Linking SSR 2.0, Human Security & Development: Community-Based Approaches to Policing and Police Reform in Afghanistan

Méline BERNARD
LINKING SSR 2.0, HUMAN SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT: COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES TO POLICING AND POLICE REFORM IN AFGHANISTAN

By

Méline Bernard
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Declaration

I, Méline Bernard, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature………………………………..

Date……………………………………….
To the Afghans.
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Abstract

The thesis presents the results of an exploratory study of perceptions which examines the debate over community-based approaches to policing in Afghanistan. Putting the security of the Afghan people rather than that of the Afghan state at the centre of the study according to a human security approach, it attempts to explain how Security Sector Reform (SSR) and police reform embedded in an international statebuilding project are envisioned by some in a developmental perspective. To do so, it engages with the recent history and developments of civilian approaches to police reform in light of four normative dimensions of SSR, namely people-centrism, democratic accountability and oversight, civilianization and civil society engagement. It focuses on the case study of a few community-based policing pilot projects and argues that their models, in the ways they revisit these key principles of SSR, sketch the guidelines of an updated form of Afghan SSR 2.0 putting greater emphasis on building a humane, accountable and responsible police beyond the basic building of a ‘trained and equipped’ police. It argues further that, despite internal tensions and external challenges, these models show definite potential for modeling revised police governance and SSR 2.0 along a path towards greater police civilianization taking into account the initiatives of bottom-level actors. It concludes that such potential can be exploited, provided these initiatives and actors are taken on board seriously in police reform and the creation of feedback mechanisms between the top and the bottom is made a normative priority on the international SSR and police reform agenda. The study is based on the qualitative analysis of over 50 individual and group interviews with development and security actors conducted in October and November 2013 in Kabul, Herat and Faryab provinces in Afghanistan.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSFo</td>
<td>Afghan Civil Society Forum Organization</td>
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<td>ADPP</td>
<td>Afghan Democratic Policing Project</td>
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<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>ANPA</td>
<td>Afghan National Police Academy</td>
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<td>APPRO</td>
<td>Afghan Public Policy Research Organization</td>
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<td>AREU</td>
<td>Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit</td>
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<td>ATP</td>
<td>Afghan Traffic Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Crime Investigation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Critical Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTCA</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Central Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-COP</td>
<td>District Chief of Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHQ</td>
<td>District Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Police Mission to Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRU</td>
<td>Family Response Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Development Agency)</td>
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“Do you know the story of the frog in hot water? If you put a frog directly in hot water, it will jump out of the pot. But if you put it first in cold water and then slowly heat the pot, it will get used to the warmth and it will not jump out. This is a story to say that the Afghans, over thirty years of war, have gotten used to a certain climate of insecurity that most foreigners find unbearable when they arrive here for the first time. Security in Afghanistan has to do with limitations that it brings to your life, the education of your children, the quality of the health services you access and how/where you can move (or not) in your own country.”

(Afghan NGO worker, interview in Kabul, October 13, 2013)

“There are multiple problems, and not only police problems. Problems are part of the nation and the culture. If you blame the police, then you blame the nation at the same time. The police change with society as it cannot change without society. The police reflect the society; it is an indicator of how the society deals with power. Never split the police and the community.”

(International UN worker, police by profession, interview in Kabul, November 5, 2013)
After long talks of the transition, the year 2014 has come and the international community is due to depart from Afghanistan by December 31. The responsibility for national security has been handed over to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Stakeholders, the media and analysts worldwide are now watching whether the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the ANSF proves to have the capacity to hold the country together while the insurgency has gained momentum and the security climate keeps deteriorating (Asia Foundation, 2013). Over the last thirteen years, a cornerstone of the international reconstruction efforts and statebuilding project to assist in preparing for this transition has been Security Sector Reform (SSR) and police reform, although they were only vaguely mentioned at the Bonn conference in 2001 (Sedra, 2010). Within the reform framework set out then, initial focus was put on the equipment and professionalization of the police, with the aim to build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) to professionally manage the civil elements of law and order. From there, the international community struggled to decide on the most adequate approach to take on police reform processes and the training component. Whereas the initial approach taken was civilian, with goals anchored in the long-term, it was rapidly jeopardized by the revival of anti-government opposition activities and the consequent re-mobilization of police in counterinsurgency combat operations. Police became increasingly frequent targets for attacks by insurgents. In 2013, the attrition rate within the Afghan police bypassed the attrition rate within the Afghan army (UNOPS, 2014). Under such circumstances, giving the police civilian training without including a military module in the curriculum was equaled to sending them poorly equipped and prepared to combat areas where they would risk their lives. This is why a military training component was never abandoned from most training curricula, thus making Afghan police training more paramilitary and less civilian in reality. For civilian policing promoters, taking such an approach to police reform has been a short-term compromise which dramatically hampered initial efforts to build a civilian police force for the long term. As time passed, however, police reform processes and police training efforts according to a para-military approach have been increasingly criticized in the media and the academic literature for their lack of effectiveness and efficiency. Criticism of the nature of that newly-built police capacity was
also voiced, with strong doubts about its military or civilian primary affiliation. It was increasingly discussed whether the ANP were provided with the necessary set of civil policing skills. A major security challenge ahead of Afghanistan is to foster greater legitimacy and inclusiveness of local communities in linkage with political processes of SSR, peace and reconciliation. The absence of a mechanism to achieve the linkage between local and national levels has been judged a critically missing component that should be strategically developed as part of an effective peace process beyond 2015 (Asia Foundation, 2013). Along this growing realization, a debate over the relevance of community-based approaches to policing and police training was launched in 2008/9. Despite a hostile context – with the US interest lying in paramilitary policing, absence of support from the Ministry of Interior Affairs and little funding – the debate continues to be fed today. It mobilizes a multiplicity of governmental and non-governmental actors from the security and development sectors located at international, central, provincial or local levels who agree on the necessity to cast new light on community concerns and lobby for greater accountability and responsiveness to these concerns in civilian police work. These actors lay important emphasis on community perceptions of police as a significant indicator of the state of police/community relations and accountability. Therefore, they have developed several pilot methodologies to deal with communities and positively impact police/community relations. These methodologies are currently tested out in a number of civilian policing projects.

This thesis presents the results of an exploratory study of perceptions which examined the debate over community-based approaches to policing and police training in Afghanistan in late 2013. It does so by adopting a human security approach putting the security of the Afghan people rather than that of the Afghan state at the centre of the study. With an interdisciplinary approach building on insights of international relations, security and development studies, it attempts to explain how SSR and police reform embedded in an international statebuilding project is envisioned by some in a developmental perspective. Overall, it sets out to question the traditional institution-building practice and revisit conventional SSR and police governance in Afghanistan.

The following research question acted as a guideline throughout the study: How do current civilian police programs relate to community needs and views, and to current security and
(police) development policy? The substance of the study is made up by the qualitative analysis of primary data collected during fieldwork in Afghanistan via the conduct of semi-structured individual and group interviews over a period of two months in the fall of 2013.

The significance of such an investigation is best explained against the background of the current search for methods that permit including local actors and stakeholders, as well as increasing accountability and responsiveness of the police/government towards the population in political processes of peace and reconciliation. A number of civilian pilot projects in community-based policing, currently being implemented and tested across Afghanistan, were identified during fieldwork as existing programs that answer this quest. Engaging a multiplicity of actors across levels and sectors in the development of several methodological models, they find inspiration in Afghan development sector practices and suggest how they might be transferred to the security sector. These models, however, have not yet been mainstreamed. They remain widely criticized and contested, deemed unrealistic or romanticized in their application to a country like Afghanistan. Consequently, they are mainly being developed ‘off-line.’ Little attention is given to them as they typically receive little funding and strategic prioritization. And yet, it cannot be denied that the pilot projects exist and community-based policing is happening through them. This shows that it is not quite an absolutely impossible policing strategy for Afghanistan, and that it is not necessarily too early in the country’s recovery phase to introduce such policing. Besides, the way multiple national actors committed to take it up proves that it can be a convincing strategy for the locals too, and not only for the international state-builders. Intensive efforts put in their development on the ground additionally demonstrate a genuine attempt to connect to reality beyond romantic theory.

Until today, very few SSR policies and projects have made space for local communities to participate in reform processes that directly affect them, whereas the pilot projects identified sketch a bottom-up alternative to typically top-down police reform. After years of pillar-led and quantity-driven type of reform, they pave the way back to holistic and quality-driven reform where community-based policing could become a strategic mechanism. This study contends that community-based approaches to civilian policing deserve more attention. It suggests the pilot
projects studied can contribute with lessons learned, and feed reflection on how to achieve more qualitative and productive reform following a more comprehensive and inclusive approach.

The study is structured into four main chapters. After situating the historical context of the international statebuilding and SSR/police reform project from 2001 to 2014 in the first chapter, the conceptual framework of the study is reviewed in chapter 2 and the research methodology in chapter 3. The fourth chapter presents the analysis of fieldwork data in three steps. It first attempts to locate community needs in police governance, before it goes on to explore issues in the development of community-based approaches to policing. Finally, it investigates the powered interactions and interdependencies of different authoritative levels in the debate over community-based approaches and their implications for the set-up of community-based policing projects. It concludes that the pilot projects of enquiry, despite external challenges and internal tensions, show definite potential for modeling revised police governance and a path towards greater police civilianization provided civil society actors are taken on board seriously and feedback mechanisms between the top and the bottom are made a normative priority on the SSR and police reform international agenda.

Before moving on to chapter 1, the following paragraph offers a brief clarification of some of the key terms and concepts used to discuss the issues at stake in the thesis. The term ‘international community’ is used with reference to the international political and development community. International forces are typically not included in this understanding; they will be seen as security forces and connected to the security sector. Mentions of the ‘security sector’ mainly refer to the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI) and the police institution. Direct mention of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) implies a more general understanding of security forces inclusive of both the police and the Afghan National Army (ANA), which is still widely used in documents and by security actors. This is despite the fact that civilian police could arguably be dissociated from security forces according to an understanding of police in terms of services. Mention of the ‘development sector’ is inclusive of a wide range of governmental and non-governmental actors and stakeholders of development activities. Although the formulation ‘development sector’ gives an impression of unity among them, there is no denying that they reflect a variety of origins, histories and interests which may show little unity in reality. The
same applies when mention is made of the NGO community. Development is understood here as ‘progress in human well-being’ (Stewart, 2004). Mention of ‘local actors and stakeholders’ is similarly made with reference to a web of more or less closely related actors and stakeholders located at the village or district level or involved in local-level activities. The ‘local’ is thus situated at the bottom and is understood here in opposition to the ‘national,’ the ‘central’ and the ‘international’ situated at the top. Communities are local-level stakeholders often referred to in terms of an authoritative unit in governance whereby power is held and exercised through their leaders. ‘Police governance’ is understood in the terms of Michael Smith quoted by Bagayoko-Penone (2009, p.4) as “the authority to make, implement and enforce rules in a specified policy domain” here defined as the police domain. The dichotomy between civilian and para-military policing will be discussed at length throughout the chapters. In brief, civilian policing is understood in this study as a strategy of policing which favors the use of non-military policing principles and skills to manage the civil components of law and order (DCAF, 2009). In community-based policing, it is important to differentiate civilian and para-military community-based approaches in order to avoid confusion. This study focuses on civilian community-based approaches. Topics related to para-military community-based approaches, such as the Afghan Local Police (ALP), are not investigated in detail, and only mentioned when relevant to the discussion. Finally, the terms ‘community-based policing’ and ‘community policing’ will be illuminated in the discussions of civilian community-based approaches to policing throughout the thesis, and are related to the above-mentioned understanding of communities as physical and political units of governance at the local level. They do not refer to a strategy of policing along ethnic lines that would suggest the creation of ethnically exclusive Hazara, Pashto, Tajik or Uzbek police units in charge of policing for their own ethnic groups.
Chapter 1 – Background

Introduction

This background chapter provides a literature review which aims to clarify the security sector and police reform context of the study and locate the approaches to police building/training and community-based policing of relevance to this study in the existing literature. The foundations and development of police reform and police training efforts over the last 13 years are believed to have a high explanatory value to the discourse on police/community relations and the origins of the different views on the matter that govern today’s debate on community-based approaches to policing. Methodologically, the body of this literature review is built as a process-oriented narrative which has been organized both thematically and chronologically in order to enable the reader to understand the topical and historical background of this study.

1. The International Statebuilding Project in Afghanistan (2001-2014)

According to Edwards (2010, p.1), “statebuilding has been seen as a means to tackle state failure since the 1990s.” So is established the contemporary relation between statebuilding and state failure as it has been applied to Afghanistan since 2001. Defined by Elhawary et al. (2010) as the lack of willingness or incapacity of some states to execute their primary functions, state fragility has been increasingly discussed as a security threat to stability and peace in the West. Meanwhile, statebuilding has become a major tool for the international community to handle state fragility, based on the idea drawn from liberal internationalism that external intervention can bring about democracy, stability and liberal economy (Edwards 2010, van Bijlert 2010). Often qualified as a failed state, Afghanistan from 2001 up until today has been an arena where “a grand coalition of nation builders is attempting to establish a functioning state, a representative government, a healthy economy, a fair justice system and efficient security forces” (van Bijlert 2010, p.157). As such, it provides a complex case for the study of state failure as well as internationalized statebuilding.
The design of the statebuilding project for Afghanistan was decided at the Bonn Conference in 2001. This first major donor conference was later on followed up by several others in Geneva and Tokyo in 2002, Berlin in 2004, London in 2006, Paris in 2008, Bonn in 2011 and Tokyo in 2012 (Edwards 2010, Suhrke 2011). From 2001 to 2008, international actors did not put up the consolidation and sustainability of the Afghan government as high on the agenda as it prioritized the war against terror and military operations (Cookman & Wadhams 2010, Edwards 2010). The statebuilding approach which the international community first adopted remained top-down until 2009. Interestingly, in 2009/10, international actors started taking some initial steps towards a more bottom-up approach to statebuilding which renewed international political will for the project. The move was matched with extensive military power and increased allocations for development assistance (Rowswell, 2012). Notwithstanding this theoretical shift in the rationale behind statebuilding, major shortfalls in the Afghan statebuilding project were not corrected. In 2010, the international statebuilding project remained incoherent in face of the absence of peace agreement to allow for effective and efficient statebuilding and the lack of coordination between actors. Besides, the rentier nature of the Afghan state prevented GIRoA from taking over financial responsibilities. Most importantly, the footprint of the international community back then was already much heavier than the initially ‘light footprint’ for which it had planned (Cramer 2006, van Bijlert 2010).

The Afghan statebuilding project today is at a stage where the international community has been eagerly preparing the completion of its exit strategy planned by the end of 2014, as well as the handing over of all security responsibilities to the Afghan government. The international community is watching whether the Afghan state is indeed ready to take over. Fears concentrate on the deteriorating security climate and the renewed momentum of anti-government opposition groups which keep challenging the legitimacy and authority of the Afghan state. This shows that security matters that were paramount in 2001 are still the focus point in 2014, and questions the nature and the successes of the statebuilding project as it was led (Plany & Perito, 2013).
2. Inception of the SSR and Police Reform Process

Security Sector Reform is a concept which emerged in the years following the end of the Cold War (Sedra, 2010). Since then, many practitioners and academics have engaged with the concept, and contributed to the growth of the literature on the topic. Yet, for Chuter (2006), SSR remains an ‘ill-defined’ concept for which no one definition has managed to convince. As a result, a variety of definitions remains. The OECD/DAC (2005, p.16) provides a leading definition with reference to the SSR objective to “create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy.” Another important practitioner, the UNDP (2003, p.5), provides another leading definition with reference to the SSR objective to “strengthen the ability of the sector as a whole and each of its individual parts to provide an accountable, equitable, effective, and rights respecting service.” Critical to both of these and the others, Chuter (2006, p.21) came up with his own, thus defining SSR as “a generic name for measures which might be taken, often with international assistance, to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector, and to make its management more responsive to the requirements of a parliamentary democracy.” For Chuter, two characteristics of SSR are worth noting while the relevance of all others is minor: On the one hand, SSR “should provide the security that people want, as effectively and efficiently as possible” and, on the other hand, “SSR should be managed with procedures normally used in parliamentary democracy.” SSR, in all case, faces major challenges in its implementation. Sedra (2010) lists ten major challenges including coordination, local ownership, engaging civil society, capacity deficits, spoilers, durable funding, monitoring and evaluation, regional dimensions and fiscal sustainability. Critically, Sedra notices that in practice few SSR efforts have proved successful and thus recommends reflecting on best SSR practices on which to found a second generation of SSR.

In Afghanistan, SSR efforts were launched with international assistance as part of the international statebuilding agenda established in 2001-02 following the Bonn and Geneva conferences which discussed the way forward in Afghanistan after the US-led military intervention. Mostly impacted by donors, the Afghan SSR agenda was labeled a ‘donor-driven process’ by Sedra (2003), as opposed to a process that would have been home-grown within the country and locally owned. In Bonn and Geneva, the Afghan SSR agenda was divided by the
international community into five priority pillars, each of which were allocated to a ‘leading nation’. Police reform was made one of these five pillars, and Germany was given its oversight responsibility (Sedra 2002, 2003, 2004). Interestingly, police oversight and material assistance within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) program authorized by the UN were purposely limited to match the ‘light footprint’ rationale (Afghan National Police Working Group, 2011).

Since the 1990s, police reform has typically been considered an integral part of SSR processes. While the initial culture and design of police reform until the 1990s emphasized the provision of technical assistance and training, police reform today has a dual emphasis on both the professionalization and the normative framing of the police. Indeed, over the last two decades, police reform objectives have gradually become more and more governed by international norms and values linked to the increasingly influential liberal agenda and human security approach endorsed by the most prominent international organizations involved in SSR and police reform efforts, such as OECD and the UN (DCAF, 2009). One outcome of this shift in rationale behind police reform was to reconsider the vision of police as a ‘force’ in the benefit of a vision of police as a ‘service.’ Bailey & Perito (2010) thus defining police reform today with reference to the objective to “create a legitimate and effective government that can deliver essential services, including rule of law.” In post-conflict settings such as in Afghanistan, training and recruitment are critical components of the police reform process. They are typically challenged by a lack of competent staff that went through criteria-based recruitment processes, the high attrition rate of police in combat operations, a predominance of recruitment following ethnic or political lines, the generalized consumption of drugs within police ranks, and a pervasive policing mindset inherited from conflict times, all of which prevent the effective development of police reform processes (DCAF, 2009).

From the onset, the primary focus of SSR in Afghanistan was put on the military and the DDR program rather than on the police, whose reform process was not given quite as much attention until 2003 at the earliest (Sedra, 2003). This prioritization of the military over the police and the civilian was not a surprise from a strategic perspective given that the US, the leading nation of the coalition that was investing the most money in Afghanistan, had been given the military
pillar in the SSR process (Bailey & Perito, 2010). The choice of a ‘hard security and security first’ approach to statebuilding, SSR and police reform from the early beginnings underlies the negligence of a comprehensive approach to the rule of law. Security sector reform pillars were dealt with exclusively, rather than inclusively. While the Germans were reforming the Afghan police, the Italians were reforming the Afghan justice system. Seemingly no particular emphasis was put on the police-justice linkage or on a possible coordination between the efforts provided for the two pillars under a rule of law approach.

3. Historical Profile of the Afghan Police

A review of several articles by Murray (2007), Wilder (2007), Perito (2009), and the Afghan National Police Working Group (2011) allows sketching a short profile and background of the Afghan National Police. Interestingly, the ANP is a historically young institution as it was first introduced with the assistance of Germany, as a project of the reformist Afghan monarchy of Mohammad Zaher Shah in the 1930s. It is worth noting that the Afghan police was initially created as a combination of police and gendarmerie (i.e. military police or constabulary), as opposed to a fully civilian or fully militarized police institution. From the 1930s on, the Afghan police received training and worked on and off, with a changing military or civilian orientation, depending on the course of the events that marked the 20th century. During times when the Afghan police was indeed functional, training efforts were always conducted with the assistance of a foreign power, whether Germany or the British Empire, which simultaneously pursued their own agenda in the region. In the 1950s for example, the Germans returned to Afghan police assistance with the objective to counter Soviet influence on the Afghan military. This competition between powers resulted in an emphasized militarization of the police. A greater emphasis on its civilianization became part of the agenda of King Zaher Shah in the 1960s, when the King sought to model the Afghan police after the European systems of the time, here again with the assistance of both West and East Germany. The police then was still a combination of civilian and gendarmerie bodies, yet efforts towards greater civilianization were cut short by political turmoil in the 1970s which led to a renewed emphasis on militarization. By the time the war against Russia started, the Afghan police had already stopped functioning as a civil
institution. All progress made with regard to civilianization of the police was further lost during
the following 35 years of conflict.


When SSR and police reform objectives were first briefly discussed by the international
community in Bonn in 2001 (Sedra, 2010), the Afghan police was a freshly reestablished
institution, shaped by ten years of war against the Soviets during which they were increasingly
militarized and misused, as well as by some years of civil war under the Mujahidin regime
during which they were disintegrated, and several years of Taliban government during which
they were replaced by a Shar‘ia-based system of law enforcement and justice called ‘vice and
virtue police.’ Shortly after the ousting of the Taliban, former police staff trained during various
eras of policing, as well as newly proclaimed police, were quickly remobilized in a factionalized
manner by local warlords to whom allegiance was sworn directly, rather than to the Afghan state.
To describe the actual state of the police, the Afghan National Police Working Group (2011, p.6)
wrote that “the ad hoc police forces that took to the streets in 2002 were untrained, poorly
equipped, largely illiterate (70-90 percent), predatory and loyal to warlords and local leaders.”

From there, in the words of Wilder (2007, vii) “the daunting challenge confronting police
reformers in the spring of 2002 was to create an effective civilian police force from an untrained
force manned primarily by factional commanders and their militias, who had little or no
equipment or infrastructure who were unpaid or under-paid, and who operated within the corrupt
and factionalized institutional structure of the MoI.” In face of the lack of skilled men and
women serving in the police force at the beginning of the 2000s, the international community set
that recruitment and training would be priorities within the police pillar (Sedra 2004).

