as being a function of travel cost/housing cost trade-offs. This does not directly take into account the role of status embedded in the "location, location, location" mantra of real estate agents. Phe & Wakely (2000) find that instead of economic trade-offs, residential location seems more to be determined out of perceived housing quality and status. New urban hierarchies emerge that reflect, and tend to reproduce, economic as well as symbolic capital strength. This may be the way cities are zoned in the minds of their inhabitants. This is what upward mobility is about. Hummon (1990) holds that it is not a particular place people are seeking, they are seeking a type of environment that corresponds to their present life-style or to the one they strive for. This is how status is created and made manifest, not by the house or place as such. It is the address of the house that holds status, - for those on top, and those at the bottom. Those with no address – no choices – have no status at all. People displaced by war easily fall into this category.

2.3.3 HOUSING AS (SYMBOL OF) HOME

The many meanings of home are symbolized in the house, in the dwelling unit. Home is tangible, socio-material reality however enigmatic in essence. It comprises our everyday behavior, our cognition and our affection. It seems that in all of literature, be it in research, reflections, fiction or poetry, home is about affection or is being described with affection. Herein lies housing’s symbolic powers. Home is in some profound way about emotions, and thus about attachment, attachment to people, to places, to things. Home is at the core of the relationships that emerge from the meanings projected into these nodes of affection. These are, on the one hand, larger than yourself in time, they are your own memories, memories inherited and memories of the people involved in your network of home; they are larger than you in physical terms, they are buildings built, landscapes created and cultivated, and there is memorabilia stemming from times or places beyond your reach. Home is making up what you are and who you are, echoing the earlier discussion on habitus. "It is not only an area for everyday life [it also] provides meaning to that life" (Eyles 1989 cf. Altman & Low 1992;109). An illustration is by way of "affordances" a term introduced by Gibson (1979 cf. Werner, Altman & Oxley 1985;5). It is not the rocking chair as a functional object, it is the act of sitting and the

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5 Recipients of the Donald Robertson Memorial Price 2000 for their work on the new theory on residential location based on status and quality.

6 Cf. the Palestinian student visiting NTNU in 1997, telling about her home in what is now Israel. It was the home of her grandparents which she herself has never seen. But it was still home (her place, her people, her things). The tragedy of the matter is that most probably there is no place, no things, as it has been the policy of the Israeli government to erase all traces of previous Palestinian settlements within Israel. According to Fallah (cf. Porteous & Smith 2001;90) about half of all Palestinian villages were depopulated and about a third of these were destroyed, of which about 15% of which were totally obliterated, leaving no trace of anyone having ever lived there. "My home" said the Palestinian student.
meaning of that act, be it in the repetitive way of everyday life – or, say, the first time it was left empty after your father died. So it is with the functional object we call home, “the furniture of self”, as Erikson calls it (cf. Brown & Perkins 1992;292): “Something you somehow haven’t to deserve”, as Robert Frost said.7

.1) The Attributes of Home

The academic literature on home is vast and varied, although much of it reflects a Western middle class, even North American, way of life. It seems biased in favor of a culture that in John Berger’s view speculates in the emotive dimensions of home for political and commercial purposes (Berger 1983). This is also why home and house (dwelling, dwelling unit, housing unit, etc) even in academic papers are arbitrarily used, and catchphrases like “home is where your heart is” and “home as a mirror of self”8 are being replicated in much of this literature. So are the many typology lists (see Altman & Werner 1985, Altman & Low 1992, Porteous & Smith 2001). Rapoport takes issue with most of this writing on home. He calls attention to the fact that the wide, almost idiosyncratic definitions applied are harmful for research (Rapoport 1995;28). Some of it retains its validity, however, by presenting lay people’s perceived attributes of home, thereby revealing the plethora of meanings held on the term or the concept. These perceptions (misguided or nor) are real in the sense that they underpin real life action, also when it comes to housing choices and tenure alternatives (Hiscock et al. 2001). This comes to head when the dwelling – as home – is being destroyed; desecrated as in war, obliterated as in natural disasters. These perceptions guide both desecrator and victim. The following attributes associated with ‘home’ stem from a US study done in the late 1980s, but might as well have been a list of the reasons for selectively destroying houses in areas of identity conflicts:

- security and control
- reflection of one’s ideas and values
- acting upon and modifying one’s dwelling
- permanence and continuity
- relationship with family and friends
- center of activities
- refuge from the outside world
- indicator of personal status
- material structure in a particular location
- place to own9

Home is not about attributes as such, but about their relationships. This does not mean an a priori relationship to a place or to a house or dwelling. Rapoport points

7 Robert Frost, Death of a Hired Hand (Untermeyer 1961).
8 Which is the title of a book by Clare Cooper Marcus (1995).
9 From Depres’ PhD dissertation 1991 (cf. Rapoport 1995, cf. Porteous & Smith 2001). Although this is a listing of attributes, they inherently contain the relational character of these attributes on the part of the respondents. Security and control is to most people a major feature of home, as is permanence and continuity. When Rapoport objects it is because these qualities cannot be seen as fundamental and constituting elements of home irrespective of setting, - of location, time, culture, life-style, religion, etc. - and that they by nature are relational; they emerge from meaningful interaction.
to other cultures where this would not be the case (Rapoport 1995), as does Kent (1995) pertaining to the homes of nomads. The same may be said about a growing number of citizens of the industrial West, many of whom are authors and researchers on books about homes and place attachment. In these cases the growing mobility basically stems from people’s own choices.

.2) Home as Choice

The problem arises when there is no choice, when mobility is the forced result of violent expulsion. For the expelled, the house, the place and the things lost or saved subsequently emerge as true symbols of (lost) home relationships. Berger’s claim that “without a history where choice was possible a house can not be a home” (1983;463) supports Rapoport’s statement that “it seems characteristic of [home environments] that they are chosen. One could almost argue that if they are not chosen they are not home” (Rapoport 1985;256). Choice becomes a key concept of home, because making choices make sense. Without choices, action becomes meaningless. Peter Marris sees ‘meaning’ as:

“a crucial organizing principle of human behavior. It is a structure, which relates purposes to expectations so as to organize actions - whether the actions are taken or only thought about. Meaning, that is, makes sense of action by providing reasons for it; and the collapse of compelling reasons to act constitutes the trauma of loss.” (Marris 1986;vii)

When your dwelling is violently destroyed and you have been banished from your home ground at gunpoint, your home is lost. The loss is seriously eroding the meaning of life with home acknowledged as “a symbol of self and self-identity” (Porteous & Smith 2001;54), a claim supported by findings from a study made by the US Department of Health in 1966 which “makes it clear that housing affect perception of one’s self” (Schorr, 1966 cf. Bratt 2002;20). ‘Perception of self’ is what Giddens labeled ‘ontological security’, which he saw as “the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of their social and material environment” (Giddens 1991 cf. Hiscock et al. 2001;50). Having had that continuity severed, the most immediate way of regaining it, and thus re-establish some sense of your life, is to reconfirm your choice of home being the very place you were expelled from (Zetter 1999).

If we revisit Habitus, we see a consistency on the part of the displaced in their projection of ‘home’ onto the building or the place that once constituted the physical

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10 In the US, 20% of the population changes address each year. On average a US resident will move 14 times during their lifetime, twice as many times as the Japanese and about 5 times as often as the Irish (used to move) (Long & Boertlein 1976 cf. Altman & Werner 1985). According to RiskWorld data for 1998, each French household moved every 10.04 years (http://www.riskworld.com/Abstract/1998/SRAEUR98/eu8ab218.htm). The scale of inter- and intra-national mobility is difficult to work out in detail, hence the use of old data.

11 Note that Rapoport never, or rarely, uses the term ‘home’ as a single term, because home is a relational concept. “Home is a useless term”, he said in Trondheim (Rapoport 1995;44). He uses the term: “home environments”.

12 The argument could be extended or refined in stating that ‘home’ is not only ‘chosen’ it is also ‘discovered’. It seems obvious that when children ‘grow into a place’ they discover home, they are in no position to chose, Only when a choice is possible, is home chosen,
imprints of their habitus. For any observer, it is important to bear in mind that these imprints initially emerged as a result of all the activated systems constituting the home, or ‘home environment’ as Rapoport would have it, not only what is related to the dwelling. For Rapoport: ‘home environment’ (‘home’ for the rest of us) is conceived as systems of activities within systems of settings.\(^\text{13}\) Housing (the house, dwelling, dwelling unit) representing home is thus part of a much wider network. ‘Home’ may be where you work’ or where you go to work from, where you master the landscape, where the rituals are familiar, where you master the tacit social codes.

Two examples show opposing interpretations of this, both determined by choice and structure. Firstly, Returning Eritreans made their homes where the livelihood options were the best. After years in exile in Somaliland, the place they once left seemed to hold no properties they could not reestablish or compensate in the place where they now chose to settle (Kibreag 2002). There are several findings of similar nature (Allen & Morsink 1994, Blakewell 2000) that make place attachment a relative notion, whereas much of the writings, especially those of environmental psychologists (cf. the book series on Human Behavior and Environment\(^\text{14}\)), deal with it in absolute terms. There are however, several noted exceptions, such as for instance, Hiscock et al. (2001), who fully acknowledge the ‘security of home’ being related to employment, tenure, neighbors, place of ancestors, etc. In effect it is these issues that constitute ‘security’. The second example deals with ‘home’ for people not able to return. Even for grandchildren of Palestinian refugees ‘home’ may be a village within Israel – a village they many never have seen and which probably has long since been destroyed. For those with no choice no other proposition provides ontological security. The uncertainty of the present does not. Only when “meanings of home changes [and] the strength of the emotional attachment weakens [do] those involved begin to see that it is possible to have another life” (Thompson 2001;14). In due course, choices may therefore emerge which eventually will bridge the impossible divide between perceived, yet lost, home, present residence – and prospects for the future (Zetter 1999). But for many of those expelled, there is no bridge. The displaced remain with no ‘permanent address’, no status, no choices..

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\(^{13}\) “Home environments are parrot of larger, culturally variable systems of settings (the house-settlement system) and are themselves best understood as that system of settings within which a particular set of activities takes place (disregarding the variability of activities and, especially, their latent aspects”. Rapoport continues: “Different groups choose very different combinations of elements as the home environments. The nature of a given home environment cannot be decided a priori but must be discovered (as must the nature of the relevant group” (Rapoport 1985;264). For a more extensive framework of home, see Rapoport 1995;44.

\(^{14}\) Human Behavior and Environment; Advances in Theory and Research, Plenum Press, New York and London. Most of the writers are part of group of people that as a matter of academic advancement move house more often than most others – but by choice.
.3) Housing as Control

The house (or village, or town) becomes a symbol of home by representing the systems of activities within a system of settings. And in this network of settings and activities now lost, stands the dwelling as primary node. The house becomes a symbolic anchor in life with no or little choices. The term or the concept has different connotations for different people at different times of their lives. When the dwelling so persistently stands out as the main node in people’s ‘network of home’ it could also rest on the aforementioned ‘affordances’: it is what takes place “behind the walls of home” that gives meaning to the dwelling. Could it be that it is the back stage properties of the ‘Goffman house’ that makes a house a home (Goffman 1969).

Fig.2.3.1 This gate pole may be one of the few tangible items left from this man’s farm. He was displaced by war, and everything he was forced to leave behind has been totally obliterated. He has been living in displacement for many years, without knowing what will become of him and his family. He is in no control, in no position to make choices, with no permanent address, and in no position to return ‘home’ to his remote mountain farm. From the Ozren Mountains, BiH, summer 2001.

In general terms, the dwelling may have been downgraded as symbol of home. But for those who have lost it against their will, violently as in war, occupation, or ‘democratically’ as in public planning, housing remains the true symbol of home (Porteous & Smith 2001). In addition to the lost dwelling, is it the lost choices that underpin the meaning of the house as home. This comes to head when planners and politicians decide to ‘demolish slums’ while the residents experience a ‘destruction of homes’ (e.g. the well-documented Boston West End demolition (see Porteous & Smith 2001;109-112 for references). It is because of having lost control of
one’s dwelling, viz. one’s life, that so many do not survive removals and resettlements (Lieberman 1983).15

We are back with Heidegger, only that instead of “Ich bin = I dwell”, we hear the displaced ask: "What am I then, if I don’t dwell?" John Turner joins in with his claim that housing is about “being in control of your life”, about being able to make choices.

Recovery will then be about regaining that control. This seems to be housing’s central challenge. In terms of post-war recovery this might not automatically mean ‘return’ to rebuild your burnt out house. Instead, it might imply a return to a state of choice where displaced people are able to choose how to reestablish their ‘systems of activities within a system of settings’. For some, it may entail a return to home grounds, for others to choose to settle elsewhere.

2.3.4 SUMMARY

Housing is about living. It may be ‘a machine for living’ as Le Corbusier would have it, but from the discussion above it is more a ‘place for making sense of life’. It is not merely a Corbusierian tool people use for living. It is an integral part of that very living. Meaning is projected into the dwelling, making it a symbol. Since it constitutes such a central place in peoples’ lives, the symbol also becomes politically powerful, not least because the symbol is tangible and the result of economic investments. Therefore the location, the address, as discussed in the previous chapter, becomes decisive in projecting meaning into the building. Housing becomes a status symbol – for those on top, and those at the bottom with no house at all. Refugees and IDPs make up a large contingent of that group.

All man-made objects are products of action, and action requires meaning, a purpose of sorts, to be released. For meaningful action to take place there must be choices. In this chapter, the power of choice has been highlighted by claiming that the concept, or symbol of home is related to choice, where to live, how to live, with whom, surrounded by what ‘stuff’, etc. Choice gives control over one’s life. When people are deprived of these choices, they lose control over their lives. This is what happens when people through meaningless enforced action are expelled from their houses, from their homes. This research deals with the physical environment for people whose life networks have been severed, and whose choices were stolen.

The literature has touched upon these losses not so much as loss of choice as loss of place. This may be because home as place attachment is oriented towards the physical environment, whereas home as a network is less focused on the place and more towards the relationships associated with it. Both of these approaches depend on and are shaped by the action associated with the physical environment, by the strategy chosen to realize the dwelling that is destined to be (part of) ‘home’.

15 In his study of 639 elderly people, Lieberman found that one year after having had to change their living arrangements, half of them were either dead, physically impaired or had deteriorated psychologically into a passive state of withdrawal.
In the next chapter, realization will be the issue. It will examine how the physical object imbued with meaning by the people using, or relating to it, also has a wider economic and social potential that may recoil and re-shape the meaning instilled. There exists no man-made physical object void of meaning. All building is intentional, hence instilled with meaning. But for it to materialize it has to be constructed. Building is a reflexive act in that how what is done will shape the output, but also affect the project’s very rationale. This is very much the point in Vedung’s theory on implementation (2000;209-245). It is the choices made through the process of implementation, i.e. its tactics that will determine the wider economic and socio-material impact of the housing project.
2.4. HOUSING AS STRATEGY

2.4.1 INTRODUCTION. ON HOUSING’S POTENTIAL

Housing represents a major sector of investment, for any country, for any citizen. It is impossible to imagine housing as a physical object and-or symbol, indeed as investment, without it affecting society materially, socially and economically. In what way and to what extent, is a matter of strategy, irrespective of it being conscientiously chosen or not. Something happens when housing is realized.

This section will look into the generation of economic activities caused by such investments and also what activities that may be rooted in the completed projects. World wide housing in the 1980s constituted between 2% and 8% of the annual GDP, and between 10 and 30% of the annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), with the industrial North holding the higher figures (Buckley and Mayo cf. Habitat-ILO 1997). Throughout the world, housing as a sector of investment has decreased somewhat since then (ibid). Yet housing’s present contribution to Germany’s GFCF still stands above 30%, i.e. housing makes up about a third of the value of all new fixed capital in Germany comprising more than half of all construction (D-STATIS 2002).1 In the developing world 40% of all WB and IMF funds go into construction of which housing accounts for anything from 35% to 40% (Habitat-ILO 1997;32). It is thus evident that housing and housing construction takes on a macro economic role in any nation’s real, financial and fiscal sector (World Bank 1993).2 The sheer volume of the housing sector impacts the balance of payments, the level of inflation - the very temperature of a nation’s economy (ibid). In all advanced economies the level of investment in housing is an indicator not only influencing the interest policies of the few still existing state housing banks, but also countries’ base rates. “Interest rates – not need, not planning, not social priorities – have [...] been the prime determinant of how much new housing is supplied in the US”, says Peter Marcuse (1990;7); and Saegert continues “Federal housing programs have often been justified as stimulants to the economy rather than as merely ways of producing housing” (1985;303). In spite of this referring to the US, it is paradoxically in line with the Keynesian economic template from the 1930s which were to guide the reconstruction policies of the war ravaged countries after WWII (Diefendorf 1990, Reiersen & Thue 1996). And it persists into the open, neo-liberal economies of today. The relationship between construction and economic growth still holds true, although the correlation is circular: construction causes economic development – causes construction – causes … (Ofori & Han 2003). This could give externally funded construction interventions a crucial opportunity to break into a ‘virtuous circle’ of enhancing recovery processes and aiding economic development. But this circle only holds true under certain, rather old-fashioned conditions (Habitat-ILO 1997). We are closing in on the core of housing as a strategy for economic development.

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1 This is substantially higher than in France, the UK and the US (Lau & Pain 2001)
2 Throughout the post-war years housing has also been the largest sector of capital formation in Bosnia (OHR Economic Newsletters, Vol. 1 & 2, ).
The core of housing is Janus-faced. The face on one side views housing as a hard-core investment, an arena for pure reason. The other face looks at housing as home guided by passion. So developing policies and forging strategies will take place with both faces looking in. Which face makes the biggest impact is a political issue resting on the worldview and ideology of those most powerful. Housing of the first generation after WW II was conceptualized mostly through the eyes of the latter, as a basic need, a right, a consumption good outside the market. With the advent of neo-classical economic liberalism housing was conceived a market commodity forging new policies, but also new relationships between people and their dwelling. The house as home, as the pole between heaven and earth, to paraphrase Berger, is losing ground to the house as strategic investment (Røe 2001). Governments have pulled out of housing in order “to enable markets to work”. But the other face of Janus may still be influencing policies and local strategies.

The economic impact of housing works in two different ways: Through backward and through forward linkages. The former refers to direct employment generated by the housing investment and the production of materials, tools transport etc used in the realization of the construction. This is ‘what housing does’ to the local economy. Forward linkages are the indirect (economic) activity generated by housing as an intermediate product, as a means to achieve something else. These latter linkages are contentious as will be discussed later. First the backward linkages.

### 2.4.2 BACKWARD LINKAGES

When a house is built on funding from abroad, irrespective from whom, the potential impact on local economic growth is at its maximum. When houses are flown in as pre-fabs (pre-fabricated houses), the potential impact of the investment is at its minimum. In both cases, the ‘basic need’ for shelter in the target area is satisfied, but the direct effects on the local economy are significantly different. With the current international engagement in housing these basic economic realities stand center stage. The difference is due to the different direct ‘multiplier effect’ of the intervention and the backward linkages in the production of the house. The ‘multiplier effect’ can be defined as the ratio of change in national income to the initial change in the sectorial investment, in this case housing. More directly, the multiplicity factor indicates how many times you are able to have the same money circulate within a defined area, normally within a country, before it is taken out of circulation as taxes, savings, or spent on imports. Backward linkages describe the pattern of these regressive demands, how they go, where they go. More formally, backward linkages are measures of the demand from one sector, in our case housing, into other sectors of the (national) economy.

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3 “Enabling markets to work” was the title of the very influential book by the World Bank (World Bank 1993), published following the UN Habitat Istanbul Convention. These guidelines from the World Bank have shaped the policies of housing privatization in the former communist economies. The last country to ‘leave housing to the market’ was Serbia. “In Serbia the government considers housing to be a private sector activity with only limited direct government intervention” (Wegelin 2003).

4 This is what I mean by ‘rather old-fashioned conditions’ (above). Multiplier effects are not what policy makers or economic research deals with in the age of Free Trade. An investigation (Jan 2002) into government and private institutions dealing with economic planning in Norway made that evident.
Housing has proven, with some noted exceptions, to be a very effective ‘sector of investment’ with a very high multiplier effect, larger than manufacturing (Grimes 1976 cf. Habitat-ILO 1997;32). This is basically because of the labor intensity of housing construction. According to findings from the 1970s, the income multiplier alone stands at about 2 on low-cost housing. This means that “for every unit of currency spent directly on house construction, an additional unit of currency is added to demand in the economy” (Habitat-ILO 1997;31). There are indications of this figure being significantly higher if generating effects of the ‘virtuous circle’ are reached, and already ILO and the World Bank claim that in developing countries, there are about two, not one, additional jobs generated from each job in housing construction (ibid;93). These are difficult effects to measure in the first place and more so, since they are highly contextual. Two such contextual exceptions are the formally built single family house in the developing world, and the externally funded housing in conflict areas or in areas damaged by natural disasters. The former require substantial imports. Klaassen et al. (1987) has found that the income multipliers were inversely related to the cost of the house primarily because of the import levels. In the case of post-war or post-disaster countries, the production apparatus for building materials may have been damaged (with no strong inducement to have them reconstructed since the international agencies can import building materials tax-free). In both cases, a smaller portion of the construction cost was taken by direct wages. In Bosnia the figures were down to about 30% during the mid-1990s. The same figure is put forward for high-income housing in Kenya (Syagga 1989 cf. Habitat ILO 1997;53). Similar, if not worse, are the labor-materials ratio in formally built single-family housing funded by overseas remittances (Goffe 2002).

Both of these exceptions are examples of practices that impede the process of economic growth or economic recovery. In both cases, import substitution would have contributed towards economic growth through employment and value creation. The much cited study from Sri Lanka from the 1980s show that by only using locally produced building materials and components the employment within the sector would increase by about 20%, reducing the national unemployment by one-third. The implications are obvious. Take any book, policy paper or any internet site dedicated to ‘development’ or ‘reconstruction’. There is a universal call for utilizing local resources. But in the ‘reconstruction’ business, where most of the housing (re)construction is funded by external governments or multilateral agencies, there are donor interests to consider. In East Timor, only 20% of the total funds granted were left behind in the domestic economy (Hill & Saldahna 2001). Mossberg et al. have shown that one expat carpenter of those brought to Bosnia to complete Swedish pre-fabs cost the same as 150 local carpenters (Mossberg et al. 1997;74). To utilize the intrinsic potential of housing as a vehicle for economic development in

5 Organizations providing material assistance to Palestine, however, have to pay ‘security charges’ – to Israel. The U.N. Relief and Works Agency, UNRWA; had to pay US$ 2.5 million to Israel for their imported relief supply (http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/aid/2002/095israel.htm)

6 This figure is much lower than the full cost, which for emergency projects also are to cover HQ overheads in the donor country and the expat and local staff of the organization.

7 These are from cost figures presented in project reports from Norwegian People’s Aid.

8 And we are talking about Bosnia, a country with traditions of excellence in modern construction.
countries where housing-related production is down or destroyed, and bearing in mind the materials-labor ratio, efforts to raise the production capacity of the building materials industry, is at least as important as the (re)construction of housing itself. Because these activities thrive on each other.

2.4.3 FORWARD LINKAGES

'Forward linkages' of a housing investment are similar to its economic 'impacts' (NMFA 1993), i.e. what housing indirectly does once built. Whereas backward linkages, however laid out, are actual inputs into the housing construction, forward linkages are assumptions about possible future gains once the housing project is being used. Take health, for instance. One of the most prevalent claims is the linkage between ill health and ill housing. Modern political movements have been rooted in this, so has the very 'modern movement' in architecture and urban planning (sun, air, green spaces).

![Image](image_url)

Fig.2.4.1 The New Healthy Housing environment was to replace the old, unhealthy, dark and crowded housing of yesterday. Le Corbusier's assumptions on forward linkages; sketches from the 1920s.

The very notion of public planning is very much indebted to this claim; even Plato posed it, according to Kostof (1992). The problem with such 'forward linkage claims' is that it is difficult to present a rigorous causation between better housing/better health with, for instance, higher productivity as indicator of a forward linkage. The elements are "next to impossible" to isolate in a way that makes rigor-
ous research possible (Moavenzadeh & Hagopian 1983 cf. Habitat-ILO 1997;125). 9

The lack of positive causation is, however, compensated by basic findings of the type presented by Burns & Ferguson (1987), that shelter and settlement programs as such have no special qualities for promoting economic progress, merely that they accommodate such progress. In the UK, Maclennan found that on a national scale housing investment does not induce long-term increases in capital formation or productivity (Maclennan et al. 1997 cf. Maclennan & Pryce 1998;6). But Maclennan maintains that, supported by “wide practitioner belief”, at local city or regional levels, housing investment appears to have endogenous growth effects on job-related investments: “Cut housing investment locally and growth will fall” (ibid;6). So research has to be content with the ability to falsify zero-hypothesis with findings like “in no case did better housing make matters worse for the rehoused populations studied” (Burns & Grebler 1977 cf. Habitat-ILO 1997;15). Bearing in mind crucial effect of choice in the housing-home-health relationship, such findings may in effect be sufficient to undergird housing strategies and inform reconstruction guidelines. They are to housing improvements as the Pareto Principle and the writings of Rawls (1973) were to the social democratic ideology and the theoretical underpinning of the welfare state. In simple terms, they hold that as long as no one is worse off, a policy is deemed fair (Rawls 1973) and socially preferable (Pareto) 10 if one person is better off because of it.

In forward linkages housing is a means. Whether it is appropriate as a means to some chosen goal or not is a matter of assumption. Take reconciliation, a strategic goal in most post-war reconstruction work undertaken by INGOs and multilateral agencies (Slim 2000, Schloms 2001, CPCC 1998). Housing as a major reconstruction input cannot confirm this assumption. Yet housing as such was brought into Guatemala’s peace accord in that the government committed itself to spend 5% of their annual revenue on housing.11 Reportedly, this pledge has not been realized. Mary Anderson (1999) presents a case where housing did affect reconciliation – detrimentally. Her case showed how easily housing can exasperate a conflict. This housing case was among those used to underpin the “do no harm” principle; a sober reminder of the frailty of these forward linkages, how they may be misunderstood, politicized, made victims of empty claims – or how they may do harm.

But there are forward linkages that are possible to ascertain, even plan for. Housing as place for work is one that makes housing an intermediate means. This is, however, such a basic issue that time might have come to incorporate it into housing proper. It started out that way. The emerging post-industrial era again opens up for ‘work from home’. In the developing world, work hardly left home. Numerous stud-

9 On the other hand, there are statistical correlations between bad housing, bad health, poverty and the like. But does bad housing cause bad health or is bad health and poverty the reason people end up in bad housing? When investigating housing mobility we often end up with the latter. Housing is a slippery tool indeed.

10 “When professional economists think about economic policies, they generally start with the principle that a change is good if it makes someone better off without making anyone else worse off. That idea, first suggested by the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, is referred to as the Pareto principle” (Public Interest, No 137, Fall 1999 http://www.nber.org/feldstein/pf99.html).

ies covering most countries of the world indicate that 10–25% of all housing is used for income-generating activities (Habitat-ILO 1997;190). Housing being a means of production has made tenants in government housing alter and extend their flats to accommodate business requirements (Tipple 2000, Dasgupta 1987 cf. Habitat –ILO 1997;126). The most visually distinctive, and by number the most common, aside from rooms to let (Tarekegn 2000), is that of the shopkeeper trading from his house front. Such a house is transformed into a ‘home shop’ due to its location. High frequency and high prevalence of prospective customers are key location factors. In new constructions or in upgrading projects these can be planned for. How housing links up to services, to public facilities, to places of employment and available communication options, are crucial forward linkages of any housing investments (Chatterjee 1987 cf. Habitat-ILO 1997;37, 81, Green et al. 2001). This, of course, is planning basics, seemingly universal, reconfirmed by Linn in his studies on urban development in cities of the South (Linn 1983), embraced by Davidson & Payne in their Urban Projects Manual (2000), and in post-disaster reconstruction recommendations (Davis 1978, UNDR O 1982). In terms of planning, it would be expected that such preferences are valid also in post-war settings.

Housing generates forward linkage economic benefits in a more direct way. On the one hand is the consumption and renewal of ‘stuff’, on the other hand is future maintenance, conversions, extensions etc., future backwards linkages, as it were. The level and impacts of these can never be quantified in advance. More than anything they depend on the mode of tenure.

It was the post-WW II housing boom in the USA which instituted home-owner suburbanization which in turn gave rise to, and depended on, the Do-It-Yourself (DIY) movement, a business sector of significant proportions in most industrialized countries. (Goldstein 1998). More than 30 years ago, John Turner documented from Latin America the commonly accepted fact that security of tenure is a prerequisite for personal commitment – willingness, by any other name – of investing into your dwelling (Turner & Goetze 1967). DeSoto has in two recent books been advocating the rights of tenure and privatization of housing in order to achieve the dynamics of the ‘forward linkages’ (De Soto 2000, De Soto & Abbott 2002). His work has been very influential in forging the World Bank’s ‘enabling approach’. In addition to the willingness underpinned by secured tenure, ability and knowledge are required on the part of the dweller to enter into these activities, either for entering them

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12 As was beautifully exemplified by Oscar Hansen and Svein Hatløy in their proposal for a large-scale housing scheme (never realized) on the outskirts of Lima (Hatløy 1991).
13 What happens when they are not will be examined in my second case, The Mihatovici settlement (Cf. Chapter 6.4).
14 He identified five decisive attributes on housing demand: access (to employment opportunities, public services, communication, etc), space (lot size to cater for urban farming, work space, etc), on-site services (quality of infrastructure), shelter (the quality of the dwelling, privacy, space for possible rent or work), and security of tenure, by many seen as the most important in terms of reaping forward linkage benefits from housing.
15 “Enablement strategies seek to improve the functioning of markets which supply the five major components in the housing process; land, finance, the skills of the labor force, infrastructure, and building material; and to provide an appropriate regulatory framework” (Habitat-ILO 1997;6).
him/herself or to organize others to do so.\textsuperscript{16} UN/Habitat sees the latter as the future scenario in reaping sustainable benefits from housing (Habitat-ILO 1997). The operational nature of these activities links back to the capacity of the housing to accommodate change and allow for a maintenance regime that is materially and financially possible to sustain. We see the merging of ‘forward linkages’ with the physical nature of housing. Now let us see if we can make the backward linkages join in.

2.4.4 FORWARD LOOKING BACKWARDS LINKAGES
In the literature the various aspects of housing are dealt with separately. Hence backward linkages are the concern of economists, whereas the forward linkages, so dependent on assumptions, are also within the realm of architects. But, as we shall see, there are issues that span both the backward and the forward linkages, issues that are at the very center of post-war housing. Two of these stand out: they are innovation and self-help. The former refers to opportunities opened by the production or the needs behind it, and grasped by someone realizing that things “could have been done otherwise”, to quote the essence of Giddens’ agency definition. The other is about how the future linkages emerge from the very process of building, from realizing the backward linkages, as it were.

.1) Innovation
When disaster suddenly strikes, new ways of dealing with housing are required, or at least opportunities are opened to do so. Housing viewed merely as a low-tech object naturally attracts outside designers and innovators. Throughout recent history a plethora of ‘innovative’, but totally unsuitable, unsustainable and even harmful solutions have been advocated. They range from the famous polystyrene sheds from BASF (Davis 1978) via ‘modern’ concrete structures (Barakat 1994) to the recent emergency housing for Kosovo.\textsuperscript{17} So far, it is only the paper drum emergency housing designed by Shigeru Ban, built after the Kobe earthquake that represents appropriate innovation (GG Portfolio 1997).

It is the experience from WW II and the ensuing reconstruction that is most often cited to exemplify the potential for innovation in permanent housing construction.\textsuperscript{18} New materials, new production schemes, new designs were launched to cater for the enormous demand for housing. It was the modernists’ heyday. Pre-fabricated housing came to prominence during the war to cater for the housing needs of the US war industry and was studied by most European governments (Danche 1986, Diefendorf 1990, Albrecht 1995). Architectural design-production experiments were

\textsuperscript{16} Hence the massive level of do-it-yourself books and periodicals, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, but still prevalent, now also as TV entertainment.

\textsuperscript{17} This was a highly publicized, and heavily sponsored international architectural competition held in 1999 in response to the plight of the houseless Kosovars. It was arranged by “Architecture for Humanity”, established by a US architect who, guided by his good intentions, thought he “could do otherwise” on behalf of the people of Kosovo. Apparently no house was built as a result of the competition.

\textsuperscript{18} Although most of the ‘innovative’ emergency housing referred to still stands, either as shelter for animals, for storage or as housing for the society’s outcasts, like the romani people, the gypsies. In Skopje, the ‘temporary’ asbestos paneled housing erected after the 1963 earthquake have become homes for middle class families due to their central location (Spangle, W. 1991).
tried out, such as the “Case Study Houses” in California\(^\text{19}\) and the “Selvaag-hus” in Norway.\(^\text{20}\) Similar efforts were undertaken in most countries at the time (Diefendorf 1990, Rassegna 1993). But pre-fab housing never made it beyond the immediate post-war years.\(^\text{21}\) The other face of Janus was probably looking in.

\textbf{2) Self-help}

That face was looking at self-help housing, or ‘aided self-help’ as it is known as a housing strategy term (Harris 1999a).\(^\text{22}\) Although this is the generic way of housing construction, as a ‘housing approach’ or ‘housing strategy’, it first took off in the wake of WW I; “The First World War was a watershed”, writes Harris.\(^\text{23}\) It was about making the most of the meager resources then available. Programs were initiated throughout most of Europe. Architects were engaged to produce designs that could cater for anticipated incremental growth; Ernst May\(^\text{24}\) was among them. But it was not until the post-WW II years that self-help took off into a movement. The war veterans sustaining their wartime bonding led the way, highlighting the social capital foundation for the movement. The veterans and their families had the greatest needs and the moral high ground in arguing for government support in building their own homes. This led to an extraordinary activity. In 1949, a third of all new one-family houses and a quarter of all dwellings in the US were made by their owners (US Department of Labor, 1954 cf. Harris 1999b;297). In Greece even more. By 1950 three-quarters of all post-war housing in Greece was produced this way (Speer 1951 cf. Harris 1999a;297). Although not at these levels, assisted self-help or self-provided housing, prevailed. In the early 1990s, Duncan & Rowe held that self-provided housing still made up “a major form of housing supply in nearly all the developed countries in Western Europe, North America and Australasia” (Duncan & Rowe 1993;1331). If that remains unrecognized, so does the fact that self-help housing is applied in programs like ‘urban homesteading’ in cities like New York (Coit 1994). It is, of course, fully acknowledged as the most prevalent approach in the developing world, although the UN has now come out in favor of promoting small and medium-sized contractors taking on the construction of housing, rather than people doing it themselves (Habitat-ILO 1997). In post-war and post-disaster housing (re)construction this is gradually growing into an acknowledged

\(^{19}\) The “Case Study Houses” were sponsored by the Californian journal \textit{Arts and Architecture}. Their aim was to seek out new design ideas—particularly in the use of new materials and techniques—and to propagate good design. We are talking 1945 - 49. One of their houses, the Eames House became very influential.

\(^{20}\) Constructed in 1948 as a proposal for a cheaper, more rapidly built family house than the building regulations allowed for. The regulations were changed. The housing crisis after the war had brought a genuine improvement to housing in Norway.

\(^{21}\) In the UK more than 150,000 pre-fabs were produced during the war and the early post-war years. By the late 1960s at least one-third of them were still in use. Some are still in use, many of them as registered landmark buildings (Vale 1995).

\(^{22}\) Another label is ‘self-provision’, comprising ‘self-build housing’, where the household do most of the actual building works, and ‘self-promoted housing’ where the household acts as promoter and developer (Duncan & Rowe 1993).

\(^{23}\) Although “the earliest documented argument [for aided self-help] was made by the Christiania (Oslo) Worker’s Association in Norway in 1874 (Umrath, 1952;9)” (Harris 1999b;283).

\(^{24}\) Ernst May was an architect and urban planner, very active in Germany up until 1930, when he left for the USSR. He worked there for some years before emigrating to Tanzania. He returned to Germany in 1957, and died 1980. His major contribution was planning for and implementing new housing, particularly in the Frankfurt area in the late 1920s.

“Housing achievements consist not only of houses and other material parts of a dwelling environment, but also of the ways and means by which they are sponsored, designed, built, used and maintained”, said Turner 30 years back (Turner 1972; 161). What makes self-help into more than a way of production is that it rests on ‘participation’, to the level of ‘community control’. Turner saw aided self-help as a strategy towards autonomy, of control, of ‘who decides - we or them’ (Turner & Goetze 1967;11-34). It is about mutual aid between families, between members of communities, about “helping ourselves”. It constitutes and relies on ‘community participation’, the omnipresent mantra of all development literature (see references to central papers in Barakat & Chard 2002). Participation as a way of transferring perceived ‘ownership’ of a project is required to secure its sustainability. As long as projects are funded by outside sources true participation on the upper levels of Arnstein’s ladder is apparently extremely difficult to achieve: “The inequalities introduced by money appear to be indestructible”, writes Lalaye (1996;140). Introducing "sweat equity", as done in aided self-help, will balance this relationship and thereby allow for top-flight ‘citizen power’ as envisioned by Arnstein (1969). Turner was convinced this to be the case (1967, 1972). At the utilitarian end we have findings like “[people] maintain their buildings better when there is an element of self-help” (Coit 1994;123), or that there is a better repayment rate in these schemes than in traditionally government-run housing projects (Shah in Payne 1984 cf. Coit 1994;123).

At the other end, we have findings on place attachment through appropriation of the environment; having ‘produced it’ as Sartre would have said (2001/1956). This way, the builder has strengthened his relationship to the place; the place or the environment in question being defined as complex and systematic organization of space, time, meaning and communication (Rapoport 1982 cf. Werner et al.

25 Sherry Arnstein’s “Ladder for Participation” was written with the realities of the US in mind, but the ladder has been used throughout the world to guide and analyze planning and development projects. The lower two steps are non-participatory, they merely aim at rallying support; steps 3, 4, and 5 indicate a ‘level of tokenism’; the three upper steps, a ‘level of citizen power’.

8 - citizen control
7 - delegated power
6 - partnership
5 - placation
4 - consultation
3 - informing
2 - therapy
1 - manipulation

26 This gives away Turner’s indebtedness to Geddes and Kropotkin. But it also alludes to the political independence of ‘assisted self-help’, to anarchism, by any other word. Thus, assisted self-help housing had support from the US (long before Turner) as and when assisted self-help was perceived to promote home ownership, or in quelling discontent from supporting communism. In the USSR, assisted self-help constituted a major part of the housing policy until Stalin went Baroque in 1936. From then on it was part of a Western conspiracy. In the West, the organized labor effectively lobbied against any assistance to the self-help approach, years before Turner was reproached in academic circles the 1980s by Marxist scholars (Harris 2003). “Aided self-help is a political chameleon”, said Harris (1999;280), making obvious that assisted self-help is more than a method of constructing houses.
The strengthening of place attachment thus enhances the relationship to other ‘people of the place’, affecting the trust and solidarity, or social capital, which stand tallest of the capital modes necessary for developing and sustaining democratically oriented communities (Putnam 1993, 163-176; 1995; Grootaert 1998). This is the sort of capital that displaced people value, to the extent of living in provisional, plastic-covered shacks rather than disperse and thus lose their social network. 27 It is the sort of capital that tends to reproduce itself. 28 This is a capital mode, which can not be provided, nor acquired in general terms.

It is impossible to lay out any secure, trans-historical generalizations on how aided self-help may impact economic, social or political life. “Its merits must be assessed with unusually close reference to place and time”, says Richard Harris (1999; 280).

2.4.5 SUMMARY
This section has focused on the implementation phase. How housing becomes what it sets out to be, a physical structure imbued with meaning and functional possibilities. Take the physical structure, for instance. It has been made quite obvious that using domestically produced materials, i.e. applying a high labor multiplier, constitutes a significant development potential compared to importing materials. Ignoring this is, in effect, squandering opportunities of enhancing recovery.

However, it might not only be ignorance that causes building materials to be imported. 29 Prevailing free trade policies make any preferential agreements with domestic producers difficult, if not impossible, partly because of international trade agreements signed, or because of fear of reprisals or refused access to markets in the rich nations. 30 This is further emphasized by the fact that international agencies and INGOs do not pay import duties. Unit cost was therefore the decisive argument when the UNHCR chose to import roofing sheets for 100,000 houses in Rwanda, in spite of economic logic showing the developmental potential in applying localized solutions (UNHCR 2000a).

Re/constructing housing through the ‘aided self-help strategy’ has community strengthening as one of its presumed by-products. This strengthening of social capital through administering and building together represents a major contribution

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27 This was the case for bulldozed community temporarily located in a park in Nairobi. They stayed together for 12 years under extreme conditions rather than accept offers of dispersal and thereby moving out to other areas (Andreasen 1987).
28 In Trondheim, Norway, two suburbs were constructed through organized self-help during the 1960s. From this, emerged a social network so strong that now a number of the participants are about to build a large self-promoted retirement home together in the same neighborhood.
29 Or is it ignorance? The EU presented their Essential Aid Programme to Bosnia-Herzegovina thus: “The essential aid programme allowed Bosnia Herzegovina to import the products and equipment necessary to start the reconstruction process. Building materials, piping, seed, agricultural machinery, medical supplies, mine detectors, buses, trams, electrical equipment, coal and all sorts of other equipment and raw materials were brought in and distributed” (EC 1997; 3).
30 Roger Zetter (1992) has documented how housing was made an instrument in support of post-war recovery in the aftermath of the partition of Cyprus. That was probably the last time preferential trade policies were strategically used in support of post-war recovery, in a manner similar to how the post-WW II reconstruction of Europe was conducted.

The strategy chosen, or the strategy dictated is a matter of context and professional perceptions. Implementing housing in areas affected by armed conflict must necessarily pay attention to the ‘realities on the ground’, the overall context composed as it is of material constraints and extreme social vulnerability. This will be the topic of the next chapter.
3 WAR, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HOUSING

3.1 INTRODUCTION
It is the ‘killing’ of housing in war that has initiated this research project. It is the effects of war that make up the context into which housing is reconstructed. The very process of recovery support is guided by the experience and outcomes of war as interpreted by those who fund and organize the reconstruction projects – modulated by the strategic goals they set for their own political and economic engagement. The way we set out to implement our housing interventions will thus be informed by our understanding of the conflict, and ultimately guide how we act in the field. That understanding is ‘theory laden’, in the Sayer sense, was poignantly posited by Hanna Arendt in reference to the US engagement in Vietnam:

"The fact is that very few of the sophisticated intellectuals who wrote the Pentagon Papers believed in this [domino] theory. Yet everything they did was based on this assumption [...] because it gave them a framework within which they could work. [...] People find such theories in order to get rid of contingency and unexpected- ness.” (Arendt 1978)

But before examining the theories in more detail let us go through some definitions and basic facts on current wars.

3.2 CURRENT WARS AND TRENDS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT
There are several research centers presenting datasets on war-related issues, numbers, origin, type, etc. Currently there are general indications on a decline from the peak 1984–1988 period both in numbers and in societal impacts (Marshall 2002). Figures show around 30 ongoing armed conflicts worldwide. There are some sobering qualifications to these figures. All but three are intra-state wars,3 and by far the most take place in non-industrial countries. In fact, in the late 1990s three-quarters of all armed conflicts were taking place within the poorest nations in the world (ibid.; 78). According to Stewart, eight of the ten lowest ranking countries, both on the Human Development Index (HDI) and in GNP/pc, have been ravaged by internal wars in the recent past. In fact half of the least developed countries have been subject to serious political violence between 1970 and 1996. More serious still, over one-third of all the world’s countries (54 out of 158) have had serious internal wars during the 90s and one third of those conflicts were running for more

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1 See Worldwatch (2003; 74) and Collier et al. (2003) for references to some of these institutions.

2 There is no codified definition on war/armed conflict or on properties defining their gravity or impact. The Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) defines ‘armed conflict’ as: “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”. This is further sub-grouped into:

   • ‘Minor Armed Conflict’ with at least 25 battle-related deaths and fewer than 1000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict”;
   • ‘Immediate Armed Conflict’ with at least 25 battle-related deaths p.a. and at least 1000 deaths in total, but less than 1000 p.a.
   • ‘War’ with at least 1000 battle-related deaths p.a.

3 Two involve the US, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the third is the conflict on Kashmir.

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than 7 years (Stewart 2002; 105). According World Bank findings there is a strong
correlation between GNP/pc and prevalence of civil war, with risks rising with
deteriorating economies (World Bank 2003; 58; UNDP 2000; 58). Current wars are
concentrated – but by no means exclusively – to Sub-Sahara Africa, South Asia and to
the island states of the Asian Pacific (Gurr & Marshall 2003; 12–13).

Furthermore, PIOOM has listed 300 “political tension situations” where human
rights violations, inequalities and environmental destruction may – or may not –
end up as tomorrow’s wars (Worldwatch 2003; 74). Research at Harvard on 20 re-
cent civil wars showed that no apparent signs of the oncoming conflict were de-
tectable five years prior to its outbreak: “The considerable efforts by academics and
others to predict where war will break out next have been largely futile (see Mar-
shall 1997 for a review)” says Haughton (1998; 9). But Haughton’s research did
not focus on the political tension situations where peace prevailed. Why there is an
apparent decline in the number of wars is not generally agreed upon. Gurr & Mar-
shall claim this is due to improved efforts by the international community to medi-
ate, deploy military forces and develop peace-building mechanisms and thus foil the
conflicts before they turn nasty (2003). This is contested by others (Hampson &
Malone 2002).

3.3 IN THE SHADOW OF ANCIENT WARS

“Honor, fear and interest” are held to be the fundamentals of war. The Greek histo-
rian and general, Thucydides, presented these in 395 BC as the ultimate causes of
the Peloponnesian War. This claim on war’s origin was reiterated two thousand
years later by Thomas Hobbes. He held that the nature of man made him wage war
for three reasons: “first competition, then suspicion, and lastly, honor” (cf. Stor-
heim 1993; 79). All these causes are perceived notions, real yet often irrational,
ancient, yet contemporary. In current political and historical discourse, Thucydides

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4 ‘Civil war’ is defined in the World Bank report as taking place when “an identifiable rebel organization
challenges the government militarily and the resulting violence results in more than 1000 combat-
related deaths, with at least 5% on each side” (World Bank 2003; 10).
5 Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM), Leiden, Nether-
lands.
6 These were the most severe civil conflicts since 1970, where at least 0,5% of each country’s popula-
tion had been killed. In the worst case, that of Cambodia, 13% had died.
7 Johan Galtung’s proposal for a Nature Park in the contested border area between Ecuador and Peru is
an innovative case in point. And there are some encouraging cases referred to in “People Building Peace”
(Tongeren 1999). This stands in contrast to much of the academic writing on ‘conflict prevention’, much
of which is conceptually fuzzy as to proactive or reactive interventions (Lund 2002). The fact that much
of the writing is normative rather than empirical reveals the prevailing academic – and operational –
adolescence of ‘conflict prevention’.
8 The plethora of “Peace, Conflict Management, Mediation and Prevention Units” and the like, popping
up at most universities of the world raises critical focus on the ethics of research. Many of these are
established on the basis of Good Intentions and in response to a “market demand” for knowledge on
how to prevent conflicts and enhance peace. Findings that confirm the importance of these new research
institutions must therefore be rigorously scrutinized. There is self-promotion in the air. INCORE of Derry
even looked into how these activities of ‘conflict resolution’ and the like may be evaluated, but acknowl-
edge difficulties in finding mutually accepted benchmarks (Church & Shouldice, 2003).
9 In this perspective the US-UK war on Iraq actually started in the fall of 2002, when withdrawing the
troops and equipment already deployed would be perceived an unacceptable loss of face, or honor, for
the leaders who sent them.
and Hobbes hold sway (Kagan 1995, Keegan 1998, Glover 2001, Howard 2001,). After a lifetime studying contemporary wars A.J.P. Taylor claimed that “men do not fight in modern wars because they like it. They fight because they are told that it is their duty to do so. The clever people invent the excuses for war” (1971). The ‘clever people’ are those who have highjacked the notion of ‘home’, and made war a project of defense of the homeland, as John Berger (1984) was saying (see previous chapter).

Defending your homeland, your territory, your house is easily extended into destroying those of the others. In line with the sort of ‘pre-emptive arguments’ currently in vogue, ‘defending Serbia’ means burning other people’s houses, or ‘defending Israel’ means destroying Palestinian homes. These are the type of political rhetoric, grounded in the Hobbesian ‘interest, fear and honor’, that are used by the ‘clever people’ to shape public perceptions – and support for war.

Waging war is the ultimate collective act. It can only be realized through mass mobilization. This is why the means of mass communication are fundamental to waging war: it was ‘the talkies’ of the 1930s in Nazi Germany,11 Serbian National Television in the years before and during the war in former Yugoslavia (Silber & Little 1996, Magas & Zanic 2001), and it was the radio in the years leading up to the slaughter in Rwanda (Metzl 1997).12 News media, particularly in the US, were instrumental in mobilizing public support for the Iraqi invasion. By ‘embedding’ journalists with the invading troops, the public in the West was informed in ways that maintained a high support throughout the campaign.13

It is only through the creation of ‘the other’, the enemy, that the notion of ‘we’ or ‘ours’ emerges (Beck 1998, 2003). This notion of “we”-“they” is most easily established – and exploited – where there exists “severe horizontal inequalities, that is, inequalities in political, economic, and/or social conditions among culturally and/or geographically distinct groups”, according to Stewart (2002). For these inequalities to explode into violence, group leaders, or ‘smart people’, have to be able to mobilize the ‘distinct groups’ (Brown 1993 cf. Deng 2002; 10). This often takes place where there is a power struggle in the group’s leadership (Hampson & Malone 2002), a phenomenon often referred to in explaining Milosevic’s role in the break-up of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1996).

It is in this context that the Hobbesian ‘honor, fear and competition’ still makes sense. War waged on behalf of – and on premises set by - the ‘smart people’ sup-

10 10,000 Palestinian houses and flats have been destroyed by the Israelis since they occupied the West Bank and Gaza, according to The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD).
11 Kevin Brownlow’s 2002 television program “The Tramp and the Dictator”, shown on Norwegian National Television, August 3, 2003, claimed that without the newsreel sound, Hitler would have been but a comic figure in German history.
12 The radio station was actually run by a Kigali university professor. The role of academia was also crucial in legitimizing Serbian nationalism and subsequent mobilization through its famous ‘Memorandum’ (http://www.beograd.com/sanu/images/memo.pdf).
13 It worked significantly. British papers presented opinion surveys showing a rise in support of the war of about 20 percentage points after the invasion. (The Guardian, March 25, 2003).
ported by the impoverished, the bored, the opportunists – and the armed, mobilized as a ‘culturally and/or geographically distinct group’.14

3.4 UNDERSTANDING NEW WARS

One of the most recent titles in the reading list on military theory at one US military college,15 ends like this:

“Nothing known or predicted about the Information Age provides conclusive evidence that the development or strategy in the 21st century will be remarkably different than in the past” (Johnson et al. 1995).

The authors see more of the same old wars, only with more sophisticated technology, more surprise, more shock and awe. They projected what Mary Kaldor came to label “spectacle wars” (2000, 2002), a mode of warfare employed in Kosovo/Serbia 1999, in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and partly in Afghanistan in 2002. It is state warfare that relies on total technological supremacy – and no body bags on the part of the supreme power.16 The label refers to the media spectacle these wars construct. “Their actual military objective is less important than satisfying public opinion”, says Kaldor (2002), touching bases with both Hobbes and Boudrillard.17 These wars, produced for television audiences of the Western world as it were, are also changing the way the West perceives post-spectacle war reconstruction18 - as a task requiring a linear efficiency based on clearly stated goals much like the way the military operates. Hence the growing role of de facto military units involved in reconstruction (World Disasters Report 2001, Macrae 2002).19

Spectacle wars are sophisticated ‘old wars’. They merit presentation for two reasons. Firstly they shape Western public perceptions of war, and by implication make manifest the humiliating helplessness of ‘the others’. Secondly, they make up part

14 However, Stewart (2002) points to the fact that mobilized masses will not easily be held back even if the ‘clever people’ do. In such cases new ‘clever people’ may be elected or appointed. Enzensberger is on to the same when refusing to acquit common people from acting as members of a warring collective: “Who was it who fed and nourished the perpetrators, who applauded them and prayed for them, if not the ‘innocent civilians’” (Enzensberger 1994; 51).


16 Of the c.350,000 US soldiers and reservists involved in Iraqi invasion by May 1 2003, 115 have died in combat-related deaths (duly specified in race/ethnicity by the US Defense Department, http://web1.whs.osd.mil/diorhome.htm). According to Iraqi Body Count 6000–8000 Iraqis have been reported killed and some 20,000 wounded (http://www.iraqbodycount.net/) (Norwegian National Radio News 07.08.03).

17 Boudrillard in his three essays on the First Gulf War rhetorically asked if the Gulf War actually did take place. His point was that none of war’s fundamental constituents, death, pain, cruelty and fear, were present. We saw nothing of it. The war was (“the allied forces”) fought was a different war “speculative[ly] unfolding in an abstract, electronic and informational space” (1995; 56). What we saw through the (controlled) media was not a distorted or misleading representation, but a simulacrum, says Boudrillard. John Pilger writes in the New Statesman August 4, 2003: “Like the American-driven, mediaval-type siege that destroyed hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives over 12 years, there is no knowledge of this in America; therefore it did not happen”.

18 This was the case in Afghanistan and in Iraq. “Building will Follow the Bombing”, writes Jack Straw, the British Foreign Minister, in The Guardian, October 21, 2001.

19 Christian ethics on war going back to the writings of Augustin and Thomas of Aquinas only acknowledge war as legitimate when 1) it is a war of defense, 2) it is declared by a legitimate authority, 3) it is fought to reestablish peace, 4) it is to be limited in time (between it being declared and the signing of a cease fire/peace treaty). These points underpin all international conventions regulating the Laws of War (Trond Bakkevig, Dagbladet 24 January 2003).
of the complex causes underlying the proliferation of the new wars in the poor world. Waging war as a way of fighting back, of coping with living in ‘the black holes of informational capitalism’, as Castells (1996) might have described it.

### 3.5 WAR IN THE BLACK HOLES OF GLOBALIZATION

The 'new wars' are significantly different from the state wars of old. To TV audiences of the North these new wars appear senseless, gruesome and endless. To make sense of these often extremely violent conflicts will depend on the concepts we apply, how we frame our questions - ultimately on our world view. Somewhat superficially it is possible to distinguish between the ‘Hobbesians’, or the ‘realist’ school of thought which informs most of the political decisions taken by Western governments,20 and the group of writers and thinkers much indebted to Manuel Castells, who sees the new wars invariably linked to the process of globalization. These new wars “are breaking up the cultural and social-economic divisions that defined the patterns of politics which characterized the modern period” (Kaldor 1999;70).

Contrary to popular opinion, the globalized liberal world does not spread its wealth. It concentrates it (Hoogvelt 1997 cf. Duffield 2002;3, Weisbrot & Baker 2003). “The architecture of the global economy features an asymmetrical interdependent world”, writes Castells in the mid-1990s, “organized around three major economic regions” (1996; 145), i.e. North America, Europe and East Asia. Generally speaking commercial investment in Africa has dried up since the 1970s (Duffield 2002; 28–30, Weisbrot & Baker 2003). These and similar regions are in fact superfluous in today’s globalized economy. Yet within all these ‘black holes’ there are scattered islands of relative wealth. These affect the horizontal inequality, and represent linkages to the globalized world. As such they take on crucial bloodline functions in the new wars. As we shall see later these islands are also where the international aid interventions locate.

Inextricably linked to this process is the reign of economic liberalism, which has directed the development of the countries excluded by globalization. Downsizing the state has been a conditioning premise for international aid or credit, opening up the economy and the borders to free trade have been others (Munslow & Brown 1999).21 In line with this policy shift, a paradigm shift in fact, has been the privatization of the North-South linkages, i.e. the rise of the non-governmental organizations (Tvedt 1996, 1998). As conflicts appear these organizations have become the piano players of globalization, administering the emergency relief and the humanitarian aid, in a way Robert Cox calls "global poor relief and riot control" (Cox 95; 41).

The New Wars may thus be seen as a consequence of this global restructuring, exclusion of the South or globalization, by any other name (Litan 2001 cf. Winer

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20 See the influential writing of Professor Huntington (1996, 2002) where he reinterpreted the ‘state’ in realist political thought to that of ‘civilization’.

21 There is, however, no evidence to support a correlation between economic growth of poor countries and their level of tariffs (Rodrik 2001, 61).
The expansion of transborder and shadow economic activity linking on to the globalized networks are forging “new patterns of actual development and political authority, that is, alternative and non-liberal forms of protection, legitimacy and social regulation”, according to Duffield (2002; 9). As such, they function as wars always have: as extremely brutal means of social restructuring (Howard 2001), giving prominence and power to new groups of ‘smart people’, to reiterate A.J.P. Taylor’s term. These are not state representatives. They are, on the face of it, an emergent group of new pre-Westphalia, anti-liberal leaders, “war-lords” by any other name, whose role is more related to CEOs of multinational corporations than to political leaders. On the basis of local resource exploitation, they link up to – in fact depend on – the globalized networks of the liberal North to market their sought after goods and purchase the machinery required to uphold the violent ‘restructuring process’.22 23 On the quantitative level this is all confirmed by the World Bank’s data sets (World Bank 2003) and in line with their focus on these wars indeed being “wars of greed, rather than grievance” (numerous World Bank reports, e.g. Collier et al. 2001). In principle they reflect legitimate international economic network relations. Not relations between states.24

This is the complex arena for the ‘new wars’.25 These “can be contrasted with earlier wars in terms of their goals, the methods of warfare and how they are financed”, says Kaldor (1999; 6).

3.6 NEW WARS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HOUSING

Housing destruction in war is not only caused by shelling, bombing or other intentional damage. In order to understand the housing deficiency, in numbers and quality as experienced during and after war, we have to include causes like lack of maintenance, halted construction and geographical shifts in demand.

Before discussing the new wars and housing I will briefly sweep through these indirect agents of destruction, which are present irrespective of war label:

- Lack of maintenance. Due to financial, material or staff shortages26 caused by the security situation, dysfunctional logistics and production standstills, buildings are left to crumble.

22 Charles Taylor of Liberia is assumed to have made $400–450 million/year on illicit diamond trade during the early 1990s (Reno 1996 cf. Duffield 2000; 82) and profits in the millions from illicit logging trade for which he bought military equipment (The Observer May 27, 2001). Up until 2000 Savimbi had extracted diamonds worth up to US$ 3.7 bill to finance UNITA’s war (Reno 1996 cf. Duffield 2000, also Malaquias 2001). The network work both ways: Republika Srpska acknowledged selling arms to Iraq recently and previously to The Real IRA (The Guardian, April 5, 2001).

23 Moises Naim of Foreign Policy identifies five areas of market transaction, ‘scenes of war’, he calls it, where these networks “empowered by globalization” aspire to take global control. It is in the trade of drugs, arms, intellectual property, people and money (Naim 2003). At the same time, Eric Schlosser (cf. The Guardian, May 2, 2003; 3) reports that marijuana, pornography and illegal labor now account for about 10% of the US economy, and the black market reaches 13% of the UK economy (Sunday Times, April 22, 2001). These are nodes in the same network.

24 It is therefore a conceptual short circuit when the new wars are explained – as they often are – in the Clausewitzian mode, like “current wars are the extension of economics, rather than politics – by other means.

25 A term allegedly coined by Mary Kaldor, based on studies of the early post-Cold War conflicts, Bosnia being the central case.
• **Lack of new construction.** Little new or no new construction taking place to renew or replenish the housing stock which for the above-mentioned or ‘normal peace time reasons’ are lost. In addition comes the perpetual housing backlog that exists in most societies.

• **Forced urbanization.** Urbanization is widely experienced in countries of war as part of its embedded ‘modernization’ or ‘reorientation’ (Howard 2001), or for security reasons. The pre-war rural population moves on to the cities where no surplus housing is available, only anticipated employment. So even if the number of housing units may be sufficient in the country, they are located in the wrong places, not where the demand is.

Consequently, when Norway set in motion her post-war housing program in 1947, the target was 100,000 new housing units, although only about 20,000 had been destroyed and damaged during the war (Ustvedt 1978;222–247).

In the remaining part of this chapter I will link housing and housing destruction to the three characteristics of the new wars. As these wars are part of the globalized economy, and hence world politics, they also are affected by the international response they cause. It has long been accepted that this response, primarily as emergency relief, also may affect the unfolding of the war. (Anderson 1999, Kaldor 1999). For this reason I add a fourth characteristic to the new wars: the type of international response they attract. This attraction will be extensively dealt with in the following chapter on reconstruction, but will also be dealt with here as it affects the housing demand chain even during war. The new wars thus affect housing through their 1) goals, 2) the way the wars are fought, 3) financed, and 4) the international response they attract.

### 3.6.1 GOALS OF NEW WARS

These wars are not fought to gain political control as such, or ‘build nations’. It is about ‘identity politics’ where the state is relevant only in so far as it affects the identity policy. Identity politics are retroactive and emerging in part as a consequence of the loss of power, relevance even, of the state (ibid.). Beck therefore labels these wars ‘post-national wars’ (Beck 2003;93–108), whereas they are being served to the public as ‘tribal wars’ and ‘ancient hatred’.27 Since ethnicity and territory are, by and large, overlapping issues, wars of identity have tremendous demographic impacts. Half of Bosnia’s population of 4 million was sent on the move during the recent war.

Worldwide the displacement by force or choice due to violent conflict creates a housing shortage of immense proportions. Presently there are some 35 million

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26 Housing maintenance is often gender defined, at least in traditional societies (Oliver 1987). In industrial countries males have normally done building work. With the male population engaged in primary or supportive warfare, there is no-one around to ‘fix the roof’.

27 Both the British Prime Minister John Major and Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd carried this ‘theoretical framework’ into their handling of the Balkan crises of the early 1990s, as did many others (Simms 2002).
refugees and internally displaced people in the world. Most of these have had to flee their homes, either banished, or from not being able to cope with the social and economic misery caused by war and conflicts.

The particularist goal of the wars’ protagonists entails large-scale housing destruction in the cleansed areas. According to the Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolition (ICAHD), 10,000 Palestinian housing units have been destroyed in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 (Halper 2003). Whereas this has happened without the world watching or caring, the mass destruction of housing in other theatres of war, particularly in the Balkans, was duly recorded. In Bosnia alone, about 35% of its total housing stock was damaged or destroyed during the war years (IMG 1999).

When civilians fleeing by the thousands, by the hundreds of thousands, and flock into areas of relative calm, an extraordinary strain is put on the housing stock, the people and the institutions of these areas. The literature is full of stories on the often antagonist nature of the relationship between the host community and the incoming displaced (Blakewell 2000, Kibreag 2002, Brun 2003, Malkki 1995) however much they are ‘of their own kind’.

The perceived goals of ‘clean areas’ rest on nationalistic imagery hard to maintain over years if cracks appear in the particularist expectations. Uncertainty replaces conviction and fervor. This is both time and place related if the demographic shift is not acknowledged as a ‘fait accompli’.

Two examples highlight the issue of this spatial-temporal uncertainty, one regarding the Muslims displaced from India, the other refers to the Palestinians. Following the Pakistan/India Partition a large contingent of Muslim refugees from India settled in makeshift shantytowns around Karachi, Pakistan’s first capital. When the initial uncertainty and confusion gave way to the fact of no return, the refugees – with only scant external assistance – organized the Orangi Pilot Project which systematically realized infrastructure upgrading and building. It can be assumed that the upgrading work itself not only improved living standards, but was the act that settled the inhabitants into the Pakistani society. Today, the Orangi Project stands as one

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28 Whereas the refugee statistics show 14.9 million as of December 31, 2001, the number of IDPs, currently acknowledged to be the much larger group, is set at 21 million by the US Refugee Committee. They qualify their assessment thus: "Estimates of the number of internally displaced persons are often fragmentary and unreliable. This list includes more than 21 million people; the total number of internally displaced persons may be much higher" (http://www.refugees.org/world/statistics/wrs01_table5.pdf).

29 The assessment of housing destruction in Bosnia undertaken by the International Management Group established by the UNHCR, developed a methodology in destruction assessment that has since become a standard. (Cf. Appendix 10.3).

30 Destruction and damage in Mostar and Sarajevo was not part of the IMG’s assessment mandate.


32 But it takes time. For the refugee settlement to become the Orangi Pilot project more than a generation passed! Most of the Greek Cypriots displaced form Northern Cyprus in 1974, are still in the transition stage, 30 years hence.
of the true success cases in participatory development, presently showing higher societal scores than Karachi proper (Hasan 1999).

Fig. 6.3.1 Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, Pakistan. A most successful upgrading and development project created by agency of the inhabitants, with outside help on management and technical advice. The settlement initially started out as a refugee settlement. Courtesy of Mr. Arif Hasan

Fig. 6.3.2 The environment for Palestinian refugees by Shatila refugee settlement south of Beirut. They are prohibited from doing any improvements on their house destroyed during the civil war in Lebanon. Courtesy of The Norwegian People’s Aid.
In the Palestinian refugee camps in countries outside Palestine, such changes have been made impossible. The continued conflict with Israel sustains the hope of return, which subsequently – politically at least – legitimizes the host states treating the Palestinians in the camps as foreign refugees, 55 years after their arrival. They are denied basic citizens’ rights, like the right to work, thus perpetuating the uncertainty. This uncertainty is made manifest in the increasingly ‘densified’ and environmentally degraded refugee camps.

### 3.6.2 THE METHODS OF WARFARE

Rather than ‘winning hearts and minds’ the new wars are relying on ‘sowing fear and hatred’. This entails mass killings, expulsion and various forms of intimidation directed at the civilian population, the very acts that the ‘laws on war’ are set to prevent (Kaldor 1999). The dramatic increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced during the last decade is but one of the more quantifiable consequences of these tactics. Whereas inter-state wars are fought within the framework of legitimate hierarchies, the new wars are carried out through networks of state organizations and private bands. Hoods becoming heroes, becoming the new ‘smart people’, with unarmed civilians become tactical pawns in a mutually reinforcing conflict of particularist hatred. Once started these wars are extremely difficult to end. They become endemic conflicts where visioning a post-conflict settlement, not to mention peace, seems, if not illusive, extremely difficult (Kaldor et al. 1995).

When opting for ways of providing permanent housing for the victims of these wars, how is that work to be implemented?

True to the nature of these wars, houses were targeted individually (Udovicki & Ridgeway 2000), executed as it were. The ferocity by which ‘the dwellings of others’ were destroyed acknowledges the symbolic properties of housing as discussed in the previous chapter. This is different from the Allied bombing of the residential areas of German cities in WW II. That was, in part, a ‘combat response’, partly a tactical maneuver to ‘incapacitate’ the German labor force, killing German workers, by any other name (Glover 2001).

This ‘murder by proxy’, which the individualized destruction of housing represents, has been recorded in many of the present wars besides those of the Balkans. I have already mentioned the ongoing individualized Israeli destruction of Palestinian homes (Halper 2003, Coon 1999) It has been observed in Indonesia and the Philippines, Afghanistan (Barakat et.al. 1994), East Timor (Du Plessis & Leckie 2000), Rwanda (UNHCR 2000a), Burundi, Eastern Congo, Tajikistan (Zehnder 1999, Anderson 1999). It is as if to erase all traces of ‘the others’, and by destroying the dwelling ensure that they will not return. This warfare of ‘fear and hatred’ perpetuates the conflict as hatred feeds on itself. In analyzing the conflict in Northern Ireland, Fintan O’Toole states: “Sectarian prejudice did not cause the violence, it was, 

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33 Holsti has shown that in a majority of ongoing armed conflicts it was state agencies that initiated the violence (Nafziger et al. 2000).
34 As reported by Dr Barakat of the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit, York, UK.
35 As reported in conversation and E-mail correspondence by the NRC’s previous project manager Rolf Moi.
36 As reported by Charles A. Setchell of USAid in conversation, January 2003.
to a great extent, the violence that caused the prejudice” (2000). Similar conclusions also emerge from the writing of Keen (2000).

This selective killing of housing may be compared to the effects of landmines. Rather than kill people, a much larger number of people are affected by having to care for the maimed, or in our case, the homeless. With the gradual closing of international borders for victims of armed conflicts, the fleeing civilians are seeking refuge ‘with their own kind’ in areas of relative calm within the borders of the war-affected state.37 This raises totally new housing challenges, tying up already overstretched resources.

### 3.6.3 THE ECONOMY OF THE NEW WARS

We have already touched upon this third new wars’ characteristic, the way they are financially organized through international networks. This is totally different from that of, say, WW II. The old wars were by and large financed without external resources. The machinery of war, governed by the national authorities raised, at least for a period, employment and the creation of wealth. This is not the case now. The networked bands are basically financed by looting, black marketeering, or local resource exploitation handled through the aforementioned global networks. The national economic outcomes are devastating, collapsing economy, endemic unemployment and extreme poverty – with small networked islands of immense ‘clever people’ wealth. Into these war-ravaged economies, international agents are sent to provide housing. How may that be done to help upset a trend of economic disintegration?

Most of these wars are related to the exploitation of raw materials supported by identified, most often ethnic groups. Outputs from mines, logging and poaching are all ‘rural goods’ that give prominence to the countryside and the people living there. Those expelled flee to the cities, as in Angola38 or as Kurds do in Turkey (Erdem et al. 2003, Yilmaz 2003). That is also where the links to the wider world are. The subsequent housing shortage is exasperated by a profound uncertainty pertaining to time and place. How long will this ‘temporary situation’ last? Will this place be safe? In the meantime, scarce resources are spent on, i.e. ‘temporary housing’ – often assisted by private organizations from ‘the international community’.

### 3.6.4 THE ATTRACTION OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Since the mid-1990s there has been a conventional opinion that international relief to war-torn societies may contribute to prolonging the crisis and hence the suffering of civilians through the way the aid is provided, see for instance the Kaldor citation below and Prendergast (1996). Terry (2002) takes issue with these claims. Aside from the scant evidence there is to support it, there are other international players who bear a much more serious responsibility for how these armed conflicts develop than do the NGOs. The ‘complexity’ of the new conflicts are just as much a result of

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37 This is yet another globalization phenomenon, i.e. a very selective policy on transborder movements of people, whereas the other component of transfer, goods, money and services, move unobstructed.

38 Reported in AlertNet (Reuters Foundation website) 7 January 2001.
the complex international interventions during the 1990s as it is by the ‘nature’ of the wars themselves (ibid.; 13,), a stand much supported by Munslow & Brown (1999).

Whatever the case, the mere presence of international aid agencies and NGOs in areas of war may affect the conflict. For obvious logistic and security reasons, foreign aid personnel group together in the major urban centers. These will therefore become centers for relief, not the least the distribution of free food. This sometimes carries devastating effects on domestic food production (Munslow and Brown 1999, Vaux 2001,). The international presence also creates direct and indirect employment opportunities in an otherwise crumbling economy. All this results in a process of war-pulled urbanization, supported by a rural push due to falling food prices. This was the case in Somalia in the early 1990s (Cuny 1994). As in most known cases of urbanization in war-ravaged countries, that trend is not followed by one of ruralization when the war is over. People whose lifestyles have been urbanized tend to stay put in the urban areas even after the security situation allows return to the areas they once had to leave (ibid., Barakat et al 1997). The complexity of the new wars, whether within the ‘complex political emergencies’ or the ‘emergent political complexes’ concept, are further complicated by the inevitable presence of the international respondents (Rieff 2002, Terry 2002).

This rather extensive run-through of the new wars has been made to show how different these wars are compared to the organized wars that used to be. Houses in new wars are becoming ‘identity targets’. They are ‘killed’ rather than ‘destroyed’. This would make housing interventions a challenge way beyond that of reconstructing housing. In 1995 Mary Kaldor warned against what she deemed “unrealistic assumptions” regarding the oncoming international reconstruction efforts in Bosnia (Kaldor et al 1995). Four years later she summed up in the following way:

“The tendency to interpret these wars in traditional terms, has been the main reason why humanitarian intervention has not only failed to prevent the wars but may have actually helped to sustain them in various ways, for example, through the provision of humanitarian aid, which is an important source of income for the warring parties, or through the legitimation of war criminals by inviting them to the negotiating table, or through the effort to find political compromises based on exclusivist assumptions.” (Kaldor 1999; 10)

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39 This local food market distortion is also taking place as a consequence of trade policies favoring the North. Powdered milk, for instance, sells so cheap in Africa due to subsidies to European farmers, that domestic milk production cannot compete. 21,000 tons of European milk were exported to Africa last year (The Observer, June 29, 2003). These are strands of the globalization earlier discussed as the backdrop of the new wars.

40 The possible exception was the establishment of the New Towns in the UK after WW II. This was a strategy of primarily moving people and industry out of London as a military precaution: to scatter future bombing targets rather than concentrate them in the London area (Bullock 2002).

41 The latter is a Mark Duffield construction out of the words in the former conventional term for the new wars as perceived by those providing assistance. The conception behind the terms is different, but as all writers know, words catch, just as they catch Duffield.

42 Fiona Terry, supported by John Burton, takes issue with the claim that humanitarian aid plays any significant role in prolonging war. Firstly, there is no hard-knuckle evidence that underpins such a claim. Secondly, “political, business, and military actors hold primary responsibility for the pursuit and out-
The selective demolition of housing in the new wars is therefore not so much about their destruction as it is about the challenge of their reconstruction. Housing has always been a tactical target of war, the sacking of cities a repeated historical phenomenon. The abhorrent destruction of housing during WW II primarily through aerial bombing and ‘scorched earth tactics’ ran into millions of units and perhaps millions killed. This was destruction on a scale beyond anything done later, although the bombing continued with devastating effects later on in Vietnam (Lindquist 2000). But those were state wars where housing was bombed collectively, and the state helped organize their reconstruction. Defeated states were rebuilt much the same way. It is a different challenge entirely when reconstruction is about rebuilding what your neighbor has destroyed.

Taking the cue from Turner, the issue of housing destruction in these neighbor-wars is ‘not what destroyed housing was, it is what destroying housing has done’ – to severely erode social capital, ravage the economy, destroy livelihoods, aside from the physical damage and demographic shifts. The policy of hatred and selective destruction of housing has thus created a new platform, a new context for their reconstruction. This assigns a significant role to the tactics of reconstruction and the process of implementation.
4 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO WAR;
The Re/Construction of Housing

4.1 “SOMETHING’S GOT TO BE DONE”: AN INTRODUCTION

Mobilizing ‘your own kind’ is a necessary requirement for entering a prospective war, whether it is a Clauzewitzian or a post-national war. A similar mobilization is taking place from the effects of war to assist those victimized by the violence. The fact that such mobilization takes place among the actors in the theatre of war is to be expected, but this mobilization also extends to people not directly affected by the violence; it extends to the fellow human spectators. It is because we get to know about the misery of innocent victims that such mobilization takes place. The rise in the modern international relief system, starting out with Henri Dunant in 1863 with what would later be the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,1 shows an interesting parallel to the rise of the ‘foreign correspondent’ and the media technology which allowed the presentation of images. The harrowing engravings from far-away battlefields in publications like the London Illustrated News, and similar magazines elsewhere, informed the public in a way that made distant suffering into a relevant domestic issue. “something has to be done!”. Funds were collected by charities and volunteers were sent to the field, much the same way as today.

Aroused public empathy2 with portrayed victims of war gives rise both to voluntary and state-sponsored emergency relief, whether informed through the London Illustrated News3 or present-day news channels. This morally grounded public call “to do something” results in private donations, but is also shown to trigger the engagement of governments. Research has confirmed significant correlations between the level of media coverage of foreign emergencies and subsequent government funding for emergency relief (Hybertsen 1997, Rye Olsen et al. 20024). Although reliable statistics are hard to come by, governments, primarily of the 21 OECD countries, provide substantially more than do private donations when it comes to emergency relief funding (Randel & German 2002). Governments do so in response to domestic public opinion, and from anticipated geopolitical benefits.5 This explains why the Balkans received more than 18 times as much assistance per ‘persons in need’ than did Somalia (ibid.; 28).

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1 There existed international bodies tending to those wounded in war prior to the founding of the Red Cross, e.g. the Christian Order of the Hospitaller.
2 The role of the media will not be specifically discussed here, but it is worth noting that the ‘public empathy’ referred to above is totally and fundamentally dependent on the media and the way they portray the situation at hand. There seems to be a symbiotic relationship between disaster, human suffering, the media – and public empathy underpinning external humanitarian action. To echo Baudrillard: ”The Gulf war never happened if we were never told”.
3 By the time of the Crimean War, the London Illustrated News printed 300,000 copies every week, much because of its reporting from the war.
4 Rye Olsen et al. also claim that ‘donor interest’ and ‘stakeholder commitment’ are additional decisive issues.
5 The governments of smaller, rich countries like Norway and the other Scandinavian countries claim to do so basically from an ‘alleviation of suffering’ point of view, i.e. as a pure altruistic act. In Norway this stand has been contested by Twedt (2003) and Nustad (2003) and others.
This presents the two principally different sources of, and causes for, international intervention in areas of conflict: the morally grounded, yet media-dependent public urge to help others in need, and the strategically dependent governmental support provided to regions or countries of geo-political importance to the donor country. The former is basically channeled through private non-governmental organization or charities, NGOs (Tvedt 1995, 2003). The latter is political and may take on any form from aerial bombardment to large bilateral material and financial aid packages, depending on the war scene’s perceived political importance (Stiefel 1999, Duffield 2002, Sogge 1996, de Waal 2000). In real life these two converge. From the 1980s onward this convergence, made manifest by increased NGO funding from governments into an increasing number of politicized areas of conflict, has raised fundamental questions on the morally grounded mission of the NGOs. Are they still angels of mercy or have they merely become development diplomats, as Tvedt rhetorically asks (1998). Or worse still, are they reduced to the role of support units in ‘humanitarian wars’? (Coker 2001). Nick Cater, in his column in The Guardian, brings it on like this “Aid is becoming just another crude tool, to bribe or bully nations into line, or to create compliant populations grateful for their handouts and unlikely to threaten their new guardians”.6 The alarms have long since gone off in many of the headquarters of NGOs (Macrae 2002).7 Aid agencies being violently targeted as in present-day Iraq may be seen as the culmination of this gradual convergence between this “new humanitarianism” and the “new wars”.

In the following, I first present and discuss the theoretical underpinning of these two approaches of assistance and then examine how, why and to what effect they interact. Then I take a closer look at the international actors, the NGOs that actually carry out the politically guided work in the field with a particular emphasis on housing (re)construction.

In referring to Figure 1.2.1 we are now investigating the external forces, or the arrows, that affect the strategy of joining physical object and meaning into the implementation of housing within the political context of a war-ravaged society. These are convergent forces; one driven by the humanitarian imperative, to assist people in need, the other by the assistants’ own interests and the perceived political effects of the assistance.

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7 http://www.AlertNet.org of the Reuter Foundation is a major arena of discussion among NGOs on these issues.
4.2 ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS MECHANISMS OF RESPONSE

There is a moral imperative to help people in desperate need ingrained in all cultures and in all civilizations. All the world’s major religions contain this imperative,\(^8\) which lends itself to political structures and institutions, and is embedded in the very notion of habitus of all societies. In times of disaster, be it the aftermath of violence or the havoc of nature, these embedded mechanisms spring into force. Evidence abounds, from the German soldier who looked the other way, to the wealthy industrialist in Gujarat who opened his house to his neighboring house-less and destitute earthquake victims, to international initiatives to provide food to people who would otherwise perish. These are all moral acts.

Albala-Bertrand (2000) has categorized these modes of assistance\(^9\) as either endogenous, i.e. response mechanisms embedded in society’s own institutions, be they spontaneous action as illustrated above, or institutionally designed as in Civil Defense activities, or they may be exogenous – channeled, as he says – via:

“ad hoc, unpatterned, unguaranteed, or irregular processes, which are expressed in action, measures and policies that may formally fill gaps left by in-built responses, bypass endogenous channels, shift initiatives away from regular actors, or superimpose alternative structures brought in from outside” (ibid.; 217).

This makes for vivid images of external interventions into war-ravaged areas.

4.2.1 THE HUMANITARIAN IMPERATIVE

The international humanitarian actors ideally see themselves as agents within the endogenous tradition; endogenous in the sense of Kant’s categorical imperative: Do as if your actions are universal law. A moral ought, as it were. According to Kant, “morality must be necessary and universal, that is, it must be absolutely binding, and absolutely binding on everyone alike: Whoever you are, whatever your situation, you ought to do X” (Miller 1992; 454). Kant thus included all humans, not only the ‘we’ of our own kind, skin color, and religion, but the whole ‘human family’. His categorical imperative\(^10\) is the theoretical foundation for the morally driven ‘humanitarian imperative’ of universally assisting people in distress.\(^11\)

The conventions constituting the ‘International Humanitarian Law’ rests on this moral foundation (IFRC 2003, Mackintosh 2000, Gutman & Rieff 1999). In fact, the found-

\(^8\) Whereas Kant’s categorical imperative is deontological in the sense that it stands right, true and universal; like a law of nature void of any utilitarian aspects, the religions are not so principled. Religions are not universal, they primarily cover only their own converts; furthermore, their imperatives are not totally without utility: rewards for good deeds will follow in the afterlife.

\(^9\) Davis (1981), Cuny (1983), Jigyasu (2002) and others have also dealt with the nature of these two strata of assistance.

\(^10\) Distinctly different from his ‘hypothetical imperative’ conditioned on personal motives or desire.

\(^11\) This is the credo of most NGOs but also of international governmental aid agencies. DFID, for instance, has committed itself to “seek to promote a more universal approach to addressing humanitarian needs. People in need – wherever they are – should have equal status to right and assistance” (NAO 2003; 31). But political commitments/utility take precedence. On November 7, 2003, The Guardian reported that GBP 100 million would be transferred to Iraq from programs in other poor nations to finance her reconstruction caused in part by US and British destruction.
ing principles of the United Nations do the same, as do the Human Rights Conventions, (from which the Human Rights to Adequate Housing are drawn). The Code of Conduct of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), now ratified by 267 NGOs and agencies, is but an operationalization of these rights. Under the heading ‘The humanitarian imperative comes first’, the first article reads: “The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries”. Subsequent articles deal with issues of neutrality, impartiality (which lies at the heart of humanitarianism), accountability, etc. A similar, even more tangible outcome is The Sphere Project, where universal minimum standards of humanitarian provisions are set, including shelter space minimums (Sphere 2003).

There are two interacting issues behind the recent upsurge in rights-based codes and standards (ODI 1999). One refers to symptoms: the inequality of aid pro capita in emergencies; the other refers to the underlying cause: the weakening of the concept of universality. The former is repeatedly documented, not least in reference to assistance provided for the people of the Balkans. DFID’s per capita support to people in need in war-ravaged Tajikistan and in South-Eastern Europe shows a ratio of 1:40 (NAO 2003; 17). The underlying reason relates to the decay of the ‘moral we’, the ‘universal we’ of the international community, which in effect annuls the very notion of ‘the international community’, at least in the sense of being a moral community acting on universal imperatives (Rorty 1996). The way these have been applied seems to point towards their relativity rather than their universality. Assistance seems to depend on the recipient countries’ economic potential, religion, system of governance and political importance to the donor. “The West”, says Samuel Huntington, is “unique, not universal” (Huntington 1996; 28), putting Kant aside. “We” are ‘The West’. “They” are ‘The rest’, ‘the others’ we assist in an “ad hoc, unpatterned, unguaranteed, or irregular” fashion, as Albala-Bertrand just said. This is a dramatic – and yet plausible – acknowledgement. It introduces the practice of triage

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12 By November 1, 2003.
13 Which is crucial to the IFRC, but is not part of any of the international conventions, and not necessarily relevant to humanitarian action.
14 Impartiality comprises three elements: 1) non-discrimination, 2) proportionality, and 3) non-subjective distinction (i.e. no distinction between ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’).
15 The Code reads as follows: “1: The Humanitarian imperative comes first; 2: Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone; 3: Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint; 4: We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy; 5: We shall respect culture and custom; 6: We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities; 7: Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid; 8: Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs; 9: We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources; 10: In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects” http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp
16 But even South-East Europe is seriously dwarfed when compared to the public donations for the people directly affected by the fall of the New York Twin Towers. A staggering US$ 2.3 billion was collected, about half of what has been internationally provided for the (post-war) reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNDP 2003). Thus, each family of a public sector worker killed on September 11th received a donation of about US$1 million, plus the worker’s salary, tax-free, for the equivalent of his/her remaining years in service (The Guardian, September 6. 2002)
in humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{17} Both Enzenberger (1994) and Rieff (2002) see this as a possible solution – for pragmatic reasons. No realistic scenario exists in the world – lofty Millennium Goals notwithstanding – that will mobilize the intellectual or material resources required to possibly bridge the gap between the destitute, often war-affected majority – and the rich ‘we’ minority of the world. Ideally there might be, but in reality the ‘the moral ought’ has been replaced by ‘the practical can’; morals and money have changed places (Rorty 1996).

\textbf{Fig.4.2.1 The relationship between ODA and GDI over time (source ODI)}

\textbf{Fig.4.2.2 The relationship between ODA (as portion of GNI) and humanitarian aid (Source Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003).}

\textsuperscript{17} This is a practice accredited to one of Napoleon’s physicians. He divided the wounded into three groups: those who were likely to survive without medical assistance, those who were likely to die irrespective of medical assistance, and those for whom medical assistance was likely to contribute towards recovery.
The agents of the humanitarian imperative, e.g. most of the NGOs\textsuperscript{18} have attempted to stem the slide by trying to institute universal norms in addition to refocusing their activities more towards lobbying\textsuperscript{19} and capacity building in line with a ‘rights-based approach’ (UNDP1998, Macrae 2002, Stoddard 2003). But with the cost of humanitarian action rising, and their scale and scope being extended, the interventions into war-affected areas may only be realized through a relative increase in financial contribution from rich, mostly Western governments – and thereby execute assistance along the lines set by these donors (Hume & Edwards 1997, Macrae & Harmer 2003).

We are in for a contest across a different fault line, between the ‘ought’ and the ‘can’ in international humanitarian action.

4.2.2 THE HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVE

Kant labeled the second imperative guiding human action ‘hypothetical imperative’. This denotes the actions required to accomplish something you desire or want, i.e. a specific set of strategic activities. As such, it makes up a central ingredient of daily life, and so too with political, and hence international, relations, even of traditional wars. This way it guides much of the international action towards countries ravaged by war, both in terms of political maneuvering, but also in state-sponsored humanitarian aid. This we could label ‘humanitarian utility’, with the quote from Cater referred to above as its ultimate expression. This humanitarian utility makes up one side of the fault line referred to above. The other side is the humanitarian imperative. Somewhere in between swivels the real world.

The modern idea of humanitarian action\textsuperscript{20} as a prospective activity, as something that deals with the future, came out of the experience of war. The universalism that emerged with the founding of the United Nations\textsuperscript{21} was a prospect of hope for a better world for all people (Rorty 1996). As such, it was a political project soon geopoliticized, and ‘utilized’ by the major powers of the world.

I will not give a historical run-through here, but in order to understand the emergence of the ‘utility assistance’ to war-ravaged countries, the success of the Marshall Plan has to be emphasized. Not only was it a grand success in kick-starting the economic recovery of Western Europe, it also proved a decisive weapon in the political contest with the USSR (Foreign Affairs 1997). These dual components were extended

\textsuperscript{18} Particularly the European NGOs under their umbrella organization VOICE in Brussels and ICVA in Geneva. The US NGOs act through InterAction, Washington.

\textsuperscript{19} There has been a parallel refocusing through conferences, books and ‘publicity actions’ by NGOs on “Forgotten Humanitarian Crisis”, e.g. Copenhagen conference, Oxfam initiatives, special issues of Le Monde Diplomatique, etc.

\textsuperscript{20} I fully acknowledge that there were worldwide humanitarian organizations long before WWII. These were organizations active in post-war assistance and in varying degrees guided by the humanitarian imperative. At one end were the Red Cross and Oxfam on the other organizations like the American Relief Committee, (later Administration) led by Herbert Hoover, who was later to become president of the US. The post-WWII era however, marks a new beginning of sorts also for ‘humanitarian action’ because of the institutionalization of ‘development aid’.

\textsuperscript{21} Even at this stage the ‘universalism’ was relative. Action on the part of the Allied countries proved that the Germans were not included. Their civilian losses - after the war was ended – are only now being recognized (Bacque 1997).
into the ‘development agenda’ introduced by President Truman in 1949. ‘Development Aid’ was born out of war, out of political competition, and out of a firm modernist belief in social and technological engineering, if we go by Truman’s inauguration address. The intention was initially to make the UN the vehicle for (universal) development (Hjertholm & White 2000), but what later became the ‘donor community’ secured the ‘utility’ dimension of the assistance by strengthening the role of bilateral aid and that of the World Bank.

A similar development has gradually taken place within the ‘humanitarian sector’, particularly during the last decade. At the end of the 1980s, UN agencies, primarily the WFP and UNHCR, administered 45% of all humanitarian assistance. 10 years later their share was down to about 12% (Randel & German; 21). This shift has been linked to two utility aspects:

1) The value of the humanitarian aid sector has risen steadily both in absolute and relative terms during the post Cold War era. This has taken place against the backdrop of a fall in ODA in absolute terms, and very much so in terms of share of the donor countries’ wealth and own income. In 2001 humanitarian aid amounted to 10.5% of ODA, or US$ 5.4 billion. Given the delivery nature of emergency aid, and hence its embedded commercial value, the ‘donor utility’ of relief is more than obvious.

2) Most of the humanitarian assistance is going to areas affected by war (GHA 2003, NAO 2003). This makes the assistance a powerful political tool for donor countries. In such cases the assistance is beyond ‘humanitarian utility’, it is in the realm of ‘political utility’.

This growing tendency to join commercial and political interests of donors in post-was assistance is brought to head in Iraq.

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23 The UN and its agencies are run on a ‘one nation = one vote’ system. The World Bank is run by those who have contributed the core capital; in effect, the Western countries under the leadership of the US.
24 This is also because the OECD allowed donor countries to include the costs of one year’s support to refugees living in the donor country as ‘humanitarian assistance’. In 2000 this constituted 20% of all emergency aid (ODI 2002).
25 Admittedly, there is a slight rise in the 2002 ODA figures, but the relative decline in the ODA’s portion of the wealthy countries’ GDP is stark. It has been reduced by about one-third in the last decade, from around 0.35% (half of what has been set as a universal goal) down to 0.22 in 2001. Some of the loss has been compensated by a rise in private support or support that bypasses the statistics of the OECD/DAC (GHA 2003). However, in volume this is dwarfed by the estimated US$ 80 billion in remittances that are transferred to countries mainly in the South each year (Foreign Policy, November–December 2003). The picture is not complete without adding the fact that because of the servicing of debt to Northern banks, there has been a net flow of capital from the South to the North during a number of years. By the end of the 1980s the outflow reached about US$ 15 billion annually (Thorbecke 2000; 38).
26 “An example is Switzerland’s study, which found that for every franc of Swiss aid, between 90 cents and Sfr 1.02 was spent in Switzerland even though 71% of Swiss aid is untied” from a report made by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) cf. Randel & German 1997; 251.
Interventions within the realm of the hypothetical imperative do not necessarily imply humanitarian assistance. It may imply warfare, like the invasion in Somalia, or the bombing in Bosnia and later in Kosovo/Serbia (the world’s first ‘humanitarian war’, according to NATO (ODI 2002; 2). It definitely includes diplomatic action and various kinds of embargoes or boycotts. Whatever the instruments used unilaterally or in tandem with others, the action is aimed at defusing the conflict, to help, directly or indirectly, the victims of the war, and finally, to contribute toward international political and economic stability. These are the intentions.

It was not always like this. Up until the end of the Cold War, support given to countries in conflict was determined by their affiliation to the superpowers. The tension of the bipolar world did keep the numbers of conflicts down, or rather, the spillover from the conflicts was kept low – or left unreported. After the fall of the Wall, the former satellite states were left on their own, economically as well as politically. The ensuing political confusion and uncertainty first of all affected the principles of sovereignty: “The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality”, said Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the Security Council in 1992. What emerged came to be a watershed in international political relations, which saw universal human rights take precedence over national sovereignty. This shift came as an inevitable result of the fall of the bi-polar world order and the prospects of the UN becoming the one supra-national body that was mandated by international law to initiate military intervention, which it did in Somalia and later in Bosnia – though not in Iraq.

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29 The sovereignty slide had already started years earlier, by Vietnam invading Cambodia and Tanzania invading Uganda to put an end to the dictatorships of Pol Pot and Idi Amin. It had been tacitly accepted by the international community – although not formally. Pol Pot therefore retained Cambodia’s UN seat for more than a decade after having been toppled.
We have been witnessing an extension of the means, or arenas of the ‘hypothetical imperative’ on the part of the donor. The “western we” have been given, or taken, the extended right to intervene as a ‘universal rights’ accolade. We may intervene with the means of our choosing to quell what we consider grave human rights abuses.\(^{31}\) This universality of intervention, i.e. military intervention, joining the universality of humanitarianism is the ultimate manifestation of a globalized world,\(^{32}\) according to Ulrich Beck (2003). It allows for ‘humanitarian wars’ and make humanitarian agencies into partners in what US President Bush and Prime Minister Blair called a “military-humanitarian coalition” (Braumann 2001; 29), while the US Secretary of State envisioned the NGOs to act as “force multiplier for the (US) military” (Stoddard 2003; 31). No wonder the NGOs are uneasy.

These issues will not be pursued further here. It has to be added, however, that when the war in former Yugoslavia started in 1991 most of this was new. The intervention into Iraq on behalf of the Kurds was what ‘the international community’ had to go by, in terms of discourse on sovereignty, on the role of military engagement, and in terms of humanitarian assistance. In fact that was the first time most of the present agencies and humanitarian organizations went into war.\(^{33}\) The Bosnia experience was very much the turning point for the exogenous assistance in areas ravaged by the new wars.

In the figure below I link the concepts applied in the text above to explain the relationship between the modes of assistance in a regular four-field matrix. It must be emphasized that the activities overlap and no single field can function on its own. Humanitarian assistance is directed at the suffering individual (1), traditional ‘development assistance’ focuses on the institutions (2). Recovery will succeed only by strengthening the endogenous fields (1 & 2). Its success will, in turn, (also) depend on the activities of the exogenous actors (3 & 4), not least in combining ‘security’ (4) with civilian assistance (3).

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\(^{31}\) As a soldier was reported saying about the reason for Norway’s military presence in Afghanistan: “We’re here to fight the burka”

\(^{32}\) “Ensuring respect for democracy and human rights came to be seen as the means whereby grievances could be addressed and effective systems for regulating violent war economies could legitimately be introduced. Thus, the distinction disappeared between a ‘morality-based’ and ‘interest-based’ foreign policy” (ODI 2002; 1). This is the ‘liberal peace’ agenda of aid, according to Duffield, where aid driven by ‘security’ considerations in its many forms is but a ‘grand project of social transformation’ - much like the visions of missionaries in former days (Duffield 2002).

\(^{33}\) A number of the big organizations started out as war- or post-war emergency agencies (including Oxfam and Care), but had turned to ‘development’ and disaster relief in the meantime.
Fig. 4.2.4 The relationship between universal and hypothetical imperatives, endogenous, and exogenous assistance.

In spite of the evidence supporting the claim that there is a growing overlap between the exogenous modes of assistance (Curtis 2001, Macrae 2002, Macrae & Harmer 2003 with references), there is still a unanimous agreement that recovery depends on the strength and dynamics of the endogenous sectors. The challenge for the exogenous actors, overlapping or not, will therefore be to construct and conduct their assistance towards that end.

Of the many multi- and unilateral agencies involved in emergency and post-war assistance, I will concentrate on those implementing housing projects. For all practical purposes they are the Northern international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

4.3 THE INTERNATIONAL NGOs
Their Informing Theories And Guiding Experiences

4.3.1 INTRODUCING THE NGOs
The term “non-governmental organization” is so enigmatic that it is “virtually meaningless”, Lewis and Wallace claim in their book on the new challenges of the NGOs (2000; x). All the same they choose to use the term without further definition on account of it being “useful shorthand for a wide variety of different kinds of nongovernmental […] organizations and work” (ibid.; xi). Others have treated the term like-
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wise (Fowler 2000, Edwards & Fowler 2002). 34 “The term ‘NGO’ should be used as a common denominator, a collective term, for all organizations within the aid channel that are institutionally separated from the state apparatus and are non-profit-distributing”, says Tvedt. In this context he introduces the term ‘NGO channel’ for the system of aid that is handled by the NGOs (1998; 16), much as a “new type of international social system” (ibid.; 24), molded out of the prevailing ideology of the West.

The new wars have left the aid establishment in disarray. Out of the many causes behind the present uncertainty, two stand out: the nature of the present wars, 35 and the privatization of aid. The former has been handled in earlier chapters, the latter merits some comments. During the 1980s and the rise of economic liberalism in the West the role of the state was set to shrink. ‘Less state, more liberty’. The public channels of welfare were to be taken over by private providers of one’s own choice. So it was to be also with international aid (Tvedt 1996). A ‘new policy agenda’ emerged that set out to design an economic order based on “free markets, private property, individual incentives, and a minimal ‘enabling’ role for the state” (Gore cf. Lewis and Wallace 2000; ix). ‘Partnership’ (state – private sector – civil society) became the operational principle, ‘civil society’ the key channel for international development assistance. Civil society, in its most rudimentary definition, is held to be ‘non-governmental’, not of government; and non-market, not of private sector (Edwards et.al. 2000; 14). This leaves, as a matter of definition, a pivotal role to the NGOs, the non-governmental organizations.

The result was a mushrooming of private non-governmental organizations (Tvedt 1996, 1998, Hjertholm & White 2000). Their number doubled from 1,600 to 2,500 during the 1980s. Today there are 3–4,000 International NGOs working in development, relief and the social sector in the South (Stoddard 2003; 25). 36 Their sheer number, their disparate ideological background, their history and tradition, and further to that, their political and economic relations to their home governments are some of the factors that distinguish their modes of action (ibid.).

34 Edwards and Fowler use the term NGDO (non-governmental development organizations as an equivalent to the term NGO and claim that “there is no commonly accepted definition of NGOs [NGDOs]. [...] They can be regarded as third-party, serving non-profit-based, legally constituted non-state organizations, directly or indirectly reliant on the system of international aid. In most cases they function as intermediaries to promote sustainable development, social justice and enduring improvement in the circumstances of poor and excluded groups” (2002; 23)

35 Whereas Edwards, Hulme & Wallace (1999) separate ‘conflicts linked to globalization’ and ‘intra-state conflicts’, I have linked these into one, in line with Duffield (2000, 2002) and others.

36 There are no statistics showing reliable world-wide figures. The Economist claims there are 30,000 international NGOs (although not necessarily ‘development’ or ‘emergency’ organizations). NGOs have also mushroomed in countries like Bangladesh and Russia where there are presently 65,000 of them (The Economist; The World in 2001; 73).
In 2001 The Norwegian Refugee Council had a total income of US$ 42.6 million, of which 36.7 million, or 86%, was official aid. Norwegian People’s Aid had a total income of US$ 69.4 million, 79% of which was official aid.

Before embarking upon the basic distinctions and general characteristics pertaining to the NGOs that work in war-affected areas, the very idea of non-government organizations needs to be elaborated upon. To distinguish them from state and market they are often, especially in the UK, labeled ‘voluntary organizations’, i.e. society’s
‘third sector’, or ‘civil society’ organizations. NGOs emerge where there is a gap in services; they are an institutional response to state and/or market failure, according to the reigning theoretical perspective of economists (Weisbrod 1988, James 1990, Tvedt 1998; 41–43). These theories were developed in the North, but according to Brown & Koren (1991) and their work for the World Bank they are equally appropriate as organizational remedies for failing state and market institutions in the developing world. This makes for a neat explanation and an easy frame of reference pertaining to the functions of the international NGOs in the developing world. This is perhaps too neat and too easy, as it is not only a matter of providing ‘missing services’; it is also about societal development. As we saw in the preceding part of this chapter, progress is achieved only when local institutions are empowered to take charge of development, meaning that the rationale of the NGOs must also be to support state and market institutions, not only ‘civil society’ and its members’ consumer needs for services. Tvedt furthermore shows that NGOs did not necessarily emerge in response to failing state or markets in the developing world, but as organizational vehicles of donor countries to provide foreign aid, in fact to organize the aid channel in a liberalized world (Tvedt 1998; 43–50, Sogge 1996).

4.3.2 THE NGOs AS PEACE MAKERS

In dealing with post-war housing it is necessary to dwell on the particular role or activities of the NGOs regarding ‘making’ or ‘contributing towards’ peace. It is self-evident that peace in the sense of personal security and mutually recognized social contracts are required elements of recovery. Egeland\(^\text{37}\) (1999) argues that the NGOs hold comparative advantages in ‘making peace’ in societies ravaged by conflict. They have access, local expertise and, says Egeland, are generally perceived as being impartial by the warring factions. And there are success stories around, which by closer scrutiny, may rest on the capacity of a few dedicated long-term committed individuals more than the institutional strength of the NGOs (van Tongeren 1999). According to Lederach (1999), one of the preconditions of peace or the process of peace is ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal interaction’ generating trust; i.e. between all strata of society (vertical), and between the respective sections across the fighting line (horizontal). The NGOs are normally outside the vertical field, but may be at an advantage in facilitating horizontal interaction. As for the other two requirements set by Lederach, justice and conceptualizing peace as both a result and a (long-term) process, these lie beyond the capacity of NGOs in general. The first is outside their mandate, the second requires a long-term commitment that NGOs acting in areas of war normally do not hold. In addition, “what is clear is that most NGOs lack the capacity to conduct the strategic analyses necessary to success (sic) in these areas, especially in the complex and contingent environments in which they operate” says Edwards et.al. (1999). But it is not merely a matter of capacity, according to Slim. The theoretical underpinnings that are to inform the INGOs’ action in current armed crisis are themselves in crisis: “Few agencies yet know how to do things ‘peace-fully’” (Slim 2000; 6). Schioms (2001) reveals the inherent shortcomings of NGOs simply by pointing to the fundamental political nature of peace building, which entails dealing with recogni-

\(^{37}\) Recently appointed Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs & Emergency Relief Coordinator of the UN.
tion and with governments. Such dealings contravenes the neutral and impartial regime most NGOs subscribe to. In reference to practical experience, both Terry (2002) referring to her work with MSF, and Judah’s writings from the Balkans (2004) are very skeptical about the efficiency of NGOs engaging in reconciliatory activities in war zones. Howard (2001) points to the fact that reconciliation was not an issue after the world wars fought between the very nations that today fund most of today’s reconciliation programs executed by the NGOs, hinting at the inherent difficulties, and touching upon the moral weakness in the ‘do as I say, not as I do’ schism. There seems to be both a theoretical and empirical backing for the claim that humanitarian NGOs are not particularly well suited to embrace ‘peace making’ – bar facilitating community interaction between conflicting parties.38

The theoretical underpinnings of acting in emergencies, i.e. the relief and development discourse, will be handled when analyzing the modus operandi of the organizations themselves, because in addressing the tactical challenges the practitioners seem to act according to the stand or status of their organization, not by being informed by theory; again, you stand where you sit.

4.4 THE MODUS OPERANDI OF NGOS

Tvedt showed that many of the NGOs active in humanitarian work, (and thus in housing (re)construction) have grown to their present state and status by having been supported by their home governments (1998). The relationship to governments is an attribute that classifies the organizations, because it reflects on ‘who gets the jobs’. A second attribute refer to the organizations’ understanding of the task at hand. As discussed above, this is very much depends on whether it is a ‘relief’ or a ‘development’ oriented organization. Hence the question: ‘How is the work informed?’ The third attribute refers to the professionalism of the organization in terms of the specialist task at hand. Hence the question: ‘How is the job facilitated or executed?’

The answers to these three questions will broadly categorize the NGOs on three levels a) how their work is funded, b) how they approach their work, and c) how they go about executing their work.

38 This is not, of course, referring the specialist ‘peace brokering’ NGOs, like Transcend and the Carter Center.
4.4.1 CATEGORIES OF TRADITION
The Emergence of the Western International NGOs

NGOs may be categorized – as Stoddard (2003) does – into three different groups, all according to their historical roots: the "Wilsonian", the Religious and the "Dunantist".39

The 'Wilsonian' organizations, whose name refers to President Wilson and his ambition to project US values on the world, includes most of the US NGOs and some European NGOs. What characterizes this group is their 'special relationship' to their home government. In the US this has historically manifested itself by NGOs’ (active or passive) support to government policy.40 They are “an arm of the US Government” which carries the obligation of doing ‘public relations’ for the US government, according to Andrew Natsios, head of USAid.41 And the NGOs seem to have responded. The CHF International, an US NGO that started out as a housing organization after WWII, came forward with this statement: “We support the U.S. troops, coalition forces, and development workers whose lives are still at risk as they strive to shore up the foundations for a more stable equitable, and prosperous future for everyone” (CHF 2003;2).

The European “Wilsonian” organizations, primarily the Scandinavian and the Dutch, Swiss and Austrian, do not have this subservient attitude towards their government. Although they might also be executors of their home governments’ foreign policy, their ‘special relationship’ is different in two ways: 1) the policies of their home governments are not world hegemonic, and 2) the organizations act within a tradition of independence. Yet the organizations are totally dependent on government funding for their work (Stoddard 2003, Hume & Edwards 1997).

39 There are numerous classification systems for NGOs working within international development, re Tvedt 1998; 32–37. These are extended further by Fowler (2000) (not least by the hilarious ‘Acronyms for NGDO Pretenders’, ibid.; 32), and Stoddard who says that “there may in fact be no satisfactory way of categorizing NGOs according to their philosophy, and there are potentially unlimited ways of carving up the community according to which of the humanitarian principles and values are emphasized, and in what operational context” (2003; 28).
40 In November 2003 Save the Children USA demanded that the UK branch of the same organization withdraw their public opposition to the US military invasion in Iraq. According to the US branch this could jeopardize their funding prospects from the US government: “Accounts published by Save the Children US highlights its vulnerability to political pressure from a Republican White House with ‘government grants and contracts’ generating some 60%, nearly £71 m, of its £119 operating support and revenue” (The Guardian, November 28, 2003).
The religious organizations that emerged out of church-based charitable work, are the oldest. Internationally this means missionary work, by any other name. Today some of the biggest NGOs are in fact Christian-based organization, although there is little in their practical action that differentiates them from other organization as they very seldom proselytize. They readily cooperate with and engage local organizations that may belong to other faiths, like World Vision and Norwegian Church Aid did in Afghanistan. But faith-based organizations invariably link up to each other as NGOs internationalize and ‘divisionalize’, and they seem to show a higher prevalence in areas familiar with their faith, as illustrated in the Yugoslavian conflict where Islamic NGOs gathered in the Muslim part of Bosnia, Catholic NGOs worked among Croats, and faith-based Orthodox NGOs worked where the Serbs dominated.42

“Dunantist” organizations refer to the ‘idealist’ Red Cross type of organizations, deriving their name from the founder of the Red Cross movement. This group is made up of secular organizations that claim independence from governments. However much MSF was established in reaction to the neutrality of ICRC,43 MSF still stands firmly within the Dunantist camp. So does Oxfam, and Save the Children UK. This group also stays more financially independent of their home governments, although the government share is rising.

42 Even the national branches of ‘Dunantist’ organizations like MSF, has shown preference for fields that related to the religious traditions of the home country, like MSF Greece working among the Serbs in the Yugoslav war.
43 ICRC is still ridden by the fact that they knew about the extermination camps during WWII, but in line with their Geneva Convention obligations of ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ the organization chose to keep quiet about the mass killings (Rieff 2002)
Oxfam GB receives about one-third of its revenue from government and about half of Save the Children UK’s revenue is government money (Stoddard 2003; 29), substantially less than the large Wilsonian organizations receive.

These traditions may be superimposed by other considerations and affiliations, such as that between faith-based (i.e. Christian) and Wilsonian organizations, which the present US administration has given preferential treatment. There may be traces of similar linkages among the Scandinavian NGOs, although their lobbying and public criticism of their own governments are a more noticeable characteristic.

The classification above was presented to highlight how traditions stemming from how organizations have evolved within a given society still guides their activities and policies in spite of their new role as a “crucial pillar of the international humanitarian architecture”, as Stoddard claims (2003; 25). This implicitly also highlights some of the difficulties organizations have in ‘reinventing themselves’ in view of the new challenges, hence this omnipresent call for organizational learning (Samset 1998; Annex 2).

The question raised, ‘Who gets the job?’ may be decided against the tripartite backdrop presented above. Housing is like a cuckoo’s egg in the NGO’s nest. Below I will show how the above-mentioned properties may have determined which nest received the egg.

.1) Housing Interventions in the Shadow of the Wilsonians

The Wilsonian impact on housing (re)construction is by far the most important. Housing (re)construction is to a large extent dependent on donor involvement because of the costs involved. That makes governments key players in marking up the housing strategies the NGOs are to deliver. More often than not this favors one’s own housing industry. This was evident in the way the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian governments opted for provisions of their own pre-fabricated housing units when housing was called for during the war in former Yugoslavia. In terms of funding, housing is a large sector. This in turn makes housing a lucrative sector for the NGOs. In accordance with the Wilsonian traditions, the US government pressed hard to have a US NGO take over the UNHCR-funded housing program in Bosnia in 1996–1997. In spite of their total lack of housing experience, UMCOR was awarded the project in preference to other NGOs that had worked on housing in Bosnia for years.

ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) has been established in the UK for this very purpose.

However, there are exceptions. The Kosovo-appeals launched by independent NGOs in the UK in 1999 netted more private funds (£ 53.6 million) than could be efficiently invested in Kosovo, according to subsequent independent evaluation (ODI 2000).

This is documented on the part of Sweden in the evaluation by Mossberg et al. (1997), and Denmark in their evaluation of their work in former Yugoslavia (Danida 1999). Norway has not made any evaluation of its outcome, in spite of its heavy investments in housing on the Balkans. The policy of providing Norwegian pre-fabricated housing stems from the 'Norwegian Model' where government, NGOs and the private sector (housing manufacturers) co-operate. This will be further presented in the case study section.

United Methodist Committee on Relief.

IMG’s Director of Housing quit his job in protest of this political decision (personal conversation). According to the subsequent evaluation UMCOR’s work was not that satisfactory (UNHCR 1998).
relationship’ is all the more revealing because the US did not spend government funds on housing in Bosnia at all.49

There is no inherent quality in the faith-based NGOs that would carry consequences into its housing operations, beyond what was already referred to: geographical (faith-based) preferences and tendency for similar denominations to group. By far the biggest and most active housing NGO, Habitat for Humanity International, is a committed Christian organization with strategic links to The Carter Center, another Wilsonian NGO with a strong Christian foundation. They have been active in war and disaster affected countries in Central America. World Vision, the largest of the faith-based NGOs has also joined forces with Habitat for Humanity in post-war housing projects in Burundi and Rwanda.

The Dunantian tradition holds no embedded guidelines for housing programs. However, where joint housing programs are taken on, social housing organizations50 or housing co-operatives from the home country, are often engaged. This is similar to how the faith-based organizations team up.

4.4.2 CATEGORIES OF URGENCY

The Two Basic Approaches to Intervention

If the categories above deal with strategies, at least where government monies are concerned, the categories in this section deal with tactics: how the organizations address the issues they are set to resolve. This is an issue highly contested pertaining to housing since housing by nature is a long-lasting investment whereas the reason for its being built in areas of war – is one of urgent need. While most NGOs were established as relief organizations in the aftermaths of natural and man-made disasters, the ‘development’ agenda of the post-WWII years shifted their focus onto long-term economic and societal progress. With the upsurge of violent conflicts in the 1990s the NGO channel again had to refocus. New organizations were established51 and many old ones set up or extended their emergency divisions.

There is a commonly held view that there is a rift between people and organizations working in ‘development’ and ‘relief’ (Rieff 2002). People from either side competitively defend their own turf (World Disasters Report 1996), and the turf is indeed different (Fowler 2000, Edwards & Fowler 2002). Development involves long-term capacity-building programs aimed at strengthening local institutions, often informed by social research and executed in cooperation with local authorities based upon local priorities. At least this is what is stated, if annual reports are anything to go by. Relief organizations, on the other hand, are oriented towards alleviating sudden – yet presumed temporary – human suffering. Thus relief focuses on supporting the indi-

49 The 'Lautenberg Amendment', passed by Congress in July 1996, “bars funding for new housing or repair of old housing unless it is directly related to the efforts of US forces to promote peace in Bosnia” according to the CRS Issue Brief (http://www.fas.org/man/crs/91-089.htm).
50 In the UK this could mean The Building and Social Housing Foundation.
51 One central NGO on the Bosnian scene, Scottish European Aid (SEA), came into being and into prominence in the 1990s, but folded as an independent organization some 10 years later when it merged with Mercy Corps.
individual. Within this tradition, institutions are often perceived to represent bureaucratic hindrances, or at worst, the very forces that cause the suffering. Relief’s focus on short-term assistance to the individual stands opposed to the developmental tradition of focusing on the long-term strengthening of institutions. This may explain the institutional discord between the two strands of assistance.

Such was the situation when the NGO channel was opened into former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The very experience from the Balkans, added to those of the protracted and violent wars of Africa, spurred a theoretical discourse on the very nature of international humanitarian relief operations. What was introduced, or rather what became common policy, was ‘linking relief and development’ (e.g. Barakat 1993, Buchanan-Smith & Maxwell 1994), which in turn rested on the notion of disasters being temporary set-backs on the developmental road to economic progress. All these concepts had strong references to theories on recovery after natural disaster and the post-WWII experience (Davis 1978, 1981, Cuny 1983, Barakat 1993). In essence it entailed a continuum, a linear understanding of development in the best of modernist traditions (Slim 2000, Macrae 2001).

The need for linking the two also came from the practitioners. It was apparent that the many ‘war disasters’ were not temporary, and that relief did not normalize the situation.

It was necessary to focus on livelihood issues. During the latter part of the 1990s the two NGO camps were to join forces. The NGO Forum at the Social Summit in Copenhagen in 1995 agreed on a set of guidelines for how this was to be carried out (World Disasters Report 1996; 47–53).

However, by the end of the decade the NGOs and their informing theories were still in disarray, according to Slim (2000). The ‘continuum’ concept had disappeared, and the discontinuous ‘contiguum’ was brought in, meaning that relief, rehabilitation and development may take place at the same time (Munslow & Brown 1999, Lewis 2001). Development requires institutions building, which were often not there (Macrae 2001), making ‘developmental relief’ a term rather than a reality. There came a renewed call for going ‘back to basics’, i.e. to lower the ambitions by discharging some of the ‘developmental load’ placed on humanitarian relief. NGOs instead high-

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52 Wayne Nafziger’s research has shown that “Humanitarian emergencies are caused mostly by the actions of the state and only rarely by insurgents” (Financial Times; January 21, 1998, see also Nafziger et al. 2000).

53 As a practitioner Fred Cuny had been propagating this for years already (Cuny 1983).

54 The language of the ‘aid business’ is one of its most striking features. According to Tvedt the mutual language or rhetoric (the NGO-speak) is one of the key attributes of the ‘the NGO thing’. (Tvedt 1998;18). Accompanying scholars also play out the ‘language thing’. They juggle between ‘continuum’ and ‘contiguum’ the way Duffield flip words in changing ‘complex political emergencies’ into ‘emergent political complexes’. Of course here are intentional changes in meaning entailed, but as any good writer would know, words sometimes take on lives of their own and by their sound or rhythm tend to change the meaning of what was to be said.

55 The conference Debates, Dilemmas and Dissention: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid held on February 1st 2001 at the Commonwealth Institute, London, with the support of the Institute for Politics and International Studies (University of Leeds), CAFOD and the ODI, was an important event in highlighting the conceptual, i.e. theoretical, change of heart. The key papers are presented in Disasters (2001) Vol. 25, No. 4.
lighted the (lack of) division of labor between NGOs and donor governments. Peace making and creating institutional conditions for development are for governments. Pressing governments for action became an even more urgent issue for NGOs from both strands: “From development as delivery to development as leverage”, as the current saying goes (Edwards & Fowler 2002). In this, the two strands of NGOs could unite.

Organizations are people; people working together within a given or chosen management structure guided by (more or less) defined goals. The two categories of NGOs, even within the same overall organization, are staffed with people who carry their respective traditions into their tactical and operational considerations. Rivalry itself exasperates the differences. The urgency – and thus the media coverage – of the relief operations makes their operators look more ‘sexy’ than their ‘slower’ development agents. Adding this to the fact that funding comes much easier during disasters, and you have another explanation as to why the two stand separate.56

.1) Housing: Long-term Urgent Interventions
Housing interventions clearly exemplify this conflict. Housing programs are usually implemented and managed by humanitarian relief organizations. The NGOs are urgently set to provide ‘shelter’ for people in dire need. Most other considerations are set aside.

Literature is scant on post-war housing. The conclusions from evaluations are the closest we get to theories being developed. The major review and evaluation from UNHCR’s housing program in Rwanda concerning the repair and building of 100,000 units draw conclusions pertinent to this relief-development dichotomy (UNHCR 2000). The developmental failure of the UNHCR housing program in Rwanda, as claimed by the evaluation team, was held to rest on the very emergency traditions of UNHCR: “UNHCR works as an emergency oriented agency. This is compatible with temporary shelters but incompatible with a sustainable housing construction program” (UNHCR 2000; 25–26). The evaluation team made a point of UNHCR’s use of ambiguous terminology by not distinguishing between shelter and housing. Making housing synonymous with shelter makes housing into a “basic necessities of relief” alongside water/sanitation, food, medical care and protection from violence and harassment (World Disasters Report 1996; 48).

56 The Norwegian government, for instance, until recently funded 100% of emergency assistance costs, but only 80% of programs for development assistance.
NGOs are often accused of applying the same shelter conceptions in support of the IDPs shown above, and in assisting returning IDPs, as shown below. (The upper picture by courtesy of the UNHCR.)
Relief organizations focus on time (timeliness) and logistics. Making housing into shelter executed by a relief-oriented NGO renders housing the function of time and logistics. This became apparent when one of the large Norwegian emergency NGOs finally employed an architect to handle their large construction portfolio.\textsuperscript{57} The Head of Construction was combined with the post of Head of Logistics.\textsuperscript{58} However, according to the team evaluating returnee housing in Tajikistan as built by SDC\textsuperscript{59}: “the emergency approach is questionable for this phase of programme”, adding “Housing (reconstruction and/or reconditioning of homes) has to be seen as a complex socio-economic activity, different from providing shelter (emergency phase)” (SDC/UNHCR 1999; ii). “The time factor is a non issue for the [returnee] beneficiaries” (SDC/UNHCR 1999; 9). These are findings confirming what previous investigations and research have long ago made available, Davis (1978), Cuny (1983) and Roger Zetter’s ‘state of the art’ report (1995).

In response to the question heading this section, ‘How do the NGOs address the challenges embedded in housing (re)construction?’, housing seems still to be ruled by relief perceptions rather than development perceptions\textsuperscript{60} among NGOs.\textsuperscript{61} Why is that? My third and final categorization of NGOs involved in housing will deal with disciplinary professionalism where part of the answer may lie.

4.4.3 CATEGORIES OF NGO STAFF; THE SPECIALIST AND THE GENERALIST

When the NGOs entered the conflict on the Balkans they did so with no or very little organizational experience in post-war (re)construction. The response to the questions of how this was to be organized, who were there to do it, and what skills were required distinguishes some organizations from others, or more to the point, reveals some basic traits of the “NGO thing”, to borrow Tvedt’s term (1998).

There has been a watershed in the NGO world since the war on the Balkans. They have now become “a force for transformation in global politics and economics”, disbursing US$ 12–15 billion per year (Edwards & Fowler 2002; 1). The NGOs have become a “giant, global, unregulated industry worth £ 2,500 million a year”, according to Lindsey Hilsum\textsuperscript{62} Yet they are still volatile institutions, volatile in terms of funding and political goodwill from governments and the home public,\textsuperscript{63} but volatile also in

\textsuperscript{57} Constituting about 50% of their operational cost basically made up of permanent constructions.
\textsuperscript{58} Cf. also UMCOR being awarded UNHCR’s housing program in Bosnia because of their logistical experience.
\textsuperscript{59} Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.
\textsuperscript{60} Professor Ian Davis maintains that ‘nothing much has changed’ since he started working in this field in the late 1970s (private conversation May 2001).
\textsuperscript{61} The referee team (of which I was a member) and author of the ODI/HPN Network paper entitled “Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and disaster” (Barakat 2003) held the firm opinion that housing’s main challenge was to dislodge it from its prevailing ‘relief orientation’. Yet in publishing the Network Paper, the ODI/HPN is said to have edited out the chapter on theory and hence eliminated generating understanding of housing “as a complex socio-economic activity”, as UNHCR’s Rwanda evaluation stated (UNHCR 2000).
\textsuperscript{62} The Observer, December 31, 1995.
\textsuperscript{63} How public appeals are presented so as to induce trust and willingness to donate is a major challenge for the NGOs (Fowler 2000, Edwards & Fowler 2002). They sometimes exaggerate the situation in order to persuade the public to donate more (Valid International 2004). Maren (1997) spells it all out: “NGOs need nothing more than publicity. Their prime interest is in reaching their customers, the donating public” (cf. Rieff 1997; 133). For this, the stories from the field are often distorted (ibid.).
terms of the 'operators', the NGO people, working in the field. Their security, however, has been recognized (van Brabant 2000), and so too have the issues linked to the management of the volume of funds presently channeled though the NGOs (Fowler 2000, Edwards & Fowler 2002, Lewis & Wallace 2000, Minear 2002). But otherwise, the people on the ground are still 'on the lose'. Little is known about their capacities and competence, about their professional qualifications and about the working conditions, contracts and organizational relationships, and how these may impact the implementation of projects on the ground.64

There was a saying that the main qualification for working for an NGO overseas was "availability"65 rather than specific qualifications. The numerous university courses on emergency issues and disaster management during the 1990s have upgraded the NGO staff in the field. This has expanding the team of NGO generalists mastering basic skills and introductory knowledge on the multiplicity of issues deemed relevant in the field.66

Over the years, however, some of the large, cover-all NGOs have emerged as specialists in particular disciplines, for instance, the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in demining, and Oxfam and Norwegian Church Aid in water and sanitation. In addition, there are those who have grown out of their NGO status and become institutions in their own right. Grameen Bank is the key example. A trend among NGOs towards professionalism is apparent,67 a change that also stems from the calls for a more integrative approach, division of labor, or co-ordination, by any other name (Fowler 2000, Minear 2002).

The normal way for cover-all NGOs to become specialists is simply by hiring short-term staff appropriately trained for the program at hand, i.e. technicians for housing programs. This invariably takes place within a ‘relief framework’ which also embodies short-term contracts, frequent change in personnel and ensuing organizational dis-

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64 This is all the more remarkable knowing that during the Rwanda crisis one of the main multinational NGOs had to change their field-based heads of sections about every three weeks. The impact on all aspects to the assistance is obvious. One of the consultants to the Joint Evaluation on Rwanda. Vol III, Humanitarian Aid and Effects provided this information (January 2000) on condition that the organization in question was not identified. High levels of stress have long been the acknowledged reason for this high turnover. Carlisle-Pesic writes what rings true in the ears of many aid workers: "The Aid agencies, despite their core purpose of being to help those in need, are notoriously bad at looking after their own employees" (The Guardian March 21, 2001). This might be the direct cause of the rising unionization among NGO staff (ibid., June 29, 2001). For further reports from the field, the aid business and the ‘NGO thing’ seen from below, see Maren (1997), Terry (2002), Carter (2004).

65 This was in fact the case in the early 1990s when the NGOs charged into former Yugoslavia, and also when the Kosovo crisis struck.

66 Half of the 242 organizations present in Bosnia in 1999 each covered 12 distinctive sectors, sectors that in the home country would be separate disciplines. ‘Shelter reconstruction’, permanent housing, by any other name, was carried out by 112 organizations. No architect was reportedly employed. The sectors covered (and the number of NGOs engaged) Education/Training (242), Children/youth (205), Human Rights (194), Return (180), Civil Society (178), Humanitarian (169), Women (156), Psycho-Social (154), Information/Media (133), Health (129), Micro-Credit/Income Generation (122), Shelter/reconstruction (122), and in addition there were Agriculture (89), Elderly (89), Demining/Mine Awareness (31), and Other (63) (ICVA 1999).

67 The publications of the ODI’s Humanitarian Practice Network (http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/index.html) as well as The Guardian’s section on the Voluntary Sector have covered these trends extensively (http://society.guardian.co.uk/voluntary/).
ruptions, aborted continuity, and lack of institutional memory (Tvedt 1998, Fowler 2000, Schloms 2001). Headquarters are staffed by all-rounder managers and administrators, not disciplinary specialists.\textsuperscript{68} The apparent tension and frustration caused by this is not covered at any length in research beyond the issues of ‘institutional learning’ and ‘NGO coordination’ (ibid.), although significant contributions towards understanding how the field ticks (or rather not), stem from the writing of Maren (1997), Vaux (2001), Terry (2002), Carter (2004).

\textbf{.1) Housing as a specialist sector of intervention.}
In spite of housing’s large share of funding and its many-facetted attributes there are very few NGOs specializing in post-war (re)construction housing. UNHCR’s large housing program in Bosnia in 1996–1997 was formally run by an Italian economist, and the program itself was carried out mainly by a NGO specializing in logistics.\textsuperscript{69} A Kosovo shelter program, undertaken a couple of years later by a group of nine UK NGOs, reported severe implementation problems stemming from the lack of specialist personnel. The fact that many of their building managers could stay only a few weeks had obvious impacts on the efficacy of the shelter/housing projects (Valid International 2000). Some of the NGOs involved encountered so many problems in staffing and in negotiating a common standard of delivery that in effect they advocated the handing over of shelter programs to regular contractors (ibid.).

Planning, construction and managing housing is a professional discipline, or rather a cluster of disciplines. The countries funding post-war housing programs throughout the world all recognize this when it comes to their own housing challenges. Annually large sums of public funds are spent on higher education and R&D in this particular field. When acting on foreign soil, the same governments – in the role of donors – pay little attention to that. In the best of cases, engineers, technicians, and in some rare cases, architects have been temporarily employed, but just as often teachers and social workers have managed extensive shelter/housing programs running into many millions of dollars.\textsuperscript{70}

Consequently, it is mostly ‘generally staffed’ NGOs that implement housing projects in war-affected areas. Out of the specialist organizations, the most influential are the United Nations’ own organization, Habitat, and in addition there are ‘Habitat for Humanity International’ (HHI), a large and American Christian Housing NGO, Building

\textsuperscript{68} The large (US$ 100 million?) shelter/housing programs implemented by Norwegian NGOs in BiH during the 1990s were led from HQ by (overworked) administrative officers with a professional background in social work.

\textsuperscript{69} UNHCR had, however, established a specialist unit, The International Management Group, that acted as UNHCR’s technical advisors.

\textsuperscript{70} In the spring of 2000 I stayed with the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit at York University, UK, trying to collecting case studies on post-war and post-disaster housing from major international NGOs. 21 organizations responded, not by providing case studies on housing, but by providing information as to why no case studies were available. Although they had all implemented housing programs, they were ‘in no position’ to allocate resources to have the programs documented, although the benefits were accepted as ‘obvious’. GTZ which had made exemplary documents on their housing project up until 1998, could no longer ‘afford it’. Inquiring about particular housing projects that I knew the NGOs had implemented, in no case was I informed by people at headquarters; they had scant recollection of project in question. Throughout, I was referred to people who were either no longer with the organization in question or who were working in another field, most often in another country.
and Social Housing Foundation (BHSF) in the UK, and Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF International) in the US\textsuperscript{71}. In housing terms, these are large and to some extent influential, but remain small compared to the cover-all NGOs. Most of their work is, as suits the issue, long-term development work, although some, mainly HHI, also work in areas of conflict and disaster (Fuller 2000).

Relief organizations seem by definition to be staffed by generalist organizations, staffed with people who are specialists in ‘development’, in ‘logistics’, or in ‘reconstruction’ in general terms. When specialist input is required, this is sought covered by hiring short-term staff of the appropriate discipline. Specialist organizations like those dealing exclusively with housing are mostly employed through outsourcing or, in the best of cases, through strategic partnerships with generalist NGOs when it comes to work in post-war reconstruction (UNHCR 2000).

From what has been presented above it would not seem unlikely that the way post-war housing is being realized as a function of the generalist nature of the implementing agencies and their policy of employing short-term specialist field staff. Is it so?

\textsuperscript{71} CHF however has recently diversified to such an extent that housing is but one ‘speciality’ among many. It has also through recent practice reiterated its strong Wilsonian traits.
PART THREE
METHODS AND TOOLS OF ANALYSIS
5 METHODS AND TOOLS OF ANALYSIS

5.1 FRAMING POST-WAR RECOVERY

It is self-evident that the sheer volume of housing investments\(^1\) accompanied by housing’s functional and symbolic properties will in some way or other affect the recovery process of BiH, as it would for any war affected society. It is the outcome of these processes that will determine the contribution housing yields to the overall recovery. Hence it is necessary first to define the term ‘recovery’, then develop appropriate tools for analyzing the recovery processes embedded in housing projects, and finally select cases for investigation that hold the characteristics of recovery defined.

5.1.1 DEFINING THE CONCEPT

Recovery describes a process where people, or societies, after having had their normal societal development processes broken, regain their capacities to function on their own. It is a healing process that might be self-ordained or made dependent on support from others. It is limited in time and deals with the whole of society although the ailment, or the cause, may be specific. The recovery process is not merely economic or material, it encompasses the whole body, the whole of society. The term is used in medicine and is used here as metaphor because it so readily shows how ‘recovery’ differs from ordinary ‘development’.

Recovery is held separate from emergency relief, the immediate shock response to abrupt disasters (again the medical reference is illuminating). Recovery deals with future perspectives, although different from ‘development’. ‘Development’ as a term – even a concept – is more difficult to pin down than recovery. “The eternal challenge of development is to do better”, as Robert Chamber says, in lining up policy statements from the annually updated Development Reports from the World Bank World or UNDP on actions and policies to make the world a better place, especially for the poor (Chambers 1997:1743). This is a statement that fully satisfies Wolfgang Sachs’s much earlier claim that “Development has become a shapeless amoeba-like word. It cannot express anything because the outlines are blurred. [...] Development thus has no content”, (Sachs 1992).\(^2\) This does not make defining recovery any easier. In her recent book Joanna Macrae argues, as has Terje Tvedt done before, that for intervening agencies applying a long-term developmental approach to reconstruction of war ravaged societies is well-nigh impossible where the societies in question have no functioning state institutions. Such an approach may make things worse (Tvedt 1996, Macrae 2001). Ha-Joon Chang does not accept that strong institutions as such are a prerequisite to the development of poor nations. He has shown how both the UK and the US were ‘developed’ without first

\(^1\) By Oct.1 2000 KM 886,588,000 (about US$ 500,000,000) had been officially spent on housing, according to OHR Economic Newsletter, Vol. 3, No 6

\(^2\) Chambers, in the 1997 article agrees. As a way out he sees a requirement for ‘personalizing’ development assistance, ‘de-mechanizing’ it on the part of the managing agency.
having functioning institutions. Given a similar 'institutional leeway' the poor nations of today could also achieve prosperity. They are effectively barred from this by today's rich nations (Chang 2002).

Recovery denotes change that comprises 'development-like' activities and processes aiming at creating conditions of predictability, comprising political and institutional growth, economic development, physical reconstruction, and the (re)formation of human and social capital. Recovery thus defined would rest within the endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986, 1994), where the presence of social capital is appreciated as decisive in terms of efficiency (Fukuyama 2001), governance (Putnam 1993), and in issues of location (Krugman 1996, Maskell et. al. 1998).

Recovery is distinguished from 'development' in basically three different ways: reflexivity, temporality, and complexity.

1) Recovery is Reflexive, Guided by the Past

Whereas 'ordinary development' is focusing on improving an unknown future, recovery takes place among people who have 'been there - done that'. As stated in the Introduction, this is a fundamental difference between 'recovery' and (intended) 'development'. Recovery will be directed, guided or influenced by pre-war/pre-disaster perceptions, either to recreate, or make new. All post-war or post-disaster records show this tension (Dancke 1986, Barakat 1994, Mazover 1998, Stiefel 1999). Some may want to go back – others will try to reach what is merely a dream in the pre-war situation. Mark Mazower says about the attitudes shaping the post WWII recovery:

"The results of wartime and post-war dislocation and upheaval was therefore paradoxical. [...] The outcome was a popular mood which was both radical and conservative at the same time. People looked forward to building a new world, but they did not wish this process to be disruptive." (Mazover 1998:228)

International assistance holds no formal political mandate to make choices for future change in war-affected nations, therefore their assistance tends to be biased in favor of restoring the historical past – as perceived (or intentionally interpreted) by the external actors. This is contested territory and along with the weakening of exclusive national sovereignty will possibly be overtaken by direct political intervention to implant 'democratic ideals' of the intervening forces. Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq show a pattern. This is more than mere political speculation. Ulrich Beck maintains that this is an intrinsic property of the dynamics of globaliza-

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3 Which entailed no adherence to copyright laws, laws on intellectual property and the like.
4 The bootlegging of music, of DVDs, of Rolexes, Levis jeans and the like is the contemporary equivalent to the former 'illegal' activities of the present world powers,
5 The US instituted Cabinet of Iraq is composed on the basis of religious affiliation. Grounded in the perceptions of the occupying forces, religion was made a decisive factor, although religion has not been a political leadership matter in Iraq since 1927. The appointed cabinet has a Minister of Human Rights (but no Defence Minister).
tion, guided as it is by universal rights and liberal economic values (Beck 1998, 2003).

These internationally imposed— in fact, globalized traits – are new features in post-war recovery. They stand in tension with the affected population’s urge to restore continuity. For recovery to carry meaning, and thus be sustained, the informed references people carry to their past endeavors and their potential future capacities depend on principal participation in the reconstruction processes. Engaging people’s own knowledge, ability and will are uncontested prerequisites for sustainable development (Barakat & Chard 2002); it is even more so in the efforts of recovery.

.2) Recovery is Time Limited

Recovery is a phase of ‘development-like’ change where the activities are borne out of war’s societal and material breakdown. When these no longer determine politics or policies, the recovery phase is over. In areas of chronic political emergencies, this phase may simply not be reached through current relief-development methods and very selective international political or donor engagement (Macrae 2001, Duffield 2002, Disasters 2000, 2001). In others, it may come long after the material or purely economic setbacks have been surmounted. The constituting activities will hence change with time. So, too, will appropriate interventions change, but not in a linear fashion as the consequences of conflict are spatially and temporally dependent. Timeliness is crucial. So, too, will the understanding of the interventions themselves change with time, as these will change the context and thus affect what is appropriate and timely.

The understanding of time and phasing of post-war/disaster interventions is worth deliberating. The way it is conceptualized gives rise to strategies and interventions. In his early works on housing after natural disasters, Ian Davis identified four post-disaster phases: 1) emergency, 2) rehabilitation, 3) reconstruction, and 4) development (Davis 1978). Barakat presents three stages for “reconstruction after natural disasters in general, and war in particular: 1) immediate relief, 2) rehabilitation, and 3) long-term reconstruction” (Barakat 1994:63). After research on the recovery after earthquakes, Kates & Pijawka identified four phases: 1) the emergency, 2) restoration, 3) replacement-reconstruction, and 4) the commemorative period, each lasting roughly ten times longer than the preceding period (1977). All these are ‘continuum models’ illustrating the overlapping phases of the recovery process. These processes are not so neatly lined up in the tense atmosphere of violence and vicious sentiments during and immediately after war as they are after natural disasters, although the components are there. Time and again, the war-post-war scenes juggle the phases in both space and time.

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6 In Norway the recovery phase following WW II was officially over by 1960 (Danche 1986). By then Norway’s economy was way beyond the pre-war level. The 1939 figures were surpassed already in 1948, according to Maddison (1982).

7 Giving credence to the claim that effective emergency management has long-term effects.

8 The continuum model is no longer helpful in that it does not anticipate the erratic disruptions of this perceived continuum experienced in current wars. Within the same ‘theatre of war’ all phases may be present at the same time, and the international response does not necessarily pass from one phase to the next (Lewis 2001).
Recovery covers all the phases presented by the authors referred to above, except for the emergency phase. Again using the medical metaphor, the emergency phase is, in most cases, very short – if properly dealt with. However, the nature of current wars often leaves the affected societies in a state of extended emergency, where recovery is an almost irrelevant idea (Macrae 2001). In others, the emergency phase is artificially extended through the mode of aid delivery because much of what is implemented as emergency relief is in fact reconstruction work carrying long-term consequences (Macrae 2001, World Disasters Report 2001). Sometimes there is relief and long-term investments taking place at the same time, even by the same agencies. There is no common definitions of these terms. What is ‘emergency relief’ to one organization is ‘development aid’ to another. 

The processes constituting recovery after war – as compared to recovery after natural disasters – do not follow a linear pattern, from emergency to development. Within the same theatre of war they progress in a much more politicized manner where all phases may take place simultaneously, and change from one to another may go either way. Hence recovering from war entails political (re)construction and the (re)development – or merely change – of political institutions, be they old or new wars (Bjøl 1988, Haughton 1998, Kaldor 1999).

.3) Recovery is Extremely Complex
Recovery is characterized by embedded political bias and psychological tension following violence, personal loss and humiliation, in addition to the many-faceted challenges of the institutional and material reconstruction (Barakat 1994, Zetter 2001, Macrae 2001). At least in degree, this is different from ‘regular development’. Sultan Barakat says:

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9 In Sri Lanka, NORAD, the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation, funds emergency programs as well as ‘regular development work’ in the war zones of the country. Currently, Norway provides bomber aircraft and emergency aid, as well as long-term support to Afghanistan.

10 Definitions are pragmatically set. What you call what you do is largely a function of what it is called by whoever provides the funds.

11 I will not digress into the finer print when distinguishing war from natural disaster. Needless to say, there are natural disasters caused by stupid acts of man, but basically, people affected perceive war and its destruction as caused by someone in particular whereas natural disasters are perceived as caused by God, or Nature in general. It is how war is perceived that counts when setting recovery strategies. In line with the emerging ‘risk society’, the perception of the causes of natural disaster has steadily become shifted towards people, i.e. politicians (Beck 1992).

12 The term ‘theatre of war’ stems from a time when war was very different. According to Branislav Jakovljevic the term “theatrum belli” (war theatre), was first used in the 17th century (1999). The term was later used by Clausewitz in his On War, and also in the Hague Convention of 1899, The Law of War.

13 Even after natural disasters there may be political squabbles in addressing blame. After the Central European Floods in 1997, Radio Free Europe stated: “But it has also created an opportunity, despite the incalculable damage, of introducing major and lasting improvements in the ways those countries conduct the business of government at home and work with each other.” The matter then entered the subsequent election campaigns in the affected countries.
“[reconstruction] could be distinguished from any other form of normal building or development by the level of complexity involved in its process (emotional energy; righting wrongs; rebuilding lives, solving differences to achieve national goals, etc.), and the magnitude of the task that has to be undertaken in the most pressing and demanding economic, political, social and cultural circumstances”. (Barakat 1994;53)

The complexities are all the more apparent in societies at war with themselves. Addressing recovery from these wars will have to reflect these complexities as there are normally no political bodies, national or international, with sufficient legitimacy, political power or will to coordinate or “to sort things out”. Borrowing tactics from non-violent conflicts, planning under such circumstances would subscribe to small projects addressing practical improvements where few value-based decisions have to be made (Sager 1994). Pursuing recovery depends on re-instituting the rule of law and vigorously protecting human rights (Glasius & Kaldor 2002, Beck 2003, Duffield 2002, World Bank 2003). This is no easy task, if at all achievable.

5.1.2 RECOVERY AS RE-DEVELOPMENT

Recovery, imbued with the characteristics referred to above, is similar to the term ‘re-development’. It has been hammered down to a set of interacting, politically sensitive activities spanning time from the true emergency phase onwards to a point where society’s dispositions are no longer guided by the effects of war. It is about the affected population regaining their capacities – individually and as a society – to provide for themselves and interact with others in a mutually dignified way. The complexity of the situation is time dependent, but also depends on how the processes are perceived in respect to the pre-war conditions and the experience of war. These change over time, and they are different at different corners of the arena. The choice of cases for investigation will be determined by these uncovered attributes of recovery, and so will the tools for analysis. They will be forged by these same attributes, chief among them the reflexive quality of recovery, i.e. the role of local agency. The time limit and the complexity does not give similar unequivocal indicators, and will more generally be made part of my filter of analysis.

14 Barakat refers to reconstruction as: "the totality of mental and manual activities directed toward relieving the victims, mending the damages and improving the quantity and quality of the pre-disaster structures, operations and relationships". This describes the recovery process.
5.2 DEVELOPING A ‘FILTER OF ANALYSIS’

By investigating the processes set in motion by internationally funded housing projects, we need a framework or a filter through which the data are sifted, a filter conceptualized and calibrated in accordance with the research challenge. The filter as a metaphor is used partly to avoid the word ‘framework’ which in development-emergency speak is so overspent it has lost its defining meaning. But also because it says something about an analytical approach to how data are treated in order to bring out valid conclusions. Since I enter into the ongoing recovery processes I am to investigate, it is crucial that I find a way of analyzing them that acknowledges the dynamics of the processes. A (multi-layered) filter metaphor alludes to a set of parameters through which the data are sifted. In the following, I will present analytical tools, ‘filter’ in my usage, employed in current development practice and relate these to the properties of housing as presented in the previous chapters.

5.2.1 THE CAPACITIES-VULNERABILITIES APPROACH

Anderson and Woodrow, in their seminal *Rising from the Ashes; Development Strategies in Times of Disaster*, presented the Capacities-Vulnerabilities (C-V) analytical framework, (Anderson & Woodrow 1989). They use a set, or a continuum, of three types of capacities when describing or analyzing (a vulnerable) society: material, organizational and motivational. The capacities of a society are mirrored in inverse sets of vulnerabilities. In the C-V framework, development is understood as processes that strengthen capacities and, or whereby, vulnerabilities are reduced. There is a crucial distinction between capacity as ‘capital’ or ‘asset’ and capacity as ‘flow’ or ‘enablement’. In reference to education Anderson & Woodrow say: “Education is not a process of putting ‘knowledge deposits’ in other peoples’ minds. Education is a process of engaging people in discovery and thought” (ibid;86). Strengthening the capacities of a society is strengthening their capability to act. The capacity itself is not the prime dimension. It is the interacting flow generated by these capacities that constitutes change, and reducing vulnerabilities constitute positive societal development. It is not the fact that Germany in the early post-WWII years had a well-educated population that caused the ‘Deutche Wunder’, it was their ability to put their knowledge and experience into strategic use that made the difference. This has been the crucial difference in the post-war reconstruction of the former Yugoslav countries. The C-V approach is still the fundament for any subsequent development logic in that they recognized development-support to be

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1 Anderson and Woodrow had poor, vulnerable societies in mind when writing their book. Since ‘September 11’ all countries are vulnerable; see Homer-Dixon’s “The rise of complex terrorism” in *Foreign Policy*, Jan/Feb 2002;52-62.

2 “When the war is over – for example in Bosnia, the country will probably get back on its feet rather quickly because the country is fairly well endowed with human capital”, stated Professor in Economics, Anders Skonhoft, in an article in Klasskampen in 1996. He based his assumptions on the post-WWII experience of Europe. His assumptions proved wrong (as did most people’s). The dreary development of post-war Bosnia has shown that human capital + financial capital is not in itself sufficient to enhance recovery.
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multi-dimensional. If it were to improve lives and livelihoods of the people assisted, it had to respond to all three ‘compartments’ of society, material, organizational and motivational.

5.2.2 THE SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD APPROACH

Another approach, another analytical framework, which obviously owes much to Anderson and Woodrow, as well as to the work of Robert Chambers, is “The Sustainable Livelihood Approach”. The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) was commissioned to present a framework for Britain’s renewed commitment to development aid as part of New Labour’s political take-over. Extending some of the concepts and relationships presented by Chambers and Conway (Chambers & Conway 1992, Chambers 1997), IDS/DIFID came up with the “sustainable livelihood approach” (Scoones 1998, DIFID 2000), in which they conceptualize society as a dynamic structure of ‘livelihood capitals’, natural, social, human, environmental and financial, through which development and change is taking place. And again, it is the ‘flow’ from these capitals that represents the dynamics, not the capitals themselves. The capitals interact within a “vulnerability context” which is also defined by the prevailing power structures of society. On the basis of the overall context and the institutional structures of power, people activate the capitals into ‘livelihood strategies’ in anticipation of ‘livelihood outcomes’.

The context and institutional power analysis resembles a SWOT analysis, with the crucial difference of extending the ‘Strength’ dimension into five capitals, one of which is financial capital. The other four capitals are defined as follows;

**Human Capital** represents the skills, knowledge, ability to work - and crucially, health: “As well as being of intrinsic value, human capital (...) is required in order to make use of any of the (...) other types of assets” (ibid. 2.3.1).

**Environmental (natural) Capital** refers to wide array of the natural assets or resources, from intangible public goods such as environmental beauty and biodiversity, to divisible assets used directly in production. And again, the focus is to be shifted towards “the more important issue of how natural capital is used, in combination with other assets, to sustain livelihood” (ibid. 2.3.3).

**Fixed (physical) Capital** comprises the infrastructure, buildings, plants and machinery and other producer good required to support livelihoods. DIFID label the following essentials for sustainable livelihoods: “affordable transport; secure shelter and buildings; adequate water supply and sanitation; clean, affordable energy; and access to information (communication)” (ibid. 2.3.4).

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3 According to Robert Chambers, the term “Sustainable Livelihoods” was coined by Conroy and Litvinoff for a conference in 1988.

4 Strengths, Weaknesses (internal), Opportunities, Threats (External).
Social Capital, presently often referred to as “the missing link”, or the glue that binds the other capital modes together, is defined by the World Bank like this: “Social Capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and the norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions” (Word Bank 2002a). DIFID points to its manifestations in a development context: “network and connectedness; membership of more formalized groups; relationships of trust, reciprocity and exchanges” (DIFID 2000 2.3.2).

5.2.3 THE SUSTAINABLE NEIGHBORHOOD APPROACH
The Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research & the York Research Partnership have, in a recent research project, employed what I have labeled ‘The sustainable neighborhood approach’ in their dealing with housing and regeneration of former coalfield communities in Yorkshire. These were communities that experienced the shock of pit closures in the early 1980s (Stafford et al. 2001). It is a simplified DIFID model, with ‘financial’ capital left out. Whether it is helpful to include financial capital into the framework is arguable. The Sheffield/York research left financial capital out because “Financial capital [...] is rather a means of paying for (i.e. financing) increases in one or more of the four capitals”. This argument is strengthened in that projects that are externally funded – like the ones examined in my research - convert financial capital into other modes of capital as a matter of course. The World Bank also excludes financial capital from the essential socio-economic assets for sustainable development (cf. Stafford et al. 2001;39). The remaining four pillars are those of social capital, human capital, environmental capital and fixed capital. I acknowledge that such a ‘capital approach’ is a gross simplification of society. As such it may represent the “the common tendency to reify the social world; that is, to turn active, conscious social relationships and processes into things which exist independently of us so that we think of them in terms of ‘having’ rather than ‘being’”, says Sayer (1992;16).

It is therefore imperative to bear in mind that it is the flow from these capitals, the processes and interaction they set in motion that validates such an approach. It is back to the ‘agency of housing’: what housing does, not what it is. If we rephrase this by referring to so-

5 Mancur Olson, Jr introduced the framework that shaped the concept of “social capital” in his 1965 book The Logic of Collective Action, whereas in 1993 Robert D. Putnam and his Making Democracy Work brought added attention to it through his work on the concept of “Civil Society”. Putnam’s own definition of social capital: “By any analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital [...] social capital refers to features of social organisation such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit. Social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital” (1993;35). Bourdieu also applies the concept of social capital and defines it like this: “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” (Bourdieu 1986;248)

6 Other capital forms are sometimes included when investigating particular aspects of societal dynamics., this can sometimes be political capital, symbolic, cultural, even aesthetic capital.