Given the lead on the police pillar, the Germans promoted a civilian vision of police reform as
early as 2002. Yet, the poor foundation for such a vision, considering the state of the ANP and
the security emphasis of the international project in the first years of the intervention detailed
above, challenged its concrete development from the onset (Afghan National Police Working
Group, 2011). What happened on the ground in the early 2000s is that police reform remained
envisioned as a technicality just as it was the practice of police reform before the 1990s, with an emphasis on training without mentoring. The impact of training and equipment provision was limited as trainees were prompt to get back to old behaviors after training when they were sent back to their unchanged working environments. Beyond the need for training, there was indeed a need for mentoring in order to make sure that newly gained skills were indeed applied by trainees on the job (Wilder, 2007). Such a one-dimensional prioritization of technical professionalization dismissed the necessity to holistically include the reform of police institutions and their governance at MoI level alongside training, new uniforms and vehicles. As of 2004, the police reform process was still plagued by the same basic issues such as the lack of equipment, poor infrastructure, low pay, pervasive corruption and consistent problems of recruitment that were identified in 2001 already (Sedra 2004, Perito 2009, Afghan National Police Working Group 2011).

Another essential dimension of policing, the accountability of the police towards the population, was also identified as missing in the police reform practice. Garrison (2004) highlighted the need for more accountability in Afghan policing and recommended democratic policing, an increasingly influential policing strategy promoting a critical shift in police vision from police seen as a force to police envisioned as a service, as a means to achieve greater accountability. This shift in police vision implied a reorientation of policing goals towards greater community needs responsiveness and accountability to the population as a whole and not just the elite (Bailey 1999, DCAF 2009), but the absence of adequate preconditions and the lack of resources did not help make the case for the development democratic policing then (Garrison, 2004).


From 2004/5 onwards, in addition to the technical and strategic issues mentioned above, the resurgence of the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan began to seriously affect the role of the ANP as envisioned in 2001/2. Counterinsurgency efforts, developed into a COIN doctrine by the military of all nations, became pivotal within the security approach of the international community and progressively altered the involvement of the police on the ground. Under US leadership, and despite the German police pillar vision of civilianization, Afghan police became
decisively involved, as had happened in the past, in counterinsurgency activities including combat. Concerns were then raised about this shift in roles which implied a shift in police training from building civilian, service-oriented police to building a paramilitary police with the necessary skills to face combat situations (Wilder, 2007).

The gradual worsening of the insurgency prompted the late realization within the international community of the police force was still not effective. The decision was then made to increase the number of police and allocate more financial resources for police reform and training than had ever been done before. Objectives were set quantitatively and a new target (from 62,000 to 82,000) for the required number of men and women in the Afghan police was soon determined, and US basic training was organized according to this need (Wilder, 2007). This implied that training became quantity-driven, and the length of training for new recruits was adapted to a restricted number of weeks (8 weeks) determined according to the number of police due to be trained over a decided number of years (Perito, 2009). Though a slight move was made towards enhancing the quality of training with mentoring (Wilder, 2007), the German vision of quality-driven training was forced to take a backseat as it could not compete with the sudden, massive US financial injection in the police pillar and a shift in training and service provision by the US to private contractors (Murray, 2007).


Prior to the worsening of the insurgency dated 2004/5, the US leading military reform had already become impatient towards the Germans leading police reform as they were not quick enough to produce tangible outcomes (Murray, 2007). The German approach had been to invest a few millions euros in working mainly at the Afghan National Police Academy (ANPA) to build capacity for police leadership in a long term perspective. As soon as 2003, the US interest rather went to the mass of patrolmen and non-commissioned officers neglected by the Germans. The US decided to invest billions of dollars for the larger recruitment, training and equipment of this particular police group. They created the Kabul Central Training Center (CTC) in 2003, which was followed by the set-up of eight similar Regional Training Centers (RTC) from 2003 on. All centers developed basic paramilitary curricula for the training of patrolmen with the aim to meet
immediate police needs (Sedra 2004, Afghan National Police Working Group 2011). The IC became polarized by a German civilian police vision based on their role in maintaining order and the rule of law and a US para-military police vision based on their role in the counterinsurgency (Wilder, 2007).

The tensions between Germany and the US about their respective visions for the ANP, accompanied by an interest-based lack of coordination, resulted in the development of a two-head police reform process which deeply impacted the overall coherence of police reform processes. Wilder (2007, p.x) therefore recommended that these visions “be reconciled and consensus reached on a shared vision that address[ed] the policing needs of all of Afghanistan” as “the differing German and US visions, combined with the government’s lack of vision, [were] seriously undermining police reform efforts.” However, from 2007 on, the coherence of police reform processes was additionally affected by the emergence of new police reform actors and their respective agendas.

A ‘boom’ in police interest was observed as new institutions for the training of the Afghan police were created. Internationally, the German Police Project Team (GPPT) that had received the leadership for the police pillar in 2001 was integrated in the European police mission (EUPOL) newly set up in 2007, while the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTMA) followed in 2009 (Perito, 2009). The Germany/US polarization in police matters thus became an EU/US polarization, which on the one hand (EUPOL) and the Americans on the other hand (NTMA associated the American CSTCA), each of which were promoting and implementing their own police vision. Moreover, international agencies and NGOs which had gradually since 2001 taken interest and action with regards to policing issues formalized their policing projects and emerged with additional training offer for the police (Sedra 2004, Perito 2009). The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) was created in 2007 with the mission to act as a coordination body for the diplomacy and the MoI, yet it failed to reach out to all powerful actors of the policing field and purposely omitted to integrate international institutions and NGOs in its coordination mandate, out of incapacity to deal with such a big diversity.\footnote{Interpretation based on interviews from the field with international respondents working for IPCB and EUPOL.}

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7. Bringing in Accountability, Local Dynamics and Police/Population Relations

While the international effort was tiptoeing into elusive strategic coordination, the population was left out the reform process. In 2003, the need to restore trust in the police among the Afghan population had been highlighted already (Sedra, 2003). Yet in 2007, the police were still seen as robbers due to their corrupt and abusive behavior, and the culture of impunity that pervaded the institution (Wilder 2007, UNOPS 2014). It was made clear again in 2010 that the ANP was neither trusted nor welcomed in most places in Afghanistan. Seen as the face of the government by most of the population, the corrupt and incompetent ANP was associated to an equally corrupt and incompetent MoI still incapable and unwilling to protect its citizens despite ten years of police reform efforts. The accountability issue described by Garrison in 2004 was an actual growing concern. Murray (2007) had warned that the police reform direction taken then was unlikely to foster human security and improve the quality of community life. To tackle the issue, James et al. (2010) recommended restructuring the top-down police institution from the bottom-up to ensure the police meet the needs of both the people and the government.

Police reform had concentrated on processes located at the central level, paying little attention to the necessity to link up with local police processes located in the districts. The focus on training, for example, was implemented at national and provincial levels, but rarely at district level. Training, moreover, was often provided without taking into consideration the context-specificity of the policing location of the trainees along a ‘one size fits all’ line of training (Bailey & Perito, 2010). The dichotomy between the local and the national, emphasized by the problem of centralization of governance in Kabul, resulted in the lack of involvement in reform activities in the districts and in the most remote rural areas of the country (Afghan National Police Working Group, 2011).

This benefited the insurgency which increasingly gained local support in these neglected areas which the national police proved incapable to access and police. At national and local levels, the establishment of the Afghan police, especially in its civilian vision, was made slower and more difficult as the insurgency increased the rhythm of their violent attacks against the police, an easy governmental target present on the ground at all levels and often underequipped. As
Deflem (2011) argued, targeting the police meant preventing the development of police institutions, precisely when these institutions were needed to fight terrorist activities and the insurgency, because a police force that functioned normally would give an important and highly visible indicator of greater peace and stability in the Afghan society, to the detriment of the insurgency.

The recognition of the generalized lack of support to the police across the country and the increased targeting of the police by the insurgents who took advantage of rural spaces left under-governed shed new light on the importance of accountability, local dynamics and the need for bottom-up interactions formerly neglected in centralized, typically top-down police reform processes (Garrison 2004, Asia Foundation 2013). Interest gradually grew for the development of police/community relations with a clear bi-polarization of the debate over the direction that this development should take between the promoters of democratic civilian policing and the promoters of counterinsurgency para-military policing. The underlying assumption of both approaches, namely the need for enhanced community/police interactions in order to better tackle crime, was shared by both sides. Yet, their strategic perspectives differed in that counterinsurgency policing promoters focused on the development of relations with communities to better fight the insurgency and secure the monopoly of violence for the government, while democratic policing promoters focused on the development of relations with communities to improve police services delivery to the population and better protect the Afghan people (APPRO, 2013).

Two models for the development of community/police relations were developed by these two sides. A first model was developed along the line of democratic policing, also referred to as ‘community policing’ or more and more often ‘community-based policing’; it was called ‘police-e mardumi’ in Persian, which literally means ‘police of the people.’ This model was developed by actors which included several bodies from the United Nations in Afghanistan (UNAMA and UNDP-LOTFA) and a number of international and national NGOs such as GIZ and ACSFo. A second model was developed along the line of counterinsurgency-oriented paramilitary policing under the leadership of the US Special Forces within NTMA-CSTCA; it was called ‘Afghan Local Police’ (ALP). Although the development of both of these models paved the way to a
greater emphasis on the need for community-based policing in reform processes, they also sketched a new dichotomy of approaches whose conflicting goals (counterinsurgency vs. community policing) were most likely to increase the “donor challenge” and impact the reform process (DCAF, 2009). Though conflicting, both models faced the same challenge of being accepted by MoI and integrated in its structure and policies².


In 2009, the election of the Obama administration in the US was followed by a foreign policy review for Afghanistan. For the first time, the US talked of a transition of security responsibility with 2014 set as a deadline for completion, after which a ‘Transformation Decade’ would be conducted by the Afghan government. From then on, police reform efforts were mostly conducted in the perspective of the international forces pull out and the transfer of responsibilities. Sedra (2010) criticized the move made by the international community in 2010 to cut short basic police training from 8 to 6 weeks as showing the greater concern of the international community to secure its exit strategy out of Afghanistan, rather than its commitment to improving security for the Afghan population. In 2012, the initiative was taken by the IPCB to develop, in cooperation with the Afghan MoI, a ten-year vision (TYV) for the Afghan police. The process took roughly a year until the draft was validated by MoI and published in 2013. For the first time, a coordinated vision for the Afghan police was produced. Nevertheless, it was not immediately transformed into a two-year action plan as validation by MoI which has remained pending until today.

As of late 2013, the political climate, with presidential elections due to take place in April 2014, greatly affected the police reform process. Ahead of these elections, an acting Minister of Interior Affairs was appointed in September 2013, which inevitably delayed ongoing and pending processes. As security responsibilities were gradually handed over by international security actors to their Afghan counterparts, reform processes were further hampered by transition technicalities and additional knowledge transfers. The official IC discourse assured that ‘quantitative targets had been met’ (app. 157,000 men and women police) and that it was

² Interpretation based on interviews from the field with international respondents working for IPCB and UNAMA.
well on track in securing sustainment and finishing the training of the trainers. Training remained mostly considered in its NTMA-led basic and paramilitary form reaching out to patrolmen en mass, whereas official police concerns had shifted from professionalization to mid-term fiscal and technical sustainment of the ANP. The Afghan police were still involved in combat operations and there was no sign of decreasing levels of violence in the country. Targeted killings of Afghan police continued to make the deadlines or newspapers; according to statistics the ANP attrition rate was higher than the ANA attrition rate in the first half of 2013 (UNOPS, 2014).

Planty & Perito (2013) recognized the failure of the international community to build, together with the Afghan MoI, a national police service capable to protect the Afghan population despite more than a decade of police reform. Their prospects for the future expressed serious uncertainty about the ANP’s capacity to manage national security and protect the Afghan people after the transition, aside essential technical issues relating to the funding, equipment and training of the ANP in the longer term. Interestingly, Planty & Perito (2013) concluded in recommending the same that was recommended in the early 2000s, that is, the restructuring of the Afghan police from a paramilitary model to a service-oriented model capable to protect citizens while restructuring the Afghan MoI simultaneously. Laying emphasis on developing police/population relations based on trust and confidence, as well as establishing a mechanism to enable regular public consultations to be conducted, was equally recommended.

Concluding Remarks

Issues in police reform and police training in late 2013/early 2014 are thus barely different from those that were widely recognized by the mid-decade and even earlier, which highlight the failure of reform efforts to address them. Observations made throughout the literature that spans the 2001-2014 period support the view that there are “serious inadequacies of the international community when it comes to institution-building and state-building” (Wilder 2007, p.xii) and that there are limits to the utility of the conventional SSR model as applied in the Afghan case with an emphasis on technical assistance and training outdated since the 1990s (Sedra 2004, DCAF 2009). Though a shift in SSR towards a more comprehensive reform strategy was
sketched by the mid-decade, the situation as of today shows that it was implemented with scarce success, never quite completed and always disrupted. Achieving MoI institutional reform, the police/justice linkage and greater responsiveness to popular concerns under a comprehensive rule of law approach alongside revised training and better equipment are the challenges ahead of police reform efforts beyond 2014. This mission stands against the background of a police persistently seen as a source of insecurity by the population and a disputed discourse on the necessity and the ways to develop productive police/population relations.

Police governance therefore needs serious revisiting. This study argues that some pilot projects specifically taking into account civilian approaches to police building/training and community-based policing located and yet consistently neglected by the international community on the ground can provide existing models for revised police governance.
Chapter 2 – Conceptual Framework

Introduction

This chapter aims to present the conceptual framework used in this thesis, based on a review of the literature. This review makes the case for the adoption of a human security approach anchored in critical security studies. It also acknowledges its limitations while attempting to explain how they can be conceptually circumvented.

1. Roots in Critical Security Studies

Critical security studies (CSS) have been developed since the 1990s as a school of thought challenging the ways to think about and practice security as inherited from the Cold War (Bilgin, 2013). Kenneth Booth (2005, p.15), from the Aberystwyth School of CSS, described these ways as “derived from a combination of Anglo-American, statist, militarized, masculinized, top-down, methodologically positivist, and philosophically realist thinking, all shaped by the experiences and memories of the interwar years and World War II and the perceived necessities of the Cold War.”

According to Booth (2005), security studies were conceptualized in the image of the political realism paradigm which dominated international politics throughout the Cold War. For him, this paradigm, because of a number of major flaws including a static representation of the world and a narrow agenda based on the perceived interests of states, does not allow for an adequate explanation of the dynamics of international politics. Political realism critically fails the test of practice in that the paradigm does not try and challenge the security status-quo, but rather perpetuates it. “As a political practice, political realism has helped construct and perpetuate a world politics that fails to provide security for the vast majority of people in the world,” Booth (2005, p.7) argues. In other words, realism can be seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
Kenneth Booth suggested that in order to challenge these old security conceptions embedded in political realism “rethinking security from the bottom up” was required. To do so, Booth suggested a two-step methodology. First, he offered to approach the term security, its theory and its practice from critical viewpoints dissociated from political realism. Second, he suggested rethinking security from the perspective of those left at the margins of power. Booth completed his methodology by insisting on the analytical need to both ‘broaden’ and ‘deepen’ the ways we think about security. Arguing that ‘security is what we make of it’ (Booth, 1997), he insisted that assumptions and interests inevitably lie behind any security agenda. Therefore, security agendas should be questioned so as to identify their underlying interests and assumptions (Booth, 2005).

With respect to this study of police reform and training in Afghanistan in particular, shifting the perspective from a traditional to a critical security perspective permits conceptualizing anew the framework in which the policing challenges in Afghanistan are defined. Following from the rationale developed by Kenneth Booth, choosing a critical perspective on traditional security-related issues allows for questioning our assumptions on the police, its role and its missions, as well as the interests which underpin specific police-related discourses. It permits deconstructing the way the police is traditionally portrayed, as well as broadening and deepening the debate on police while including in the discussion those actors who are not traditionally referred to when it comes to police matters because they are out of power circles. Who defines policing frameworks and challenges, for what purpose and with what consequences is a stake of power which designs the contours of what it possible or impossible to imagine as a resolution. Questioning definitions opens the door to challenging the status quo (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007).

Adopting a critical perspective allows for questioning the traditional perspective on security which primarily focuses on military balances, capabilities and the safety of the state (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007). Human security can be brought into the debate at this point as it is an approach to security that precisely promotes a focus on the safety of the individuals that compose the population of a state, rather than on the state safety. In doing so, the human security approach also takes a critical stand towards political realism, in opposition to whose determinism and state-based logics of security it is built (Newman, 2001). As Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy (2007, p.20)
explain, human security challenges political realism on morals, ethics and methodology with “normative ethics, or moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct in the international system” and “a set of values that guides scholars and practitioners in assessing contemporary world arrangements and methods through which to envision more humane arrangements.” The human security approach thus clearly verges towards the one of critical security studies, as was recognized by Newman (2010). Though Newman ponders that the ways human security and CSS theories engage have yet to be precisely conceptualized, he argues there could be potential for human security, with its practical assumptions, to act as a bridge between CSS and policy and merge into ‘critical human security studies’.

2. Conceptualizing and Applying Human Security

Similarly to critical security studies, human security is an approach to security that was conceptualized in the 1990s, following the collapse of the USSR and the efforts to rethink both a new world order and a new agenda for peace after decades of bipolar politics impacted by realist thinking. Simply put, the concept of human security is based on a shift in perspectives from state-based security to human-based security. It suggests putting populations at the center of the security debate, as opposed to a traditional focus on military assets and capabilities.

First launched and developed within international organizations, the concept was introduced by the United Nations (UN) in their 1994 Human Development Report. Back then, it was identified as a ‘way to go’ forward with the new UN agenda by broadening the traditional conceptualization of security to include a new dialectical definition for the concept as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ which implied the consideration of security also with respect to a variety of dimensions such as economy, access to food, the environment, the individual, the communities, and politics (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007). Soon enough, the concept of human security caught attention in the academic arena, where it became the subject of an intense conceptual and definitional debate which has been continuing up until present.

A variety of definitions, underpinned by a debate between these that promote a narrow definition and those that promote a broad definition of human security, characterize the concept. Its most
minimalist definition is the one based on the OED definition of security as the ‘absence of insecurity and threats,’ that is, security as the freedom from fear mainly (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007). On the maximalist side, a relevant attempt at crafting a definition was made by the Commission of Human Security in its 2003 Human Security Report. This inclusive definition is formulated with reference to the objective of human security which is ‘to safeguard the vital core of human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment.’ Each word is carefully chosen so as to encompass as many security situations in the scope of human security as possible: in other words, human security aims to protect ‘freedoms that are the essence to life from ‘severe’ and ‘widespread’ threats in a sustainable way (Alkire 2003, Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007).

While Paris (2001) raised the issue that the concept of human security lacks a definition precise enough to be useful, other voices such as Newman (2001) defended that human security does not aim to be an approach emphasizing coherence or objectivism, as it recognizes that its various conceptualizations are sometimes very different or even competing, while as such they reflect a variety of orientations with respect to cultural, sociological and geostrategic features as they actually exist in international politics. Newman (2010) argues further that precisely this debate about defining the concept of human security and its orientations benefits human security in terms of fostering creativity in the conceptual and definitional process.

The development and usefulness of the human security approach is to be related to its critical stand towards political realism and traditional security, as mentioned above. Placed in its historical context, human security represents an attempt to reconcile the need to achieve security in the world, in the states and in people’s daily lives and the need to meet basic human needs so that individuals can actually experience the absence of insecurity or full-fledged safety, establishing a double priority on these needs according to goals set within international organizations. The rationale behind the reconciliation of these needs lies with ensuring security at the grass-root level as a way to prevent the emergence and development of threats to peace and security at the international level (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007, Kaldor et al. 2007). Additionally, and in agreement with critical security studies, human security aims to emphasize the idea that asking ‘whose security’ we are talking about matters. Human security aims to look
at the populations as opposed to the states, and in specific it aims to cast light on these people that are usually marginalized from power (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007, Hampson 2013). With respect to this study, the shift to a human security approach in police issues permits adopting a people-centered approach to look at how the police reform process is led to meet the security and human needs of those that are not benefiting from these processes, arguing that meeting the needs of these marginalized groups can benefit the police reform process as a whole. In the Afghan case, it is the bulk of the population that does not feel they benefit from police reform, which raises the significant question of the relevance of police reform efforts overall.

Analytically, Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy (2007, p.3) explain that the human security approach implies looking at specific social phenomena and focusing “on the consequences they have on the stability and dignity of the lives of individual human beings”. For this study, analyzing police-related issues from a human security perspective thus implies focusing on the consequences of policing, police reform and police training on the stability, safety and dignity of the lives of the Afghans. Besides, Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy (2007) highlight ‘protection’ and ‘empowerment’ as being the two strategies defined by the Human Security Commission to achieve human security in practice. An analysis of the practice of Afghan policing from a human security perspective can therefore also focus on the issues of protection and empowerment.

Beyond its analytical capacity, it is worth noting that the concept of human security is defended by a number of authors for its practical dimensions. Precisely, Axworthy (2004) argues, human security offers a non-traditional perspective that is a practical tool to understand and implement policy also. Not only does human security provide an analytical tool, Kaldor et al. (2007) agree, it also provides a practical framework that captures the dynamics for action in the security field and their corresponding narrative. Newman (2010) goes further in defending that human security is a ‘policy-relevant’ approach which has the potential to foster people-centered security thinking among policy analysts and governments. According to Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy (2007, p.21), human security conceptual framework has, indeed, implications for how security strategies should be designed, as an opportunity to protect people and empower them so that they, in turn, desist from violating the security of the state.” In particular, the authors believe in the power of
human security to cast light and take up on the issues of underdevelopment and human dignity on the policy agendas.

3. Human Security & the Linking of Security and Development

In the 1990s, major shifts in international politics and the emergence of new threats to global security such as terrorism after 9/11 required new thinking of security and development which led to an intensification of interest in the security-development nexus (McNeish & Sander Lie 2010, Stepputat 2010). It was increasingly recognized that traditional security approaches failed to provide the necessary security conditions to allow for development to happen in critical contexts. States and international organizations such as the UN or the EU gradually acknowledged the need for innovation to better tackle fragility in states like Afghanistan through the development of an enhanced linkage between security and development (Elhawary et al. 2010, Wendling 2010). Based on the growing recognition that security and development are interrelated, sometimes mutually reinforcing, and central to sustain the transition from conflict to recovery in countries like Afghanistan (Elhawary et al. 2010), moves were made towards the greater integration of security in development policies and, conversely, the greater integration of development in security policies (Stewart 2004). This integration can be understood, in the idea of King & Murray (2001), as the result of a tighter intertwining of two traditionally separate tools of foreign policy, ‘economic development’ and ‘military security.’ Such integration can also be seen as a way to promote more coherence in policy and practice under a comprehensive approach (Nyborg, 2011). Finally, such integration is additionally understood as the shift that paved the way to conceptualizing human security (King & Murray 2001). Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy (2007) locate the clear conception and use of human security as the linking of security and development within the reform agendas of international institutions such as the UN in 2004/2005. For the authors (2007, p.93), it is clear that the current security practice “seems to evolve towards the critical paradigm expanding the notion of security to individuals, to social, economic, and environmental threats to human life and dignity.”

Importantly, the intensification of the security-development nexus matched a related shift to a holistic vision of political, security and development processes, and the emergence of the
concept of ‘comprehensive approach.’ States, militaries and international organizations gradually shifted their understanding and practice of security from a typically one-dimensional approach to an increasingly multidimensional approach comprehensively taking into account political, economic and development dimensions in addition to the dominant security/military dimension (Owen & Travers 2007, Finney 2010, Elhawary et al. 2010). In its Anglo-Saxon understanding, the comprehensive approach involves the cooperation of the defense, foreign affairs and trade ministries of a country with their national development agency (or other international organizations) in a common executive strategy (Owen & Travers 2007, Finney 2010). Fostering such cooperation, bound to be a continuum of engagement, represents an attempt to “link military action with development, foreign policy and other forms of ‘civilian engagement’ in order to consolidate reductions in violence and create the minimum security, political and social conditions necessary for viable recovery and reconstruction and for mitigating threats to international peace and security” (Elhawary et al. 2010, p.4). Interestingly, this evolution is accompanied by emerging interests in taking a developmental approach to security matters also. SSR and police reform thus presume that “effective and democratic security delivery is fundamental for reducing poverty and for sustainable economic, social and political development” (DCAF 2009, p.1). In particular, Groenewald & Peake (2004) believe that community-based approaches to police reform can successfully help ‘develop security’ and ‘secure development’ in impacting economic, social and political development. In addition to SSR, the comprehensive approach is commonly applied in foreign policy (Natsios, 2006) and increasingly integrated in military doctrine (US Department of the Army 2006, NATO 2012) as well as in military practice with the direct involvement of soldiers in development activities (Nyborg, 2011). In Afghanistan, the shift to a comprehensive approach to security and development occurred in 2006/08 as reflected in policies such as the 2006 Afghanistan Compact or the 2008 Afghan National Development Strategy. It represents an attempt to make up for the pitfalls of a one-dimensional, sequential approach to securing Afghanistan that proved unsuccessful in face of the revival of the insurgency from 2004 onwards (Wendling 2010, Hoogensen Gjørv 2014).

Despite its wide promotion and adoption, the comprehensive approach faces criticism on several aspects. Whereas McNeish & Sander Lie (2010) and Stepputat (2010) warn against the
securitization of development that sometimes makes development a tool to give legitimacy to a military intervention, Elhawary et al. (2010) recalls that security does not necessarily entail development and vice-versa. With reference to the case of Afghanistan, Wendling (2010) highlighted that development and security objectives and timeframes often collide, while they are rarely supported by adequate institutionalization alongside their field practice. Understood here in terms of balancing security and development, the essential problem of balancing power and emancipation described by Nederveen Pieterse (2010) further challenges the successful implementation of a comprehensive approach. In Afghanistan, the difficulty remains to give equal priority to interventionist countries’ concerns over global security while promoting development. Indeed, around 2006/08, security, governance and economic development began to be increasingly integrated in Afghan policy-making. Though these components were in appearance balanced in policy, they became, again, increasingly dominated by security-related political concerns as the insurgency gained momentum (Nyborg, 2011). Despite all recommendations, this implied a switch back to a security-first, state-centric type of approach detrimental to a vision whereby development is seen as ‘progress in human well-being’ (Stewart, 2004), and pushing forward of another ‘state-focused’ and ‘technocratic’ vision of development considered for its political and strategic value (Nyborg, 2011).

4. Limitations of the Human Security Approach

A first criticism of the practice of human security resonates in the critical discourse of the securitization of the human being and securitization of development as a consequence of the human security approach. Chandler (2008) argues that human security has attempted to exaggerate the threats that emerged at the end of the Cold War. For Duffield (2005), the evolution of human security, which he sees as a ‘technology of governance,’ is closely linked to the evolution of the war on terrorism during which the relation between security and development was tightened by a renewed focus, in terms of resource, on the people and the places that were also seen as presenting a risk for homeland security in the West.

Another critical aspect of the practice of human security, for King & Murray (2001), is that the concept has rapidly moved away from the realms of security and development to become a
pivotal object of foreign policy. Human security has proved to have a political and interest-based usage in foreign policy more frequently than in security policies. After the introduction of the concept by international institutions, some countries like Canada and Norway were quick indeed to pick it up and make it a relevant guideline for their respective ‘middle power’ foreign policies, as a way to gain in influence within these institutions that were using it also, such as the United Nations, and in order to gain credibility within the international arena (Suhrke 2004, Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007). This led Chandler (2008) to argue that the mainstreaming of human security in policymaking served the purpose to strengthen existing policy frameworks more than it challenged them. In addition, both Suhrke (2004) and Newman (2010) note that these country that championed human security as a foreign policy have not always been consistent with their human security choice in the long run, as the case of Canada showed that its human security line in foreign policy was soon replaced following domestic elections and the desire or the new government to take distance from the former. For this study in particular, clear interests in using statebuilding and police reform as tools of foreign policy are at stake.

Moreover, according to Chandler (2008), the practice of human security can be criticized in that the approach has repeatedly kept locating the new threats that emerged after the Cold War in the developing world, in such a way that did not break with earlier policy making but rather continued the oppression of the ‘South’ by the ‘North’. As it is recognized by Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy (2007) human security has increased the fear of countries such as G77 countries that human security is yet another ‘ethnocentric tool’ for the West to impose its liberal values and its political institutions, as well as to justify intervention in the developing world, while strengthening its economic power. This view is shared by Mgbeoji (2006) and Newman (2010) for whom the controversy about human security in policy making spheres is currently associated with connotation of ‘Western hegemony’ and ‘liberal cultural imperialism’. For this study in particular, it cannot be denied that the liberal agenda has always stood behind the international statebuilding and security reform project. Human security in Afghanistan must therefore be questioned from this perspective also.

Finally, Duffield (2005, p.1) pushes the argument against the practice of human security further by bringing up the notion of ‘biopolitics’ in association to human security which, he says, is a
concept that “facilitates the way that populations living within the territories of ineffective states are understood, differentiated and acted upon by aid institutions emanating from effective ones.” In this framework, Duffield sees that development is used as a ‘security technology’ while Stepputat (2010) argues more directly that it is a ‘form of biopolitics.’ According to Stepputat (2010, p.32), development can be seen together with security as “different mechanisms through which the conditions for some kind of political order that permits the state to be inserted in local relations can be created.” As such, development aims to build “specific forms of state” and define “some practices and forms of life as desirable and improvable, while others are deemed unworthy and immoral and are assigned to abandonment or to extermination by force.” Human security and development discourses are therefore “smacked of power in the construction of the terms” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007, p.4).

5. Paving the Way to Circumventing Limitations

While taking these criticisms seriously, it must be remembered that definitions, concepts and arguments emerge from past theories and go against past theories. Human security experienced the same; it also emerged as a concept offering to see international politics through new lenses. In doing so, it established a rupture with previous paradigms, which could not possibly be neutral. Also, a political process of determination of priorities and allocation of funds is necessary to put a concept such as human security in practice. For human security to become a practice, it could therefore not be apolitical (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007).

Although there is a risk to securitize the human to a dangerous or manipulated extent, it is hardly imaginable to envision the implementation of development activities without talking of security, especially when it comes to so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’ or ‘lawless areas.’ In peacebuilding in particular, Bailey & Perito (2010) argue that security is as much a priority as building an effective government; without one, the other cannot be. This makes it a situation where the prioritizing of security and development activities is a dilemma. Sedra (2002) agrees that a minimum level of development is necessary to conduct development activities, while it is equally true that security reform processes need to benefit from the momentum of a minimum level of
development to be successful. The relation between development and security is symbiotic, and in spite of the risks it entails, the two strands must be taken up together.

Likewise, there is no denying that there is a risk that human security be increasingly manipulated as a tool of foreign policy serving precisely the purposes of the states even when the concept wishes to reject state-centrism. Yet, beyond this risk, there are also opportunities for the concept of human security to be used effectively, even by states, for the purposes that were developed along the line defended by the theory of the concept. Newman (2010) defends that human security is a policy-relevant perspective, which is corroborated by Paris (2001) when he highlights that human security has already successfully been used as a ‘rallying cry’ in the past, on such occasions as the signature of an anti-personnel land mine convention, among other examples. In the same way, Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy (2007) argue that human security could further on be used as a campaigning tool casting light on underdevelopment and dignity issues in the benefit of Southern countries like Afghanistan.

As to the question of using human security as a tool for oppression by certain states on other states, it must be borne in mind on the one hand that human security does not challenge state sovereignty directly. In human security, even if the security of the individual is believed to come first in line and to lie beyond state prerogatives, individuals are still considered within the borders of their state in reality (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007). The pivotal idea is that although state security remains fundamental, it is not considered sufficient (Axworthy, 2001). Human security therefore implies a dialectical analysis of social phenomena taking into account both people’s safety and state safety. On the other hand, it must also be remembered that human security was conceptualized as a tool of empowerment for both the North and the South, based on the underlying assumption that both the North and the South have their own human security threats to deal with, as human security threats have countless variants and may be different in the North compared to the South (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007). So that human security does not fall in the ‘patronizing discourse’ category, Mgbeoji (2006) recommends that the dichotomy between ‘the civilized’ and ‘the savages’ be rejected absolutely in the debate as a pre-requisite for the success of the concept. From there, it is possible to imagine achieving greater empowerment of all sides rather than greater oppression; it is also possible to imagine the South reminding the
North of its own human threats of which to take care. For UL Haq (1998), human security equaled the promotion of a new North/South partnership funded on justice, equity in the global market, mutual cooperation and two-way compacts, rather than on charity, aid, unilateral conditionality and one-way transfers. Importantly, Acharya (2001) rejected the idea that human security is a Western concern, as he himself worked on the topic and contributed to the human security debate with insights from South Asia. If he acknowledges important variations in the definition of human security, he highlights that such variations exist both within the ‘Western camp’ and within the ‘Eastern camp,’ thus concluding that the idea of an ‘East-West faultline’ for human security should be abandoned. Finally Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy (2007) remind the reader that Southern and Eastern countries are free to develop their own definition and conceptualization of human security, with a regional focus if necessary, and take it up on international agendas, thus contributing to making human security a greater tool for the empowerment of the both the North and the South.

Concluding Remarks

As this review suggests, human security can be envisioned as a conceptual approach rooted in critical security studies which rejects the state-centrism and static logics of political realism and offers itself as a theoretically, analytically and practically policy-relevant alternative. Despite numerous criticisms including the accusation of being yet another tool of agenda-based foreign policy, oppression and biopolitics, human security reconsidered within its practical project merely shows that becoming a concept applied to field reality implies the design of a related political agenda that allows for its application. If the methodological rupture that human security represents must be strengthened further by practice, its people-centered approach and analytical focus on protection and empowerment of the groups marginalized from power deserves to be recognized as a clear challenger perspective on the status quo and traditional security models. This is such a challenger perspective that allows investigating, in this study, how the police practice, its reform and related training help tackle human threats or rather keep contributing to enhancing human threats to the Afghan population.
Chapter 3 – Methodology

Introduction

This chapter presents the methodological approach to this study, as well as the methodology which was applied to designing the research plan, collecting the data and proceeding to its analysis. Essential reflections on qualitative research evaluation criteria, research ethics and the limitations of the chosen methodology are also included in this chapter.

1. Approach to Qualitative Research

1.1. Philosophical Considerations

The philosophical assumptions of the researcher impact the methodology and methods they chose, and consequently the way they design, conduct and present their research. It is therefore important that researchers identify, explain and justify the set of assumptions about reality and the understanding of human knowledge on which their work relies (Crotty, 1998). In particular, it is critical for researchers to clarify their understanding of ontology (the nature of existence) and epistemology (the nature of knowledge). The task is not easy, as there is no consensus in the literature on whether one ontological and epistemological position reflects better the nature of knowledge and the ways we study it than the others (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Different disciplines thus adhere to different philosophical positions. Within one discipline, it is also frequent to observe that individual researchers subscribe to different philosophical positions. In general, the conceptualizations of ontology and epistemology as well as the terminology used in the literature often prove inconsistent (Crotty 1998, Bryman 2008). For example, while Bryman (2008) puts positivism and interpretivism in the ‘epistemology’ category, and objectivism and constructionism in the ‘ontology’ category, Crotty (1998) considers objectivism and constructionism as epistemological paradigms, and realism and idealism as ontological paradigms. Ultimately, it is up to the researcher to make and justify their choice on these matters.
The underlying philosophical assumptions of this study will be explained in the terms of Crotty (1998). Accordingly, this study thus reflects a social constructionist understanding of epistemology in social sciences whereby constructionism posits that there is no objective truth or meaning, in a way that rejects objectivist views. Meaning is understood as the result of interactions between the subject and the object; it is thus constructed, and not discovered. Besides, as cross-cultural and historical comparisons show it, it is understood that meaning can be constructed differently by different people. The ‘social’ nature of constructionism flows from the understanding that meaning is generated and transmitted collectively, as opposed to a more individualist understanding of constructionism which Crotty labels ‘constructivism.’ Turning to ontology, this study considers that an object can be both socially constructed and real. Accordingly, it draws upon realist ontology, and defends that realism and constructionism are compatible. At the same time, the study draws upon relativist ontology that posits that “what is said to be the way things are is really just the sense we make of them” (Crotty 1998, p.64). Here again, cross-cultural and historical comparisons show that the same phenomenon can be interpreted very differently, hence testifying for the relativity of the creation of any meaning.

Finally, this study integrates the assumption that all types of science have an important moral dimension which implies that research, and especially social qualitative research, cannot be a value-free and objective process (Murray & Overton, 2003). The researcher’s positionality, that is, their origins and inevitable value-judgments, is recognized as a considerably influential element in the research process at all stages.

1.2. Choosing Qualitative Research

The objective of this study was to explore, locate and put into perspective the discourse on policing, police reform and police training in Afghanistan in the context of late 2013/early 2014. Put in methodological terms, the objective was to study the perceptions and interpretations expressed by a sample of respondents with respect to policing, police reform and police training, and subsequently analyze the meanings of their qualitative judgments.
The choice of qualitative methods of data collection and analysis over quantitative methods was motivated precisely because of the study interest in considering qualitative judgments and their meanings to explore the extremely complex Afghan context of police reform and training. Drawing upon Dey (1993), it is arguable that qualitative judgments and their meanings may be more illuminating than figures when placed and explained in their social context, although they are often deemed to be unconfirmed and unreliable compared to figures. In the background chapter of this study, it was explained that the focus of the debate on police reform and training in Afghanistan since 2001 has been far more quantitative than qualitative in trying to assess progress by counting the number of boots on the ground and the increasing number of trained staff in the national police. As progress proved elusive over time, this numeric focus has been largely criticized. Indeed, what does the number of trained police say about the quality of their behavior and their post-training conduct? And does this number really permit measuring progress in police reform overall? These two questions highlight that figures do not mean much in themselves unless they rely on meaningful contextualization and conceptualization of the object of the study (Dey, 1993). The choice of methodology for this study therefore relies on the assumption that, beyond figures and in order to illuminate figures, qualitative assessments are worth exploring in order to meaningfully capture the quality of essential social aspects and concepts of the police reform and police training context in Afghanistan. With this assumption, the depth of analysis that characterizes qualitative methods is preferred over the precision and standardization that characterizes quantitative measurement.

1.3. Designing Qualitative Research

The research design of a qualitative research provides a framework to plan and anticipate data collection and data analysis. As Berg & Lune (2012, p.41-42) put it, “the design for a research project is literally the plan for how the study will be conducted. It is a matter of thinking about, imagining, and visualizing how the research study will be undertaken. […] The design stage involves a series of important decisions about the research idea or question(s).” A number of these decisions are typically taken before fieldwork when the research proposal is being developed and the research needs to be given a direction. Murray & Overton (2003) argue that designing the research is a critical process which includes considerations of philosophical,
methodological and logistical nature. Among these, the most essential steps can be mentioned briefly: the formulation of a problem statement and a research question; the determination of research objectives and expected outcomes; and the choice of a study area, a setting and suitable data collection methods. Limitations and ethical challenges to the research must be envisioned early on. As research is a resolutely iterative process, a number of these decisions have to be questioned again when fieldwork starts and various elements on the ground inevitably come to challenge pre-fieldwork methodological choices (Murray & Overton 2003, Berg & Lune 2012).

Initially, the research plan for this study was designed to use both qualitative and participatory methods, that is, interviews and focus groups to be complemented by participatory workshops. The study also aimed to include both urban and rural communities in the respondents’ sample. At the time of the proposal writing, it was unclear what the research sites would be, how the respondents could be identified, and what the settings for the interviews or participatory workshops could be due to the particularity of the field in Afghanistan, which is partly considered as a conflict zone. A clear and practical understanding of the reality of the research context, which was constantly evolving and needed continuous update, was missing at the early design stage to decide on these elements. And indeed, several elements of the research design had to be changed during operationalization. It proved difficult, for example, to balance the rural and urban dimensions of data collection due to the security situation. Likewise, it proved difficult to envision the organization of participatory group works and the idea was ultimately abandoned.

1.4. Evaluating Qualitative Research

The design of a research is influenced by a set of criteria that are used for the evaluation of qualitative research (Bryman, 2004). Trusting research findings is at stake when evaluating research procedures, which is justified by the possibility that research be abused (Dey, 1993). Looking closer at qualitative research, evaluation appears to be a difficult task. Based on principles of constructionist epistemology which establish that two people can produce different meanings from the same data, it must be reminded that qualitative research cannot be replicated. Evaluation criteria must be adequate in considering the specific features of the qualitative paradigm, as opposed to the quantitative paradigm. Such important features of qualitative
research include the reflexivity of the researcher (ontology, epistemology, and positionality), the context of research (including related ethical considerations), the selection of the participants to the research (sampling methods and implications), and the (subjective) interpretation of their accounts (Horsburgh, 2002). According to Denzin & Lincoln (2012), the division of the qualitative research community into a multiplicity of interpretive sub-communities which all have their own sets of evaluation criteria makes it particularly difficult to determine one set of criteria universally applicable to all types of qualitative research. Criteria are mainly disputed between fields of study in social sciences. However, a few general principles for the evaluation of qualitative research can be applied across fields. For example, it is universally critical in the qualitative paradigm that research be submitted to critical scrutiny through peer review as a way to discuss findings and evaluate their robustness. To do so, criteria must be identified, formalized and rigorously applied (Horsburgh, 2003). Besides, researchers should show their ability to monitor and reflect upon their biases while conducting research, as well as in writing their account of research by provide a clear description of their philosophical stance, the research context and the methodology applied (Berg & Lune, 2012). Overall, the validity of qualitative research is typically evaluated on the basis of the relevance, credibility and internal coherence of the research findings, and the manner by which they have been supported by collected data.

2. Methods of Data Collection

Methods of data collection constitute a set of techniques for the researcher to interpret the reality around them (Murray & Overton, 2003). The choice of methods is logically influenced by the initial research question and the subsequent design of the research. These two elements, as well as the expected constraints of the fieldwork environment, guide the researcher to determine the most suitable methods for their study (Berg & Lune, 2012). The methods of data collection and analysis used in this study, as well as their limitations, are presented in this sub-section.

2.1. Sampling Procedure

The main guideline for selecting respondents was their involvement in either the security or the development sector, and a direct or indirect involvement in police and/or security reform in the
country. Given the rule of law approach taken by the study, justice sector actors could legitimately have been included in the sampling. This was not done in order to limit the scope of the study. However, some respondents could talk about their experience of working at the intersection between policing and justice. Once this was defined, the identification of respondents opportunistically started with convenience sampling, a practice which relies on relevant people who are easily accessible in the surrounding of the researcher. From there, a snowball sampling strategy was used all along the research. The first respondents were asked to help identify other potentially relevant respondents, thus creating a useful chain of referrals which permitted reaching people and accessing various related institutions easily (Berg & Lune, 2012). Given the potential sensitivity of police research in Afghanistan as well as the relative difficulty to approach certain categories of respondents such as government officials at the Ministry of Interior without prior contact with the institution, snowball sampling proved to be the most effective way to request and obtain interviews in a timely fashion while being recommended by personal contacts in a country whose culture highly values personal relations and networks. The use of snowballing, despite these advantages, implies that other relevant respondents who did not pertain to the networks accessed may have been missed.

A thorough follow-up of the nature and characteristics of the snowball sampled respondents was done with the aim to ensure the representativeness of respondents in terms of their working sector (security or development/civil society) and their origins (considering two main categories that are ‘national’ and ‘international’). Hence, mention of ‘security actors’ is made with reference to national and international respondents working for security institutions such as MoI, the police, the military or ISAF. Other actors working in civil institutions (such as embassies) on security portfolios are included in this formulation. Mentions of ‘development actors’ are inclusive of a wide range of governmental and non-governmental actors and stakeholders involved in development activities with national or international organizations. No specific target number for interviews was defined from the onset; the unpredictable dimension of the Afghan context implied that all opportunities to interview were worth taking. Over a period of two months, a total number of 56 interviews were conducted, involving one or several respondents. Four respondents accepted to be interviewed twice. Excluding these doubled interviews, in-depth interviews were conducted with a total of 32 nationals and 20 internationals. Answers were
received from 31 individual security actors (16 nationals and 15 internationals), as well as from 21 individual development/civil society actors (16 nationals and 5 internationals). Additionally, two group sessions gathered some 55 participants in total, with approximately 40 participants for one and 15 for the other. These two group sessions were meetings arranged within the frame of a United Nations field mission by and for UN staff. They were attended with the purpose of observing as a participant. Respondents who took part to these sessions were interviewed neither personally nor individually. All considered, the total number of respondents reached out to is estimated to 106 individuals, including 73 male respondents (36 in individual interviews) and 33 female respondents (16 in individual interview). The difference in figures between male and female respondents can be explained by the male-dominated nature of the group of security actors, especially among Afghan security actors.