7 From correspondence between Stafford and Skotte on the issue of Financial Capital, November 2001.

8 Chambers claim that new terms were introduced to make development economists and engineers able to handle the new development dogma of ‘people and capabilities’ within their own world of ‘things and numbers’ (Chambers 1997).
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ciat capitals: it is not what they are, it is how we make them interact that brings about lasting developmental change. This echoes Forrest and Kearn’s description of social capital “Social capital, then, is important not for its own sake, but for what one does with it, or can attain by it, as with other forms of capital” (2001;2141).

This approach is chosen as my filter of analysis because it allows for an understand of the dynamics of the affected societies by utilizing the notion of interacting capitals. I use the metaphor of the electric motor – which is constructed similar to a electric generator: the devise can generate motion or activity when expending energy, but when in motion it can itself generate energy. From the figure we also see that capital replenishment may escape without interaction, without strengthening the other capital modes. This was exemplified in the Yorkshire study by the government programs to retrain people, expand their human capital as it were. Instead of supporting societal growth, the people simply moved out when sufficiently trained, leaving the communities in question even worse off.

![Fig.5.2.1 An approach to understanding societal interaction as interaction between constituting capital modes. Development or re-development takes place when replenishing one replenishes the others through interaction.]

The whole proposition depends on the interaction, the spillover, between the assets. The capital modes feed off each other. Thus depletion in one might lead to depletion in another or, investment in one capital form augments capital formation of another. These are not market transactions in any way, although the model itself owes much to the endogenous growth theory (Romer 1994), particularly to the linkage between knowledge (human capital) and investment (fixed capital). In addition to conceptualizing this interaction, the illustration above also shows another
crucial element of this approach: the ‘complementarity’ between the assets; they cannot readily be substituted.⁹

Another metaphor may also help understand the basics of this approach. When lifting a carpet from the floor all four corners have to be raised simultaneously. It makes no sense to lift one or two, or lift them in succession. And we may do without metaphors: we experience daily how one action inadvertently leads to another, intentionally, or by chance.

This approach acknowledges that there is an inevitable interactions between a capital intervention, like housing, and that of the other societal capitals. By analyzing my findings I will hence be allowed to uncover the extent of interaction, how it came about and with what effects. The bottom line for any intervention is to contribute to the well-being or welfare of the population assisted. “The objective of development is well-being for all”, says Chambers, well-being being described as the experience of good quality of life: “Unlike wealth, well-being is open to the whole range of human experience, social, psychological and spiritual as well as material” (Chambers 1997;1748). Well-being may be seen as a matter of subject choice, and development as a matter of strategic subject choice.

To operationalize such a ‘filter of analysis’ requires that a territorial aggregate is set, and external relations are recognized. Although crucial, this seems to be a practical and conceptual difficulty in all sustainability analysis - and corresponding planning. It is evident in the realities of slogans like ‘act locally, think globally’, in the shifting of scale and linkage between (local) action plans and (larger scale) strategic plans (Hamdi & Goethers 1997). The same is evident in theories of ‘Ecological Footprints’ (Rees et.al. 1995) and is also contested in basic social choice theories (Buchanan & Tullock 1999, Sen 1990). The ‘neighborhood approach’ defines through its name its territorial demarcation, recognizing at the same time the limitations in not being able to investigate the further linkages into the recovery processes of the society at large.

This section sets out to develop, or rather to chose among existing modes of analyses, a tool for understanding – and thus analyze, how housing projects might have

⁹ The concept of capital’s modes not being interchangeable apparently stands in stark contrast to Bourdieu’s notion of ‘capital’. In his thinking, the capital modes are readily interchanged; it is their very nature to be used this way. Symbolic capital, for instance, may be exchanged for other modes of capital – in pursuit of and reproduction of power (Bourdieu 1996). This takes place within a given field of society, a field into which, as will be examined in this research, external agents are to provide financial capital in order to strengthen the four basic modes of developmental assets. Resolving the apparent contradiction lies in accepting that the capital exchange of Bourdieu constitutes the overall context into which the externally financed provisions are made, and that all the models described above are but contemporary tools for the analysis of societal change.⁹ (‘Change’ is actually too blunt a term. ‘Progress’, ‘evolution’, ‘transformation’ or ‘modification’ are terms more in line with the progressive and evolutionary nature of sustainable societal change.)
affected processes of recovery. I have decided to apply the Sheffield/York ‘neighborhood approach’, which has already been employed in research on housing interventions. By acknowledging that (re)development stems from the strength of beneficial interaction between the four modes of societal capitals, the issue will therefore be to investigate how this actually has occurred in housing projects in Bosnia, and to what effect. This approach gives a way of understanding the dynamics of recovery where one capital mode, housing as fixed capital, is being richly replenished by foreign emergency funds.
5.3 RESEARCH APPROACH AND APPLIED METHODS

5.3.1 INTRODUCTION

‘Method and Field Work ’ takes on a position in research as ‘Planning and Implementation’ does in building: phases of action that are much more than instrumental, executive – almost abstract - activities between the chosen goal or end product and the provided resources, be they theoretical/cognitive or material. In effect, these ‘phases’ have reflexive qualities. They impact the end result in substantial ways depending on the chosen path of research or building. In fact, in the post-positivist era of social science, methodology itself is becoming a key area of research. Not so for planning and building implementation. Consequently, for research undertaken by an architect fostered in a technologically, and yet discursively inclined tradition, it is pertinent to clarify the path through which this research has been implemented since the path passes through a ‘social landscape’.

In the previous chapter I presented my ‘filter of analysis’ through with my research data will be sifted. Methods relate to such analytical frameworks as tactics do to strategies. And tactics grow out of the ‘situation on the ground’, or more correctly, our perception of the situation on the ground. This is what lies behind the tactical options selected for the implementation of housing projects in war-ravaged societies: appropriate to the given context in view of the overall (donor-set) strategies, and (more or less explicit) goals. So it is with research. At the end of the day, rigorous research will have to abide by what is practically and ethically attainable in the field1 - and be conducted through methods epistemologically appropriate, i.e. that acknowledge the impact of methods as such on findings, subsequent insight and concluding theories. This is the theme of this chapter. First the field is identified, then the methodological approach.

5.3.2 SELECTION OF STUDY AREA: JUSTIFYING BOSNIA

This research will deal with housing projects financed and implemented by international agencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are two basic reasons for choosing Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter, ‘Bosnia’ or ‘BiH’) as an arena for research, one substantial, and one operational. First and foremost, Bosnia’s war was ‘paradigmatic’, as Mary Kaldor states (1999), in that it held so many of the features found in the “new wars” (Cairns 1997, Duffield 2002, Woodward 1995, Macrea 2001).

In Chapter 3 four characteristics of the new wars were presented; goals of war, methods of warfare, economy of war, international response. The Bosnian war2

1 Which makes implementation strategies and choice of method also a matter of values.
2 True to its ‘new war’ nature, the war in Bosnia held several conflict fronts. First, the Serb aggression against Muslim and Croats populations, then Croat aggression against the Muslims (in an attempt to divide the country in two then there was the short-lived Bihac rebellion where Muslims led by the local business tycoon Fikret Abdic joined the Serbs against the Sarajevo government, and then Muslim-Croat rejoined forces in the final campaign against the Serbs.
supported them all. The goals in most of the conflict fronts were based on crude identity issues, resulting in massive displacements of civilians. These were also outcomes of internal leadership struggles and horizontal inequalities. The methods of war were personalized and extremely brutal, as were the witness statements currently presented at the War Tribunal in Hague³ and in endless books and reports on the issue.⁴ The way the Bosnian war was financed was partly that of draining the national coffers, but more characteristically by the transborder, illegal and Mafioso-like economy⁵ (Glenny 2003). This was made all the more obvious since the national economies in most of the former republics of Yugoslavia were on the verge of collapse even before the war started; and may in fact have been a major reason for it breaking out in the first place (Woodward 1995, Schierup 1993). The fourth characteristic feature deals with the international involvements. This is one of the main issues in this research.

The war in Bosnia heralded a new role for the international agencies, both in scope of presence – and mandate. Bosnia’s decade of war and struggling reconstruction has been a ‘learning process’ for all. It has been the laboratory in which project impact assumptions, timelines and progress, and anticipated effects of the international political involvement have been tried out. This research is entering this laboratory to test the recovery contributions made by internationally financed housing.

There are numerous reasons for the international involvement in the Bosnian war, its proximity to Western Europe being the most obvious, triggered as it was by the ‘national security’ argument, not the least through its historic references (Large 1998, Glenny 2000). As such, the Bosnian war was a unique kind of new war. But all wars are unique in that they are contextual. International interest or response is based on how these contextual wars are perceived by the major international actors. Some wars are important, others are better left forgotten (Conesa 2001, Rye Olsen et.al. 2002). The wars in South Eastern Europe were not forgotten, which were well documented by the figures on assistance, as shown in Figure 4.2.3.

There are also practical reasons for doing research in Bosnia (as there are practical reasons why Bosnia received so much international support). Bosnia is close, it is in Europe. That is why I had come to know Bosnia well long before this research began, partly from working on Bosnian reconstruction issues at NTNU⁶ and partly from having several friends in the Bosnian refugee community in Norway. This has practical advantages, e.g. contacts and language, in addition to these Norwegian

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³ see http://www.iwpr.net/tribunal_index1.html
⁴ Noel Malcolm and Quintin Hoare even produced a book on the books written on the Bosnian war.
⁵ Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian-Serb leader, was already in 1985 sentenced to three years for embezzlement and fraud; three years which he never served.
⁶ The Programme for Reconstruction and Development (PGU) was established in 1996 to train Bosnian exiles in issues relevant for reconstruction planning. The program ran for two years and was funded by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration.
Bosnians providing substantial contributions into the ‘thick’ description of the scene of research.

5.3.3 RESEARCH APPROACH

This research takes on housing in a cross-disciplinary way. It is part natural science (technical solutions and housing construction issues), part social science (judgments, decisions, actions – and anticipation of the people involved in its realization), and then there is architecture. Architecture by its very nature rests, or rather moves, in-between these spheres, with scant research basis of its own (Lund 2001, Leach 1997, Mo 2003). When challenged, practitioners most often end up in instrumental post-rationalizations, honed, as most are, in the modernist8 tradition. We get “architectural determinism”, or “the ‘taylorization’ of architecture” as Escobar will have it (Escobar 1997), where ‘good’ architecture is presumed to link causally to ‘good’ living.8 There exists no such evidence-borne linkage. In this research the architectural dimension will be left in the in-between realm, between technical object and social life.

Investigating housing projects implemented in a post-war setting calls for different methodological approaches. On the one hand, it’s a matter of counting and measuring size, cost, numbers, and estimates based on figures provided in cost, remittances, migrations, all in the straight quantitative mode. Then there are investigations into the motives and understanding underpinning the actions on which these quantities rest. My research into the recovery effects of internationally funded housing will therefore concentrate on identifying actions impacting these processes and uncover the possible motives and underlying tactical and operational considerations made by the people involved or responsible.

The nature of the sub-questions of my research, on housing as physical object, as strategy or as symbol, all relate to social action or meaningful individual decisions. Even the one on housing as physical object is formulated within an epistemological framework of housing as a socio-material phenomenon, because in this research housing is conceived as part of the process of recovery. Again, to reiterate Turner - this research is not so much what housing is as what it does, and how and why it does just that. I am therefore principally concerned with the qualitative aspects of the housing investments, and hence approach this research from a qualitative perspective.

5.3.4 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Qualitative research is an inclusive research approach acknowledging that the researcher will necessarily affect the case s/he is investigating by his/her mere intervention. It is a tradition much indebted to the work of the ‘Chicago School’ of the

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7 ‘Functionalist’ is the term mostly used in the Nordic countries. 8 The mission of the architect/planner is, according a former president of the Norwegian Architects Association, to create urban structures conducive to ‘the good life’ (det gode liv), of which architects have a priori knowledge (Adresseavisen’s Urban Environment Meeting, Trondheim, November 2000).
1920s and 1930s where the ‘students made the streets their classrooms’. Qualitative research is a tradition of science that “fundamentally depends on watching people in their own territory and interact with them in their own language, on their own terms” (Kirk & Miller 1986:9). Whereas qualitative research is focusing on ‘qualities’ being absent or present, quantitative research focuses on counting the presence of some stated feature (ibid): “Quality refers to […] the essential character of something. Quantity refers to […] the amount of something” (Kvale 1996:67). Identifying, isolating and gauging crucial features pertaining to housing’s impact on recovery presupposes an understanding of the prevailing context, which is only achievable through identifying the qualities of the situation. Quantities, i.e. prevalence and frequencies of constituting features, are still required and will make up part of the data collection. From what will be explained later, these figures make up the raw material of the context from which qualitative data will emerge. The qualitative approach seeks to uncover people’s own perceptions which, at the end of the day, are what drive or sustain change, development, or recovery following war (Barakat & Chard 2002).

Without understanding the perceptions, opinions, and experiences of the people directly and indirectly assisted, it is not possible to grasp what long-term effects, or potential, these foreign housing interventions have had, or will have on a broader societal recovery. It is not a matter of what is ‘true’ in my sense, it’s what perceived ‘true’ in theirs. And what is true in theirs is what will have true - real – consequences. This is all the more evident in the omnipresent call for reconciliation as a required element of post-war recovery (Galtung n.d.). Both recovery and reconciliation (and reconstruction) is about creating hope, which is both an individual and a social endeavor, not an abstract societal feature. The “quality dimension” in research is made manifest here. Doing research on the recovery processes of a community makes the research and the researcher part of that emerging hope. I certainly was.

This raises questions on the very nature of knowledge, objectivity and truth – and how it is obtained. All these are ‘slippery’ terms and concepts and require some clarification: in the natural sciences, truth is what is confirmed through experience, be it through inductive experience (“every morning the sun rises in the East”) or through deductive logic opening up for explication and causation of natural phenomena (“The sun rises in the East – because the earth turns counterclockwise around its own axis”). In the world of the natural sciences, ‘truth’ exists on its own terms, separate from all human life. It relies on the ‘correspondence criterion’ of truth; it is true if the statement corresponds with the realities of the external world. This is the criterion applied in the positivist tradition. The ‘coherence criterion’ refers to the inner consistency and logic of the statement, as in mathematics (and

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9 Its conceptual roots are much older that that.
10 This is all in line with the Thomas Theorem: “if men (sic) define the situation as real they are real in their consequences” (Merton 1995).
11 I have subsequently submitted my ‘local knowledge’ gained through my research to NGOs applying for funds for reconstruction projects in some of these settlements.
hermeneutics), whereas the third, ‘the pragmatic criterion’, relates the truth of a knowledge statement to its practical consequences. Knowledge is action rather than observation. These are not fully exclusive of each other as they are all used in our every-day life. The first one cannot, however, run parallel to the last, but they can both interact with the second one.

In the social sciences – as in everyday life - truth is in some way negotiated.¹² Therefore there is no such concept as ‘absolute truth’. A negotiated truth is both temporal and may stand as one among several, sometimes competing truths. This may stem from different ontological perspectives, and or from different perceptions and interpretations of one’s own experiences. Truth in social science, being negotiated, is a fairly recent concept. Historically, it replaced the positivist tradition where truth existed on its own, the way it does in the natural sciences. This tradition fed the development of Modernism, “the grand project” as Niels Ole Lund said,¹³ to which ‘post-modernism’ or ‘late modernism’ emerged as a reaction. “The conception of knowledge as a mirror of reality is replaced by a conception of “the social construction of reality” (Berger and Luckmann 1966 cf. Kvale 1996:41).

Where do all of these ‘negotiated truths’ leave objectivity? And how will research findings stand to be recognized as true? In science there is a long tradition for holding true what has been subjected to testing by scientific methods. Today this means that an assumption stands true if it has been subject to rigorous testing by evaluated evidence from the ‘real world’ and has thus withstand efforts of falsification, at least until some later test topples it. This means that our understanding of the world changes over time: “‘Truth’ (or what provisionally passes for truth at a particular time) is thus bounded both by the tolerance of empirical reality and by the consensus of the scholarly community” (Kirk and Miller 1986:12). Kvale validates true scientific findings by the “craftsmanship of the research” (Kvale 1996). In the world of science this is striving for objectivity.

Truth, knowledge and understanding being negotiated in discourse, were brought into mainstream planning in the 1970s with the decline of the post-WWII synoptic planning tradition (Friedmann 1987). To replace the synoptic model ‘communicative planning’ was one of the alternatives introduced.¹⁴ Habermas’ concept of ‘undistorted discourse’ was an important theoretical underpinning.

The Habermasian claim (within a hermeneutic perspective) that true knowledge stems from undistorted communication between informed people was to be the basis for enlightened political action – and hence, planning (Sager 1994). But where are the common fora for this undistorted communication? Bourdieu claims through his writings on Habitus that there are none for ‘general use’. Those available are only for groups playing on the same field, as it were, groups that ‘under-

¹² When it comes to it – such negotiations also take place in natural sciences (Feuerabend 1988, Kvale 1996).
¹³ During a lecture at NTNU in 2002.
¹⁴ Having just as hard a time in being accepted any post-positivist stand has. Synoptic planning is based on a positivist epistemology.
stand each other’, i.e. share a common system of relations that rests on a common habitus (Bourdieu 1995). Qualifying ‘undistorted communication’ in this way does not make qualitative research any easier. It merely focuses on the need for reflexivity on the part of the researcher, which is what ‘undistorted communication’ is all about.

Fig 5.3.1 Observations are reference or theory laden. The drawing above shows the Brooklyn Bridge as depicted by a Chinese artist in 1885 (Source: Amnesty-Nytt 1996, No 1), below is what it looks like on a contemporary photograph.
Qualitative research is epistemology bounded\textsuperscript{15} and may logically be linked to the philosophy of pragmatism (Smith 2001:32). But Smith also presents a political agenda in justifying the qualitative approach: “These choices are not so much about philosophical and methodological abstractions as about political and ethical practicalities [in] recognizing the relevance and importance of ‘lay’ or ‘folk’ perspectives on the practicalities of everyday life”, she says, and continues by claiming that qualitative research is a “strategy that aims to place non-dominant, neglected knowledges at the heart of the research agenda” (ibid:25). If there were ever a disenfranchised group of people, people that almost by definition are objectified (Harrell-Bond & Voutira 1995), it must be refugees and displaced people in war, the primary group of interviewees in this research. Although it may be seen as a political act, interviewing the disenfranchised can also carry methodological benefits. People otherwise never listened to, open up to any trusted interviewer, simply because there is someone there who is genuinely interested in their lives and views. This happened to me.

5.3.5 THE CASE STUDIES

This research is designed as a case study research.\textsuperscript{16} It is part evaluative, trying to find out ‘how’ housing projects do or do not render support to the overall recovery processes, with a ‘why’ extension that seeks to explain the reason for people acting in ways that support or impede these central processes. These are the type of research challenges that lie at the heart of the case study approach, being “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994;13). The case study is a project of understanding and communication rather than prediction. It was chosen because this approach is detailed, explanatory, and descriptive, and the most appropriate when studying implementation processes (Vedung 2000).

The present research, dealing with a complex issue in a different country without the researcher speaking the local language, not only sets limits to the available sources of information, but also shapes the perspectives of the research. In effect, it restricts the research question within the investigated research theme in line with the tactical research options available. To comprehend the workings of a situation different from your own is always difficult, especially since you initially only have your own references to guide you. It is made more difficult still when people themselves are often unable to comprehend and hence explain what is going on, what has happened, and are even worse off in predicting anything about their futures. Yet they act in attempts to reduce uncertainty and to regain some existential meaning in life (Marris 1986). Add to this the fact that meaningful action is temporal: what makes sense today may have seemed senseless only years back. It is a social complexity, "mess" would perhaps been a more appropriate term, full of con-

\textsuperscript{15} Kvale (1996) refers to post-modernist interpretations, hermeneutical interpretation, phenomenological description and dialectical situating, Sayer (1992) to realism.

\textsuperscript{16} There are five major research strategies in social science, says Yin (1994). Aside from experiments, the major research strategy within the natural sciences, these are: surveys, archival analysis, histories, and case studies.
fusion, contradictions and rumor. This is how life is. This is the material and cognitive context in which action is taken. This is the field of research where the central methodological challenge will be to uncover the hidden patterns of action undergirding the everyday observations.

I started out this chapter by saying that the research approach is ‘field dependent’. The following section will deal with the choice of cases for investigation, but these choices interact with the methodological choices I have made. Although there is no principle reason why surveys uncovering issues of frequency or prevalence cannot be embedded in case studies, they must be conducted in ways that provide reliable results. The general post-war social mistrust also affects the foreigners. Their high profile role as ‘foreign donor’,\(^{17}\) and ‘parallel government’ also make them targets of local manipulation. Under these circumstances I found it highly unlikely that a survey conducted by an outsider\(^ {18}\) would provide unbiased information. As a Norwegian I was automatically made a ‘Norwegian representative’ and prospective donor. Under these circumstances I presumed that a survey would draw too many opportunistic answers.\(^ {19}\)

### 5.3.6 THE CHOICE OF CASES

The choice of individual cases has to respond to the research questions and hence to the central characteristics of the new wars as presented in Part Two of this thesis. The cases also have to reflect the central constituents of context, i.e. time, place and agency. Time because what is done will depend on when it is done. We act differently during war than we do after war, and different still if five years have passed or merely five months. Place is similarly important in war, and in particular in the new wars since they affect different areas so differently, creating different platforms for recovery. Finally whoever decides what and how things are to be done, may make projects significantly different in terms of recovery contribution. This deals not only with the international agencies, but on how they interact with the people they are set to assist, i.e. how they engage local agency.

Separating time, space and agency is done for analytical reasons, the way we split society into capital modes. In turn, joining them - time/space/agency - emphasizes their interdependence. ‘Time’ and ‘space’ are ultimate abstractions of the human context. ‘Time’ is embodied through ‘action’ and ‘space’ through ‘place’, place being space perceived. ‘Action’ and ‘place’ are meaningless concepts unless linked to each other. Time takes place. Place is space perceived

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\(^{17}\) ‘Donations’ was one of the English words most Bosnian people seemed to know.

\(^{18}\) The researcher carrying all the paraphernalia of the well-off: his own car, big camera, local assistant, etc.

\(^{19}\) Clive Connough, head of the Swiss Red Cross Committee, and now managing the Mihatovici refugee settlement, was himself a man with a background in social science. He gave clear warnings against trying to do a survey in the settlement: “It would give you figures, but not figures I would trust” (personal communication, January 2002).
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through action. Action is rooted in human agency, i.e. in everyday activities or strategic action spurred on by or made in response to perceptions of self in context. The nature of this relationship between agency and time/space is what Giddens has defined as the duality of structure and agency (Giddens 1981, 1984). These structures may materialize in constraining or enabling institutions, i.e. ‘accepted ways of doing things’. It is presumed that through the set of selection criteria my cases will present such time/space bounded structures that will help explain action.

As there are many projects that fulfill these criteria, and since the choices must be made provisionally, more mundane reasons also played a role in the final decision on cases to examine.

The unit of analysis will be the housing project or a set of internally linked projects located on the same place or within the same area. A housing project is normally handled by individual agencies or NGOs, whereas shelter or housing programs are instituted or set in motion by funding donors.

1) Cases In Time

Housing interventions will relate to the continuously changing political situation, first of all to the scale of displacement and ‘houselessness’ and the prevailing security situation. This in turn has an impact on the availability of materials, on logistics and transport, all of which affect the possible physical solutions to the housing challenge. These constraints will swing with the times. Because of these contextual changes, the set of presumptions and the determining considerations brought to bear on the housing projects will vary significantly over time. For the projects to yield relevant data it must be old enough to have worked itself into the context, into the capital interaction of the community, as it were.

Just as important are the objectives sought through the intervention. ‘Post-War Reconstruction’ is an activity, the substance of which will change throughout the ‘post-war years’. Projects will aim at different target groups and housing will support different political objectives. The most obvious are those of doing housing for the displaced at their temporary place of residence versus re/constructing housing when they return to their permanent place of residence:

Case I – (The NRC shelter scheme) covers the mean and extreme period from the fall of 1993 and onwards, i.e. during the war.
Case II – (The NPA Settlement at Mihatovici) covers a large settlement built for what was presumed to be temporarily displaced people. The settlement was realized in stages, the first opened March 1995, the last, one year later, i.e. at the end of and immediately after the war.
Case III – (the rebuilding of Grapska) is a ‘return case’: a destroyed village being partially rebuilt by the people who were violently displaced in 1992. The
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project was implemented when political and practical circumstances (and neighbors) ‘allowed’ return, in 1999, i.e. *well after the war was formally over*.

.2) Cases In Place

Housing will necessarily relate to the social and physical environment and the supporting infrastructure, be they the institutions, landscapes or man-made/man-destroyed environments.

Different places have different ‘war-stories’. Memories and experiences are different for people chased away from their homes as compared to people who lived in areas where the displaced chose to, or were forced to go. Initiating and managing housing interventions will be executed differently in such environments.

Different places have different resource bases and thus different potential for recovery (and reconstruction funding). This is most obvious when comparing isolated farms in remote villages or housing quarters in dense urban settings. The ‘recovery impact’ of housing projects will be different in such different settings:

Case I – (The NRC shelter scheme) is built for incoming IDPs within the existing urban fabric of Tuzla or directly linked to existing infrastructure and peri-urban neighborhoods.

Case II – (The NPA Settlement at Mihatovic) also built for IDPs, was a separate settlement built on a brownfield recovered from an open pit mine, about 12 km from the city center of Tuzla.

Case III – (the rebuilding of Grapska) covers the partial reconstruction of the village of Grapska in what is now Republica Srpska, 12 km from the regional sub-centre of Doboj. Bosniaks are returning to a totally destroyed village and an environment of social antagonism and municipal disregard.

.3) Cases Of Agency

This investigation is focusing how the international housing interventions have fared when set against the local contexts outlined above. The way this is addressed depends on strategic guidelines set by donors, on tactical considerations made by the implementing agency, but also the operational decisions made by the staff in the field. It is therefore necessary to investigate different implementing agencies to catch different approaches pertaining to the housing challenge.

The projects must therefore be implemented by different agencies – and thus relate to different ‘organizational traditions’, stated guiding principles or adhering to different donor induced strategies.
They must employ different tactical approaches, i.e. ‘self-help’ versus ‘contractor built’ housing; support directly to private owners versus support to existing public authorities. These tactical approaches must reflect different modes and levels of interaction with primary and secondary beneficiaries. Most of all they must show different approaches to activating local agency.

Case I – (The NRC shelter scheme) was executed by Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and covered different implementation strategies and modes of interaction during the examined period. The NRC approach was novel and was widely replicated in the region.

Case II – (The NPA Settlement at Mihatovici) was implemented by Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), as one of many similar projects done in BiH during the war and in the first post-war year. It focused on expanding the municipal housing stock to be temporarily used by displaced people. The project was implemented according to ordinary local construction practice.

Case III – (the rebuilding of Grapska) was managed by the Swedish Rescue and Services Agency (SRSA) and was executed as a strictly self-help project with only materials and technical advice provided by SRSA. The project relied on responsibilities being shifted from the agency to the the village inhabitants regarding, e.g. the selection of ‘beneficiaries’, obtaining legal permissions and determining end design of the rebuilt houses.

5.3.7 COLLECTING DATA

It is well worth quoting Wedel’s simple equation \( \text{data} = \text{observation} + \text{concept} \) (Wedel 1991:77). This means that all data are theory laden, as Sayer would have said (Sayer 1992). We record what we experience, but our senses are calibrated according to our own ‘cultural categories’ (Aase 1997:43), or to our own ‘habitus’ in Bourdieu’s lingua. This makes collecting qualitative data into constructing data. An approach that certainly does not mean the same as ‘making them up’. According to Callewaert, Bourdieu holds that “we are in a way studying our own knowledge of reality, or the reality as it is known” (Callewaert 1992:149). The required reflexivity constitutes the road signals or rear-view mirror which conduct and control the collecting of data when the researcher passes through the social landscape.

According to Yin, there are basically six sources of evidence available in case study research: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts (Yin 1994, p:78-90). Sometimes these come as hybrid sources, like exploratory and explanatory drawings. These may well be physical artifacts for the researcher, but they are the manifest results of ‘participant observation’ on the part of the people involved, where they express, through the drawings, their own emotions and perceptions of their own
situation. Such drawings may also illustrate how the community is seen to function, and are particularly significant in that they reflect spatial relations.

In ordering the data below, I distinguish between physical data, however much the latter may be the outcome of negotiated encounters, and interactively gained data, primarily interviews.

The collection of data has been going on for more than two years, with the first exploratory interviews held in Mihatovici in February 2000. Subsequent interviews with HQ staff of the Norwegian NGOs were held throughout 2000 and 2001. The interviews took place in earnest during a three-month stay in BiH, from late October 2001 until February 2002. Some were held earlier, and some in the Spring of 2002. Primary and secondary physical material has been collected continuously since the mid-1990s.

.1) Physical Data
a) Maps, site plans and construction drawings
Since this is a housing investigation, maps, site plans and construction drawings are important types of documentation. Maps will unmask the physical relations between site and neighborhood and reveal future development potential, particularly relating to infrastructure, communication, and public utilities. Site plans provide a basis of understanding the structure of the site and buildings and thereby provide information on the capacity for future change, upgrading and required maintenance. Drawings show the technical solutions and the materials used, and thereby disclose performance quality regarding sound, heating, lighting, etc., and they will disclose solutions likely to cause future problems, such as water leakages, subsiding, and erosion. They also show what improvements are required to enhance the performance of the building – and the living conditions of its inhabitants.

These types of documents also indicate, by way of their execution, the intention underlying the shown solution. The Mihatovici case had a totally different set of drawings from those guiding the construction of Case I and Case III. This also discloses the level of ‘planning control’ exerted by the authorities. Mihatovici was a formal construction case, where a full set of drawings was required by the law. The others were, at best, registered by name only. When rebuilding Grapska, there was no village reconstruction map, only one made by hand, highlighting the lack of authority held by the planning office of Doboj Municipality. Cf. Figure 5.3.1 below.

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20 The UN has established a ‘drawing school’ in Freetown, Sierra Leone, where traumatised people draw their pain (see Dagbladet July 8, 2003 p 4-5. and Cathrine Skonhoft (1998). Skonhoft used children’s drawings as a means of gaining insight into the lives of displaced people in Tanzania.

21 This is well established and has rendered important new understanding in ‘development research’ (see the work of Robert Chambers and the FRA-method (Participatory Rural Appraisal), later extended into PLA, Participatory Learning and Action (Chambers 1983).
Obtaining official maps proved difficult. A lot of formal paperwork was required because maps are still deemed politically sensitive, especially in the areas where whole villages are destroyed. For these areas, I was able to obtain maps through ‘private connections’, much the same way it was done in the Yugoslavia days. Sometimes, I made my own rough maps and site layout sketches to document the extended building activities made by the inhabitants of Mihatovici since 1995.

Fig. 5.3.1 Part of the Reconstruction drawing of Grapska, above, and the site plan for Mihatovici, below.
b) Photographs
So much was lost during the mayhem that took place during the war, that old photographs have become precious documentation. Pictures are not mere documentations of what was once there. For the people concerned, they are literally ‘pieces of history’, both as tangible objects and in what they show. They are as visual, sometimes emotionally powerful observations, a means of gaining insight through supportive conversation and interviews. Superimposing old photographs with recent ones visualizes time. Cf. Pictures from Grapska in Chapter 6.5.

c) Filed Project Data and Reports from the Implementing Agencies
Pertaining to the wartime projects, most files and records were in jumbles. This made identifying - and accessing the early NRC-houses difficult. Some were identified by street name only, which we still could not find because many street names and numbers have been changed since the war. Asking for directions was difficult because most of the people in that area were themselves displaced, while others, in a puzzling way tried to shield the people we attempted to find. Two days were spent in vain trying to identify a particular group of NRC houses.

The field offices of the agencies submit regular reports to HQ on the prevailing conditions and on progress. In addition, there was also – conditions allowing – considerable correspondence between HQ and the field offices. This gave information on operational matters, which at times proved to be of significant importance for the final outputs. These reports and letters reveal uninhibited ‘vibrations’ of the situation in a way present day recollections never can.

d) Statistics, quantitative information
Statistics, quantitative information are from both primary and secondary sources. Some are compiled for this research; some are made by others, but as yet unpublished. Others are extracted from statistical works produced by the international agencies, primarily by the OHR, UNHCR, UNDP, but also developed elsewhere and already published.

2) Interactively Gained Data
a) Direct Observation
Observing the goings-on in any settlement renders important information, but is highly unreliable. Observation refers to more than the mere visual. Our visual sense being the strongest often dwarf the other senses. Architects who are professionally biased in favor of the visual, may if not careful, construct a somewhat distorted understanding of the investigated field. Observation is about using all the senses to make sense of what is observed. But what is observed is interpreted from the observer’s own referential history or preconceived notions.²² It

²² This is at its most obvious when choosing motifs for photographs when travelling. Pictures – pure visual observations – are just as much confirmation of home grown notions, prejudices by any other name, as they are documentations of the realities of the people in question. Change in motifs over time may signify a change in understanding.
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is the Wedel equation again (data = observation + concept), which also implies a central validity challenge in research. Observations remain as hypothesis, if not accompanied by the raising of relevant questions or discussions on the meaning, the narrative, of what is observed. Therefore, to be used in evidence, observation normally needs to be confirmed or falsified by other means of information. For social phenomena, this implies (triangulated) interviews, questions or plain talk; for building works, construction drawings and interviews with people functionally involved in the building process.

Architecture is perceived as a multi-disciplinary practice comprising elements from the social sciences, technology and art. As such it relies heavily on the rhetoric of art, and hence its visual qualities for its legitimacy (Kasa 2000). Add to this the legacy of ‘architectural determinism’ referred to earlier, and we have a plethora of tripwires for architects doing direct observations. This is mentioned merely to emphasize the reflexivity required to withstand professional biases when entering unknown territory, but also the many legitimate perspectives that may stem from the same set of observations – by different observers. I felt this to be a general challenge throughout my work, one most apparent in Case II, Mihatovici, a formally designed settlement where the initially designed houses have been overtaken by incrementally built ramshackle sheds, which now make up the character of the place. The issues raised are further explained in the case study itself.

b) Participatory observation

According to Aase, “The primary purpose of participatory research is to be allowed behind the official front and into the arenas of internal interaction that are valid for the research question at hand” (Aase 1997:51). As direct observations are means of raising relevant questions, participatory observation is where, for instance, these questions are raised, and discussions on the meaning of the observations take place. This is entering Goffman’s backstage, where the interviewer, translator and the interviewee act on a stage, communicating through worlds and gestures, giving and “giving off” information pertinent to the expectations of the other (Goffman 1969). To fully enter into such a participatory dialogue depends on trust, which in turn depends on some sort of symmetry, which Aase, in citing Wadel (1991), attributes to mutually acknowledging the status of the participants and the roles that come with it (Aase 1997:50).

Working with an interpreter makes the interpreter your alter-ego in this dialogue, not merely a translator. But others had been experienced this long before I had. Take, for instance, Berreman’s experience in the Himalayas:

“Since to villagers my assistant was more conventional and hence comprehensible as a person than I, it was largely from him that impressions were derived

23 When conducting my first (trial) interview in February 2000, a trader was chosen, admittedly because he had such a well-designed and professionally built little shop.
24 My translation from the Norwegian.
which determined our status. It is for this reason that the characteristics of the assistant-interpreter were of crucial significance to the research effort” (Berreman 1962:13 cf. Aase 1997:54).

The role of my assistant and interpreter was therefore crucial in achieving the required symmetry. He was himself unemployed, had served in the Bosnian army during war and had had his education cut short. It was possible for the displaced to relate to his position. My role as Norwegian on the other hand, gave me a certain status and the embedded role of ‘provider’ or ambassador of hope – roles I persistently disclaimed, sometimes to no avail: “We know you don’t have money, but at least you could talk to somebody who has”. Consistently trying not to create false expectations, I never promised to do any service if I was not certain I could carry it through. On several occasions I was able to. At other times the symmetry was established through my very mission. When I excused myself for prying into a young family’s dismal history, the husband said: “I like to tell you about it. It’s nice that somebody – even one from Norway – is interested in our story”.

The required symmetry was thus established first of all by my interviewees relating to one of their own. My entering their story was exchanged for an, albeit limited, indirect access to agents otherwise closed to them. I felt accepted in my role as an oddly interested grown man, well acquainted with the Bosnian scene, who wanted to know and discuss community issues. In turn, they had a channel for relieving their grievances, expressing their gratitude or simply acting as kind hosts for a foreign visitor. The fact that I am, by age, not a typical young researcher also affected the perceived balance in status which made these participatory observations more rewarding, aside from being personally enjoyable. There is an inherent tension in these close interactions; between being ‘on the same team’, which, in a way, qualitative research requires, and

25 I remain forever grateful to my main assistant and translator Adnan Ahmedbegovic, who at times was supported by Nevres Kesetovic and Vedran Krajnovic.
26 The Serb population also seemed to have given the Norwegians preferential treatment, for instance at military checkpoints during the early phases of the war, due to Norway’s WW II legacy. Karadzic even gave an account of the kind treatment he was given when he was prisoner of war in Norway when interviewed by Bjørn Egil Eide of the Norwegian State TV in the mid-1990s. Karadzic was born 15 June 1945.
27 Besides being a normal go-between between inhabitants/interviewees and international agencies, embassies, and Norwegian business, on one occasion I promised – and carried through – an attempt to link a younger sister of an interviewee to the World Health Organization. The sister was rapidly going blind and had no means of otherwise saving her eyesight. There are numerous stories in BiH where such individual link-ups have been successful, mostly because they were linked to mass media coverage.
28 “One of your own” calls for much more than language skills or nationality. Comparable personal war narratives proved important. So when interviewing the Serbs I used a non-Muslim interpreter. Temple & Edwards (2002) had earlier shown how the difference in perceived social class affects the work of translators, and hence becomes a methodological challenge affecting the research results. Again, it is a matter of symmetry.
29 I once interviewed people displaced by the Germans from Northern Norway in late 1944. On several occasions they expressed misgivings about the reconstruction planning, not the least how young the planners were. ”More mature planners would be able to understand our situation better”, one said during an interview. I take this to heart.
succumbing to the ‘team spirit’, when the researcher ‘goes native’. Evert Vedung refers to the regulatory capture theory to explain how actors are co-opted by the very people they set out to oversee (Vedung 2000:236). This theory, developed initially by George Stigler (1971) was not targeting research, but covered the tension of acting on the inside and the outside – simultaneously.

5.3.8 CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEWS

Beyond my own capacity to think and act, the obvious constraints were time and access. It takes time to reach a working level of reciprocity, the first level of trust. Only after talking for about an hour or so was the valuable information revealed – the nubs of the interviewee’s guiding perceptions – as, for instance, the Head of Development and Reconstruction in Tuzla whispered to me as I left: “I’ve only told this to the mayor – and to you” Am I to believe what he said, or is it only the “Spezial-price-for-you syndrome”? In some of the other encounters the answer to such a question would emerge only after subsequent meetings.

In most cases access was not a problem, although I stubbornly had to send several letters and press the assistant to make numerous calls to some of the officials I would like to meet. Throughout the years such officials have been overrun with foreigners like me with no relevant local mission. Interviews were eventually granted. It was much easier with the primary and secondary actors. Most of them were idle anyway. Most international agencies were also open as long as the issue at hand dealt with non-controversial projects or issues. The primary organizations, the NRC, NPA & SRSA, opened all their files and cooperated totally.

The interviews took place both as formal interviews with set and guiding questions and as flowing (sometimes overflowing) conversations with primary actors. They took place individually and in groups. The latter arrangements took place when supporting information was needed, when alternative views of events were called for, as a means of simple triangulation – or to try to reveal the power structure within leadership groups, as in Grapska and Mihatovići. All field interviews were conducted through interpreters - which allowed intermittent breathing spaces for making notes. Tape recorders were never used, for tactical as well as ethical reasons. It was hard enough to be a resourceful foreigner prying into unknown peoples’ often miserable lives without using a fancy machine to depersonalize the encounter further. Consequently, no signed interview agreements or any other formalized arrangement was ever made, except for promis-

30 He complained about the quality of the assistance they had received from ‘the international community’. It was not that good, and not at all that efficient: “The low quality of the assistance is a greater threat to our future than is the local corruption”.

31 I was ousted from one large international NGO when inquiring about an incident where about 100 IDPs were forcefully evicted from Tuzla to be moved back to their reconstructed houses in a remote village in Eastern Bosnia. The fact that these evictions had become a media event, closed off my access, but I made my way back, and was actually able to –off the record – spend an hour talking to the local project manager.

32 I will forever stand grateful for that.
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In the beginning there were some hapless incidents that required the interpreters to be given a second crash course on this issue.

1) Primary Actors
The primary actors signify the people whose dismal life and living conditions released international funding for housing re/construction. ‘Prime beneficiary’ is the difficult term used. Aside from its ‘victim’ connotations, it is contentious as to who the real prime beneficiaries actually are. In Case I, the NRC shelter scheme provided funding for private house owners to complete their houses if only they allowed IDPs to live there for 30 months for free. Here, the house owners are arguably the prime beneficiaries, although the international housing investment was released by concern for the IDPs that were to be temporary sheltered there.

In housing there are therefore two sets of primary actors. The first set are the displaced in their role as ‘prime beneficiaries’; the second set are the home owners, be they recipients of the NRC ‘completion funds’ in Tuzla, or formerly displaced, now returnees to Grapska. Because of the way the reconstruction of Grapska was carried through, I have chosen to include all returnees in the primary group, irrespective of whether or not they were funded by SRSA.

Selecting whom to interview was part chance, part intentional. For the NRC case, there was only a relatively small group of house owners identified. They seemed to be concentrated in selected areas of town. We chose those clusters where we were able to identify a sufficient number of houses so that we had a chance of investigating any social impact the importation of displaced people might have had. Such a cluster also had urban development impacts, which we were also able to examine. The clustering also clarified how house owners came to be involved in the program. We went out of our way to interview owners of different type of houses, the big, multi-flat houses where more than DEM 100,000 was invested and the DEM 1,500 alterations in old houses with space to spare. And although the house owner was normally a man, when he was not present we mildly insisted on interviewing the wife. This proved particularly fruitful at times.

The Mihatovic interviewees (Case II) first chosen were those we were able to identify as former Case I participants, tenants of the NRC scheme. This would provide additional data on the life of the tenants of Case I. We gained further insight into the changes that have taken place over time, aside from the fact that in explaining their actions or everyday lives they were also able to place these into other housing experiences. Others were identified because of their participation in livelihood programs or apparent tenacity in securing an independent livelihood. One grandfather was interviewed because he had moved out of his overcrowded flat where he lived with 10 others and into a tiny clapboard

33 All the people whose names appear in the case studies, have given their permission.
shack next to the house, while others were interviewed because during earlier visits had taken their photographs which I had since brought back. One extended family was selected because they stood to be evicted from the settlement. We took some of the young members up into the remote mountain village close to Zwornik where the parents/grandparents/in-laws already had returned - and the young were set to follow. And then, of course, the teacher, the administrator, the staff of the clinic and some of the shop owners were duly interviewed, as well as several members of the elected Settlement Board.

The Grapska interviews were initially set up by the Village Board. Their members, all recently (re-)elected proved very knowledgeable. Some became key informants. As a matter of triangulation, people with no connection to the board were interviewed, the local tinsmith and medical doctor, among others. In 1999 I passed through Grapska by chance and the only person I met during that visit was duly interviewed with his family, so were those with family members in Norway. There are many weekend Grapskians who have not yet returned for good because of the lack of employment. We interviewed some of them as well as some of the teenagers who had recently returned with their families. We set up interviews with returnees who were not part of the SRSA program, people who still lived in small temporary structures, or, through remittances or foreign earnings, had been able to build their own houses.

2) Secondary Actors
These comprise two categories: 1) the people who made up the ‘social context’ of the primary actors, 2) the present and former staff of the implementing agencies.

In Grapska, the social context group comprised the Serb neighbors who proved to hold strong nationalist views, the displaced Serbs who in 1995 sought refuge in the destroyed Bosniak houses, and local government officials formally responsible the return process, one of whom was a Bosniak returnee. I made several interviews with the displaced Serbs, and even took a small group back to their destroyed homes in the village of Panjik in the Federation, which proved a disturbing experience in participatory observation.

In the Mihatovici case, I interviewed two immediate neighbors from the village of Mihatovici proper. This secondary group also comprised personnel from the NGO presently running the settlement, Head of the Municipal Office of Displaced and Refugees (ODPR) and the Chief City Planner and her staff. The latter two were also interviewed as secondary actors in reference to Case I, the NRC shelter scheme. Similarly, the neighbors of the Case I houses were also interviewed, chosen by proximity only.

The other set of secondary actors was the former and present field staff and HQ personnel of the implementing agencies. It is because the workings of organizations are so idiosyncratic, so dependent on individuals in the field, that the NGO
staff belongs to the secondary actor group rather than the ‘functional others’. In
total, I interviewed formally and made notes from informal meetings with 27
people; present and former staff, both Norwegian and Bosnian.

.3) Others Functionally Involved
This group comprised donor representatives, i.e. ambassadors and high-ranking
diplomatic personnel, and senior staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo.
Then I held several meetings with contractors involved in the projects as well as
with building material producers and with traders who provided building material
and components to the projects.

.4) Others
This was a disparate group, including academics, economists and planners who
shed light on the forces that shaped the pre-war conditions in the country – and
the linkages from then to now. In addition, this ‘others’ group was also staff of
the diplomatic corps, representative of other international organizations and UN
agencies involved in housing. The group included other displaced and returned
people who, through their life experience, shed light on prevailing policies and
practices, all part of the current recovery.

5.3.9 ASKING THE QUESTIONS
Asking questions in case study interviews is all about uncovering the prevailing
perceptions people hold on issues that guide their actions and underpin their
preferences, not the least in their relationships to others, and (in my case) to
their housing situation. This is not sociological or anthropological research as
such, but in dealing with housing I would have to borrow some of their methodo-
logical approaches. My questions focused on issues within the domain of archi-
tecture and planning and how these issued related to their choices and actions,
to their life stories as it were. But again, it is not only what issues and questions
you raise, it is just as much how you go about asking them.

Basically all questions, all observations – and all the information otherwise gath-
ered – were focused on how and why the housing projects, their housing situa-
tion, had made any difference on the processes of ‘re-normalization’ – beyond
the obvious, that of sheltering a certain number of people. A long list of ques-
tions was initially made up, which (of course) proved impossible to handle.

There are different ways of approaching – and thus posing questions – to mem-
bers of the primary and secondary group as compared to the ‘functional others’
group. Getting towards – not to - the bottom of things with the former, semi-
structured interviews with open-ended questions were posed, slightly different in
each of the three cases. The others were asked more precise questions since
the prime objective was to get supportive data. But here as well, it is not possi-
ble to ‘simply ask questions’. Other issues were brought into the conversation
which by the end of the day proved useful also for understanding underlying
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concepts and ‘triggers of action’ of the primary actors as well as presumptions underpinning decisions made by the ‘secondary actors’.

The issues for which the questions were formulated centered around how the housing project had changed, directly and indirectly, the ‘capital modes’ - and to what effect and with what benefits. These, however, are not the type of questions to ask. They were reformulated to safeguard an uninhibited conversation. The capital concept would have made the conversation all too abstract. For the sake of analysis and reliability, I initially set up a quite extensive ‘interview guide’ that covered the main issues embedded in the research questions (cf. Appendix 10.1). However during the course of the interviews, this list was heavily ‘edited’, made to contain only a few headlines and was constantly reviewed (cf. 5.3.11).

For the people working in the implementing organizations, the questions were posed in such a way as to uncover the background for the decisions and actions – formal, rational and emotional – and to reveal any stated or anticipated long-term ‘recovery dimension’ in their projects.

All these formal and informal interviews, all the checking, all the querying, all the open conversations, the shrugs, the sighs, the looks, all of these interpersonal exchanges all contributed towards better understanding the rationale behind peoples’ choices. The ‘chained visits’, following people from Case I, then Case II, and on to their prospective future home, and the return visits with the Serbs displaced in Grapska proved very valuable insights into the reconstruction/return/recovery challenges posed by the international interventions.

5.3.10 VALIDITY

Validity is about accuracy, about using relevant information and asking questions that are relevant to the research topic. Are we conducting the study consistently? This is not only dependent upon the researcher, it also deals with those engaged by the researcher, in that it also entails conveying the questions to the respondent in a way that s/he understands. It is about the respondent telling the truth, not necessarily what is factually correct, but what s/he holds as the truth. The same goes for remembering correctly. Memory plays with our perceptions – and vice versa. And it is about interpreting and analyzing the information in a way consistent with what the respondent gave and ‘gave-off’ as his/her true answer. Kirk and Miller said it rather bluntly: “validity is the degree to which the finding is interpreted in a correct way” (Kirk and Miller 1986: 20). Validity as quoted here raises the issue of “correct interpretation” which, Kvale holds, depends on the “context of interpretation”. The context appropriate depends on whether it deals with the interpretation of statements by interviewees, or whether it is a critical common sense interpretation aimed at the general public, or whether the statements are theoretically interpreted, in which case only theoretically qualified people may validate the interpretation (Kvale 1996:217). All my case studies have been submitted to central agents of each case, and sent to

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the interpreter-assistant. Minor factual corrections were made along with suggestions for highlighting certain issues more clearly.

1) Yin’s Four Tests
Yin has devised a set of four tests to ensure that case studies withstand the viability/reliability test of being trustworthy, credible, confirmable and data dependable (Yin 1994:32). It is worth noting that Yin does not proscribe ‘correct’ or a quantifiable answer. The tests are to bring about negotiated, persuasive results.

**Trustworthiness** is secured by testing the ‘construct validity’ of the research. In my case, this test is passed when it is confirmed that there exists a critical relationship – not merely a spurious one, between housing re/construction and long-term recovery. This is tested when sifting the evidence from the case studies through the developed ‘filter of analysis’ in such a way as to show that there is, and under what circumstances there is, a critical linkage between housing as a specific sector of international intervention and critical elements of the recovery process.

**Credibility** is ensured passing the ‘internal validity’ test, “whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Yin 1994: 33). This is what traditionally is referred to as ‘validity’ in research. Yin highlights the problem of making inferences because, he says, “a case study involves an inference every time an event cannot be directly observed” (ibid: 35). This problem stems from researchers bringing to the field – and hanging on to – pre-conceived notions of causation. Alternative explanations may be excluded. Sayer refers to the same when claiming: “Successful communication, including the establishment and negotiation of concepts, depends to some degree on particular temporal sequences of actions, both linguistic and non-linguistic, and spatial, material settings: in other words meaning is context-dependent” (Sayer 1992: 60). He warns against overlooking the dangers: “Contextualizing events involves finding familiar patterns of association but the process of making inferences from the latter is fraught with difficulties. The dangers are clear in cases where associations which are accidental or ‘contingent’ (neither necessary nor impossible) are treated as if they were necessary properties of objects” (ibid: 61). Fielding and Fielding (1986) warned against exploring merely the conspicuous phenomena and to leave the more silent alone.

The aforementioned is an appropriate warning to an architect trained in reading, examining and interpreting the man-made environment, not least its visual properties. The safety valve lies in the ‘what housing does’ notion, that is, how peoples’ everyday life and strategic decisions relate to the building as object, symbol, and ‘vehicle for change’. On the other hand, bringing an architect’s perspective into the interview-conversation might change the perceptions of the

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34 And even when observed we make inferences (see above, on the hypothetical nature of observations).
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Interviewee. This might have been the outcome of one of my interviews. This made for some uneasy questions as to the participatory role of the researcher. But the answer is simple. When uncovering the perceptions underpinning the choices and actions of the interviewee, we are given the perceptions guiding past action. Future action, however, now resting on new understanding, will be part of somebody else’s future research challenge.

However successful this research has been in terms of passing the ‘internal validity test’ will become evident through the case study analysis and in the comparison of cases. The findings from the different cases, chosen as they are on merit of theoretical propositions, will necessarily be different, and hold plausible explanations as to why they are, or are not. The internal validity test is passed, i.e. the conclusions are deemed credible when the different cases are shown to bear different impacts on to the processes of recovery, and are given credible explanations as to why they do, or do not. All this is done when comparing the cases.

Yin’s third test is on confirmability through testing the ‘external validity’ of the case study. Whether or not the finding from this one case study can be used in trying to understand another similar case concerns generalization. Generalizations from case studies are a contentious issue, since they are studies of one-off situations. Whereas surveys underpin statistical generalization, case studies generate analytical generalizations, or ‘theoretical generalizations’ in Sayer’s terms (Sayer 1992). “In analytical generalization, the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory”, says Yin (1994: 36). As far as the present research is concerned, not much theory has been developed through case studies within this field (which, of course, is the rationale for this endeavor in the first place). This means that whatever has come out of the present research will be a theoretical input into further research on permanent housing in a war or post-war setting. When these theoretical generalizations are, in Yin’s term, ‘replicated’ we have a confirmed ‘analytical generalization’. And again there is the issue of who determines when and if there exists such an analytical generalization. Is it the researcher through his/her conclusions or is it the next researcher using these conclusions into any subsequent research? The question is relevant regarding qualitative research, which at the end of the day is validated by its conclusions being trusted by other researchers, and applied by practitioners in the field.

To ensure that the external validity test is passed, the design of the research has to provide a clear linkage between the theoretical input, the case study evidence, and the theoretical output to safeguard the logical consistency throughout the research.

Yin’s fourth test, the data-dependability test, deals with reliability and will be dealt with under that heading at the end of this chapter.
.2) Kvale’s Contextualization

Yin’s rather elaborate validity testing has an engineering quality about it in that the validity testing is somewhat estranged from the data collection and the analytical processes. Kvale, on the other hand, emphasizes that validity testing is an integral part of the research practice itself, not a separate activity. By extending the validity concept from ‘observational’ to ‘communicative’ and ‘pragmatic’, he maintains that, ideally, the practical excellence of the research procedures will create knowledge outputs that by themselves are so convincing and strong that they actually carry their own validity – “like a strong piece of art” (Kvale 1996:252). He argues for the ‘shifting the focus of validity’ towards 1) ‘the craftsmanship of research’, i.e. checking, questioning and theorizing within the framework of the Popperian falsification process; 2) the ‘communicative validity’ as deliberated in discourse among the interviewees, the general public and the scientific community, bearing in mind possible underlying power structure. Thirdly, Kvale introduces ‘pragmatic validity’. A pragmatic validation of a knowledge claim replaces justification by application. A claim is ultimately validated through concrete action, either as part of the research itself, or instigated by it. And it is the ‘desired result’ that validates the claim. This immediately makes the validation an issue of value and ethics – and of politics.

Qualitative research validation is difficult. Many of the validity tests are in fact rooted in the positivist epistemology according to Kvale (ibid:238): “The complexities of validating qualitative research need not be due to an inherent weakness in qualitative methods, but may on the contrary rest on their extraordinary power to picture and to question the complexity of the social reality investigated” (ibid:244). Whatever the case, it will be on the bases of the internal logic of the claims and the craftsmanship of the executed research that this research will be judged. Its ultimate validity will eventually be decided by the people and organizations who will execute housing projects in future theatres of war.

5.3.11 Reflexivity

Contextualizing validity is another term for reflexivity. Data and the meaning will reflect the presence of the researcher. This is embedded in qualitative research, hence the notion of data being constructed and truth negotiated. Reflexivity is a way of exploring how the researcher impacts the ongoing research. Personal reflexivity refers to the personal qualities of the researcher, his/her beliefs and prejudices; epistemological reflexivity refers to the incessant inquiry into how the research design, the question, methodological approach and the like affect what is ‘found’ or constructed.

Research into fields of intense emotions, loss, grief, and destroyed social bonds is methodologically and logistically difficult and emotionally exhausting (Barakat & Ellis 1996). It is hard on reflexivity, much easier on advocacy. 35 My position

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35 One of the most influential theoretical approaches to planning in the late, turbulent 1960s, was actually coined ‘advocacy planning’ (Davidoff 1965), in a way similar to ‘action research’. Advocacy
was that war in of Bosnia was basically the result of external and internal Serb and Croat aggression,\textsuperscript{36} which at the end resulted in unimaginable injustices towards all civilians. In numbers, the Bosniaks suffered by far the most. Working with displaced Bosniaks made it very easy to ‘go native’ and thereby lose the independent perspective on which research depends.

There were basically two means of acknowledging my presence, yet securing my independence. Firstly, in addition to my field records I kept a personal diary, filed as “My Spontaneous Reflections”, where important issues raised during the day’s field visits or interviews were pondered upon. These were reflections of the bygone and preparations for the oncoming work. The second strategy was of talking to the antagonists. The privilege of the researcher – or the outsider – is not being fully reigned in by the customs where you work. I could have meetings with the Serb nationalists with the full understanding of my much closer Bosniak acquaintances. Much to the surprise of my assistants – who had their legitimate prejudices – I could spend hours interviewing, discussing and trying to get to grips with the moral codes, the perceptions, and perspectives of those who made the lives of the Bosniaks so miserable – all in the most amicable way.

5.3.12 RELIABILITY

Yin linked reliability to validity although they both address different aspects of the research. They are in no way ‘symmetrical’. According to Kirk and Miller, “It is easy to obtain perfect reliability with no validity at all. Perfect validity, on the other hand, would assure perfect reliability, for every observation would yield the complete and exact truth” (Kirk and Miller 1986: 20), which is, of course, impossible “in part because ‘perfect validity’ is not even theoretically attainable” (ibid.21). Validity deals with consistency, reliability addresses replicability, ensuring that others doing the same case study and following the same procedures will come up with the same findings. But is replicating the procedures at all attainable (and who would spend time doing it – and who would pay for it)? However, as a matter of documentation, I have made a protocol of all interviews in Bosnia and in Norway, time, place, with what interpreter, and dealing with what issues.

The idea of reliability in qualitative research being ensured through replicability is contentious, to say the least. I am a central character in this reality play, and my approach in gaining access, addressing questions, providing information, etc., is customized to me (and my interpreter). Any other researcher will fail in being me. Whoever will attempt to repeat my study will have to customize my procedures to those of their own. This way, the study could be repeated (not strictly replicated) and its analytical generalizations re-confirmed.

\textsuperscript{36} with numerous mediating causes.
PART FOUR
THREE CASES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
6.1 THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
An Overview

The war in Bosnia held the whole world’s attention for the better part of the 1990s. Not primarily because of its political or territorial issues, they could be difficult to follow, but because of its human misery, so vividly presented by the world’s media. More than half of Bosnia’s population was forced to flee their homes. Of those, 800,000 sought refuge outside Bosnia proper, affecting almost every country in Europe directly. All the more so when large contingents of international UN and later NATO forces were deployed there. The key issue throughout the war, and the main cause for this extraordinary flux of people, was the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’. ‘The Others’ were expelled, the area ‘cleaned’, through intimidation and violence, or by outright massacres. In material terms, the ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia came to be linked to systematic destruction of housing.

The map on the next page shows the post-war division of the country into a totally Serb dominated part, The Republika Srpska, and the Muslim/Croat Federation, which, in spite of its name is divided into Croat dominated areas, especially in Herzegovina, and areas in Central and Western part of the country dominated by Bosniaks, or Muslims. The historic outcome of the Dayton Agreement was the partition of the country into ethno-religious para-states. Much of the internationally funded housing re/construction may be seen as an attempt to nullify this particular effect of the Dayton peace agreement.

It is not the mission of this research to bring new possible interpretations to the causes or the conduct of the war. The war as context is presented in each of the following case studies, to link it directly to the lives of the people in the communities I examined. This is done rather extensively, particularly in the case of Grapska, and it is done to give a deeper sense of what the war experience meant for the people affected, how they reacted and how it changed their perceptions of the future, which lies at the very heart of recovery.

It is still necessary to first present the economic and political dynamics of the years preceding the war in order to understand what happened locally. I will then briefly consider the theatre of the 1992-1995 Bosnian war, and close by presenting how the war has been interpreted politically and what guidance this gave to the international intervention.

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1 The term was new, translated from Serbo-Croat "etnicko ciscenje", but the phenomenon was ancient.
**Fig 6.1.2 Annual Inflation Rates in Yugoslavia 1979 -1991**

![Graph showing annual inflation rates in Yugoslavia from 1979 to 1991. The graph illustrates a significant increase in inflation rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s.](image)


**Fig 6.1.3 Growth of GDP in Yugoslavia, 1979 – 1991**

![Graph showing the growth of GDP in Yugoslavia from 1979 to 1991. The graph indicates a decline in GDP growth from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.](image)


**Fig 6.1.4 Yugoslav Rate of Unemployment, 1979–88**

![Graph showing the Yugoslav rate of unemployment from 1979 to 1988. The graph indicates a steady increase in unemployment rates during the period.](image)


*(Please note that this is based on national averages. Slovenia did not have unemployment to speak of, Croatia was below 10% throughout the period, whereas Kosovo passed 50% in the mid 1980s, and Bosnia ran in the 20s.)*

*(All tables are from Woodward 1995)*
The effect of the economic retraction was not equally dispersed. Slovenia had no unemployment at all, neither did the coastal parts of Croatia. They had ready access to foreign earnings. The constitutional rules governing the federal share of these earnings became a critical, decisive, issue during the 1980s.

The constitution of 1974 called for extensive economic decentralization. The balancing powers of the central government were correspondingly reduced. This was brought to a head when first Slovenia and then Croatia refused to share tax monies with the federation and later refused to abide by central government decisions regarding economic reforms. This stand was supported by neo-liberal economic advisors, and not least by the international creditors, but not by the IMF who promoted a strong central government as a means of resolving the economic crisis.

"By 1985-86 the preconditions of a revolutionary situation were apparent", according to Woodward (1995;73). With no democratic outlets, no fora for unbiased dialogue, the opinions and the forging of perceptions were left to academia\(^3\), the bounded media – and public rumor. The constitutional stalemate and the rapidly deteriorating economy (inflation was to rise to more than 1200% for a period in 1988) made people – and politicians – look for scapegoats. The duality of 'narod' was discarded; now the nation and people became one. When the Croats and later the Slovenians in principle refused to contribute to the funding of the JNA (Yugoslav National Army), but instead started shoring up their own defense units, the situation became dangerous. By then they had reached the Hobbsian stage of "interest, fear and honor".

Within Serbia, and not least within Kosovo, manipulations, deliberations, and violent demonstrations took place, well nurtured by the official press. Throughout Yugoslavia the language, the arguments, and the simmering ethnic 'sleeze' in the official press, legitimized the perceptions that 'the others' were to blame for the hardship most people were experiencing. As one of my interviewees said, it was: "Just like it was during WW II", inadvertently confirming Oberschall's claim (2000). This etno-religious narrative was given democratic legitimacy in 1990 when the nationalist parties won the elections throughout the country.

What took place in Yugoslavia was inextricably linked to the political developments elsewhere in Europe. With the Cold War over a number of independent Central European nation states\(^4\) re-emerged. The dismembering of Yugoslavia was seen by many outsiders as a similar process of liberation, not least because many of the Nationalist movements were headed by former political prisoners.

\(^3\) The most notorious document was the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Art and Sciences which gave credence to the notion of Greater Serbia. [http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:yZf7CpjTH1UJ:members.aol.com/SIPANY/MEMORANDUM.html+sanu+memorandum+of+the+serb+academy\&hl=no\&ie=UTF-8](http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:yZf7CpjTH1UJ:members.aol.com/SIPANY/MEMORANDUM.html+sanu+memorandum+of+the+serb+academy\&hl=no\&ie=UTF-8)

\(^4\) Before being taken over by the Communists in 1947-1948, both Poland and Czechoslovakia had cleansed their territories of Germans, 1,950,000 and 2,900,000 respectively, so by 1989 they were ideal nation states.
Only days after their declaration of independence on June 25 the JNA invaded Slovenia and armed bands of Serb paramilitary units started killing and expelling Croats from Eastern Slavonia. A couple of months later the JNA rolled in. The war in Croatia drew to a close after Germany issued their national recognition during Christmas 1992. By then a violent societal climate had percolated the country.

It is possible to interpret the JNA invasion of Slovenia and Croatia as the ultimate attempt to rescue the federation, in effect similar to Lincoln’s military defense of the US union. This is a stand more difficult to defend in the case of the Bosnian war. By then Yugoslavia was history and the Bosnian war is best interpreted as a war in pursuance of a Greater Serbia (and Greater Croatia).5

6.1.2 THE WAR IN BOSNIA

Bosnia was a country where the nature of being Bosnian was to live ‘with others’ (Bringa 1993, 1995). She was, and still is, the most heterogeneous republic of former Yugoslavia, although the only republic where Muslims made up a significant part of the population, in fact its largest nation.6 As the Ottomans withdrew the Muslims had early on been expelled from other regions, and many had settled in Bosnia. Croats had lived in the mountainous areas bordering the coast with numerous settlements scattered throughout the country. Serbs were living all over Bosnia, but made up a proportionally larger group in the areas bordering Serbia and Croatia.7

This description belies the realities of life in BiH. People belonging to these traditional ethno-religious groups lived all over the country, according to a social contract tacitly accepted by all. The rural settlements were by and large segregated territorially (cf. my Grapska case) but socially integrated with full social equity (ibid.). This spatial segregation could sometimes be a mere matter of 100 meters, a bend of the river, or across a hill. Cities also held territorially distinctive areas, but the structuring impact had waned over the years. It is claimed that the Muslims made up the majority8 of the urban population with the Serbs and Croats owning more of the rural land.9 But again, there were many other lines of distinction, which made more sense in people’s lives than of ethno-religious affiliation. Being urban or rural, educated or not educated were very important distinctions in Bosnia (Djilas 1958, Woodward 1995, Mazover 1998, Glenny 2000).

5 Tudjman and Milosevic had agreed in principle to a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina at a meeting in June 1993 (Magas & Zanic 2001;368).
6 National Composition of BiH in 1991: Muslims 43.7 %, Serbs 31.4%, Croats 17.3%, Yugoslavs 5.5% (the highest portion in the federation), Other 2.5%.
7 Ethnic mapping is a highly contested endeavor. Raising the scale literally erases the minorities. The territorial image so important in identity politics is easily manipulated by scale and unit size.
8 Radovan Karadzic among them. He said to the Serbian Weekly (11.12.1992): “So far, the Turks used to be in the cities and we were in the woods, and now it is the other way around; we are in the cities and it is the Turks who are in the woods” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/bosnia/bosnia.html
9 This is why the Serbs demanded 51% (and got 49%) of the land area in the negotiations in Dayton.
With the collapse of the federal order the split within Bosnia was inevitable. Ethno-religious parties emerged and were supported by their respective ‘narods’. With the Slovenia and Croatia out of the federation, the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, himself an ardent Muslim and former prisoner because of it, led a similar process towards independence for BiH. Given the fact that Serbs made up a minority, the SDS (Serb Democratic Party) professed fear of Serbs becoming secondary citizens the way SANU’s memorandum had described the Serbs position in Yugoslavia. The SDS boycotted the referendum and established their own Serb national state within Bosnia instead. Their aspirations were in due course to join Serbia proper, and were financially and militarily assisted by Serbia/Montenegro to accomplish this reciprocal goal.

There is no real date for the beginning of the war in Bosnia. The open aggression began in earnest after the referendum on Bosnia’s independence held Feb 29/March 1 1992. After that Serb bombardments and random shooting started. Vicious raids by Serb paramilitary bands were taking place in the East. During the spring of 1992 regular units of the JNA entered the war in Bosnia, formally led by Bosnian Serb commanders, yet dependent on support and manpower from Serbia/Montenegro. Facing them were Muslim and Croat units, for the most part made up of the TDF (Territorial Defense Force), established within each republic as local guerilla units, plus militias from the various political parties. Within a short time the Serb forces occupied the major part of the country, with devastating consequences for the non-Serb population. It was to be worse.

About the time President Tudjman and President Milosevic reportedly agreed on a partition plan for Bosnia in March of 1993 the Croats also turned on the Muslims. A merciless tit-for-tat cleansing took place that ravaged large parts of the built environment in Herzegovina, and thousands of lives with it. In November 1993 Croat forces blew up the bridge in Mostar, an act just as spectacular as any Twin Towers destruction, and just as spiritually devastating. By now, the HVO (Croat National Defense) effectively controlled the transport routes into central Bosnia from the sea, which proved to seriously affect my two first cases. The Serbs on their part controlled airlifts and practically all transport routes into Sarajevo proper. Sarajevo had been held under siege since the summer of 1992 and was to remain cor-

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10 The Serbian Academy of Art and Sciences which issued its famous Memorandum in 1993.
11 The way the Serbs within Croatia had already done. These border territories (Krajina) were occupied by Croat forces in the spring of 1995, resulting in the departure of 250,000 Serb Croats. Many came to Bosnia.
12 The commemorations take place at different dates throughout the country, because war started in different parts of the country at different times.
13 92.68% voted for independence. The turnout was at 63.4% with the Serbian Democratic Party boycotting the referendum. They instead proclaimed an independent ‘Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ on 27 March 1992, later renamed Republika Srpska (12August 1992).
14 When it was first established as a defense measure against the Serb aggression many Muslims joined the HVO.
15 Serbs claimed 23% all goods airlifted or convoyed to the sieged city of Sarajevo for distribution to Serb areas elsewhere (Prior to the war the Serbs made up 23% of the population of Sarajevo. In general 30% of the food distributed by UNHCR went to the Serb population as per the pre-war ‘population ratio’, irrespective of needs) (Cutts 1999).
The Appendix 7 of the Dayton Agreement\textsuperscript{17} dealt with the right of return for the about two million who were victims of these ethno-religious expulsions. By and large, these took place during the campaigns at the beginning and at the end of the war. During 1993-1994 the fronts were fairly stable, which meant there were stable areas on either side of the front lines. This was when UN protection forces were sent in and ‘safe havens’ were established. During the final Muslim/Croat campaign Srebenica was purged and renewed housing destruction took place. With (Bosnian) Serb atrocities first in Tuzla and later in Sarajevo, the latter well covered in the media, the long awaited NATO air strikes in effect brought the parties to Dayton. When the war ended and housing destruction assessments were done, it was evident that about 35\% of Bosnia’s housing stock had been damaged or destroyed (IMG 1999). Part of the post-war obligations taken on by foreign donors was to support housing reconstruction so that the right to return could be realized.

**6.1.3 The Bosnian War As A Conceptual Backdrop**

The war in Yugoslavia and in Bosnia in particular allowed for two basic interpretations. It was either a war of Serbian aggression, a war towards realizing the historical vision of Greater Serbia – or it was a war driven by ‘ancient hatred’ between the various tribes of the Balkans. The latter explanation made the war contagious and could, in the worst of cases, spread to other parts of Europe. With the exception of Serbia, and to a certain extent Russia and Greece, the first explanation was taken by most of the countries plus USA. The explanation on ancient hatred, easily disseminated in the press, was primarily held by the British and the French, and others who had experienced the senseless violence applied in the fighting. It was a combination of these that guided the many international peace missions (Simms 2002, Eide & Stoltenberg 1996). During the negotiations in Dayton the aggression argument secured the right of return and ensured funding for the uncompromising goal of helping the displaced return, which would in effect nullify the aggression. The ancient hatred explanation brought on the division of Bosnia as an irreversible ‘fact on the ground’.

The international funding for the reconstruction of Bosnia was linked to these two sets of causal explanations. They were to guide the policies, the priorities and the operational regulations employed by the foreign donor governments and the implementing agencies. My cases were conceived within this twin, or rather double, frame of mind.

Susan Woodward and Mary Kaldor presented separate explanations as early as 1995 (Kaldor et al.1995, Woodward 1995). Both claimed that this was a different war. It was neither like the European ‘world’ wars, nor was it a ‘tribal war’. Its underlying causes were embedded in the international dynamics of political and economic change. These changes were scrambled through at a time when Yugoslavia’s markets were dwindling and their economic capacity and living standards were rapidly declining. This corroded societal trust, and state institutions were rendered im-

\textsuperscript{17} The formally correct name is “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina”
potent in managing the political crisis. It was a European case of state failure, similar to what has been seen in the former Soviet Union and in countries in Africa (Woodward 1995:15).

These perspectives might have led to a different reconstruction regime, and different priorities, but by 1995 the prevailing explanations had become conventional wisdom.
6.2.3 Internal Linkages

1) Social and Political Characteristics

The industrial expansion after WW II made Tuzla part of an industrial cluster, also comprising the neighboring Banovici, Lukavici and Zivenice municipalities. These were later to be major host communities for the displaced people from Eastern Bosnia. By 1991 about 260,000 people were permanently living in these four municipalities. In addition, maybe more than 25,000 people commuters daily into this cluster from villages around. This industrial experience had forged a new social and political identity in Tuzla.7 Statistical data on ethno-religious affiliation, religious affiliation, and political voting patterns makes this quite clear.6

The main outcome of Bosnia’s first elections in 1990 was a legitimization of the nationalist rhetoric of ethnic supremacy and territorial division, – not of democratic governance. Such sentiments were not so prominent in Tuzla. That made it possible for the ‘opposition’, the non-nationalistic Social Democratic Party (SDP)9 to win the Tuzla elections. Choosing the SDP to govern the city in times of high uncertainty revealed the strength of the non-nationalist convictions among the people of Tuzla. It also characterized attitudes totally different from those held by the thousands of displaced Bosniaks from villages and towns in Eastern Bosnia who were later to seek refuge in Tuzla. This would in due course create tensions and underpin several important IDP policy dispositions on the part of the political leadership of Tuzla. It would also directly, although in different ways, affect the two Tuzla cases to be examined.