2.2. Data Collection 1: Interviewing

In-depth interviewing was chosen as the main research method for this study on the theoretical basis that it is a meaningful tool when the researcher aims to explore perceptions and analyze their meanings put in their social perspective. Moreover, in-depth interviewing enables the development of a rapport, which is a pivotal element affecting the quality of perception collection (Berg & Lune, 2012). From a more practical point of view, the use of interviewing was motivated by several reasons. First, the conduct of interviews was familiar. Second, it seemed to be a conventional and therefore suitable method to some of the sectors and settings investigated, such as the hierarchical security sector and formal government institutions. Third, the expected fieldwork timeframe implied that the use of some of the more time-consuming participatory methods would be difficult to plan without prior knowledge of the terrain and the target groups. Also, the unpredictability and the uncertainty of all processes on the ground reinforced the preference for ‘classical’ interviewing to maximize the chances to achieve a solid data collection.

As for the preferred interview format, it was determined on the basis that the type of questions envisioned for interview and the type of answers expected are the main parameters to take into consideration for the choice of format (Berg & Lune, 2012). A certain degree of standardization
was preferred for the questions in order to allow for comparability of the answers, while at the same time a certain degree of flexibility was required so as to allow for respondents to develop their answers, and for the interviewer to discover unexpected elements of answer. These criteria led to the use of semi-structured interviewing throughout the data collection process. Semi-structured interviews function with a set of guiding points or questions, which may or may not be asked during the interview, depending on the turn the discussion takes. These points are used by the interviewer to keep a certain direction for the conversation; they are supportive to the conduct of the interview but do not restrict its course, so space is provided for digression (Berg & Lune, 2012). This strategy was used to uncover the complexity of the topics discussed and allow for unknown elements to be spotted and integrated within the scope of the study.

There is no denying, however, that “interviewing is only one of a number of ways researcher can obtain answers to questions” (Berg & Lune 2012, p.115). Interviewing is noticeably limited by the degree to which a respondent is willing to disclose information, as well as by the physical and social environment that influence the quality of an interview, and consequently the quality of the data collected, as will be highlighted later on in this chapter. Besides, because of their position, the researcher cannot necessarily access all target groups of respondents, especially in a chaotic and highly insecure environment such as Afghanistan. The researcher’s position, especially as a foreigner in Afghanistan, may likewise affect what is said to them or not, and how it is said to them. In this study, interviewing as a main research method was therefore completed by the use of other methods, such as participant observation, second-hand data collection and secondary data review.

2.3. Data Collection 2: Observation as Participant

What I term ‘observation as participant’ was used as a method of data collection whenever it happened that an interview was conducted with multiple interviewers. For this study, it implied that the researcher’s role as an investigator remained overt, yet their participation was less active as some of the multiple interviewers took the lead in interviewing because of either their prioritized mission objectives or their seniority. These team dynamics and priorities, constrained further by tight mission schedules, the lack of time overall and security issues inherent to the
field trips, made the choice of observation as participant adequate to allow both for the other interviewers’ goals to be met and the researcher’s data collection to take place. This could function smoothly as the topics investigated were very similar. Yet, it must be highlighted that observation as participant remained formal in its character, and mostly took place during single site and setting visits. This specifically applied to the data collection work carried out within the frame of a UN field mission to Herat. For this intensive two-day mission, individual and group interviews were pre-arranged by LOTFA local staff and led by the three guest members of the mission team. Data was thus collected in the form of observations and notes made as a participant in and rapporteur of these meetings. The principal pitfall of such a method of data collection lies with the risk of having misunderstood or left unexplored the nuances, subtleties, informal norms, roles and relationships between actors which are typically better uncovered through more informal or personal research processes allowing for the development of a helpful rapport between the researcher and the respondents (Berg & Lune, 2012). Despite this, the relevance of observation as a method remains in that the researcher is allowed to be part of formal and informal exchanges in which they would normally not be included, in places to which they would not necessarily have had easy access. First contact with respondents is thus facilitated, while situations provide the opportunity to become familiar both with the content and the dynamics of exchanges between the actors involved. In particular, they provide the opportunity to observe the relationship between the interviewers and the interviewed, what the interviewers prioritized and understood to be important, as well as how the interviewees responded and, in turn, highlighted what was important to them. Observing what actors talk about, how they talk about it and how they relate in practice, can illuminate yet undiscovered areas of investigation in the study and inform the research process with external input, beyond the researcher’s limited position. Additionally, it can illuminate powered relations between the evaluators and the evaluated in situations where such rapport is established.

2.4. Data Collection 3: Assisted Data Collection

Assistance in data collection was also required for this study as a way to compensate for the inability to conduct research personally in rural areas at the time of the field work. On one occasion, it proved uneasy to reach a rural province in the North, Faryab, for a number of
reasons: cancellation of a direct flight to the targeted destination, relative insecurity of roads prohibiting alternative road transport to the destination, and limitations for a foreigner to reach out to local contacts and conduct interviews. It appeared feasible, however, to mandate a senior Afghan male NGO staff and colleague familiar with the research topic of this study, who was going to the same destination, to take advantage of their own fieldtrip to collect data on the researcher’s behalf. This way to collect data with the assistance of a third party proved to be a relatively satisfying alternative for data collection in the chaotic Afghan field. A number of pitfalls for such a method can nonetheless be highlighted. Indeed, the researcher on whose behalf the fieldwork is done does not get the opportunity to develop a rapport with the respondents, and the risk exists that essential characteristics of the respondents (such as background, profession, social status, etc.) are not understood accurately enough. Ideally, extensive communication between the researcher and their mandated data collector is necessary to make up for the absence of an active role of the researcher in the research process and a poorer understanding of the field environment. Informational loss is inevitable as the transfer of knowledge from the data collector to the researcher is deemed to be filtered by the subjective experience and analysis of the data collector. This process of data collection is therefore comparable to processes of secondary data collection, although more direct and tailor-made. For this study, data collection in Faryab province, as explained by the colleague who kindly assisted in the mission, was conducted by interviewing 10 field staff from 7 districts of Faryab representing a number of local NGO partners attending an unrelated workshop, as well as 3 villagers (2 from Qaranqul district and 1 from Qourghan district) and 1 police person. The interviews conducted were non-standardized, both individual and collective.

2.5. Data Collection 4: Review of Secondary Data

The background and conceptual framework chapters of this study are based on secondary data review which consists in collecting and confronting a variety of seminal work and publications such as books, articles and press releases which both empirically and theoretically addressed the study topic prior to its investigation in the present work. Using such data allows for assessing how the study topic has been conceptualized and researched by other researchers previously, thus uncovering how it was not conceptualized and researched earlier and illuminating the
argumentative choices made in the new research (Berg & Lune, 2012). The use of secondary data, however, requires manifold crosschecking in order to minimize informational loss related to the inevitably subjective methodological and analytical choices made in the writing processes leading to publications and the mainstreaming of specific patterns of the study topic. In this study, secondary data was used to inform the literature reviews of chapter 1 (background) and chapter 2 (conceptual framework), as well as for the justification of methodological choices (chapter 3) and parts of the analysis (chapter 4). Useful secondary data was also recommended and/or provided by respondents. Such documents include activities fact sheets, annual reports, baseline reports, guidelines, official GIRoA policies, meeting minutes, presentation slideshows, as well as seminal pieces from the Afghan SSR and development practitioners’ literature that are widely quoted.

2.6. Data Management

As Berg & Lune (2012, p.55) accurately put it, “a clear working storage and retrieval system is critical if one expects to keep track of the reams of data that have been collected, to flexibly access and use the data, and to assure systematic analysis and documentation of the data.” In this sense, proper data management is essential to the research process if the researcher aims indeed to allow for easy internal verification of their data, that is, for the replication of their coding and analysis strategy based on the same set of data – a method which has been identified earlier in this chapter as an evaluation criterion of qualitative research. For this study, interview data was first collected in the form of extensive manual notes taken by the researcher themselves during the interview. These notes were later on transcribed in typing in order to ensure the possession of electronic files of data more easily used, copied/pasted and coded during the analysis process. Transcription occurred within a week following the conduct of the interview so as to minimize the loss of situational insight of the interview at the moment of typing and maximize the accurate restitution of the interview content with unwritten details.

Although no extreme warning was received against data sensitivity despite the specificity of the Afghan political and security context, particular attention was paid to collecting and storing data for this study. The decision was made to use manual note-taking as data collection technique.
Interview recording, usually used as a back-up for accuracy reasons, was not used. Voices and speech recording was judged unnecessary in order to prevent the potential misuse of such recorded data in the future. Moreover, it was assumed that the request for recording may make respondents feel uncomfortable and uneasy during the interview for the abovementioned reasons.

With relation to the topic of data sensitivity and the choice of interviewing as a method, though infrequently, it happened that respondents highlighted their stance and offered their opinions and observations irrespective of the institution to which they belonged. Several reasons may explain this. First, it may have been that these respondents were willing to take the interview, yet without going through their institutional chain of command to ask for permission. Respondents may have thought that institutional permission was difficult to obtain. In one case, the chain of command of a specific organization denied a request for interview twice, although staff contacted in the first place were willing to take the interview. Also, institutional policies may have required a visitor to be in touch with the public relations service in the first place, rather than directly with the actual person that had knowledge on the topic of enquiry. Some respondents may have been aware of this, so they offered to skip the administrative chain of coordination. Finally, some respondents may have wanted to express views they knew were not in line with the official discourse of their institution and could only do so in their own name. A few respondents additionally required not to be quoted on points they made, as they knew they were politically incorrect remarks. Interestingly, these aspects of data sensitivity show the interconnection and overlap between data management and data analysis issues. They highlight the necessity to anticipate both type of issues while taking careful stock in view of their management at a later stage of the research process (Berg & Lune, 2012).

2.7. Data Analysis

In continuation of data management, data analysis is the process of reducing, codifying, organizing and displaying data in a systematic way so as to make it easier to identify trends of interest in the mass of data collected. Typically, in the beginning of the analytical process, organizing the data implies the creation of thematic categories under whose headings it is interesting to classify relevant fragments of data. Such classification then allows for a clearer and
more precise abstraction of specific features of the object of study and for easier comparison of these features. In a later stage of the analytical process, the deconstructed and classified data can be linked again. This process of reconstruction of the data usually casts light on dynamics and interconnections of particular interest between the categories. Finally, the production of a report is part of the analytical process in that it pushes for the production of a text that draws conclusions on the subject of study. The text is expected to aim for clarity and coherence in making sense of data and in itself, thus proving accessible and acceptable for submission to peer review and evaluation (Dey 1993, Berg & Lune 2012). The analysis of the data for this study has been conducted according these very guidelines. Data was first reduced and organized, before interconnections between categories were re-established and built into an argument. The analytical chapter of this study presents the account of the process.

3. Logistics & Practice

Beyond the elaboration of the research design and the choice of adequate methods of data collection, a number of logistical and practical considerations conditioned the implementation of fieldwork. An integrated part of the methodological process of this study, they are presented in this sub-section. The challenges they posed to data collection are also discussed.

3.1. Choice of Site & Setting

The choice of site and setting is typically made in accordance with the research question providing guidance (Berg & Lune, 2012). The research question for this study set to investigate the relation between police reform/training and community needs. Fieldwork was initially envisioned for both urban and rural sites in different regions of Afghanistan in order to ensure the comprehensiveness and representativeness of the different realities of community needs in the country. Yet, the final selection of sites could not be determined before reaching the field and evaluating the situation on the ground.

Geographical constraints to fieldwork are typical in Afghanistan, a landlocked country almost entirely covered with mountains. Travels across the country are uneasy to plan because the
topography is particularly complex and infrastructures are extremely poor. Any trip is therefore time-consuming, in addition to being relatively unsafe depending on the quality of the roads and the frequency of road attacks and bombings in a given area. The planned sites for study happened to be one of several elements of the research design that had to be changed during operationalization as it proved difficult to balance the rural and urban dimensions of data collection due to the security situation. By default, Kabul became the main site for the research as it is the most easily accessed and deemed ‘safest’ location in the country, where many relevant respondents were based or bound to stay at some point in time. Secondly, the city of Herat located in the West of the country was chosen as a site when an opportunity appeared to join a field mission of the United Nations. Lastly, the northern province of Faryab failed to be reached personally, but was selected as a site for assisted data collection performed by an Afghan local staff and colleague. Faryab was initially chosen because of contacts with the Norwegian organization NCA Afghanistan which had a field office there and very good knowledge of the region. Faryab is also a particularly relevant region for Norway whose military contingent and aid support was assigned there by the international community until 2013.

Settings for the interviews conducted for this study were mostly thought about in terms of their convenience and appropriateness for a conversation to unfold without disturbance in a quiet environment. A few times, nevertheless, interviews happened to take place in busy offices in which the passage of various colleagues and visitors was inevitable due to the responsibilities and rank of the respondent. In such cases, duty phones and personal secretaries under pressure represented a major disturbance to the course of the interviews. Conversely, the offices of workers of lesser rank or lower position in the hierarchy also represented less appropriate settings to conduct an interview. Typically shared with several other colleagues, such settings were relatively crowded, with a number of unwanted ears and eyes that listened and watched the respondent while they answered, and sometimes even interfered in the discussion. Given how the presence of any other individual can influence the development of a discussion or the content or authenticity of the answers of the respondent, such additional unknown listeners represented a potentially unpleasant experience for the respondent and a disrupting element to the interviewing process; yet crosschecking of research experiences indicated they are also cultural element of Afghanistan which had to be integrated in the research process.
3.2. Research Timing

At the research design stage, fieldwork was planned for a period of two months conditioned by a number of practical arrangements including visa granting and the accessibility of the provinces to be checked on the ground. This initial research timing was respected in practice; two months proved an adequate period of time to spend in the field, where data collection processes were relatively time-consuming. Indeed, organizing interviews in Afghanistan was a delicate exercise of juggling between schedules. Reflecting public’s life unpredictability in local security and political contexts, interviews were most often organized from one day to the next. Respondents’ availability despite their willingness to take part to an interview was an issue which sometimes required patience and determination in its handling. In the professional sectors investigated (security and development), staff workload and their frequent participation to manifold events, meetings and field trips sometimes resulted in the postponing of appointments. Cancellations of appointments were also always likely due to last minute security notice or the local habit of double booking. International workers in Afghanistan were especially uneasy to meet as they happened to be often out of the country. Constant follow-up on organizational administration was necessary.

Interestingly, the amount of time off work in for both local and international respondents was another challenging aspect to arranging meetings. Holidays were frequently announced. Firstly, a planned celebration of Eid in early October lasted over some ten days. Secondly, the planned celebration of Ashura lasted 3 days in mid-November. And lastly, a national holiday of five days was unexpectedly announced on the occasion of a gathering of very important elders and tribal leaders from across the country (an event called ‘loya jirga’) in the end of November, and prolonged by some days of street unrest prior to and following the event. Over a two-month fieldwork period, it was almost twenty days off work over two months – weekends not included. Additionally, it was observed that conflicting local and international calendars challenge the timely, effective and efficient collaboration of the Afghans and the internationals. Their respective holiday calendars and division of the week into working and resting days differ greatly, which importantly impacts all joint processes in the country. Friday being the Afghan equivalent of a Western Sunday, international organizations which involve both local and
international staff tend to compromise on Western weekends in taking days off on Friday and Saturday, while local organizations stick to Thursdays and Fridays as days off. All organizations usually cooperate with overseas organizations for which Sundays are typically days off. This cuts the number of effective working days during which all partners can communicate normally to a very limited three-day period every week. Afghan religious holidays combined with Western traditional holidays must also be taken in consideration, as well as Afghanistan-specific vacation schemes for international workers who are typically given extra ‘retreat’ time due to the specificity of the field. All workers’ regular movements overseas for work or leisure, make it very difficult and often ineffective in reality to organize meetings and be in touch with working partners when required.

Consequently, processes and communication are typically delayed to a great extent. It is therefore extremely hard to be systematic during one’s data collection, and very necessary to remain flexible at all times in the research process. Workers in Afghanistan are used to not being obsessed by their initial plans; unexpected elements pop up very frequently. A reserve of make-up plans is very much recommended, as well as a capacity to adapt hour by hour when circumstances require so, if not minute by minute in case of emergency. Beyond the methodological scope of this study, these methodological, time-related logistics considerations were judged worth mentioning in this section as they may represent an element of answer to the questioning of more than a decade of unproductive reform efforts overall in Afghanistan.

3.3. Use of Translation

For this particular study, and despite the Persian/Pashto-speaking context of Afghanistan, translation was required on few occasions only. All respondents, except for a very small number of them, had a proficient command of either English or French which allowed conducting direct interviewing and avoiding the barrier that translation represents in terms of a type of communication which inevitably implies the transfer of filtered, interpreted and compressed information by the translator for technical reasons. For the limited number of cases for which the presence of an interpreter was required, two Afghan colleagues from NCA Afghanistan kindly accepted to attend meetings and act as interpreters. Beyond the effects of the translation
mentioned a couple of lines above, the presence of the interpreters naturally changed the dynamics of the interview situations, with benefits and challenges. For example, both gender and age dimensions of the choice of interpreters impacted the fragile balance between the roles of the translator and the interviewer. For this study, two male interpreters (a younger one and an older one) provided assistance during interviews. Their intervention impacted the rapport established with respondents in several ways. It was noticeably felt that they would comparatively receive more attention from the respondents in such a way that could be related to their men’s status. Similarly, it was noticed seniority mattered in the way the older interpreter gained greater respect and attention from a respondent than the younger one, and than the actual interviewer (younger and female). Such changes in dynamics give insight to a set of cultural norms that affect the way the Afghans address each other or foreigners. Though translation challenges cannot be dealt with and counter-impacted by the researcher easily, they can at least be unveiled and presented as acknowledged challenges to the nature and quality of data collection, with possibly a subsequent impact on the analysis of the data (Temple & Young, 2004).

3.4. Planning for Ethical Research

Planning for ethical research implies adopting a reflective attitude on a number of principles that seek to establish what is morally right or wrong to do in research. Such reflection is expected to inform the research process at all stages of its development, from the design to the write-up. Arguably less close to being a linear alignment of clear principles according to an absolutist model, the planning for ethical research is more of a constant re-negotiation of several of its dimensions as research goes on according to a relative ethical model. One principle, though, remains overarching: the principle of ‘do no harm’ is generally recognized as the ethical basis for any research. It suggests that sensitivity and respect in research are essential. This applies, for example, to power relations between the researcher and their respondents, and how these affect the conduct of interviews; the issue of reciprocity and what the researcher can/should, or not, give back to their respondents; or the safety of the researcher in conflict zones and how far they can go in putting themselves and/or others at risk (Scheyvens et al. 2003).
More typically discussed with regard to ethics in the methodology part of any academic study are the aspects of informed consent, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality. Informed consent has to do with the responsibility that the researcher, ahead of the interview, has to inform respondents about their own background, their research topic, and the planned content of the discussion they are requesting. Respondents should be given the opportunity to decline the request, receive more detailed information or refer back to their chain of command before getting involved in the research. They should also be informed that they can withdraw from the research process at any time (Berg & Lune, 2012). For this study, all respondents were informed orally or in writing prior to the interview, depending on whether contact was made by phone or by email. Additionally, they were reminded of the same content the beginning of each interview so as to ensure modalities of data collection and processing were understood and agreed upon. With respect to privacy, confidentiality and anonymity are two principles which to some extent overlap in the case of interviews, when respondents’ anonymity cannot be preserved as researcher and respondents have to meet. Confidentiality, then, applies in referring to the responsibility that the researcher has to keep the identity of their respondents private. The principle recognizes that private or sensitive information may be shared with the researcher; therefore, respondents should be guaranteed that they will not be personally identifiable in any account produced by the researcher (Berg & Lune, 2012). For this study, this ethical dimension was considered carefully at the moment of the data analysis and writing, with specific considerations made as to how to best quote from interviews while also ensuring anonymity. In order to respect the clause of anonymity, the names of respondents are not mentioned in the text. A list of interviews registered by date electronically is available for cross-checking upon request.

**Conclusion**

This chapter presented the methodological approach to this study, from the methodology applied to designing the research plan through collecting and managing the data to proceeding to the analysis. As this study is based on fieldwork, this chapter is particularly important for evaluation in that it constitutes a critical account of how the data was collected and approached, both philosophically and it their practical treatment. It attempted to demonstrate a degree of self-
reflectivity with respect to a number of acknowledged practical limitations which arguably may have impacted the research process as well as the interpretation of data and thus the findings.
Chapter 4 – Analysis & Discussion

Introduction

Put against their historical background, it was identified in chapter 2 that civilian approaches to police reform in Afghanistan were soon dismissed after being briefly sketched by the Germans within the vague framework of international donor-driven SSR defined in Bonn in 2001. Although located in the literature throughout the decade, discussions of civilian approaches to policing were consistently overlooked. As anti-government opposition groups resumed the rebellion, strategies for counterinsurgency became increasingly prevalent in security policies aiming to train police en mass for combat operations to a greater extent than for policing work. Police reform processes quickly regressed into para-military ‘train and equip’ patterns of international intervention showing the limits of internationally driven SSR in Afghanistan in its failure to adequately train and prepare police to the civil components of their profession before international police trainers and mentors depart by the end of 2014. It thus failed to live up to its own SSR core principles and accordingly help reform ANP into an ‘accountable’, ‘responsive’ and ‘human’ police (DCAF, 2009) that the Afghans want to trust. The approach to police reform within SSR in Afghanistan, it was established, therefore needed revisiting.

This chapter engages with the recent history and developments of civilian approaches to police reform in light of four normative dimensions of SSR, namely people-centrism, democratic accountability and oversight, civilianization and civil society engagement (Sedra, 2010). With an exploratory study of the perceptions of a sample of respondents about police reform and related topics, it seeks to investigate the following research question: How do current civilian police programs relate to community needs and views and to current security and development policies? Rather than taking a top-down approach to answering the question starting with policies and looking for community responsiveness hints in them, this study takes a bottom-up approach beginning its investigation with the discussion of an empirical case (i.e. community-based policing programs) before it goes on to explore related top-level power dynamics and
politics. The importance of understanding the public perception of ANP to inform reform processes and policy-making is an underlying assumption throughout the study.

The chapter is structured in a way that seeks to address each of the following analytical objectives. As main objective, the analysis sets out to analyze how multi-leveled and multi-sited SSR decision-making processes have affected the development of community-based policing models as tools of police reform in Afghanistan. To do so, a triplet of sub-objectives aim to highlight the relevance of community needs and views in police reform; explore the inception and development of community-based policing pilot projects; and investigate the dynamics and challenges of police policy-making i.e. the competing agendas and objectives of a multiplicity of SSR actors that affect the development of community-based policing models. Accordingly, Part 1 first explores in what ways the use of greater consultation of communities in police policy-making addresses the need for greater people-centrism and democratic accountability according to Sedra’s normative dimensions of police reform. Part 2, then, examines accountability and responsiveness of the police towards the population based on the experience of UN-led community policing pilot projects conducted in cooperation with civil society actors. Finally, Part 3 investigates multi-leveled and multi-sited power and resource distribution in police governance and how politicization in reform processes has affected the development of community-based policing pilots.

**Part 1 – Community Needs in Police Governance**

This section explores the relevance of community needs and views in police governance and reform. Two questions were investigated to understand the linkages and connections between community needs and police reforms: What principles do civilian community-based approaches to policing rely upon? And why did some actors start and continue developing a non-mainstream policing model emphasizing police/population relations and the bottom-up information of policy-making? The section is divided into various themes to understand the situation fully.
1.1. Dusting off People-Centrism and Democratic Accountability in SSR

According to Sedra (2010), people-centrism and democratic accountability are two fundamental principles of SSR. In line with a human security approach, “SSR is a people-centered concept, emphasizing the security of individual citizens rather than governments or regimes” (Sedra 2010, p.6). What’s more, “improving governance within the security sector and ensuring that it is subordinate to democratic civilian authority is the central concern of the SSR model” (ibid). The theoretical centrality of these principles, however, has been mostly overlooked in the Afghan practice since 2001. With reference to the peace and reconciliation process to which it closely relates security matters, the Asia Foundation (2013, p.29) assessed that “perhaps the weakest part of the process to date has been the lack of mechanisms for linking local communities with the political process.” On MoI’s side also, from the early days of 2001 on “there was scant focus on the systems and processes that linked national to local-level police,” the Afghan National Police Working Group (2011, p.7) stated. Although there have been discourses on the necessity and the ways to develop police accountability and responsiveness to the population over the decade, they have been mostly disputed and disrupted (Garrison, 2004) by a systematic switch back to a focus on counterinsurgency and securing the state rather than human security (Murray, 2007). The recent launching in 2009/10 of new pilot projects seeking to develop community-based approaches to police reform counters this tendency in bringing back the dimensions of people-centrism and democratic accountability to the front of SSR and police reform. The next themes of this first section will explore how popular perceptions of the police and expectations towards then can meaningfully inform and shape police reform based on people-centrism and democratic accountability principles, while the specific case of the pilot projects will be studied in details in the second section of this chapter.

1.2. Assessing Support towards Community-Based Approaches to Policing

SSR actors taking a non-mainstreamed stance in favor of the integration of community needs and views in the Afghan policing practice still need to justify themselves. As put forward by an international respondent working for UNDP, this is because “there is no general agreement at policy-making level on the relevance of making space for community needs and views in police
governance as long as some territories in the country are still at war.” It is true that managing war in some territories while trying to build the state and reform the police in others is undeniably complex. Each of these missions implies a set of short-term and long-term goals which may at times seem antagonistic. Considering community needs and views is then considered as an additional mission for development work with yet another set of goals to manage. This is illustrated, for example, in the statement of a national respondent working at top management level at the central training center in Kabul who made clear that “Afghanistan is still at war. Police are not taught how to bring further development.” Realistically, another national respondent similarly working at top management level in at the police staff college acknowledged that “ANP is now fighting the insurgency and does not do its job like a real civilian police.”

However, a comprehensive approach to these missions suggests it is possible to not only consider the immediate security needs of the state and its police in face of ongoing war i.e. defending themselves when they are targeted, but also the immediate security needs of the population with respect to their experience of insecurity and expectations from the police i.e. civilian law enforcement and protection. This approach is justified by the undeniable simultaneity of top (state) and bottom (community) processes and the mutual reinforcement of development and security policies conducted simultaneously (Stewart, 2004). An international respondent providing strategic counseling at MoI captured the challenge of such an approach in commenting on the “incoherence of a policing strategy which emphasized the military training of the police before encouraging them to interact with communities and engage with them in consultations on police role and police practice.” As it happened on the ground, the paradox of conducting police reform theoretically for the people but in practice without the people stands out in these words. Departing from this practice, actors promoting community-based approaches to policing argue for a shift in police reform strategy from a state-centric, security-first approach to a primarily people-centric, comprehensive approach aiming for enhanced human security. At stake in their argument as well as in the general discussion are the legitimacy and accountability of police reform towards the population.
This very quest for greater legitimacy and accountability in police reform led a number of policing actors, among which some of the respondents who participated to this study, to identify the Afghan people as the pivotal, and yet overlooked partner in reform. Reform remains a strategic, top-level matter non-inclusive of the bottom level. As perceived by an international respondent working for UNDP with reference to the Central and South Asian region, “at diplomacy level, human life is cheap. The reality is that people will die. Strategic decision-makers put human security into this very context.” This perspective was pondered by another international respondents working for UNAMA in a way that captured the rationale behind the combination of top/down and bottom/up dynamics: “Strategic-level work such as the work of IPCB is necessary and important, but if you do not connect to the bottom level, how does it change people’s lives in reality?” If Afghan communities have been consulted at times in the course of the decade, they seem to rarely have been involved in a sustainable and meaningful manner in police reform efforts mainly led by MoI and the IC at the top in ways that will be explored in the third part of this chapter. Testifying for the consequences of overlooking popular inclusion and bottom-up dynamics, as well as for the absence of much progress in reform, a recent survey of the Afghan people published by the Asia Foundation (2013, p.36) concluded that “Afghans’ views on the ANP have not significantly changed since 2008.” This trend can be interpreted as showing a perceived lack of effectiveness in police reform and somehow as a sanction from the people. Importantly, it highlights the police/population gap has yet to be filled.

Acknowledging this in the MoI discourse as of late 2013, a high-ranking official emphasized the need to “maintain direct relations between the people and the police, to build mutual relations with the police and to enable face-to-face discussions with the police.” Similar discourses were held by other MoI representatives who participated to this study, in a way that seemed to match an official line acted in speech if not in deeds. Arguing further for the necessity of a normative shift from the conventional top to the neglected bottom in terms of who gives the impulse for reform, two international respondents working for UNAMA agreed in saying that “the Afghan police force should be started from the ground up, because communities know what they want from them.” Drawing upon such thinking, the pilot projects studied in this part 2 of this chapter

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3 As part of question 44 a/b/c of the Asia Foundation Survey of the Afghan people 2013, respondents were asked about their views on the ANP relating to whether “ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people; ANP helps improve the security; ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes.” (Asia Foundation 2013, p.37)
have set out to engage with populations in more consistent and better sustained consultations opening space for people’s participation to police reform efforts.

1.3. Assessing Police Perceptions & the State of Police/Community Relations

Perceptions of the population about the police have gradually been more studied than in the past, and considered as a tool for strategic guidance for police governance by some institutions such as the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, AREU (Wilder, 2007), the UNDP (2011), the Afghan Public Policy Research Organization, APPRO (2013) and the Asia Foundation (2013), or by individual researchers, mostly affiliated to institutions overseas, such as Norman (2012). These studies remain scarce due to practical difficulties in conducting cross-country surveys in Afghanistan (UNOPS, 2014). Although they have been mostly commissioned by international donors, and more in the development field than in the security sector, their conduct on the ground is typically outsourced to Afghan institutions. As noted from the recommendations of respondents, study results are widely used and quoted by both international and national actors to inform their work and help plan and give a direction to new consultations and policy reform. In this literature, as well as in the answers of the respondents who participated in this study, three main issues can be identified as posing problem to the development and maintenance of police/population relations: the abusive character of the Afghan police, the impunity following police abuse, and the subsequent popular distrust of the police. These three issues are explored in details below.

As it is widely perceived by respondents and was simply put by one of them, a national respondent working for a development NGO, “the police are not educated.” Afghan police are known for being illiterate in their great majority (70-90 per cent⁴), as well as poorly trained for the job during varying lengths of time depending on whether they are trained at the Afghan National Police Academy (ANPA), the Central Training Center (CTC) in Kabul or one of the

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⁴ Figure quoted by the Afghan National Police Working group (2011) on the basis of figures from 2010. Figures of illiteracy in the ANP greatly vary. The French Embassy in Kabul considered that 60 % of ANP was illiterate in April 2013. It must be mentioned here that reliable statistics are almost non-existent in Afghanistan (UNOPS, 2014).
remaining (formerly 8) Regional Training Centers (RTCs) located in the provinces. Accordingly, police education may take from 6 to 8 weeks for patrolmen, in the terms of the programs developed by NTMA-CSTCA, to 4 years for future police officers at ANPA. Most police (low-level patrolmen) receive 6/8-week basic training which, in the words of an international respondent working for NTMA, “lasts 8 weeks and full stop. The result of such training is the production of para-military men who can march and use a gun, while real police issues are only touched upon.” Moreover, as of 2013, 15% of ANP remained untrained upon beginning service. The problem of poor education of the police can partly be related to the recruitment process. In 2001, the ANP was a freshly rebuilt institution, yet still factionalized, which mobilized former police and new recruits, including a lot of former mujahidins, that remained more loyal to local leaders and warlords than to the new government (Afghan National Police Working Group, 2011). State ownership of the police institution had to be progressively reclaimed by MoI. It took time until the ministry, in 2010, took the initiative to create a recruitment command in charge of managing an adequate procedure for the selection and oversight of new police, in coordination with the training command. Due to very low pay and the difficult working conditions of most police – police patrolmen have been more exposed to attacks than the ANA in the past few months (UNOPS, 2014) – police work is seen as a ‘last resort’ type of job for which mainly people with a poor and uneducated background apply. As explained by a top-level official working at the recruitment unit of MoI, “mostly jobless people want to join the police force.” With reference the selection of patrolmen only, the same respondent indicated that candidates simply need to come with their ID card to apply and pass first a background check and then a health check to be given a contract. Despite efforts to upgrade the recruitment procedure with more selective criteria, the ANP need to increase the number of police in the country; illiterate recruits are still selected and integrated into ANP. Flowing from this, Afghan police, especially these deployed at street level and more frequently in contact with the public, are not always in a position to perform their work in a satisfying manner. As described by an international trainer at EUPOL, “the question is to know how police can perform well when they can neither read nor write the plate number of a car for example.”

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5 All these institutions provide basic training. The Police Staff College created by EUPOL in 2007 is an institution which provides in-service training. It offers several courses targeting different groups, taking place over a period of 4 weeks. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is not included here due to its disputed status (not quite police). ALP training is provided by US Special Forces-trained trainers and runs over 2 to 3 weeks.

6 Figure dated April 2013 provided by the French Embassy in Kabul. Unpublished material.
Because of this, as came out from interviews with respondents, police do not gain much respect from the public who does not perceive the police having the adequate skills to enforce the law and provide services to citizens. Overall, little prestige was associated by respondents to the police profession. In a telling manner, a high-ranking official at MoI recognized that they would prefer their kids to choose another profession, just as they wished the same for themselves. Therefore, the institution struggles to attract better educated recruits. As of late 2013, the ANP remained the hostage of this negative cause and effect pattern which further constructs, in public opinion, the image of a security force not to be trusted.

The typical behavior of the patrolmen that are in contact with the public further aggravates the case of the police. In their majority, those among respondents dissociated from the police institution reported that police behavior is mostly perceived as disrespectful to citizens, as if police themselves were not citizens familiar with the notion of respectful conduct. As noted by a formerly high-ranking official at GIRoA, “police behavior is a challenge. As police are also citizens and part of this country, their behavior should not change when they enter their uniform. They should be based on respect while on duty, just as well as respect is important in their family context. It is not happening with the police.” Among examples given by some respondents, police are usually seen driving dangerously on public roads, heard talking in a rude manner to the public addressing them, and reported discriminative or abusive to women specifically. According to an international respondent working for UNAMA, “even though the situation has improved a little in the last few years, police are still predators.”

As a result of their lack of education and rude manners, and based on personal experiences of respondents or their relatives and acquaintances, the police are also widely perceived as an abusive institution robbing the population through corrupt practices such as extortion and bribery. A national respondent working at ministry level at GIRoA recognized that “although I could not be sitting and working in my government office every day if it were not for the police and their work, you should also ask a truck driver about the traffic police and how much they get robbed by these” (a statement which could later be supported by an informal conversation with a former truck driver). Showing some self-reflectivity, confirmation that police abuse is widespread also comes from within police ranks. A provincial leader of a criminal investigation
department (CID), for example, gave in that a lot of police are interested to work at CID because of the opportunities it offers for corruption and embezzlement. The same respondent added that “if one is professional in their police work, they do not want to work at CID because other colleagues are not professional. Many police do not serve the people, but rather bother them.” On the same occasion, the linkage with inadequate education and training was highlighted by the acknowledgment that police themselves mostly do not know what is legal or not. Hence, the lack of awareness of the responsibility police have for their acts, in addition to their infamously low pay, is commonly identified as a driver of fraud and corruption. As an international respondent working for EUPOL at police district level in and around Kabul summed up based on perceptions of their Afghan colleagues, “the police are corrupt, take sides, abuse, and are aggressive to both victims and offenders. They are not appreciated; to the contrary, they inspire fear for further abuse and are rather avoided.” Overall, this comforts rather than challenges the view shared by a former high-ranking official at MoI that “historically, the police have only been seen as a force with a stick. It was never an honest body.”

The justice-police linkage is another weakness of police work that greatly affects public perceptions of the police. As it is stated in the following narrative of a national respondent involved at ministry level with GIRoA, “the rule of law in Afghanistan has been compromised. The degree to which corruption is widespread implies that it is easy to release prisoners. It happens under many circumstances. People too, at their own level, believe in the power of money and connections to ensure that there will be no consequences following their acts. The police are corrupt based on the common perception that if the police do not release a prisoner, the prosecutor will anyways bribe the police who will, in turn, allow for the release.” This is one example of how patronage relations play up corruption and the general neglecting of the rule of law, despite the existing police law and a full set of legal documents. Another example of such patronage relations shows that when a criminal under arrest can be backed by an influential official higher up in the hierarchy, the police know from the start that the arrest of the criminal will be pointless. As the police will most likely not be backed by the justice system for an arrest, they typically prefer to ask directly for bribes instead. A former high-ranking official at GIRoA clearly expressed their indignation about this practice: “Police’s lives are put at risk to arrest criminals but then the justice is corrupt and criminals are released. This has a very negative
impact.” Besides, according to some respondents, it is commonly perceived that provided any criminal can pay a bribe, they can be fearless of any arrest. This interestingly testifies for the acceptance of corruption as a vector of corruption (UNODC, 2010) although low salaries for both police and justice fellows (even lower than police’s salaries for justice fellows, according to an international respondent working for EUPOL) make up another dimension of it. In all cases, while the utility of the rule of law is critically downplayed by these practices, perceptions of impunity in police and justice work are reinforced. Such situations contribute to a general perception among the population that justice is never made and impunity always rules.

In a related manner further accentuating this feeling of impunity, an international respondent working for UNDP explained that “part of the challenge relates to the fact that there has been no peace and justice done in this country after 2001. An amnesty law was quickly signed by President Karzai. People who abused other people remained unpunished, and this is still the main issue.” Seen as the street-level face of the government, police are thus widely associated to larger breaches of law, ignorance of the justice system, and legitimization of the power of former warlords and other war criminals (it was mentioned before that such affiliations remain in ANP). This illuminates a critical paradox in the work of an institution that is supposed, at least on paper, to “ensure individual and societal security and protect legal rights and freedoms” and “help and assist victims” (article 5 of the Afghan Police Law 2005, p.3-4). Logically, this paradox was depicted by most respondents who participated in this study. As a consequence, the rule of law discourse is envisioned in a cynical way; in practice, police are not seen as a law enforcer and security provider, and the public prefers to limit contact with them rather than request their services. This perception benefits competing candidates for security provision such as the insurgents (Asia Foundation, 2013), especially at district level where police are relatively absent or concentrate on the protection of government infrastructures more than on that of citizens, as it was expressed by respondents working in the districts of the province of Faryab.

All the problems retold in the paragraphs above have contributed to darken the image of the police in the eye of the public. A high-ranking official at MoI recognized that “police perceptions have become negative and the police have lost people’s trust.” In contrast with the results of the Asia Foundation’s Surveys of the Afghan People (2012, 2013) and the UNDP’s Police
Perception Surveys (2011) which show rather high rates (82 per cent) of public confidence in ANP, in the experience of an international respondent working for an international development agency, “the level of trust between the police and the people is very low.” Many other respondents shared this opinion based on their distrust of the methodology used to produce the quoted statistics (UNOPS, 2014) and the feedback they receive from community people on an everyday basis. As expressed in formal interviews as well as informal conversations, it seems indeed that both old and young Afghans can hardly remember a time when the police were to be trusted. Today’s youth grow up in fear of the police. After years of violence and a series of different regimes which each in turn altered the original nature of a historically young and fragile police, it also seems that part of the Afghans do not actually know what the police institution is supposed to or can offer them, which reflects confused expectations. As retold by a group of police women interviewed collectively, if they know that ‘the police is at the people’s service’ (a slogan written on all Afghan police vehicles), it is more often in such a sense that is used to mock and discriminate female police who are often victim of abuse than in a sense which refers to ANP duties and responsibilities. Borrowing the words of a high-ranking official at MoI, “after thirty years of conflict, it is a challenge for the police to deal with people, communicate with people, build trust, and change people’s perception of the police.” In other words, it is a challenge for the police to remember how to perform the core duties and responsibilities of their profession and reflect their integrity as an ‘accountable’, ‘responsive’, ‘humane’ and ‘capable’ civil institution (DCAF, 2009) to the Afghan population in doing so.

1.4. Paving the Way towards Community-Based Policing

All observations above lead to conclude that police are typically not perceived as part of the solution to the equation that could ensure security and protection to the Afghans. The police, as of late 2013, are still seen more as an actor fueling conflict than as a potential element of conflict management that it could become through accurate application of police law, consistent police reform considering civil components in their own right and a genuine re-orientation of police vision towards service provision (Groenewald & Peake, 2004). Interactions with respondents have shown that police mostly remain considered as outsiders to the communities and often excluded from local conflict and crime management processes. In face of this track record,
changing the Afghans’ perceptions of the police from being a ‘robber’ (Wilder, 2007) to becoming a security provider is the gigantic task still ahead of MoI. Given low trust levels, a meaningful beginning to this task is to acknowledge both the gap between the people and the police and the resulting need to bridge the two sides so that the already one-decade-old reform process can finally move towards greater responsiveness and accountability. Such a beginning was reflected in the mindset of a high-ranking official at the Police Staff College in their hope to have “a community police that can build a bridge between the government and the Afghan people. To build this bridge, the engineers required are the Afghan police themselves.” Notwithstanding the poor condition of police/population relations as of today, a former high-ranking official at MRRD positively noted that “people are afraid of the police because there is little interaction between them.” Fostering interactions through the re-establishment of a dialogue between people and police seems a relevant first step to negotiate in order to pave the way to qualitative police work and sustainable police reform, and addressing the people’s expectations.

Starting with a re-estimation of the significance of the Afghans’ perceptions and expectations towards the police, a few civil society actors took interest around 2008/9 in the policing function of the state. They decided to revamp, in their own way and in the interest of their development activities, the overlooked principles of people-centrism and democratic accountability in SSR and reshuffle conventional top-down dynamics that had hampered the process of police civilianization since 2001. Following exploratory consultations, a few national and international organizations (inc. GIZ, ACSFo, UNAMA) launched a few pilot projects in several provinces of the country (GIZ and ACSFo in Kabul and the Northern provinces; UNAMA in Balkh, Kunduz, Baghlan, Ghoor, Herat, Helmand, Bamyan, and Kabul) aiming to revisit the policing practice by using community-based approaches that give a voice to civil society in the police reform debate and seek to provide room for grass-root level police/population dialogue as a foundation for reform. Consultations were further on developed as a mechanism to feed such dialogue. As explained by a the leader of one of the organizations conducting community-policing projects today, the emphasis on the empowerment of local level police and communities in these approaches feeds from the realization that “government police, in their training environment, do not become sensitive to population needs. This cannot happen with theoretical training. People have to experience closer cooperation and meaningful interactions. Creating mutual interest in
practice is the idea.” The new pilots have precisely set out to foster the development of such mutual interest in ‘learning by doing’. The models developed may differ slightly, but they all aim to re-unite people and police in joint activities. On the one hand, such activities aim to help police realize they need to dialogue with the population to better identify how they can adequately address these needs and contribute to conflict and crime management at community level. On the other hand, they allow for working with communities on transforming their perceptions of the police from a ‘force with a stick’ to a force that shows they can provide services and help protect people – through concrete experiences, beyond discourses. The pilot projects are presented and discussed in greater details in the coming section of this chapter.

Part 2 – The Development of Community-Based Policing Models

This section explores the inception and development of the abovementioned community-based policing pilot projects in the form of a case study. Three questions were investigated to understand how the dimensions of accountability and responsiveness of the police towards the population were treated in the projects: How were these pilot projects started and developed? What methodology do they rely on? And what are the challenges they face in their development? The section is divided into various themes to understand the situation fully.