2) Physical and Urban Development

Tuzla is situated along the banks of the Jala river trapped between hills on either side. It expanded into its present state from a central mound where the footprints of the old Ottoman town plan still shape some of the finest urban spaces anywhere10. Industrialization also entailed industrialization of construction, creating a skyline of large housing estates similar to what we see in all cities in former Yugoslavia.11

6 I have no exact figure for Tuzla. However, I have information that Doboj had about 15,000 and Zenica had 20,000 daily commuters. Those towns are significantly smaller than the ‘Tuzla cluster’.
7 I am indebted to Professor Reshad Baktic of the Faculty of Economics, Tuzla, for much of this information.
8 According to the 1991 census, the ethno-religious composition shows that more than one-fifth (21.3%) of Tuzla’s population ascribe themselves as “Others” (“Ostali”), i.e. ‘Yugoslavs’ as compared to Muslims (Bosniaks) (47.6), Serbs (15.5) or Croats (15.6). More revealing still are the religious affiliations people ascribe to. Almost half the population (46%), claims no religious affiliation at all (Samary 1995:89). As this refers to a national average, the figure is definitely higher in urban areas, and most definitely in Tuzla. Being a Yugoslav (with no religious affiliation) was a claim to being a ‘modern citizen’, free from the confines of the ethno-religious traditions (Bringa 1993). This was also reflected politically.
9 The SDP was established on the basis of the communist party in BiH ahead of the 1990 elections and still holds government in the municipality – as part of a coalition. In the 2000 elections the SDA became the largest party.
10 This needs to be emphasized and repeated: “some of the finest urban spaces anywhere” – but alas – decaying and most probably disappearing.
11 In fact, Tuzla came to be a center for Yugoslavia’s international construction industry, with Tuzla companies active in most parts of Africa, the Middle East and in USSR.
But Tuzla is still different – and again because of the salt. The underground salt extraction has caused the ground to subside under large parts of central Tuzla. During the last 80 years almost 3,000 dwellings have collapsed, affecting about 15,000 people, and around 200,000m$^3$ of commercial and public floor space, as well as important historical buildings. A total area of 500 ha has thus been rendered unfit for development for purposes other than parks and playgrounds (Özerdem 1998: 269). When adding these limitations to the fact that the city’s large industrial sites were located on the river plains west of the city effectively barring further urban expansion in that direction, most of Tuzla's future growth will have to take place within the confines of the existing city.

Fig 6.2.4 Central Old Tuzla with the Orthodox Church. The area in the front of the picture was previously built-up land, but abandoned due to subsidence. Since the picture was taken (2000) the World Bank has funded a leisure park with a lake for swimming.

Housing is a major element of urban growth. In Yugoslavia housing provision was the responsibility of the employer, and as most employers in Tuzla had thousands of employees – the biggest had over 12,000 – the scale of the housing projects tended to reflect that. Appropriate sites for large-scale housing thus became a me-
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diating element in the pattern of urban expansion. These high-rise blocks with 14–17 floors housed about 60% of the population of Tuzla proper.¹²

These large-scale projects, however, fed a parallel process. Unregulated, often formally illegal, small-scale private housing was constructed throughout fringe areas on plots of private land. This was a Yugoslavia-wide phenomenon (Vucinic & Todorovic 1995) In Tuzla, these new ‘informal settlements’ gradually filled hillsides and smaller side valleys, as these areas were unsuitable for the large-scale housing projects. Lacking formal approval, a large portion were not connected to the city’s sewerage system, although they were formally connected to other utility systems. They were normally of the same construction quality as any formal housing project.¹³ It must be added that such was the structure of Muslim towns that the hillsides were traditionally where housing, or the ‘mahallas’¹⁴ were located, although most of the Tuzla mahallas had been destroyed by the subsiding land. The new ones were built outside the areas of subsidence, on virgin slopes, on farmland and pastures. Generally, the new housing was ‘self-help’ housing, constructed in stages. As these will be the scene of one of the following cases, an extended exploration of this housing type, or rather, housing strategy, is merited.

¹² According to the Dutch organization, “Assistance to Bosnian Communities Foundation” (ABC), active in Tuzla, 18.03.02.
¹³ For all practical purposes they have been accepted, even formally so in Sarajevo in a recent formal ‘up-date’.
¹⁴ A mahalla is an ordering unit in Arabic and Muslim societies; it is a neighborhood unit initially defined in area by how far a mullah’s voice could be heard, and contained a school, a bakery, a market and a water fountain. Housing was organized in such a way that each house had a view often on to the ‘charshiya’, the urban center. All this made the traditional villages and towns in the Balkans favor a valley floor or river bed location with the mahallas situated in the adjacent slopes (Grabrijan 1984).
.3) The Half-Finished House

It is obvious for anyone to see. Houses left half finished. The owner living on one completed floor and the rest left open. Sometimes there is not even a roof, and often one can observe building materials stored for the next building phase.

This is a ‘generic’ type of private housing in areas where industrialized building materials are readily available. This is what in Chapter 2.2.2.2 was labeled ‘contemporary vernacular’, a housing type found throughout the Balkans, the Middle East and Asia. It replaced the truly traditionally constructed house in Yugoslavia during the WWII reconstruction era (Grabrijan 1984). This ‘modern house’ is incremental in the sense that its construction is often phased, depending upon personal savings and self-help capacities. Building materials may be bought when economic conditions allow, and stored as if they were a bank deposit. Not only the half-finished houses, but also these deposits of building materials proved crucial when the wartime housing construction took place.

Houses in this half-finished category were either built, to a large extent illegally, on family land, or legally, on purchased plots in accordance with some formal urban plan. For building permits to be issued, formal drawings had to be presented, though not necessarily adhered to for construction.

This ‘privatized urban encroachment’ represented yet another curtailment on the future development of Tuzla, enclosed as it was by surrounding hills, the subsiding grounds of the central city, and large industrial sites in the west. At least, that is the way urban development was perceived and urban development planning practiced in Tuzla.
.4) Plans and Planning
Choosing a path for spatial development and coordinating, sometimes even cementing social and material linkages in space, is what centralized physical planning is about. The core feature was the Master Plan. Tuzla had one made in the expansive 1970s. As the overall economic climate in Yugoslavia deteriorated during the 1980s, this mode of planning became almost irrelevant. It became evident that targets set would never be reached as there were no public funds available. Consequently, planning was reduced to regulating immediate projects or anticipated interventions.

The war and its impacts on Tuzla were anything but anticipated or small. The absence of a structural plan for urban development embracing the whole of Tuzla effectively eliminated any thorough guidance concerning the physical interventions made to meet the acute needs of the people chased into Tuzla during the war. At least, that is the way the planners saw it. The concepts of development and the development planning practice were neither sufficiently flexible nor open enough to deal with the prevailing scale of uncertainty. But then, can any planning approach cover ‘force majeure’ (forces beyond one’s control)?

6.2.4 Linkages Ripped
.1) The War comes to Tuzla
The people of Tuzla knew it was coming. After the initial raids by the Serb paramilitary groups into north-eastern Bosnia, and the subsequent invasion of regular JNA forces, it was a matter of time before they would take on Tuzla. The Serb forces had already ‘cleansed’ Bijeljina, Brcko, Modrica, and Doboj, and the Muslims expelled had already knocked on their doors.

After the UN brokered cease-fire in Croatia in January 1992 large contingents of JNA forces had been relocated to bases in BiH, and also to Tuzla. The City Council immediately established a local defense force comprising the local police, the Territorial Defense Force, various militia bands and regular volunteers. Among those presenting themselves was my research assistant’s former professor, Dr Muhamed Borogovac. He later recollected: "We were all waiting in line to become soldiers in defence of our homeland. I was so touched that for the first time during the war, I cried” (Borogovac 1995). True to the legacy of Tuzla, in that line there were Bosniaks, Croats and some Serbs. And true to the situation was also the breakdown of social mores, and the parallel collapse of social trust. Worst off were the Serbs.

15 This centralized planning model based on the concept of rational choice and coordination was developed in the aftermath of WW II. It was much indebted to military planning and the experience of WW II campaigns. It required control of the means to meet the chosen ends. This model of ‘synoptic planning’ was in principle maintained in Eastern Europe right up to the time of “liberation” (Åman 1987).
16 Sarajevo had one made prior to the 1984 Olympics. This was – and still is – the plan of reference for the development of Sarajevo, in spite of new political and territorial realities, and in spite of the changing role of planning itself, as Bosnia is moving from a centralized economy to market-led economy.
17 The national defense of Yugoslavia was organized in three levels: The National Army (JNA), the (decentralized) Territorial Defense (TD) force, and the public militia. As part of a ‘reorganization’ of the national defense, all TD and militia weapons were handed in to the JNA well ahead of the war. The Tuzla TD was, in effect, without weapons.
They had a hard time in making a choice as what to do, and a hard time when the choice to stay had been made. It is estimated that about half of the 20,000 Serbs left Tuzla\(^{18}\). Many fled out of fear. Others did so because they were forewarned, and some even armed by the JNA in anticipation of what was to come\(^{19}\). Also true to the situation in Tuzla in the spring of 1992, my assistant, then a young university student, was not accepted as a volunteer, “because there were no more guns”. Later, he was accepted. Later there were guns.

On May 15 the Tuzla volunteer corps made a pre-emptive strike on a Serb military column, killing about 200 soldiers. That day Tuzla entered the war. The JNA retreated into the nearby Ozren mountains for later to occasionally shell Tuzla. This irregular bombardment kept tensions high. People were scared, they feared for their own lives and the lives of their family and friends: “A recurrent feeling of fear, isolation - and anger. Life was on ‘stand-by’ all the time”, as one of my interviewees described the atmosphere of Tuzla during the war. The intermittent shelling did relatively little material damage. Only 715 flats and houses were affected, most of them slightly (IMG, cf. TALDI 2001). Beside the fear, the most dramatic impact on life in Tuzla was caused by the influx of displaced people from eastern and northern Bosnia.

\section*{2) The Displaced come to Tuzla: Local Response.}

By the summer of 1992 more than 50,000 people had already sought refuge in Tuzla proper. In the region there were 250,000, and in Bosnia as a whole there were 752,000 IDPs, according to UNHCR’s May 1992 estimates. By the time the fighting stopped in 1995, the Mayor claimed the Tuzla region held one-third of the total population of the country, according to information disseminated to the international organizations. The huge population movements into Tuzla took place in waves, reflecting the advent of the war. The first started in April 1992 and lasted into the summer. In one night alone, 12,000 people entered Tuzla\(^{20}\). As most able-bodied men were called into military service, about 85–90\% of the incoming IDPs were women and children\(^{21}\). The last wave of women and children came from Srebrenica in July 1995. Their menfolk were never called into military service.

\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item Figures vary, and data from the Federal Bureau of Statistics do not always add up as post-war figures are often estimates. Taldi (2001) sets pre-war figures of Serbs at 20,424 and the 1997 figure at 10,156.
\item This is one of the war’s most chilling phenomena. Serbs were told by word of mouth about JNA plans and data on future military attacks. At the same time, Serb volunteers were being armed. Stories like these were floated among displaced and refugees but were only recently corroborated through Serb documents. In the 2nd Military Sector encompassing Sarajevo, 75,198 handguns had been distributed to Serb voluntary groups and members of the SDA by the JNA (Divjak 2001).
\item This is a figure given to me by the then Head of the Office of Refugees and IDPs in Tuzla, Zehera Dropic (later Zehera Morankic). This was an estimate, like all other figures in the first year of the war that are seldom based on actual registrations. Even UNHCR figures, in the early phases, were mere aggregate estimates from various sources.
\item The information on Tuzla in the early days of the war is (where no other reference is given) assembled from documents, reports and briefing papers, sometimes undated and unsigned, held in the files of the Norwegian Refugee Council or the Norwegian People’s Aid, and from transcribed interviews with expatriate staff stationed in Tuzla during 1993-1994.
\end{enumerate}
In November 1991 the Secretary General of the UN had requested UNHCR to be the lead agency for humanitarian assistance to ‘people of concern’ in the war on the Balkans. UNHCR established their head office in Sarajevo, but when the war also hit Bosnia they retreated to Zagreb with most of the INGOs. International agencies were still active within BiH though, operating convoys from Belgrade and the Adriatic coast, and airlifts into Sarajevo. UNHCR did not re-enter Tuzla operationally until early 1993.

The administrative and material challenges of managing the IDP influx during 1992 and early 1993 were exclusively handled by the local agencies, first among whom were the Civil Defense units of the region. They were organized according to the Yugoslav laws regulating civil defense, and acted within their corresponding mandate: it was an absolute emergency regime. The housing strategies were crude and short-term: people were either ‘self sheltered’ in some private accommodation, in some cases formally requisitioned, or they were placed in ‘collective centers’. UNHCR figures from mid-March 1993 show that of the 51,120 registered IDPs in Tuzla, 82% were accommodated privately. The remaining 11,000 (18%) were shoehorned into public buildings, schools, hotels, sport halls; even the city’s old peoples home was converted into a ‘collective center’, as these temporary accommodation stations were labeled.

Fig 6.2.7 The main sports hall, the Mejdan, in Tuzla was the most important reception center for incoming IDPs. From here people were either transferred to other facilities or private people with some extra space came to pick up families temporarily sheltered like this picture shows, although this one shows how Serbs driven out of Croatia were sheltered in Belgrade. Printed by the courtesy of UNHCR.
There were 22 such centers in Tuzla alone. These figures are strikingly parallel to figures obtained for Croatia, albeit taken at a later stage of the war: 79% were 'privately accommodated', 21% resided in organized accommodation (Kurent 1999). It is important to recognize that these figures are not precise, rather they indicate an 'about' figure, which in this case implies that the recipient communities in question were able - in some way or another - to take on about four-fifths of the people coming. One-fifth had to rely on some sort of collective solution. These figures stand alongside similar findings from natural disasters, where “in no case have these organizations (i.e. external shelter programs) provided more than 20% of the local shelter response” (UNDRO 1982:5).

The ‘self sheltered’ were occupying flats and houses left by fleeing Serbs, or houses not yet fully completed, although most of the IDPs went to live in private homes, either with friends or relatives, or with ordinary citizens with rooms to spare. This extraordinary phenomenon of Tuzla residents, on a grand scale offering space in their homes to total strangers, often also to rural and hence almost ‘alien’ strangers, signifies two things: the extreme destitution of the displaced, and the role of ethno-religious communality. Because the help people offered was, as a rule, help for ‘their own people’. It is difficult to assess how Islam’s command to assist the needy may have impacted the assistance to the displaced during the war in Bosnia. None of my interviewees volunteered any information on the issue, true to the nature of the notion: it is part of ‘the practice of life’, not a function attached to it. Whether the support given to the incoming IDPs was primarily a humanitarian response on the part of the urban population of Tuzla, or an ‘obligation’ embedded in the ethno-religious tradition of Zakat and Sadaqa, is nowhere uncovered. All this corroborates the claims of a generic human urge to help innocent victims (Albala-Bertrand 2000).

If we apply the concept of habitus of people growing up as Muslims in Bosnia, however secular in practice, it would follow that the ‘legacy of Zakat and Sadaqa’ would still prevail in their ‘practice of life’. During the course of the war the religious convictions – or rather the Bosniak habitus - were to become all the more manifest. Most conspicuously

22 ‘Privately accommodated’ did not mean ‘living with host families’. The latter accounted for about 20% of the IDP/refugee total in Croatia, about the same number as were taken care of collectively. The rest had to fend for themselves (Mossberg et al. 1997:45).

23 An important principle of Islam is that everything belongs to God, and that wealth is therefore held by humans in trust. Giving alms is thus one of Islam’s ‘five pillars’, the concepts and practices which constitute Islam. The first pillar is ‘Shahada’ or the declaration of faith; the second ‘Salat’, or prayer; the third is ‘Zakat’, then there is ‘Syam’ or the fast of Ramadan; and the last is ‘Hajj’, the pilgrimage to Mecca. The giving of alms is either done through ‘Zakat’, the obligatory one-fortieth of your assets or annual income, or Sadaqa, which is a voluntary donation given as a symbol of faith and assistance to a cause. In the Qu’ran (9:60) the following are listed as worthy beneficiaries: “Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those employed to administer the (funds); for those whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled (to Truth); for those in bondage and in debt; in the cause of Allah and for the wayfarer: (thus is it) ordained by Allah, and Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom”. IDPs qualify on several of these accounts.

24 In a similar investigation into a IDP-receiving Muslim community in Sri Lanka, the host community claimed not to be bound by the obligations of Zakat or Sadaqa in their relationships to the displaced (Brun 2003).
this took the form of new religious buildings, but also in everyday practices and rituals. Non-practicing Muslims now refrained from eating pork, for instance, which may have been part of their regular menu before the war. This also changed the role of the religious leadership. The Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks have become – as a matter of patriotism – more Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim because of the war.25

.3) Sheltering the Displaced: the response of 'the international community'26
It was all about housing. The undignified housing conditions offered to the incoming IDPs were at times so appalling that aside from bringing in food and non-food essentials, housing came to be the key sector of external intervention. Upon returning to Tuzla in early 1993, UNHCR set out to organize the implementation of internationally funded housing programs in and around Tuzla. This coincided with the Municipality of Tuzla establishing The Office of Refugees and Displaced Persons (ORDP).27 They took over the management from the Civil Defense and were also to act as the local counterpart to UNHCR and the international organizations being established in Tuzla. In a top-down, or 'savior – victim' perspective, shelter had become an international priority, basically through the media coverage of the plight of the homeless. Already in 1992 donor countries had pledged about USD 30 million for shelter purposes in Bosnia.28 From the perspective of the IDPs, those at the very bottom, the Collective Centers proved to be extremely dysfunctional human habitats. The buildings used had neither space nor service capacities to cater for the number of people forced to reside there. In one instance in Kiseljak, close to Tuzla, according to documents found in the NRC archives, 930 people shared 3 working showers and 5 toilets. In another reported case, 65 people were accommodated in one classroom (and later refused to leave). To use schools for accommodating IDPs automatically closed the schools for their primary purpose. Schooling took place in improvised localities, cellars, in private homes, and at alternate times. In some areas, children's education simply stopped: "Children have been almost without schooling for two years", said a NRC report to headquarters in July 1994. As the conflict dragged on reopening schools became a high priority issue. These two local needs matched the international shelter agenda. During the winter-spring of 1993 UNCHR called upon organizations that were already working in Bosnia, and only months later the first internationally funded shelter programs were implemented in the Tuzla region29.

25 The current composition of the Tuzla population shows a dramatic fall in the number of self-ascribed 'Ostali', primarily 'Yugoslavs', from 21.3% as per the 1991 census to 3.1% in 2000. In 1991, 47.6 % of Tuzla’s inhabitants labeled themselves Muslims – currently, 74.9% do so. The 2000 figures originate from the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Sarajevo, quoted from TALDI 2001.
26 The term is well-nigh meaningless as an analytical tool. The definition of 'community' cannot apply to societies with so divergent political and economic agendas as those active in BiH (cf. Foreign Policy September/October 2002). The usage has strong moral, self-righteous overtones and is basically referring to the countries that hold western liberal values, and act in areas or on issues of political conflict or controversy.
27 Headed by arch. Zehra Dropic who was later to become the Chief Town Planner in Tuzla (Zehra Morankic).
28 Information from UNHCR’s first ‘shelter coordinator’ in Tuzla, Per Iwansson.
29 In the spring of 1993 the following organizations were present but still only provisionally connected to the shelter sector: ICRC, SDR, NRC, NPA, OXFAM, SEA, UNHCR; and at least two more NGOs were doing surveys.
These first internationally funded (emergency) shelter projects were implemented close to one year after the shelter crisis had become a critical reality. As a matter of course, these new funds were to be administered by ‘international’, i.e. external, agencies. The local political and administrative bodies, which had managed the IDP influx and implemented the emergency shelter provisions, were not awarded funds, for institutional and political reasons. The fact that they were remnants of former communist structures did not enhance their standing, and ‘representing’ only one side of the conflict, disqualified them. Many observers had strong misgivings about the role of the local leadership. “They were perceived as part of the problem” as one centrally placed field agent later told me. Another international agent left his position, albeit in another part of the country, because of undue local interference into the internationally funded projects. Their interference was indeed contributing towards sharpened the forces of conflict. A complex call for ‘doing no harm’.

The reason for the international agencies not intervening earlier was also due to basic logistics. The international organizations had limited access, the security and
supply situation was unpredictable and thus deemed unsafe, and besides, to build a sufficient professional and organizational capacity takes time. Few of the agencies had any experience in construction work, and none had specifically worked on housing.

Just as international shelter agencies established themselves in Tuzla, a new war broke out, now between Croats and Bosniaks. New front lines were established, new roadblocks set up. From April 1993 until the US brokered the ‘Federation Peace’ in March 1994, the Croats effectively closed the only ‘international link’ to Tuzla, leaving Tuzla besieged from the summer of 1993 onwards. The trapped population was in for hard and difficult times. So too were the agencies present. Aside from small quantities of smuggled goods, what little was brought in came by way of international convoys, but only at the mercy of roadblock commanders of various creeds, and often only after they had their share of the load. All in all, 65% of all aid into Bosnia was brought in by convoy trucks.

Many of the organizations involved in these initial supply convoys were among the first to take on the shelter challenge. The field staff’s personal experience of the appalling housing shortage and overcrowding was instrumental in shifting organizational focus towards shelter, a sector where none had substantive experience, and none had HQ staff that professionally covered building construction.

Because Tuzla was late in getting outside help, the organizations which were to participate were familiar with, directly or indirectly, what had been done in BiH during the first period of the war. The housing interventions thus far were basically providing prefabricated houses and camp units delivered from the donor country. This had proved to be both prohibitively expensive and a transport liability, given the distance and the conditions of the local road network. By the time international housing interventions were set for Tuzla, the prefab trial period was practically over. In those very first Tuzla-attempts the NGOs were supported by private building management consultants from the home country. The Swedish funded ‘Hi-fab Houses’ were even to carry the name of the consultancy firm. These were the first regular, in-situ built housing in the Tuzla area, built in the neighboring municipality of Zivenice. Sites within Tuzla proper were deemed ‘too expensive’ (Mossberg et al. 1997). That argument will be examined when presenting my second case, NPA’s Mihatovici project, the only new IDP settlement built in the municipality of

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30 There are claims and anecdotal evidence of 5% to 30% cuts at these roadblocks (Mossberg et al. 1997).
32 The Danish Refugee Council, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency and the Norwegian Refugee Council were all initially engaged in transport, but experiencing the plight of the displaced, they took up a long engagement in providing shelter.
33 The experience based advice against providing donor-produced prefabs was not picked up by other agencies that entered the ‘shelter scene’ later on. Consequently, the NRC sent prefab housing to Serbia four years after NPA had concluded that Norwegian prefabs were not for the Balkans. It would also be NRC’s last prefab venture: “Never again!” was also their subsequent conclusion. The UNDRO handbook from 1982 cautioned agencies against using donor-produced prefabs. Organizations not previously involved in housing construction did not normally subscribe to that type of information.
Tuzla. UNHCR’s reigning policy regarding all shelter programs was for the municipalities to provide free and fully serviced plots. This was rarely the case. One large NGO even chose to pay a reluctant and cash strapped neighboring municipality for providing an unserviced and remote plot in order to have housing built for some of the displaced.34 Another NGO, Scottish European Aid, went straight into reconstructing damaged houses along the former frontlines, and thus enabling the very first IDP ‘majority returns’.

What amounted to a Croat blockade in effect made it impossible to bring in building materials except as emergency supplies on UNHCR convoys. meanwhile, the IDPs kept coming, kept coming. When, in the spring of 1993, UNHCR appealed for shelter assistance to the Tuzla region, Norway responded immediately.

6.2.5 Norwegian Shelter Programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Norway provided help to Bosnia from the very beginning of the war. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), in the wake of the displacement of the Kurds in 1991, had established a comprehensive emergency program. This comprised a swift three-pronged response to international emergencies: the NMFA provided politically approved funding to Norwegian non-governmental organizations for implementing relief operations, in partnership with the Norwegian private sector, through the NOREPS consortium.35 Specialized personnel was also part of this supply program, as were prefabricated housing and tents. This system was set in motion when the call for emergency aid for Bosnia reached NMFA. The Ministry prescribed a division of labor between the NGOs involved. The Norwegian Refugee Council was given responsibilities for logistics, i.e. transportation and warehouse management. In Bosnia they soon assembled a fleet of more than 50 trucks36 that was to become the lifeline to large parts of the county in the years to come. In addition they were made responsible for providing temporary shelter and water. The latter was later taken over by the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). The Norwegian People’s Aid was designated the medium and long-term shelter agency, and the Norwegian Red Cross was to deal with health.

All Norwegian organizations were in action in Bosnia from 1992 onwards (with NOREPS supplying goods and services). By the time NPA was called to Tuzla, Norwegian prefabs settlements had already been built in and around Zenica. During the early 1990s the construction market was slack in Scandinavia. This led to a donor preference for the type of aid that also aided the donor’s domestic markets. Shelter assistance is capital intensive and thus easily tied. Not only products, Sweden even sent carpenters to the war zone to assemble Swedish prefabricated

34 The professional and administrative ‘impotence’ felt by the local authorities – and sometimes by the local citizens – made for such reactions, like the one reported by Guy Hovey when, after literally risking his life bringing a truck load of foodstuff into Sarajevo during the siege, he was refused help by the local warehouse staff to unload the truck: “you brought it - you unload it” (Hovey 2000).
35 The Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) was obliged to provide food and non-food supplies, personnel and ‘service packages’ (tent camps, mobile hospitals, etc.) at 72 hours notice.
36 These were the white truck convoys for UNHCR, initially supporting the work of 15 organizations working in BiH. All total there were 438 white trucks involved in UNHCR convoy system supplying BiH via Serbia and Croatia (Mossberg et al. 1997).
houses. This proved grossly inefficient\textsuperscript{37}, impractical and led to unacceptable costs per beneficiary.

Norway was to provide shelter support for the Tuzla region through the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). They responded differently, partly by mandate, partly through different contextual interpretations on the part of their field officers, and partly by intention, i.e. as a result of ideological differences. In the following, these two approaches will be presented and discussed through two project cases. They acted within the same time/space context but their different approaches resulted in two distinctly different housing outputs. By the fate of time, however, some of the prime beneficiaries from one were later to benefit from the other. This will also be discussed in the following.

\textsuperscript{37} “A cost comparison between Swedish and local staff shows that one expatriate costs as much as at least 150 locally employed people. The per diem alone could pay the salaries of 60 local people” (Mossberg et al 1997:74).
6.3 CASE I
A SHELTER SCHEME FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA
Implemented By The Norwegian Refugee Council 1993-1995

The following presentation of the NRC case reflects the way I learnt from asking the set of research questions that guided my work. The physical properties of NRC projects were never seen as a particular issue of investigation since most decisions on the ‘layering’, as discussed in 2.1.2, had already been made by the house owner long ago. The central issues were how the project was instigated, carried through, interacted with the context, and what benefits and re-development dynamics it left behind. This process is perceived differently for the different categories of primary and secondary actors. Resting on the donor decision to ‘do housing’ the challenge is to uncover how the tactical considerations were forged, and how these interacted with the ‘contextual flow’ of figure 1.2.1.

6.3.1 FAILING TENTS
When NRC entered Tuzla it was still an umbrella organization acting on behalf of a number of other Norwegian NGOs specifically focusing on assistance to refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). In spite of slight shifts in ascribed mandate and formal status, NRC’s singular focus on the protection of refugees and IDPs in cases of emergency has basically remained the same.\footnote{Reconstruction has never been formally addressed by NRC, in spite of housing rehabilitation being their main field of intervention in the former Yugoslavia. It has, at all times, been addressed as emergency operations.} They revised their statuses in 1981, but went through the kind of ‘slide in mandate’\footnote{In Tuzla this led NRC to act within the same field of action as some of their ‘owners’. This proved difficult and caused some antagonism, particularly at HQ level between NRC and the NPA as both were to act, not only in the very same sector, i.e. housing, but also in the very same country, and in the very same area of emergency – at the same time. In 1997 NRC went on to become a foundation that was independent of its former ‘owners’.} that so many NGOs went through during the 1980s (Tvedt 1998, Smillie 1995). The organization would probably claim a place within the Dunantian tradition, but being totally dependent on project funding from the Norwegian government it firmly remains an (independent) Wilsonian organization (see chapter 4.4.4). Professionally NRC had no prior housing experience to speak of. It was their emergency experience and their expertise in logistics that underpinned their shelter mandate in Tuzla.

Part of the overall agreement on the Norwegian assistance to the Tuzla region was for NRC to provide transport and warehouse management, water provisions, and provide short-term shelter, i.e. tents. Tents were seen by UNHCR in Geneva and by externally placed donor agencies to be the most appropriate shelter contribution to the Tuzla region at the time. UNHCR anticipated more waves of IDPs fleeing into Tuzla. NRC was initially set to build a tent camp with a capacity of 12-15,000 beds.\footnote{All in line with the comprehensive Norwegian emergency regime in which private industry provided the tents (10 x 54 m, at a reported price of NOK 350,000/85,000 DM a piece), NMFA provided the funds, and NRC carried out the work. By opting for these (unused) tents the Norwegian government lost several million NOK.} However, only 9 ‘rub-hall’ tents with a combined capacity for 2000 were built. They
were hardly used by the displaced because new IDPs never arrived in sufficient numbers, and those who did never wanted to stay there, claiming the site, by the Tuzla airport to be unsafe, the spaces too cold, open, with no windows, etc. The local political authorities had also advised against building the tent camp. Eventually it was taken over by a Swedish NORBAT company. It was not the cold of winter, but the extreme heat inside the tents in summer that caused the Swedish company to move out. They were 30 to a tent, a mere one-seventh of the planned number of IDPs. No one knows where these rub-halls are today.

The first Norwegian shelter initiative in Tuzla had thus failed, initiated as it was based on a supply side understanding of the local situation, not on the local demand, and an apparent disregard or ignorance for the laws of building physics. This was to characterize much of the international housing support in BiH.

6.3.2 OPTING FOR HOUSING

From the Spring of 1993 onwards Tuzla was isolated, under siege. It would sometimes take days to wind one’s way from Sarajevo to Tuzla within Bosniak held territory. Once there, one stayed. The city was short on water, on electricity, on all sorts of goods. Tuzla had, according to UNHCR, only received a quarter of the aid volume they needed. Petrol prices were steadily rising. The communications were bad, and prior to the satellite telephones it could be well-nigh impossible to communicate with the outside world. And still hundreds of displaced people were walking into Tuzla every day – with no place to stay. The conditions offered to them were appalling. The situation was extreme.

Under such circumstances the Head of Field Office of any NGO takes on strategic responsibilities in addition to those of tactics and operations. Mandate or no mandate, the one overwhelming need in Tuzla, apparent to all, was housing for the incoming IDPs. Joining NRC’s overall objective, “to enhance international protection of refugees and internally displaced people, and to offer humanitarian assistance” (Solberg 2002), and NMFA’s clearly expressed mandate: “To reach as many people as possible in the shortest possible time”, the head of NRC’s Tuzla office, Mr Lars Silseth, proposed a program of completing the many half-finished private houses in the area so they could be used for temporarily sheltering IDPs. This was not the result of any NRC initiated capacity assessment, and was one far removed from the type of procedures proscribed and illustrated in intricate flow diagrams in learned literature (Babister & Kelman 2002) or even UNHCR’s Blue Book (UNHCR 2000b). It was a combination of Silseth’s professional background and a field-based perspective that revealed these resources, these opportunities, in a situation of extreme logistical constraints. In no way could new housing be constructed in time for the

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4 In NRC’s own statistics, 1500 IDPs are said to have been assisted, but only for a very short period: “days, not even weeks”, according to former field officers.
5 Dagbladet 8 March 1994
6 This overall goal was re-emphasized by the Ministry as late as June 24, 1996 according to minutes from meeting between NMFA and the NGOs involved in BiH housing FS/AKA 4.7.96.
7 This ‘method’ was once again applied by Charles Setchell of USAid in Goma after the volcanic eruption in 2001: no flow chart assessments, merely being ‘inside’ the situation and from there using one’s
1993-94 winter to shelter the steady flow of displaced people. Ownership issues and local political opposition prevented the many flats in the half-finished housing estates from being completed. But private houses could be completed if the right deal could be struck with the owners. Indeed, deals were struck. This was to become NRC’s ‘Tuzla Model’, copied by other NGOs and NRC elsewhere in the region. In the Tuzla and the adjacent municipalities, eight five consecutive NRC-SHELTER phases were implemented: I and II jointly financed by UNHCR and NMFA, phases III and IV were funded by NMFA alone, and phase V was a GTZ project. In total, 647 houses were completed and c. 13,000 IDPs were temporarily sheltered.

I investigated houses completed as part of NRC-SHELTER I, II, III in the municipality of Tuzla. Initially, I was to exclusively concentrate on Phase I, but it proved impossible to locate all the houses. Records were incomplete and street names and numbers had been changed. We also learnt that some of the houses had been sold. By including houses from the other phases I was able to observe effects apparent in later phases but not in the first, because of changes in NRC tactics. For logistical reasons and for recording possible aggregated social effects, five areas were chosen: three streets within urban Tuzla, one on the urban fringe, and one separate Croat settlement outside Tuzla proper. See markings on the map Fig. 6.3.3.

6.3.3 THE NRC TUZLA MODEL; Contextual Determinants

The rationale behind the ‘half-way’ house approach was underpinned by perceived urgency and practical constraints, i.e. lack of time, thousands of houseless IDPs facing winter; scarcity of building materials, closed production plants, no regular markets; severe transport constraints with Tuzla cut-off from the rest of the country, bad roads, and soaring petrol prices. Tuzla was overcrowded – yet all quiet.

Time was crucial. The urgency left most other considerations aside. Examined reports, letters and communications all dealt exclusively with the prevailing situation, and said practically nothing at all about the future. In spite of large investments, there is almost no reference to long-term, or post-war development. An attitude of “when the war is over, everything will be OK” prevails in most of the NGO’s archival material that I consulted. It is evident that the context was overpowering, all efforts were set to finding solutions to very acute problems. Whenever the future was touched upon, it was superficially without obligations and in general terms. And nobody from HQ or the donor community called for any professional capacity to try to make sense of the true contextual potentials. Setchell came up with surprisingly similar proposals (personal communication, January 2003).

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8 Banovici, Lukavac, Zivinice, Srebrenik.
9 This may have been for ‘safety’s sake’, in that the institution of UNHCR was held to be more experienced and professionally accountable, which of course it was not. This co-funding merely caused added bureaucracy and personal antagonism.
10 NRC also undertook regular housing reconstruction; they repaired schools, hospitals, and upgraded several CCs.
11 The IDP figures vary because NRC statistics in general refer to project proposal figures whereas there were houses completed where no IDP ever stayed, and others where IDPs stayed sometimes more and sometimes less than initially proposed.
serious reflection on the long-term effects of the efforts undertaken, much less as
to how these housing interventions would possibly strengthen the post-war Bosnian
society in regaining its former self. As one of the early Norwegian field agents said: “Seeing displaced people actually freezing to death, makes a hell of an impact on how you see your own role”. And that role called for ‘Action now!’. NRC’s Tuzla Model made ‘action now’ possible. New housing was made available within weeks.

Building materials and building components had been produced in the region prior to the war. All production had been closed down when war started: “There was no market”, said the deputy director of the Siporex factory, “and remember, the workers also had families. They had to take care of their own lives”. The NRC model circumvented the non-existing formal building material market by drawing on the deposits of building materials stocked by private house owners. When establishing a cash-on-delivery demand, first supply and then a market of sorts are bound to emerge. It did. What proved impossible to obtain within the region was brought to Tuzla by NRC convoys, on “the Friday trucks”.

Transport became an urgent issue. The longer the isolation of Tuzla lasted, the more expensive the fuel. The prices fluctuated immensely, almost by the hour. The price of diesel was said to reach DM 30 at times. This, of course, made transport prohibitively expensive. One of the house owners, later to be assisted by NRC, told of spending DM 500 in fuel to go to Srebrenik, 34 km away. Thus, any attempt to go outside the region to access building material was impossible. And the added burden this would have on the worn down road network would in fact put other types of more urgent transport at risk. The Tuzla Model called for much less transport, 100 mT of transport per house, according to Mr Silseth.

6.3.4 THE MODEL COMPONENTS
The idea was simple. The owner of a ‘half-way’ house was given funds and technical advice by NRC to complete the building against the owner allowing IDPs to move into the premises for a set period. This way, a triple set of benefits were to be achieved:

• Within a very short time the housing stock of Tuzla increased, enabling more people to be decently sheltered (or ‘protected’ in the refugee lingo of NRC).
• Schools used for sheltering IDPs could be emptied and regular educational activities could resume.
• House owners could enhance their investment by having their house completed. This was presented as a gesture towards the host community.

The scheme aimed at some subsidiary benefits as well:

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12 During the early phases of the Kosovo crisis, I urged the ‘desk staff’ of NMFA to give due consideration to the long-term consequences when forging their strategy for shelter and return support. This was to no avail: “First things first”, was their express response!
13 There are recurrent stories by former convoy drivers about old buses and trucks full of ‘Christmas presents’ breaking down and stalling the regular convoy transport. The roads in Bosnia at the time were “not for amateur drivers and worn-down vehicles”.
14 From notes prepared by NRC for a Norwegian delegation, Spring 1994.
• The investments would bring real salaries, cash, into the community and thus contribute towards overcoming some of the current hardships. These were the days when sugar was to reach 35 DM/kg.
• Commissioning private contractors would contribute towards the formation of a construction industry formerly ruled by very large state-run building contracting firms. In pre-war Tuzla the biggest of these, Technograd, had 12,000 employees.

These objectives show that there are in fact many sets of ‘beneficiaries’. In the following, I will use the term in reference to the displaced people, those being given temporary shelter through the program - as well as to the house owners. They were given investment resources allowing for long-term benefits\textsuperscript{15}.

NRC was to act in concert with the Tuzla Office of IDPs and Refugees (ORDP), which was to be the overall responsible agent. The latter identified the IDPs. NRC primarily saw its role as building manager and funding body. These two parties plus the house owner signed a tripartite agreement regulating the intervention. True to the prevailing emergency concept, the tenants were mere ‘victims’, never considered as a due signatory party\textsuperscript{16}.

Selecting houses, or rather, choosing house owners was, in principle, a matter of economics. Those houses were selected where minimum investment would shelter a maximum number of IDPs, as long as ownership and other formalities were in order.

Each house would be fully completed, including plastering and rendering of external walls.\textsuperscript{17} Even certain external works were included. All rooms were to access a chimney, as stoves were provided, a large number of which were even imported from Norway. Each floor was to have a toilet, and the house owner had to certify the capacity and a formal municipal link-up of the sewerage system. Electrical installations were down to a minimum: one light and one socket per room. Thermo insulation in external walls was required and so too was double glazing, but these requirements proved difficult to fulfill. There was to be vinyl flooring, with ceramic tiles on the bathroom floors. The house owner could – when paying for it himself – have better quality materials and a more comprehensive electrical installation. Many owners did just that, cf. Technical Specifications in the Appendices, page 359.

\textsuperscript{15} Contract documents issued for the Tuzla Model are found as an appendix at the end of the thesis.
\textsuperscript{16} In the contract between house owner and ‘tenant’, it is the Municipality that signs ‘on behalf of’ the tenant. See appendices where a set of contracts are enclosed.
\textsuperscript{17} As the same technical solutions and same detailing were used throughout the program, we were soon able to identify a ‘NRC house’ from the way the balconies were executed.
The number of IDPs per house was determined by what came to be UNHCR norm: 5 m²/person net\textsuperscript{18}, or rather, 5 m² per bed. Many houses were not accepted because the layout made it impossible to place a sufficient number of beds in the flat, and thus to reach the required cost efficiency, or ‘DP density’, by any other word. Furthermore, houses were chosen in clusters. This was done to ease the logistics and reduce transport. These were the days of exorbitant fuel prices, and when electricity was available one hour a day. Electricity meant radio and television – information. It was during these short bursts of communication that NRC introduced their Tuzla Model. We are in the fall of 1993.

6.3.5 SHEARING THE NRC HALF-FINISHED HOUSES
I investigated 20 houses. In terms of their shearing properties, these were different for each one of them, although since most of them were initiated in the 1980s they were constructed and spatially structured according to the traditional Bosnian ‘contemporary vernacular’, presented earlier and evident in the plans for the first floor shown below. Where the owner was around, or did the work himself, there was a minute quality control. Where the owner was absent, this was not the case. In general there was nothing NRC did that constrained the future peace-time use of the building. It was normally the other way around. The strategic decisions regarding adaptability and capacity for change were made by the individual owners long before the war. The very fact that the houses were able to take on the shelter functions of NRC scheme would normally confirm their open-endedness. Some

\textsuperscript{18} General living space 3.5 – 4 m²/person + sanitation 0.5 m² + cooking/dining 0.5 m² = 4.5–5 m²/person. This norm, which were to become a national norm, was initially set by UNHCR’s shelter coordinator in Tuzla in early 1993.
houses chosen for completion were not of the ‘open ended’ type, see figure 6.3.3 below right, and Figure 6.3.4. The fact that such structures were chosen again emphasized the level of discretion involved in the selection of houses, or rather, the selection of house owners. Regarding ‘layers’, it will become apparent that it is the ‘site’ layer, the location, that stands out as the most critical dimension in the building’s strategic importance in serving the recovery process. This will be discussed in due course.

Fig 6.3.2 One of the first houses in a cluster to be completed in Phase I.

Fig 6.3.3 Floor plans; 1. floor to the left, basement/ground floor to the right. The house has a traditional four quadrant structure which normally allows for one quadrant (the kitchen/living room) to occupy a quadrant and a half. In this case the plan for the 1. floor was made to allow for the maximum number of occupants: 13. In the basement/ground floor, half of which was initially planned as a garage, 17 people were living in conditions made worse by sloppy spatial organization. 30 IDPs lived in this house. When the picture was taken in 2001 the two completed flats were occupied by rent paying tenants.
6.3.6 IMPLEMENTATION IN TIMES OF WAR
The Tuzla Model was forged in the field. For it to succeed would depend on the assumptions being correct, on goals being shared and on local agencies being able to carry it through. The Tuzla Model was realized through its approach to implementation, i.e. tactical considerations informed by operational assumptions. Hence, how a project is ‘implemented’ will affect not only its output, – but more so its outcome. In high uncertainty cases - and Tuzla during the 1993-1994 period certainly was one such case - any successful implementation approach emerges from the constraints and opportunities present. In funding the second phase, NMFA went so far as to state: “it is for NRC to decide as to what would be the most appropriate way of spending the funds both pertaining to the security situation and to the quickest way houses may be completed”. In the following, I will examine the implementation phase and show how change in agency and context affected the outcome.

.1) Spreading the Word, Selecting the Beneficiaries
In the fall of 1993 the head of NRC’s Tuzla office, Mr. Lars Silseth went on the air. With the support of the Tuzla Mayor and with funding from NMFA and UNHCR, he was interviewed on TV and presented his ‘Tuzla Model’ to radio audiences. Within a short time the ODPR received about 200 applications from house owners. Most of my interviewees heard about the scheme on the radio directly themselves or were contacted by others that had heard about it. None of the first phase participants entered the scheme without others they knew also doing so. Not all applicants were eventually enrolled, but the reference to other house owners, and later to their experience with the IDPs, was to play an important role throughout the whole program.

19From NMFA’s covering letter approving funding for the 2nd phase of the Tuzla Shelter Scheme, 8 November 1993.
After several rounds of selections and site visits the first 37 houses were selected on the basis of the criteria set, among which investment per IDP was the most important. The fact that investment per IDP varied from 600 DM to 1,583 DM makes it evident that the selection still was a matter of discretion. In this selection process the local staff both within NRC and ODPR came to play an important role, not least by way of their bi-lingual powers. A former Head of Office of one of the large NGOs told me, “They [the local staff] knew whom I was to employ - even before I did myself!” It is a fact – but one not presented here as statistical evidence – that 10 per cent of the 20 house owners I interviewed, had in some way been employed by NRC. And as most of the applicants were engaged by word of mouth, it is not at all known how the links of friendship, of reciprocity and ‘making up outstanding dues’ and the like actually affected the selection. The local staff, however, did appreciate their vulnerability towards rumors and therefore made it a prerequisite that the final decision always lay in the hands of a foreigner who could act independently of local pressure. But then again, "they probably did not understand the situation", as one former local staff said. He referred to the selection of houses in the Croat settlement of Kiseljak-Breze in the outskirts of Tuzla. The circumstances surrounding that particular selection procedure are still cloudy, not only for the then head of office, but also I myself “did not understand the situation”. NRC invested 207,000 DM in completing 5 houses to ultimately shelter 246 IDPs. The 5 houses were completed, but not one single displaced person ever stayed there.

![Image](image-url)

**Fig.6.3.5** The largest of the empty houses in Kiseljak Breze. 144 people were to live here. The owner stayed in Croatia throughout the war and never returned. The house is all but empty and due to lack of maintenance is showing signs of advanced dilapidation.

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20 At 110,000 DM, the contract for one house was NRC’s largest. It was to be completed in 40 days, and was to host 130 IDPs. That caused political upheaval, involving the political leadership in Tuzla. NRC was accused, in writing, of supporting ethnic cleansing by ‘shifting the ethnic balance’ of the village. The owner of the house in question lived in Croatia, and still does.

21 The fact that ODPR, according to a minute from a meeting in April 1994, proposed Kiseljak as a future location for Phase II, does not make the selection process easier to grasp. More complicated still, ODPR and NRC there agreed on a maximum of 40 IDPs per house. Why NRC then went on to fund a project that was to shelter 130 IDPs remains a mystery, - although the neighbors claim to know.

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If nothing else, investigating these selection procedures clearly disclosed the power of language. Command of English was extraordinarily empowering. During the first years of international relief operations in Bosnia relatively few Bosnians spoke English. Local staff was then often employed simply on the basis of their mastery of English, in much the same way as many of the expatriate NGO staff were recruited on merits of ‘being available’. Many of NRC’s local project managers started out as interpreters. In the prevailing situation, where real money was literally given away, the people involved in the selection procedure yielded considerable power. “They were trusted with tasks they were not prepared to deal with, or dealt with according to their own preferences”, as one former staff said. A large number of people – in Tuzla several hundred – perhaps more than a thousand were working for the international agencies and organizations at salaries well over what they could expect if locally employed. Rumors of their ‘financial prowess’ were circulating freely, not dissimilar to what returning refugees experienced. I have heard many such rumors.

I found no clear support for claims that certain people, say, friends and family of politicians or agency staff were able to buy themselves into the list, in spite of such claims having even been presented internationally (Kaldor et.al. 1995). I do know of cases where such offers were made, but reportedly not accepted. However, in Phase V in Srebrenik, one of the new flats completed was taken over by the local branch of the SDA. The IDPs were said to have been given alternative lodging.

As the housing scheme progressed into the next phases, NRC went on to manage most of the program components with only minor participation from ORDP, although the latter remained the sole selector of IDP beneficiaries. And again, rumors were affecting the program. As the first two phases got under way and

22 Sometimes not even that. Female staff were often given language courses to be able to master English, according to my assistant, himself an NGO employee from 1994 onwards. ‘Drivers’ who spoke English but could not drive were given driving lessons. They even went to Dubrovnik to do driving lessons, according to my source. But there were also professionals employed who spoke no English, but who learnt during the course of their employment. In this way, one architect learnt “English with a Norwegian accent”.

23 There are no reliable records of the number of people employed by NGOs and international agencies. However, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, ICVA, issues data on the number of organizations active within BiH. By August 1997, their updated directory showed that 116 such organizations had offices in Tuzla. Figures on those locally employed by the NPA in BiH range between 266 and 252 in the years 1997 and 1999, with expatriate-local ratios between 1:11 and 1:16, which were high because of their demining and psycho-social programs. Their buildings department employed 17 and 18 local staff respectively, with a respective ratio of 1:4 and 1:6. Bojicic-Dzelilovic claims that in 1999 about 15,000 foreigners were engaged in non-military activities in Bosnia, and as many as 50,000 locals were employed by ‘various international organizations’ (2000; 110).

24 In sectors with scarce human resources, like in the health service, the local employers lose out – with dire consequences for the local population. During the refugee turmoil in the Great Lakes region in Africa in the mid-1990s, so many of the locally employed nurses and doctors were taken over by the international organizations that it brought the local health service in the affected areas into serious crisis. According to Dagens Nyheter (12, 15, 16, 17 May 1999) the consequences were so grave that they affected the local mortality rates.

25 “Their signature could be clandestinely quoted” as one interviewee claimed, albeit not referring to NRC.

26 This case has been passed on to me by a former expatriate NRC staff.
houses were being filled up with IDPs, the bad, brawling cases seemed to have been circulated among prospective house owners. It was much more difficult to fill up the list at the end of the program than it was in the beginning.

Rumors, so prevalent when transparency is veiled and regular information channels are clogged, erode confidence. It makes no difference if they are totally false. Distributing ‘free cash’ to selected house owners fuelled suspicions on whether or not the selections were fair. True to their emergency nature these selections certainly were not ‘transparent’. Even NRC reports to HQ and onwards to NMFA could be ‘selective’ in their presentation of facts.27 From working with the NGO staff of my three cases and interviewing staff from other NGOs, it is evident that as they were going back into the local job market, they do not see their former NGO employment as an asset. They feared it to be more of a liability, either ‘rumor infected’ or, as is perceived to be the case in Republika Srpska, also ‘politically infected’. This is contrary to commonly held NGO claims, which see the hiring of local staff and the emergence of local NGOs as a ‘civil society contribution’. I find no support for such a general claim, neither does Dough Rutzen in Kosovo.28 Such rumor infected perceptions are themselves eroding the social capital base which in turn will reduce the benefits from the human capital formation that people in productive and meaningful employment actually accrue. These first line findings merit more thorough investigations.

Selecting the other category of beneficiaries, the IDPs, was a mere administrative affair. ORDP selected the worst off among those sheltered in schools. All the houses were initially filled almost to the last bed. Compared to where the IDPs had been sheltered so far, this was a great improvement: “Now at least we as a family have a room of our own”, as one former IDP tenant explained.29 For two years they had lived in a classroom with several other families in a run-down Tuzla school. Others, however, felt humiliated at being sheltered in other people’s houses, tucked into rooms with other people they did not know. As one of the IDPs told me, thereby bringing to light yet another reconstruction dilemma: “NRC was giving to those who had everything in order to help those who had lost everything”!
For two and a half years they were allowed to live in their new room. By then, surely, the war must be over – and they all could go home.

.2) Setting the time
The perception of time is just as much a victim of war as is truth. The inherent uncertainty combined with peace-time references dupes actors into overreaching

27 Although the difficulties pertaining to the Kiseljak case was known at HQ, all records, all reports and all formal feedback to donors carried the figures from the project proposal, not from the completed project.
28 “In Kosovo, there were more than 2,000 registered NGOs. Most of them folded once international emergency aid dried up. The experience left a lasting negative image of the non-governmental sector, and a lack of public trust”, according to Dough Rutzen, Senior Vice President at the International Center for Not-for Profit Law in Washington DC, in IWPR’S Balkan Crisis Report No. 427, 2 May 2003.
29 Dagbladet 5 March 1994.
their capacities, and thus invariably leads to short-term planning.\textsuperscript{30} Immediately after the Dayton Agreement both UNHCR and IMG set the emergency period to last only another 6–12 months. UNHCR made plans to scale down its activity accordingly and advised their implementing partners to plan for the same. NMFA followed suit and suggested the Norwegian NGOs “start preparing their exit strategies” as the expected funds would be “substantially lower in 1997” than they were in 1996. From 1997 onwards it was expected that normal development mechanisms would pick up the action through private investments along with strategic support from the World Bank and others.\textsuperscript{31} But this of course never happened.\textsuperscript{32} The Bosnian experience has taught us about time\textsuperscript{33}.

When NRC set the contract period for IDP tenancy to 30 months it was under the presumption that “surely by then the war would be over”. Primarily, however, it was to ensure that the IDPs would be sheltered during the coming ‘two winters and then some’. This 30-month term became the norm throughout all the Shelter phases, irrespective of when they were signed, i.e. irrespective of when the term ended. For many it literally ended in the snow, or by the police evicting them. Others were allowed to “stay until spring”. Some few remained as tenants, paying their 100–300 DM a month, and in one observed case, a mother and her two children were invited to stay for free for a whole year after their contract period was over. NRC’s housing scheme emerged out of the opportunities their head of office grasped in the fall of 1993. He was worried about the IDPs and the winter cold. The fact that the contracts were not modified to secure full winter protection for the IDPs of the later phases, while modifying the construction strategy, indicate that the subsequent heads of office were focusing more on construction issues than on protection issues. Raising yet again the question as to who were the true beneficiaries.

By the time the Phase I contracts expired, the war was indeed over. But for most there was still no place to go. Return to the new Republika Srpska was as yet impossible for Muslims. Many were therefore transferred to the newly built settlements, among them my other Tuzla case, the NPA settlement of Mihatovici, where no limitations were set on the duration of their stay. Others left the country, went to occupy empty Serb houses in the region, and in some few cases had to

\textsuperscript{30} One of the war’s most memorable ‘time slides’ are those of the US administration. When finally committing ground troops to Bosnia, Clinton said on US television in November 1995: “our Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that this mission should – and will – take about one year”( New York Times 28 November 1995). One year later, a further postponement was announced (ibid. 9 November 1996) whereupon the US Secretary of Defense concluded in March 1997: “it’s very clear that by June 1998, we’ll be on our way out” (ibid. 5 March 1997). At the current time of writing (2003), there are still large contingents of US troops in BiH.

\textsuperscript{31} NRC Board meeting papers 3/96, 24 April 1996.

\textsuperscript{32} The emergency-based donation policy prevailed. When I first asked NRC’s head of mission in Sarajevo in 1997 if they were considering changing their housing approach from donation to some sort of credit scheme, he said: “Yes, we do – for five seconds”. Running credit schemes was held to be way beyond the capacity of NRC.

\textsuperscript{33} Re Carl Bildt’s analysis for BBC where his final lesson learnt from Bosnia reads as follows : “Lesson 7: Nation-building takes a longer time, and requires more resources, than most initially believe” (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3407613.stm).
Implementing the Tuzla Shelter Scheme largely kept to its initial schedule, primarily because of the short completion time required, from 10 to 60 days, depending on the amount of work required. This was fast, efficient emergency work, never made complicated by long-term considerations in spite of their long-term contributions. Being able to deliver within these tight schedules was the program’s very ‘raison d’être’.

.3) Completing the half-finished house; Phase I
Contractors known to the local staff were invited to tender for the first 37 houses. This was done on the basis of simple floor plans sufficiently detailed to have all the beds positioned, the number of IDPs fixed and floor space per IDP determined, cf. Figure 6.3.3 and Appendices page 354. In addition, Bills of Quantities (BoQ) and technical specifications were issued, cf. Appendices. About 10 contractors submitted tenders, 5 of them small private firms. Although tendering was well institutionalized in Bosnia, the prevailing conditions called for radical improvisation. How were prices to be set when no building merchants were operating? And how was transport to be secured when petrol prices fluctuated +/- 2–300%? And what would the security situation be in three months? When NRC’s intention of
specifically supporting the establishment of small & medium-sized private contractors was added, the embedded challenges for all parties involved become apparent.

Three small private contractors working on the basis of unit prices of the lowest bidder executed the first phase. Their role will be discussed below. To have regular building contractors do all the work was something new to most of the house owners as they had done most of the present construction themselves. This made for a certain discord on site reflecting a wider issue prevalent throughout Bosnia.

The type of private housing reconstructed by international organizations were originally built, or at least administered, by the owners. This made them knowledgeable on building matters, and often ‘a pestering nuisance’ for the contractor. The owner complained about the quality of the work done and cases of ducking contract requirements, like "only one coat of varnish instead of three …", etc. Some of the house owners alleged that the contractors siphoned off excess profits through low quality workmanship, and by employing unskilled workers. All the while, the owners sat around watching, knowing well that participating only made the contractor make more profit. Such complaints are well known to NGOs engaged in contractor-built housing. The contractors rebuff these allegations. In substance, so too do the technical staff of the NGOs, but for practical reasons, more than for economic or developmental reasons, most of the NGOs have over the years shifted towards self-help. So too did NRC after their first Tuzla phase.

The winter of 1993-1994 was extreme in Tuzla. The population was hedged in, left hungry and made the object of random Serb shelling. The house owners entering NRC scheme saw their houses being used by contractors to make, what they felt to be short-cuts to profits. At the same time, the IDPs who came to stay were provided with food parcels and other emergency assistance. The house owners saw nothing in this for them – not in the short run. And all were short-term oriented: "Patili kao nikad", said one, it was "suffering like never before".

.4) Completing the half-finished house: Phase II and onwards

From Phase II onwards, NRC made the house owners responsible for completing their houses. This was in direct contravention of the advice from the ODPR. They wanted – true to their pre-war tradition – one big contractor to take care of all projects. Instead, NRC provided cash grants, normally in three installments, to

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34 Again this was a ‘generic development approach’ informed, for example, by Silseth’s experience from working in Africa, rather than by reference to the discourse following Habitat’s Istanbul Declaration and the ensuing partnership-approach to housing, which in essence is quite similar to the Tuzla approach (see World Bank 1993).

35 The labor market was made difficult by the fact that much of the labor force made up Bosnia’s military force during the war years: "Two weeks at the front, one week at home". For all laborers this was their week of possible work. Under certain circumstances, there were exemptions for skilled labor from serving on the front.

36 NRC’s own in-house evaluation report questions why the organization kept up the use of contractors when the participatory self-help model had proved so successful. Almost two-thirds of their housing since 1993 has been executed as contractor-built (Solberg 2002:25). NRC applied two self-help approaches: building material grants and cash grants.

37 Minutes from NRC-ODPR meeting, April 19, 1994.
the house owner for the owner to complete the house on the same contractual terms as in Phase I. The difference was that the grants were based on pre-construction cost estimates rather than competitive tendering. The estimates were based on the initial quotations from Phase I and then adjusted to the reigning ‘cost of the day’. Sometimes these were unit prices from NRC’s warehouse as certain materials had to be brought in by the convoys. About 20% of the house owners of Phase II still commissioned a contractor to do the work.

Most of what was needed for completing the houses was locally available, at least in the beginning. Although building merchants were closed, they still stocked materials and so did many private people. Transport was in effect unavailable, due to fuel shortage and exorbitant prices. This forced the contractors to walk when locating sources of supplies: “In one day I did 40 km on foot”, said one of the selected 3”. NRC provided 40 liters of fuel per house, which was often not sufficient. Much of the materials were transported on horse carts. As the news of NRC program spread, a building materials market of sorts emerged with prices reflecting local availability. These fluctuating prices made cost estimates difficult. All contracts therefore had a 20% contingency entry to absorb such changes. Already during the winter of 1993-1994 this ‘market’ had expanded to include several second-hand building material outlets. It is a simple fact of the BiH war that the destruction of houses to a large extent – although no estimate has been published – was caused by theft and looting. It would not be surprising if this would prove to surpass the destruction from shelling. These goods were brought onto the market. Reliable sources tell about cash-strapped army units that let soldiers bring (stolen) windows and doors from the front to sell on the ‘reconstruction market’ – in lieu of being paid salaries. Much of these items were to re-emerge in internationally funded housing reconstruction, certainly in the later phases of the Tuzla model they did.

38 Throughout the war NRC brought in, by convoy every Friday, building materials that were otherwise unobtainable. In this way NRC warehouse became a formal building merchant.
This shift from contractor-built to house owner-built reflected a shift in perceptions by the field staff. It was a true case of what Donald Schön would call “reflection in action” (Schön 1983). It was never a matter of policy change, merely a shift of tactics based on operational experience. It could never have come from HQ. There was no difference in the quality of work executed during the contractor-built phase as compared to the house owner-built period. These were all minor works, where specialist skills were never really called for except for plumbing and electrical wiring.

This new approach also meant the owner was awarded payment for his labors. To repeat the lament of those sheltered: “NRC was giving to those who had everything in order to help those who had lost everything”! This shift to cash grants bred rumors also by the fact that the perceptions and explanations of the owners were so inconsistent as to what these grants actually were to cover. Some were adamant in that the money they received was “1/3 rent, 1/3 building works, 1/3 labor”. Others took it to be a compensation of “850 DM per head - and then some”, while others had understood the funds to cover “the cost of completing the house + 30 months rent”. Almost all my interviewees from the cash grant phases took part of the money to be rent, or ‘profit’. NRC never saw it this way: the grant was to cover the cost of material and labor only.

A Short Story of Ham to an Orthodox Wife

One house owner reluctant to entered the scheme, but strongly encouraged by his wife and by the NRC staff, finally gave in and agreed to allow 27 IDPs to take over their then half-finished house. At the time they lived in a flat in town. The very morning he signed the 30.000 DM contract, he received the first installment, an envelope with 10,000 DM in cash. As he came back to his wife, still in bed, he slowly spread the 10,000 DM notes over her, “... and then we ran out to buy ham … My wife is orthodox, you see”. These were the days when ham would cost a fortune, which was what they paid. The house was completed in time, and in full compliance of the standards set by NRC. 27 IDPs moved in, stayed 30 months and left the house owners with a clean-up bill of 4,500 DM, which he claimed he was able to pay from the NRC grant.

.5) Living in the full-finished House

The ultimate goal of NRC’s emergency activities was to secure peoples lives. The Tuzla model also aimed at restoring some dignity to survival. In that sense, it had a long-term perspective. My interviews with house owners and the handful of former tenants I was able to trace, revealed that dignity was not the first thing that sprang to mind, although there were cases where conditions and expectations successfully overlapped. The NRC Tuzla Model was a minimum survival package – except for one embedded quality: location. The IDPs were living in the city where they could easily blend in with the rest of the population. Although their total number, including the IDPs otherwise sheltered in Tuzla, was so large that “the image of the

39 These are my own assessments, made on the basis of 20 years of building practice.
A SHELTER SCHEME FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA

city changed. The rural influx changed the domicile population also. The latter have retreated into themselves”, said the Chief City Planner. The Model made for no territorial segregation. The IDP children went to the neighborhood school. The IDPs shared the city’s amenities as if they were permanent citizens. Several of the former tenants saw this very access to services and places outside the house as a social and psychological safety valve from the overcrowded premises.

The density of 5 m² per person was extreme. Although this figure was initially used by all NGOs when applying for funds and when submitting reports, they were never strictly adhered to in the field. My next case on a settlements completed a year or so later, followed the same standard, but these later settlements were seldom filled up, thereby raising the area per IDP. The Tuzla Model, however, kept to the standard.

The density had social consequences. There were many reports of disagreements with the owners, and of tense and spiteful relationships among tenants, particularly when it came to intimate relations and “woman things”. Different families having to share the same room did not make living easy, neither did the sharing of one bathroom among 10-20 people. The singular focus on numbers (as many, as cheaply, as quickly – as possible) and not on rooms and families was deemed the major reason for these impoverished social conditions. ‘Dignity’ was not a term easily associated with the conditions by my interviewees.

The number of people bore down hard on the buildings, for two reasons. Firstly, there was the level of use, the wear, and the chance for breakage due to large number of people using the installations. Secondly, there was the psychological urge to get even: "Why should the house owner get it all?" Stories abound about clogged toilets, broken windows and smashed doors. One absent house owner, and the worst cases stemmed from houses where the owner was absent, reported on the tenants breaking up floorboards to use for firewood. In another house I personally observed paneling that apparently had left the wall for the stove. The ironmongery on a balcony had been dismantled and reportedly sold on the market as secondhand reconstruction material. Chimneys cracked due to overheating.

It was not like that everywhere. In some houses there seemed to have been respectful relationships prevailing. The level of damage or the exact number of satisfied or dissatisfied tenants and owners is not the issue. The fact remains that the density prescribed in the Tuzla model was so high that it led to exceptional damage. And it seems to have been anticipated by NRC. In their initial contracts

40 By early 1996 four of the settlements managed by NPA in the region ran at 84.9%, 77.8%, 88.9%, and 82% capacity, according to a report sent to NMFA, July 1996. This raised the effective area per person by about 20%. It must be noted, however, that under extreme circumstances, especially after the expulsion from Srebrenica, the settlements were packed way beyond capacity.
41 In one case, an owner family would not reveal how bad it had been because I was Norwegian and they felt grateful for Norway’s contributions. The full story was later told to my assistant. Much was in fact destroyed.
42 In the best of cases the ironmongery was reused on another NRC house. As I have already mentioned, NRC houses had the same type of balcony railing.
with the contractors, the guarantee period against workmanship faults was set at 6 months, whereas the still existing Yugoslav building norms prescribed a minimum 2 years. This was yet another case where the laws of physics and professional predictions are subjugated to the ‘perceptions of urgency’: “But it was war”!

.6) Managing the full-finished House
There is a tendency among local authorities to blame the international agencies when things turn difficult, much different from how they were greeted in the beginning. “Initially we wanted to be like them – European”, one actually burst out saying. This helps explain why the international agencies and their staff were trusted with making the sort of wide-ranging and strategic decisions that reside within the realm of local politics. The perceptions have changed somewhat over the years. Now many of the people who initially praised the Tuzla Model have become very critical. Among the first are the former and present director of Tuzla’s Office of Displaced People & Refugees (ODPR). The Tuzla Model proved to be “an enormous administrative burden”, said the present director. During the desperate days of the 1993-1994 winter, much was overlooked. The level of social problems and internal disputes was never anticipated, nor that the wear and tear, and outright destruction would be so prevalent. Nor too was it anticipated that the IDPs would normally not be allowed to stay on. Instead, they were evicted, adding yet another burden on the ODPR. They were left – yet again – to handle the extensive logistical and social challenge this represented. And then it appeared that the departing IDPs as a rule left large water and electricity bills behind. Although the water bills were wavered, and the house owner in the end had to pay most of the electricity bills, the ODPR spent hundreds of man-hours defending themselves against claims presented by the large numbers of affected house owners. The director has been brought to court four times by house owners claiming compensation for ‘the IDPs having destroyed their house’.

ODRP tried to quantify the administrative burden loaded onto them through the NRC program. All told, the director estimated that about 100,000 man-hours have been spent on managing the NRC program. That is about 50 man-years. This work did not qualify for international project support.

.7) Reclaiming the House
In most cases the post-contract repair work was quite extensive. One of my interviewees claimed to have spent 7,200 DM on repairs, about 25% of the grant, but such figures are hard to confirm. However, most house owners who initially were on the cash grant phases claimed to have received sufficient funds to also cover most of the restoration works. The Phase I house owners did not. They had to cover the repairs out of their own pockets. The little support they received from the financially strapped ODPR was not sufficient by far. It is no wonder that most house owners would not extend their contracts. They did not have to, because by the time the contracts expired, refugees who had fled abroad started to return in earnest. They had money, as did the many foreign agency personnel coming to Tuzla.

43 In this arrangement the ODPR would pay regular rent to the house owner; 100 DM for a family of up to 4 members, 120 DM for 5 members, 150 DM for more than 5 members. In total, only 170 families were allowed to remain on these terms.

44 Letter to me from ODPR Director, Tuzla, Professor Esma Ibrisimovic, December 13, 2001.
This house in the suburbs of Tuzla sheltered 75 IDPs from December 1993 onwards. Since the owners did not live there (it was an investment for their two sons), displaced people had already broken into the half-finished house and also sold off their stored building materials. Joining the NRC program was therefore perceived to be a win-win option. By the closing of the contract period, and by agreement with ORDP they let the IDPs stay for another year for free. When they left, the house was extremely worn-down. “All we got from the municipality was three door handles and three cans of paint. We needed ten times as much”. After some repainting they let the house to Bausanierung und Kampfmittelbeseitigung SMSA, a German de-mining company which kept their local (IDP) staff in the house. The destruction was even worse. They have spent all together 45.000 KM in repairs and upgrading now that the sons have moved in.

The NRC Model allowed the house owners to enter the housing market at a period of peak demand. Focusing solely on the short-term objective of temporary protection brought some unexpected outcomes because of ignoring the long-term nature of the intervention. These may even have been “perverse” in the terminology of evaluation theory, i.e. houses completed to shelter displaced people were (instead) taken over by foreign aid workers sent to care for the displaced and returning refugees. These groups could pay a much higher rent than the municipality was able to offer on behalf of the IDPs, for whom the program was initiated. The IDPs were again left houseless.

Today (2003) there is a glut in the rent market. The foreigners who paid 2-3 times the rent of local tenants are moving on and substantial numbers of IDPs are returning to their pre-war place of residence. Still, most of the flats completed
within Tuzla proper are let. For a number of house owners interviewed, rent was their only ‘formal’ income. For the houses located outside Tuzla, like the ones in Kiseljak-Breze, there is no housing demand. Those not re-occupied by the owners are left empty. True to the program’s immediate protection focus the urban development potential in these investments and hence their location, were never considered an issue, neither by NRC, nor by the planning authorities of Tuzla. The empty, neglected NRC houses outside the Tuzla proper are rapidly decaying. “Because it was war”, makeshift detailing and bad workmanship was more readily accepted. Now the results appear. Without maintenance timber rots because of leakages, walls crack due to frost and subsidence.

.8) Supporting the Contractor

The direct contractor support, which was one of NRC’s objectives, never really took off beyond Phase I. But this period, the winter of 1993-1994, was also the hardest. "These were the time of famine", as one of the three contractors said. Nothing was available. Getting hold of materials “was a game without rules”, he continued. It must be emphasized that NRC was one of the very few sources of virgin cash in Tuzla. The contractors did act as ‘distribution nodes’ for the funds NRC spent: to their laborers, to their suppliers, and to their own families. "I never had such a big family as I did during that winter", another one said. None of their earnings were thus reinvested into their company, not only because of family requirements, but simply because there was nothing to invest into. Besides, credit was not available. In that sense there were no possibilities for the Tuzla Model to contribute towards the establishment of a private construction sector – aside from keeping them afloat, allowing them to maintain their skills. There was no long-term capital formation or capacity building taking place. One of the three went bankrupt after the war. The two others keep the business running with a handful of people in full employment. The business situation is more difficult now (2003) because there are so many ‘non-professional’ firms competing for the decreasing volume of international funds, according to one of the ‘selected 3’, Enver Mehmedovic. He maintained that these difficulties were "extended by the lack of professionalism among the NGOs. They don’t know the difference between an amateur and a professional, because

48 This explanation, “because there was a war going on”, was the main reason given by technicians and program managers alike when queried on issues of bad detailing and fallible technical solutions.
49 Two issues are important in this respect. There was no universally accepted currency in Bosnia at the outset of the war. The Dinar was destroyed even before the war because of the collapse of the Yugoslavian economy. The absence of a financial system in BiH made all internationally funded activities reliant on hand-carried cash. For various reasons, the German Mark (DM) was chosen as the main currency of the reconstruction. Literally hundreds of millions of DM had been carried in cash by agency personnel across the border to pay for the reconstruction works during the years up until 1997. This ‘international cash culture’ was by its very nature non-transparent and made financial dealings easy to hide or camouflage. Corruption was not prevalent only because of ‘dishonest people’, but also because of a financial system that invited corrupt practices.
50 When the banking system came back on track in 1998–99, the interest rates were so high and the payback period so short that loans were still beyond the reach for most of the smaller contractors. Their investments came from savings.
51 One had about 50 people working with a core staff of 10, during the 1993-94 NRC period. This is also his present staff level. The other also runs at the same level as during the 1993–1994 winter: 6 people permanently employed.
52 One is run by a medical doctor. Being a buildings contractor may be more profitable than working as a physician. Physicians employed in the public health services are paid 5–600 KM/month (2002).
they are all amateurs”. “Your unprofessionalism is worse than our corruption”, maintained the Head of Office for Reconstruction and International Relations in the Municipality of Tuzla. The perceptions of the international agencies have changed considerably over the years.

6.3.7 CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS LOCAL CAPITAL FORMATION
This NRC project was conceived as a ‘protection project’, implemented through completion of half-finished houses. These tangible, material objects constitute the fixed capital contribution. Along with other man-made environmental objects, these also constitute part of the environmental assets, particularly in urban areas. Environmental assets as such, of course, refer to the area’s total natural environment. Human capital has been affected both through the implementation processes, and will be if the new flats contribute towards societal stability and thus enable local capacity to be extended. Social capital, what Grootaert (and the World Bank) label the ‘glue of society’ (Grootaert 1998) refers to societal coherence and trust. These will be affected by the way the implementation processes were conducted and the way the houses and the completed flats will allow for reliable social relations to develop.

.1) Environmental and Fixed Capital
The physical and environmental contributions were the most significant. They were the feeding capitals from which the spillovers originated. The Tuzla Model houses were in effect an extension of fixed and environmental capital already in place. This refers both to the houses, the infrastructure and the urban fabric. Each house as physical object was brought to a level of completion beyond what is normal for post-war houses in BiH today, signifying independence, relative prosperity and “community settledness”. As such, it represents an environmental contribution to the whole community. These effects are strengthened by the clustering of NRC houses in certain areas. Pertaining to the decaying houses in Kilseljak-Brese, the opposite happens. Eroding the fixed and environmental capital base has negative spillovers. At least, those interviewed felt let down by the people who ‘got the money and ran’ and let the buildings just crumble.

The implementation processes did not produce noteworthy spillover effects into the social capital bases. Most of those found were actually negative. This casts doubts on emergency housing as such being able to contribute towards social capital formation at all. It seems evident that the Tuzla Model was the most successful emergency intervention at the time. Yet, the fact that they were permanent ‘give-away houses’ to people who already had houses, caused resentment among many IDPs and, through lack of transparency, mistrust among the general population, at least initially. The fact that the Model was a much-preferred emergency approach by local leaders does not negate these findings.

This leaves the developmental spillover effects for the post-emergency period, indicating that if permanent housing is to play a role in societal recovery, the focus must shift from the emergency settings to its post-conflict use. This does not make
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a difference in coping with emergency housing needs. Moving into ‘peace time’ housing is what most of the displaced people do during emergency anyway.

In that respect the completed flats of the Tuzla Model are suitable contributions to the housing stock of Tuzla, and do already play a part in the strengthening the other capital bases. Some owners have arranged for relatives to move into the completed and refurbished flats for mutual social and economic benefits, others have entered the local housing market for economic, and hence material and social benefits. Engaging the housing market is primarily a function of locality, which means that some of the housing gifts are in effect much more valuable than others in enhancing the capital base required for recovery.

2) Human Capital
The Model relied on the human capital of contractors and house owners. However, in neither case did the construction works contribute to extend these capacities. The contractors were held economically afloat, and thus able to maintain their skills, but the conditions did not allow for investments and growth. Instead, the growing construction market in post-war Tuzla was met with an increased number of small, less experienced contractors rather than those who were kept afloat during the war growing bigger. In the meantime, the large construction companies of pre-war Bosnia have been privatized and remain the large ones even today.

By working for NRC the local and expatriate staff have gained valuable experience and important new skills. However, these gains in human capital may not automatically be utilized. It will depend on how they interact with the other capital modes. Expatriate staff have left NRC\(^53\) with mixed feelings and often under the impression that their gained experience was never really appreciated.\(^54\) Bosnian staff have been met with local prejudice when approaching the local labor market simply for having worked with international NGOs. Therefore most staff try to stay within the NGO circuit.\(^55\)

Again, we see the difficulties in reestablishing the linkages required in recovery. And again we see how the flows, the drawing of benefits from one capital mode depends on how it interacts with the other societal assets. In this case we see how updated skills are useless if there is no social trust allowing these skills to be utilized.