2.1. Dusting off Civilianization and Civil Society Engagement in SSR

The pilots studied in this section set out to give new momentum to police civilianization and give a voice to civil society in the debate over police reform. These two dimensions of the pilots fall in accordance with the principles of civilianization and civil society engagement which, in SSR, are complementary to the principles of people-centrism and democratic accountability. According to Sedra (2010, p.7), talks of civilianization typically occur in “post-authoritarian and post-conflict security sectors [which] tend to be heavily militarized or securitized, featuring a preponderance of military personnel in roles designated for civilian actors. Civilianizing the security sector is accordingly a key component of the SSR agenda, as it defuses the ‘military mentality’ in the sector, which is often ill-conducive to the establishment of democratic civilian control and oversight.” In heavily securitized Afghanistan, where police have long been
militarized, talks of civilianization precisely reflect the need to defuse the military mentality of the police in order to depart from the image of a ‘force with a stick’ anchored in public opinion and move towards a vision of a protective force that can mitigate crime and conflict non-violently or using violence proportionally to circumstances. Situated at the roots of the debate on community-based approaches to policing, the long-dismissed goal to achieve police civilianization in Afghanistan was dusted off and revisited in by civil society actors when the pilots were launched. Civil society actors were interested to take part in such policing pilots based on a growing realization that, as explained by Groenewald & Peake (2004), “a police service supported by the community and capable of arresting insecurity can have a far-reaching impact in enabling lasting economic, social and political development”. Put differently, the police were increasingly recognized by civil society actors as an indispensable security partner that should be included in their development processes. Conversely, there were in the process some security actors who gradually started to recognize and accept the potential of mobilizing civil society in SSR efforts. As Sedra (2010, p.7) explains, “civil society, whether it is the media, human rights advocacy groups, or community organizations, plays a vital role in the security sector, providing an external check on policy and practice. It also serves as an important conduit or medium for state-society communication and interaction. Accordingly, SSR programs should prioritize efforts to empower civil society to engage in security issues and interact with security institutions.” The pilot projects studied are built upon mutual benefits on which civil society and security actors can capitalize in SSR: contrary to the mainstream programs designed and funded from 2001 until today, the pilots push to the front the added value of engaging communities with police issues, and lobby for the mediation and oversight role of civil society in SSR.

2.2. Identifying Driving Forces behind Community-Based Approaches to Policing

During fieldwork, a small network of international actors stood out for being actively involved in leading and promoting civilian policing and corresponding police training: GPPT, EUPOL, GIZ, UNDP-LOTFA and UNAMA. As detailed by an international respondent working at EUPOL, the work of the German Police Project Team (GPPT), which was the work of Germany as lead-nation for the policing pillar, first initiated civilian police training efforts in Afghanistan. GPPT’s civilian emphasis was taken over by EUPOL in 2007, when the EU policing mission was
created. The GPPT remained active to a lesser extent, mainly at the Afghan National Police Academy (ANPA). Importantly, the German development agency GIZ was identified as a major investor in civilian policing and thus an important partner for cooperation with UNDP-LOTFA and UNAMA. Some embassies were reported to support civilian policing projects also. Among these actors, approaches to their work on civilian policing vary slightly. EUPOL is essentially active at government level with MoI: its involvement in Afghanistan feeds thus into conventional top-down political dynamics. Conversely, GIZ (since 2008) and the UN (since 2009) endeavor to be active at grass-root level. In doing so, they are the leading co-operating actors in the development of community-based approaches to policing and police training which feed into the creation of bottom-up police governance dynamics. All of these international actors – but GIZ – conduct their civilian policing activities in relative cooperation and coordination with MoI.

As two international respondents working for UNAMA and another one working for UNDP retold the genesis of community-based approaches to policing from a UN perspective, it all started in 2009/2010 with a country-wide assessment program conducted by UNDP in coordination with MoI, with the aim to discuss police development and security issues with GIRoA, all international agencies and communities across the country. This assessment concluded that there was an actual need for a ‘community police’ that could act as an interface between communities and the police and allow for the discussion of ideas, needs and requirements for police standards, police practice and police training. The concept of such a ‘community police’ is understood here as regular police given a community mandate\(^7\) whereby the ‘community’ is understood as a unit of local governance and not as an ethnic group. The debate was launched about how such a ‘community police’ could be named in Persian. The formulation ‘police-e mardumi’\(^8\) or literally translated ‘police of the people’ was suggested and ultimately approved by MoI for further usage. Following the assessment, UNDP Afghanistan created a pillar labeled ‘community policing’ in the structure of its country trust fund LOTFA, with the aim to improve effectiveness in police service delivery in Kabul and the provinces. MoI, with the support of EUPOL for training and equipping new staff, established in parallel the

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\(^7\) This conceptualization of a ‘community police’ should not be confused with other conceptualizations whereby community members are hired by the police, or police that have a different training than other police. The conceptualization used here is distinct from the one Afghan Local Police (ALP), as will be discussed later on.

\(^8\) Other spellings are possible for the transcription of this Persian term, such as ‘police-e mardomi’.
premises of a ‘police-e mardumi’ or ‘Community Policing’ Directorate at MoI in Kabul. It also set up police-e mardumi units and teams at the provincial police headquarters of eight selected provinces, namely, Balkh, Kunduz, Baghlan, Ghoor, Herat, Helmand, Bamyan, and Kabul. In 2012, the UNAMA Police Advisory Unit joined UNDP efforts and started their Afghan Democratic Policing Project (ADPP), jointly with UNOPS and the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands in Afghanistan. The project set out the goal to improve accountability and responsiveness of the police to their communities thanks to a two-way process meaning to empower civil society in their role to make police more accountable and responsive to their needs, and to empower the police in their understanding and motivation to serve and protect the population. As part of a ‘community policing’ pillar of the project, ADDP planned to on several components such as community/police consultations, safety campaigns and police training in outreach techniques in order to increase interactions and communication between the police and the population, restore public trust in the police and enhance safety and security cooperation. It was decided that the program would focus on the same provinces where EUPOL and MoI had created ‘police-e mardumi’ units, with a few exceptions – Balkh and Herat were left out, while Mazar and Uruzgan were included. Though overseen by UNAMA, the implementation of all program activities across Afghanistan was delegated to Afghan civil society and consulting organizations, and the German GIZ.

The critical role of these civil society organizations at program operationalization stage in the Afghan context must be highlighted, bearing in mind the principle of civil society engagement in SSR. Importantly, community-based activities in Afghanistan unfold within a network of civil society organizations without which the implementation of pilot projects would not be possible. On the ground, the role of these organizations is pivotal; they represent the link between policy and program designers and beneficiaries; hence they must be closely associated to the top driving forces behind the development of community-based approaches to policing. Their administrative and operational structures being less constraining than the ones of a ‘big machine’ like the UN, they allow for more flexibility and adaptability to cope with the various challenges encountered

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10 All information about ADPP are drawn from interviews with UNAMA respondents, as well as from UNAMA external communication material (unpublished) and annual report 2014 (UNOPS, 2014).
during the implementation of the projects. They also bring to the projects valuable field expertise that the UN and other international organizations do not possess. They are typically required to conduct activities in areas where they are established and have previously deployed teams and conducted activities. As explained by an international respondent working for GIZ, teams sent to the field are fully composed of national staff, which increases the legitimacy of projects in the eye of the local population and enhances, to some extent, the potential for local ownership of processes. Another respondent, an Afghan national working for an implementing NGO contributing to a Police Women Mentoring Program (PWMP) related to ADPP, added that while these teams may not be used to working with the police in the first place, their expertise usually compensates this lack of experience whereas they learn their lessons very quickly.

2.3. Methodological Choices in Community-Based Approaches to Policing

The selected methodology for establishing the foundations of working models of community-based policing, whose insights are presented here, was developed by the UNAMA Police Advisory Unit in cooperation with a number of supporting organizations, the major ones of which are the German development agency GIZ, the Afghan Civil Society Forum organization (ACSFo), Tadbeer Consulting and the Sanayee Development Organization (SDO). This methodology is specific to one component of the ADDP project, that is, the so-called ‘community-police consultations’ component. As explained by two international respondents working in ADPP, the development and implementation of different methodological models of consultations was encouraged in phase one of ADPP. Models can be split into two complementary methodological trends which will be detailed below. Both of them aim to serve as mechanisms to establish a dialogue between the population and the police; feed this dialogue over time; and foster the inclusion of the population in police decision-making. Other components of the ADPP project, namely safety outreach, support to policewomen councils, placement of legal fellows for police justice, enhancement of policewomen literacy and enhancement of relations between Family Responses Units (FRUs) and health care providers (UNOPS, 2014) represent additional attempts in which community/police relations can be improved in light of a human security approach, beyond conventional ideas of security.
Although these components will not be explored in detail here, they address important aspects of the quality of policing in a way that is relevant to the broader integration of police into society.

A first methodological model was developed by GIZ in close cooperation with ACSFo. Both organizations are widely considered to be the first organizations that made the case for community-based approaches to policing as early as 2008, before the UN had even launched their assessment program that led to the inception of ‘police-e mardumi’ with MoI. GIZ, in particular, is recognized as the leading actor in community-based policing – and the only one that does not pursue cooperation with MoI for reasons that will be discussed later on in this chapter.

As explained by an international respondent working for GIZ and a national respondent working for ACSFo, back in 2008 both GIZ and ACSFo, each on their side, had already started developing pilot projects whose lessons learnt contributed to the development of the model presented here. Reunited under the umbrella of the ADPP program and operating together, GIZ and ACSFo mainly intervene in the Northern provinces of the Afghanistan (where the German and Dutch donors of the projects have been mostly involved since 2001). Their approach focuses on civil society support at grass-root level, based on the assumption that empowered communities can later on organize themselves. It consists in establishing a community ‘Neighborhood Watch Committee’ (NWC) whose role is to allow for a better understanding of community needs. This committee is composed of 12 members (e.g. local teachers, elders, women, or head of mosque), 8 men and 4 women elected by a convention of 40 to 50 people. Its mission is to report on community problems related to the police and think of terms of cooperation with the police. The NWC is complemented by a steering committee (SC) composed of 5 to 8 people, community members of influence or high-ranking government officials, whose mission is to filter findings of the NWC. Both committees’ meetings are facilitated by ACSFo. The SC is given the opportunity to interact directly police liaison appointed by the Chief of Police on a regular basis. It is entrusted with the mission to promote discussion of security issues related to community life; raise specific issues that the community wants to highlight; and work to resolve them together with the police liaison. On specific occasions, larger-scale community dialogue events can be convened by the NWC. As part of the process, communities receive interpersonal skill-building training aiming to empower them with new communication and lobbying skills. Conversely, training is also provided to the police in order to prepare them for
the likelihood of increased community expectations and negotiation in the future. Training for
the police is organized at training centers; it focuses on the role and responsibilities of the police
with regards to human rights, how to better behave and communicate with citizens, and how
women can interact with the police also. Precisely, as stated by UNOPS (2014, p.15) in the
ADPP annual report 2014, “police training product aims to increase the capacity of police to
perform their tasks better in accordance with the law. Content includes police law, regulations,
civil society concept and role, citizen rights, children’s rights, human rights, women’s rights,
elimination of violence, and conflict management.” Additionally, “awareness raising workshop
is a product delivered for local communities and police to raise their awareness on laws,
regulations, human rights, peace building, good governance, advocacy, community mobilization,
rights and duties of the government, and other.” Additional activities and initiatives from this
model include the set-up of suggestion boxes for anonymous complaints in public areas, treated
on a monthly basis; quarterly meetings with the Provincial Police Chief to exchange direct
feedback with authorities; and school campaigns during which police visit schools and give
presentations about children’s (boys’ and girls’) rights and the role of police in protecting youth.
Access to information is secured with the creation of libraries in schools and resource centers in
target districts’ police stations to provide kids with “hundreds of books on law, politics,
literature, religion, and sociology” and police with “access to different legal, social, and political
publications which respond to police information needs” (UNOPS 2014, p.16). TV and radio talk
shows, as well as the publication of an informative magazine every two months, are part of the
district-level communication plan for communities. As summed up by a respondent working for
UNAMA, this model emphasizes community leadership in police liaison through community
councils in which the police is expected to discuss with the community what they want.
Evaluation (UNOPS, 2014) shows its value lies with the development of capacity to tackle
specific problems while its overall impact on the police image and perceptions remains limited.

A second methodological model was developed by the consulting agency Tadbeer in cooperation
with the Sanayee Development Organization (SDO). Built on community mobilization, this
‘joint workshop’ model suggests launching an inclusive process involving a mixed group of both
community and police influential actors (around 50) in a workshop whose outputs should be the
listing of a number of mutual expectations, the sketch of a shared vision for police development,
and the draft of a memorandum of understanding. Such workshops are facilitated by a trained staff from Tadbeer or SDO. As described by two national respondents working respectively for Tadbeer and SDO, the process typically starts with the identification of these app. 50 community resource persons who can help mobilize other community members, as well as convey new ideas with their capacity to raise sensitive issues and foster discussion. Mobilized community members then receive initial training in conflict management and negotiation. Workshops are convened for four days. They set out to discuss a variety of topics including security, development, peace, stability, rule of law, or the roles and responsibilities of citizens and police. Participants are subsequently required to define and draft a common list of expectations, analyze objectives and draft (and sign) a memorandum of understanding, as well as a one-month work plan with specific tasks for each actor. The workshop is followed up by a second two-day workshop and a third two-day workshop involving the same groups. Later on, monthly meetings are organized to assess progress and make necessary refinements. As products of these consultations, it happened that committees in charge of community-police coordination were created. As summed up by an international respondent working for UNAMA, evaluation (UNOPS, 2014) shows that the workshops create a forum for building relations and overcome some misperceptions police and communities have of each other. In this model, the police are presented as a partner rather than an enemy; citizens have the responsibility to help the police realize the impact of their behaviors and actions and improve. The impact of this model is assessed positive for changing the overall image of the police and perceptions; it is more limited for tackling specific problems.

The methodology detailed above testify for the endorsement of a population-centric focus in civilian policing which prioritizes the protection and empowerment of communities, two major strategies that match the prescriptions of a human security approach according to Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy (2007). It also testifies for the use and valorization of bottom-up consultations which in set up feedback processes between communities and police/MoI. In so developing two-way consultative mechanisms that re-establish a long-dismissed dialogue between the population and the police, civil society organizations demonstrate how they can play a useful mediation role in police reform, contribute to filling the gap between population and police, and thus help strengthen democratic accountability and local ownership in police governance. The two models differ: while one emphasizes changing the overall image of the police and their popular
perceptions, the other approach focuses on the resolution of specific problems voiced by the community. Balancing this difference in impact may be a challenge with respect to the overall coherence of the ADPP strategy, as the different partners typically intervene in different ways in different provinces. This is acknowledged by ADPP advisors who are currently reflecting, in preparation of phase 2 of the project, on how to best blend the two models. Phase 2 actually foresees the drafting of a joint community-based policing training curriculum by the lead actors of both models based on their best practices from the field.

2.4. Challenges in the Development of Community-Based Approaches to Policing

This brief identification of driving forces and methodological models as they are currently being implemented in the pilot projects allowed for the clarification of a broad picture of community-based policing in Afghanistan. These pilots were not launched in a police civilianization vacuum. They have to be envisioned in the scope of several years of efforts and negotiations during which a number of internal and external challenges surfaced and developed in conflict with other, non-civilian or more top-down approaches. Importantly, it must be reminded that community-based approaches to policing are not owned by the UN even though the ADPP program of UNAMA was selected as a case study. Far from being a single-headed process, the development of these approaches must be envisioned amidst a pluralistic fabric of actors, including MoI, working more or less closely (or remotely) together. These actors convey a multiplicity of voices which typically match a variety of either similar, complementary or conflicting views. The broad picture of community-based policing in Afghanistan will now be refined by an exploration of the main tensions and challenges it faces.

2.4.1. Labeling and Defining Community-Based Approaches to Policing

The involvement of a variety of actors in the development of community-based approaches to policing is reflected by the corresponding development of a variety of discourses. The vocabulary used to describe the practice is a first issue of disagreement as community-based approaches to policing remain ill-labeled and ill-defined. Indeed, community-based approaches to policing are sometimes referred to under the label ‘community-based policing,’ as it is mostly
done in this study, while elsewhere they will be called ‘community policing’ or, more carefully, ‘community-oriented policing’ or ‘community-oriented police services.’ As agreed by international respondents working on community-based policing programs with UNDP and GIZ, the shorter label ‘community policing’ is increasingly perceived problematic as it has created confusion and controversy with other types of policing at community-level, such as Afghan Local Police (ALP) or arbaki\(^\text{12}\). Therefore, they are progressively replaced by longer and more explicit formulations such as ‘community-based policing services’. Persian formulations are also in use. The term ‘police-e mardumi’ [in English: ‘police of the people’] was chosen by MoI as the official formulation. One can sometimes also hear ‘police barai-e mardumi’ [in English: ‘police for the people’].

A second issue is to agree on a definition for these terms. What is community-based policing? What does it mean, and how can it be defined? Also, can all different terms be defined the same? There is no consensus on one definition to community-based policing internationally or in Afghanistan. To the contrary, there is still much dissonance in an unruly cacophony of definitions, guidelines or principles, just as it was observed in the answers of the respondents who participated to this study. All labels were more or less similarly and broadly explained by respondents as referring to a policing strategy which is “about integrating the concerns of citizens and communities into every level of policing policy, management and delivery”, with an emphasis on “improving the experience of those who have contact with the police” as well as “ensuring effective community engagement” (including consultation and public involvement) and “enhancing public understanding and local accountability of policing” (DCAF 2009. p.2)\(^\text{13}\). A high-ranking official at the Directorate for community policing in MoI suggested the following: “The idea, drawing upon recommendations made by experts from abroad, is to change the situation so that the police start acting as a real police serving to protect the population, maintaining relations with the community and civil society. The objective is to increase people’s trust in the police and eliminate misperceptions.” Yet, despite similarly conveying this general

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\(^{12}\) Afghan Local Police (ALP) is a form of para-military police that was developed in the districts by the American Special Forces. Arbaki is a tribal security militia. (Hakimi, 2013)

\(^{13}\) This basic description is provided here for the purpose of clarifying the concept of community-based policing to the reader that may be unfamiliar with the notion. Drafted by a team of experts for the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), it was chosen for its concise and comprehensive character. However, it is not argued here that this is a definition and that it is the most appropriate one for the concept.
sense for community-based policing, respondents disagreed on the precise nature of the practice. Some defined it broadly as a ‘concept’, a ‘philosophy’, a ‘set of principles’ or a ‘belief’; others defined it more narrowly as an ‘approach’, a ‘project’, a ‘practice’, or a form of ‘partnership.’ Critically, each of these substantives has significant implications in terms of widening or restricting the scope of community-based policing, with potential consequences for strategic decision-making and a subsequent impact at the stage of implementation.

Often, the same respondent would use several of these terms, at different times, to refer to community-based policing, thus showing internal tensions in their understanding. For example in the perspective of MoI, as it was formulated by a high-ranking official at the Directorate for community policing, community-based policing was explained as “a concept which relates to post-war countries” in its theoretical dimension, while it was described as a “pilot project conducted in eight provinces” in its practical dimension. Both descriptions, in this case, gave the impression that community-based policing was envisioned as a temporary policy for countries in recovery, suitable even prior to the full end of the conflict, in some country areas at least. According to an international respondent working close to the leadership at EUPOL, this time-constrained vision of a community-based policing ‘project’ at MoI conflicts with a more overarching vision at EUPOL whereby community-based policing is seen as a whole-of-police philosophy essentially affecting the way policing is done and thus police building in a long-term perspective. In turn, an international respondent working for UNAMA expressed disagreement over the EUPOL approach implying all police would perform and therefore need training for community-based policing. To the contrary, the UNAMA view defended that community-based policing is not a policing strategy applying to all police, but only to these segments of the police that work in contact with the public and need to develop effective interpersonal skills to perform their work.

Overall, such confusion over labels, definitions and description not only creates tensions between policing actors, but also jeopardizes the meaning and sustainability of all efforts to promote community-based policing. A strategy is not a project, and deciding for the prevalence of one or the other term in policy will eventually affect the way institutional reform will be conducted: essentially (in depth, over the long term) or superficially (temporarily, for recovery purposes).
Hence, a fundamental challenge overshadowing community-based policing is to achieve consensus in defining the term. There is an urgent need to clarify what community-based policing means to whom and how it is best labeled and defined to be understood and applied by actors. In this clarification process, particular attention should be given to historical connotations, especially with Persian formulations, in order to avoid traumatic associations with former and contemporary militias; this was pointed out with care by both a national respondent and an international respondent working for development organizations. Careful attention should also be given to how populations interpret the chosen labels, and what community people put under these. As highlighted by a former high-ranking official at GIRoA, “community policing was first misunderstood as the practice of recruiting community men and giving them uniforms.” Outreach to populations should make it clearer that formalized community policing goes far beyond such a basic conceptualization of a community police.

2.4.2. Managing the Involvement of a Multiplicity of Nations and Organizations

Confusion about community-based policing does not stop with vocabulary. With the involvement of a multiplicity of organizations and nations in the development of community-based policing activities, the greater coherence of the practice is at stake. On the one hand, confusion over community-based policing is amplified by the involvement of a variety of nations – within the international police reform project – which each have their own understandings of the practice. In the field, it was observed that the implementation and knowledge transfer of community-based policing were often done according to the cultural and practical framework of the nation leading the activities. As an international respondent in charge of police training at EUPOL explained, “the concept of community policing is not made explicit; there are very different reference schemes.” The Dutch, for example, will tend to envision their work with community policing in terms of the Dutch model despite the Afghan context specificity, while the British and all others will do likewise. Another international respondent training Afghan police for EUPOL further explained that “ten different British police officers would probably give ten different definitions of what community policing means to them.” Unsurprisingly, among both the Afghans and the internationals, confusion over the principles of community-based policing grows with every development of a new narrative by one or another actor, which
has a detrimental impact on the clarity, the coherence and the credibility of the practice. The Directorate for community policing at MoI published in 2013 Guidelines on the implementation of community policing programs. It is an interesting attempt to clarify the confusion, yet its source at MoI creates challenges for other actors who wish to keep away from the government, as will be explained below in greater details. On the other hand, confusion is also amplified by the involvement of a multiplicity of organizations whose geographical distribution and content of activities vary. As indicated by an international respondent working for UNDP, for example, confusion about the different UN community policing projects flows from the fact that UNDP/LOTFA and UNAMA conduct similar activities, but in different provinces. Apart from these, activities conducted by MoI, EUPOL and UNAMA take place in the same provinces while their contents usually differ. Community-based policing in Afghanistan, in fact, is developed in such a way that it is difficult to perceive the differences between all projects and to understand whether or not they fall under the same umbrella.