There are two basic sectors, however, where NRC’s housing scheme, did make a unconditional contribution towards increasing the human capital stock of the region. Firstly, by emptying the school buildings, and thereby allowing children back into school, a significant contribution was made towards raising the long-term human capital of the area. Secondly, granting that the NRC housing was better than what was otherwise available, life for many was made healthier, which in turn increased people’s ability to act, and thereby increasing their capacity to contribute towards the future BiH.

\(^{53}\) There are other organizations that have a much longer trail of disappointed former staff than NRC.

\(^{54}\) This seems to be an almost ‘generic’ reaction and relates to the uniqueness of the experience confronting the organizational ‘business as usual’.

\(^{55}\) There were almost 400 applicants for a vacancy as Return Monitor for World Vision recently (2003).
.3) Social Capital

The war has depleted Tuzla’s social capital. Replenishing is difficult. The way the Tuzla Model has made, or will make, a difference to the stock of social capital hinges upon two conditions, the implementation processes, and how the completed flats will allow social capital to develop. There is a methodological challenge in gauging ‘levels of’ or ‘change in’ social capital. Surveys and opinion polls are often used (see for instance, World Values Survey\textsuperscript{56}). I found it impossible – and superfluous – to conduct a survey since I had limited access particularly to the former IDP residents. Besides, why should anyone trust me, yet another foreigner breezing by, to lay bare his or her opinions on societal trust and social cohesion? Through my interviews, archival data and documents I have received information and explanations which enable me to determine how the housing project has affected people’s opinion about the other actors involved. This allows me to conclude that NRC’s Tuzla Model has had complex and divergent impacts on social capital formation. I will highlight three areas where the project bears impacts on increasing or decreasing social cohesion and trust.

a) Exasperating the differences in society – between those who received help and those who did not. It is quite evident that the IDPs found it disenchanted to see money given to those who already had houses, and not to those who had lost

\textsuperscript{56} http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
A SHELTER SCHEME FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA

their, in spite of their being given a ‘respite’ through the project.\textsuperscript{57} The lack of respect and trust between house owner and tenant was presented as part of the reason for the physical breakdown of the premises. The rumor so prevalent during the Tuzla Model period would indicate that those not eligible for the program envied those who were given money. In that way the program may actually have seriously contributed toward lowering society’s capacity to collectively mobilize for recovery.\textsuperscript{58} However, this program was but one of many international support initiatives where the beneficiaries were individually chosen in ways that many felt were random choices made by foreigners. This individualization of reconstruction assistance might in fact have contributed to the erosion of trust and thereby deflated the social capital on which recovery rests. This conclusion is all the more plausible when considering Tuzla’s legacy of solidarity as presented earlier. My third case, the reconstruction of the village of Grapska will present another approach – executed several years later – which shows the opposite: discernable social capital gains through collective incentives.

b) \textit{Social strain through overcrowding}. There is an apparent link between the attitude of the house owners and the tangible effects on the physical environment caused by the sheer number of displaced people in the houses. This has led most of my interviewed house owners – with some marked exceptions – to be more distrustful of the IDP population: “They behaved like animals!” The exceptional wear and breakage due to overcrowding has been interpreted by the house owners as intentional action on the part of the tenants. Although that seems to bear some credence, the fact remains that overcrowding in itself has destructive consequences on the physical environment.\textsuperscript{59}

However, there were lasting personal relationships established between some host families and IDP families in ways comparable to the experience from the evacuations in the UK during WW II. The UK experience is referred to because it confirms the importance of social capital formation on post-war reconstruction. According to Brown (2000), the relationships that emerged and the mutual understanding and insight into the lives of the inner city population and life in the country side ultimately “led to […] today’s welfare state” (ibid:v).

c) \textit{Change in lifestyle and values}. Life in the city as experienced by the IDPs has had effects on their lifestyle, particularly among the young. The NRC Model houses being located throughout the city, enabled the IDPs to learn about, and to a certain extent be part of urban life (in spite of the Chief City Planner’s comment quoted above). During their stay many had become ‘urbanized youth’ indistinguishable from those born in Tuzla. In this way, it is possible to link the program \textit{through its}

\textsuperscript{57} There are numerous incidents, a pattern almost, of people refusing to leave their Collective Centers. Security of food rations was one, the physical connectedness was another. When the latter was ripped, ‘secondary trauma of displacement’ ensued according to Sutovic (2001).

\textsuperscript{58} Several interviewees made comparisons between the enthusiasm of the collective WW II reconstruction and the individualized and fragmented processes taking place today (see also Loyd 1999).

\textsuperscript{59} Phase II had an average of 15.82 IDPs per floor. There was normally one toilet per floor. Similar physical consequences will also be presented in the following case from Mihatovici.
location as having contributed towards erasing some of the traditional Bosnian prejudice between the rural and urban population. This represents a contribution to the overall social capital of the region, although it in effect meant that many IDPs, particularly the young, chose to stay on in the city, rather than return to their place of origin.  

6.3.8 REESTABLISHING THE LINKS

The linkages that made up Tuzla’s societal web have been transformed forever. The war, and the inevitable ‘conquest’ of the internationalised liberal, free-trading world, whose key local agents were the thousands of international military and humanitarian personnel and their organization, together made an irreversible impact on Tuzla’s ‘legacy of solidarity’. History has been forever altered.

NRC’s shelter program in Tuzla was part of this change, however much it protected IDPs in times of crises, and however efficiently it was in offering shelter. However, furnishing free investment funds to a selected group of families exposed contradictions between the objective, providing short-term shelter to victims of war, and means, providing long-term assets to private homeowners. The program thus effectively widened the gap between “the haves” and “have nots”. During the war and the years that followed, this program therefore made no significant contribution towards the sort of ‘unity’, trust or mutual respect that would seem beneficial for the ‘recovery of Tuzla’. This was further exasperated by the exceedingly heavy, yet unsupported, administrative burden the local public institutions had to carry. This again bred support for the general resentment towards the ‘refugees’. All this seems to be in line – intentional or not - with guiding principles of the ‘new political agenda’, that of weakening state institutions, and supporting private institutions61 (Tvedt 1998; 4).

This transformation of the economy makes up Bosnia’s ‘frame of recovery’. Within this frame of redevelopment the investment funds that the NRC provided to selected private house owners already play a supportive role – where there is a rental market. This remains – as always – a matter of strategic location62 combined with timeliness. The fact was that most of the houses that were completed by NRC within Tuzla proper had been vacated by IDPs already by 1996–1997. These houses could then enter the rental market at a time of peak demand, and at international price levels. Many house owners made a living out of that, and many still do. In that way, the NRC program contributed towards re-establishing new societal linkages, but now of a new order. In this emerging societal web the violently displaced, for whom the housing scheme was initiated are in effect superfluous.

60 What we witness are processes at the heart of Giddens ‘reflective modernity’: “Lifestyles are routinised practices, the routines are incorporated into habits of dress, eating, modes of action and favoured milieus for encountering others; but the routines followed are reflexively open to change in the light of the mobile nature of self-identity” (Giddens 1991; 2).

61 In this context, the institutions of private (house) ownership.

62 The houses built in Kiseljak Breze therefore remain empty. Not only were they left empty for political reasons during the war, they remain empty even today as they were built where there was no (prospects of a) housing demand – a double loss.
6.4 CASE II, MIHATOVICI, A SETTLEMENT FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA
Implemented by the Norwegian People’s Aid 1994 - 1996

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) is an organization founded by the Norwegian Labor movement in 1939. The organization is today one of Norway’s “Big 5”, working within numerous professional fields both as a ‘development organization’ and as an ‘emergency organization’ aside from their domestic services. Its ideological profile is drawn from the principles of the international labor movement: “solidarity, unity, human dignity, peace and freedom”. This has made NPA an organization that often signals a stand in conflicts where they work, and in choosing areas where to work. Its independence signify a genuine Dunantian strain, but being totally dependent on the governments in funding its projects duly places NPA in the Wilsonian family of NGOs. Mine action activities has become NPA’s main sector of expertise. In Bosnia the organization additionally focused on shelter programs, organizational and psycho-social support within settlements built, and psychotherapeutic support to traumatized women and children.

6.4.1 SETTLING THE DISPLACED
In the division of labor among the Norwegian NGOs in Bosnia, NMFA gave NPA the mandate of providing “medium and long-term shelter”. “Medium-term” housing was initially understood to be temporary housing for the displaced, i.e. Norwegian prefabricated housing (pre-fabs) in line with the NOREPS deal presented earlier. The reason NPA was given this particular task was not on the basis of their experience in development assistance, which sometimes also comprised housing. It was because of their management experience in running asylum and refugee reception centers in Norway. In general there was little interaction between the development and the emergency sections of the organization.

The initiative taken by NMFA and the inclusion of Norwegian prefabricated houses inherently contained the ‘settlement concept’. This was also in line with the ideological basis of NPA as the houses were to be built on behalf of the municipalities, whereby they marked an ideological distance to NRC and their Tuzla model. “NRC supported the house owner, not the IDPs”, said Marianne Øen, head of NPA’s Bosnia program. The settlement model was furthermore a well-tried Norwegian housing model. It was not in Bosnia as we shall see when examining the Mihatovici case.

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1 The others are: Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Church Aid & Save the Children
2 Their international activities cover long-term development assistance within agriculture, environment, production, health care, psycho-social assistance, self-organizing, human rights, media, etc. in emergency aid NPA cover shelter, rehabilitation, medical aid, mobile clinics, etc. They deal with conflict prevention and resolution, but their foremost international expertise is on mine-clearance and mine-awareness programs.
3 NPA takes on mine clearance projects on behalf of many donor governments, the US among them.
4 In due course, and out of local pressure, NPA gave in and did the 40 ‘Tuzla model’ completions in municipalities around Tuzla, funded by UNHCR. However, their contracts lasted 36 months and they finished a number of the flats in half-finished municipal (office) buildings.
In 1992 NPA set out to build four IDP settlements around Zenica, three of which consisted of Norwegian prefabs. Architect-planners and building management consultants were initially brought in from Norway. By the time NPA was summoned to Tuzla by UNHCR in 1993, NPA was probably the most experienced NGO working in the housing field in Bosnia. This capacity was due as much to their short-term field personnel as to their HQ staff.

In Tuzla, NPA continued their ‘settlement approach’ to secure “decent housing for the displaced”, as stated in their own documents. This also meant improving the collective centers and, after the war, doing regular housing repairs and large-scale housing re/construction. The settlement phase, which is the area of my interest, roughly lasted from 1993 to 1996 and made up a minor part of the NPA’s housing work in BiH.

6.4.2 THE POLITICS OF LOCATION

During the 1993–1994 blockade of Tuzla the international housing projects were the only investment projects in the region, aside from those triggered by the presence of UNPROFOR. The settlement projects were the biggest of all. For that reason they were welcomed by the authorities. However, the fact that they were to provide large, serviced plots for permanent housing schemes made the same authorities skeptical. Permanent settlements did not signify temporary residence, and the authorities did not welcome the idea of ‘refugees’ coming to stay for good. “Municipalities seldom welcomed refugees”, said Bjørn Mossberg rather indiscreetly (Mossberg et al. 1997:64). In addition, the settlements would be filled up with destitute people that would easily turn them into ghettos or “potential slums”, according to local politicians. This was the part of the reason why Lukavac

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5 These were from three different producers: Ringsakerhus, Konsmohus and Anebyhus. Prices were negotiated, not tendered.
municipality, one of Tuzla’s neighbors, never allowed settlements to be built within their area. Zivenice municipality had two Sida/HIFAB settlements built in 1993/1994, at reasonably good locations, but only after some heavy persuasions. “Cooperation was [...] less good”, Mossberg et al. said (ibid:60). When NPA later approached the municipality proposing an extension of the Sida/Hifab settlement, they were told in no uncertain terms: “New settlements would shift the ethnic composition”. Tuzla municipality was also very reluctant to allow permanent settlements. The official reason was that the “cost would have been too high” (ibid:60). Similar difficulties had previously been experienced by NPA in Zenica and by others elsewhere. Sometimes ‘IDP settlements’ were indeed physically and infrastructurally integrated. In Gorazde this was achieved – not without spite – by building on municipal land within the abandoned Serb part of the town. But most of the time the settlements were built on remote sites, requiring additional infrastructure investments. In several cases these sites had no access to the public transport network. NPA settlements in Zenica “depended on NPA transport” (NPA 1994), as they did in the Tuzla region.

The first NPA settlement in the region was in Doborovci, in a neighboring municipality, where NPA initially was allotted a remote site outside the village. It was not least by demonstrative action on the part of the Norwegian consultant architect that NPA was given a plot adjacent to the village proper.

Regarding their last settlement, at Prutace near Brcko, the Final Report submitted to HQ states: “There is a rather long way to the nearest center, Gornji Rahic, and

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6 A Swedish building consultant firm handling the building works on behalf of Sida.
so long as there are no bus routes it is difficult for the inhabitants to use the services of the community”. Six years later there was still no bus routes. In Banovici the municipality was very, very reluctant. In the end, NPA actually had to purchase land from the municipality for the settlements – 5.5 km into the forest. During this first emergency period, lasting into spring 1996, NPA built all together 6 different settlements for about 6000 people, besides doing housing reconstruction and other construction work. They also managed the settlements as part of their program and managed the settlements built by Sida/Hifab. Except for UNHCR funding for the Doborovci and part of the Jecevaz settlement, all were constructed from NMFA funds.

None of the permanent settlement projects, irrespective of agency or donor, made any serious planning provisions for their post-war use, in spite of the fact that these were large, expensive, long-term investments – and that peace was, if not imminent, at least anticipated. The archival material, i.e. policy papers, project proposals, final reports and general correspondence, show an almost total absence of reference to future use. In their funding application of 17 February 1996 for the extension of the Mihatovici settlement, NPA states that in due course the settlement ”can easily be converted to family housing”. There are sometimes passing remarks on ”housing for the elderly”, a possibility also envisioned for the Sida/Hifab settlement in Zivenice (ibid:75). Another possibility discussed, but not found in the planning proposals I have had access to, was using the settlement flats as ‘transit housing’ for returning refugees. A possibility of converting the isolated settlements in the Banovici forest into a hotel and tourist resort was also mentioned, albeit superficially. These settlements were built to overcome acute housing needs, and basically nothing else. Their potential benefits in the years to follow, was not a prioritized planning proviso. This is most evident in their highly inappropriate location, which in effect resulted in their being highly inappropriate investments. When considering these remote settlements as long-term social or financial investment, they appear today as highly misallocated.

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7 This settlement, Grad Potok, is a severely depressing place in terms of physical conditions and social possibilities. However, recently LWF (The Lutheran World Federation) has initiated a strawberry production program which is now able to produce two harvests a year. This had never been achieved in this part of Bosnia before.
8 In Zivenice, these settlements, because of NPA having managed them, are now formally named ‘NPA settlements’, with no reference to Sida or Hifab who actually funded and built them.
9 The NRC model, as we have seen, was based on the presumption that war would soon be over. There is no indication that other agencies involved in settlement construction assessed the situation differently.
Fig.6.4.3 The settlement in the forest in Banovici. What was once thought of as a possible future post-war hotel is today a dilapidated structure, made almost uninhabitable by extreme neglect on the part of the tenants, lack of maintenance and unsound construction.

There were some that were able to focus differently, a few people and organizations able to look beyond the immediate needs so endemic in situations of high uncertainty. Funds were made available to restart one of the shoe factories in Tuzla. It was better to produce locally what otherwise had to be brought in by convoys. Tons of dry milk powder was brought in before someone finally looked beyond the immediate and discovered what the local people knew all along: the largest dry milk factory in the country was located in Tuzla, but was closed because of lack of spares and some of the key production ingredients. The same eventually happened with local food production and food processing. Not only did this ease logistics and the fulfilling of current needs, it carried sustainable post-war perspectives. What was needed, and was provided, was seed funding, donor-led demand (e.g. 50,000 pair of shoes for distribution to displaced children), willingness to work with the existing structures of power – and the strategic capacity of outsiders to look beyond the immediate needs (World Disasters Report 1996; 49). These cases are highlighted to show that it is possible not to be totally overpowered or blinded by the short-term needs. These issues were thoroughly discussed among the field personnel.

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10 All of these projects were initiated by Norwegian Church Aid. The agriculture and food processing projects were later taken over and expanded by the Lutheran World Federation.
11 These were most often seen as part of the problem rather than of the solution. By joining forces with the authorities, some agencies held the opinion that they were aiding one faction of the conflict, the same way as supporting local production could be seen as contributing to “extending the war”. So, many ‘kept on trucking’.
12 This merits a footnote. A surprisingly high number of former NGO field staff has complaints about how HQ has acted upon their field-based professional or strategic proposals. Many I have interviewed claim their contracts were not renewed due to these disagreements. The NGO environment abounds with such
6.4.3 BUILDING MIHATOVICI

.1) Introduction

Mihatovici, as a case, represents a totally different housing strategy to that of NRC Model. In due course this will become apparent. As such it will also be presented somewhat differently as there are issues present in this case not present in the former and vice versa. The major difference, of course, is that the people for whom the Mihatovici settlement was built are still here. This gives another dimension to the investigation.

Because of this the constituent processes of Figure 1.2.1 bring about different outcomes in this case as compared to NRC case. This is basically because the NRC case related differently to the contextual flow than did this one. Although it was planned and built using indigenous materials and manpower, it still transferred a concept that was not interacting to any significant degree with the contextual flow. This is reflected by the division of meaning and symbolic content between the donor/provider side and the user/recipient side. This will be uncovered as we go along.

Fig 6.4.4 Mihatovici settlement as seen from the North, from where up until the war there was the biggest commercial orchard in the region with 12,000 fruit trees. This picture was taken just after Phase I was completed, summer 1995. Beyond the hill in the very background lies Tuzla, and the single houses on the hill to the left are the upper houses of the old village of Mihatovici

The Mihatovici settlement, as a project, is of a different category compared to the other two cases examined. Whereas the latter were implemented as support to private house owners, Mihatovici is a public housing project in the traditional 'provision mode'. It is a project made “to” and “on behalf of” the displaced. For logistical, but also for political reasons, strategic and tactical decisions are taken outside the realm and influence of the primary beneficiaries; except for the choice of site, even outside the direct influence of the local public authorities, the secondary beneficiaries as it were. The 'settlement concept', as I have pointed to, was the inherent result of the 'partnership-in-emergency' approach developed in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a true consequence in the Wilsonian stories. In the field this fosters conformity. More dangerous still, it causes the field staff to refrain from taking on the opportunities available, because opportunities are inextricably linked to risks.
community’. The settlement was given a site of no status, as were most other NPA settlements in the region.

The two formal planning arguments behind the siting were:
1) The master plan, albeit outdated, had not made provisions for such a large, yet low density, housing project. Locating it next to Mihatovici village in some fashion made it into an extension of the village, and, by stretching it a little, ‘not in contravention’ of a minor plan made for that area some years earlier. Besides, Mihatovici could fulfill the requirement set in the brief for access to plots for growing food.
2) NPA’s plans for a settlement this big left few or no alternatives. Smaller schemes could much more easily have been located within the city proper. Later, such internationally funded 5-7 house schemes were indeed implemented within Tuzla proper. But when the decision on Mihatovici was made the housing stress was desperate. In terms of efficiency and time one big settlement would be cheaper, faster and logistically easier to execute that many small ones. "It was take it or leave it", as Tuzla’s Chief Urban Planner told me.

At times like these political power is concentrated at the top. The Mayor and his close support staff\(^1\) in effect ran the municipality - that is, as long as the military leadership concurred. Hence, "locating the settlement was not a planning issue. It

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\(^1\) The Chief Urban Planner, Zehere Morankic, was appointed to her post by the Mayor in 1994 after having headed the Office of Displaced People and Refugees from its initiation the year before.
was a political issue”, a senior UNHCR official stated, referring to discussions with the Mayor on the matter.

.3) Designing Mihatovici

In March 1994 NPA appointed Sefic Vejzagic project manager for Mihatovici. He was the former Technical Director of Technograd. Providing shelter was for most agencies, and in particular for NPA’s settlement projects, a matter of time, quantity and cost. Shelter interventions became ‘buildings projects’. In this perspective the extraordinary capacity of Sefic Vejzagic could be fully utilized. He prepared a brief in line with UNHCR standard and prescribed design solutions and materials to ensure that the project would “shelter as many as possible as quickly as possible and as cheaply as possible”, as he told it. He immediately had five architects compete on the design, one of which withdrew upon receiving the design brief, because he could not accept the ‘humiliating living standards embedded in the project’. The winning entry was designed by the Municipal Urban Planning Office, for which they were paid DM 1500. The design merits some comments.

Although the housing model of low-density row houses was new in the region, the proposed floor plans of the flats were not. They were, albeit smaller in area, of the typical quadrant type found in typically Bosnian ‘contemporary vernacular’. In that sense the floor plans were a most appropriate response seen in a long-term perspective, - bar on one crucial account: the total lack of support space. Given the high density of people, where were they to store the “stuff” they brought or acquired? This one feature was to shape the visual and spatial environment of Mihatovici, and will be discussed later.

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16 Before the war Tecnograd was the largest of Bosnia’s international construction companies, with 12,000 employees.
17 Prior to this Alan Cameron, the NPA’s Head of Office, had asked an architect working for the UN to do the design. With the Vejzagic initiative that deal was annulled and the architect paid off. Cameron had no previous experience in building. He was a de-mining expert.
MIHATOVICI, A SETTLEMENT FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA

URBANIŠTJČKO RJEŠENJE NASELJA ZA SMJEŠTAJ
RASELJENIH I PRRGNANIH LICA NA LOKACIJI
"MIHATOVICI - SICKI BROD"
U TUZLI

R 1:250

LEGENDA

NAMJENA POVRŠINA SA RAZMJESTAJEM OBJEKATA

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Fig. 6.4.8 Floor plans, ground floor. These were two-storey buildings and the drawing shows a construction unit of four flats joined by a semi-private stairway. In reality all of the spaces shown became semi-public. The closeness, the density of people – and the mode of construction - made privacy an impossible quality.

Fig. 6.4.9 Section through two flats. The floor between the two flats was built from (raw, and eventually warped) timber, which made vertical sound insulation impossible. The reduced roof height on the 1. floor made it necessary to construct cross gables in order to reach full ceiling heights in places. This was designed or constructed in ways that caused endemic leakages.
Some months before Mihatovici was designed, a local architect had made the design for the Sida/Hifab settlement in Zivenice. His one-and-a-half story 18, 4-flat walk-up became the cue for the design of Mihatovici. 19 Although the design was slightly modified, there still remained unresolved construction detailing that would later cause problems. This is partly because there were design ambitions overruling practical insight. “The architects wanted to prove themselves as altogether European designers’, as a Norwegian colleague mused, and partly because the ‘quality guard’ was lowered on the part of the client. These were times of emergency – although conspicuously absent in the over-all design.

I cite from my diary of December 9, 2001:

Re Mihatovici: The site plan: It was built on an illusion of normalcy (long term housing) in a highly abnormal situation (homeless IDPs in huge numbers). Its site plan looks like any suburban housing plan from almost anywhere in the world. Even had organized ‘kiosk areas’ and trees lining the street.

This the architect knew very well would not materialize. S/he was not looking into the challenge as a ‘real world’ case. As a wishful illustration only. Not taking on the design challenge of creating space (5m$^2$ pr person) for bereaved people within the material and temporal conditions prevailing. Hence an extreme illusion of a suburban settlement was created. Everybody knew it was wrong, - but not knowing any alternative approach, the process detached itself from the situation at hand and became an estranged, yet ‘normal’ process of design and build.[20]

The point is that the detached and illusive assumptions on which the designer made his/her site plan and housing design, reproduced – through the plan drawings - these illusionary concepts of housing for IDPs into the donor community and among NGO staff unaccustomed to dealing with physical planning and housing. Re Alan Cameron’s contact with an architect he had happened to come across in UNHCR whom he simply asked to do the Mihatovici plan. And it was not out of reaction to this architect’s approach it never came to be, it was because it did not conform to Sefic’s design and building management aspirations which almost in total rested on efficiency, - in planning, implementation and site management.

Seven years after its construction Mihatovici was as far from being a Tuzla suburb as it was on the architect’s drawings. In fact it had become one of Tuzla’s official Collective Centers, the very institution it set out to replace.

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18 Already in 1946 the Norwegian Housing Directorate found that the one-and-a-half story house was the most resource efficient housing type. It was therefore used as a model for the reconstruction of housing in Northern Norway after WW II (Dancke 1986).

19 Which was later to be copied in the NPA’s last settlement in Prutace near Brcko.

20 This sounds like Hannah Arendt’s comments on the Pentagon Papers, see Chapter 3.1, but was written months before I came across her writing. It shows the crucial importance of structuring theories for our actions, for our practices.
4) Constructing Mihatovici

NPA applied standard FINIC\textsuperscript{21} contracts on all works initially tendered. Whereas NRC favored the small, independent contractor (for their numerous small works), it was the former state construction companies that competed for Mihatovici. The company chosen was Technograd I, an engineering company which in turn contracted Technograd II, a construction company (and fellow competitor). Some of the works were further outsourced by Technograd II to smaller, private contractors. These international projects were the sole means of survival for the construction industry during the war years. Inasmuch as NRC kept some of the small contractors afloat, the Mihatovici contract might have had a larger impact in maintaining Tuzla’s human and institutional construction capacity by keeping the largest and most experienced building company in business during the war.

Between 150 and 200 workers were employed at any one time. According to Vejzagic, it was the largest work place in Tuzla where they regularly paid salaries, even though they were low: "Labor was cheap then", DM 10–15 a day. In total only about 20\% of the building cost was spent on salaries\textsuperscript{22}, most of it on day-labor. By default rather than strategy, "most of the able-bodied men" from the old village of Mihatovici were engaged in this work. This definitely cushioned the social impact of suddenly having a large settlement of displaced people established in their backyard. Even some of the men from the settlement’s first phase were engaged. In the beginning all was synchronized to the front-line duties of soldiers, as most laborers were also soldiers. The 80\% spent on materials was by and large spent on materials produced in Bosnia, most of which was made before the war. Siporex, the main construction material, was bought off private individuals or companies having planned to build when the war came, much the same as was done by NRC. Prices were about 50\% of pre-war levels. People had to have money.

Besides it being an housing investment, the Mihatovici construction was also a way of disseminating purchasing power. It is hard to find evidence of its construction contributing to any significant increase in local capacities, the standard claim often held by international organizations.\textsuperscript{23} More than half of the funds spent went into purchasing locally produced materials. By mostly drawing on stocks that were not being replenished, the secondary employment effect was also rather meager. As far as capacity building is concerned, the Mihatovici experience supports the findings from NRC case: the emergency context itself hampers any significant industrial or institutional capacity building.\textsuperscript{24} The tale of local roof tile production is a case in point.

\textsuperscript{21} International Federation of Consulting Engineers.
\textsuperscript{22} In Norway it fluctuates around 50\%.
\textsuperscript{23} See any brochure or newsletter from any of the big NGOs or from those dealing with construction work, CHF in particular
\textsuperscript{24} There are always exceptions. During the war a joinery workshop turned factory was established in Lucavac. Private sawmills and workshops for concrete blocks were also being established, most of them ‘highly informal’.
A Short Story of Bosnian Roof Tiles

In Bosnia most pitched roofs are covered with clay tiles originally produced in what is now Croatia or Serbia. The Bosnian clay is not good enough for tile production. When the international housing re/construction started in 1993, roofing material was not available since Tuzla in effect was sealed off. This represented an opportunity for taking up production of concrete roof tiles, which in many European countries have a larger market share than do clay tiles. Scottish European Aid supported by UNHCR and the Soros Foundation purchased two machines for producing concrete tiles. These, plus one made locally, were placed at the Siporex factory. They were to produce roof tiles to most of the internationally funded housing projects during the war. In 1995 NMFA reportedly funded, via IMG and NPA, two more machines that were installed in a Technograd production shed. They provided roof tiles to Mihatovici and to other international housing projects.

With the Dayton Agreement and the opening of borders, suddenly no one needed concrete tiles any more. Clay tiles were again available. They were imported tax free from Croatia at lower prices per tile than were the locally produced concrete tiles. The fact that concrete tiles were cheaper by the square meter, as there were 10 concrete tiles per m² compared to 16 clay tiles, apparently made no difference. And besides, clay tiles "looked like real roof tiles", whereas the gray concrete tiles made the house look inferior. The Deputy Director of Technograd, the one responsible for concrete tile production, told me he "would never use concrete tiles" on his own house!

By 1997 there was no production of concrete tiles at any of the production machines in Tuzla. Skills and know-how meticulously developed during the hard days of war, were lost.

This story has a post scriptum. Skeptics are at a liberty to read it as an allegory of Bosnia’s post-war reconstruction and recovery challenges:

After the war a Norwegian engineer and contractor, Bjørn Bøe, having formerly worked for NPA, established a large, modern concrete tile factory in Zenica with investment support from Sida: "If there ever were a market for roof tiles, Bosnia must be it". His factory, symbolically named "Most" ("Bridge") set out to serve the local marked through slogans like "Made in Bosnia, by Bosnians, for the Bosnians". "It was a total flop", he concedes. "Anything Bosnian is deemed second class". Even after having changed the slogan, solved the color problem by making them look like clay tiles, and offering tiles at very competitive prices, he still has a hard time on the local market, "the cultural market", as it were. "Roof tiles are synonymous with clay tiles" in the minds of people. "Besides, the local market is marred with all sorts of 'commissions', kick-backs and political back-scratching". So far the international organizations have been 'Most's major customers. As they are pulling out, where does that leave 'Most'? "If there ever were a market for roof tiles, Bosnia wasn’t it; or may it still be"? The 2002 sales figures from Most may indicate hope.

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25 Information confirming the funding has been impossible to obtain. This is how Technograd 'remembers' it.

26 All goods to be used by international agencies or NGOs are exempted from duties and tax. This is seriously diminishing the multiplier effect and hence the (re)developmental effect of the international housing support, as explained in the Housing as Strategy chapter.
5) Construction in war

In chasing “the cheapest and quickest” solution, some serious technical misjudgments were made. I have already touched upon bad architect’s detailing. Similar technical slips passed on the waterproofing of bathroom floors, and on metal flashing between houses. All of these caused endemic leakages: in the first floor when it rained, on the ground floor whenever somebody used the bathroom upstairs. Whenever these issues were raised with local NPA staff, they were acknowledged – conditionally: “but it was war”!

I have earlier shown how uncertainty shifts the focus towards the immediate. So it does regarding technical solutions. It is as if we refuse to acknowledge the physically inevitable – like a prosaic leakage, as long as we can provide an immediate solution to the primary problem we set out to solve: providing shelter for the houseless - now.

This will have to explain the choice of timber floors, a highly unusual solution in contemporary mass housing, all the more so since no dry, stable timber was available. By using timber though, both money and time was saved. Money was saved by the fact that the price of timber was down to less than half its pre-war price, while cement was much more expensive since cement had to be brought in on convoys because the local cement factory at Lukavac was down. Time was saved in that one did not have to wait for concrete to cure. But even with these two parameters fully satisfied, the end result was highly unsatisfactory, bordering on the undignified. The absence of horizontal sound insulation between the flats and

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27 Even the previously built Sida/Hifab buildings had concrete floor slabs dividing ground and first floor.
warped floor and ceiling boarding made two flats into one ‘soundscape’ inhabited by several families, sometimes more than 20 people.

These were all results of local tactical decisions borne out of the overriding strategic goal, set by the donor and HQ, to provide shelter for as many, as quickly and as cheaply as possible. But the funding procedure itself also plays a role in explaining the results. By funding these housing investments as emergency assistance the funds are released annually and normally in the spring. Consequently, the construction of the main structures will then be carried out during winter. In the case of Mihatovici this had an adverse effect on the quality of the timber slabs, and thus on the subsequent living conditions of the flats.

In addition to the challenges of the field, of snow, material shortages and high fuel prices, what seems to have caused delays were in fact difficulties in transferring funds from HQ, from Oslo to the Tuzla offices. The archives are full of fax copies from Tuzla on the same issue, over and over again: “money is necessary for further progress”, “work stopped due to lack of money”. The last phase was about 4 months late, fully completed on September 16, 1996.

Fig.6.4.11 Constructing the ‘Mihatovici houses’ in Prutace in February 1996 revealing the seasonal difficulties in constructing floor slabs in timber. In Bosnia, even today, there is normally no ‘exposed’ construction going on in winter.

.6) The settlement built
In terms of physical output Mihatovici will have to be assessed differently to my other two cases. They were permanent, individual, small-scale houses where each owner owned and managed the premises. Besides, in the NRC case, it was the very
adaptability and structural rigor of the houses that made them part of the project. In Grapska, all choices were – as a matter of development policy – left to the individual owners and the community organization to decide. At Mihatovici it was different: a publicly owned and managed settlement, “built on behalf of” displaced people staying there for free awaiting possible return to their former homes. The settlement was built during war, but will serve in the years that follow. Whether it constitutes a sustained fixed capital injection will depend on the benefit flows, and how it possibly helps replenish the other capital modes on which recovery depends. So far Mihatovici has remained a one-dimensional shelter project. But it is not a matter of what it is, but what it might become. “Time is the essence of the real design problem” says Frank Duffy (cf. Brand 1994; 13).

In order to examine its potential, to see its true capital contribution, I will briefly analyze the settlement by shearing it in the Duffy-Brand manner presented in Chapter 2.2.2. This will disclose how Mihatovici is prepared for the inevitable change that follows war.

Site:
Mihatovici is fixed, its location deemed a liability by all. Its only salvation lies in the possibility of urban expansion and new housing built on the adjacent brown fields. “There is absolutely no chance of that happening in the foreseeable future”, according to Tuzla’s planning authorities. As it was located ‘out of sight’ it also relies on its own water and sewerage treatment plants. Both are in bad condition, overburdened. The water, containing three times the permissible iron content, is not for drinking as it may cause hepatitis. Drinking water is collected at a public tap down by the main road, but there the water is so infected from sewerage infiltration that it has to be boiled. The sewerage treatment plant of the settlement is overburdened and undermaintained. The manholes of the septic tank have been removed, some say stolen, others say to allow for overflowing. Overflow they do: a child fell in and drowned last year (2002).

28 Except for IDPs living in the more remote settlements. They repeatedly report on wanting to move to Mihatovici, because it is closer to Tuzla.
29 According to the project manager it is still within “war standards”, which allow for an iron content 3 times higher than the normal standards. This implies that the contextual, the immediate, considerations during the implementation stage take precedence over issues of long-term health. Certainly the buildings and the water system was planned to outlast the “war standard” period.
Fig. 6.4.12 a) When the water pump in the settlement is out of order – which they often are – water, still with hazardous levels of iron, is collected from the source in the upper Mihatovici village.

Fig. 6.4.12 b) This is the only water source that holds a permissible level of iron. It still needs to be boiled, however, as it is contaminated from sewerage spills. The source is located by the main road, approximately 1 km down the access road, cf. Figure 6.4.6.

The structure of the site plan is fixed although its garden city ideals are currently impossible to recognize. There are two planning reasons and one situational, or dynamic reason for this. Firstly, because of the total lack of storage space people built sheds and garages adjacent to their house to store everything from foodstuff to firewood. Secondly, the extraordinary number of people causes an extraordinary wear on the physical structures and on the environment, leaving the settlement with hardly any lawns, trees or flowers. Thirdly, this very high number of people constitutes a market, triggering the building of shops. There are at least 30 shops in operation.30 All these constructions are incrementally built, basically on the front of one’s house and from bark-covered slabs and off-cuts bought cheaply at the local sawmills. The inhabitants have invested something like DM 50,00031 in these sheds, garages and shops. Today, these structures cover a ground area of at least 6800 m², more than do the formal buildings. For outsiders the visual impact of these ramshackle sheds creates the ‘character of the place’ i.e. destitution and hopelessness. This is a superficial observation and definitely one that has nothing to do with the settlement’s environmental potential. Its garden city atmosphere could yet materialize if its inhabitants had other future perspectives and terms of tenure than those they have today. Because they all see the inadequacy of the situation, none of the Mihatovitcians has ever lived this primitively before. But why bother?32

30 On December 4, 2002 there were 31 shops and hairdressers operating. The number depends on the season, and the ongoing process of ‘take overs’ within the settlement.
31 Calculated from material cost data provided by the interviewees, approximately DM 6–8 /m².
32 These are strikingly similar observations to what Rapoport has referred to pertaining to migrants in developing countries. The environmental quality of their initial dwelling was totally unacceptable after
Mihatovici, a settlement for displaced people in Tuzla

Fig. 6.4.13 Mihatovici. The initial situation. Picture taken in the summer of 1996.

Fig. 6.4.14 What it turned out to be. Picture showing the street depicted above; December 2001.

some years. Rapoport refers to research done in India by Sastrosasmita and Nurul Amin (Rapoport 2002).
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Fig.6.4.15 Main Street, Mihatovici with the shops (initially) established by the tenants of the houses right behind. These shops also serve people in the old Mihatovici village.

Fig.6.4.16 The house where the tenants divided the 50m² ground floor flat in two, and one made a separate entrance at the back. At another house it was also done for 1.floor flats with a new entrance door out to a somewhat rickety stairway in the back.

Structure:
The one-and-a-half story houses are set in rows, leaving most of the houses with expansion possibilities only at the front and back. They are built within a concrete frame from Siporex blocks, but with only 20 cm external walls.\(^{33}\) Siporex, being easy to work with, has already showed its capacity to accommodate change: people sharing the same flats, but unable to live together, have been able to divide the premises and make separate entrance doors – simply by cutting through the external Siporex walls.

\(^{33}\) Tilting the 20x25x50 cm blocks so that the thickness is reduced increases the wall area by 20%. This is a cheaper solution when building, but one which draws substantially more energy resources to heat. This was a trick the self-help builders used both in NRC project and in the following Grapska case.
There is, similarly, the potential for joining flats horizontally or even shifting the entrance to adjacent rooms from one flat to the other. No provisions have been made for this, however, nor for the merging of flats within the same “soundscape”\(^{34}\), although the structure allows for this. Sound leakage through the timber slabs (discussed earlier), may be mediated somewhat by introducing insulation and gypsum ceiling boards. Water and trapped vapor may have severely damaged the timber floors and joists, which may require serious repair. The roof construction is part of structure, and part of the roof construction has some weak points. Repairs are required not only to waterproof the roof, but also to prevent part of the construction from rotting. The structure, its materials and the applied technology is adaptable to change, but some serious repairs and improvements, primarily of the timber construction, are required.

**Skin:**
Skin is part of the structure in the Mihatovici houses. The plaster is easily damaged, which is evident from this settlement and others where plastered Siporex has been used. In due course the walls could be re-dressed or re-clad, allowing insulation to be added. Winters are cold in Tuzla. I know. The roof is covered for life by concrete tiles.

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\(^{34}\) In terms of flexibility and adaptability there is much to learn from the “Swedish Houses” of Finnish and Norwegian reconstruction, or from the results of the architectural competition for flexible housing for refugees held in Norway in 2000 (Rikskommittén 1942).
Services:
Services are strategically well suited to change and extensions, the fittings and equipment used are of standard good quality.

The Space/floor plan:
The plan has a structure which allows for flexible use of the flat. Its small size and the load bearing wall cutting through it reduce the options, however. The lack of storage space calls for solutions outside the flat, or two flats sharing the space of three, an option fully possible. See Fig. 6.4.8.

Stuff:
Stuff is not an issue beyond the repeated fact that there is no place to put it. The same could be said about the people living there. There are too many people and too little sleeping space. Therefore, all furniture is convertible into beds, or else there are very few pieces of furniture so as to make floor space for all the mattresses required at night. In no home did I observe an eating table or regular chairs, only coffee tables and low stools, folding camping chairs at best; otherwise there was no room for the people.35

35 If comparisons are made to, say, the furnishing of flats in Hong Kong, which have a similar living space per capita, we find there a much more sophisticated and efficient space utilization. But then again, they have a much longer history of dense living – and they have money.
years some of the structural weaknesses are tended to. If they are not, Mihatovici will inevitably descend into an arena for the truly marginalized and thus represent a social liability to the municipality and perhaps an uneasy embarrassment to NPA. The oncoming decay is partly due to ‘unfortunate’ planning, however much “it was done in war”, and is further exasperated by extreme wear and lack of maintenance.

But Mihatovici was indeed cheap when built. It cost DM 428 /m², excluding infrastructure investments. This is 30% less than NPA’s settlement in Jezevac in close-by Banovici municipality. Since there is no common standard for calculating construction costs among the implementing agencies, comparing Mihatovici with others is difficult. Some agencies include items that others exclude, some make concessions for administrative costs, other agencies do not. Whenever such comparisons are used, they are often used strategically – and often misleading. The mandatory “cost per beneficiary” figure may be very inaccurate as both the figures above and below the fraction line are highly contentious. In reference to Mihatovici this figure was always calculated on the basis of 2,200 IDPs. Reportedly, never more than 1650 people lived there, which immediately raises the cost per beneficiary figure by more than 30%. NRC did similar calculations, even on houses that had zero beneficiaries. Such inaccurate calculations in effect pushed the reconstruction focus onto the houses with the least damage, houses that often could have been taken care of by the owners themselves. All this made the cost per beneficiary figures ‘impressively’ low, which again made the NGOs aim at assisting the least needy. Those families whose houses were totally destroyed, were initially not assisted at all: the ‘cost per beneficiary’ was too high.

6.4.4 Managing Mihatovici
Housing management is more than administration. It is about strengthening the inhabitants’ human and social capital, helping in making the settlement into a place. Managing the settlement is the guiding activity that allows for the crucial interaction between the built environment and the lived lives. This link was fully appreciated by NPA. Managing the settlement became a project in itself, and sought carried through during the short period that NPA ran altogether 13 settlements throughout Bosnia. Mihatovici was under the official management of NPA until December 31 1996, when NMFA closed further funding. NPA prepared a comprehensive outline for the running of the settlements (NPA 1994), conceptually founded on the interaction between:

1) material conditions: housing, food, transport, common facilities, international presence providing security, etc.

2) organizational conditions: citizens’ participation through democratic processes

3) psychosocial conditions: meaningful activities for work and leisure, social rights advocacy, the handling of loss and mourning.

36 The NPA settlement at Grab Potok has already reached that stage.

37 In this work NPA used a canon of the Norwegian labor movement, the book Tillitsmannen (The Shop Steward) by the post-WW II Norwegian Prime Minister, Einar Gerhardsen.
While funding lasted NPA did organize a People’s Committee, but 5 years later few people have any recollection of its doings or impact. What is remembered is the availability of funds for dealing with daily life, like occasional maintenance, transport and organizing funerals, etc. 38 The legacy of the People’s Committee is retained in the story of the minibus. This is just as much an allegory on the state of social capital in Mihatovici and the difficulties outsiders encounter in trying to ‘organize’.

**A Short Story of the Minibus in Mihatovici**

As told by nurse Edina, Clive Cavanaugh and Mihela Dzindo of SRC

A couple of years back a French woman doctor donated a minibus to the settlement to ensure that emergency cases would be attended to, either by taking the sick to hospital or by enabling the doctor to come to the settlement during off-duty hours.

But the van had to be registered. As the donation was given to the Settlement, and not to the health center, which was run by the Swiss and owned by the Municipality, the chairman of the former “People’s Committee”, the old NPA-induced settlement board, signed the registration papers. Although the committee had ceased to exist long ago, it was still important to have somebody from the settlement remain as the formal owner, and not the ODPR, as they were claimed to have ‘hi-jacked’ a bus previously donated to the settlement by the Norwegian AUF. 39

This time the signee, the former head of the People’s Committee, claimed the van. He is the formal owner, because the committee no longer exists. And that was it. So he has taken the car for his own use. He sells vegetables on the market. It is reported, however, that he occasionally helps people with transport.

The same minibus owner was the one receiving the most personal votes in the elections for the new Settlement Board in 2001.

The ‘People’s Committee’ never survived the handing over of the management responsibilities to the Municipality in 1997. From the very opening, due to its size and proximity to Tuzla, Mihatovici has attracted several curious and benevolent individuals and agency representatives (and researchers) bringing project proposals, projects and gifts to be distributed to the needy. The manager, Ekrem Mirascic, has long since lost the names of all the agencies involved in the various support services. They have taken on – independently of each other – the building of a gym hall (French), a kindergarten (Dutch), playground equipment (Danish), and a youth club (‘some Swiss lady’). NORBAT (The Norwegian Battalion in BiH) has left two containers which are used for youth activities, and at the time of my last visit a French organization was involved in the upgrading of the water system.

38 Staffing (6 persons), transport, repairs, cantina cost (food distribution – not provision – cost), and miscellaneous items ran at DM 2 250/month.

39 The Youth Chapter of the Norwegian Labor Party had donated a bus to the settlement because of its isolated location. It was also a way of disposing of the vehicle used to transport gifts from Norway to BiH.
This was after a Dutch organization had extended the pipe network to 18 houses of old Mihatovici, houses that were situated above the pressure level of the municipality water system. No wonder Mr Mirascic is ‘relieved’ now that several NGOs are leaving Bosnia. But even his salary is paid by ‘some organization’. Since 1988 Mihatovici has been run by The Swiss Red Cross, (SRC).

SRC was called in to take care of the psycho-social program that was left in disarray after NPA left. From there on they have tried to revitalize social activities, enabling the inhabitants to take care of the community. Today they spend more than DM 150,000 a year on running Mihatovici. The psycho-social program has been altered from its ‘palliative’ focus toward dealing with the challenges ahead. This has changed the activities within the settlement. Besides carrying the cost for the health services and the administration of the settlement, SRC also initiates all sorts of communal activities, such as basic reading and writing courses for illiterate grown-ups, computer courses, and establishing work units that can take on cleaning jobs outside the settlement. There are also sewing groups, an old men’s club and boy scouts groups. They have even run a course on make-up for teenage girls. All this takes place within SRC’s “Healthy Community Approach”. “The aim is to make people wake up”\(^{40}\), as the social worker said. A key institution is the recently elected Community Board.

The Board was meant to be the focus of activities in the settlement. Although they have no funds of their own, whenever a donation is presented, like the one from “the Swiss lady”, they make the priorities. The Board also disseminates a newsletter once a month to counter the swarming of rumors within the settlement. Their most conspicuous initiative was launching the big Spring Cleaning Day, when more than half of the inhabitants got together to clean and bury the solid waste that had been piling up. The settlement owed DM 35,000 in waste collection fees, so the municipality just stopped collecting solid waste from the settlement.

The Board encountered problems, however, when trying to deal with payment for electricity. Each family was allowed DM 20 of free electricity a month. Beyond that they had to pay. But they did not.\(^{41}\) Even after the distribution company wavered all claims up to January 1, 2002, the Settlement Board was still split over whether or not to pay. The Board dissolved itself shortly thereafter because of this.

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\(^{40}\) Thereby disclosing her ‘parental’ attitude towards the population – all in line with the provision concept

\(^{41}\) In total the settlement has a monthly allowance of 90.00 KWH, but consumes up to 150,000 kWh. Organizing a fair payment system has proved difficult because of the way the metering has been set up. Several families share one meter, and these may fluctuate within the settlement, and others leave. Some have previously paid, others not, and all the while the distributing company wants it all in one sum. In addition, the municipality provides free coal to the settlement, worth DM 80,000 year. Much of this has been privately sold to outsiders because ‘free’ electricity has been available, or additional ‘free’ coal have been (illegally) collected from an open pit mine close by – and sold.
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Fig. 6.4.19 a, b Spring Cleaning Day 2001; women, children – and men participate.
When it had taken so long to settle the electricity issue, it was also because the municipality expected a political uproar: "They'll take to the streets of Tuzla", ODPR’s director said. If that were ever done, it would be one of the very few times the population of Mihatovici ever did anything in unison. It would advance the social capacity of the settlement. But then, what for? ‘We’re only here for the time being, waiting to be evicted’, as the co-chairman of the defunct Board told me.

6.4.5 LIVING IN MIHATOVICI

“They hate the place”, Dr Sutovic told me. This was in early 1999, and Dr Sutovic, a clinical psychologist, had just seen to some of his “several hundred” patients in the settlement.42 The lives of the inhabitants are in limbo. They do not know what the future will bring, and they are burdened by an uncertainty, unease, trauma even, about the past; the grown-ups share that past, but the children raised in Mihatovici do not. Fault lines run every which way in Mihatovici.

The people of Mihatovici do have certain things in common. There is the territorial proximity; it is the shared experience of expulsion from their home somewhere in Eastern Bosnia; it is the temporary tenure; and the fact that all inhabitants are Muslims. They carry all sort of different capacities and professional skills and aspirations. These are all but irrelevant elements of life in the settlement. Here they are all categorized by most others as ‘refugees’, and most of the people are all here against their will. For all practical purposes the refugees do not need each other. This is hardly a pregnant starting point for creating a sense of community.

1) Selecting Beneficiaries & Close Co-Habitants

The first people came here in early 1995. NPA had made a provision in the contract with the municipality and UNHCR to select the beneficiaries themselves, but found that their selection criteria were adhered to through ODPR’s own selection process,43 which was basically to empty some of the most undignified collective centers. It was the extraordinary random allocation of space within Mihatovici itself which caused the most problems. People were set to share their lives in the same flat or the same ‘soundscape’ without previously knowing each other. Although families and ‘special cases’ were allowed to stay together, the process entailed shoehorning people so close together that there was little space and no privacy left. In most cases people were taken from the CCs against their will and put onto yet another unknown stage, this time somewhere out on the countryside. “They were pushed into a secondary trauma”, according to Dr Sutovic (Sutovic 2001). Some refused to leave the collective center, whereupon they had their food rations reduced. Many of those who eventually did go did so almost at gunpoint. “The only time during the war I was so afraid that I carried a gun, was when I was transporting the first group of refugees to Mihatovici”, said a former NPA employee.

42 “An evaluation team estimated that 300 persons living in this settlement suffer clinically standard PTSD [post traumatic stress disorder] symptoms, (and) at least 1000 persons suffer of secondary trauma”. (Sutovic 2001)

43 The NPA initially set out to prioritize the most vulnerable: single mothers, single minors, the old and chronically ill, former POWs and their families, soldiers and civilian made invalids during war, and displaced people presently living under extremely bad conditions (NPA 1994).
However, by the time the last phase was completed, people reportedly broke into the completed flats to secure residential rights. This was in 1996, after the first batch of IDPs were evicted from NRC houses presented in my first case. There are dozens of former ‘NRC families’ living in Mihatovici. Residents of the other settlements built in the region also aspire to a flat in Mihatovici: “so much closer to Tuzla”. And besides, people stay for free, and so far have had free electricity, and coal. This makes living a day at a time all the more easier, but it hardly signifies a road to recovery.

.2) The old population – and the new
Mihatovici never had a regular population of more than 1650 inhabitants\(^{44}\), a total which is significantly less than the nominal capacity of 2,200. However, it is reported that for a short period after the Srebrenica exodus as many as 1800 people stayed here. Many left voluntarily; the size and the density was too much to take. The number of people has declined as a matter of policy ever since. It stood at about 1250 when I last visited the place in early 2002.\(^{45}\) Almost no new people have moved in since it opened. About 450 family units, sometimes consisting of only one person, share the 220 flats, which makes an average of two families a flat. Lately, a growing number have become one-family flats. Using the official figures from 2001, when 1291 people officially lived there, 43.5% of these were male, and 56.5% female. The breakdown in age shows that 309, or almost a quarter of the population, were below 14 years of age. These are the people with no or little recollection of the places they were forced to leave in 1992. 128 children have actually been born in the settlement as per December 2001. Over recent years the birth rate has been declining\(^{46}\), partly because of offensive campaigns for the use of contraceptives, partly because of the age profile of the population. Two-thirds of the population is between 14 and 60 years of age, and 10% is more than 60. 50 have died here over the years, which for many relatives may be a strong reason for remaining in Tuzla.

The children and youths are the true Mihatovicians. Since their world is created here, their mental references are significantly different from those of their parents. It is this split between generations that is presented to me as the most important conflict in the settlement.\(^{47}\) “Going back” would not make sense for most of the young. They hardly remember ‘their’ place. Besides, many have established their own families while in displacement: more than 20 new families in Mihatovici alone, four of them between settlement residents and people from Mihatovice proper, the rest are among displaced people. And it is for these ‘children’, the true Mihatovicians, that the physical assets could spill over into enriching the social capital of the settlement and thus create a platform for

\(^{44}\) About the same number that Charles Fournier proposed in his utopian phalanstère housing in the early 19th century and Le Corbusier anticipated living in each of his Unités d'Habitation housing blocks, from the middle of the 20th century.

\(^{45}\) It was set to increase as it is one of the few remaining settlements where people evicted from occupied flats and houses in and around Tuzla may be re-housed.

\(^{46}\) Number of births per year from and including 1995 and onwards: 29, 17, 27, 20, 19, 9, 7, as per December of 2001.

\(^{47}\) A parallel observation was made by Roger Zetter in the settlements for Greek-Cypriot refugees (Zetter 1999).
development for making Mihatovici into a community. But that is not what is happening. By January 2002, 12 such ‘young families’ cum ‘DP children’ were served preliminary eviction orders from Mihatovici because their parents have had their house reconstructed. Hence the tenure of the children is also terminated however much they are grown-ups or have families of their own. For those without local employment or housing prospects, ‘going back’ seems the only option. Mihatovici is a place for temporary residence only, not a community.

.3) Social Cohesion

“The collective spirit does not exist here”, said one of the former residents to me. He later left for Australia. When he tried to mobilize the residents to have the wreck of a truck moved out of the settlement, their refusal was underpinned by the presumption that there was something in it for him personally. His statement is supported by all my interviewees: there is no trust. That is why the co-chairman of the Settlement Board initially withdrew. He was later convinced to stay on. He himself felt the suspicion by the others that his initiatives and actions were to his own personal benefit, and not in support of an emerging community. My last interviewee claimed stubbornly that whatever money the Settlement Board handled, the members made sure they got their share of it – personally. These findings are in line with what UNDP has come up with based on large national surveys. There is a general low societal trust, lower still with regard to the politicians – in both entities of the country (UNDP 2002). The prevalence of distrust was not gauged by me for reasons discussed in my chapter on methodology. Let there be no doubt that the level of distrust in Mihatovici is sufficiently high to guide the actions of the people living there, either by those not caring, or by those who see a mission in trying to overcome it. The turnout for the elections to the Settlement Board was an impressive 60%. The results – so far kept from the electorate – was that the man who ‘hi-jacked’ the minibus from the health center got the most votes. One can but speculate. Admiration for the ability to seize the moment, ‘to outsmart the system’, stands as a plausible explanation – hardly a contribution towards community building.

The war experience where your former neighbor turned out to be your mortal enemy, was held by Dr Sutovic as one main reason for the breakdown in trust (Sutovic 2001). Another reason may be still closer. The home provided do not hold the attributes required to nurture the building of trust between people. In Mihatovici people are deprived of their privacy, and thereby a necessary base for personal recovery. This explanation was fully endorsed by Dr Sutovic (2001). The overcrowding cause and perpetuate conflicts that effectively inhibit any sense of community in Mihatovici. In one observed case the father/grandfather in his 70s was ‘moved out’ of the flat and made to stay in a small shack made of DM 80 worth of scrap boards. There was initially 22 people in the flat. Something had to give.

"But I sneak in during day-time to watch television", said the old man, staring at the snowy 14” screen.

48 That old truck originated in Norway and was initially donated to “some organization” that filled it with gifts, presents and donations, drove to Bosnia, distributed the gifts and subsequently gave the truck to the settlement of Mihatovici. Having no money for registration fees, the truck was left to crumble and rust. It did. It was finally taken away by SRC. Add this to the story about the bus ‘donated’ to the settlement (but later ‘hijacked’ by ODPR). In both cases it seemed more like a matter of ‘getting rid of the vehicle’ than providing sustainable assistance.
The LWF gave the concluding argument on the low status of social capital of the settlement: “The reason”, they said, “for the success of the agriculture programs is that in this program the people do not have to rely on others”. Success depends solely on the commitment of each participating family. Margaret Thatcher springs to mind. Mihatovici fulfills her concept of non-society: “There’s no such thing as society, there are individual men and women, and there are families”.49

4) Health

It is not only the focused will to work, but also the ability to work, which determine success. People’s health is the chief constituent in human capital and a pillar in development. I have briefly touched upon the prevalence of diagnosed PTSD in Mihatovici in 1999, see 6.4.5. That figure has decreased, primarily due to the fact that a re-assessment of the cases as PTSD carries a set of contestable symptoms which in themselves are the basis for extended debates.50 This decline in PTSD prevalence coincides with a more forgiving attitude among the inhabitants towards their former perpetrators, according to the health center personnel. This echoes findings from similar cases elsewhere.51

49 Woman’s Own Magazine October 31, 1987.
51 “PTSD were significantly more common in those who were unforgiving towards the perpetrators than in those with high “forgiveness” scores”, according to findings from South Africa and referred to in the British Medical Journal 2002; Vol. 325:1105.
The medical statistics\textsuperscript{52} on the population in Mihatovici show what the doctor described as “a general condition of bad health” for which she saw two main causes: “The psychosomatic impacts of the experience of war – and the high population density”. Both affect the immune system. There is a high war-related prevalence of hypertension, with a significant increase parallel to the exhumation processes from the mass graves of Srebrenica in 2000. See figure below.

The population density, the highly unsatisfactory solid-waste treatment, the overflowing sewerage system and the iron-laden and unhealthy water make fertile grounds for contagious diseases. Early treatment and preventative measures have so far held these at bay, although the prevalence of the seasonal flu and hepatitis is much higher than normal, according to the health center nurse. The health center, now also catering for the old village of Mihatovici, covers a population of approximately 2000 people all together.

\textbf{Fig.6.4.21} The graph shows the prevalence of diabetes and hypertension among the population of Mihatovici. Note the rise in diagnosed cases of hypertension following the exhumation processes than unrolled during the summer of 2000.

\textbf{.5) Livelihoods}
People’s skills and capacity to work is contextual. That is made all the more apparent when people are forced into another environment, into another context,

\textsuperscript{52} During the one year (1.12.1999–1.12.2000) there were, for example, 6592 examinations and 365 home visits, 4890 rump injections, 890 vein injections and 329 bandages provided. 100 patients were being treated for diabetes, 160 for hypertension and 141 carried a psychosomatic diagnosis.
which is the case with refugees and displaced people. In Mihatovici there were teachers, engineers, shop attendants, farmers, mine workers, technicians, plumbers, i.e. all sorts of skills that only a handful could use in their new environment. Some of the teachers were able to; as teachers at the new school in Mihatovici. Most breadwinners had to opt for other vocations. A mechanical engineer set up the only shop made out of proper building materials in the settlement, for which he had to take a loan for the first time in his life. The reason for his design attention was his presumption that people would see the difference – see the ‘normalcy’ in his shop, and choose him. His next step was to extend his credit and start an auto repair shop. He never did. Instead he emigrated with his family to the US.

"The best ones leave", said the nurse. Since they started recording in 1996, by 1 December 2001, 75% of those who have officially left the settlement have emigrated, 25% have gone back to their homes or left for some other destination within BiH. In addition, more than 50 families have been formally accepted as immigrants in other countries. They are reportedly only awaiting formal admission, made more complicated after Sept 11 event. The chairman of the Settlement Board claims that more than half of the population have made their first applications to leave for another country. He himself has also applied, although he does not want to leave Bosnia. He holds a job as a night watchman in Tuzla but will soon be evicted from Mihatovici. He owns a flat in Srebrenica, but “How will I make a living? he asked, "you think those people will give me a job?" So he will try to make it abroad.

But some do their best to sustain a living even within the settlement. The settlement represents a market and holds large pieces of land that the residents have come to use. Many have therefore gone into cultivation or raising livestock; either on their own, or through the agriculture program of LWF, by far the most successful development project I have come across in BiH. The local director “should have been the Agriculture Minister of Bosnia”, a senior diplomat stated. New skills on intensive farming and on greenhouse cultivation have been acquired by hundreds of people in all the IDP settlements around Tuzla. For those returning to villages this will be a possible way of sustaining a living if, or rather when, they return. LWF has not only trained people in these new skills, but also introduced these ‘new’ farmers to the food processing industry towards which the farmers will be able to plan and organize their production. This is changing the heart of Bosnian village farming which, to a large extent, has been for the production of household food, which was all what the small private plots allowed.

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53 Echoing finding from the Yorkshire study. As soon as people had completed some of the many training courses, having ‘increased their human capital’ as it were, they leave for well paid jobs elsewhere (Stafford et al 2001).
54 As per December 1, 2001, 160 persons have emigrated, and 58 have left for an address somewhere in BiH.
55 Most of those leaving do so through a company in Zagreb that has specialized in arranging all the formalities regarding immigration to various countries. They also furnish tickets. Their expenses – plus a substantial service fee – is to be paid back to the company within 3 years.
The settlement as a ‘market entity’ shows signs of crude capital aggregation, primarily a result of investments in human and environmental rather than financial capital. One man’s day work cutting trees brought earnings sufficient for him to place his first initial investment, two sheep. The last three years, assisted by credit from a brother in Australia, has resulted in 8 sheep and a cow. The milk is sold in the neighborhood at 1 DM a liter. This agent may purchase another cow because of the market potential for milk.

Fig. 6.4.22 One of the barns of Mihatovici. Inside there is a cow and 8 sheep, all winter fed from the hey stacks shown, and from corn grown in the adjacent fields.

Fig. 6.4.23 The sheep and the shop belonging to the “Manager of the year”
“The manager of the year” was how the second agent was introduced to me. He is also an IDP but used to live in Tuzla before moving to the strategically located flat of his parents when the second family moved out. With some ‘savings’ he set up a corner shop, and also bought some sheep. He now has more than 50 head of sheep and has already bought - and closed - several competing shops in the vicinity of his own. The settlement’s location – with adjacent pastures – has at least enabled some to draw benefits from it.

But those who buy their food at the corner shop, the residents in general, how do they make a living? All sorts of lofty answers abound. This is definitely not the sort of data the residents will reveal – in full – to a foreigner. According to reliable sources, about 250 people still receive food support which otherwise was stopped in 1998. Out of the 1250 people living in the settlement, 12 people (1 per cent of the total population) are reported to have formal employment. Many try to work as day laborers. SRC has helped establish ‘cleaning units’, groups of women who take on cleaning jobs in the city, although this appears to be an initiative of good intentions rather than an important employment reality. In the late 1990s, a van and tools for carpentry, plumbing mason work, etc. were donated “by some organization” and a ‘repair unit’ of skilled tradesmen living in the settlement was established. But it soon folded. Skills are realized in context, i.e. in local social networks, particularly when employment opportunities are scarce.56

The Word Food Program (WFP) made a study on food security among IDPs in BiH (WFP 1999). Their findings echo the pieces of information I was able to glue together for Mihatovici. For one thing, they do not pay rent, and (at least prior to when I was there) had paid nothing for electricity or coal. Secondly, they pool resources. This is done as a matter of course in Mihatovici in that people have to share flats, although not much within the flat is shared.57 WFP cites findings by the World Bank that about one-third of IDP income stems from remittances sent by relatives living abroad58, and a quarter from the ‘informal sector’ (ibid). These are recognizable figures for Mihatovici too, although people now complain that the remittances are drying up. Agriculture does play a more significant livelihood role in Mihatovici than among the general IDP population, according to the WFP report, justifying the choice of location pertaining to this particular feature. A key source of real money comes from the ever diminishing pensions paid to the old, the infirm, the ‘war widows’ and others. In 2002 the monthly pension stood at about KM 120, down from KM190 two years previously. Only those who worked for Bosnian

56 Similar efforts by Norwegian ex-NGO staff have proved similarly unsuccessful.
57 Where flats are sheared between families, the kitchen is furnished with their own stoves, with separate cupboards, kitchen utensils etc, making the kitchen extremely cluttered and easily crowded.
58 According to figures I obtained from the Central Bank of BiH, the annual volume of private remittances stood at KM 1,257,000,000 in 1998, declining slightly to 1,150,000,000 in 2001. This is much more than the annual ODA to BiH. Remittances are sent into the Bosnian economy in full – albeit much of it is spent on traded imports from the neighboring countries, but again, much less than does the ODA (Official Development Aid).
enterprises are eligible for a workers’ pension. Those who worked in the other ex-Yugoslavian republics, have no pension whatsoever.  

One of those who lost his pension has already left Mihatovici. His story is the story of village return. There are thousands of stories like this. Three of his children, all grown into adults during the 9 years of displacement, stand to be evicted from Mihatovici now that the family house in Samari is sufficiently complete to allow them back.

The story of the Murić family’s return to Samari

The houses of the village of Samari ride along the ridge of a hill some 10 km west of Zvornik, or rather, what is left of the 111 houses that once made up the settlement. There were many such hill ridge or hillside villages in the area. From one you could look across the valley onto the next one. One may be Bosniak, the next Serb. The Murić family owned the farm furthest up. The forest was just beyond their house. It was an old family farm of 4 steeply sloping ha of land. The Murić household consisted of the husband, Behram, now in his mid-50s, his wife, Zejta, four girls and one boy. Behram was a migrant worker in Belgrade for 23 years. About 80% of the menfolk of Samari were migrant workers. “The village was full of children, wives and cattle”, he said. 3.5 kilometers down on the steep, curved road there used to be the school, the youth club, the shops, and the bus to Zvornik and Tuzla. All are gone now, but for an occasional bus.

Fig.6.4.24 The village of Samari with the houses riding the ridge in front. On the left in the background there is a similar village inhabited by ‘the others’

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59 Throughout Yugoslavia’s extensive industrialization the prospects of regular pensions was a key welfare issue. This became a dominant driving force behind the region’s urbanization and de-ruralization processes.

60 The situation is very similar to what is found in Lebanon, also a country of many religions, and also a country ruled by the Ottomans for centuries.
They were forced to flee together with all the other villagers, through the forest west to Tuzla in April 1992. After a harsh period living in collective centers they eventually ended up in one of NRC-finished flats in Tuzla. They found that “a good period”, and when their 30 months had passed, “on the 3rd of June 1995” they were taken to Mihatovici. When they came they had absolutely nothing. Their ‘NRC-hosts’ gave them some old furniture and an old refrigerator. Their flat, mostly furnished with second-hand items, now stands impeccably neat and inviting. But as their parents have already left Mihatovici, the children have received notice. They are to go back to Samari.

After four and a half years Behram could not suffer Mihatovici any more. There were too many people, and too noisy: “The nerves played on me”. So, after ‘some organization’ had agreed to provide materials for the burnt-down roof, give him three doors, three windows and 15 m² of floorboards, Behram left for Samari. In the beginning, he stayed alone working on the house that he initially built 20 years earlier. The cash required to pay for electrical installations and other sundry costs, totaling DM 370, was collected from the rest of the family, not least from the relatives they have in Germany.

The fact that he was not harassed by the Serbs opened up for further return. During the ensuing months, materials for the reconstruction of yet another 33 houses were provided. What pull-factors proved decisive? “I had no other place to go to”, he shrugged. He certainly acknowledged the hardships he faced, but what was there for him elsewhere? “To recreate life here takes much longer now than before. And yet, earlier we did have support, now after the house is completed, we have none”. Besides, part of the year they are completely cut off because the road up to the settlement is no longer kept open during winter, and erosion will make the upkeep difficult without municipal input – which they will not get. One organization has given them 7 chickens, and a cow, whose milk they have to share with the others. They were also promised 40 fruit trees by ‘some other organization’, but since they were unable to come up with the required self-contribution of a certain number of “tractor hours” – because they have no tractor – they expected the offer for the trees would be withdrawn. It was during the discussion on these international organizations that Behram Murić said:

“It is not a matter of making houses, it’s a matter of making a living”.

While in displacement three of the Murić children have married. Two daughters are staying with their in-laws, one within Mihatovici settlement. The only son, Abdullah, has also married and now has a small child. His new family and his two sisters now share the Murić flat in Mihatovici. When evicted – and with no other viable option open to them, they will most probably go back to their parents (and in-laws) in Samari.

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61 There turned out to be several NGOs working in the area, InterSOS and Islamic Development Trust being two of them.
62 A letter we brought when visiting Muric in Samari was from their relatives living in Germany. Also this time there were DM 10 notes appearing when the envelope was slit open.
Fig. 6.4.25 The Muric house recently rebuilt, bottom right.

Fig. 6.4.26 The Muric family (from left: daughter, mother, daughter in law, son, father). Picture taken in their provincial basement living room.

The young Murić family would like to stay on in Mihatovici. Along with other young Mihatovicians, they have the human and social capacity to make the settlement a community, make it an “ordinary housing settlement” in line with the initial vision of NPA. But this proves a pipe dream for the Muric ‘children’ now, as it was a pipe dream for NPA then.
6.4.6 Contribution Towards Local Capital Formation

NPA settlement scheme is in many ways an archetype emergency intervention, in the later phases modified by being planned and constructed by local personnel from locally produced materials. Conceptually, it relates to the ‘provision models’ from the early ‘trickle-down’ days of development aid to housing (Rodwin 1987). The case of Mihatovici shows how NPA’s planning considerations and construction approach have affected the lives and livelihoods of the inhabitants. At the same time there are wider contextual attributes that shape the way the inhabitants use, or are allowed to benefit from the settlement’s physical and environmental assets. By sifting evidence through the four-tiered environmental, fixed, human and social capital filter, I will be able to uncover the contribution towards recovery already made and the contributions expected, from this settlement project.

1) Environmental Capital Contribution

Locating the settlement to the orchard on the brownfields of Sicki Brod set in motion the chopping down of altogether 12,000 fruit trees. With the outbreak of the war, the orchard was abandoned as a commercial enterprise and there was a free-for-all attitude on the part of the settlement as well as the domicile population – "it was war" – the orchard was doomed. This represents a major environmental loss. It cannot be compensated for by the fields being used for grazing or for cultivation. Orchards are traditionally being used for grazing in BiH anyway, and the part used for cultivation is but a small part of the former orchard.

On the other hand, the access to land has proved crucial for many of the IDPs. For those participating in the LWF program, annual incomes may reach more than DM 4,000 for a family. Most people in the settlement have at least a patch where they can cultivate potatoes and vegetables. Some land would have been made available even if NPA had succeeded in locating the settlement within Tuzla proper, but obviously the former orchard at Mihatovici opened up possibilities that were not available in the city. In this respect, the formal planning arguments for locating the settlement where arable land was available have proven valid.

The settlement is not part of the overall urban environment of Tuzla, neither geographically, nor morphologically, nor infrastructurally. Its contribution towards the wider environmental asset base of Tuzla is doubtful in as much as the spillovers

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63 The World Bank funded Palestinian housing projects implemented in the wake of the Oslo accord is also characterized by this ‘provision approach’. In his PhD work, Ghassan Elkahlout found that this approach may have come about by default rather than informed choice because of the inexperience of the Palestinian authorities (Elkahlout 2001). The NPA and NMFA shared a similar inexperience in housing.

64 It is impossible to hold back on a personal story. During the very first days of the German occupation of Norway a stranger was discovered chasing our neighbor’s cattle up the Romsdal valley, away from our neighbor’s farm. When our neighbor finally got on to the cattle chasing stranger, asking him what the hell he was doing, stealing his cattle, the cattle chaser responded: "Nobody owns nothing when it’s war!”. An explanation our neighbor did not accept.

65 The domicile population added another crucial argument for chopping the trees: this was the land of their forefathers, confiscated during the Tito era. Now they were merely reclaiming it for cultivation. In effect, the land is still free-for-all although a new pattern is emerging based on the work actually carried out on each carved-out plot.
bring both depletion and capital gains to the other modes of societal capital. The man-made environment of the settlement itself holds potential for improvement, but as it stands today it carries all the visual connotations of a place for the marginalized. Its low status is fully acknowledged, albeit not accepted by the inhabitants. That is why they ‘almost physically attacked’ the ODPR director during the funeral ceremony for the boy drowned in the malfunctioning septic tank (see story at the end of this chapter). And that is why Elektrodistributia refrain from action against Mihatovici in spite of not paying their bills. Any other electricity customer not paying would have had their electricity cut off.

The flow from the environmental capital embedded in the Mihatovici settlement thus shows an increase both in benefits and in liabilities. Benefits are drawn from using the available arable land, which in turn further increases its capital value. There is an obvious spillover into human capital formation as new skills are acquired in growing vegetables and in greenhouse cultivation. The loss of environmental capital due to the chopping down of the orchard was basically a result of negative spillovers from the depleted social capital base. As such it amply illustrates how change in one capital mode spills over into a similar change in other modes. Similarly, the site – seen as environmental capital – at the very edge of Tuzla, behind a hill barely accessible, has no status. After two weeks, one of my interviewees finally gave in: “It is really the bottom of the world”, he conceded. The joint ‘flow’ from the environmental and social capital does not make for appreciated benefits. For sustainable benefits to flow, assets have to be replenished and the nature of the interaction must change.

2) Fixed Capital
This is the origin of the intervention: constructing houses for the temporary houseless. The process of construction whereby a large number of future neighbors were engaged as day laborers proved very effective in contributing towards an amicable social relationship between the domicile and the settlement population. The buildings have already been analyzed and show that it is on the most permanent levels that the weaknesses are most apparent. The spiraling reciprocity between leaking roofs and the reluctance on the part of the inhabitants to do anything about it, starkly highlights how the physical structures, i.e. the fixed capital, interact with the social capital of the settlement, and in sum inhibit a platform for sustainable development from being properly created.

The sheds, the ramshackle constructions made by the inhabitants, barely qualify as fixed capital. But they hold a reciprocal importance towards the initial housing, enriching both. These structures also stand as a genuine expression of life in the settlement, both in terms of sustaining a minimum level of independence and

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66 In a recent competition on first aid between youth groups in the region, the Mihatovici participants were reported to have hid their origin. They were ashamed, much the same way, incidentally, that displaced Norwegians felt while living in temporary barracks awaiting their return home in the early years after WW II.
security\textsuperscript{67}, and in terms of livelihood opportunities. It is fully acknowledged that they ‘look terrible’, but this is the best possible under the prevailing circumstances. In that sense they actually signify progress, the ability to cope, and stand as a genuine result of interaction between all the four modes of capital. But they are but temporary structures, easily torn down. And in due course they will disappear, either intentionally as a consequence of economic progress, or simply through negligence.

NPA built a community building and a school. Later, others built a kindergarten, a youth club and a gym hall.\textsuperscript{68} All these buildings strengthen the developmental potential of the settlement by countering its isolation. Along with the health clinic, these facilities are open to the people from outside the settlement. Initially, very few parents from Mihatovici proper let their children attend the settlement school. The number of outside pupils has increased over the years, confirming the growing acceptance of the settlement population on the part of the people of Mihatovici proper. It also shows that the practical benefits of having a school and a health clinic next door outshines any possible social division between the two groups. These elements of fixed capital\textsuperscript{69} produce obvious social and human benefits, making them the most important structures in the settlement.\textsuperscript{70}

.3) Human Capital

The Mihatovici settlement may have replenished the human capital base of the area if its implementation and physical properties have enhanced the development of new capabilities or allowed old ones to be maintained, and by securing or improving peoples’ health and thereby their livelihood potential.

Through the Mihatovici contract the contractors involved were allowed to retain and renew their basic organization and thus regain their strength as a major contractor in the Tuzla in the post-war era. Thus, the impact of engaging the ‘old’ Technogrod was more significant for the re-development of Tuzla’s construction capacity than was keeping the small ones afloat (cf. NRC policy of engaging small private contractors), although both are required. We have seen how the employment of local labor helped defuse tension between the settlement and the domicile population. More significant in scope was employment itself, skilled and unskilled. Mihatovici was “the biggest ‘salary site’ in Tuzla\textsuperscript{”}, according to the project manager. The material gains were obvious. The psychological gains were highlighted by Dr Sutovic.\textsuperscript{71} “There’s no better therapy than being permanently employed”.

\textsuperscript{67} One of the main reasons for building the sheds was to store, but also to secure a family’s property, their “stuff”. Sheds could be securely locked; nothing in the houses could.

\textsuperscript{68} Even before it was opened the building showed signs of subsiding and cracking, adding further liabilities onto the settlement.

\textsuperscript{69} A similar, yet reciprocal relationship stems from the fact that the Settlement Board voted in favor of extending their water pipe system to include 18 houses in Mihatovici proper.

\textsuperscript{70} This is further explored in the third case from Grapska. It is not housing that creates social interaction and communal development, but the overarching structures, the collective activities that do. In BiH this has been a crucial element in developing and maintaining a multicultural society.

\textsuperscript{71} Interview in Mihatovici February 2, 2000.
Only a small number of settlement laborers were engaged. The most significant spillover from the intervention and onto the inhabitants, i.e. from the fixed onto the human capital, has therefore taken place after the houses were completed. Being located in a fairly inaccessible cul-de-sac at the outer fringe of Tuzla has so far made the few employment opportunities available in urban Tuzla difficult to exploit for the people of Mihatovici. And besides, when employment is scarce, local social networks where IDPs are normally excluded, take on a decisive role. However, as was presented in the introductory chapter on Tuzla, the industrial plants and factories are located west of the town center and in nearby Lukavac municipality. This is a favorable location for the Mihatovitcians. Although the days of high industrial employment died with the war and the ensuing privatization, the industrial plants and installations are still nearby and hold the potential of offering future industrial employment. This was yet another possible score for the planners’ formal arguments.

The ’secondary construction’, i.e. the school, the community building and the health center allow for a significant interaction with the human and social capital modes. The school definitely adds to the lives of the inhabitants, both instrumentally by providing education, but also socially by contributing to the children’s and thus society’s future (re)development. The children, the true Mihatovicians, provide tangible hope for their families and for the country.72

The health condition of the population is chronically ‘bad’, as previously explained. The health center staff acts as a buffer against further erosion, i.e. erosion of the settlement’s human capital. They can do little, however, when it comes to the density of people in Mihatovici, which is held to be partly responsible for the ill health thus linked directly to the fixed capital provided. Again, a convincing illustration of the generic linkages or interaction between physical assets and those of human and social capital.

There is no lived-in house that exists on its own. How it is used, i.e. the management of a house, is one of the operational constituents of this interaction. After 1997 the management of Mihatovici was made a municipal responsibility. It was severely disabled by lack of funds and administrative capacity – in addition to the traditional prejudice against ‘intruding refugees’ whom are perceived to stay on indefinitely. And it is quite evident from what has happened thus far that the longer people stay under the current terms of tenancy, the more their bundle of human capital is depleted. This will make it all the more difficult to ‘re-enter’ post-war society and contribute towards its recovery. “Those who do leave, mostly leave the country”, the nurse said.

.4) Social Capital
I have already discussed the low level of trust prevalent in the settlement. There is a relationship to the other modes of capital, and the effects are negative. But the

72 And finally, after all these years, there are now (2003) firm commitments on the part of central government to fully integrate education, with the same curriculum for all ethno-religious groups.
distrust, the individualization, is embedded in the general condition of the post-war ‘fend-for-yourself’ climate. Having no data on the level of societal trust in Mihatovici as compared to, say, one of the permanent neighborhoods where NRC completed their houses, makes it difficult to state in any certain terms how the housing settlement and the approach that guided its planning and implementation have affected the level of social capital. Trust is low within the settlement itself, and from the data collected it is fairly easy to argue for it being in part the result of people having to live so close together. The inhabitants are thus deprived of decent privacy and live so physically close that they are bound to run into personal conflicts aside from not being able – or willing - to take care of the physical environment. Above these private skirmishes lies a general distaste for being there in the first place. Staying in Mihatovici makes no sense to a large part of the population. And staying in a place with no meaning, gives little guidance to action.

A vicious – not a virtuous – circle has been created between the constituting capital modes of Mihatovici. To make this interaction re-developmental, assets have to be replenished in a way that changes the capital interaction.

Two short stories on the identity of Mihatovici:

To gauge the feeling of community here comes two Mihatovici stories. One was on the extremely gifted but mortally ill teenager who was flown to Italy for treatment, but later died. The other was on the child who drowned in the septic tank. Both were tragedies well-publicized both in the national and international press.

The first boy was born in a village near Srebrenica. He was so gifted that he was enrolled as a medical student at the university before he was 18. He did his first year studies – passed with laurels – from his bed in Mihatovici. He was already seriously ill by then. Initiated by the settlement nurse money was collected after he and his case had been presented on Bosnian and international television and in other media. About DM 100,000 was collected, primarily from international sources, to pay for an operation abroad. He was picked up by helicopter from the settlement and eventually flown to Italy. The treatment was successful. Upon return to Mihatovici he died from a common cold a couple of weeks later. His case drew attention to the settlement, and although Mihatovici was known among international agency personnel, this was the first time it had been repeatedly presented to the Bosnian public. In far as I saw it, this display of extraordinary talent, tenacity, commitment – and tragedy would represent a classic case of civic pride and mutual loss on the part of a community. But in Mihatovici it did not seem so. This happened one year before I was there. People still remembered the helicopter, but nothing much about the boy or the fact that their settlement was hot news for a while. “But people from his home village were very proud of him”, said the nurse, inadvertently giving away much about the (lack of) communal spirit in Mihatovici.

The other story relates to a tragedy that took place after I left. I have already described the overloaded and overflowing septic tanks. A 6-year-old boy lost a ball down the open manhole and drowned trying to retrieve it. This also
became a national media event. This time, however, the people of Mihatovici acted like a community. From what I have been told by participants, there was a burial ceremony which started out at the settlement with dignitaries from the municipality and the canton, and international agency representatives in addition to the inhabitants of the settlement. The incident – the tragedy - was directly related to the physical conditions under which the residents lived, and the perceived policy conducted towards them by the municipality. The ceremony doubled as a demonstration. The director of ODPR was present and was reportedly, “just about physically attacked” by some of the most aggressive residents.

This elementary ‘joining of forces against a common enemy’ would have the potential of enhancing the creation of a community spirit, the formation of social capital in and of this very physical setting. But it was bound to fizzle. For who would be a constructive enemy to fight in post-war Bosnia?

I recently learnt that the World Bank has conducted a BiH study on Local Level Institutions and Social Capital (World Bank 2002) where they also have examined (old and the new) Mihatovici. Their findings differ from mine in that they consider the divide between the domicile population and the IDPs as socially significant, whereas I saw the devide as weakening.74 There is a rising number of domicile pupils attending the settlement school, the health center is widely used by people from Old Mihatovici, traders and customers attend the settlement market, and intermarriages have taken place between people in Old and New Mihatovici. These are all a type of interaction that depends on certain levels of trust, although the settlement and Old Mihatovici are definitely perceived, at least by the older generation, as two distinctly different fields.

The World Bank Study also portrays the Mihatovici population as a unified group acting against the domicile population and other bodies of authority. I never saw that. In fact the internal situation got more and more grim the longer I conducted my investigations. What people revealed after three weeks was a different community than was presented to me in the beginning. The World Bank team might have caught first stage information only.

The World Bank’s general findings stemming from a representative survey of 675 people all over BiH reveal the general state of deepening social distrust, or crumbling social capital. This has already been documented by UNDP (2002), and comes out in line with my specific findings from Mihatovici.

73 I have been informed that these news reports also were presented in the Norwegian press without the added information that the settlement was actually the result of a Norwegian housing intervention.
74 I cannot say ‘statistically significant’, but neither could the World Bank.
6.5.2. EXTERNAL LINKAGES; Regional Structure and Village Development

As was done for the two Tuzla cases, I will provide a thick description on the village’s external and internal linkages, how the village has been shaped by national and regional policies, and by internal social and physical processes. These two perspectives give crucial guidance towards understanding the present activities and the rationale behind reconstruction priorities.

1) Industrialization, urbanization and the de-ruralization of Bosnia

The post-WWII industrialization concentrated national investment in regional centers throughout Yugoslavia. Doboj became such an investment node due to its strategic importance in the country’s emerging communication network. It was made the ‘railway capitol’ of Yugoslavia alongside Vincovici in present-day Croatia. For Grapska, located 12 km away from Doboj, this meant access to a whole array of new employment opportunities. By 1990, Doboj was one of Bosnia’s 6 regional urban centers. Its population was a mere 28,000. However, an additional 15,000 people commuted daily. This was partly due to the city’s housing deficiency, but also because people preferred ‘the independence’ of living in private houses in their home villages. During this rapid post-WW II industrialization the number of people involved in agriculture fell dramatically in Yugoslavia, from 78% to 29% (Mazover 1998:44). This also affected the demographic structure in Bosnia, but here, leaving agriculture did not necessarily entail a parallel permanent migration to the cities. Instead, the country went through a process of ‘de-ruralization’ where the rural population took up employment in the newly established industries while remaining residents of their villages. Grapska was such a “de-ruralized” village.

This phenomenon merits a broader presentation. It not only helps understand the context of the war in Bosnia, it is crucial in understanding the reconstruction challenges of the country, and to assess the internationally funded housing reconstruction that has taken place during the last 8–10 years.

By the early 1980s Bosnia had about 5500 villages, i.e. settlements with less than 2000 people. Of these, about 3300 had less than 400 inhabitants (Bogunovic & Pericic 1983). In general, the villages were mono-ethnic, partly because of conversion during the Ottoman years often took place collectively (Mazover 1998). In addition, people belonging to the same ‘millet’ joined forces in settling and cultivating Bosnia as well as migrating within the region, thus creating the present ‘quilt of nations’ that is Bosnia. A similar phenomenon appears in Lebanon, another ‘Ottoman country’: neighboring villages hold different faiths.
After 1945 the large agricultural estates were taken over by the state, whereas the smaller farms remained private. A large portion of Bosnia is hilly and steep, and so most farms here are small, smaller still through generations of intra-family partitions – and therefore private. In fact they were so small they could no longer sustain the lives of their owners. Hence, mostly the men left for industrial work in the cities, either close by as was the case with Grapska, or further afield in other Yugoslav cities or abroad. Formal employment brought cash earnings and merited old-age pensions. These earnings were brought back to support the (extended) family and finance new village investments, mostly new housing. The industrialization of Bosnia in fact enhanced the reproduction of traditional values and village life-styles. This took place irrespective of the villages being mono-ethnic, as many were, or were spatially shared. Village life was life conducted and reproduced according to the habitus of each of the ethno-religious groups in an almost pre-modern 'multinationality' (Andrić 1995, Bringa 1993).

According to the 1991 Census these ‘de-ruralized’ villages held 37.2% of the Bosnian population, down from 46.5% in 1981. During this period a significant urbanization took place, villages were deserted, while others grew into the ‘urban’ category. By 1991, 49.5% of Bosnia’s population lived in urban areas. Grapska was part of that figure, although it did not grow significantly during the 1980s, many left for ‘the modern life’ in the city.

There is a strong prejudice towards the rural population in Bosnia, a pecking order affecting almost all communities; there is always a village smaller and more remote than one’s own. The de-ruralization process of re-enforcing ‘traditional values’ may thus explain the persistent bias between the urban population and the people from the villages that is so common in BiH.

In spite of this local patriotism or inter-village bias, extensive documentation and research have shown fundamental similarities between villages in BiH. Irrespective of its ethnicity, the physical and spatial imprints were similar, excluding religious buildings. What made villages different in structure and concrete features were only their size and geographical location (Bogunovic & Pericsic 1983, Hamidovic 1993).

6 According to the 1991 census, 53.26% of the land was state owned, the remaining 46.74 was owned privately, 45% of which was owned by Muslims, 42% by Serbs, and 13% by Croats. Pertaining to arable land, 94% of it was privately owned according to the World Food Programme’s Displacement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Final Draft, Rome 1999.

7 By 1990, 8% of the Bosnian work force was employed as ‘Gastarbeiers’ abroad (Mennesland 1995). For a period the late 1960s–early 1970s Yugoslavia was the single largest exporter of labor in Europe. In the 1980s, 611,000 Yugoslav Gastarbeiers with their families were living in Germany (Williams 1996).

8 The Serbs remaining in ‘their’ part of Grapska village throughout the war, saw Serb IDPs coming to occupy some of the abandoned Bosniak houses as nothing but ‘peasants’. The same goes for the fleeing Bosniak villagers that came to Tuzla in 1992–1993: “Seljakii!” (‘You peasants!’).

9 In fact, the first explanation I was ever given on the causes of the war in BiH, was that it primarily was a war between the rural and urban population (presentation by Dr Amir Pacic, Røros, April 1994). That claim still stands today (see Papic 2001). We have to bear in mind that the Bosniaks have always outnumbered the Serbs in the urban areas. At the beginning of the 20 century half of the Bosniak population was living in the cities, while only 20% Serbs did. By 1991, with a much higher level of urbanization, the Bosniaks were still the major urban ‘nation’ in BiH, according to data provided by the Geography Department of the University of Belgrade. This made Bogdan Bogdanovic, the famous architect and former mayor of Belgrade label the Serb aggression as an attempted murder of urban life. He branded it “Urbicide”, giving name to a subsequent international exhibition on war destruction in BiH (Bogdanovic 1993).
El-Masri & Kellett (2001) give a similar description of the villages in Lebanon. Although the physical structures carry seemingly identical features, they carry different meaning within the different communities. So, if imprints are seemingly identical but interpretations different, what is the role of 'culturally specific' physical planning? How do planners interpret what they observe? And what is – or what should be – their response? The experience from the reconstruction of Grapska suggests a planning approach that deals with the 'meaning of things', developed through the 'process of planning' rather than aiming at the 'product of planning'.

Summing up the external linkage overview there are two sets of reconstruction and recovery-relevant issues to be highlighted.

Firstly, rebuilding houses in de-ruralized villages of Bosnia will not support the recovery process, i.e. not as long as the destruction of its economic linkages and the required communication means are not replaced or substituted by other means of livelihood. Without such substitution (intensified farming methods may be one possible strategy), there is no economic logic – i.e. no livelihood basis – behind the international housing reconstruction. Without sustainable external linkages (or local innovation) the re-ruralization programs cannot be anything but programs for temporary residence steered by international political goals and morally underpinned by convention based 'rights of return'. A phrase often flagged by the present High Officer to BiH, Mr. Paddy Ashdown.

Secondly, the traditionally antagonistic relationship between rural and urban populations, exasperated by social tension between displaced 'intruders' and the 'domiciles', especially that pertaining to housing, seems to give rise to an urban 'send-them-back' sentiment. Although this lends support to the 'politics of return', what we see on the part of many IDPs is a struggling urban adaptation – or the shredding of traditional lifestyles. All rural migrants go through this as part of 'modernization'. "When she arrived she could not tell time, by the time she left she was wearing mini-skirts", one of the house owners in Tuzla said about an IDP teen-

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10 This is also the case in Lebanon between Christian and Druze villages, and in Xian, China, between Chinese Muslim and Han Chinese communities. By interpreting this as the objective structures, or imprints, of the *habitus* of these different societies, violent conflicts would require an outside source rather than internal one.
11 Anecdotal observations and the writings of anthropologist Tone Bringa contest this claim (Bringa 1995).
12 "Looking at the distribution of house types in Lebanon one is surprised that the composition of the country of a predominantly Christian northern part and the predominantly Druze and Muslim southern part is not expressed in the architecture. The religious affiliation of a family cannot easily be deduced from its habitation" (El-Masri & Kellet 2001;539)
13 LWF have initiated some greenhouse and vegetable production programs that have proved extremely successful, firstly for IDPs in displacement and then for maintaining an initial support upon return.
14 "We've invented a new human right here, the right to return after a war," (Guardian, 11 October 2002).
15 A similar attitude was directed towards the IDPs from Northern Norway in the early post–WWII years.
16 From numerous conversations with diplomatic and NGO staff, both local and expat, 1996–2002, and recorded at meetings with the Urban Planning Institute and the Faculty of Architecture, Sarajevo, and the Director of Planning, Tuzla, and underpinned by the first strategic plan for the reconstruction of Sarajevo.
The years in displacement have changed the existential preferences, the lifestyles of the people now called upon to ‘go back’.

6.5.3. INTERNAL LINKAGES; Pre-War Grapska
Before the war (Gornja og Donja) Grapska had a total population of about 2800, a figure fairly stable over the last 20 years. The village had good public services, better than most other villages of its size, according to their own claims. These services were shared among the population irrespective of where within the Grapska basin they lived, i.e. what ethnic affiliation they claimed.

.1) Origin and Composition
According to Bosniak legends, Grapska was first settled by a Turkish officer named Huria during early Ottoman times. Hence the name Hurtic, one of the main family names in the village. Huria was married to a Bosnian girl, Murat, from which stems the other prevalent family name, Muratovic. Names play a significant role in Bosnia. For all practical purposes, that is how ‘ethnicity’ is determined. The founding of Grapska, being a tale of names, is a case in point.

The topography of the village is a like a large amphitheater divided by a low ridge. To the South live the Bosniaks, to the North live the Serbs, cf. Figure 6.5.1. The division is not absolute. Land has been exchanged throughout time. In the Bosniak part there were some 25 houses belonging to Serbs ‘married into’ the Bosniak part. There were likewise Bosniak living next to Serbs in the northern part of the village. However, the overall division between the ethnic groups was echoed in space and in the topography of the land. Between the village and the river Bosna are large areas of agricultural river bed land which in pre-WWII was the main resource of the village, and the rationale behind the first settlements.

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17 Although this certainly is an exaggeration it indicates a general tendency of an inevitable shift in lifestyle.
18 In the following, ‘Grapska’ will – when nothing else is noted – refer to the Bosniak part of the village, the part that was destroyed, and whose reconstruction has been the focus of my studies. Gornja Grapska is the new ‘formal’ name of that part, whereas Donja Grapska refers to the predominantly Serb part.
19 Which was – as were all population figures in BiH – split into Bosniaks (81%), Serbs (18%), Croats (0%), and ‘Others’, i.e. ‘Yugoslavs’ etc. (1%).
20 However, in the early partisan days after WW II a campaign was launched to ‘exchange’ names. Many today hold a Serb first name and a Bosniak family name and vice versa. They had especially hard times during the recent conflict when passing checkpoints and ‘entity’ borders.
Fig. 6.5.2 The Reconstruction Map of Grapska showing all pre-war houses (open squares) and those reconstructed (filled squares) + provisional buildings built by those who still wait for donations from 'some organization'. January 2002. The picture below is taken from the southernmost part of the village looking North-north East. (For editorial reasons the map is slightly cropped)

Fig. 6.5.3 Grapska 2001 showing part of the rebuilt village with the agricultural fields in front towards the Bosna river
.2) Built Environment and Housing
The built-up environment showed no ethnic distinction, except that in the Serb part there were more farm buildings within the village fabric. The Bosniak part, holding five times the number of people, was larger, denser, and therefore had a more ‘urban’ flair, although this was initially more due to subdivisions of land than urban intentions. With the post–WW II growth followed more formalized planning requirements. The ‘urbanist plans’ from the 1950s and 1960s set out regular plots along the main road and side streets, irrespective of territorial perceptions. This way, several Bosniaks also purchased plots within the Serb-dominated part of the village.

Within Gornja ("upstream") Grapska, the Bosniak part – which is the focus of this study – there were 584 inhabited houses at the outbreak of the war, according to the local reconstruction map. Although the village is old, the pre-war building stock was not. The built environment was basically composed of typical Bosnian ‘contemporary vernacular’, i.e. two-story concrete structures with clay block infill walls, sometimes plastered, sometimes not.

Fig.6.5.4 A pre-war picture of Grapska taken along the main road; the road which during the build-up towards war had been the Serbs’ ‘Boulevard of provocation’.

.3) Village life, village organization
It is impossible to present a ‘correct’ picture of what social life was like in pre-war Grapska. There are many pictures; each inhabitant would probably paint his own. People interacted irrespective of ethnic origin as they did throughout Bosnia up until the late 1980s. A small qualification is required: The interaction was conditioned by
a traditional codex of behavior. An ascribed identity “we – them” was prevalent even in Grapska particularly among the old, whereas the young were not particularly conscious about it. By the outbreak of the war there were about 80 ‘mixed-marriages’ in Grapska, which signified a ‘open and modern’ village. Today people see it otherwise. “There will be no mixed marriages any more, not for a long time”, said a Bosniak. “Now it’s all different. After all we did shoot at each other”, said his Serb neighbor a couple of days later.

On average, 4 people inhabited each house. The relatively large housing area per capita was due to two overlapping tendencies: rising affluence, and the demise of the extended family. Traditionally, houses were built big enough to accommodate the families of sons. However, by the time of the war many of ‘next generation’ had built their own houses, or had moved to flats in the city. In addition, one could discern a tendency in which the urbanized young no longer automatically moved back to the village to take care of their parents. Now that the war has scattered young Grapska families all over the world, this is no longer a tendency. It is a major fact of life. Its ill social effects will probably affect other more remote villages much more than it will affect Grapska.

During the Communist years each urban municipality, hamlet or village had its own Savjet Mjesne Zajedice, its own ‘Village Board’. Within the Doboj region, with its 106,000 inhabitants, there were 60 such Village Boards. One of them covered Grapska. It had 9 elected members, all men, it proved. These boards were normally not fora for ‘apparatchics’. “Ambitious politicians would never be satisfied by sitting in a local Board”. Instead, it was “a local board of ‘elders’ supported by the young who wanted things to happen”, as one of the members recalled. This board had the responsibility of organizing and administering the public services. These were provided if and when the local population did their share of work or carried their share of the cost. Ultimately, the level of public services in the village would be the resultant of three sets of actions: 1) Initiatives and activities organized by the Board; 2) Voluntary action, or “samo doprinos” and individual contributions carried by the population. This in turn reflected the legitimacy the Board’s prioritization; and 3) The direct or indirect resource support from the regional or central authorities, often in the way of tax exemptions. This accounts for some of the difference in service level among similar villages.

21 Still “built big enough to possibly accommodate the next generation’s family”.
22 Particularly, many of the reconstructed villages funded by international donors will be badly affected because of their very high mean average age (in a return and reconstruction program comprising about 2900 returnees, SRSA recorded an mean age of 54.25 years), and the lack of institutional resources – and often political will – to provide services to the needy. Conditioning housing support on ‘return’, irrespective of future prospect of development the international community, has willfully contributed to these oncoming difficulties.
23 “self-involvement”, or ‘voluntary action’, equivalent to the Norwegian “dugnad”.
As for Grapska, the inhabitants funded and built river embankments, had the main streets tarred, had street lights erected, administered the Community Hall – and successfully lobbied the municipality into building a health centre, a community hall and a post office. The inhabitants joined forces and built the village water tank, and pump station, and laid out the sewerage system and the water distribution network. This water distribution network was laid out in the 1980s when the national economy showed clear signs of contraction, and the nationalistic movements were becoming equally expansive throughout Yugoslavia. Locally, this resulted in a Serb call for the division of Grapska, into a ‘Gornja’ (upstream), Bosniak and a ‘Donja’ (downstream) Serb part. Donja Grapska was thus never linked up to the water system: “When it came to paying their share, the Serbs would not stick to the agreement, so we never provided pipes onto their part of the village”. To which the Serbs retorted: “the Muslims would never give us access to the water”. During the years of displacement the water pipes and sewerage system was systematically ripped up and destroyed (or sold).

It is worth emphasizing the ‘multi-ethnic’ role of the collective action in implementing public services or infrastructural improvements. This was a neutral arena for mutual improvement of life, for institutional development, for the sort of (secularized) modernization that in urban centers has led to an increase in ‘mixed marriages. It was in such arenas rather than in the realm of the home that the ‘multi-ethnic’ dimension of society was played out. The ethno-religious identity was mutually respected. What one group ‘had to do’ as part of their religious practice was
respected by the other. Yet, in working together on the village infrastructure, no religious identity had to be observed at all. This changed in Bosnia in the late 1980s.

4) Livelihoods
Out of the 2.800 people residing in the whole of Grapska, less than 20% of the population made their living from farming, with less than 10% of the work force employed in agriculture. Given the small individual land holdings, land was leased and farm produce bartered to make farming viable.24

True to her ‘de-ruralized’ status most of Grapska’s population was employed in Doboj, the municipal center 12 km further upstream. The 2002 Board secretary estimated that about 80% of those employed worked in Doboj, Modrica and other local towns, about 10% worked abroad or in the major cities of Yugoslavia, and the rest were self-employed or worked in public service or in agriculture. Due to its proximity to Doboj, Grapska’s population was well-educated. 80 of its pre-war inhabitants held a university degree, according to the Board secretary.

5) Politics and the emerging Crisis
As expected, the 1990 elections ended with landslide victories for the nationalist parties. By now Grapska was divided. SDA (the Muslim nationalist party) won Gornja Grapska and SDS (the Serb nationalist party) won Donja Grapska. These first democratic elections legitimized and elevated national extremists, certainly no democrats, into power. In a way, it represents a democratic short circuit, disabling the very system of governance the elections were set out to guide.

“It was the elections, not the violence, that started the destruction of Bosnia”, says Ekrem Buljabasić, a member of the Village Board and former mechanical worksmith in the National Railways, working in Doboj.

4.5.4. LINKAGES RIPPPED; The War and its Aftermath
1) The Serb Anschluss, and the Bosniak Expulsion May 199225
On May 10, at 12.00 noon, heavy Serb artillery initiated a systematic destruction of Grapska. From all around the village, and most seriously from artillery positions on the fields right in front, high caliber shelling of the Bosniak part of the village continued for the rest of that day. At least 50 houses were burning when darkness fell. There was total confusion. People were being killed or wounded, with no one to help. Families were left to fend for themselves, hiding in cellars – or trying to flee. Some stayed below ground until the next day. When they emerged they were taken

24 The wealthiest man in Grapska, Ahmet Besic, initially only owned 100 da (10 ha). By the time of the war he ran a large beef cattle farm with well over 100 heads of cattle, had three tractors, two combine harvesters and the largest house on the most conspicuous site in Grapska. Now everything is gone; stolen and destroyed. Besic died during the war, so did one of his two sons, the other son will not return.
25 The attack on Grapska and the subsequent killings are included in the war crime indictments both against Yugoslavia’s President Milosevic and Republika Srpska’s President Plavsic.
prisoner by the Bosnian Serb forces. The stay-bhinds were later shot; their graves have still not been found.26

The story of the expulsion from Grapska is the embodiment of ‘ethnic cleansing’.27 The people assisted in my two previous cases could have given similar stories of threats, fear and eventual expulsion. These experiences make fundamental referential nodes in any subsequent ‘network of meaning’ for all present-day displaced people (Porteous & Smith 2001). For many people these experiences also made dramatic impacts on their health and their subsequent ability to cope with the oncoming difficulties. Subsequently, for any action to make sense, it will in some way have to refer back these incomprehensible acts of expulsion.28

EKREM BULJABASIĆ’s STORY ON THE EXPULSION FROM GRAPSKA

“He’s either stupid or brave - probably both”, his neighbors say when we go through what Ekrem did in the early years after the war. The first one to revisit Grapska in early 1996, he brought food stuff and flour to the group of

26 There is a deep and persistent resentment against the neighboring Serbs because the returning Grapskans feel that their neighbors know where the missing Bosniaks are buried, but will not tell.
27 It also holds biblical references. War stories often do. In war myths and realities seem to interact.
28 A Grapska refugee now living in Germany told how her father saw no meaning in leaving his house in Grapska that day in May. He has never been heard of since, (http://www.grothe.org/bosnien/mb.html).
displaced Serbs who were then occupying some of the Bosniak houses in the village. More than anything he wanted “to see what was Grapska now, just to sit, to have a cigarette, just to feel what it was like”. He was also the first one to rebuild his house after the war. Years before that, on the very day of the Bosniak expulsion his very ‘stupid or brave’ ways secured his exit from Grapska. Dressed up as a Muslim woman he was allowed to board one of the buses that were taking the women and children out of the village. Most of the other men were taken to concentration camps. Many were shot.

Ekrem Buljabasić is 45 years old, married with no children, and carries one of the original Grapska family names. With his wife, also a Grapska girl, they live on a family plot where the families of Ekrem’s two brothers also have their houses. During the war his brother, Tariq, settled in the US, in Atlanta, Georgia, where he lives in the vicinity of about 20 other Grapska families. Still, he has had his house in Grapska rebuilt, primarily by Ekrem. The other brother who spent two years in a Serb concentration camp is still displaced within BiH, but he will return permanently when his house is completed in the spring of 2002.

Grapska entered the emerging disaster in early 1991. A local mobilization order was issued to all young males to join the reserve army or the local police. All the 120 Grapska draftees deserted – while all the Serb youth joined. They were given uniforms and guns: “That was the point of no return. Now the Serbs were armed”.

Ekrem was called to join a new police unit established in Grapska. The following year was tense. Serb intimidation caused fear among the Bosniak population. When the JNA (Yugoslav National Army – in Bosnia renamed ‘Bosnian Serb Army’) entered Doboj on May 1 1992, the writing was on the wall. All telephone lines were cut, Serb roadblocks were built and new identity cards were issued to all non-Serbs. In trickles, Bosniaks started to flee. Some even had the foresight to take their tractors and other valuables along small back roads to place them in safety further South.29 Ekrem, as most others, never came around to doing that.

“On May 8 it got serious”. On that day the JNA arrested a Grapska family who were fleeing South. At the same time Bosniaks from another village, threatened by hooded Serb paramilitary units, were fleeing into Grapska giving evidence of things to come. The next day, on May 9, Grapska was given an ultimatum: “Hand over 400 guns within 12 hours – or face the consequences”. They knew well that there were no “400 guns” in Grapska.

“No-one knew what do to. We were not prepared for this, had no experience with this sort of thing. We responded – by building barricades and close the only road between Modrica and Doboj!!!”. This way they were actually able to arrest 20 JNA soldiers. This act immediately reopened the telephone lines. The deadline was extended.

By now Grapska was totally surrendered. The Village Board and the local police station pleaded with the Serbs to let the women and children out; there were about 1000 still in the village. “Only if the 400 guns are handed over”. The next day the 20 soldiers were exchanged with the arrested Grapskanian

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29 The same story my own family went through in Norway in 1940.
family. By now the Serbs opened the telephone every 15 minutes to reiterate their demand for the "400 guns".

“The ultimatum was extended until 12.00 noon. Then they would attack. The last contact was at 11.00. At 11.20 the first grenade – a dead one – was sent from Kladanj, a deserted Bosniak village on the other side of the river – as a warning. It hit a house”.

At 12.00 full artillery attack. Total confusion. Shelling continuously. From all directions. People tried to hide in cellars, others stood in the river under the bridge. Many killed. Children even. “Your own people - killed”. Impossible to exercise any leadership. No communication. Heavy bombardment went on for two hours. New ultimatum for “400 guns”, “We couldn’t accept. We had no guns! – so they started again”. By now heavy artillery was positioned in front of the village and wrought further havoc.

Fig.6.5.7 This picture is taken a little to the north of where the artillery was positioned. From their standpoint the Serbs had the semicircular sloping village of Grapska right in front. It was slaughter.

A new revised ultimatum was issued: “Present all guns – and all people!” “Many tried to escape through the woods, others swam the river. Some made it – some did not. It was total panic! No one had any idea! Total confusion”!

They were then ordered to line up on the main road with Serb soldiers guarding on either side. All the men and boys were taken out of the queue and eventually sent to prisons and concentration camps. They were beaten badly. Many died. 8 were shot while in prison in Doboj. The women, children, old men – and Ekrem - were sent through on buses organized by the Serbs.

“I was sidelined by a Serb officer I knew and asked to go back to the village and collect the sick people. I never did. I wrapped a shawl around my head and made it into a bus nearby. I could see my brother in the queue. He ended up in Manjaca. A women outside the bus saw me and started to scream “Ekrem, Ekrem!!”, but no one took notice of her”.

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"In situations like these you only think of yourself".

The people were sent off without any belongings, no papers, no money, no extra clothes. Later, all what was left was either stolen or destroyed.

The buses took them to another Bosniak village closer to Doboj. Some went on the next day. Others stayed. Nobody knew anything about what was happening or what would happen - to themselves or to their men, to their homes in Grapska – or to the war. Eventually all were forced to go further South. Some kept on moving within Bosnia, others went abroad. Ekrem eventually ended up in the nearby town of Gračanica.

The Serb (paramilitary) forces in Grapska were under the command of Nikola Jorgić, a notorious gangster who had lived in Germany for 23 years. He was later tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity for his deeds in Grapska. He was given five consecutive life sentences.30

.2) The Interregnum: Displacement, Exile and Post-War Destruction

Immediately after the expulsion no one knew what to make of what had happened, or what the future would bring. They stayed with Bosniak friends and relatives in the vicinity. During these weeks many Serbs put their own lives at stake to help Bosniak friends escape from the Serb confines. The current chairman of the Grapska Village Board was saved from execution that way. As the contours of a Serb entity emerged, many people from Grapska left the country altogether. There are no reliable figures, but various sources from the village indicate that at least 20% of the Grapska families have left the country for good, to Germany, USA, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway where two Grapska families now live. In addition, there were single family members, particularly the young, who during the uncertain times of 1992–1993 left and have since settled permanently abroad.31 When also considering that about 50 Grapskanians worked abroad before the war and never returned, we see Grapska gradually becoming part of a globalized network. This network has proved to be crucial to Grapska’s reconstruction and return process.

Most of those who remained in the country eventually settled in those municipalities on the Federation side closest to Grapska. Although many of the men served in the Bosnian Army32, and some were employed by international organizations, most families were dependent on external support to survive. In addition to the food parcels from international organizations, the internally displaced Grapska population was soon to be supported by the Grapska diaspora. As early as June 1992 the Grapska Gastarbeiter started sending food and clothing to displaced Grapskanians

30 After the verdict the presiding judge, Günther Krentz said to Associated Press, "Whoever hoped something like the genocide of the Nazis against the Jews could never be repeated sees himself cruelly disappointed after the events in the former Yugoslavia" (http://www.applicom.com/twibih/twib1104.html).
31 There could well be about 1000 Grapskanians living abroad by now.
32 The army normally paid salaries in kind, often in smuggled cigarettes, or the soldiers were allowed to loot Serb property, and later also Croat property. In Doboj Istok it is openly reported that the soldiers grew marihuana for sale.
in Doboj Istok. The volume of this support grew with the increasing number of Grapska refugees. This constituted a ‘pull effect’ towards the villages in the region close to Grapska. To take care of the distribution of the goods from the diaspora in a transparent way, the Village Board was reassembled, but only ‘temporarily’ since many of its members were dead or living elsewhere. “Everything was signed for”, ensured the Board secretary. This growing influx of support was organized through Zagreb, where a Grapska family purchased and packed parcels that were forwarded to Doboj Istok and Gracanica through one of the informal distribution systems that operated throughout the war. Initially they rented a garage as their ‘dôm cultura’, their community hall and distribution centre, but by 1996 they actually received a prefab house as a prize for being the best organized return community in the region. They could not function without a place for meetings, nor for transit storage of goods. In 1996, about the same time they moved into the prefab in Brijesnica, they formally elected a new Village Board.

The interregnum of Grapska in exile uncovered how dependent the village proved to be on foreign contacts, a sort of ‘bottom-up globalization’. Not only did the Grapska diaspora eventually help finance much of Grapska’s reconstruction, it instigated the reorganization of the village board which was later to prove crucial in setting up the reconstruction process. The importance of this self-organization was recognized locally by the provision of a residential building for the Board to use, not to shelter homeless individual Grapskanians, but to support the collective process of return. In internationally funded return interventions, we do not often see that sort of priorities.

.3) The Post-War Destruction of Grapska

The Dayton Accord held the promise of return for the displaced Grapskanians, and caused fear of their return on the part of their Serb neighbors. “That’s when”, one of the Serb neighbors said to me, “I understood that, after all, there would be a Turk’s cow eating grass on my grave”. An organized resistance against the Bosniaks returning instigated a renewed destruction of their property. This was carried out as a ‘networked destruction’. It involved the SDS party, i.e. the local authorities, the neighboring Serbs – plus the Serb IDPs that had settled in some of the empty, but still partly habitable houses in Grapska. The Serb IDPs had themselves been chased from the villages of Panjik in the Ozren Mountains North-West of Tuzla.

33 Doboj Istok is a new municipality established as part of the Dayton Agreement, It is comprising that part of the former Doboj municipality which was located within the Federation, whereas Doboj Municipality remained within RS.
34 Klokonica and Brijesnica in the Doboj Istok municipality and Gracanica, Pribave, Lohinja, Stjepan Polje and Lukavica in Gracanica municipality. These villages held most of the displaced Grapskanians during the war.
35 During the war The Open Society Network was to set up a distribution system through which the Bosnian refugees could send parcels and post to family and friends within Bosnia. The feasibility study, however, showed that a satisfactory distribution system, albeit informal, was already in place and so no new system was needed.
36 Paying an exorbitant DM 100/month.
37 “House of Culture”, Community Hall
38 It has been impossible to identify the donor. Sometimes the Tuzla Municipality is named, sometimes the SDA party, sometimes “some organization”. This is not primarily to hide the facts, but exemplifies the “some-organization syndrome”. All organizations were perceived as part of a large organizational maze. It was like a lottery, it was your luck, not your needs that made the difference.
during the 1995 Bosniak-Croat offensive. The story of their expulsion is unashamedly similar to the story of the expulsion from Grapska.

By the end of the war more than half of the houses in Grapska were still partly habitable, although damaged and looted, according to pieced-together information. The 52 IDP families from Panjik had settled in the houses closest to the domicile Serbs. This renewed post-war destruction had a triple set of objectives: 1) Make the houses where the Serb IDPs lived fully functional by stripping usable items and installations from the other houses in the village, and 2) Sell and trade whatever sur-
plus material the stripping allowed. This was at a time of early reconstruction; with an expressed demand for water pipes, taps, electrical switches, cables, joinery, etc. – not to mention movables which were looted much earlier, such as furniture, farm equipment, machinery, cars, tractors, and livestock. All were stolen and sold. The ultimate goal was, however, to 3) Ensure that the Bosniak population would not (be able to) return. Why is it so important for them to live here?! Why could they not go somewhere else?”, one of their Serb neighbors said to me – echoing the rhetoric of similar conflicts elsewhere.

This post-war ‘networked destruction’ rolled on for 4 years. The last house to be blown up was destroyed in August 1999, a mere week before the first UNHCR bus brought Bosniaks back to start preparing for the reconstruction. By the time the reconstruction started almost all houses not inhabited by the Serb IDPs were destroyed ‘beyond repair’, i.e. >70%.

In Grapska most of the houses were destroyed beyond repair – after the war was over. Similar stories abound. Not only people’s houses, but significant historical buildings were obliterated as well.

This was also the case in the villages where Grapska’s Serb IDPs came from. The Ozren area was 100% Serb before the war. At the very, very end of the war, in mid-September 1995, they were all forced to flee their homes. By that time there lived several thousand displaced survivors from Srebrenica in the region. With the Serbs out, one of the villages, Donja Brijesnice, was taken over by some 140 families from Srebrenica. In May 2002 they were still living there. In the meantime, all the other Serb settlements which were left standing in 1995 were totally destroyed, not by artillery, but by dynamite in a concerted ‘networked action’ in which the local Bosniak authorities, i.e. the SDA-party, most probably have played their part. This mutual experience of forced displacement shared by the Grapska IDPs and the Panjik IDPs set in motion a unique interaction. It constituted the prelude to the reconstruction of Grapska.

39 Before the war, according to pre-war statistics, there were 48 tractors, 38 trucks, 75 two-wheel tractors, and 210 cars in Gornja Grapska. In addition, there were 569 cattle, 31 horses, 175 sheep and 49 goats.
40 IMG (International Management Group) was set up to assess the damage and advise on building and infrastructure to the UNHCR. They established a grading system for damage assessment. Here destruction ‘beyond 70%’ was deemed ‘destroyed’.
41 Right after Dayton, Scottish European Aid made a preliminary assessment of about 20,000 houses/flats in 18 potential reconstruction towns and villages in central BiH: 54% of the houses suffered only minor damages, caused primarily by military action and light artillery; 38% were severely damaged, primarily from burning, much of it presumed to be the result of arson; the remaining 13% were totally damaged through bombardment, but also through dynamiting (Murray 1995). When the IMG did their damage assessments two years later, their figures might be interpreted as indicating a wider destruction.
42 Professor Hamidovic has estimated that 50 historically significant buildings were destroyed in Bosnia – after the signing of the Dayton Agreement (private conversation May 2002).
Fig.6.5.9 A displaced Serb couple living in what was once a chicken house in Grapska. Note the 'new' door and the chopped out electrical wiring. Upon return of the Bosniak owner the couple was evicted.

Fig.6.5.10 They returned to nothing at their desolate place some kilometers from the village of Panjic in the Ozren Mountains. Their house had been totally destroyed. They are starting up building a new house (the construction to the left). In the summer of 2001 they lived in the plastic covered structure to the right. Their present situation is unknown.
6.5.5 AGENCY OF RETURN AND RECONSTRUCTION;  
International Engagement And Local Agency

.1) Structural opposition against return
The term ‘agency’ refers both the social theory definition, that of acting upon one’s own decisions – and the concrete reference to organizations working in the field, e.g. UN agencies. The latter would like see agency synonymous with ‘intentional actor’. This is not, however, how Giddens defines ‘agency’ in his structuration theory. For agency to interact in reciprocity with ‘structure’, agency is defined as the ‘actor who has a choice of acting otherwise’. This highlights day-to-day activities within an immediate time frame, but where the potential of acting strategically – and thereby make an impact on structure – is a possible option (Giddens 1984).43 Return and reconstruction are very much strategic choices. Displacement came about through structural disruption, return will bring about change in structure through altered institutional systems and rules which govern the day-to-day lives of people living together.

Throughout Bosnia the displaced people were at first afraid to go back into ‘minority areas’ in spite of the ‘right of return’ granted in Appendix 7 to the Dayton Agreement. They were afraid for their lives.44 This fear was based on distrust of institutions. These institutions constitute the ‘structure’ against which we interact as agency. The Dayton Agreement endorsed an institutional system, the partition of Bosnia into two entities, which in its structural nature opposed the return of minorities. The institutional changes necessary for minority groups to be able to return, came about through the intervention of ‘intentional actors’ as well as local people acting strategically. It was about their lives.

.2) Preparing for return to Grapska
It was not until April 1996 that Ekrem Buljabasić filled his car with foodstuff and flour45 and passed the invisible – yet sharply perceived - border back into Grapska. The foodstuff was for the destitute Serb IDPs now living in the village, but delivered for tactical reasons: as long as they stayed there, the houses would not be destroyed. Later it was revealed that the domicile Serbs in fact had tried to move the Serb IDPs out in order to destroy these houses as well. Having nowhere else to go, the IDPs stayed put. Subsequently a formal food distribution system was established between the IDPs from Grapska and the Serb IDPs living in Grapska.

Although more Grapskanians sneaked back for short visits, at this stage there were no plans for organized return. The fact that many of the Grapska IDPs gradually had settled close to Grapska was partly in preparation for return, but also to get

43 Giddens operate with three categories of time, "durée of day-to-day experiences: reversible time"; "life span of the individual: irreversible time"; and "longue durée of institution: reversible time" (reversible meaning that the same actions tend to be repeated and reproduced in this mode of time). (Giddens 1984)

44 Numerous incidents were reported of people being violently attacked – some even killed – upon return to their former homes. The most famous being when Muslims from East Mostar wanted to visit the graves of their relatives in West Mostar. They were attacked and a number of the mourners were shot to death – by what later proved to be members of the West Mostar police corps.

45 Originally donated to the Grapska communities then living in Doboj Istok and Gracanica.
closer to the distribution centre for provisions organized through the re-emerging Grapska Village Board. Some of those living further off complained about not being included in the distribution chain.

3) International involvement

The reconstruction of Bosnia and the assistance rendered to the displaced has in many ways been a game. Donors were eager to fund programs aiming at ‘permanent solutions’ that would enable people to return to their former homes. But out of the simple fact that there was not sufficient funding for all destroyed houses to be rebuilt, some areas were selected ahead of others. Even in the communities selected, only a portion of the destroyed houses were funded for reconstruction. This selection, arbitrary as it often was, will carry consequences for the regional development of BiH, whether the selection was done with this in mind or not. Lacking any overall strategy, the international housing interventions would basically be implemented according to choices resting on the contextual perceptions and professional capacity (or lack thereof) of the field staff of the NGOs. There were no physical or regional planners involved, making the selections as to which communities were to be rebuilt, and which ones were not, dependent on a number of seemingly arbitrary determinants, however much the UNHCR and later the OHR acted as ‘coordinators’ (Skotte 2003).

Whatever the formal criteria for support, catching the attention and interest of “some organization” came to be a crucial first step towards local reconstruction.

During their displacement the people from Grapska participated in this fight for attention. Through the regional UNHCR office in Tuzla they pressed for reconstruction funds. UNHCR acted as something between an information broker, a project coordinator and a donor. Formally UNHCR was the ‘Lead Agency’ of the international organizations working in BiH. Still, the many NGOs acted as sovereign bodies but still kept close links with UNHCR both because of the funds they commanded and because the various donors often required a UNHCR recommendation to release funds to the NGOs. These recommendations were normally issued as a matter of course when NGOs presented a proposal for housing reconstruction. UNHCR never reached the role of co-coordinator (Cutts 1999).

By the summer of 1999, Murat Hurtic, a member of Grapska’s Village Board approached the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) while they were preparing a housing project for displaced Serbs near Zwornik. By then the Grapska call to UNHCR had brought off response from a large American NGO, World Vision (WV).

46 This is well grounded in the principles of the UNHCR where ‘return’ is seen as the principal ‘durable solution’, with ‘assimilation’ within the country of refuge as the second solution and ‘settlement in 3rd country’ as the third alternative policy towards refugees. IDPs are, in principle, dealt with in a similar manner.

47 Made evident in a Final Report from one of the large international NGOs: “If our goal was to (…), we more than succeeded. However, if our goal was to (…), we did not”.

48 As instituted by the UN Secretary General (UNSG) UNHCR were also empowered, again by the UNSG, to deal with ‘all people in need’, including the IDPs, which in fact is a matter for the UN General Assembly to decide, because the UNHCR is established to care for displaced people having crossed international borders, i.e. refugees, and not those still within the country, the internally displaced. Bosnia was UNHCR’s first major arena, where they also took on the responsibility for protecting IDPs.
They presented a reconstruction project of 50 houses – the anticipated minimum to reach an acceptable level of security. In addition, the Municipality of Tuzla had agreed to fund the rough structure of 9 additional houses. For undisclosed reasons, World Vision suddenly pulled out.\(^49\) This happened about the time SRSA’s Zwornik project stalled. There, the Serb target group refused to leave the Bosniak houses they occupied. Neither did they accept to participate in the reconstruction of their own houses. They wanted ‘key-in-hand’. “Instead I gave them a kick in the ass”, said Kaj Gennebäck, head of SRSA in BiH. SRSA pulled out – with funds to spare.

After SIDA and SRSA’s preliminary investigations and visits these funds, around 1.4 mill DEM were made available for the reconstruction of Grapska, and more was to follow.

.4) SIDA’s Approach to Housing Support in BiH

Sweden and Norway were some of the first donor countries to provide housing support in BiH. SIDA financed a number of housing projects as early as 1993 in the Tuzla region. From these initial housing projects conceived and implemented as emergency projects, yet permanent in nature, SIDA gradually developed a housing approach based on the principle of self-help. At a seminar in February 2001, they summed up their housing accomplishments and policies like this:

“Sida [has] financed reconstruction of over 8,000 homes in the Balkans since 1995, mainly through self-help for both private houses and apartments. Self-help is not used to save money. House reconstruction is an integral part of our integrated area programmes, an approach we started in BiH in late 1995. The money “saved” through self-help is better used to finance reconstruction of local infrastructure, community buildings such as schools and clinics, and job creation, to support a sustainable return. To use self-help is not a question of money as it carries values that cannot be measured”. (Mossberg & Iwansson 2001;2)

In implementing this strategy SIDA has channeled their funding through a limited group of NGOs each working in different regions of the country.\(^50\) This enables the organizations and their staff to accumulate knowledge and thus improve the quality and efficiency of their work. In addition, this allows for donor flexibility – as shown with the Grapska funding case – which allows for progressive interaction between implementing agency and donor. Concentration also means fewer, but larger projects, which would allow for an anticipated ‘laser effect’ to take place, i.e. a self-generated return or reconstruction. The geographical concentration of housing projects for minority return also entails mutual security and a potential local political impact.

\(^{49}\) No records are available to explain this pull-back, which again illustrates how dependent the reconstruction – and peoples’ future - were on what seemed like whims or reorientation of the NGOs. Creating false hopes or breaking promises towards target groups had no bearing on the functionality of the NGOs, only their accountability towards the donor did.

\(^{50}\) Cross Roads International (CRI) works out of Zenica, Caritas/Switzerland in Sarajevo, the World Lutheran Federation (LWF) in Bihac, and SRSA in Tuzla.
SIDA’s defined policy of self-help and their policy of funding but a small group of organizations and locations comes from their first-hand ‘field experience’ as a donor. SIDA made their decisions in Sarajevo while most other donors made their strategic decisions and selected their projects in their respective national headquarters or – most commonly – in their respective ministries of foreign affairs. Pertaining to SIDA’s large housing engagement, they staffed both the Sarajevo and Stockholm office with architects well-experienced in housing matters and planning. This may also have contributed to the apparent success of the Swedish strategy in Bosnia (Sandgren 1999).

.5) SRSA and its principles of housing support in BiH
SRSA is not formally a NGO. It is a part of the Swedish Civil Defense and is the government’s official body for accident prevention and response. About two-thirds of their current staff of 930 are involved in the training of personnel employed in the municipal fire & rescue services and in the chimney-sweeping service in Sweden. Its international engagement makes up around 1% of their activities. Their international engagement is primarily to assist in international rescue operations, and to a smaller extent, provide reconstruction support. For this purpose SRSA has recently established strategic partnerships with a number of national and international agencies on emergency and relief issues, primarily with SIDA who is also their major funding source.

It was initially SIDA and UNHCR that funded SRSA’s engagement in Bosnia. Their work here is their largest single international project since the establishment of SRSA in 1988. During the early stages of the war in BiH they ran a transportation program, much like NRC did. Seeing the appalling housing conditions in the areas of IDP influx, SRSA decide to also enter the housing sector (also much like NRC did).

The way an NGO acts in the field is highly dependent on the tactical and operational approach of the Head of Office. This is also the case with SRSA. In Bosnia SRSA is in many ways the head of office, Mr Kaj Gennebäck. He is a building engineer employed by SRSA in 1996. Bosnia was his first foreign engagement. The success of the rebuilding of Grapska rests in his somewhat idiosyncratic ways.

SIDA and SRSA have set conditions for providing reconstruction funds. When these are satisfied they have pursued a policy of concentration: of bringing large numbers of people back so as to initiate a “social movement”. This was deemed to have a significant impact on: 1) physical and psychological security, 2) the character of the environment, and 3) the social and economic multiplication effect - including reducing unit costs of infrastructure, transport and logistics.

51 Whereas most embassies in Sarajevo through the post war years were delegated such authorities, Norway still (at least up until 2003) handles almost all such issues, “due to its political nature,” in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo.
52 1. The beneficiary must already live in BiH – or in Sweden; 2. The house owner must have valid property rights to the plot of the destroyed house – or to some equivalent plot in the village; 3. The support not only applies to families.
SRSA has developed their own tactical approach to reconstruction along the principles of ‘assisted self-help’ as described in Chapter 2.4. Initially this strategy was highly contested (UNHCR 1998). The effects of self-help on capacity building, private sector development and cost have been hotly debated among more or less informed agency personnel throughout the post-war years in BiH (Mossberg & Iwansson 2001). From my own data, one housing unit done through self-help costs about 60% of one done by contractors. However, this figure varies from case to case, partly because of varying content in comparative figures, but also from substantive differences, e.g. pertaining to logistic input, etc.

In the self-help programs run by SRSA the house owners are only given materials. In response, the house owners commit themselves to complete their houses within a given time frame (in reality proven to be a somewhat flexible requirement). The amount of materials are based on a house roughly the size of the foundations of the one destroyed, specified on the basis of the pre-war Yugoslav quantity standard and SRSA’s own general building design reflecting the number of people returning. As long as the papers are right, SRSA do not insist (as do programs financed through the EU) on rebuilding on the same plot, although it has to be in the same village. This option has not been taken up by any minority returnees because building permits for totally new buildings are rarely, if ever, given by the majority authorities. In further contravention of EU practices, SRSA also lends support to the house owner if he - at his own expense – alters or increases the size of the house. About 90% the ‘SRSA-houses’ in Grapska were actually extended during the course of their construction.

The materials provided are to be domestically produced, if at all possible. This means about 85%. SRSA base their purchases on nationwide tenders where product quality, proven security of delivery, and price are the three decisive selection criteria.

SRSA employed a technical advisor at service 24 hrs a day. He would, if time allowed, also advise on issues relating to any privately funded extensions. He often did. This person would also act as a general monitoring agent, not the least pertaining to local ‘kick-backs’ and corruption. Some additional transport within the village was also provided, as were cement mixers, generators and hand tools.

But it is the shifting of responsibilities onto the people who are to benefit from their support that sets SRSA approach apart from other assisted self-help programs. SRSA insists on dealing with the villagers through a formally organized Village

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53 Basically collected from experienced building professionals working with NPA, SRSA and SIDA.
54 This stands in contrast to housing reconstruction in Croatia during the early post-war years. There the government set out to finance and organize a full-sized reconstruction of any house damaged or destroyed – irrespective of number of returnees.
55 LWF runs an exceptionally successful agricultural program in Tuzla – also funded by SIDA. One of the reasons for their success was held to be due to the availability of LWF advisors 24 hrs a day. “Plants don’t have 8 hrs days”.
56 In their previous project in Klisa near Zvornik, SRSA were thus able to uncover the fact that people had paid the Head of the Village Board to be placed on the list of house owners eligible for support. The project was put on hold until a new organization was established and new names were brought forward.
Committee, be it organized by the returnees directly or be it (remnants of) the former Village Board which all villages had prior to the war. Commanding a certain level of ‘organizational capacity’, to use Anderson/Woodrow terminology, is thereby a precondition for being supported by SRSA. The Village Board is delegated the responsibilities to:

- develop a set of transparent selection criteria upon which the agreed number of beneficiaries are selected
- obtain all the required formal approvals from the local administrative bodies
- nominate a number of people among the beneficiaries who SRSA will authorize to control, confirm and sign papers regarding material deliveries

No other reconstruction program is known to have transferred so much ‘real power’ to the beneficiaries. The issue of selecting beneficiaries is, by other NGOs, considered both a cumbersome, complex and extremely sensitive task, as it deals with outright gifts of substantial proportions. It is about choosing winners or losers. The NRC therefore developed a separate program, the INCOR program, to exclusively deal with the process of selecting worthy beneficiaries. Other NGOs have done the same.

The shifting of responsibilities also transfers some of the administrative workload away from SRSA. This has resulted in lowering their overheads to about half of the NGO average.\(^\text{57}\) One major international NGO working in Krajina spent as much as 20% of their project funds on the process of selecting beneficiaries.\(^\text{58}\)

This transfer of responsibilities was based on a set of plain and down-to-earth propositions on the part of Kaj Gennebäck: "My main concern is return. I want as many as possible of those who want to go back – to be able to", and further, "It is their future, I'm not here do what they can do better". By not entering into the selection of beneficiaries SRSA approach might be seen as insensitive to the needs of the most vulnerable, the women-headed households, the old, the single and those not able to do work on their own. This has made one of the other NGOs SIDA funds in BiH retain a right to intervene if the most vulnerable are ‘de-selected’ by the villagers’ organization. SRSA, however, claims that identifying ‘the vulnerable’ remains very difficult under all possible circumstances. ‘Female-headed households’ may in fact include sons and daughters, brothers and in-laws who are just as qualified – and available – for doing building work as the ‘absent husband’. The same goes for the old. "So what do we know about who receives remittances from abroad"? SRSA’s presumption is that the people affected will have a much more comprehensive picture of the vulnerabilities and capacities of the applicants. In addition, SRSA relies on the reflexive self-control of the system, claims Gennebäck: as long as there is a large group of applicants that are not given support, this group of let-outs will not tolerate major misappropriations of the funds.

\(^\text{57}\) SRSA was down to 4–5% on the cost of local staffing and administration whereas the ‘norm’ for NGOs in Bosnia is 10% of total project cost.
\(^\text{58}\) According to the then Head of Office in Knin as presented at a summing-up meeting in Sarajevo Nov 2001.
In summing up the donor and agency policy, we see a number of principles applied for gaining support: 1) The principle of ‘assisted self-help’. It is not only a matter of financial prudence, it is also presumed to carry “values that cannot be measured”; 2) The principle of concentration: SIDA is trying to surpass the threshold of critical ‘return mass’ by supporting a relatively large portion of each village, rather than spread the funds around; 3) The principle of engaging local agency by shifting responsibilities on to the assisted population; genuine participation, by any other name. Requiring the beneficiary to obtain all the necessary formal documents, develop transparent criteria for selection and at the end choose the recipients, are all activities that serve similar ‘non-measurable’ qualities. I will come back to a discussion on the qualities of these issues when closing of this chapter.

4.5.6. REBUILDING GRAPSKA

For return to succeed, the people must want to go back, they must recognize a future livelihood potential – and they must dare to return. It is evident that ‘wanting to return’ was not enough to set off a return process (UNHCR 1998). To facilitate a return-driven reconstruction the returnees must command capabilities, i.e. human and social capital and material and/or financial resources, to invest in the reconstruction effort. In addition there is security. Most of this was beyond the capacity of the internally displaced Grapska community. In the following I will show how outside agents, organizations, institutions and individuals, provided these resources in a way that interacted with the capital endowments of the returnees, i.e. their own capacities to organize (sustained by their own history), their skills at building and their capacity to work. These issues will be dealt with successively.

1) Security

House, home and security are concepts bundled together. No wonder then that the issue of security took on, and still retains, such a central place in the minds of the Grapskanians when approaching reconstruction and return.

Minority return was urged – and heavily funded – by the international agencies long before the Bosnian displaced felt confident or secure enough to ‘go back’ (ibid). During the two first post-war years out of the well over 1 million displaced within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina only 153,000 had returned to their homes almost exclusively to their ‘own’ areas (ICG 1998).59 Merely 1125 Bosniaks and Croats returned to Republika Srpska during these two years.60 The International Stabilization Force (SFOR) operated throughout the country safeguarding those who did, and flagging their authority in areas where return was expected. SFOR therefore patrolled Grapska in efforts to reduce the ongoing destruction.

On August 13, 1999 – almost four years after Dayton – the UNHCR organized the first bus convoy back to Grapska. Still they were attacked by stone-throwing Serbs

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59 Out of the 1.3 million refugees 208,000 had returned to BiH by the end of 1997, “though often not to their own homes” (ICG 1998; i).
60 the UNHCR Gis Unit, Sarajevo, http://www.unhcr.ba/return/Tot_Minority%20_GFAP_August_2003.pdf
61 SFOR thus prevented several houses, already wired for demolition, from being totally destroyed.
when passing through the neighboring village of Kostajnica. They could only stay for the day.

When the reconstruction work started in earnest they organized groups that completed joint ‘overnight houses’, ground floors of certain houses or separate huts so they could work continuously and be safe from their neighbors at night. The SFOR set up base in Grapska and kept the village under 24-hour surveillance. The presence of the SFOR proved to be a crucial ‘tool of return’: “Without SFOR Grapska would not have been rebuilt, it would have been too dangerous”. No wonder the local Finish SFOR commander, Captain. Matti Lauka, is held to be Grapska’s “hero general”. Even today the issue of security is still relevant – “They are still armed”. The neighboring Serbs claim similar fears of the returned Bosniaks: “The Muslims want revenge”. Some of the Grapskanians have postponed their return until the summer 2002 - insisting it is from the ‘uneasy feeling of fear’. Security was also a key issue when selecting the first group of returnees: families, preferably with no children, in houses close to each other. The first SRSA program concentrated on houses within the village away from the road which prior to the war had been the Serbs’ ‘boulevard of provocation’. It was not until the summer of 2000 and the second SRSA program that the houses along the road were being rebuilt. Similar stories highlighting the crucial role of the military abound throughout the Balkans (Hovey 2000).

62 On Sept 20 2002 it was reported that the newly rebuilt mosque in Kljuc was bombed. Fear feeds on such incidences – and on the rumors surrounding them.
63 A colleague in Mostar East confessed that it took 5 years of ‘peace’ before he felt confident enough to visit Western part of town. And still today I know many Bosniaks who feel unease about visiting the RS part of the country, and who refrain from doing so – 7 years after Dayton.
64 Still today provocation takes place, especially on days of religious importance. On one of my visits the police was called to investigate Serb stone throwing and window smashing.
.2) Selecting Beneficiaries

The Village Board set up criteria for selecting the first 80 – and the subsequent 98 house owners to receive SIDA/SRSA funding. Prior to that 9 owners had received some building material from the Municipality of Tuzla. SRSA provided the necessary additional support. The house owners who best fulfilled the following requirements received materials, and technical and logistical support for reconstructing their houses:

- Stayed in BiH during the war.
- Participated in the war
- Victims of war, social cases, lost family members, woman-headed households
- The number of family members
- Permissions and formal return documents in order
- Commitment towards return

There is a significant difference between these selection criteria as compared to those set by the international agencies in selecting worthy housing beneficiaries (cf. those employed by the UNMIK in Kosovo (UNMIK 2000) or NRC’s INCOR criteria). These are

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65 The criteria for vulnerable families shall be:
- no access to adequate income either through a steady job, through remittances of family members abroad or through income-producing land or other assets
- families with over 8 children under the age of 12 years
- female-headed families without able bodied members
- families with elderly, handicapped or chronically ill family members

and:
“rights-based” and are operationalized within a welfare framework; the most needy are the most worthy. In Grapska, however, those who were primarily funded were those who in some way had participated in the war or at least stayed put in Bosnia during the war. Those who left were disqualified however dire their living conditions were upon return to BiH. In spite of being disqualified many former refugees are back in Grapska. They have rebuilt their houses from savings made in exile, either having saved some of their social benefit allowances or money earned while in exile. The criteria and the final selection have been respected throughout, although some of those not living in the Gračanica-Doboj Istok area during the selection period claim that those who did were favorably treated. There are no indications of favoritism, corroborated by the fact that the secretary of the Village Board as well as other elected members did not make the list.

A number of issues are raised by these ‘war conscious’ selection criteria. Their impact, and reliance, upon the social and human capital of the village will be elaborated later. Here are some practical consequences: Grapska has a relatively low mean average age for her returned population – 35.53 years - compared to most other return projects. The average age of the return population to SRSA’s two most recent housing programs comprising 16 villages, 600 houses and about 2800 returnees was 54.25 years. Here other selection procedures were applied.

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Fig. 6.5.12 Table showing age distribution among those who had returned to Grapska by 21 January 2002, all together 573 people.

- if the family is facing homelessness
- if the family is at risk (safety or health) as a result of their current living conditions
- if the family is unable to fund housing reconstruction

66 Cf. NRC project 61RN6RS197, comprising about 300 housing units implemented in the Posavina region 1997–1998. Here, a local committee processes the applications and presents a prioritized nomination to NRC, who does the final pointing assessment. The selection criteria: 1) Social category of family; 2) Family with war victims; 3) Family with war invalids (Certificate about degree of invalidity of family members; 4) Present accommodation situation (Certificate from authorized department); 5) Number of family members; 6) Certificate about school education; 7) Certificate about occupation and place of employment.
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE VILLAGE OF GRAPSKA

It is quite evident that the selection criteria favored those ‘of fighting age’, i.e. the relatively young. In addition they favored those who were able to “participate in the war effort”, i.e. the “able-bodied” in preference over the “unabled”. This stands as an important feature when assessing the (re)development potential of the village. The fact that so many families were returning – and not only the old and vulnerable – plus the large investments into housing by returning refugees – has unleashed a housing re/construction activity by the Grapska diaspora which has not been reported elsewhere – at least not in the villages.

The fact that so many families were returning – and not only the old and vulnerable – plus the large investments into housing by returning refugees – has unleashed a housing re/construction activity by the Grapska diaspora which has not been reported elsewhere – at least not in the villages.

The vulnerable were not the prime target group. However, widows, particularly ‘war widows’, were prioritized. These were assisted in rebuilding their house by relatives and friends. On the other hand, a number of them withdrew from the program prior to construction. They felt they did not command the entitlements (relatives, brothers, sons, remittances, physical capacity, etc) they deemed necessary to rebuild – and return. They were left in displacement, for the time being, yet constantly looking for ‘some organization’ to help them.

Contributing to the collective action of war qualifies for collective support when war is over. The Grapska criteria are, in effect, similar to the criteria set up by the US Congress (the ‘GI Bill’ of 1944, and the Housing Act of 1949) and administered by the Federal Housing Administration regarding housing credit after WW II (Hansen 1949). Similar arrangements were made in Norway at the time (Ustvedt 1978).

.3) Going Back
Returning to Grapska had become an obsession, individual experiences and memories were being reproduced and reinforced through ongoing social re/construction among the displaced Grapskanians. We find the same reactions among other displaced communities, at least where these are not assimilated or integrated into the ‘host communities’. Perhaps the most telling comes from third generation Palestinian refugees. There is a perpetual social reconstruction of the emotional and material degradation experienced by being forcefully expelled from one’s home (Winter & Sivan 1999). As news kept coming on the continuous destruction during the post-war years, the more determined people seemed to become to go back: “This is a war we shall win” 67. Returning became an extension of the war and a symbol of defiance.

Return contains this element of contest, and contests are about confidence. This had already been made evident during a visit to NPA’s IDP settlement in Doborovci in 2000. Here, LWF ran a very successful agriculture program. The most successful participant, a farmer from Eastern Bosnia, had already made a pledge of not returning to his village in Republika Srpska until he had earned enough to buy two cars: “I’ll show them!” Two year later he was back with his two cars, his portable greenhouses and his acquired skills of intensive agriculture. His ‘capital base’ had expanded during his displacement. The benefits from the capital flow were partly

67 “The war is not over until the reconstruction is complete” is a statement by Ayatolla Khomeini, quoted from a poster at the 3rd International Conference on Reconstruction, Tehran, 2–8 March 1997
the confidence which enabled him to return, and partly the income which would enable him to make good.

So when, in the fall of 1999, the first 9 house owners of Grapska – duly selected by the Village Board – were provided with the first batch of building materials by the Tuzla municipality, the reconstruction became a celebratory event. Ekrem Buljaba-basic was in that first group. His house was reconstructed in only 27 days. “There were 500 people here who wanted to help me!”, he said.

Fig. 6.5.13 a, b  Four stages of reconstruction. This page: a) Ekrem Buljaba-basic in front of his house in Grapska in the summer of 1996; b) in front of the house 1997 with one of the Serb IDPs. The clay blocks of the external walls have now been smashed (continued on next page)
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.4) International Reconstruction Investments in Grapska

By the time SRSA started organizing for the reconstruction of Grapska the inter-agency division of labor had, for instance, resulted in SIDA having struck strategic alliances with a limited number of other NGOs in BiH. USAID and the LWF were therefore also brought into the Grapska reconstruction. While SIDA/SRSA took on responsibility for housing, USAID took on responsibility for infrastructural investments, water, sanitation, electricity, etc. LWF was focused on agriculture support. However, the ‘beneficiaries’ are not always aware of these organizational alliances. Throughout Bosnia, all international NGOs are branded as one, the “Some Organi-
zation”. In Grapska too, it was ‘some other organization’ that provided a few heads of cattle and basic farm tools.\footnote{The Board secretary was not able to identify the donor organization during my interview. We let it rest at “some organization”. Later I was sent the names.}

\section*{5) SRSA’s Material Contribution}

SRSA’s first 1999 program funded 80 houses, plus taking over the 9 houses partially funded by the Tuzla Municipality. Contracts were signed in late 1999.\footnote{By chance, I passed through the ‘moon landscaped’ village in February 2000. Some were day-visiting, busily cleaning their site. They were preparing for return.} Half a year later, another 98 houses plus a new school were funded by SRSA. In other words, SRSA set out to fund about one-third of the destroyed housing stock of the village. This is a much higher concentration of investment than is usual in BiH (UNHCR 1998, Solberg 2002).

The ‘formal’ reconstruction work began March 27, 2000 when 15 trucks full of building material were lined up in Grapska ready for unloading.

Each selected family received materials according to drawings based on these standards:

- 2-3 persons: 7x6 m, 1 floor
- 4 persons: 8x7 m, 1 floor
- >4 persons: 8x7 m, 1½ floors (two rooms in attic)
- 2 families: 8x7 m, 2 floors.

The average value of the materials provided amounted to KM 14,200 per house. Each house owner was apportioned his own part down to the appropriate amount of nails. No funding was allowed for labor, but two cement mixers and a generator was provided per 10–15 families, depending on the proximity of the houses. SRSA also covered some local transport, and a 24-hour in-residence technical advisor.

SFOR kept close surveillance and no registered theft took place, except from a plot close to the Serb part of village. But again, if this was a contest, or an extension of the prior conflict, this was less than expected.

Most of the material originated from the Federation side: clay blocks from Visoko, cement and joinery from Lukavač, roof tiles from Zenica, sanitary equipment through wholesalers in Sarajevo, etc. Only about 20% of the deliveries came from the RS side, primarily sand and gravel. In the RS there was a widespread political and public opposition to these 'return projects'. Building merchants therefore showed no particular interest in the Grapska project although they were effectively supplying Serb reconstruction projects. The companies on the Federation side were much more experienced in doing business with the international organizations, and were thus better prepared to act within a more transparent, above-the-table tendering environment than were their RS competitors. Today (2003) this has evened out to some extent.
In line with the shifting of responsibilities onto the village inhabitants, SRSA had no objections to the recipients making amendments to the standard reconstruction drawings. Almost all did.

Fig.6.5.14 This is one of the houses extended beyond what the SRSA materials made possible. This was achieved with some extra financial input, with the use of recycled materials, and by the owner doing most of the work (The walls reveal different levels of professional capabilities as well as different sources of materials).

.6) USAID’s waterworks and infrastructure investments

In contrast to SRSA, USAID undertook their infrastructure work as regular tendered contractor work, with bills of quantity, tenders, contractors and follow-ups. True to tradition, USAID had outsourced all construction management work to Parsons, a large US consultancy firm.\(^{70}\) That way, by 2002 Parsons had managed building works throughout Bosnia to a total value of US$ 265 million. In Grapska they managed the implementation of new water and sanitation networks, and the high and low currency electricity networks totaling KM 1,035,000. These investments were merely replacing what was deliberately destroyed during and after the war by local Serbs. According to the returned Grapskanians,\(^{71}\) prisoners of war were used to dig up water and drainage pipes and to sell or destroy them, and do likewise with electrical cables (re Fig.6.5.9). The pump station was destroyed, so was the water tank.

\(^{70}\) The Ralph M. Parsons Company, under their USAID contract, managed local contracting and implementation with Bosnian construction companies. Direct subcontractors to Parsons include: Brown & Root, PADCO (International Planning and Development Company), UXB (demining), Unioninvest, Riggs Bank, Metcalf & Eddy (water supply), and S.C. Myers (cost estimating).

\(^{71}\) This is information gained from the Serb IDPs with whom the returning Bosniaks established ‘a special relationship’.
The work went on independently of the self-help activities of the housing construction. It was implemented by a contractor from Banja Luka, with only a few Grapskanians being employed. They were late starting up due to budgetary reasons. The returned population therefore had to drill for water both for domestic use and for construction. For more than a year the houses waited for their water. After finally being connected, the first water bills were so overstated that it soon became apparent that the contractor had done a leaking job. There might be reasons for this, either practical, or technical; the returnees claim it was intentional. Whatever the cause, it exposes a structural weakness – an accountancy deficit - in managing building works in an aid context. This will be deliberated upon later, but mentioned here because it shows how vulnerable or ‘victimised’ the villagers are made to be also on technical issues. The contractor is not accountable for workmanship or quality of delivery towards the end user. Their contract is with the implementing agency, in this case with Parsons, not the ‘beneficiaries’.

It is worth noting that a piped water connection to the Serb part of the village was not part of the USAID program; fair enough since there was none before. However, the development of the technical infrastructure has been an important arena for the ethno-religious interaction of Bosnia. By neglecting the opportunity to negotiate with the Serbs in Grapska Donja, an opportunity was missed in forging acknowledged processes of reconciliation and social recovery, one likely to carry a much wider impact than most other ‘governance’, ‘democracy’, ‘reconciliation’ program financed by the international community. The Bosniaks themselves would not initiate any extension, history was far too painful for that, but the international agencies hold the capacity to look beyond the immediate history. They would be the ones to see the importance of such an infrastructural initiative. They did not.