2.4.3. Achieving Coherence in Multi-Headed Processes

From there, the challenge is to achieve greater coherence of action between all nations and organizations involved in community-based policing projects. Some strategic choices seem to have been made by some actors with the aim to contribute to creating greater coherence in action. In some cases, the activities of different actors that were developed independently have been joined when they overlapped in time or in space. For example, as explained by two respondents working for each of the following organizations, both GIZ and ACSFo started their activities independently in 2008. As they realized they shared the same approach to community-based policing, the two organizations started cooperating in the districts. Similarly, UNDP/LOTFA, MoI and EUPOL started being involved with ‘police-e mardumi’ around the same time in 2009/10, at different levels but in a joint effort – the UNDP doing assessment, MoI setting up departments and teams around the country, and EUPOL stepping in to train and equip them. As explained by an international respondent working for UNAMA, the geographical alignment of the activities of MoI, EUPOL and UNAMA meant to foster synergy between all pilots. In other cases, organizations decided to foster the cross-fertilization of projects focusing on similar components, although they were run by different actors. This happened, for instance,
with the ADPP program of UNAMA and the Police Women Mentoring Program (PWMP) of UNDP/LOTFA which have achieved a degree of cooperation in their working component focusing on strengthening women police, and improving access to justice and rights for women. In yet other cases, initiatives for greater coherence seem to have been integrated in top processes also. As pointed out by an international respondent working for UNAMA, MoI, UNDP/LOTFA, UNAMA and EUPOL have all cooperated in the frame of the activities of ‘working group 4’ on the development of ‘police-e mardumi’ during the preparatory phase which led to the design of an action plan due to follow the publication of the Ten Year Vision (TYV) for the ANP in 2013. Building on such experiences, the challenge is to continue fostering greater cooperation and coherence so as to minimize the risks inherent to developing a diversity of models in parallel.

2.4.4. Achieving Coordination in Multi-Headed Processes

In this quest, coordination between all actors is a pitfall that is difficult to avoid. Challenges faced in coordination tend to downplay the coherence and credibility of community-based approaches to policing. They also highlight the respective interest-based agendas of all actors. Illuminated by their political context, strategic choices seemingly enhancing coordination in a purposeful manner sometimes appear to do so more by chance than by will. For example, the geographical alignment of MoI, UNAMA and EUPOL ‘police-e mardumi’ activities can be better understood as the result of a selection of areas suggested by donors providing the funding for these activities because they had the greatest political influence there. In this sense, geographical alignment was thus more of an interest-based choice than a benevolent concern over the need to avoid duplication of efforts. Likewise, whilst the purposeful cross-fertilization of projects may be seen as a design preference, the cooperation and information sharing between projects still remains a personality-based relationship. As it was put by an international respondent working for an international development organization, “coordination mostly depends on people.” Coordination is typically not a given principle in project implementation, as it depends to a great extent on those in charge are and their desire to share knowledge and information. As pinpointed by an international respondent working closely with the leadership at EUPOL, “there are a lot of key players and they cannot always be coordinated, or want to be coordinated.” Beyond the question to know whether the need and capacity for coordination
exists, there is indeed that other question to know whether there is a genuine wish for coordination among all players. All actors do not necessarily want to be coordinated. Other actors judge from the onset that coordination is impossible to achieve. The impossibility and the lack of willingness to coordinate thus condition each other. As formulated by a senior national respondent working for a civil society organization, “coordination is a nice word but it is not achievable. It is impossible to get to the place one wants to go to if one also wants to coordinate, because entities are too different from one another. How to come to an agreement then? Every entity has a tendency to insist on their own values they have to stick to rather than on the common values that all entities share. In this game, some values cannot survive. Most entities will not accept to compromise on their own founding values.” Put into perspective, the success of coordination is always relative as it is perceived very differently by different individuals with more or less high expectations. Records from the field show mixed experiences. While a number of actors across sectors felt there have been increasing coordination efforts in developing community-based policing, others rather expressed dissatisfaction. Whereas an international respondent working for UNDP/LOTFA stated that “there is no coordination in deployment between UNAMA, UNDP and EUPOL,” a national respondent working for an implementing NGO likewise regretted that “there is not a pro-active coordination between leading and implementing organizations.” Pondering the choice of aligning activities geographically, an international respondent working for UNAMA suggested that other provinces could have been chosen as a strategy to expand the regional coverage of community-based policing, instead of favoring concentration. Overall, as reflected in this diversity of opinions, no consensus can be observed on the challenge of coordination.

2.4.5. Promoting National Ownership of Community-Based Approaches to Policing

Another challenge is that it is mostly international actors that comment on the problems of coordination. And when there seems to be some coordination, it takes the form of a very international ownership of the community-based policing processes. While this testifies for a very strong international drive in the ‘police-e mardumi’ development process, it centers the debate on coordinating internationals. This raises two fundamental questions: What does such a focus on international actors in the coordination debate reflect? And where are national
stakeholders? A perception shared by a mix of cross-sector respondents, both national and international, is that national ownership in the process of developing community-based policing is hardly felt. As noticed by an international respondent working for the UNDP, “community policing is internationally driven, not Afghan-led.” In line with this opinion, another international respondent working for EUPOL stated that “it is obvious that the idea of community policing is imported by the international community. The international community wanted community policing because it is a major concept in the West.” Complementing these international points of view, it was stated by a former high-ranking official at GIRoA that “community policing is slowly getting institutionalized at MoI due to the IC pushing papers.” As it appears, national ownership of community-based policing processes, and therefore their legitimacy, is compromised over the prioritization of the normative agenda of the IC. And when these processes are, as it was explained above, developed by a multiplicity of nations and organizations pushing for their own diverging normative agendas at the same time, the community-based policing project in Afghanistan eventually gives the overarching impression that it is a large international experiment conducted without any direction, coherence and consistence. As such, it poses the question of ethics in the international police-building project, whereby the ‘Do No Harm’ principle is at stake in international interventionism guided by human security concerns. As reminded by a former high-ranking official at GIRoA, “Afghanistan should not be a laboratory for experiments.” Put differently, what Afghanistan may need is not a Dutch variant of community-based policing in one district and a British variant in another because this is how territories were distributed among the coalition allies. This mainly leads to develop new structural layers with a high potential for conflict across the country. If community-based policing should be developed at all, it may need to be developed in the form of an Afghan variant of community-based policing responding to the specific needs and context of policing in Afghanistan, in such a way that could make the Afghans feel more involved in the process. In a complementary manner, there may be a need for an international police doctrine laying the foundations of a shared understanding of policing terms and principles such as community-based policing. Such doctrine could allow for harmonizing the basic practices of a multiplicity of actors in international projects. It is worth noting the preferred use of the term ‘national ownership’ in this section rather than ‘local ownership,’ as there is a difference between them that deserves to be highlighted. As it will be discussed later again, both the
nationals and the internationals are split between two sides: those who focus on centralization and those who focus on decentralization and listening to communities. Promoting ‘national ownership’ of community policing processes therefore does not equal promoting its ‘local ownership’, as the Afghanization of community policing may result very differently depending on whether it is designed with a centralized or decentralized focus. Although it is the IC which strongly pushes for the development of community policing, it does so based on consultations with local communities. In this sense, the interest in community policing is not merely international but also rooted in the expressed needs of the local communities. Beyond the Afghanization of community policing to achieve ‘national ownership’, it is the full recognition and empowerment of the local communities whose needs give an orientation to the development of community policing that would pave the way to ‘local ownership’.

2.4.6. Building Consensus over the Choice of Community-Based Approaches to Policing

In the meantime, IC involvement at all levels feeds confusion about ownership and who really wants community-based policing in Afghanistan. In this picture, as it was suggested by an international respondent working for EUPOL, the absence of national willingness at MoI to coordinate policing efforts may be a statement of local ownership in its own way. If the choice is made at MoI not to coordinate policing development actions, it may be a way to show there is no desire to develop on certain points, be it police training in general or community-based policing in specific. This consideration has a major impact on the foreseeable sustainability of all efforts. If community-based policing is not wanted by the Afghan side, it can hardly be envisioned as sustainable in the long-term, and could therefore be abandoned as soon as the internationals will depart the country. Additionally, it must be remembered that community-based policing is not even wanted by all international players within the IC. As noted by an international respondent working for UNAMA, “everything that happens with community policing happens offline.” The difficulty in mainstreaming community-based policing flows from the fact that, among IC nations, all are not convinced by the relevance of adopting a community-based strategy of policing. This is typically the case of nations (eg. France, Italy, Spain, etc.) whose policing
system is based on a gendarmerie (constabulary)\textsuperscript{14} type of police, rather than a community-based police more typical for Nordic countries in Europe. The French, for example, have been mostly involved in policing in Afghanistan with the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) section of ANP. The French contribution to reforming Afghan policing therefore emphasizes a civil order type of police which relates to their tradition of ‘gendarmerie’ which does not share much with community-based approaches to policing. To the contrary, in the words of a high ranking French military official providing strategic advice to ANP, “community policing is the drawback of Nordic countries in Europe. Civilian, community-based policing does not make sense everywhere and should not be imposed to all countries. In Afghanistan, it is a policing strategy that represents a major risk in a society that functions along ethnic lines matching ethnic tensions. One should be careful here to not amplify existing ethnic divisions.” This view reminds of the dangers of seeing communities as united polities, not having different interests internally. In reality, local communities are complex polities, with different interests, in which participation also must include several actors and interests. Another French official participating in bilateral police cooperation with ANP echoed their counterpart in warning that “community policing is a policing strategy appropriate for countries where there is little unrest. It is less appropriate for countries with a stronger revolutionary tradition.” This lack of support to community-based policing within the IC can noticeably be observed in funding patterns: different IC actors will rather fund para-military policing programs than community-based policing projects. Sometimes, as it was noted by an international respondent working for EUPOL, funding by one country can follow dual directions, both civilian and para-military or military: “EUPOL encourages EU or associated contributing countries not to dissociate policing efforts, but some still do through their bilateral military programs. EUPOL still needs to negotiate and convince them that the focus should be on civilian community-based training, and not para-military training. There is a dilemma in having countries donating two-fold without coherence.” Knowing that para-military policing development largely conflicts with civilian policing development, the amount of dollars spent on each side is what ultimately makes a difference in the balance between both. Looking back at a decade of funding, the balance has always primarily leaned towards the allocation of more funding for para-military policing (Murray 2007, Suhrke 2011).

\textsuperscript{14}A constabulary police can be defined as “an armed police force organized on military lines but distinct from the regular army” (Merriam Webster Dictionary [online]. Available: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/constabulary?show=0&ts=1400399891 [Accessed May 18, 2014].
2.4.7. Settling the Dispute over the Need for Civilian vs. Para-Military Policing

Contrasting such differences in ambition for community-based policing with the nature of ANP brings the discussion back to the need for a realistic debate over para-military and civilian policing. Historically, ANP has mostly been a constabulary body (Wilder, 2007), which justifies the still ongoing debate about whether the ANP should be para-military, or based on a gendarmerie model of police, or become fully civilian. This debate is further reinforced by the current reality of a mainstreamed counterinsurgency orientation in policing under US leadership and funding (Murray, 2007). As news feeds regularly demonstrate, insurgency operations across the country go on. The ANP is still involved in combat operations in lawless or under-governed areas, and police, especially in the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Traffic Police (ATP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP) sections of ANP, remain easy targets for attack merely standing on the street with little equipment for self-defense. As expressed by an international trainer and mentor at EUPOL, which only provides civilian police training, trainers worry that they will once be accused to have trained ‘cannon fodder’ for the insurgency in rejecting the need for minimal para-military training. If a service-oriented police mentality should be conveyed to all ANP across sections in the development of civilian policing, there is no denying that the practice of community-based policing as in the pilots is unlikely to be a panacea for achieving the rule of law in Afghanistan. In face of these considerations, a suggestion is that civilian and para-military are not necessarily mutually exclusive. There may be an actual need for the para-military facilitation of civilianization. If so, such facilitation should by all means be much more balanced than has been done until today. As long as a clear strategy is designed, the combined use of civilian and para-military policing, matching the historical constabulary nature of ANP, could be imagined either temporarily (in time frame to be defined ahead and strictly limited) or as part of a long-term vision. As defended by an international respondent working for UNAMA, the body which keeps oversight on the pilots studied in this chapter, civilian policing using community-based approaches does not need to be a whole-of-police strategy. As the pilots are currently being conducted, they mainly involve police from the AUP section of the police. Likewise, MoI ‘police-e mardumi’ teams currently function independently from other police departments in practice, despite theoretical input from the leadership of these units conveying
that ‘police-e mardumi’ should belong to all branches of ANP. Put differently, the development of civilian and para-military policing within ANP can be envisioned as complementary. For example, while the para-military nature of the work of ANCOP police cannot be denied, as it requires the moderate but proportional use of force to maintain civil order within the state, the nature of AUP police work is essentially civilian and should not require para-military training. ANCOP and AUP work can be seen as complementary in their respective state-centric and people-centric approaches. Combining the strengths of both para-military and civilian policing in clearly associating one or the other approach to specific sections of ANP may, in a way that is comprehensible to the public, help balance state and human security. In doing so, such a combination may also help overcome the dichotomy between the national (the top) and the local (the bottom) that is characteristic of the top-down institutional structure of MoI. It could also allow for the expansion of either section depending on the context – since both would be firmly rooted in the police system.

2.4.8. Clarifying the Difference between Community-Based Policing and ALP Policing

In this respect, civilian community-based policing represents a window of opportunity to take the local into consideration to a greater extent than before, precisely because it is community-based and therefore local. Nevertheless, the narrative of the ‘local’ must be handled with care as it has been previously heard and used. In specific, because of its strategic use in the development of ALP as part of US/MoI counterinsurgency efforts to reclaim the local level from the insurgents, the narrative of the ‘local’ has taken a strong para-military flavor in Afghan policing and associated vocabulary. Although the quality of ‘real police’ of ALP is contested, ALP is sometimes the most present form of ‘quasi-police’ experienced by local communities on a daily basis. Using the narrative of the ‘local’ with reference to civilian community-based policing may therefore create additional confusion in blurring the lines between civilian and para-military policing in the eyes of the local public. Experience from the field shows that the formulation ‘community-based policing’, to people unfamiliar with what it means, conveys an idea of ‘local policing’ based on the territorial understanding of the ‘local’. This interpretation is correct; however, the subsequent use of derived paraphrases such as ‘local police’ in association to ‘community-based policing’ becomes confusing in that it implies a too close connotation of
ALP. Indeed, the label ‘local police’ typically refers to the concept of Afghan Local Police developed for counterinsurgency under US-leadership together with MoI. In brief, ALP represent a group of community men who are given guns and jeeps as well as quick para-military training for two or three weeks, and then entrusted with the mission to act as police for the community, yet without police mandate as they are supposed to report to ANP for proper crime management and follow-up. The ALP program has been stained by regular human rights abuse scandals since its inception in May 2010. In the words of a high-ranking official at MoI working at the 119 hotline department registering complaints about police from across the country, “the ALP is made up of some 30,000 men who are not police. Although there had been good ALP experiences in some provinces (e.g. Logar, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Ghazni), in other provinces such as Faryab and Kunduz complaints have been made against ALP. ALP men ask for bribes and food, and they beat people.” ALP is thus largely perceived as yet another form of local militia more than it is seen as police. Hence, it is important that the line between civilian community-based policing and the para-military quasi-policing of ALP be drawn very clearly while civilian community-based approaches to policing are being developed. As reported by a national respondent managing development and peace-making projects for an international organization, large segments of the population seem to remain extremely confused on the respective roles and exactions of ANP and ALP. An international respondent working for the IPCB explained that although the compromise has been made to include ALP in the TYV published in 2013, the ALP are not yet officially integrated in ANP and their status still poses problem at all strategic IC and MoI levels. As long as such lack of clarity and differentiation over the ALP status will persist, the population will remain skeptical to any sort of community-based policing activities. Among civil society actors involved in community-based policing activities, this fear of being associated with ALP adds up to another fear to be too closely associated to MoI in the development of the practice. Indeed, a certain degree of fear exists that extended communication about their activities in community-based policing and greater coordination including with governmental actors should lead to governmental ‘hijacking’ of their methods and possibly monopoly on community policing in the state interest eventually, rather than in the population’s interest. Civil society actors will remain concerned that their model of policing be misused in order to serve pro-regime and pro-state counterinsurgency objectives, as opposed to the initial people-centric human security focus.
2.4.9. Lobbying for Greater Self-Reflectivity and Cultural Change at MoI

All challenges above, though their discussion opens avenues for further research and refinement, do not take away the added value that the pilots studied bear with them: methodological prototypes paving the way towards the wider use of civilian policing based on community/police relations and changing the Afghans’ perceptions of the police. Nevertheless, for the police to understand the importance of popular perceptions/expectations and how it affects their work, they first need to have a clear understanding of the nature and role of their own institution. According to an international respondent providing strategic counselling to the top leadership at MoI, such clear self-consciousness is yet a missing element in the police: “The ANP have no understanding of themselves. They do collect statistics, but badly. Consequently, they cannot make plans to change themselves.” Additional work and studies seem to be needed on the police side to promote greater self-reflectivity and a higher degree of clarity about their own role and functioning, and thus maybe bring about the self-realization of a need for cultural change in the MoI institution. Comprehensively envisioning the way to community-based policing, the same respondent commented that “in order to achieve community-based policing, the idea is not to bring authoritarian people into the police anymore, but rather people who think the police can help the people, solve problems and make decisions. This requires training that does not focus on people who obey, but on people who think, solve problems, envision policing in a service-oriented context, and develop interpersonal skills. Corresponding incentives should not be the number of arrests performed, but rather the assessment of the relations of the police to the community and people’s perceptions of the police. Achieving all this requires a cultural change at MoI.” As change must be brought about from within the institution to be meaningful and sustainable (Marten, 2006), self-realization of the need for change at MoI is a key pre-requisite for the success of the pilots. While awaiting change at the top, the pilots represent a means to empower the bottom so that they can start pushing for change as soon as now.

After exploring internal and external challenges to the pilots, the full complexity of the powered dynamics and political interactions involved in its development must be investigated. Indeed, bottom-up dynamics are conditioned by top-down dynamics in the way they are governed. All
dynamics are multi-leveled, multi-sited and shared, which implies high political complexity including much political resistance. These dynamics are explored in the final part of this chapter.

Part 3 – The Politics of Community-Based Police Governance

This section explores the political dynamics that impact and condition the development of community-based approaches to policing in Afghanistan. Four questions were investigated to understand how multi-leveled and multi-sited power, resource distribution and politicization play out in police governance and reform processes: How is police governance organized? How do top-down and bottom-up dynamics influence decision-making processes? In specific, what are the political challenges to the development of community-based policing models and who decides on community-based approaches to policing? And what can be the realistic ambition of community-based police governance? The section is divided into various themes to understand the situation fully.

3.1. Police Governance & Politics

Sedra (2010) critically insists on the political nature of SSR. As he theoretically highlights, “SSR is innately a political process that should be conceptualized as an outgrowth of the wider political transition. [...] Building the crucial political consensus surrounding the SSR strategy and agenda, both among local actors and external stakeholders, invariably involves complex political bargaining. Over the long term, the goal is to de-politicize and bureaucratize the sector, but the process of reform, particularly in its early formative stages, is a highly contentious political game” (Sedra 2010, p.7). In the Afghan political transition, the process of SSR unravels a high degree of politicization which challenges its efficiency and effectiveness. Duffield (2005, quoted in Nyborg 2009) pointed out that politics in Afghanistan ‘in the driver’s seat.’ Power dynamics within MoI in Kabul add up to power dynamics at different levels of command nationally, provincially and within the districts, while international assistance in SSR implies yet another set of SSR actors and stakeholders in SSR-related political bargaining. In an attempt to capture these power dynamics and seize the complexity of multi-leveled police governance challenges, part 3 looks at power in terms of “a policy-oriented concept of power [which] depends upon a specified
context to tell us who gets what, how, where and when” (Lasswell and Kaplan, quoted in Nye 2011, p.12). It seeks to identify how power is exercised in different fora and how it affects the ways these different fora set up projects i.e. community-based policing projects together. To do so, an expanded multilevel governance approach will be used as a methodological thread. This approach, as developed by Bagayoko-Penone (2009), offers a relevant framework to study security policy-making and governance in developing countries such as Afghanistan where the international community has a strong presence. In this framework, governance is shared by a set of actors across different structural levels; therefore, it is multi-leveled. This dimension is a feature of traditional multi-leveled governance approach. Seeing governance as being additionally shared by a set of actors across borders expands this traditional approach, and therefore multi-sited, makes it an expanded multilevel governance approach. Bagayoko-Penone also integrates the notion of ‘policy transfer’ defined as a “process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in another political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, quoted in Bagayoko-Penone 2009, p.6). Integrating this notion implies a specific focus on international interactions between stakeholders (international and national stakeholders, including formal, semi-formal and informal actors) which permits to “capture the impact of foreign institutions as the source of policy ideas, policy design as well as implementation in developmental countries, and enrich the grasp of politics, policies and practices” (Bagayoko-Penone, p.6). Policy resistance to such influence is another important dimension of these interactions that the model seeks to investigate. In applying the model, Bagayoko-Penone suggests to proceed as follows: identify the nature of power, where it is located and how it is distributed; identify the actors (multilateral, national) and procedures which drive processes at the different levels of government at which decisions are made (top-down, bottom-up); and map out the distribution of resources e.g. normative, technical, or financial between these actors. The following sub-sections will follow in these footsteps in an exploration of international, national and local actors’ involvement in SSR and their interactions.