.7) Livelihood Support
Sustained return requires livelihood. Today about 70% of the people in Grapska make a living from agriculture, mostly as sustenance farmers. Grapska has been re-ruralized.\textsuperscript{72} The agriculture land is fertile but subdivided into small plots. Before the war most of the land was used for producing vegetables for domestic use. Now – initially with no seed, tools, machinery, livestock, or storage space – people are trying to make a living from these same plots, mostly between 5–15 da. Before the war there were 48 tractors\textsuperscript{73} and 75 ‘two-wheelers’ in the village, and there were 649 heads of livestock. Now there are 5 tractors, 5 horses and 20 heads of cattle.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} This re-ruralization of Bosnia is a result of the prevailing policy of return. Although the political motives were different, a similar scheme, the Morgenthau plan, named after the US Treasury Secretary Henry R. Morgenthau was made for the re-ruralizing, i.e. de-industrialization of post-WW II Germany. However, the strategies set up during the war never succeeded in real life post-war Germany.

\textsuperscript{73} Only one was saved. In the early days of May 1992 it was driven South and stored. Everything else was stolen, sold or destroyed.

\textsuperscript{74} All these figures and many more stem from the immaculate work of the Village Board Secretary, Mr Ferhid Hurtic.
During the war the land was farmed by the Serb neighbors. Some of it has been fenced off and not yet returned: "We fought for it. We conquered it. It’s ours!". The gardens and lawns of the village – and the graveyard\(^{75}\) were used to graze the neighbors’ cattle and for the one cow that the old displaced couple shown on Fig.6.5.9 brought along when they fled the Serb village of Panjik.

Upon return, the Grapskanians were immediately given 20 cows\(^{76}\) by an RS-based NGO, “Zdravo da ste” (“Hi Neighbour”) in Doboj, not as a coordinated part of the return, but more or less by chance. The organization later also gave cattle to the Serb IDPs, who let the cattle graze on village land. This caused some tension as did the conditions set for the keeping of the cows. The Grapskanians felt that “Zdravo was more concerned about the welfare of the cows than they were about us!”.

LWF as part of the SIDA/SARSA reconstruction program provided some farm equipment: three motor cultivators for 12 families and cash support that allowed 18 families to organize the purchase of two used tractors.

"Some organization in Sarajevo", which proved to be the “Church World Service”, a large NGO which spent more than 5.5 million KM in BiH in 2000, provided two mowers and some seed for the 2001 season, and later for the 2002 season. The equivalent in seed provided was to be returned at the end of each season. But the amount of seed was not sufficient to cultivate the land they actually had available.

\(^{75}\) Bear in mind the victorious significance of having your "cows eat grass off your enemy’s grave".

\(^{76}\) In due course the recipient was obliged to hand over the calf to the next on the list, and thus onwards.

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Worse still, the floods in June 2001 decimated the corps considerably, just when they needed it the most. The Municipality of Tuzla also provided some seed.

There are all together five shops in the village. They have received no outside assistance. One of the village bakers has rebuilt but not yet furnished his ground-floor bakery, and the restaurant awaits completion. There is only one unit of production aside from farming: one tinsmith has, through assistance from “some organization”, established a workshop on the ground floor of his rebuilt house, taking on work primarily from the village (“...but now the good times are over”), and for SRSA or other international NGOs. And occasionally, gravel from the banks of the River Bosna is sold for building purposes. However, this has proved difficult to sustain because the Serb neighbors, supported by the local police, have literally occupied the best – and Bosniak owned – part of the riverbank for gravel excavation.

Fig.6.5.16 a) The tinsmith’s workshop in the ground floor of his reconstructed house.
Fig.6.5.16 b) One of the five shops in town. When this picture was taken both Serb IDPs and returned Bosniaks congregate at the one table outside, but never fellow Serb Grapskanians.

With the building works now declining and the ‘celebration phase’ coming to a close, a relentless search is going on for institutionalized income. Because of local political realities, this search is primarily directed towards the international agencies still in the country. “Some industry” is now called for in the way “some organization” has been called for earlier.

Developing a basis for a sustainable livelihood is the one most serious challenge facing Grapska, and facing the Bosnian society. The international support for housing reconstruction has not led to kick-starting the economy the way rhetoric claimed (UNHCR 1998, EC/WB/UNMIK 1999, CPCC 1998). The investments into housing in remote rural areas have probably exasperated, not enhanced, the prospects of (re)development of the country (Skotte 2003).
8) Private Housing Investments in Grapska

The housing reconstruction of Bosnia has been an international undertaking. There is no national policy, not even entity based housing policy, nor any housing programs or central housing banks to service the need for housing credit. Nevertheless, there is some private capital available for housing investment, albeit minute compared to the needs. A substantial part of this stems from remittances transferred between exiled Bosnians and their domestic relatives. According to The National Bank of Bosnia, these remittances stand at about 1200 million KM per year\textsuperscript{77}, the multiplier effect (and hence the development dynamics) of which is normally much higher than that of international aid.\textsuperscript{78}

In Grapska, by February 2002, there were 55 privately financed houses completed or in progress – in addition to the 187.5 SRSA-houses. On top of that, some 36 small provisional houses were constructed, built and funded by people who awaited donations or other means of reconstructing a proper house. Almost all the houses built from material provided by SRSA had been extended or altered in ways that required private funding. By and large, these private investments were made possible only through funds generated abroad. Only the most recent investments had been paid for through local earnings, much of which stemmed from the circulation of the remittances.

*Fig. 6.5.17* A house financed in total from money transferred from a Grapska family living and working in Norway. Most of the materials used are brought in from abroad. Note the imported PVC coated window frames mounted partly to reduce annual maintenance for the owner living abroad. Such un-Bosnian features tends to raise the perceived status of the building, cf. the failed slogan of the Bosnian tile factory referred to on page 197.

\textsuperscript{77} Private correspondence with the National Bank of BiH

\textsuperscript{78} In East Timor only about 20% of the massive amount of international aid is actually spent within the country (Hill & Saldahna 2001).
There are three types of private housing investments: 1) Private houses built by returnees through funds accrued abroad, 2) Externally funded private houses belonging to exiled Grapskanians, the building of which are either administered or actually executed by returned relatives, 3) Extensions of SRSA-houses. There are basically three sources of financial capital for these investments: 1) Funds brought back by returnees from abroad; 2) Family remittances; 3) Local earnings (much of which are recirculated remittances). There are about 30 persons in formal employment out of the 530 that had returned by January 2002. Houses are funded by combining these resources, although remittances remain the prime financial source. Figure 6.5.16 shows relationships between funding and housing investments.

The standard SRSA-houses were small compared to the houses they were set to replace: between 12.5 m² and 17.5 m² net floor area per person, about half the pre-war figure. For all practical purposes they were adequate, given the current situation. But almost all SRSA-houses were extended or totally changed.

Basically, it was support from relatives living abroad that made the extension of SRSA-houses possible, either directly by receiving money from relatives abroad, or by earning money from working on the privately financed houses. Lately, there has been some money generated locally, but this still only accounts for a small part of these extra investments. Aside from those in formal employment, income is generated by way of day work, and from some of the farmers, particularly those with their own tractors.

The reconstruction of Grapska represents a text book example of the early stages of capital formation, albeit highlighting different aspects than that of Mihatovici, presented in case II. In Grapska it may well be called ‘economic development’. What we see is fixed, environmental, human and social capital being generated and sustained by recurrent circulation of external financial capital transformed through human labor.

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79 Generally pensions are not a source of investment. They are too meager for that.
80 By contrast, the current figure in Norway is about 50m²/capita.
81 Add this to the example of capital concentration in the Mihatovici case and we see a post-war economy functioning at its most rudimentary: interaction among informed actors in pursuit of profit for survival. Heinrich Böll covered the same phenomena in his novellas from the early post WW II years in Germany (Böll 1975).
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>investment object</th>
<th>HOUSES FOR RETURNED REFUGEES AND 'GA-STARBEITERS'</th>
<th>HOUSES FOR GRAPSKANIANS (STILL) LIVING ABROAD</th>
<th>EXTENSIONS TO SRSA-HOUSING FOR RETURNED IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL EARNINGS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREIGN EARNINGS</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REMITTANCES</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig.6.5.18 shows the relationship between types of funding sources and housing investments, in approximate percentages.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure target</th>
<th>LABOR (within Grapska)</th>
<th>DOMESTIC PRODUCTS</th>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL EARNINGS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREIGN EARNINGS</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REMITTANCES</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig.6.5.19 shows how the funding was circulated. The basis for the shading is the relationship between labor costs and material costs of a typical house and the origin of the materials used.

| MATERIALS PROVIDED BY SRSA | - | 85 | 15 |

Fig.6.5.20 Shows the origin of the building materials provided by SRSA

I have not combined the relative distribution figures above with estimates on the private housing investments. They are all inference figures comprising information from group discussions, individual figures, and general information on building costs. Combining them would present absolute, yet uncorroborated, figures.

Through the sources mentioned I gather that close to 1 million KM has already been invested in the privately funded houses. Another half a million KM may be required to complete the houses already started. This is hands-on money channeled through the village.  

Through similar operations I found that private investments close to 1.5 million KM have gone into extensions and alterations of the SRSA-houses. Some of these funds are in fact re-circulated from the former.

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82 There are no existing records available to verify these assessments, They are the aggregate of assembled statements collected from various sources in the village.

83 And spent on all sorts of markets where the official organizations fear or are not allowed to tread.
In Grapska the value of the material supplied by SRSA, for housing, KM 2,806,689, is almost matched by the private housing investments funded through remittances from abroad. This is not considering the value of the self-help labor, the infrastructure investments carried by USAID, and the school investments funded by SRSA/SIDA. When combining all these elements of expenditure and cost, the conclusion would be that the international contribution towards the reconstruction of Grapska is almost matched by private investments and economic commitments on the part of the inhabitants.

About half of these private investments were spent within Republika Srpska, most of it from the local building merchant Filux in nearby Kostajnica. Filux claim they also had customers come from the Federation side (the division line is 6-7 km to the South), “Because we are cheaper”. The argument of comparative price was consistently used by the house owners of Grapska as well. The fact that so much ‘leaked back’ into the Federation’s side, however, adds practical considerations – and perhaps political reasoning – into the purchase pattern as well. The estimates above were compared to the annual turn-over of Filux and their assessment of Grapska’s relative share. The figures roughly matched. Total private building material purchases in RS are around 900,000 KM +/- 100,000.

Only about 20% of the building materials sold by Filux are domestically produced, whereas SRSA’s material provisions have an 85% domestic share. The 20–80 ratio was common for any locally initiated building project, according to Filux’s manager. Producers in Croatia and Serbia are their main trading partners, but they also import from Italy, Hungary and Montenegro. Domestic products have a low public esteem – which is an attitude from pre-war days. Appealing to the population to “Buy Bosnian!” brings about “perverse effects” to use terminology from evaluation theory. The new roof tile factory in Zenica, established by a foreigner, had to scrap that slogan. Sales had plummeted because of it.

.9) Organizing the Self-Help construction of SRSA houses

The material, logistical and professional resources provided by SRSA required manpower, building and organizational skills on the part of the owner. These capabilities were there. Almost all houses destroyed in Grapska had been directly or indirectly built by their owners. That fact also signified an emotional link, what Anderson/Woodrow would call ‘motivational capacity’, for return. Many of the former houses were never formally registered. It was like this for most family houses throughout former Yugoslavia (Zegarac 1999). As often in Bosnia, when ‘minority houses’ were to be rebuilt in an environment disapproving of their reconstruction, a whole array of formal objections were presented. True to this practice, The Building Authorities from Doboj were frequently on site controlling and rejecting works al-

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84 Annual turnover in 2001 was 3.5 million KM, slightly down from 2000. Then Grapska deliveries made up about 25% of their turn-over. The figure is much less now. Filux has 10–5% commission on the goods sold, viz more than 100,000 KM from Grapska alone.

85 A similar figure was also uncovered in my local grocery shop pertaining to foodstuff. Only about 20% of the foodstuff sold was produced in Bosnia.

86 The Chief Planner of Tuzla indicated that 10,000 illegal structures have now been built in Tuzla municipality – a substantial number after the war. The figures cannot be corroborated and seem too high.
ready done, although there were no cases reported where these objections were heeded. Their persistent presence became a nuisance more than an real obstacle, and by the fall of 2000 they had more or less ceased coming. During this period SRSA had no formal or informal contact with the authorities on behalf of the ‘beneficiaries’.

There were no longer “500 who wanted to help”, as was the case with the very first returnees. Family links, proximity, the bartering or exchange of services, access to cement mixers, the rate of progress, etc. all determined how each ‘SRSA-owner’ organized the reconstruction works. There was no set pattern. The socially vulnerable, the war-widows or wives widowed during the reconstruction period, were all helped primarily by their extended family, but also by their immediate neighbors. Then there were those who had money but were unable to work themselves: “You buy food – they work”, one of them said. As far as I could uncover, no one abandoned their projects because of lack of resources once they had returned. Two families left the project by emigrating.

Among the returnees there were all together 30 masters of various trades, timber, masonry, flooring, plumbing, electrical works, etc. These were called upon particularly for roof constructions and for plumbing and electrical work. The required certificates for the latter were issued, for a fee, by an electrical firm in Doboj. During the construction period no ‘building contractor’ has emerged, although most tradesmen were hired throughout this period. They demanded DEM 50/day, those most respected even 60 DEM/day or more. In fact, the reconstruction of Grapska was to a large extent based on paid services, almost as much as on exchange of labor. “The fact that we are brothers does not mean that our wallets are sisters”, was often quoted.

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87 Exactly the same words as expressed by the head of the NRC’s office in Tuzla 1993.
88 During the three first months after my investigation in January 2002 three more families left by emigrating to the US. They will, as do other Grapskanians living in the US, have a house in Grapska.
89 Set higher for returning Bosniaks (KM 132) than for local Serbs (KM 75), according to Grapskanian sources.
90 Although they were not in full employment, the weekly wages still add up to high monthly salaries, taking into account that no taxes are paid. A medical doctor at a local health center earns 550 KM a month, less tax.
.10) The Houses
The fact that ‘outside money’ played such a central role in Grapska’s reconstruction was just as much due to the extensions and alterations of the SRSA houses as the building of privately financed houses. From my own observations, a mere handful of houses were built according to SRSA drawings. "95% of the house owners deviated from the drawings", maintained my key informants, "The houses were too small". Most of SRSA-houses were built to pre-war size which in effect meant increasing the volume by 60–80%, sometimes even doubling it in floor area from that of SRSA model. In almost all cases only one floor was completed and furnished (as SRSA had stipulated). The extra space was left unused, sometimes even open, much like what was the case also before the war.

Grapska rebuilt the standard two-and-a-half floor, “four quadrant”, column/beam ‘contemporary vernacular’ that is so prevalent on the Balkans (cf. floor plan sketch on page 363). They are copies of the ones presented in Case I. Minor improvements were instigated by SRSA through their material provisions, including double-glazed windows, full tiling of the bathrooms and first-grade cement tiles for the roof. To raise the clay blocks sidewise, as probably all SRSA owners did, lowers the insulation capacity of the external walls. Consequently, heat insulation capacity may be lower now than prior to the war. The prospect of market-based energy prices obviously did not deter the owners from choosing absolute volume to lower future energy bills. The fact that most of the external walls are left un-plastered will further aggravate the insulation capacity, as the ‘dew effect’ (evaporation and condensation) in the walls will require more energy for heating.
It is worth noting that only small amounts of building materials were recycled. This was the case in Grapska, as in most other places, with the exception of an EU sponsored program in Mostar in 1995-1996. The damage was almost total and most of what could be recycled had been recycled already – by the Serbs cf. Figure 6.5.13. Besides, cinder blocks are impossible to recycle once damaged, and much of the ‘war efforts’ were put into just that. But whatever was retrievable was reused, mostly chimney bricks and to a lesser extent cinder blocks, cf. Figure 6.5.21.

The extra floor space may be seen as a potential for future change, or different use. Quite obviously it will allow for future small-scale production or trade, taking care of housing’s forward linkages as it were. This has already happened with the shops and the tinsmith. I suggested that the family of one of the bored youngsters – whose references, ‘life style’ and interests are still linked to the town of Graćanica – that they should make the ground floor into a youth club. It was out of the question. There are neither funds nor interest for alternative usage of these vacant spaces, for instance to make flats that could be rented to Grapska families wanting to return, but who still live elsewhere. Only two families rent such flats in Grapska. These rebuilt, new, yet pre-war houses seem to embody so many personal projections that letting or renting parts of them (still) represented an uncomfortable option.

In addition to the extensions, the other area of improvements was internal furnishing, particularly furnishing of kitchens. As the housing type has a combined kitchen and common room (normally covering one-and-a-half quadrants), the furniture of the kitchen will flag the status and aspirations of the owner more than the living room furniture does. This supports the contentions presented earlier that where the outer imprints seems similar, the interiors signifies one’s belonging and one’s aspirations. Interior furnishing may literary constitute the Goffmanian “back stage” setting of the family. Hence much effort and resources have been put into the appearance of the interior furnishing.

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91 In many of Bosnia’s houses there is still the formal, and thus seldom used, ‘lounge’ in which to socialize with guests or celebrate. At night it is often rearranged into a master bedroom.
92 One family actually had a complete kitchen sent from the Netherlands where they stayed as refugees 1993–1998, and where two of their children had remained and settled.
.11) Shearing the House in Grapska
I have not sheared the houses in Grapska the same way that I did in the Mihatovici case. The reason is the same as presented in the NRC case, i.e. the different solutions chosen by the different owners. In general, the housing reconstruction is basically guided by what houses people once had. Today they all have ‘lose fit’, and are ‘open-ended’ in their design and size. Aside from their somewhat low insulation capacity, the houses have been rebuilt in accordance with perceived long-term strategic choices guided by the owners’ past experiences. The house, as output, is thus embedded with meaning, raised as a symbol as it were, reflecting the ontological security and future aspirations held by the ones who made the choices. I therefore consider making a shearing analysis of the Grapska houses beyond what is presented above to be off-target regarding the focus of this investigation.93

.12) The Guiding Motives
Why is so much of the returnees’ capital spent on their houses? What motives or reasons do they give?

"Don’t you ever think that this house has come cheap. I had to forsake a university education for my daughter in order to have the second floor built", stated a man who has built a new, rather delicate, two-story house on the foundations of his former home – with the second floor left unused. His former house was shot to pieces on May 10, 1992. Later the Serb neighbors “even sawed down my fence”.94 Why is so much extra effort and scarce resources put into rebuilding houses beyond any functional needs? Consistent references were made to what had been there before. That was the benchmark for what was to be. Returning to Grapska was returning to their old house. Building their house – as they did themselves – was

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93 Shearing Mihatovici was important because there someone else made the choices, and a shearing analysis would uncover the impact on future use from these very choices.
94 When visiting the farmer three months later, even the fence was back!
rebuilding their old house. This is a crucial observation as the meaning projected into the new building has changed by its very destruction, by the war, by the exile. What people have been forced to go through will directly affect the way they understand and interpret the world and hence guide their own actions. It is not only 'rebuilding the world as it was', it is rebuilding the house in a way that make (strategic) sense today. It is "Back to the Future", a recurrent slogan in all reconstruction debates.

Fig.6.5.23 The house rebuilt, January 2002, after it was totally demolished by artillery fire on May 10 1992. The efforts and sacrifices brought into its reconstruction signify its extraordinary ontological value.

Hence the comments of getting even with their neighbors is a forceful reason behind the housing priorities people made. The destroyed pre-war house is the most obvious symbol of the forceful act of return. It is all about what housing does, or says: "What would the neighbors think if I only did one floor next to their two-story house". The owner in question had one of the houses set in rows parallel to the main thoroughfare, cf. Figure 6.5.4. The fact that houses seemed to require a certain size to be acceptable actually entails that the concept of house also holds size or at least visual impact as an attribute. For the returnees it does not make sense otherwise. This honors the environment. 'Keeping up with the Jones' and thereby retaining a certain scale in the urban landscape is enhancing the quality of the built environment.....and besides", as most home owners said whether in Grapska or in Tuzla, “someone in the family might need a flat sometime in the future, who knows”.95

95 This is almost ad verbatim what I remember my own father said when he started rebuilding our family house bombed during WW II. He rebuilt a house about the same size – containing three flats, one for the family and two smaller ones for his two sons to move into in due course. None did.
The house-as-symbol-of-the-future referred to above is similar to that observed regarding the houses built by Grapskanians living abroad. They build their houses as a ‘virtual return’, a way of keeping all options open, of deferring existential decisions. They might come back; they might move in – but then again, they might not – acting ideally in line with how Giddens define ‘agency’. However, the interaction between these exiled post-war agents and their respective societal structures re-enforces the exile. It is the realization of this gradual loss, or change in habitus, as Bourdieu would label it, that instigates these ‘virtual return investments’. It is a way of reproducing the ‘objective structures’ that once molded the habitus of the Grapskanians. This has been a commonplace phenomenon among emigrants through all times.
As far as it has been possible to ascertain, no villages have been able to muster the relative number of privately funded houses as Grapska has. The reasons given for Grapska’s high level of private investment refer to the fact and the scale of return. Once SRSA set in motion the return program, it was possible to build; the scale of the program enhanced the viability of the undertaking as private investments. Once some started out, others followed, thereby sustaining the return process itself. Furthermore, these investments were claimed to be diaspora’s contributions in the current “war of reconstruction”, conspicuously so, as on average they are much larger and more grandiose than the others. This way the private houses have contributed towards changing the character of the physical environment beyond their number, partly by contributing to a critical mass of new buildings, but also by generally having a better external finish and a higher level of completion.96,97

6.5.7 CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
In the first part of this chapter I have explored the pre-war life of Grapska as a necessary backdrop for understanding the process of return and reconstruction. I examined how external time-space linkages (modernization, industrialization, de-ruralization, proximity to Doboj, etc.) shaped the village, and how internal linkages (village organization, livelihoods, cross-ethnic relations, etc.) constituted a social codex, or a set of ‘habitus’ for the Grapskanians. The events which led to the conflict and the war itself, violently dismantled these linkages. These are in effect the lifelines of society, and it is my contention that recovery depends on the (re)emergence of such linkages.

These linkages may be seen as the means of interaction between the capital modes in my analytical filter. Societal recovery depends on this interaction. How the fixed capital provision made by SRSA will contribute towards recovery depends on how their material contribution through interaction enriches the other capital modes, and what long-term benefits may be drawn from them.

1) Environmental capital
Environmental capital comprises the land and the man-made (and man-destroyed) environment. The land, what we normally understand as ‘the environment’, has suffered degradation and destruction. The Serb neighbors made large areas of agricultural land into gravel pits. Some of the fields are still occupied and so are the gravel pits along the river. Some of their forests have also been chopped down.98

96 Currently the biggest house in Grapska is owned by a refugee working for a multinational company in Tanzania, married to a Grapska woman. It stands empty. One of the other large houses is owned by a Grapskanian plumber living in Horten, Norway. About 60,000 KM has already been invested in its construction. It stands empty, not yet fully completed (Summer 2002).
97 I have observed similar reconstruction phenomenon taking place in Southern Lebanon in areas devastated by the Israeli occupation. Large empty houses owned by absent (refugee) Lebanese who claim their piece of land and flag their successes to previous fellow villagers. Similar investments, albeit without the backdrop of war, are taking place in West Africa from their diaspora in the US (Goffe 2002). And of course, this has been a much observed and documented phenomenon throughout the whole of the Balkans since the 1960s.
98 Not to any significant extent, the decimation of the forests is in fact primarily a social capital depletion rather than an environmental one.
The housing program has impacted both kinds of environmental capital. It has enabled the returnees to cultivate the land and draw benefits from it. Some of these earnings have gone back into financing housing extensions. Compared to the large agricultural potential of the land, however, these assets have been ignored: by default in the case of the international agencies, and intentionally, in the case of the returnees. They put their efforts and financial means into strengthening the fixed capital of their houses – and the symbolic flows drawn from that, rather than invest in means of increasing harvests. Then again, they were never farmers in the first place.

Fig.6.5.26 The new landscape of Grapska. January 2002. It is quite evident from this picture even for outsiders to acknowledge the fusion of environmental and fixed capital modes.

Fig.6.5.27 This is what it looked like the first time I passed through, January 2000. Again it was impossible to distinguish the ‘natural environment’ as separate from the ‘built-up environment’
The new housing has changed the overall environmental experience of the village. The landscape is changed. It carries a new meaning: most obviously that of anticipation and hopes for future development for the village people, but also an unambiguous shout of “We’re back!” These signals are attuned to the ‘newness’ of the structures, which invariably make the remaining ruins look old. The latter are gradually losing their terror as they are overtaken by weeds and trees. Time will eventually blur the meaning of these man-made and man-destroyed structures. But for many years still, the ruins of the brother’s house or the remnants of the house of the killed neighbor will remain powerful ‘war memorials’\(^9\). They constitute ‘objective structures’ of hatred, violence, and degradation and act as obstacles in processes of reconciliation (Galtung n.d.). Eventually though, they will be rendered meaningless (Winter & Sivan 1999). This is the ‘entropy of memory’.\(^10\)

The dense physical, cognitive, and even existential effect of the housing program in Grapska has thus made an immense contribution towards replenishing the environmental capital of the village, and the flow, or effects, are recognized by the villagers and the surrounding communities. The housing program has enabled the returnees to tap slightly from the environment that once gave rise to the settlement, i.e. the good agricultural land. This land has a sustainable flow potential that invariably will help replenish the other societal assets of the village. We are envisioning contributions towards recovery.

\(\textbf{2) Fixed capital}\)

Fixed capital is where the housing programs have made their most obvious contributions. Its impact on recovery depends on its capacity to interact and enhance other capital modes and assure that the flows are beneficial to the people of the village. The housing project has allowed for this. It was not merely a matter of building houses appropriate to the functional needs of the returnees. Taking over the reconstruction, it became a venture of recreating the village, affecting as we have seen, the environmental capital, but also, as will be subsequently shown, the human and social capital modes. The shape of the houses as fixed capital was guided by the past, yet in a reflexive way stemming from people’s recent experiences of war. References are easily made to the conceptual Figure 1.2.1.

Each completed SRSA house was a significant personal investment due to the privately funded extensions. The level of risk involved in these investments subsided with the growing number of houses. This also helps explain the high number of ‘houses of virtual return’ financed by members of Grapska’s diaspora. The fact that so much private funding has been channeled into housing rests on the confidence of permanent return due to the high number of returnees and the large investments both by SRSA/USAID and the returnees themselves. One feeds on the other.

\(^9\) In cognitive psychology they are referred to as ‘objects of rehearsal’, which allow the public or the person to rehearse the events which the memorial commemorates or signifies.

\(^10\) But memory is sometimes reconstructed – and reinvented. Remember Kosovo Polje!
The houses are in general too big for their present function. This will easily allow for future changes and adaptations in line with internally or externally driven needs and opportunities.

When SRSA announced their return program one of the first reconstruction works was actually the reconstruction of the mosque, the first building to be totally destroyed almost 8 years earlier. The funding for its reconstruction, much of it done by paid labor, was financed by the diaspora. The mosque stands as the most conspicuous and convincing example of fixed capital interacting with human and social capital. The internal linkages are apparent. Without the external investments into housing as fixed capital, no mosque would have been built.

3) Human capital

Human capital refers to the capacities, the capabilities, knowledge, skills of the people of the community. The flow refers to the ability to use these capacities. Through the Village Board’s selection criteria, the returning Grapskanians were relatively young, able-bodied, and most of them were also highly motivated. Many of the returnees were well qualified. A number of their 80 pre-war university graduates returned, and so did 30 of their master tradesmen. Their skills were called for. The combination of the ‘assisted self-help’ approach and the remittance funded private housing created a market of sorts, which allowed the tradesmen to enjoy a period of high demand. Some of the workmanship executed in Grapska is of excellent quality. But also the building skills of the non-professionals, of those who once contributed to building their own houses, were reactivated through the self-help strategy. This approach enabled SRSA to fund 187.5 houses. Only about 125 houses would have been built with the same funds if done by a contractor. And the multiple impact on the other capital modes, and thus on the prospect of recovery, would have been significantly lower.

The medical doctor, himself a Grapskanian, confirmed reduced use of medicines among the village population compared to what it was when still living in Doboj Istok. Anecdotal evidence supports this, “...and now I’ve even stopped using medicine!”. The epidemiological status of the village was described as one of normal prevalence and scale of illnesses relative to the age groups of the population. It may therefore be inferred that the housing program – and the way it has been implemented – has positively impacted the physical and psychological well-being of the population. Assessed in conjunction with the age composition, this directly impacts Grapska’s potential for recovery.

Self-confidence constitutes part of the flow from human capital. The villagers deal with the RS authorities in Doboj “only if we have to”, and they had to as part of SRSA’s approach. In other return and reconstruction programs contact with local authorities was normally taken care of by the NGO involved, but not so in Grap-

\[1^1\] At the very last run-through of the text I learned that the SRSA, as their last project in Bosnia, has funded another 75 houses in Grapska (November 2003).

\[10^2\] Using the 60% figure presented earlier.
The organizational strength of pre-war Grapska and their capacity to retain a legitimate village organization during displacement is the social capital base onto which the housing program was founded. It was possible to retain and extend that base because most of the displaced villagers lived close to each other, and close to Grapska. The former was also instigated by international support, not the least from their own diaspora. All this ensured and required a high level of social trust. Living together and acting together gave social strength, a strong resolve of return, fueled by uninterrupted ‘psychological rehearsals’, and undoubtedly a certain patriotic peer pressure. The importance of these social capital components cannot be overstated.

SRSA responded to the strength of the returnees by delegating to the inhabitants the most important decisions on reconstruction: who shall receive free materials and thereby be able to return. The selection process enhanced social capital formation as did the re/construction strategy of self-help. “It would have weakened the organization; it would have weakened the village – or the spirit, if the houses were to have been built by contractors – while the villagers stood watching”, commented the Chairman of the Village Board, Safet Buljabasic.

In addition to the reconstruction strategy, the way of going about the reconstruction works, there is also the social capital formation stemming from the physical planning strategy, i.e. where to build at what stage. The village is fairly compact, yet the two SRSA phases concentrated on different areas. This was done for security reasons as well as for logistic and practical reasons. In both cases, interpersonal contact and social de-
pendency were required components of the reconstruction process. All for the good of what Safet Buljabisic called “the village spirit”.

The social capital status in Grapska has only focused on the Bosniak part of the village. The post-war relationship between the returnees and their neighbors has not been directly affected by the reconstruction. They remained firmly separated, in spite of occasional chance encounters. Although interaction is inevitable, it was not sought after. There was absolutely no social trust between the groups. The social capital within the Greater Grapska has been totally eroded because of the war. There were no signs that the housing investments, seen as replenishment of fixed capital had any rub-off effects on any of the other capital modes of Greater Grapska. Reconciliation is definitely beyond housing.

Yet. Some signs of interaction has been taking place, instances of cooperation where both groups had benefited. This was the case where the Bosniaks cleared a small canal across the agricultural fields, for which they needed support, and a machine, from the municipality. The latter was arranged by their Serb neighbors. The benefit was mutual. Tasks like these could be replicated. To dilute the tension between the groups, replenishing the fixed and environmental capital that previously had been beneficial to both parties should have been supported by the international agencies, not only housing re/construction. But this is also a contentious strategy. The experience in Mostar where this was the chief strategy, did not bring much supportive evidence. Replenishing social capital takes more than international funding. More than anything reconciliation is time bound.

6.5.8. REESTABLISHING THE LINKS

The responsibility of developing Grapska is in the hands of the Grapskanians. Their expulsion and their return show for all the world to see that their lives also depend on others. Their capital assets not only have to interact within the village, they have to link up to asset bases in communities outside Grapska to ensure recovery. Hence the concept of “geographical capital” (Bird et al. 2002), which by combining the four capital modes allows for a geographical106 analysis of the community. This uncovers Grapska’s development potential as a function of its location, close to Doboj and other population centers in the region. That one quality outshone all others when explaining why some former – and initially dying – mining communities in Yorkshire, England, thrived whereas others dried out (Stafford et al. 2001).

The Swedish housing programs in Grapska have been implemented in a way that has helped strengthen all the asset bases of the village. Add to this their strong geographical capital. This would normally indicate a high probability of developmental success. But reestablishing external links to the splintered political and social environment of the region and the country constitutes a developmental challenge beyond the reach of individual housing programs.

106 or external linkage based.
PART FIVE
CLOSING THE CIRCLES
The cases were chosen on merit of time, space and agency; when the project was executed, where it took place, and who managed and/or implemented it. These criteria respond to new wars taking place in a contiguum, i.e. the same conflict exists at different stages at different times in different places. The international housing response follows suit.

My research challenge is to find out how international housing projects impacted the recovery processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do that through posing sub-questions relating to housing’s three primary attributes: housing as physical object, symbol and strategy. The following comparison will therefore be a relational presentation on how time, place and agency impacted the housing projects’ physical solution, symbolic content and strategic support on economic and institutional capacity (re)construction. The conclusions drawn from these comparisons will finally be analyzed so that valid claims can be made on internationally funded housing’s capacity to enhance long-term recovery of a society ravaged by war.

It is important to state that conclusions from qualitative research do not come out as a sum of added figures or ‘findings’. Such a maneuver would, in effect, be in contravention of the epistemology of this research approach. In qualitative research the conclusions are argumentative, not additive (although arguments add to each other), much like in legal practice and judgment. The arguments have to build on the evidence uncovered, be consistent and intra-supportive, and yet able to convincingly explain possible inconsistencies. Hence I do not make a three dimensional matrix out of this three-case comparison and then filter these findings through my four-layered analytical filter expecting to find the answer at the end.1

Earlier I have made a case for not treating time and space as distinct qualities, because time takes place; action takes place in time. In real life they are mutually dependent and one exists only by means of the other. In the following, I retain the analytical distinction but by using the term ‘place’; hence time, place and agency.

What follows are 9 sections defined by the matrix below. These are interrelated, yet somewhat static findings. They are elements that make up societal capitals, or are the outcome of their interaction and subsequent flows. It is within such a framework that is it possible to assess the dynamics of the housing programs, indeed, what these housing programs do to support recovery.

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1 The futility of such a multidimensional and, in essence, mechanistic exercise may be exemplified by referring to a large building project I was once involved in. There were those who held the opinion that a large hospital renewal project would have its design solutions projected through a computer-supported investigation of the functional qualities of each room of the existing hospital, and set against various sets of functional parameters. In the realized design a number of leaps of faith or creative presumptions were made, which in retrospect proved both rational and logical, and to a certain extent rested on the interpretation of the functional qualities presented in the initial computer-supported investigation.
7.1 HOUSING AS PHYSICAL OBJECT

7.1.1 INTERACTING WITH TIME; 1/A

Technical solutions as well as workmanship were affected by the temporal context in two ways: 1) access to building materials, and 2) level of emergency as perceived by the planners and builders.

The availability of building materials is obviously a function of production and logistics, which again are critically affected by the war. But even when Tuzla was isolated and production was down, there were building materials still available from building merchants and from private citizens eager to sell. Stocked materials were available since no one but the international organizations were doing building works. When materials were again available it was primarily as imports. This is most obvious in Grapska where the privately financed houses were more lavishly built, and as such used much more imported material like PVC-coated aluminum windows, chosen not least for their perceived status.

War’s shredding of social contracts and perversion of the rule of law seemed to have rubbed off on the laws of physics, prevailing standards of workmanship and contractual responsibilities. “Because it was war”, was the recurrent explanation given when these issues were raised. The effect of this is most evident in the case of Mihatovici where technical solutions were chosen on merit of lowest possible cost and construction time. 6--7 years on the effects of these choices contribute significantly to the present unsustainable conditions of the settlement. Leaking roofs, cracked floor boarding, subsiding structures, highly inadequate sound insulation and storage space. The first phase of NRC’s shelter program showed
similar traces, but since the owner overlooked the work, it never reached that Miha-

tovici’s level of ‘war quality’, except where the house owners were absent as in 
Kiseljak Breze. One of the houses there has been heavily damaged over the years 
due to bad detailing and sloppy workmanship. NRC seemed to have acknowledged 
this by cutting the contractor’s liability period, or the formal guarantee period, from 
24 to 6 months. The nearsighted focus on the emergency also made the planners 
downgrade the provisions for future alterations and alternative use. None of the 
above applies to Grapska. By 1999 this “but-it-was-war” syndrome had 

Disappeared.

During the war years the emergency culture that guided both the program strategy 
and project tactics was extended into the implementation phase. In the most 

extreme cases it is as if construction was exempted from laws of building physics, 
and the basic traits of workmanship, as were most other rules guiding human 
action in war.

7.1.2 INTERACTING WITH PLACE; 1/B

The physical solutions necessarily reflect the qualities of the site, of the physical 
place. The most significant issue, however, and the one which has been evident in 
all three cases, is the impact of location. It seems difficult to overstate its impor-
tance.

The NRC houses and the houses of Grapska were similar and basically built within 
the ‘contemporary vernacular’ mould. Mihatovici was different, yet the floor plans 
retained much the same structure. It was the number of flats of this settlement and 
the size of the required plot, combined with local political bias that located the set-
tlement on the Sicki Brod brownfields, separate and far from the city proper. The 
settlement layout was based on an imported, idealistic garden city suburb model 
previously not realized in Bosnia. Due to political circumstances, management pol-
icy, and somewhat illusory site plan, Mihatovici today bears no semblance to a gar-
den city suburb.

The NRC scheme physically connected onto the existing urban infrastructure, in fact 
onto existing houses, thereby enhancing the environmental frame that already ex-
isted. This is even more evident in Grapska where the renewal totally changed the 
environment. It recreated the place. The new houses now outnumber the still re-
mainig ruins, thus enhancing the environment in a way that was unimaginable in 
the late 1990s (when I first visited Grapska).

2 This is a ‘style’ prevalent in most private housing throughout BiH. However some placed throughout 
Republika Srpska it is possible to discern a kind of ‘Serb vernacular’, i.e. with unambiguous Byzantine 
and sometimes Greek references, most prominently in houses built by people whose earnings were 
made during the war. Greek columns are also brought to prominence by their counterparts in the Fed-
eration.

3 Some of the other shelter projects built in the region are much worse set than Mihatovici. With few 
exceptions they are remotely located, isolated, and in the case of Grab Potok in Banovici municipality, 
beyond the edge of collapse.
7.1.3 INTERACTING WITH AGENCY; 1/C

The decisions to build and the way the work is organized and carried out is the work of agency, in whatever sense of the word: agency as the capability ‘to do otherwise’, or understood as an ‘implementing agency’, an NGO by any other name. Both are characterized by having the power of choice, making decision on where and when and how the housing project is to be realized.

The three NGOs\(^4\) approached their housing challenges differently. Only in the case of Mihatovici was this approach a result of a pronounced ideological policy. NPA wanted to do ‘settlements or new villages ‘in solidarity with the IDPs’.\(^5\) This was a decision made at HQ in Oslo. The other two organizations shaped their approaches more pragmatically in the field – partly by default, partly by circumstance, but most significantly by what I call “professional intuition” (or lack thereof) of their field personnel. They were the ones, and this refers to personnel from all three organizations, who developed project proposals and thus made the crucial decisions on place and approach to housing (re)construction. This is clearly evident in the way NRC’s Lars Silseth devised the ‘Tuzla model’. It could never have come from HQ, and it would have been very difficult for a non-professional to make this into a feasible emergency project. Later heads of office altered some of Silseth’s initial tactics to comply with changing conditions and from practical experience gained.

In a similarly idiosyncratic yet reflexive way Kaj Gennebäck of SRSA ran his organization’s reconstruction projects. SRSA sought to concentrate their projects geographically as well as making them big, i.e. include large numbers of houses and thereby also change the physical (not to say the social) character of the chosen village. SRSA transferred the process of selecting beneficiaries, the clearing of legal formalities, as well as the overall implementation activities to the agency of the beneficiaries. Their choices and priorities resulted in a built environment that was totally different from what would have been the case if SRSA’s standards were ever built. The agency of the villagers was also able to release resources from many others who thereby contributed towards the rebuilding of Grapska. Later, NRC also shifted to a self-help approach. There was no evidence of this lowering the level of workmanship, it was just as often the other way around.

NPA’s settlement schemes, of which Mihatovici was one, left all operational decisions to the field. Their first principal officer in Tuzla had no experience in housing construction, which was therefore left to their Mihatovici’s project manager, the former technical director of the largest construction firm in Bosnia. His terms of reference was to build for as many DPs as possible, as quickly as possible and as cheap as possible. We have seen how this impacted the technical solutions and the long-term prospects of the project.

\(^4\) SRSA by definition is not an NGO, it is an offshoot of Sweden’s Civil Defense. In the field, however, it acts similarly to any NGO and has been treated as one in this research.

\(^5\) For reasons of ideological conviction NPA would not follow NRC, because that meant assisting house owners rather than the IDPs, according to NPA.
The head of office is the one responsible for an organization’s tactical and sometimes strategic decisions. These decisions are made in the field and make the one responsible the fulcrum of any NGO. This invariably led to disputes between HQ and field offices. It happened in my cases, as it did in all other major NGOs I got to know.6

How what came to be was basically the result of decisions made in the field.7

7.2 HOUSING AS SYMBOL

7.2.1 INTERACTING WITH TIME; 2/A

Meaning changes over time. Things come to mean different things as time passes. So is also the case with the housing built in BiH. Housing was a most concrete, and practical contribution, but during the emergency phase the notion of “dignity” for the displaced was also pronounced as a rationale behind the both NRC and NPA’s housing initiatives.

How symbols are time dependent comes out differently for these two projects. From what little information I got from former NRC tenants some did indeed experience the flats as allowing them a more dignified existence, while others were humiliated by living in other people’s home in such an ‘undignified manner’. Either way, the housing projects came out as symbols carrying meanings that guided peoples’ actions, even to the point of causing physical damage. With the IDPs long gone, the war related meaning of the NRC flats has also vanished. They are now merely ‘normal houses’ carrying whatever meaning people place in them.

Not so with Mihatovici. In practical terms, it is now officially labeled a ‘Collective Center’, the very institution it was built to replace, and which it indeed did replace. Time has changed all that, partly because of its capacity and uniform population, partly because of lack of maintenance, which signifies a somewhat dilapidated atmosphere. It is not the symbol of community initially envisioned by NPA. The grinding reality of time has changed all that.

The symbolic meaning of the reconstruction of Grapska is immense. Not only is it the material fulfillment of a consistent effort that lasted seven years of displacement. It is also an exercise in rebuttal against their Serb neighbors. The houses (built much larger than any functional requirements would call for), are yelling: “We’re back. Your destruction was in vain”! It is for all to see – or hear. This connotation will necessarily wane over the years. Pending livelihood

6 By the time I did my fieldwork, many donor nations with embassies in Sarajevo channeled their funding directly to the local NGO offices, thereby circumventing the organization’s HQs.

7 One reason persistently claimed for the conflict with HQ was grounded in their lack of compatible professionals. Because of this there were no organization-wide building management routines; each head of office had their own. A change of officer equaled change in routines. This was a general trait among all International NGOs involved in construction work in BiH throughout the post-war years.
opportunities, and in common with the NRC houses, these houses will in due course become ‘normal housing’ and stand as symbols of different sets of meanings.

7.2.2 INTERACTING WITH PLACE; 2/B
These three housing projects carry different symbolic relationships to their respective places. NRC contributed by completing the ‘traditional two-story urban housing’ that was already located in the slopes surrounding Tuzla. Although, or because, the location was predetermined the place carried totally different meaning for the house owner and the displaced tenants. For some tenants and their hosts the opportunity for rural IDPs to live in the city deflated some of the traditional rural/urban bias, and a number of the displaced came to embrace the modes of urban life. For them, the place took on a new meaning, as the prospect of return to their former homes grew dimmer and/or more unlikely.

In the Croat village of Kiseljak-Breze the political symbol of place caused the loss of large investments, plus time and effort on the part of NRC’s staff. It highlights the difficulties in working in areas of violent conflict where territory, or place primarily carries symbolic powers, which was what the war for the most part was about.

Mihatovici was located out of sight on the Sicki Brod brownfields for politically symbolic reasons, leaving its residents at a non-address outside the city proper. The settlement is easy to spatially and morphologically define – and hence conceptualize as a separate no-status entity, a “refugee camp” as the road sign proclaims. There is no status associated with living in the settlement. Incidents have occurred where school children have hidden this fact from others when in Tuzla. There is no detectable communal identity among most of its residents, although there are obvious bonds among the younger population, among those who have grown up in the settlement. For them NPA’s ‘new village for the displaced’ might carry some significance.

The Grapska case was different. Returning to Grapska, coming home, proved the ultimate act for most of the returnees. The violent loss in 1992, the struggle throughout the years in displacement, culminating in the reconstruction of most of the village, gave evidence to the power of place way beyond what the other cases could muster. The many hundreds of Grapskanians that have permanently emigrated has more than any confirmed that ‘housing in place’ is saturated with meaning guiding action: more than 50 houses are being built and paid for by families living abroad: these are not for rent, not for permanent residence, at best they may be future summerhouses, but foremost they are tangible links back to Grapska: They are symbols.

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8 According to Muslim traditions urban housing was to be located on slopes to allow all houses to have a view and thereby open the valley floors for collective activities (Grabrijan 1984).
9 It is worth noting that over the years a number of former inhabitants have settled permanently elsewhere in BiH to rid themselves of the perpetuating uncertainty about a future return to Grapska. Also, for families with younger members, returning was not such a self-evident act; the young do not place the same symbolic content into returning to one’s ‘place of origin’.
7.2.3 INTERACTING WITH AGENCY; 2/C

All three cases were outcomes of symbolic, i.e. political acts ‘of the Norwegian (and Swedish) people’. Without this public engagement, and the subsequent government funding, there would have been no projects to implement. This became evident when politicians visited Bosnia in the early post-war years.

Whereas the Mihatovici settlement was raised on ideals brought along from Norway, the other two projects emerged much more pragmatically, more prosaically as it were, without much ideological content. In line with the village image of Mihatovici, NPA made substantial efforts to organize the residents of Mihatovici in ways that would help them regain some control over their lives. But with NPA’s loss of management responsibilities their programs evaporated.

The other two projects made their beneficiaries create the symbols. They did so by transferring the responsibilities of implementation to the house owners, through assisted self-help housing.10 For the NRC house owners this meant control, the capacity to influence some of the solutions, but foremost it meant access to real money. The symbolic meaning was embedded in the finished house, be it envy or honors.

SRSA’s approach to Grapska’s reconstruction made the returnees create powerful symbols. They materialized through a series of decisions made by the returnees themselves: 1) their elected representatives decided on who were to receive building materials, 2) wrangles for legal approvals from the local (Serb) authorities were waged by the returnees themselves, and 3) from the building materials they received from SRSA, and with the exception of a few cases, they built their houses as improved copies of their pre-war houses: “We’re back - to stay forever!” All this took place because SRSA’s Head of Office, in cooperation with Sida, set in motion a reconstruction process that allowed the agency of the local population to induce so much of their own meaning into the rebuilt houses. They stand as symbolic stakes in their own future, in the recovery of their village.

7.3 HOUSING AS STRATEGY

7.3.1 INTERACTING WITH TIME; 3/A

All three projects called for the use of ‘local resources’. This follows from the basic assumption that using what is locally produced enhances local economic (re)generation. This is true to a certain point only. For (re)generation to take place it must be accompanied by production. Expending stocks for building housing does

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10 NRC changed to self-help as early as 1994, after Phase I, whereas SRSA, in line with the strategy of Sida, almost exclusively practiced an assisted self-help housing approach for all of their housing programs.
not make much more of a contribution towards economic (re)generation than does money handouts. This was very much the case during and immediately after the war, i.e. pertaining to NRC housing and the building of Mihatovici. Grapska was different. By the end of the 1990s basic building materials were again being produced in Bosnia.

What NRC used for building, apart from what they brought in on convoys, was produced prior to the war in what now had become ‘foreign’ countries, or in Bosnian factories since destroyed or closed. In addition, much was traded on the black market. What was evident was that even at these times materials were available, but not in such a way as to ‘trigger recovery’ as is often presumed. Much the same was the case in building Mihatovici.

These early projects made a point of supporting (the formation of) local contractors: NRC the small contractors, NPA the big ones. This took place during a period when thorough structural adjustments were taking place, and during a period with severe economic hardships, no economic infrastructure, or any production worth mentioning. None of the contractors made any investments or made any long-term economic dispositions as a result of their housing contracts. The only strategic outcome of these two housing projects may have been to sustain a minimum activity on the part of the engaged contractors so they survived the war as viable companies. This certainly represented no ‘kick-start’ of the economy. Mihatovici’s ‘forward linkages’, i.e. the informal trade that emerged in the settlement, represent no significant seed activity for economic development. With Grapska built four years later it was different.

The intermediate years had re-opened the borders for trade in building materials, and basic production was on the increase in BiH. This enabled SRSA to tender for Bosnian-produced building materials in their deliveries to the self-help builders in Grapska. This was not necessarily the practice of other INGOs. Probably out of pragmatic reasons – as controlling the place of origin was notoriously difficult, most organizations loosened their locally-produced requirement, including NRC and NPA, and made their choice on the basis of price, as did most of the private builders, including those in Grapska. SRSA did not. Of the DM 2.8 million they spent on building materials in Grapska, 80% originated in Bosnia.

The early housing interventions were unable to play any significant role in developing a building industry in BiH because of the war and the absence of financial and industrial infrastructures. When these were reestablished, as when Grapska was rebuilt, special efforts had to be made to ensure that nationally produced goods were used. Otherwise international funding for housing and
building construction was spent on often cheaper, tax-free\textsuperscript{11} imports, because free-trade policies prevail even in the benevolent world of the NGOs. The re-development potential embedded in the multiplier effects are thus pulled from under the feet of the very society one is set to assist.

\textbf{7.3.2 INTERACTING WITH PLACE; 3/B}

The (re)developmental processes initiated or strengthened by the projects were different for each of the three cases, of different order as it were, much of it depending on place. The Tuzla cases were primarily urban development projects, whereas Grapska additionally set in motion processes impacting local economic and political realities.

NRC located their housing investments in areas already part of Tuzla proper. It supported not only private property owners, but the overall pattern of urban development set (or at least approved) by the local authorities long before the war. By technically connecting onto existing infrastructures and visually enhancing what was already there, the NRC intervention was spotlessly integrated into the urban fabric of Tuzla. On the other hand, Mihatovici was not, in spite of its location being decided by local political authorities. Its infrastructures are separated from the rest of Tuzla, and its access road, water distribution network and sewerage system are highly unsustainable regarding both quality and capacity. For that reason alone there is no possibility, miracles aside, whereby Mihatovici may be part of a coherent urban development scheme, in spite of its primary school and health center. When adding all this to its social and economic malaise the Mihatovici project seems to have started a series of self-perpetuating processes pointing towards regression.

SRSA’s reconstruction project in Grapska set in motion other sets of processes, the most obvious being that of recreating most of the physical environment. SRSA assisted in reconstructing almost half of the village’s pre-war housing stock, a figure much higher than in most village reconstruction programs in BiH. This was a strategic move so powerful that it set in motion a number of private investments by Grapskanians living abroad and thus not eligible for SRSA support. More than 50 houses were built by private funds, confirming the power of hope, the power of place.

In the rebuilding of Grapska millions of KM in private funds were spent on housing in addition to the materials provided by SRSA. This activated local markets – in both entities, i.e. irrespective of ethnic affiliation. Perhaps one million KM were spent on materials purchased in Srpska, “because they were cheaper”.\textsuperscript{12} The effects

\textsuperscript{11} The NGOs have made agreements with the Bosnian government (similar to those of the UN agencies) of not paying tax or duties on any imports used for their work or projects in BiH. By 2003 these agreements were being renegotiated.

\textsuperscript{12} SRSA tendered for materials all over BiH, but deliveries from Srpska were sparse, partly because of the practice of ‘commissions’, which immediately disqualified the bidder, and partly for political reasons. Many Serb businesses were initially not providing materials so as to enable Muslims to return. However, since they came anyway, this reason for not bidding was no longer pronounced.
were primarily the reestablishing of commercial markets; a step towards normalcy. If the linkage between a functioning economy and peace is to be trusted, this would also have been a step in that direction, recovery by any other name. Yet they were only tiny steps.

Forging peace is beyond housing, but the large number of Bosniaks assisted in returning to Grapska (as part of a pronounced SIDA/SRSA policy) is bound to have political consequences, not least in future local elections. In selecting ‘worthy’ villages for reconstruction, and ‘committed’ villagers for return, strategic locations and sufficient numbers are crucial parameters on the road towards democratic co-existence and ultimate peace.

7.3.3 INTERACTING WITH AGENCY; 3/C

The power vested in gifts, vested in international NGOs, normally ignores the agency of the people assisted, displaced, destitute and in dire need of these very gifts. This is how emergency relief is conceived, and this is the basis for the Norwegian housing strategies during the 1993–1996 period. They came out different on the ground because they applied different tactics and operational approaches. Sida funded the reconstruction of Grapska in a different time/space context, which opened for a different strategy born to completion through the idiosyncratic regime of SRSA in Tuzla. I have earlier argued that recovery is a reflexive activity on the part of the primary actors, i.e. members of the affected societies. For recovery to be sustained the primary actors must secure agency in the processes initiated by these international gifts. My three cases show different levels of such participation – and different effects because of it.

In Grapska the extraordinary transfer of responsibilities to the village board, on selecting beneficiaries and securing necessary political and formal approval from the local (Serb) authorities, enhanced the institutional recovery of the village. So did the license given to the house owners in using the materials provided in whichever way they saw best when rebuilding their houses. SRSA’s approach depended on the agency of the village population in implementing their project. In terms of ‘what housing is capable of doing’ the prospect for a beneficial recovery for Grapska may well be at its practical maximum.

NRC did not engage the primary beneficiaries at all. The displaced were in the classical relief fashion objectified and not involved in any aspect or phase of the project, they were not even contract partners. The house owners were. The project revolved around their very house, their home and property. It was their commitment, not that of the beneficiaries, which sustained this project. NRC’s major contributions towards recovery lies in the agency of the house owner. The displaced tenants were back “on the street” and filed into some new shelter queue as soon as their 30-month contract ended. The NRC case shows that the field-based tactics may bring about long-term results quite different from those set for the immediate intervention, i.e. that of protecting the displaced population. Instead, the program turned out to protect the interests of private
house owners. But sustainable it is, and a most efficient emergency shelter project it was, though hardly in the way envisioned.

The agency of the local political leadership was activated in locating Mihatovici at the very edge of the municipality, which in turn has proved to be the settlement’s dominant liability. As in the NRC case, this shows the short planning horizon employed on permanent housing construction during periods of crisis. This is all the more extraordinarily as all people involved knew that permanent housing normally lasts several lifetimes. While NRC had the house owners to safeguard the project, NPA attempted instead to organized and thus empower the settlement residents. This folded once NPA handed the management over to the municipality. Without a communal commitment and responsibilities on the part of the residents, community never emerged. The very idea of establishing a ‘village for displaced people’ based on a ready-made model fell through for the same reason.

The conceptual underpinnings which made permanent housing no different from other emergency goods sent into Tuzla may also be the outcome of an “emergency culture”, sustained through strong social networks that emerge among expat staff. Here, issues regarding their ‘common destiny’ and mutual challenges were constantly debated. Although views differed somewhat, the experiences and prevailing perceptions of the situation were much the same regarding such issues as the pervading uncertainty, lack of amenities (in spite of ‘Biblioteka’), erratic logistics, entangled bureaucracy, the UNHCR, and the ineptness of their respective HQs. All these issues played their part when tactics were developed. But there were some whose very own insights, understanding and stubbornness enabled them “to do otherwise”. Restarting production at the dry milk factory in Tuzla was set in motion by Jo Kvalvåg, of the Norwegian Church Aid’s local Head of office. Getting the commercial farms running was another of his projects. In both cases, these interventions broke the prevailing relief attitude, which up until then had entailed bringing in dry milk powder and foodstuff on UN convoys.

I close this chapter by highlighting the role of the local field staff, the importance of their ‘professional intuition’ and the social context that may hone and reproduce their attitudes, including their prejudices, their understanding and ultimate actions on the ground. All of my cases carry deep personal imprints of the organization’s local head of office. The crucial outcomes, those that are deemed to support recovery and those that seem to erode it, are embedded in those personal imprints. The respective NGOs and their HQs are, aside from the Mihatovici case, somewhat distant.

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13 Much the same way industrial clusters are sustained (Maskell et al. 1998).
14 One of the watering holes/restaurants catering for international staff safely located in the basement of a private house.
15 They are but ‘large filing cabinets’ as one of the expats once said, ‘run by archivists and auditors’. I personally contest that. None of my Norwegian NGOs had anything that looked like proper project archives. “During the war HQ was only there to say yes. There was nothing they could do”, said another.
8 RE-APPROACHING THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HOUSING RE/CONSTRUCTION

8.1 REVISITING THEORY

Theories of post-war housing, i.e. theories on the role of housing in current post-war contexts hardly exist. Theories in post-war housing, i.e. theories on how to go about implementing post-war housing in today’s settings are just as sparse. Housing is something people or organizations do in the field, not something they reflect upon and write about. Davis (1978, 1981, 1995), Barakat (1994), and Zetter (1995) all point to this latter fact. But most importantly, and this also affects some of the writers above, the writing on post-war housing is to a large degree based on reference to and evidence from natural disasters and from traditional, international wars. Another issue is that much of what is written also lacks empirical basis as far as housing goes; it is just stretched to cover ‘the shelter sector’, cf. Post-Conflict Housing and Peacebuilding (CPCC 1998). In addition, there are the evaluation reports. Depending on their terms of reference and the capacity and professional competence of the evaluation team, this is probably the closest we get to theories in post-war housing.

What follow are my small contributions. They will primarily cover theories ‘of’ post-war housing re/construction, but also bring in issues dealing with theories ‘in’ post-war housing, although these will come as recommendations in Chapter 8.3. What follows below is based on my findings and will follow the structure of my theory chapters in Part Two.

8.1.1 HOUSING AS PHYSICAL OBJECT

What I found in all of my cases, but primarily in my wartime cases, was a tendency to neglect common peacetime practices of good workmanship – even basic laws of physics. Physical construction is contextualized beyond anticipation. This is exposed in three ways:

- The ‘but-it-was-war’ syndrome. Planning, design and execution was carried out under an emergency regime where the principal objective was to solve a temporary shelter need – fast and cheap. Long-term – inevitable – physical deterioration was not taken into due account, nor were the consequences of location. They have now become apparent.

- The density of people. Maximizing the number of people living on the premises – inevitably – lead to breakdowns, destruction and forced deterioration – if constructed for ‘normal’ use. This ‘material logic’ was ignored, but soon became evident. This is apparent when imagining daily life when 30 people live in the houses like the ones presented in Figure 6.3.2 & 6.3.3.

- Lack of accountability. A building contractor stands accountable to the commissioning NGO, not to the beneficiary for whom the house is built. In two of my

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1 I have earlier presented my failed attempts to collect case stories on housing from the NGOs that are undertaking housing re/construction in present post-war settings.
cases, and supported by data from subsidiary cases, this tends to lower the quality of the work, or what the beneficiaries perceive as good workmanship. In conflict areas, bad workmanship may also be an intentional political act.

8.1.2 HOUSING AS SYMBOL
Home is a matter of choice, or better still, home is a matter of discovery. This is how ‘home’ was presented in the introductory chapters. My research reconfirms the fundamental importance people place in their chosen home. Grapska is a very case in point. At first it seems to fulfill all the clichés. Whatever the reasons, there is an undisputable fact that Grapska was reestablished because most of its inhabitants intensely wanted to go back, and restart life just there, to reestablish and reconfirm their habitus as it were. Rebuilding their houses was reestablishing part of the objective structures that brought about this wish to return. The houses therefore were rebuilt not only as functional objects but just as much symbolic objects, to signify their return in the face of their antagonists and to reinstate the order that had once provided their ontological security.

Grapska is, relatively speaking, well endowed with geographical capital. ‘Going back’ therefore is rational both in terms of regaining one’s ontological security, as well as aiming at a future livelihood. But those whose long displacement had forged new allegiances, given meaning to new places, will not return. This was more obvious in my other cases. The young inhabitants of the Mihatovici settlement would even have preferred to forge a life for themselves there instead of ‘going back’ to places with little or no ‘geographical capital’, hence with no social or economic future. The war has accelerated the process of urbanization, and the donor policy of reconstructing remote villages with no economic future, reveals a lack of understanding of social dynamics, that can only be explained by a blind adherence to the principle of return as the only ‘durable solution’. Two major changes take place in the aftermath of ‘ethnic cleansing’, however despicable:

- the place of expulsion is irrevocably changed, both external and internal linkages are severed. It has become a different ‘place’.
- Displacement means different environments that people may adjust to in ways that does not make ‘going back’ a preferable choice.

The principle of return as the most durable solution does not necessarily hold true for internally displaced people of today’s wars. It depends on the capital base of the place of expulsion. On the basis of such a capital assessment returning to Grapska does make sense, going back to Samari makes little sense, and going back to some of the remote mountain villages from where the Serb IDPs seeking refuge in

2 For all practical purposes this was why many of the NGOs opted in favor of assisted self-help. In this way a contractor would be accountable towards the owner, not towards ‘some organization’.
3 The water leakages in Grapska may be explained that way. USAid intended it to be a ‘reconciliatory’ motion to commission a Serb contractor for the reconstruction of the waterworks in Bosniak Grapska. Inadequate monitoring by the commissioning party and inadequate workmanship on the part of the contractor led to leakages. The returning Grapskanians had to pay KM 2000 extra before the leakages were discovered and tended to. The Grapskanians reckoned it was sabotage.
4 The disappointment voiced upon the reconstruction of the burnt-down villages rebuilt in Northern Norway after WWII was rooted in this issue. The places were modernized beyond recognition.
Grapska came from, makes no sense at all. Not only to an observer, but to the people expelled. However sad or heartless it may sound.

Housing reconstruction as a means of return is only viable when people find such choices strategically meaningful. For many of the former Srebrenica inhabitants now living in Mihatovici, return was seen as meaningless as having to leave. Their former house, or whatever is left, is a symbol of a past life.5

All these cases are covered by Rapoport’s loose-fit definition of home (environments) as ‘a system of settings’. The system will allow for different choices depending on what system people are able to be part of, or deem most strategically meaningful for themselves and their future, i.e. their children.

8.1.3 HOUSING AS STRATEGY

Housing constructed during the war or immediately after the war provided much needed shelter for IDPs, but it did not contribute towards economic recovery in any other way than as a distribution channel of purchasing power. No production to speak of was initiated; no lasting investments to speak of were made, or were at all possible, either for producers or for building contractors.

After the emergency phase a formidable part of what was invested in housing went to pay for imported building materials. There were a complex set of reasons for this, many of which are generic to countries ravaged by war: open borders, no system of customs collection (besides, all international organizations are customs exempted), destroyed domestic production plants, loss of skilled manpower, lack of financial institutions, and cross-border trading run by cartels often monopolizing transport and often involving politicians. Even before the war Bosnia had the added disadvantage of lacking production facilities for all but the most basic building components.6

A country ravaged by internal wars has regional allies: Kabila in Congo had the Uganda government, Taylor in Sierra Leone had Coté d’Ivoire, Bosnian Croats had Croatia, and the Bosnian Serbs had Serbia. For them there was no such thing as ‘Think Bosnian!’7 In these areas, therefore, demand for building materials would be directed towards the production facilities in their virtual ‘motherlands’. The notion of ‘multiplier effect’ needs some geographical demarcation to make sense. For a country with no common national identity, such a demarcation remains illusive, which was also the case for the Bosniaks. In my only post-war case, it was SRSA, not the Bosniaks, who ensured that most of the funds were re-circulated at least once within the country (thereby doubling the effects on the economy). By 2000 most

5 “Many refugees have returned to towns synonymous with ethnic cleansing. Many have not, and it’s unlikely they will return soon”, is how Tim Judah starts his article in Transition Online, February 5, 2004. He ends his piece like this: “Watch this space. This story has many years left to run.” (http://www.tol.cz/look/BRN/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=98&NrIssue=1&NrSection=4&NrArticle=11547).
6 According to Professor Reshad Begtic of the University of Tuzla (conversation April 2001).
7 Cf. my story on the concrete tile factory in Zenica, page 197.
NGOs had long since removed their initial clause on primarily using domestic products. It proved too difficult to control and besides, ‘open borders’ is a policy in line with the reigning economic dogma.

My cases have given strong evidence in support of aided self-help as a strategy for recovery. Both the latter phases of the NRC project and that of Grapska show how engaging the will, ability and resources of the house-owners constitute a pledge, a long-term commitment in line with the reflexive nature of recovery. In Grapska it allowed for a larger number of houses to be completed (within the funds made available) thereby raising the return momentum. The perceived quality was secured by the owner commissioning the work and being assisted by the managing NGO.

My cases show aided self-help as a spillover rich strategy for the re/construction of one’s own house. This is in line with what others have documented before, albeit in more peaceful circumstances (Turner & Goetze 1967, Turner & Fichter 1972, Harris 1999b, De Soto & Abbott 2002). Reports on successful self-help programs in urban apartment blocks (SIDA 2001) show that this model applies beyond rural settings and rural populations, as has been claimed (UNHCR 1998). I return to this as a prospective field for further research at the end of the following chapter.

Housing seems not to carry any ‘peace building’ capacities. There was nothing in my research to corroborate a claim that housing would ‘heal the scars of ethnic cleansing’. Elsewhere (Skotte 2003), I have claimed that what guides the donor-led physical rebuilding of BiH is a long-term strategy to undo the cleansing and the Dayton partition, and in grand national engineering projects, to reestablish a multi-ethnic Bosnia through housing reconstruction. My research does not register any direct peace dividend. Spatial affinity is reestablished between their houses, which – if they are inhabited – will inevitably lead to personal contact. But compared to reestablishing mutual arenas or structures beneficial for both parties, housing reconstruction instead reestablishes the distinction between them. In pre-war Bosnia the societal linkages that defined local multi-ethnic communities were those defined by the commons, like schools, roads, shops, health centers, water systems, etc, which disintegrated through loss of mutual trust, in much the same tragic way as Hardin described “The Tragedy of the Commons” some 40 years ago (Hardin 1968). From this it follows that peace is given a better chance when supporting these interacting institutional structures – rather than housing.

8 As claimed in a picture caption accompanying an article by Paddy Ashdown in Developments, Fourth Quarter 2002; 6-7.
9 This does not come explicitly, but emerges as the ultimate consequence of the policies that guide the reconstruction efforts and one which has been discussed among major donor nations, according to Professor Adelman of York University (private conversation, February 2003).
10 OHR/RTTF’s Housing Verification & Monitoring Unit shows disturbing numbers of houses remaining uninhabited (http://www.rrtf-hvm.org/).
8.1.4 HOUSING AND THE NEW WARS
The vigor and extraordinary importance paid to the reconstruction of housing and the rationale people present for doing so, reveals housing’s innate symbolic strength as a personalized object and as a constituent of place, of what gives place part of its meaning. This is all in line with the basic texts presented in Chapter 2.3.

Recognizing the power of place and the personal and intimate character of the dwelling, looting and eventually destroying it, is to administer the ultimate humiliation and punishment to the residents and owners. In present-day identity wars, the killing and destruction is individualized, partly to punish, and partly to cleanse territories. Israel has practiced this in a systematic way since 1967, and through their guidance, the US forces have taken up that practice against members of the anti-US factions in Iraq.

In the identity wars of today houses are ‘killed’; their symbolic meaning sought obliterated. They are also destroyed for functional and territorial reasons. In Bosnia these destructions continued many years after the war was formally over. It happened on both sides for the express purpose of making return impossible. No doubt the total destruction in Bosnia is substantially larger than was registered during IMG’s 1995–1996 assessments.

8.1.5 THE INTERNATIONAL HOUSING RESPONSE
My findings add to what has been written before (cf. Zetter 1995, UNHCR 2000a) on housing being conceived as ‘shelter’, i.e. a temporary solution to what is perceived to be temporary needs – but solved by permanent means, built as ‘tents in Concrete’, as it were.

What comes forward in my research is the pivotal role of the implementing agent, the head of the NGO’s local field office. He – because it has been men throughout – actually runs the activities, and often very independently of the organization’s HQ. When scrutinizing my three cases, their role in effect questions the very nature of the “NGO-thing”. In the field, the “channel” was perceived as not much more than an under-sized funding cable. In the best of cases, certainly not all, the local officer in effect did not need HQ other than for funding and to have somewhere to send his reports. None of the organizations I worked with had staff with any particular insight into, or professional experience about, housing. They became experts by means of the professionals sent on short-term contracts to head the field offices where housing projects were being implemented.

The strategic guidance provided by UNHCR was not generally appreciated as being any better or sounder than the NGO’s own. Hence there was no broadly accepted

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11 Until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq provided financial assistance to the Palestinian families of the destroyed houses.
12 ‘Israel hired to train US killer team for Iraq’, reads the headline on the front page of The Weekly Guardian, December 14, 2003, where this clandestine collaboration is revealed.
hierarchy or UNHCR coordination among the expatriate community in Tuzla (Cutts 1999). As one senior NGO officer said: “If we were to follow the UNHCR directives, we wouldn’t have been able to do anything for the people here”. Fred Cuny said the same (cf. interview with Cuny in Merrill 1995). This only emphasizes the importance placed in people rather than their organizations when in the field. This again makes any local ‘international community of aid workers’ into a major force in forging as well as reproducing guiding perceptions on what to do, and how to do it.

8.2 REVISITING THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND APPLIED METHODS

When analyzing what has been done by virtue of its effect on recovery, I have done so by applying what I called the ‘capital neighborhood approach’. It is a way of understanding how the various findings presented in Chapter 7 interact in support or in opposition to each other. It is a way of uncovering the dynamics initiated or sustained through international housing interventions. These cannot be fully presented by the findings themselves. In real life there is a rich and wide interaction between them. As stated Chapter 2.2.4 we live in an ‘everything-is-connected-to-everything-else’ understanding of the world. This is the backdrop to the ‘capital approach’ of society, my ‘analytical filter’.

When foreign funding, i.e. financial capital, is transformed into fixed capital, and to some degree environmental capital, a number of other transformations affecting human and social capital take place as a matter of course. This is a very basic observation, part of which was embedded in Keynes’ economic theories of the 1930s, and applied by the US government in their New Deal policies. It may well be explained in the structure – agency duality of Giddens (1984) as well. The concept rests on the presupposition that capital modes cannot be substituted. This makes the interaction between them determine the (re)developmental effect of any intervention. As for housing, this interaction can emanate from the way housing is being planned and implemented (backward linkages), or emerge from the way houses are used once built (forward linkages).

In filtering my findings I have found that housing projects which directly enhanced or extended the environmental capital were those in which human and social capital was replenished the most. This would entail that where the housing project makes up part of a ‘place’ as perceived by the primary actors, the immediate impact of the housing project on people’s physical and social well-being seems all the stronger. This is a conclusion supported by (inverse) evidence from Mihatovici and Grapska. Also, the NRC case supports this when branding the house owner the primary actor; it does not if we label the IDPs the primary actor.

13 In effect, this contradicts the controllable order of modernism (Johnson, 2001). Maclellan also applies such a perspective in his writing on housing (Maclellan & Pryce 1998).
‘Place’ is a point in space endowed with meaning, with ‘reputation’ as Tuan says (1980; 6). Pertaining to the IDPs of the NRC project, they preferred to live in Tuzla rather than in the surrounding municipalities. In that sense, Tuzla and the NRC neighborhoods also had a reputation for them. The houses as fixed capital, however, were not able to rub off lasting human or social gains onto the IDPs, beyond enabling them to stay alive with some small measure of dignity, i.e. retaining a small but crucial measure of their human capital. In effect, many of the IDPs were to become more vulnerable as they were later evicted, and sent onwards to somebody else’s ‘place’.

Places then depend on their ‘reputation’, which means that, like reputations, places change. This in turn allows for physical planning, i.e. the ‘creation of new places’. The capital approach explains the creation of new places on the strength of social and human capital to impose meaning into new things and landscapes, i.e. into fixed and environment capital. This has been persuasively shown in recent cases of Israeli settlements in Palestine (Segal & Weizman 2003). There are numerous cases where the strength of IDPs’ social capital has created ‘new places’, realized in conjunction with and defined by physical interventions, be it in Greece (Hirschon 2000), in Kenya (Andreasen 1987), or in Pakistan (Hassan 1999).

What my cases uncover is the ‘special relationship’ between replenished fixed capital (housing) and environmental capital (site), and their impact on the re-formation of human and social capital. It is the meaning attributed to the houses and the location that determines how well they replenish or sustain the other capital modes. This was in fact experienced and documented decades ago in urban renewal projects, like the Boston West End demolition (Porteous & Smith 2001), and subsequently brought into the theory and practice of physical planning (Forester 1989, Sager 1994). My cases show that it also holds true in the context of post-war housing re/construction, and that this relationship is important in contributing towards recovery.

In effect my findings questions the division between fixed capital and environmental capital, the way the Yorkshire research used it on the recommendations of the World Bank (Stafford et al. 2001). As explained in the introductory chapter on my analytical filter, Chapter 5.2, the choice of capital modes will depend on the issues under investigation. Since housing may be defined as both fixed and environmental capital, and since meaning is invariably infused in a similar way into both of them, (which is not the case with the other two capital modes, in fact they are source of these projections), the initial concept sketch Figure 5.2.1 would explain the interaction and the processes of recovery better if it only had three nodes: fixed (physical and environmental), human and social capitals.

Using the capital approach in trying to understand the dynamics of recovery has been helpful. However, beyond the number and nature of capital modes, there is another simplification which has been uncovered. It underestimates values. NRC did
not start out in Tuzla to help house owners relatively unaffected by the war. They went in there because of the homeless. Yet when filtering the data from the NRC scheme, the outcomes of the intervention proves a definite contribution towards recovery: by having provided long-lasting support to the house owner, not to the homeless. Such conclusions do not come forward from the analytical approach directly, but must accompany the analysis. I submit this prior to presenting my sketch on the outcomes of my three cases, cf. Figure 8.3.1, .2, & .3 below.

Fig. 8.2.1 a/b The initial four-legged version on which my analysis have been based, above. And the three-legged version that combine the material capital modes, fixed and environmental, into one, below.
The figure that has accompanied most chapters ends here. I have marked a ‘recovery zone’ on the figures below showing how the findings from each of the cases make up a ‘zone’ on the cross-hairs of capital modes. They are intentionally blurred since these are made up from imprecise, qualitative constellations of findings. Based on these findings the figures show what my investigations claim to be the recovery potential as it stood when I did my fieldwork during the winter of 2001-2002.

**Fig.8.2.1 Case I The NRC Housing Scheme**

**Fig.8.2.2 Case II The NPA Housing Settlement**

**Fig.8.2.3 Case III SRSA’s Return Project to Grapska**

*It is imperative to acknowledge that the cross/hairs figures on the right are not quantitative figures. They are argumentative figures born out of my qualitative data collected to uncover the recovery potential of the cases in question.*
8.1.3 METHODS
The theme is overpowering. It is about war and the slow and arduous road, not back, but forward from the pre-war references that have been painfully twisted and bent by the experience of war and violence. In order to come up with material deemed relevant for responding to the research question, ‘How do internationally funded housing projects implemented in war-ravaged areas affect the recovery processes of the societies assisted?’, I had to address this in a qualitative manner. My own experience has now confirmed that no alternative approach would enable me to uncover how the primary actors\textsuperscript{14} interact with the housing process. This interaction is, in fact, a constituting part of the wider recovery process when recovery is conceptualized as reflexive development.

Housing is a physical object, which acts upon and is acted upon by forces of nature. This is best handled, as I did, in assessing the quality from a practitioner’s point of view, in what could be called a ‘field-based visual appraisal’. This is the way the practitioners in the field at the time of construction also worked. Besides, in analyzing floor plans, site layouts and urban issues, these were based on mature professional experience: my own.

The third element in my investigation, that of housing as a strategic contributor towards economic and social recovery, could have been investigated far more intensely. But time did not allow for that, and hard facts are difficult to come by in an economy where all financial transactions, at least until 1998, were ‘cash in hand’. Through confidential interviews and open access to the NGOs I was able to piece together an understanding of housing’s impact on the regeneration of the national and/or local economy. Funds for housing and buildings construction make up – depending on what post-war year – between 20% and 30% of ODA to BiH,\textsuperscript{15} but not much is know about its true impacts on the national or regional economy. I call for this to be further investigated when suggesting issues for further research.

\textsuperscript{14}I now use this term so as to include the house owners (and not the tenants) in the NRC project.
\textsuperscript{15}Cf. OHR, Sarajevo, Economic Newsletter, Vol. 1 & 2, www.ohr.int
8.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE

In forging a practical approach to housing re/construction in war affected areas there are three basic premises: 1) housing with its symbolic and strategic capacities is about permanent physical structure that will outlast the contingent needs that called for its urgent re/construction; 2) recovery is an indigenous endeavor; an act of reflexive development on the part of the affected society; and 3) internationally funded housing will always be exogenous assistance, which at best will support local agency. In combining the premises the first one touches upon issues pertaining to professional planning and construction, the second on tactical issues handled by the ‘implementing agency’ primarily in the field, and the third on policies and strategies set by donors and NGO headquarters.

Policy and practice is about resources and agency, i.e. about resources, choices and who makes them. In the following I will revisit the ‘agency’ column in my comparing-cases matrix Figure 7.1 and turn my empirical conclusions into normative recommendations. There is no seamless link between the two. It entails ‘leaps of faith’ of sorts, firstly on trusting that the empirically based explanations are valid, and secondly on trusting that explanations derived from bygone events within a defined setting can underpin assumption on future action in a different setting. Yet this is what planning is about.

8.3.1 THE OBJECT

1) Local material resources
There seems to be a buffer of available resources for housing re/construction, however marginalized the region. This is because housing construction, under normal circumstances, is a major, ongoing, low-tech activity in all societies. With war closing down production, materials are stocked by producers, merchants and by private citizens. I present this to defuse the notion that displaced people of war-affected societies can only be sheltered by ready-made foreign housing gifts, however ingenious their design and ‘adaptability’. If they are not taken over by local agency such housing gifts normally obstruct rather than support the course to recovery.

Appropriate housing solutions,¹ may be achieved through improvisation – the capacity to choose opportunities available in an uncertain situation – and by using the building resources and local know-how that are bound to be available.

2) Management
In war and post-war settings the perceptions of time, urgency and mandate (“as many, as cheaply, as quickly as possible”) may distort peoples’ sense of physical realities pertaining to building physics and workmanship standards. Within a short time deficiencies emerge that hardly will be repaired or improved upon because of

¹ Housing that is “warm, dry and dignified” to quote Sam Mocbee (Dean & Hursley 2002).
the prevailing economic situation. By the time they emerge, the implementing NGOs are beyond responsibility or reach.

There is an astonishing lack of building management routines within organizations working with housing construction. They seem to change with each manager-in-charge, and thus differ in time, between field offices, and between organizations. Although this signifies the independence of the field, and the power of their head-of-office, it also opens up for possible malpractice and inventive bookkeeping.

Organizations should introduce a basic TQM framework, a norm for building management, which would enhance efficiency and transparency, including routines for contracts, document handling, for (advance) payments, for liability claims, for tracing decisions, etc. Such a regime would be unrelated to whoever happened to manage a field office, although would have to consider the prevailing practice of the country in question.

There should be a uniform cost reporting regime among NGOs to allow for reliable cost analysis and cost comparisons pertaining to housing projects undertaken. Acknowledging the difficulties in coordinating NGO actions in the field, at least information on cost figures and implementation strategies should be exchanged between NGO. New software is being developed to accommodate such exchange (see http://www.coincide.info).

3) The Manager

My cases all reveal the pivotal role of the field office and the manager-in-charge. The challenges of working with the highly sensitive issue of housing re/construction within a high uncertainty context requires a broad set of qualifications. From my studies, what comes out as the key requirement is "professional intuition". It is the combination of lived life (which in effect means people of age), confidence in one's 'gut feeling' combined with the capacity to improvise, and an extensive experience in professional planning and building. It is tedious to yet again state that housing re/construction is more than bricks and mortar. This requires experience beyond construction. Add to that the ability to work within the context, i.e. work on longer-term contracts, and there is nobody to fill the position. Neither people nor organizations come in those sorts of combinations. I will touch upon this in 5.3.3 below.

Managing the tactical level office in high uncertainty areas, i.e. the field, requires capacities to seize opportunities and avoid risks not detectable by HQ or donor. This requires people with 'professional intuition'.

2 Countries ravaged by 'new wars' are being impoverished, and normally remain poor (Haughton 1998).
3 Total Quality Management is the redeeming term.
4 When Northern Norway was rebuilt and renewed, complaints were made concerning the age of the planners. Young ambitious architects who were in it to change the world did not meet the expectations of the population who were looking for 'adults'. Forty years later, one of the displaced told me something to the effect that 'older people would at least acknowledge our aspirations'.
There is nothing in my cases indicating that local staff, as such, would be better suited to manage housing re/construction programs or projects. In areas of identity conflicts the very quality of being an outsider empowers the manager. But managers are easily fooled. The ‘language game’ sees to that.

4) Construction

In the light of the endless settings where home environments and housing are to be (re)created or new ones established there are principles and approaches needed rather than case-bound empirical references: theory by any other word.

Reconstruction opens up for opportunities of renewing institutions and the physical environment. This is, however, countered by an equal call to bring the train of history back on track, to reestablish the continuity of history, the perceived order as it were. There is no ‘right’ way of resolving this conflict. It is a conflict that lies at the very heart of recovery as reflexive development. It affects the aspirations embedded in housing re/construction. These may be different regarding the bearer of housing gifts and the beneficiaries who are to receive them. This difference is conditioned by: 1) the capacity or power of the bearer of gifts’ to execute, and 2) the beneficiary’s capacity and/or willingness to maintain and accept what is brought in.5

Adding this to the generic issues of building, I would present the following ‘ought tos’:

- **If there is no local and institutionalized policy on housing,**6 housing re/construction should follow in the footsteps of what was there before. Reconstruction is an exceptional opportunity for renewal and improvement, but this is only possible where there is an institutional commitment – and capacity - to uphold and maintain what is being introduced.7 This is not to be taken lightly.
- **Under emergency conditions or under conditions perceived as urgent,** construction should strive for simple, basic solutions in line with what local artisans do well. All projects should be physically linked up to existing infrastructures or form extensions to existing infrastructures.
- **There is no such thing as an ‘emergency house’ (or tent of concrete):** ‘emergency shelter’, yes, but not ‘house’. Houses are conceived as permanent structures capable of responding to changing needs over time, and are in need of upkeep. Even in ‘un-normal’ times houses should therefore be structured as ‘normal houses’ in anticipation of oncoming changes.8 They should be structured in line with the ‘shearing layers model’ presented in Chapter

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5 In the 1990s the secondary school system in Zambia was endangered by the fact that the school buildings were literally falling to pieces. They were built in the 1960s and 1970s, funded by NORAD, but in a way and with buildings materials that were alien to the prevailing maintenance traditions (lecture by Professor Michael Lloyd, Røros, Norway, 1996).
6 In BiH, with a third of its housing damaged or destroyed during war, there were no housing policy documents issued by any political level as of March 2002, six-and-a-half years after the fighting stopped. The foreigners did all the housing re/construction – but sporadically and with no planners (Skotte 2003).
7 This is the opposite of what Hasic & Roberts recommended in *Open House International* (1999).
8 There are probably no finer examples of emergency-built permanent houses than the Swedish-built housing sent to Norway and Finland during WW II (Rikskommittén 1942). I was born in one.
2.2. In order to escape the fallacy, and unnecessary cost, of ‘double reconstruction’, all ‘emergency shelter’ should be built – either – as structures that may be improved and extended into permanent housing, following the principles above, or as structures that due to their siting (e.g. in the middle of streets) or materials (e.g. paper tubes or canvas) are temporary in both the perceptual and physical sense.

- Houses normally last lifetimes. They should be planned for accordingly. The single most important issue on post-war housing is location, i.e. where new housing is being built, or destroyed ones reconstructed. The effects of war lead to different future possibilities from those perceived before violence erupted. Yet there are some basic planning constants, like the generic dynamics connected to locations of sought-after resources, institutional and administrative centers, to lines of communication, etc which necessarily will affect and cause future changes. The endemic weakness of war-affected institutions and economies require committed considerations as to where housing is being (re)constructed, i.e. how they are linked up to these structuring resources and institutions. It is about being able to assess the present and likely future ‘geographical capital’ of a location. This issue cannot be overstated.9

8.3.2. THE TACTICAL APPROACH

Housing is about agency. My cases tell me that for displaced people, housing, perhaps more than any other issue, is saturated with symbolic powers. For the returning Grapskanians it was an existential (yet perhaps temporal) manifestation of being reconnected to their own lives, however distorted by war. For many in Mihatovici the settlement symbolized social marginalization unknown to most of them before the war, whereas the NRC houses symbolized for most of the owners and tenants the chasm between the have and the have-nots of war. There is no way of circumventing meaning being infused into housing. What housing projects mean, what perceptions they create or reproduce, is beyond the donor or NGO. Meaning is the fundamental basis for action. That is why instilled meaning will determine the potential recovery powers embedded in housing. In order to maximize these powers, agency or decision-making powers must be shifted from provider to the people for whom re/construction funding is being provided. This has both policy and practical implications:

- There seems to be no better way of achieving this than through aided self-help. That is a conceptually coherent and well-tested tactical approach to housing. This approach shows its particular strength in these three areas: 1) it lowers the unit cost by lowering the labor cost input,10 which means more housing units per unit international funding; 2) it strengthens the social...

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9 No one knows yet if the grand ‘Imidugudu’ resettlement program will succeed in Rwanda. It was decided by the national authorities that scattered farmsteads were to be ‘centralized’ into new villages where services may be provided. So far, it has had detrimental effects on farming efficiency (UNHCR 2000a).

10 The difference in unit cost is not that big in post-war setting because of extraordinarily low salaries. In BiH, about 20% of total cost was allotted to labor, in Norway a comparable figure would be 50%.
bonding in the community, as all members are involved in ways that create interdependence; 3) by taking on the responsibility of re/constructing your own dwelling in what has been, or what will be your community, you make a strategic investment in your own future, which entails sustained action to secure that very investment.

- Not all houses in war-torn societies will be reconstructed through international funding. Funding will set limits. In addition to the embedded planning issues briefly touched upon above, there is a call for spatial concentration. Aside from obvious security reasons and logistics, it is about creating or re-creating places that sustain themselves through a sufficiently strong material and social momentum. It is about creating a ‘laser effect’ that is recognized also by others to act upon.

- Housing is too personal a symbol to enhance reconciliation between former antagonists. There is absolutely no reference in my own work nor in any of the other projects I know of in BiH that indicate that housing in any dimension has had any impact on the relationship between former antagonists – except that it physically brings people closer together. This will invariably lead to increased contact, although the world is full of examples that physical proximity is by no means sufficient to secure interdependence or even interaction between people who perceives themselves as of ‘different origin’.

8.3.3 THE STRATEGY

Identity wars bring the dwelling to the very center of conflict. Dwellings are looted and destroyed in recognition of their symbolic character – their identity. Houses are being desecrated and killed. These realities make up the ‘field’ for any war – and for any international housing intervention. The proclaimed goals of these interventions are cast wide, not only to shelter, but to contribute towards social, political and economic recovery, towards peace and, as was the case in BiH, towards ‘reestablishing a multi-ethnic society’. All these reasons comprise an overall aspiration of contributing towards societal recovery. On the basis of what I have found out about what housing actually has done to the recovery processes in BiH, the following three sets of recommendations are put forward on strategic issues.12

1. Local Agency

Recovery comprises processes of reflexive development. This requires the decisive participation of local agency for two reasons. First, they are the ones who have ‘been there before’, both in place – and time; they have experienced that the very web of society has been torn apart; they have experienced violence, hardship and personal loss. What they see as meaningful action of reconstruction is affected by these past and recent experiences. Outsiders may perceive the situation differently and forge reconstruction strategies that insiders may not recognize. Second, local

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11 In BiH, the Dutch used SFOR’s ‘hot spots’ area indication as one of their chief location criteria for housing reconstruction, based on the assumption that housing investments and the funds that followed would ‘calm things down’.

12 This applies in principle to the donor level, particularly in environments where NGOs work in the ‘Wilsonian’ tradition. Where NGOs work more independently, strategies are set by themselves. But since these distinctions are becoming more blurred, they apply to both.
actors will be the ones sustaining the various acts of re/construction in the future. These will not be sustained if they are not accepted as meaningful or deemed relevant.

Any housing intervention must be organized in ways that engage the agency of the people for whom housing is being funded. This is the only way to ascertain the necessary spillover from housing investments onto other societal capitals, a necessary prerequisite for sustained (re)development. This shift of responsibilities from provider to provided implies two other changes:

1) The practice of housing as free gifts (to the randomly lucky few) must be altered. Attaining funding or materials for housing re/construction must entail a contractual commitment based on some sort of collateral, 'sweat equity', or through bartering in services.

2) Some sort of housing policy guidelines will have to be developed in order to frame the housing reconstruction, and allow for long-term strategic choices to be made. The characteristically weak institutions of war-affected countries must be assisted in these matters.

Judging from BiH, structures were there but were circumvented by the international agencies for reasons of efficiency – and for "not taking sides" in the conflict.

.2) The NGO String

In practice the NGO ‘channel’ works more like a ‘string’ with two semi-independent units at either end. The field taking on tactical and operational, and at times strategic challenges, and HQ active in lobbying governments for funding, running public relations campaigns and handling accountancy and auditing. In principle, my investigated cases could well have been run by their respective field offices and linked to some government directorate like Norad or Sida. All the emergency programs were government funded anyway. Whatever the realities on the ground, the ‘NGO thing’ will prevail – for public and political reasons. So the focus is on organizational improvements. Some recommendations follow that aim at upgrading the ‘string’ into a housing ‘channel’. This is sought realized through professional overlap between the two nodes:

- The NGO headquarter forge a strategic partnership with an established housing co-op. That way, the ‘non-government – non-market’ nature is retained. The HQ level can now work out organization-wide housing and shel-

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13 This does not refer to the illusive participation referred to in most NGO reports, but participation where responsibilities for choices are shifted from provider to provided.

14 In BiH it is foreigners working for UN agencies and NGOs, people with no training nor previous experience in planning, not to speak of knowledge about Bosnia, that out of almost arbitrary considerations are deciding on where housing is being rebuilt. No physical planners are involved, either international or local. The local planning authorities are concerned, in principle, but their capacity is overstretched as it is, and besides, it is not their revenue being spent.

15 During the war, Tuzla’s urban planning unit spent their time planning a holiday resort on a nearby lake, ‘The Modradc Riviera’.

16 In Norway, this could be The Norwegian Federation of Co-operative Housing (NBBL) or similar organizations.
ter policies, develop strategies, support the tactical level and work out standard routines for the operational level. Raising the professional housing profile would allow HQ to assist the field in their ongoing work – and vice versa. The string would widen. Alternatively, HQ could establish their own housing & shelter unit, but given the fluctuating nature of programs, the people involved would most likely cover other sectors, which is what is there already.

- Provide incentives for expatriate field staff to stay on. There is a dire need to attain some sort of organizational loyalty between short-term field staff and their organization – or vice versa. Former staff should be retained on a roster, and (bi-)annual brush-ups should be undertaken as a means of maintaining skills and interest, and of being professionally and organizationally updated.

- Cleanse the channel for empty words. There are two aspects of this: 1) there should be a requirement to rid reports of jargon words, which disguise rather than clarify the situation in the field. Several writers have commented upon the same as my investigations have uncovered: the lack of substantial and reflected information provided in field reports and in reports passed on to donors. Instead they are full of NGO-speak; 2) the reports from the field, from projects and on achievements should be more true to what takes place. The situation in the field is often much more difficult and complex than presented in initial proposals and subsequent feedbacks to HQ and to donor. Tactics have to reflect context, which in turn may result in other achievements than initially proposed. By not reporting comprehensively, outdated strategies set by misinformed HQ/donor will be maintained.

- State donors should delegate their strategic decisions on support to the field, i.e. to the respective embassies. This is a way of strengthening the ‘aid channel’, of enhancing learning and understanding, and it is a way of ensuring that strategies reflect the contextual flows.

8.3.4 THE DONOR

Within the ‘Wilsonian’ tradition, and in particular in Scandinavia where governments fund most of the emergency activities of the NGOs in full, governments have a strong impact on strategies of assistance. Housing reconstruction became a high

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17 There is a surprising number of field employees bearing grudges against their former NGO employer. This is a general attitude recorded by staff of ‘my’ organizations, but it applies as a general phenomenon, observed in other organizations and by other people.

18 The lingo of the ‘development sector’ is also very much promoted by the donors. The field of emergencies is anything but clear or neatly defined, actions are taken in highly volatile contexts, outcomes are uncertain, and the frame of reference is often shaped by domestic politics. Such circumstances favour a vague terminology. But a vague terminology inhibits learning and improved practices. The evaluation of UNHCR’s housing program in Rwanda brought that to head (UNHCR 2000).

19 Often Final Reports to donor read like the Project Proposal + the Auditor’s report.

20 Outdated strategies being upheld could also be explained by field staff opposition, either because of ‘established field routines’ or – which lies at the heart of the structural division between strategy and tactics – the field staff is too close to the ground to acknowledge the bigger strategic picture.
profile strategy of assistance in the Balkans for two reasons: firstly, it tended to the immediate shelter needs of the ethnically displaced, secondly, it was seen as a means of securing territorial return of the displaced. The latter was part of a joint international attempt to nullify the consequences of the war and reestablish the multi-ethnicity of the region. Housing was assumed to be able to achieve results beyond its shelter function: my work in Bosnia has shown that it does, but perhaps not in the way assumed.

If housing is to support long-term recovery the overall strategy has to consider a number of associated issues:

- **Housing support should be provided in a principled way, not by chance as is the case today. Societal recovery is a collective effort and support should enhance a sense of fairness among the people who have lost their property. That one family gets their house rebuilt for free while the neighbors get nothing seems meaningless in view of what they both have gone through – and the cost involved. Donor conferences should institute a system of damage compensation. This way reconstruction would be a more dynamic enterprise where investments would be made where displaced people saw their future aspirations best served.**

  This could be institutionalized in various ways and in ‘mixed formats’ with possible credit schemes, etc., cf. recommendations under 8.3.1.

- **Support programs should be established to assist physical planning institutions in furnishing planning guidance on long-term housing investments. What is called for is strategic recovery options, if not plans, realistic in reflecting the funds pledged or provided by international donors. Bosnia is an extreme case in point where no economic or physical planning existed to underpin the reconstruction of villages or regions.**

  It has all come about at the discretion, albeit with some guidance from IMG and RRTF, of each of the more than one hundred international agencies and organizations that worked on housing reconstruction in the country.

- **Housing re/construction should be carried out in ways that maximize its high multiplier potential. For each builder employed, several more would be engaged in the production, in transport and in services – if, and only if, the house is built from domestically produced materials. It should be a condition for funding that a given percentage of its total cost, say 80%, should be domestically produced. In war-ravaged countries production plants for building materials are often closed, in which case materials are imported. The re-

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21 Strategic considerations are not part of the reconstruction activities in BiH. Consequently, more than 10,000 of the reconstructed houses are left empty, looted or abandoned according to the Housing Validation and Monitoring Unit (HVM) of RTTF/OHR, Bosnia (conversation with Ms. Hughes (HVM), March 2003).

22 I only know of Sida employing architect planners in their embassy to develop strategies on reconstruction locations. Grapska was a village within what they stated as a viable area for re-development.

23 At least one more and perhaps as many as five, all depending on circumstances (Habitat-ILO 1997).
recovery powers of housing is thus lost in support of economic development in neighboring countries. This leads to the additional recommendation:

- Instigate programs for the production of building materials. As for long-term recovery, this is probably more important than support for housing re/construction. Experience from BiH shows that nothing is being invested during war due to lack of investment capital, capital goods, and general poverty. But more importantly, not much was invested afterwards either since imports were cheap, and trade was the preferred sector of investment. Lacking local production facilities and lacking preferential purchase policies, much of the enormous international housing gifts provided were in fact aiding the neighboring countries. Under such circumstances housing is robbed of some of its most basic recovery powers.

- Housing re/construction should be conceived as a community affair rather than a series of individual housing projects. This would entail the funding of community-wide livelihood projects, extending beyond the sort of ‘start up package’ provided to returnee families in BiH. The focus is on projects beyond housing, but which are parts of the ‘housing network’ required to sustain housing investments. For instance, in my case, Grapska, materials for two houses would buy two used tractors.

The last two issues are for governments only: the first one is on domestic polices towards refugee return. All my cases reveal the extraordinary importance played by the diaspora in providing economic support to people, and in funding private investments in their country of origin.

- Government should refrain from immediately returning refugees from countries ravaged by war because of their important role in providing support, through remittances, to their relatives and to needy people in their home country. Their contribution towards their (former) homeland’s recovery is deemed more effective than traditional ODA, and definitely so if compared to the refugees being sent back to add to the burden of the local economy. One of the most glaring facts of post-war societies is their devastating unemployment.

My case from Grapska convincingly showed that without the physical security provided by SFOR, people would not have dared return to rebuild their village, Therefore:

- In post-war reconstruction settings the presence of international military forces may be necessary in creating the level of security required for housing re/construction to be carried through. Military forces should act to neutralize and reverse the ‘culture of violence’ caused by the preceding conflict. In my case the division of labor was almost absolute between the security

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24 KM 1500 in seeds and manual tools.
forces and the reconstruction forces. It is my recommendation that this division is upheld. International assistance to secure peace and support the recovery processes of war-torn societies is profoundly difficult and represents an immense professional challenge. Each should therefore do what each does best.

Throughout this thesis the incongruity between the emergency culture of the field and the permanent nature of housing has been a recurrent theme. This leads to a final recommendation:

- **When in doubt, stick to tents, or at least stick to genuinely temporary arrangements until housing can be provided within a local setting in line with its potential powers. The most wasteful contribution would be to erect housing that ignored its long-term nature, but merely focused on temporary, urgent needs. The Bosnian experience show that such houses are either abandoned or left for the marginalized part of the population. Such are tents of concrete.**

### 8.4 COLORING THE WHITE SPOTS; A Call For Further Research

My own arena for research has been broad, linking as it does housing, new wars and international response. Throughout my work, both while working in the field and when analyzing my data, I have felt the inherent need to know more. When I failed to meet these calls it was either because I did not have the time to pursue them, - or I discovered that there was nothing there.

The field of post-war recovery has large white areas of vacant research ground. I hasten to add that there has be an extraordinary expansion particularly within the field of political science during the last decade, which – in the prevailing manner of their discipline – has primarily focused on quantitative aspects of internal wars, through which researchers seek the wars’ probable causes and try to identify issues that may prevent them from breaking out (Berdal & Malone 2000, Nafziger et al. 2000, Stedman et al. 2002, Collier et al. 2003). At the other end, within the traditional social sciences of sociology, human geography and anthropology, much important work on the plight and agency of refugees and displaced people has been coming forth (Malkki 1995, Harrel-Bond & Voutira 1995, Zetter 1999, Kibreag 2002). With links to both arenas, but with an emphasis on international (humanitarian) interventions and the concepts guiding them, run the works of Kaldor (1999, 2001), Macrae (2001), Duffield (2002) and others. In spite of this there is still a number of key issues that needs tending to in order to understand the dynamics – or paralysis – of recovery. These issues could favorably be investigated as multi-disciplinary research in which housing re/construction could be the mediating issue given its importance both to the societies affected by internal wars – and the high funding volume involved on the part of the donors.
The following presentation contains mere inception sketches, yet they touch upon themes that have appeared to me and my contacts in the field as important:

**8.4.1 AIDED SELF-HELP HOUSING.**
In post-war reconstruction settings where the arena is reigned by NGOs, old arguments are incessantly repeated, unsubstantiated claims bravely presented, and cost comparisons made between non-comparable figures, and so forth. There is more to the self-help housing approach than I have uncovered, such as its true capacity building powers on issues of trade skills, management, labor time, organizational structuring, and not least on cost and cost determinants. In addition what is not looked into at all is the psychological and social regenerative powers of self-help in war and disaster ravaged contexts. I have made a tiny contribution through my Grapska case, but self-help housing’s wider re/developmental impact needs further investigation. All the more so since the World Bank has advocated against it as a ‘development strategy’ (World Bank 1993).

**8.4.2 THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF INTERNATIONAL HOUSING INVESTMENTS**
The large sums allotted to housing re/construction in areas of war are in effect regular housing investments, and as such act upon the local economy in certain ways. We know little about the course of the funds once spent. The World Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit claims that “Aid is considerably more effective in augmenting growth in post-conflict situations than in other situations, but the pattern of aid matters, [ however] this is based on judgment rather than quantitative analysis” (CPRU/WB 2002;1). My small peek into the impacts of these investments reveals a blurred picture affected by what Duffield (2000) called ‘transborder trade’; I see imports rather than domestic production, I see tied aid, and by the absence of financial institutions, I see an opaque economic culture based on payments in cash. In Bosnia most of the reconstruction works that took place from 1992 to 1997 were paid for in cash brought in by field officers in bags and briefcases. Tens of millions of DEM were channeled into the economy this way. It is not only the “pattern of aid” that matters, it is probably also the “pattern of the economy”. To get to grips with this calls for methodological approaches best handled by the professional insight of social economists. I see this as one of the major fields for future research on post-war recovery.

**8.4.3 THE DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF REMITTANCES FROM ABROAD**
These remittances from Bosnians in exile to their relatives in BiH has surpassed net ODA to Bosnia-Herzegovina during the post-war years. My Grapska experience showed how these remittances were re-circulated within the community in ways that invigorated the economy and enhanced the environment. But it also showed that remittances were more likely to be spent on imports than were, at least in case of Grapska, the funds provided by the aid agency. Aside from their economic impacts, the remittances are also manifestations of the refugees’ psychological attachment to the ‘old country’. And the other way around, these remittances and their tangible results in the BiH, also stand as expressions of the international interdependence, globalization, by any other name, that is taking place at the grass-
root level, the impact of which is yet to be fully exposed. The world-wide impacts of international remittances is now being gradually acknowledged (Kapur & McHale 2003), but remittances may prove to play a distinctive role in countries ravaged by factional wars; besides their affecting the economy, they may also strengthening the respective identities of the parties in conflict.

8.4.4 LONGITUDINAL STUDIES ON THE PEOPLE DISPLACED THROUGH 'ETHNIC CLEANSING'
Through my interviews I was often given horrific stories on violent expulsions. The displaced went through crucial 'life events' which altered their outlook and their subsequent actions. Their core aspirations and their life strategies were forever changed. So how did it go? Based on social and anthropological research similar to that of Bringa (1995) done prior to the 1992-1995 war could be used as a basis for such longitudinal studies. The communities in question could be followed into the war, and into the complex processes of post-war recovery. What were the determining issues in choices of return, of staying put, or emigrating? Such follow-up research could document and help explain the war based changes and, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, help clarify how the concept and practice of ‘multi-ethnicity’ has changed. These are core concepts in understanding identity wars.

8.4.5 PHYSICAL RECONSTRUCTION AS RECONSTRUCTION OF SELF
This is a heading formulated by terms used in crisis psychology. In the terminology I have used throughout this thesis this would be referred to as interaction between (the replenishment of) fixed and human capital. Although war and violent displacement are major stressors which are bound to have serious impacts on people’s health and capacity to act, they are superficially and speculatively handled, if handled at all, by most agencies working in the field. Some NGOs, NPA among them, established a number of centers in Bosnia to help the most severely traumatized. But the number of cases far outnumbered the capacity of these centers, which gradually had to reduce their intake in line with the drying up of international support. From my experience what is required are appropriate methods of helping people with war traumas, or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in situations where the numbers of cases far exceed the capacity of required treatment.25 Treatment has to take place by proxy, as it were.26 Building houses and (re)creating material environments are both physical activities which might serve as a vehicle, or method, of treating people who have been psychologically wounded by the war. This is already taking place irrespective of its therapeutic powers, although tactics may be shaped by the agents’ own psychological speculations. I would like to see the field of crisis psychology do research in the field of housing to find out if there are ways of combining methods of treatment with the act of housing re/construction. What we need to know is if housing is able ‘to do’ this, and in case, how it is to be done.

25 There are documented work being done on treatment methods for people having been psychologically scarred by war, see Heidi Holland’s work in Mozambique (2001), but these are not directly linked to, or made part of other programs, say on re-housing.
26 In both my cases from Tuzla displaced families, yet total strangers, were set to live together at a level of intimacy reserved only own family. If people who knew each other, and had been through the same ordeals together, were to share space, chances are that their shared experience would allow them to exchange feelings in a way the could have therapeutic effects. This is a mere example as I have scant knowledge of psychological therapy.
ADDENDUM

During the night when the manuscript was submitted the most obvious proposal for further research, the one I plan to pursue was left out.

The Challenges of War Related Forced Urbanization

The current wars lead to forced urbanization. Most conflicts are identity conflicts fought to gain control over exploitable natural resources in rural areas. This presses 'the otheres', the displaced into the cities for reasons of security, but also to gain access to what international organizations may provide in terms relief, and possible employment of sorts.

These movement to urban centers of ethnically homogeneous groups hold certain characteristics that merits further investigation. How is their anticipated strong social capital transformed into the other capital modes in their plight to reestablish community in a totally new setting where the other capital modes are either non-existent or rendered irrelevant.

Whereas my present thesis investigated the effects of replenishing fixed capital on the other societal capitals, and analyzing their composite impacts on the recovery process, what is suggested here is the opposite. How does social and human capital facilitate the formation of fixed and environmental capital? Or simply: how do the migrants forced into urban areas because of identity wars shape their environment, and how are they assisted?

Hans Skotte
24 April 2004
PART SIX
REFERENCES AND APPENDICES
9 BIBLIOGRAPHY


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REFERENCES AND APPENDICES


REFERENCES AND APPENDICES


REFERENCES AND APPENDICES


REFERENCES AND APPENDICES


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REFERENCES AND APPENDICES


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REFERENCES AND APPENDICES


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10 APPENDICES

10.1 CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS
.1) Lists made prior to Case I – later modified
.2) Guiding Themes When Interviewing Secondary Agents

10.2 CONTRACT DOCUMENTS FROM A SINGULAR NRC Tuzla Model case
.1) Picture of the house
.2) Floor plans as executed by NRC
.3) Contract between Tuzla Municipality and house owner
.4) Contract between NRC and house owner
.5) Appendix to contract
.6) NRC's Technical Specifications and Performance Requirements

10.3 CONTRACT DOCUMENTS FROM A SINGULAR CASE IN GRAPSKA
.1) Agreement between house owner and SRSA
.2) Enclosed drawing

10.4 IMG’S APPRAISAL SHEET FOR GRADING DAMAGES TO HOUSING

10.5 IMG SUMMARY ON DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION OF BiH DWELLINGS

10.6 IMG’s STANDARD FOR HOUSING RE/CONSTRUCTION OF 1998

10.7 UNHCR’S STANDARD FOR HOUSING REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION

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1 The following four set of interview forms were made prior to investigating CASE I. The idea was to learn from these interviews when going into the second and third case. This was also how it came to work. Within only a few interviews the questions were modified and reduced, partly as a result of a reflexive process, partly on the advice of Steinar Kvale (1999). His advice on inquiry is to first address the “what”, seek the “facts” (as perceived), then find out how the issue was handled, say, on how people organized their when living in overcrowded settlements, or how they were able to paid for their housing extensions. Finally we ask for their reasons, their response on the ‘why’ question. So rather than all these pages, by the end of my field work my questions spin around these three basic questions.

2 This set-up was made prior to going to the field. When encountering the realities, the set-up was much simplified. Basically holding on to the substance of the headlines.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>AGENCY/INTERVIEWEE</strong></th>
<th>date/place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>organization:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>name of interviewee:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relation to project:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>position/period in post/ age bracket/gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional background/previous experience relevant to pw housing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGENCY DATA in the year(s) in question – and –at the time – recent change financial turnover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>key sectors of competence – then/now</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous relevant experience; BiH, housing projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>link from these to present project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional assistance on housing issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy on cooperation on professional matters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff capacity building policy/seminars/feed-back routines/library services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10.1 CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS

.1) Lists made prior to Case I – later modified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDP/TENANT</th>
<th>date/place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

AGENCY:

1. PERSONAL DATA

.1 address

.2 name of interviewee:

.3 identified as beneficiary by whom – on what criteria

.4 former/present occupation - means of income

.5 family size/age bracket/ – CHANGE since displacement:

.6 Pre-displacement place and type of residence

.7 Time and circumstances of displacement

2. PRESENT RESIDENCE

.1 area, shared facilities, no of rooms, part of potential flat area. CHANGE

.2 flat services, water, electricity, heating – CHANGE during occupancy

3. INTERACTION PERSON/RESIDENCE

.1 period of occupancy

.2 present/former rent per month

.3 CHANGES within flat - or in external/internal common areas, initiated by tenant

4. CONDITIONS SET BY AGENCY ON ISSUES PERTAINING TO PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION MODES, POST-PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND TO ORIGIN OF BUILDING MATERIALS.

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CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS

1. Lists made prior to Case I – later modified

HOUSE OWNER

PROJECT AGENCY:

1. HOUSE OWNER DATA
   .1 address
   .2 name of interviewee:
   .3 identified as beneficiary by whom – on what criteria
   .4 family size /age bracket:
   .5 former/present occupation, means of income, previous house building experience
   .7 house formally registered by authorities, in whose name

2. HOUSING DATA
   .1 physical data: building size, no of flats, materials, potential for overall extension
   .2 re to urban structure, roads, utilities, schools, markets, places of employment:
   .3 reconstructed, rental area; part of potential flat area
   .4 Owner-initiated CHANGES during or post project period

3. INTERACTION RENTAL SPACE/TENANTS
   .1 tenants during project period, family size, period of tenancy
   .2 tenants post project period
   .3 voluntary or contractual participation by tenant into physical changes
   .4 present/former rent per month

4. CONDITIONS SET BY AGENCY ON ISSUES PERTAINING TO PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION MODES, POST-PROJECT MANAGEMENT OR TO ORIGIN OF BUILDING MATERIALS
10.1 CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS

.1) Lists made prior to Case I – later modified

KEY PROJECT DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. AGENCY</th>
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</thead>
</table>

2. INITIAL PROJECT APPLICATION DATA

.1 PROJECT RATIONALE; FORMULATED PROJECT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

.2 INCEPTION; APPLICATION DATE TO (WHAT) DONOR

.3 BUDGET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME/FUNDS</th>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FINAL ACCOUNT</th>
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</thead>
</table>

.4 TARGET GROUP/DIRECT BENEFICIARIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOs AS PER APPLICATION/AS PER COMPLETED PROJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

CHANGE – EXPLANATION FOR POSSIBLE DEVIATION

.5 DBs IDENTIFIED BY WHOM

.6 ON WHAT CRITERIA - DEFINED BY WHOM?

.7 DB INVOLVEMENT INTO PLANNING/BUILDING/ MANAGEMENT; WHEN AND HOW

7. PLANNING

.1 LOCAL PROFESSIONAL TEAM ENGAGED, why were these chosen?

.2 PLANNING GOALS AND MANDATE SET BY AGENCY

.3 ‘REALTIONSHP’ TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES, how ‘manifested in practice’?

.4 ‘EXIT STRATEGY’, MANAGEMENT SUPPORT, HANDING-OVER TO WHOM, WHEN?

8. BUILDING

.1 CONTRACTORS names and trade, pre-war/present turnover

.2 TENDERING AND/OR SELECTION PROCEDURES, ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

.3 NOs OF LABOR EMPLOYED. WHAT CATEGORIES (“war vet.s”, “refugees”, self)

.4 PLACE OF ORIGIN OF (MOST OF) MATERIALS USED to be further investigated

9. CONDITIONS SET BY AGENCY ON ISSUES PERTAING TO PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION MODES, POST-PROJECT MANAGEMENT OR TO ORIGIN OF BUILDING MATERIALS

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GUIDING THEMES WHEN INTERVIEWING SECONDARY AGENTS, INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, NGOS, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, CONTRACTORS AND ‘FUNCTIONAL OTHERS’

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1A) Do the project in any substantial way change ‘normal practice’?
1A.1 How did it all start,? Background? Historical references?
1A.2 Prior professional experience, building, housing, urban planning?
1A.3 Conceived, formulated as a continuation of previous practice?
1A.4 In what way was this new? Sector, elements of input?
1A.5 Why was this NGO chosen/awarded this project?
1A.6 Earlier experience with these types of projects – in areas of war?
1A.7 Organizing the project – in principle – like any other building project?

1B) General political agreement about the project?
1B.1 Political consensus about this type of intervention? Sources of doubt?
1B.2 Media? Any activities directed at ensuring press support?

1C) Scale of the intervention, degree of change
1C.1 Choice of scale, relative to other projects. Why the the chosen scale?
   How did the scale affect the way it was treated? Handled? Political importance?

1D) Level of attention and interest focusing on this particular project
1D.1 How many other projects competed for attention – within the area? BiH? Other ‘hot-spots’? A ‘prestige case’? Entrance project – for subsequent contracts?

1E) The symbolic dimension of the project
1E.1 Project seen as political manifestation? – what about the subsequent political attention, control, evaluation, feedback – used in subsequent political manoeuvring?
10.1 CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS

.2) Guiding Themes When Interviewing Secondary Agents

1F) Are those directly affected involved in any decisionmaking?

1E.1 Who were they, and how were they involved? At what stage, to what extent? For what purpose? – or – why not?

1E.2 Local authorities as ‘the participating body’ – who, why, for what purpose? – why not more? – or less?

1E.3 Reference to participation as a prerequisite for development: Reasons why – why not end-user ‘participation’ was deemed relevant?

2 INITIAL INPUT

2A) (un)ambiguity in political statements and goals formulation

2A.1 Formulations from one level to the next: from donor to NGO etc? What overriding policy formulations guided the project? The clarity of the terms used – allowing for several courses of action, and/or different priorities? Could the project have been implemented in several ways – by other actors?

2B (Technical) Complexity of the policies to be pursued

2B.1 Logistics: How the materials, manpower, communication, weather – and fighting affected the formulation of the project and the choice of implementation strategies?

2B.2 Who – how many – interacting agents were involved?

2B.3 Who were the ‘controlling parties’, donors, other agencies, UNHCR, local authorities? Reporting to whom – frequency?

2C The Validity of the ‘Program Theory’

2c.1 Envisioned goals/anticipated achievements by the intervention? What were the primary goals? What options were available – why this one? What if nothing was done – or something ‘totally different’? How did the envisioned ‘indirect’ effects influence the tactics and operations chosen?

2C.2 How was adaptibility for future change handled? Re choice of site, location, technology and construction, Future end use? Who decided, on what grounds, What financial considerations was involved? Role of UNHCR, and local/central authorities?
3 IMPLEMENTATION (from decision to act – until output is complete)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. COMPREHENSION</th>
<th>a) Local authorities</th>
<th>b) Local networks</th>
<th>c) Implementing agencies</th>
<th>d) Local business interests</th>
<th>e) Primary Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understand what this is about; the major goals, long-term, peace</td>
<td>Political level Bureaucratic level</td>
<td>ref. organization old and new local power networks Political/ethnic strongmen</td>
<td>Main NGO UNHCR co-oper. NGOs</td>
<td>directly involved indirectly involve War profiteers</td>
<td>owner, tenants, gender, children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. ABILITY</th>
<th>command of resources</th>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. WILL</th>
<th>public choice theory – (ego) Regulatory capture theory commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4. ADDRESSEES – initial situation – subsequent slide/evolution

4A.1 Comprehension.
How were the addressees informed, made to understand the goals of the project? How did they see the intervention? Intervention as long-term, contribution towards reconciliation, peace?

4A.2 Will.
Willingness to ‘sacrifice’ in order to take part. Commitment? What would they rather do? Options? Professional or social ethos?

4A.3 Resources.
What did they command? What were their contributions?

4A.4 Organization.
Collective or individual relationship to project? How did it relate to ethnic division? Key people, initiators?
4A.5 General state of Affairs.

4B Formative moment.
   The right – or – wrong time.
   How did intervention - in time – affect the response from the addressees?
   What are current ‘time potentials’?

4C Regulatory capture strategies.
   How did addressees try to capture project on own terms (dependency?
   coping strategies?)? – try to camouflage other benefits/justify needs? – outright
   undermine project?

4D Free riders
   Were the addressees about to solve their housing problem on their own?
   What options were in question?

5. MONITORING AND CONTROL

5.1 How was the project to be evaluated?
   What were the key indicators?
   Reported to whom?
   Report procedures; from HQ, field?
   What happened?

6. OTHER POLITICAL OR POLICY PRIORITIES, OTHER INTERESTS

6.1 Other –competing- priorities or agendas within the local political apparatus?

6.2 Competition among NGOs on housing, on funding?
   different agendas within agency?

6.3 Support or obstruction from other international/local bodies, army/S/UnproFOR?

6.4 UD-Emergency - Norad relationship, how was this relationship perceived, or
   activated?

7. MARKET – and subsequent change

7.1 What expectations were expressed initially by the key actors in supporting the
   local market?
   ‘Market’ depends on communication (transparency-information flow)
   - how was that acieved?
   What are the key market differences then-now? manifested how?

7.2 What was the “market” at the time of intervention
   -how and when did it change. Driving force for change? Manifested how?

   Economic communication, banking system?, credit system? DM? Cash?

   Materials production, availability, source? Loss, theft, sihponing?

   Labour, salaries, selection criteria of staff.
10.1 CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS

2) Guiding Themes When Interviewing Secondary Agents

Logistics, transport, fuel, organization, co-ordination

7.3 Who were the actors, how were they identified?
Old – new power structures, always the same ones? Outsourcing? Black mail?

8. PREVAILING CONDITIONS at the time of intervention – and onwards

8A IN the Field:
8A.1 Anticipations on the course of the war or the emerging peace/normality
Security issues, food delivery, provisions, public services

8A.2 How the situation affected the specific actors involved – their personal references.

8A.3 Perspectives on time. How did these manifest themselves in personal choices.

8A.4 Experience of time passed. History, WWII, future, children, aspirations

8A.5 How do the project fit these personal perspectives?

8A.6 How were information about the general situation obtained/disseminated

8B IN the donor/expat/NGO community
8B.1 Perspectives on input, anticipation of impact on the overall situation

8B.2 Agency build-up and organizational inertia. Data on actual activity over time

8B.3 Scale of media coverage, official policy, in support of these types of intervention.

8B.4 Role of private interests in exporting hardware, tied aid?

These points will be raised to illuminate the situation as it was at the time of the implementation – but – they will also be raised to describe the situation to-day and thus show the change having taken place.
The ‘NRC house’ for which the following five documents were issued
LOVRIC KARLO - KISELDJA
4/2 BEDS - 4 WEEK - 35000 DM - (833)

GROUND FLOOR - 20 BEDS

LOFT - 22 BEDS

ZVINICE
1.7.94.

Lovric Karlo
AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

NRC .................................................. AS AN INVESTOR

AND

LOVRIĆ KARLO .................................. AS A CONTRACTOR

1. NRC is ordering and LOVRIĆ KARLO is accepting to execute all needed construction and other works in the accordance to attached NRC standards.

2. The contractor is accepting to execute the all mentioned works for the fixed sum of DEM 35,000/.

3. Both sides are agreed that starting construction date is 1.7. and the completion date is 12.8. days from the date of advance payment.

4. The penalty for each day of delay is 0.5% of the contract amount.

5. The investor has taken the obligation to pay the contractor 30% of the contract amount in advance, further payments will be according to the execution completion of works, and final payment of 10% of the contract amount will be payed after the works are taken over.

6. As a part of this contract the following documents shall be deemed:

   1. Agreement between Zivinice Community and the Houseowner
   2. NRC Completion Standards

7. The owner is familiar with the content of this contract and has accepted the execution of works which give accommodation for 42 DP’s in a period of 2.5 years from the day of construction works completion.

CONTRACTOR

LOVRIĆ KARLO

HOUSEOWNER

DATE: 1.7.94

LOVRIĆ KARLO
AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT IS MADE BETWEEN

____________________ COMMUNITY AS THE TENANT

AND

HOUSEOWNER MR/MS LOURID KARLO

ADDRESS KISELAK

1. THE OWNER OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED HOUSE WILL GET HIS PROPERTY COMPLETED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT IT HAS CAPACITY TO ACCOMMODATE 40 DISPLACED PEOPLE. THE DP’S WILL HAVE TO THEIR DISPOSITION GROUND FLOOR + FIRST FLOOR.

2. THE WORKS WILL BE CARRIED OUT ACCORDING TO NRC’S STANDARDS.

3. THE HOUSEOWNER COMMITS HIMSELF TO ACCEPT THAT THE SAID NUMBER OF DP’S SHOULD STAY IN HIS HOUSE FREE OF CHARGE FOR A PERIODE OF 2.5 YEARS FROM THE DAY OF COMPLETION.

4. WHEN THE CONTRACT EXPIRES THE HOUSEOWNER’S REWARD IS THAT HE WITHOUT EXPENCES MAY UTILIZE THE WHOLE HOUSE INCLUDING CONSTRUCTION WORK AND FIXED INSTALLATIONS SUPPLIED BY THE DONOR AND WHICH FROM THE SAME DATE IS SOLELY HIS PROPERTY.

5. THE MUNICIPALITY HAS THE RIGHT FOR UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT WITH THE HOUSEOWNER IN THE CASE THAT HE/SHE DOES NOT ACTS ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.

6. THE APPENDIX NO. SP___/1 IS THE CONSTITUENT PART OF THIS AGREEMENT.

DATE 1.7.94

_________________ TENANT

_________________ COMMUNITY

_________________ HOUSEOWNER
APPENDIX SP /1

1. THE DP’s WILL ENJOY FULL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM, WHICH IS TO SAY THE DP’s TOGETHER WITH THE HOUSEOWNER AND HIS FAMILY ENJOY MUTUAL JURIDICAL PROTECTION.

2. THE HOUSEOWNER OBLIGES HIMSELF TO GIVE TO THE TENANT HIS OWN INDIVIDUAL HOUSING OBJECT/FLOOR GROUND FLOOR FIRST FLOOR WHICH HAS BEEN BUILT WITH PERMISSION NO. FROM THE DATE 19__ CADASTRE ITEM NO. _______ ISSUED BY THE MUNICIPAL SECRETARIAT FOR URBANISM, CONSTRUCTION AND PROPERTY- LEGISLATION WORKS FOR THE ACCOMMODATION FOR DP’s. WITHOUT REWARD FOR THE PERIOD OF 2,5 YEARS STARTING FROM THE DAY OF COMPLETION OF THE OBJECT FROM THE SIDE OF NRC C/O UNHCR AS THE DONATOR AND INVESTOR.

3. THE HOUSEOWNER OBLIGES TO PROVIDE THE SPACE FOR STORAGE OF FIRE WOOD AND COAL FOR THE WINTER.

4. THE HOUSEOWNER OBLIGES WITHIN THREE DAYS STARTING FROM THE DAY OF EXECUTED CONSTRUCTION WORKS, COMPLETION OF THE OBJECT TO HAND IT OVER TO THE TENANT. IF HE SHE DOES NOT DO SO FROM THE UNJUSTIFIED REASONS HE SHE IS OBLIGED IN THE NEXT PERIOD OF 15 DAYS TO GIVE BACK ALL WHAT WAS INVESTED OTHERWISE Tuzla MUNICIPALITY WILL TAKE OVER THE OBJECT AT THEIR DISPOSAL.

5. THE HOUSEOWNER IS AGREED THAT AFTER TAKING OVER OF THE OBJECT WHEN PASSING OF 2,5 YEARS TIME HE SHE WILL REPAIR BY HIS HER OWN INVESTMENTS ALL THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY REGULAR USAGE OF THE OBJECT FROM THE SIDE OF DP’s WITHOUT ASKING FOR THE COMPENSATION FROM THE TENANT.

6. THE TENANT OBLIGES TO RETURN THE OBJECT TO THE HOUSEOWNER AT DISPOSAL USE AFTER THE PERIOD OF 2,5 YEARS IS PASSED AND AS A REWARD HE SHE WILL BE GIVEN ALL THE INVESTMENTS SPENT FOR COMPLETION REHABILITATION OF THE OBJECT.

7. ALL MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TENANT AND HOUSEOWNER WILL BE SOLVED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENTS AND IN THE CASE THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE THE BASIC COURT IN Tuzla WILL BE IN CHARGE.

[Signatures]

TENANT COMMUNITY

DATE 17 1994
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Red. broj</th>
<th>NAZIV ROBE</th>
<th>Jed. mjere</th>
<th>Kolčina</th>
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<th>IZNOS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>STRUK 17.03.97 g.u. VLASTINU KUĆE LOVRIĆ KARLO PREDAJ KUĆU</td>
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<td>OD KUĆE KDŽ O.D. NAPO NAPLAČA</td>
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<td>PO PRIJEVU KUPCA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Izdao: [Signature]

Prima: [Signature]
NRC-Building Team - Tuzla
Rudnik Building - Kreka
Mira Trifunovic 6
75000 Tuzla
Telephone 215 932

NRC-SHELTER PROJECT

GENERAL SPECIFICATION OF FINISHES

These Specifications shall be used with contracts for the NRC Shelter Project in Tuzla. They may be superseded by particular specifications or descriptions applicable to the particular contract. Where details are not provided here, it is expected that the quality and solution used shall conform to the normal requirements for such work in the country and good workmanship. If the specifications are unclear, descriptions are missing or inadequate or where alternative methods or materials are proposed, the NRC Building Team shall be contacted for clarification and instructions.

The houseowner may at his/her own expense exceed the requirements specified herein.

1. General.

The specifications in this section apply to all rooms where not particularly otherwise specified herein or in separate particular specifications.

1.1. Floors
Concrete flooring on ground shall be finished with damp-proof course [PVC sheeting or equal] under 50 mm thermol insulation [glasswool or other of equal quality]. Concrete floors above ground (between stories) do not need insulation. Floors made of wooden structures shall be insulated with 50 mm glasswool or equal. Surface shall be floor- or parquet (no polish or varnish).

1.2. Inside walls.
Walls made of brickwork/blockwork shall be plastered and whitewashed or painted. Other walls shall be finished with suitable wall panelling or wainscots and painted or varnished as required and/or instructed.

1.3. Ceilings.
Ceilings made of concrete shall be plastered and whitewashed or painted.

1.4. Roofs
Shall be insulated with glasswool, minimum 50 mm with damp-proof course [PVC or equal] between insulation and ceilingboards. The inside shall be finished with ceilingboards or wooden panelling and painted or varnished as required and/or instructed.

1.5. Windows.
Windows frames and surrounds shall be painted or treated with suitable water-resistant paint or varnish. Minimum thickness of window panes is 3 mm glass. All rooms to be used for habitation, and kitchens and bathrooms, shall have at least one window which can be opened. All necessary ironmongery shall be included.

1.6. Doors
Shall be built in the openings to walls as required, using solid and durable materials and treated as specified for windows. All doors to be with all necessary ironmongery, including lock and keys.

1.7. Electrical instalations
Shall, where not described otherwise below, consist of minimum one light fixture with bulb with wall switch and one socket in every room.

2. Kitchen

2.1. Walls.
Walls shall preferably be painted with water-resistant gloss paint where not covered with tiles.
Ceramic tiles (wall tiles) shall be fixed to wall from the top of the sink, about 500 mm up and at least as wide as the sink unit.

2.2. Kitchen Sink unit.
The kitchen sink shall consist of a single sink unit made of stainless steel with at least one bowl and a surface for placing dishes, and a cabinet (cupboard with doors) below.

3. Bathroom

3.1. Floors.
Shall be finished with ceramic tiles (floor tiles) and with skirting of one ceramic tile around the walls.

Initials, NRC:..............

359
3.2. Walls shall preferably be painted with waterproof gloss paint where not covered with tiles. Ceramic tiles shall be put on walls where sanitary installations are fitted up to a height of at least 1800 mm.

3.3. Electrical Installations
shall include a control unit placed outside the door with switches for light and water heater. An electric water heater to be installed inside the bathroom where not otherwise specified.

4.0. Stairways, corridors, balconies and pantries.

4.1. Floors to stairways shall be made of stone or tiles. The finish of flooring of stairways, pantries and external corridors shall be done with steel-travelled cement screed. Internal corridors to be finished as described in 1.1. above.

4.2. Railing shall consist of metal posts with wooden boards and handrails to approval. Inside railings may alternatively be made with posts made of wood. Railings to be painted or varnished.

5. Plumbing and Sewage

5.1. Plumbing in kitchen: Kitchen sink shall have at least one cold water tap. The outlet from the bowl shall be with drainage, and the outlet pipes shall be connected to the main sewage system.

5.2. Sanitary installations in bathroom: The sanitary installations shall consist of one WC-pot with flush-cistern, one wash hand basin with taps and one shower with mixing-battery.

5.3. Plumbing works: All plumbing works required for the above items to be provided, including cold water pipes and hot water pipes from the water heater to the shower and wash hand basin, and necessary drains and outlet pipes for the installations. All outlets from sink, wash-basin and shower to be complete with water locks.

5.4. Water: The house shall be connected to the municipal water works or another suitable water source, by underground pipes if not otherwise instructed.

5.5. Sewage: All outlets for drains from building to be connected to suitable sewage pipes and connected to a municipal sewage system or to an underground septic tank with outlet to covered infiltration trench or pit, or equal and approved system with adequate capacity.

6. Other works

On completion of the work, the ground around the building shall be cleared of building rubble and other debris. The inside of the building shall be cleaned and ready for use.

7. Owner's agreement:

I agree that all work to be done on my house on the contract with NRC shall comply with these specifications.

Date:…………………………. Sign:………………………………………………

Name:…………………………………………………………………….

Initials, NRC:……………………..
A. The Implementing Partner agrees to repair the House to a standard of basic conditions (the “rehabilitation works”). Depending on the state of the property, the following material will be provided as necessary to bring the house to a basic standard. This will include one or more chosen room(s) (depending on family size), kitchen and bathroom (see enclosed specification of material).

1. The house-owner is obligated to do all needed work himself in accordance to the attached SRSA specification, annex no 1 which will be handed-over together with this contract, the maximum time-limit shall however not exceed 75 working days from start of work. The start of work shall commence within 7 days from that the first material is delivered. If not SRSA will retract the material from the house-owner.

2. The delivering of building material is divided into 7 stages:

   Material for:
   Stage 1 - External and internal walls
   Stage 2 - Roof construction, roof tiles, tin
   Stage 3 - Doors and windows for chosen rooms
   Stage 4 - Wall plastering in the chosen room(s) and kitchen
   Stage 5 - *Plumbing and electrical works
   Stage 6 - *Plastering of walls and remaining inside works
   Stage 7 - *Ceramic tiles for kitchen and bathroom, completion of floor and ceiling
   (* will be received if it existed in the pre-war standard)

The house owner is responsible for delivered, not yet used, building material. Delivered material is in the property of SRSA until the moment that the material is used in the construction.
3. SRSA is not responsible for the present construction.

4. Possible obscurities that may occur shall be solved between the municipality and the house-owner.

5. SRSA and the municipality will immediately terminate the agreement with the house-owner in the case that he/she does not act according to the provisions of the agreement.

6. The house-owner, by signing this agreement, states by documents proves that the building in this agreement belonged to him before the war and that he is still the legal owner. He is also obliged to return together with his family to above mentioned building after adaptation is finished, and when DOBOJ municipality decide that the living conditions are sufficient. The house-owner is not to adapt the house in purpose to sell, or rent it out, if not otherwise agreed upon with DOBOJ municipality.

7. The Beneficiary agrees to deregister from his/her current municipality of residence (if different to the Municipality) and regulate his/her status with the Municipality as soon as possible after his/her return. The Municipality agrees to register the Beneficiary and all members of his/her household immediately on receipt of their request for registration and to provide them with all necessary documents, including ID card.

8. The Beneficiary agrees that if she/he fails to return in a time of 5 months after start of the project, the Municipality have the right to allocate the house to displaced persons for at least two years temporary use. The Beneficiary will remain the right to return to the house, but agrees to give a minimum of four months notice to the Municipality before doing so. The Municipality agrees to identify viable alternative accommodation for the temporary occupants during this period and ensure that the House is vacant for the Beneficiary’s return.

9. What was said here depends on the present and future development of the war and its impact on the possibilities to implement this project as intended. SRSA/Sida will continuously assess the situation and decide whether to continue the program or not. If the war situation for some time will stop the implementation of this project but allow a restart within six months from the day of signing this agreement, SRSA/Sida has the right, but not obligation, to continue this project until finished according to the agreement. SRSA/Sida will not be responsible for, not will they pay any additional fees, salaries, rents or other costs if the program will be delayed, postponed or cancelled.

10. Each Party agrees that a signed copy of this Agreement may be provided to the authorities in the Municipality where the Beneficiary and/or his household members currently reside as displaced persons, if different to the Municipality. For overall planning purposes, data on this project may also be shared with other shelter agencies or donors.

11. Signing this contract I assure that I am the real owner of the house.

12. Each Party agrees by signing below it has read, understood and will comply with the terms of this Agreement.

13. This agreement is made in six copies, both in English and local, of which each party will be given two copies in each language. In case of discrepancies between English and local version, the English one shall govern.

Date: 08.05.2000

Place: 

IMPLEMENTER: SRSA

HOUSE-OWNER

DOBOJ MUNICIPALITY

Annex 1: Material specification, simple drawing of the floor for which material will be provided, and explanation of how the calculation had been done.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Damage Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Windows and Doors</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Roof</td>
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<td>IV</td>
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<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>70%</td>
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**Note**: The table above represents the percentage of damage caused by various categories to housing structures. The columns include Category, Damage Type, and Percentage. The data is presented in a clear and structured format, making it easy to understand the distribution of damage across different components of the housing structure.

**Action**

- **Preventative Measures**: Regular inspections and maintenance to prevent damage.
- **Emergency Response**: Quick intervention to minimize damage in case of emergencies.
- **Long-term Solutions**: Implementing robust structural designs to withstand future incidents.
### SUMMARY REGARDING DWELLING STOCK 1991, DAMAGED / DESTROYED REHABILITATED AND ESTIMATED FUTURE FUNDING REQUIREMENT

November 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entities (1)</th>
<th>Entitities (1)</th>
<th>Dwellings (2)</th>
<th>Dwellings (3,4)</th>
<th>Dwellings (3,4,5)</th>
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<tr>
<td>7 Hercegovacko-neretvanski</td>
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<td>8 Zapadnobrezovacki</td>
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<td>9 Sarajevo</td>
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App. Total 794559 306937 97483

Republika Srpska

| 1 Banja Luka | 223626 | 41054 | 10824 |
| 2 Doboj | 73046 | 37533 | 6743 |
| 3 Bijeljina | 68527 | 17480 | 4087 |
| 4 Vrbas | 61666 | 24086 | 2734 |
| 5 Sokolac | 26624 | 6986 | 1304 |
| 6 Srebrenica (Foca) | 31894 | 12485 | 1042 |
| 7 Trebinje | 25151 | 4519 | 347 |

App. Total 501226 144983 27085

App. Grand Total 1295784 451900 124683

A calculation based on funding requirements in relation to remaining dwellings to be rehabilitated shows the following:

- Total damaged / destroyed app. 452,000 dwellings
- Total repaired / rehabilitated app. -125,000 dwellings
- Balance app. 327,000 dwellings
- Total damaged / destroyed summer / weekend and other dwellings app. -30,000 dwellings
- Balance app. 297,000 dwellings
- Total dwellings damaged <20% (100,000 - 30,000 repaired) app. -70,000 dwellings
- Balance of dwellings >20% damaged / destroyed app. 227,000 dwellings

Funding requirements: 227,000 dwellings at average 18,000 KM 4,086,000,000 KM

Explanations for above summary figures are given under the NOTES
STANDARDS
FOR THE REHABILITATION OF WAR-DAMAGED
RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS
(private houses and public / private apartment buildings)
November 1998

In order to harmonise the approach of all donors / agencies engaged in the
rehabilitation of dwellings, a set of living standards has been drawn for the
rehabilitation programmes.
The level of rehabilitation is based on the following principles:

- the rehabilitation will facilitate the return of the owners / rightful occupants of the
dwellings.
- the rehabilitation will stabilise the living conditions for present residents.
- the dwelling will be habitable and provide good protection against rain, wind and
cold weather.
- the dwelling will be rehabilitated using marketable good quality materials of
commonly used standards. All workmanship to be carried out by trained,
experienced persons to a suitable / sustainable standard or a good quality.
- external traces of war action (larger holes in the external walls which in the long
term can cause facade deterioration) will be repaired / reconstructed.
- the household to be living in the rehabilitated dwelling will as a minimum have the
following rooms and facilities at their disposal:

  1. One bedroom
     A min. of 5 m² bedroom area per person in the household should be made
     available. This may be achieved by rehabilitation of additional bedroom(s)

  2. One living room area

  3. Kitchen area (if originally part of the living room, only one combined kitchen /
     living room will be rehabilitated)

  4. One toilet / bathroom

  5. One entrance lobby

  6. Water installations and sanitary fittings for the toilet / bathroom and kitchen
to be rehabilitated

  7. Electrical installations and accessories in the rooms selected for the
rehabilitation

The aim is to provide the owners / rightful occupants of the residence with a closed
habitable unit within the building frame fully protected against the weather.
It must be possible to heat all the habitable areas of the unit – as one unit
The unit shall provide privacy and security – also for personal belongings.
TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR REHABILITATION WORKS

1. **Roofs**: Reconstruction of the whole roof structure including original roofing material or a suitable alternative (fixed to the battens). Chimney(s) to be used in relation to heat rehabilitated rooms. Height of the chimney(s) should be min. 50 cm above the ridge. Thermal insulation (according to local conditions) to be applied if the top floor is occupied. Hydro insulation to be applied if attic space is inhabited or if the roof is flat. Gutters to be fixed in areas where rainwater is used in the household or the eaves width of the house are less than 20 cm. All openings in attic to be closed to avoid lifting up the tiles due to wind pressure.

   All ventilation channels to be lead through the roof construction / material.

   For apartment buildings, additional ventilation ducts, parapet walls and access doors and other facilities / installations should be repaired / replaced.

   Apartment buildings are to be equipped with lighting protection, if missing.

2. **External Walls**: Reconstruction of all external walls, including repair of any load bearing beams and columns using original materials or a suitable alternative. External walls to be plastered in order to cover all signs of damages, in relation to the repairs, if the remaining parts of the building are already plastered.

3. **External Openings**: Missing windows to be replaced in rooms to be inhabited with the original size windows with thermal insulation glass of suitable glass dimension. Windows may also be wing-to-wing type. Damaged windows and frames are to be repaired; and fitted with single layers of glass in suitable dimension or thermal insulation glass according to local climate.

   External doors with standard locks are to be provided for the existing openings.

   Doors and windows to be painted or protected by a suitable alternative.

   Windows and external / internal doors are to be provided not only for the rooms to be made habitable, but to be installed in a way and number that secures a "weather tight" habitable unit.

   The remaining external openings must be closed against weather and interaction as appropriate.

   In apartment buildings, additionally, all windows and doors in the common areas to be repaired / replaced / glazed to pre-damage standard.

4. **Internal Doors**: Internal doors to be provided to rooms to be inhabited by the household. They will be as originally fitted type, standard flush doors, or suitable alternative, including all ironmongery. Existing doorframes are to be re-used wherever possible, and fitted with new door leaves.

   Internal doors to be painted or treated by using suitable alternative.

5. **Internal Walls**: Internal walls in the rooms to be inhabited will be repaired, plastered and decorated with white emulsion paint / white wash.

   In apartment buildings additionally the walls in the entrance lobby and stairwells should be repaired.
6. Ceilings: Ceilings will be repaired, plastered and decorated in the rooms to be inhabited to the same standard as the walls. Wooden planed boards used for finishing of ceilings / lean – to walls, must be of min. 20mm thickness. Where the ceiling is on the top floor level repair works are to include thermal insulation, if possible to fit correctly.

7. Floors: Ground floor concrete slabs should be finished with a 1/2, tar / bitumen treatment if the ground floor will be inhabited. Untreated wooden floors to be fitted, and insulated with thermal insulation (thickness to be calculated accordingly) if the ground floor will be inhabited. If the floor to be inhabited is an upper floor only untreated wooden floors to be fitted.
For bathroom tiles: see 9. Bathroom.
In apartment buildings the flooring materials should be similar to pre-damage conditions. This could be vinyl tiles in kitchen and lobby, and parquet floors / carpets in living rooms / bedrooms.

8. Kitchen: The kitchen to be equipped with app. 150 cm kitchen combination unit (can be smaller where space is limited) equipped with a stainless steel sink, tap(s) and a laminated desktop. Ceramic tiles, or other waterproof finish, to be applied above the unit to a height of 45 cm. A wood burning stove to be provided if necessary, and if not supplied by other donor / agency.

9. Bathroom: The standard of the bathroom should be adjusted to the pre-damage standard / tradition in the specific area / settlement. The bathroom to be fitted with the following:
- one shower basin or bath tub
- one 50 cm hand wash basin complete with taps
- one 50 l electric boiler complete with bath tap / shower fittings
- one water closet of appropriate design complete with a seat where appropriate
Toilet / bathroom floor to be fitted with ceramic floor tiles. Ceramic tiles (or other approved waterproof finish) to be fixed along the bath tub, or in a shower basin / area of minimum 90x90 cm, to a height of app. 170 cm above the floor. Remaining walls to be given waterproof finish. Upper walls to be painted with emulsion paint / white wash.

10. Water installations: Damaged / leaking installations in the dwelling to be repaired / replaced.
In case of public supply a meter should be installed in manhole with cover. The connection to the public mains should be checked / re-established in co-operation with the utility company. If there is no public supply, but rainwater tank or well, the existing pump to be repaired / connected / provided. Repair, cleaning and desinfection of the rainwater collection / well should be provided.
11. **Electrical Installations:** Distribution board (cabinet) including main house fuse(s) next to meter, house fuses, differential circuit breaker and an appropriate meter should be installed and prepared for the connection to the public supply (low voltage network) by installing of house connection set (normal installation for the area). In case of heavy damage to a board (cabinet) inside the dwelling, an approved out door cabinet – with all installations, should replace the previous installation.

If the low voltage network is rehabilitated in the area, the single piece connection cable / cable in the ground from the board (cabinet) to the network should be connected / re-established in co-operation with the utility company.

Every room up to app. 15 m² to be inhabited to be fitted with one light fitting, one light switch and two (in kitchen area 3) earthed safety sockets. Rooms larger than 15 m² / or combined kitchen - living room / L-shaped room to be fitted with 2 light fittings, 2 switches and 3 earthed safety sockets.

The bathroom to be equipped with a waterproof light, one splash proof earthed safety sockets (washing machine a.o.) and a standard light / boiler combination switch. All switches for the bathroom to be placed outside the bathroom.

The above standard for the fittings / sockets applies when the room is being replastered. Otherwise the existing network to be used / rehabilitated.

In apartment buildings, additionally, an approved central distribution board with all necessary equipment including main fuse board, two-tariff meter for every apartment, one for the common areas, and tariff clock(s) should be installed.

12. **Gas Installations:** If already available in the dwelling, and if cost efficient, gas installations use for cooking and / or heating of the dwelling should be rehabilitated in accordance with rules and regulations.

13. **Sewerage:** Damaged / leaking installations to be repaired / replaced.

   The connection to the public sewerage system should be checked / re-established in co-ordination with the utility company.

   If septic tank / soakage pit, it should be checked and, if necessary, cleaned and / or repaired.

14. **Lift:** Existing lifts to be repaired and made operational complying with all safety requirements. The lifts are also to be provided with new internal safety doors, if missing.

15. **Thermal Insulation:** Thermal insulation should be installed in compliance with national standards. Sub-roofs, membranes, ventilation voids, etc. must be installed in accordance to current standards.
16. Heating: A wood burning stove to be provided. Existing individual central heating systems may be renovated if considered cost effective. If rooms to be inhabited are situated on different floors, separate chimney outlets should be provided.

In apartment buildings the common central heating system to be repaired wherever existing. As a minimum requirement living room, kitchen, bathroom and if possible bedrooms, are to be provided with suitable radiators. If the common heating system will not be repaired / is not existing wood burning stove to be provided – if adequate chimney(s) is existing. Connection to district heating is desirable, if operational. Any works on public network heating outside the boundaries of the apartment building will be the responsibility of others.

17. Structural works: In case of high category of damage, the new structural works should be done in a way to comply with current seismic regulations in the area. If structural works to be done partially on the already existing structure, the works should improve (where possible) seismic safety of the structure.

For apartment buildings all structural works to be calculated / dimensioned and supervised by qualified structural engineer.

18. Disabled People: Provisions should be made for disabled people, if any in the household.

Door steps and stairs to be avoided and replaced with ramps where possible. Lay-out of rooms and dimensions of doors to allow for wheel chairs. Further works, if necessary, to be carried out to suit individual cases to current standards for disabled people.

In apartment buildings areas the access and use of public spaces should be improved as well, as a part of the rehabilitation programme.

General:
The standards for the rehabilitation of residential buildings will apply unless the donor / implementing agency in their project documentation clearly specifies / justifies any variation (without changing overall goals or the quality level for the rehabilitation) in regard to the proposed level of standards.

Not all recommended standards regarding quantities are according to the rules and regulations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Where the deviations of standards are lower than required it should still be possible to comply with the standards at a later stage. It is important that the works carried out are no hindrance for a later upgrading of the standards – to meet the requirements according to the rules and regulations.


IMG is cooperating with the Federal Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment and the Ministry of Town Planning, Housing – Communal Services, Civil Engineering and Ecology from Republika Srpska for the preparation of a common Manual for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Housing reconstruction by UNHCR standards aims at providing basic living conditions in accordance with the World Bank criteria for emergency housing projects, which includes waterproofing the housing space, and repair of one living room, one bedroom, kitchen and bathroom.

**Standards, materials and workmanship:** The standard of materials and workmanship to be applied to the house repairs shall not be less than those applied at new building works in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To achieve the satisfactory performance of the workmanship and materials, the contractor shall ensure that the approved materials of the proposed type shall be used in strict accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and by the skilled labor.

**Roofs:** Reconstruction of a roof shall include durable tiles, battening, and where appropriate, roof timbers properly sized and secured. Works to the roof shall include flashing, edge boarding, gutters and downpipes as appropriate.

**External openings:** All window openings on the designated floor will be provided with either single or double wing frames. Only those windows in the rooms to be occupied will be fitted with a single 3 mm pane of glass, correctly put in place, although the frames will be of such a type that a second pane can be fitted at a later date. Window openings in the story above the one to be inhabited will be closed off with reinforced plastic sheet securely battened and fixed along all edges. Where applicable, one external door will be provided, complete with security fittings comprising a key-operated latch lock and an internal bolt.

**Internal walls:** Internal walls will have damaged blockwork made good and plaster patched to an even finish prior to decoration. Any work to fixing electrical conduits or similar shall have been completed prior to plaster repairs. Only rooms that would be inhabited will be repaired.

**Ceilings:** Where ceilings are of prefabricated concrete type, they will be plastered and finished to the same standard as the walls. If the ceiling is of a wooden structure, repairs to the timberwork shall be carried out and thermal insulation placed above. In no case work will be carried out in buildings where the roof has not been rendered waterproof.

**Floors:** Ground floor concrete slabs will be covered with a minimum 2 mm layer of tar, bitumen or a similar material. This membrane shall be protected with a cement creed. Damaged blocks or tiles shall be cut out and removed to be replaced with either cement mortar or, if provided free of cost by the beneficiary, the original type of material. Untreated wooden floor panels shall be fitted over a layer of thermal and hydro insulation.
Internal Doors: Internal doors will only be fitted in those rooms in use by the family and will be of a standard physical soundproof design, including hinges and non-lockable closer.

Kitchen: The kitchen will be equipped with a combined sink and cupboard. The sink will be plumbed of cold water supply and waste water.

Bathroom: The bathroom will be fitted with the following:
- flush toilet complete with bowl, plastic seat and syphonic tank,
- ceramic sink complete with cold water tap, plug and drain,
- shower unit complete with tray and plumbing, electric heating boiler,
- walls will be painted with suitable water-proof paint.

Electrical: The house will be equipped with a roof connector to a distribution board including a main isolator, four fused circuit supply ways and a meter. Each room to be occupied will be wired and provided with one light fitting, one light on/off switch and two switched power sockets. The bathroom will be provided with a light and a water heater switch, both located immediately outside the bathroom. The light fitting will be of the enclosed glass bowl type.