3.2. Mixing Aid & Politics: International Donor-Driven Police Governance

The international community has been a major player in the political game related to SSR in Afghanistan. Within the scope of the international state-building project, SSR has been a
fundamentally multilateral, donor-driven process. It was primarily sketched at a first international conference in Bonn in 2001, and later on developed in follow-up conferences in Geneva, London, Chicago, Istanbul or Tokyo. Importantly, police reform processes have been specifically affected by decision-making at the BMZ in Berlin and at the Department of State in Washington given the initial German lead on policing and the progressive US overlap in leadership from 2003 onwards (Bailey & Perito, 2010). Locating decision-making processes in all these foreign cities in addition to Kabul implies that Afghan police governance can legitimately be labeled ‘multi-sited.’ Importantly, international interactions taking place abroad or between international actors in Kabul have had a significant impact on policy ideas, policy design and policy implementation in Afghan SSR. According to an international respondent providing top-level strategic counselling at MoI, “the international community has been, and still is dictating.” Indeed, the international community has had a very significant normative influence at policy formulation stage in police reform because of the capacity it has had to mobilize and involve expertise in advising, mentoring and helping prepare the drafting of documents that became seminal policy documents. Essential MoI documents of relevance to this study such as the Afghan National Police Code of Conduct (2011), the Ten Year Vision for ANP (2013) or the MoI Guidelines on the Implementation of Community Policing Programs (2013) have all been drafted either together with international actors, or at least with their strong encouragement. In general, international actors have also heavily influenced the design of reformed police training – its content, delivery and monitoring. Police trainers were long mostly international until the departure of foreign troops was announced and ‘training the trainers’ programs finally started. Besides, a common practice has been to deploy and embed international mentors within departments at MoI and in provincial police headquarters or training centers across the country. Each nation committed to providing international mentors to such an extent that one MoI staff was often followed and counseled by several. Although mentors are also progressively leaving, many still remain posted on the ground until the end of 2014.

Such foreign influence on the normative police agenda is inherent to the tying of international aid to a number of requirements and conditionalities. Throughout the decade, it has been an essential dimension of multi-lateral police governance often reflecting home-based and foreign policy interests towards Afghanistan. A case retold by an international respondent working at the
EUPOL Police Staff College was that of “the Dutch [who] were not involved in Afghanistan to answer the needs of the Afghans, but rather to please the Dutch Parliament at home. The Dutch Parliament decided, for example, that more teaching on human rights was required. Thirteen more hours on the theory of human rights were added to the curriculum, though the actual need for human rights knowledge at police level is practical and operational.” With reference to the Dutch intervention here, the example could apply to any other nation of the international community. Community-based policing projects were equally pinpointed by respondents as being the result of international incentives, as it was explained in greater details in part 2 of this chapter. International pressure and donor money funding community-based approaches to policing have been determinant levers to the engagement of GIRoA (eventually, though not in the early stages of community policing) and civil society with community-based policing. Incentives mostly came from international players like GIZ, and later on UNDP/LOTFA, UNAMA and a few embassies such as the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands where a few leaders saw some relevance in funding pilot projects and supporting the greater involvement of civil society actors in police governance. Pilots were thus mostly developed by international actors in such a way that started shaping the redistribution of power relationships in police governance. In promoting greater engagement with the bottom and pluralistic decision-making through these pilots, international actors have simultaneously promoted their own role in police governance in Afghanistan, which can be connected with their traditional association to civil society organizations. Besides, in pushing for dimensions of governance such as greater oversight and transparency in police policy-making, they have simultaneously promoted their own value-loaded liberal normative agenda based on democracy and human rights.

Such strong international normative power in Afghan police governance is backed by superior international financial power. Unsurprisingly, the money invested in police reform in Afghanistan since 2001 has been foreign aid money. Massive injections of foreign aid in police reform have reinforced the rentier nature of Mo/the Afghan state and the influence of the IC. Funds for the renovation of ANPA in Kabul, eleven police instructors, 50 police vehicles and the refurbishing of police stations in Kabul first came from Germany (initial contribution of USD 70 million according to Bailey & Perito, 2010) which had the lead on the police pillar, before the US decided to invest further (2003 contribution of USD 185 million according to Murray, 2007)
in the set-up of a central and several provincial training centers. LOTFA was created in 2002 with a main mission consisting in the payment of salaries, and a necessary donor contribution for this purpose estimated at USD 65 million (Bailey & Perito, 2010). Today, and despite problems to collect enough funds, police salaries are still managed by the international community via LOTFA. Additionally, there is an estimated residual cost of USD 2 to 6 billion to sustain ANSF after 2014, which technically represents more than the annual budget of GIRoA (Planty & Perito, 2013). As a respondent working for the UN indicated, there is no sign of a shift in situation that would allow Afghanistan to financially self-sustain its police transition in the near future. In the politico-financial game, an international respondent providing strategic counseling at MoI and another working for EUPOL agreed to say that the Afghan case has proved the obvious, that is, the bigger payer has also been the bigger player. In 2013, for example, the US remained the main contributors to LOTFA (860 million) before Japan (620 million) and the EU (100 million)\(^\text{15}\), sometimes in addition to their own bilateral channels for investment. Consequently, the US has largely dominated the course taken by police reform over time, which explains the prioritization of short and para-military training focused on achieving a numeric target for ANP rather than qualitative training, as wanted by the US. Overall, millions of foreign dollars have been spent over Afghan police reform since 2001. And yet, the effectiveness of aid with regards to police reform is heavily debated. As expressed by an international respondent working for UNDP/LOTFA, “between the money spent and the achievements recorded, the discrepancy has been shocking”, incidentally but critically noting that “Afghanistan has never had infrastructures developed enough to process so much aid money.” Not only does it appear that it was a mistake on the part of the IC to think that ‘big money’ equals ‘big success’, but also the IC seem to have further reinforced in its rentier condition a state that was already fragile and rentier.

International financial power, interestingly, must be remembered as enabled and constrained by the aid industry oversight framework. On the one hand, aid is subject to conditionality, which empowers donors to pressure and impose their requirements on the recipient country. Yet, on the other hand, donors are subject to international norms that they must respect. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) is one example of a document that makes the principle of ownership, harmonization, alignment, results and mutual accountability stand out in relation

\(^{15}\) Figures provided directly to the author by the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) on October 9, 2013.
the aid system. With respect to the principle of local ownership in particular, the Afghan government and MoI conserve their sovereignty over processes funded by the IC. By keeping control over pivotal technical processes without which the technical implementation of policies is impossible, they can thus face and counter the superior IC normative and financial power. This point is further explored in the following section.

3.3. For the People or for the State? Police Governance at MoI

GIRoA is a natural player in the political game related to SSR in Afghanistan. Precisely, national police governance is located at the Ministry of Interior Affairs in Kabul, and to a lesser extent in the provincial and district police headquarters managed by MoI. This national police governance bears three paramount features which condition power dynamics in reform: heavy centralization, hierarchy and bossy attitude by civil servants. As explained by an international respondent providing strategic counseling at MoI, police governance bears the burden of a heavily militarized, hierarchical, stratified and centralized ministerial structure in which the top in Kabul has to approve of any decision. This critically impacts the margin of maneuver of middle-ranking and lower ranking staff, not to mention the police bottom at district level, to instigate and promote even minor change at their own level. A former high-ranking official at GIRoA explained that “since 1880, the state approach has been top-down, without any space for people’s participation.” Such top-down, exclusive type of governance also implies the concentration of authoritative power in the hands of a few, typically these that are the closest to the President and the President himself, within MoI. Moreover, the mentality and working culture of staff at MoI critically sustains this feature of governance. According to the same respondent, “a civil servant attitude in Afghanistan is typically bossy. Governance is interpreted here as a system of instructions and procedures prevalent in the entire machinery. All those who are involved with the government today think they are the bosses of the citizens.”

This is amidst such institutional culture of leadership and management that police reform is due to take place, which has proved challenging at times over the last decade. The concentration of power at top-level in MoI is challenging in that it implies there are very few chances for reform – even minor – to be ignited, conducted and achieved at the bottom – or even at mid-level – if the
top is not on board in the process. Even minor tasks seem not to be delegated to inferior levels. For example, as it was explained by a national respondent working for the hotline (119) unit at MoI, it belongs to the Minister themselves to decide on which cases will be followed upon after they have been reported to 119. Such internal micro-management has important implications in terms of procedures and the functioning of chains of command and communication, as power is held and conserved through such micro-management. In the examples presented below, it must be borne in mind that approval must be always obtained from a small group of powerful top-level micro-managers whose very privileges, it must be recalled, would be jeopardized by reform implying greater power distribution.

Multilateral police governance seen under such light arguably has an explanatory value to the reasons why police reform processes have been so often hampered over a decade of efforts. The examination of a number of cases will further uncover the location of MoI power in technical procedures. For example, the political dynamics impacting rapid personnel turnover within MoI were pinpointed by a mix of respondents both internal and external to the police institution as a major, cyclic hindrance to the progress of any police reform. An official at a provincial CID department indicated that regular staff transfers after five or six months represent a big challenge on the ground, while at the top they are motivated by political (and personal) reasons and decisions taken by MPs. Importantly, staff transfers imply discontinuity in all police governance processes, be it short-term projects, long-term programs or department team-building efforts. As pointed out by a former high-ranking official at GIRoA, reoriented decision-making on recruitment criteria for police-e mardumi teams shortly after they were set up in 2010 led to the sacking of all newly trained staff of the units, thus counterbalancing recent achievements and staining the relations of MoI with its partners that had been involved in training. As corroborated by a national respondent working for an Afghan NGO, personnel turnover greatly affects the development of institutional relations between MoI and partners in hampering the establishment of lasting contacts at MoI and the building of confidence. The more often staff are transferred; the more difficult it becomes for partners to maintain operational relations, in which they consequently lose interest. Staff transfers also imply that ‘bad practices,’ such as discrimination or corruption, develop more easily or persist. Police women interviewed in Herat province agreed that they could defend themselves better if they had the opportunity to hold the same
position for longer periods of time. Aware of all this, the leadership, as in the words of a high-
ranking official representing GIRoA at provincial level, interestingly gives in that “staff transfer,
especially specialized staff transfer should not happen to such an extent as it does now. The way
it does so now reflects personality issues.” Though such acknowledgment is clear, it remains to
determine whether it is meaningful or aimed to satisfy the (foreign) recipient of the comment.

A second case is provided by the functioning of chains of communication and command. As
highlighted by a high ranking official at a CID provincial department, “before any action is
taken, the chain of command is very long. It can take days and weeks until the right letter written
by the right person arrives on the rights desk.” Although this is the case in many countries in the
world, the proportion taken by corruption in Afghanistan and in criminal investigation
departments in particular. This results in a very restricted number of criminal cases, if not in the
absence of cases, which are duly prosecuted. As further illustrated by an official working in the
hotline (119) unit at MoI, it takes an especially long time for the follow up and prosecution of
corruption cases reported by phone. From a more administrative perspective, it is the drafting
and approval of essential documents that is repeatedly hampered by the extremely long
procedures of chains of commands, which are sometimes further hampered by staff transfers
decided in parallel. This happened with the drafting of the TYV. As explained by an
international respondent working close to the leadership at EUPOL and confirmed by another
international respondent working for the IPCB secretariat, it took approximately one year (2012)
of coordinated international and MoI efforts for the document to be drafted and finally published
in the beginning of 2013. A subsequent two-year action plan was due to be drafted and published
soon after. However, after long waiting times, it was still blocked at Minister’s office level in the
fall of 2013 (at the moment of fieldwork) after key staff redistribution at MoI saw the
appointment of a new Minister which would have to review all the work done until then and give
new approval to old and new documents. As a result of such internal tensions, reforms are
typically delayed to such an extent that is perceived as unnecessary capital, time and energy costs
ultimately leading to widespread fatalism with respect to the outcome of MoI internal politics.
Control over the length of administrative procedures thus represents a tool of power in that it
dangerously slows down the processes and downsides the efforts of all teams. It is easily
imaginable, under such circumstances, how such power can be used to prevent the development of undesired policies forced upon MoI by the IC.

Yet another case is made up by the lack of inter-ministry cooperation in GIRoA. An official at GIRoA explained that inter-ministry relations within GIRoA are typically uneasy, determined by dispute between ministries, and consequently turn into a hindrance to cooperation. Ministries compete rather than cooperate, and thus make the application of a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to governance and the rule of law an elusive perspective. This is particularly problematic when comprehensive SSR reform would require such a whole-of-government approach (Sedra, 2010) in general and in particular strategic coordination between MoI, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry for Recovery and Rural Development in charge of development across the country.

Last but not least, the lack of effective communication and turf battles within MoI also prevent effective and efficient collaboration between MoI centralized and decentralized levels, as well as between MoI departments. As explained by a high ranking official working for the recruitment department at MoI, the chain of command for recruitment (newly created in 2010) and the chain of command for training did not use to be coordinated in the beginning. Likewise, working relations between Kabul, provincial chiefs of police (P-COPs) and district chiefs of police (D-COPs) did not use to be sustained very strongly. Internal tensions and the lack of structural coordination thus contribute to feeding paradoxical situations detrimental to the overall coherence of policies at MoI. Giving an illustration to a turf battle, a high-ranking official at the Afghan National Police Academy (ANPA) retold that they once suggested integrating tuition in community policing in the curricula of the academy, while the Directorate for community policing (surprisingly, as it should have felt supported in its efforts) rejected the idea, which was subsequently abandoned.

Overall, all abovementioned cases uncover different technical dimensions of the culture of management and leadership at MoI which typically lead to blockages in policy-making and reform. Integrating international interactions in these patterns, it appears that incentives coming from the international level which may not be approved by the national top leadership can be
easily dismissed along one of the lines depicted above. In such cases, the national top secures technical power in reform negotiations. It importantly conserves the power to delay and hamper processes, such as the development of community-based approaches, as long as it serves their purposes, as MoI control of technical processes includes budgeting processes and the channeling of funds, which means that financial power eventually remains within GIRoA funding structures and depending on governmental good willingness. Consequently, funds that are channeled directly from international donors to their non-governmental partners can be better controlled and adjusted according to donors’ conditions and follow-up evaluation. Funds channeled via MoI are typically subject to less transparency and corruption (UNOPS, 2014).

In the experience of two international respondents working for UNAMA and UNDP, while official discourses at MoI may show strong support to reform, the lack of action beyond them reflects what they describe as ‘lip service,’ or put differently, the interest-based politics of the rentier state’s top leadership and the politicization of reform processes based on official opportunism (reflected in discourses) rather than actual political commitment to fostering actual development on the matter of interest. With respect to the development of community-based approaches to policing, international interactions between IC and MoI, as well as interactions internal to MoI have shown a gradual evolution from the absence of MoI support to a certain realization of the interest of the strategy for MoI to better manage criminality with the help of the community. As retold by a former high-ranking official at GIRoA, “community policing was wanted by the IC but not so much by GIRoA; still, community policing was integrated as a component.” In the beginning, “community policing consultations conducted were not supported at all by the government. It took no responsibility, did not conduct any mentoring and did not even ask for a report to be written and sent.” This implied that the government did not take ownership of the community policing process. A reason often sketched to explain this is that GIRoA fears, to some extent, that community policing could become a decentralizing force that would weaken the control of the central authorities on the police, such that the decentralized police ally themselves with strong interests locally. As the same abovementioned respondent added, “the situation could have been much different if it had.” Still now, “the community policing concept is slowly getting institutionalized due to the IC pushing papers.” In 2013, the drafting of MoI Guidelines on the Implementation of Community Policing Programs by the
Community Policing Directorate showed interesting progress on the side of MoI. As highlighted by two international respondents working for UNAMA, the guidelines were developed by the Directorate without direct assistance from any advisor or international partner, though with encouragements of international actors.

In these guidelines\textsuperscript{16}, MoI interest seems to be placed on two outstanding aspects emphasizing the state’s benefits of involving the community in tackling crime. On the one hand, community policing is seen as a public relations instrument for improving the image of the police through work on police behavior, joint activities (e.g. schools and university programs, youth sport activities, programs for children’s parents, career connections) with the community and the media coverage of the results. In doing so, as the Guidelines read (2013, p.3), “the most important police function is to draw the attention of public cooperation in preventive activities and preventing crimes.” On the other hand, emphasis is put on developing ‘police social relations’ to build confidence in the police within the population and thus motivate citizens to report to the police on crime. In the words of a high-ranking official at the Directorate of community policing who actively participated to drafting the guidelines, “the people also are the police: people become police when they report to the police and thus help prevent crime.” Eventually, “mutual trust and the establishment of people-police relations will reduce the number of crimes and prevent crime.” The overall impression conveyed is that of an MoI approach to community policing inspired from COIN whereby the community can be mobilized to assist the police in their work. In doing so, community policing is made to stand out in closer relation to the para-military policing principles lying behind ALP and the active role of communities in counterinsurgency according to COIN doctrine. It thus departs from civil society organizations’ and EUPOL’s vision of ‘police-e mardumi’ whereby the focus is set on shaping the police into a service more responsive to community concerns (APPRO 2013), compromising to a certain extent the goal of greater accountability and human security in favor of maximizing state security interests and benefits. Accordingly, MoI follows a conventional approach that reinforces the top-down structure of Afghan police governance and leaves out the strategic idea of promoting

people-centrism and bottom-up processes, which is a dimension particularly dreaded by civil society actors developing community-based policing programs.

Overall, although it cannot be denied that MoI interest in community policing has grown since its first reluctant steps into the program, as of late 2013 a national respondent working for MoI and formerly involved with the Directorate of community policing critically regretted that “no attention is really given by MoI to community policing.” Critically, an international respondent providing strategic counseling at MoI top-level noted that “achieving all that is connected to community policing requires a cultural change at MoI with a move from commanding control.” Yet cultural change, in the bossy MoI environment exposed above, faces the reluctance of senior staff. Their attitudes have been highlighted by a former high-ranking official at MoI as part of the problem in that seniors “prevent their subordinates from learning and developing because they feel vulnerable and threatened. There is a sense of greed on the part of the Afghan senior leadership for whom juniors should remain juniors and not be given opportunities to develop their skills. This has to change; training juniors is not a threat.” Summing up on police governance at MoI and the need for cultural change in current practices, the same strategic advisor at MoI quoted earlier concluded that, in strategically looking at community-based police reform efforts, “it is about training the next generation which will take over in the next 5 to 15 years.” As for today, technical power in police governance in Afghanistan remains located with a senior leadership class that relies on a strong hierarchical chain of command. Normative and financial power located elsewhere remaining very limited without technical support, this leaves very little leverage at implementation stage for external actors, be they national located at lower hierarchical levels or at the bottom, or international, in face of such critical power concentration. As highlighted by an international respondent working for UNDP, key policies, when formulated and validated, may thus never be truly implemented, as it the case with most of justice law and some of police law. Allocated funds may never reach the target recipient and spent on the selected project/program, such as community policing. A consequence of the concentration of technical power implies the ultimate control by GIRoA of the actors with whom the international community tries to mobilize and cooperate at the local level. To some extent, this control can be interpreted as a claim of national ownership of the reform processes, yet a form of national ownership located at and limited to the top leadership at MoI. Beyond endorsing discourses,
actual top-level political resistance behind the façade demonstrates that MoI controls the IC and pulls the strings that really matter in technical decision-making.

3.4. Integrating the Local: Mediation and the Significance of Civil Society Engagement

Local actors and stakeholders are the bottom-level players of the political game related to SSR in Afghanistan. The formulation ‘local actors and stakeholders’ will be used here to refer to all these involved in, or concerned by, policing and policing-related activities at the local level i.e. provincial and district levels. In this sense, they could also be labeled ‘decentralized actors’. In the use of the formulation, the focus will be kept on local power holders and persons of influence often referred to as ‘community leaders’ located in formal, semi-formal or informal representative instances in the provinces and the districts of Afghanistan. Typically, these leaders are the local political or religious leaders and the elders of a given community. They may also include other authoritative personalities of the community who are not necessarily politically or religiously affiliated such as the community teacher or nurse. Police actors and stakeholders belonging to the bottom ranks of MoI offices in Kabul, the provinces and the districts are also considered to be part of these ‘local actors and stakeholders’ although they do not constitute the main focus of the formulation. Likewise, civil society activists based or intervening in the communities are also included in the meaning of the formulation. The challenge of actively mobilizing local actors and stakeholders in police governance lies in the national context of a traditionally very centralized state and police structure. All political processes, including police governance processes, have historically been led according to a top-down approach while power remained located in Kabul (or elsewhere abroad). Little consideration was given to governance levels located beyond Kabul, despite numerous disparities between provinces and districts across the country. Importantly, local actors and stakeholders remain deprived of significant normative, financial and technical power, which implies little influence over the distribution of resources. Local actors and stakeholders are located at the end of the chain of command, depending on top-level decision-making which in turn depends on donors’ conditionalities and budgeting17.

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17 Local warlords and other powerful local leaders who do not abide by the rule of law are, technically, living and acting beyond these constraints and therefore not included in this discussion.
Respondents who participated in this study were able to broadly depict how power in police governance is shared between local actors and stakeholders. In the perception of a mix of NGO project staff and community leaders from various districts of Faryab\textsuperscript{18}, power is concentrated in the hands of the district chiefs of police (D-COPs, also commonly called commanders), while police officers (NCOs and patrolmen) under the orders of the commanders were perceived to be powerless. Respondents identified political affiliation, ethnicity and geographic location, as well as education and information levels as pivotal parameters affecting the relative power or powerlessness of local actors and stakeholders. Firstly, political affiliation was identified as a source of power because powerful D-COPs are perceived to be largely influenced by district powerbrokers according to their affiliation to a political party or to the side of a local warlord. Their judgment is believed to greatly depend on the recommendations of these powerbrokers. Police/population relations are dramatically impacted in that police and citizens will relate differently based on whether they share the same political affiliation. This testifies for partiality in the treatment of the population by the police. Secondly, ethnicity was identified as another source of power located along the lines of ethnic divisions that have historically constrained Afghan politics. Police are believed to be very much partial in cases of incidents or legal procedures in which tribal leaders are involved. Thirdly, geographic locations were identified as determinant to local actors’ and stakeholders’ experiences with the police or as police. Centrally settled populations in the districts seem to have better experiences with police services than populations settled in more remote locations in the districts. Their experience shows that district police usually manage to ensure the security of district official compounds but struggle to manage armed clashes or major incidents affecting populations, especially when they occur further in the districts. Central districts are believed to be better protected than remote districts. Police are believed to lack both human and material resources to intervene, leading to the absence of police governance in the most remote districts.

Finally, police’s and people’s levels of education and information were also identified as determinant to powered relation between the police and the population relations. Based on their experience, respondents explained that educated people tend to suffer from police bribery to a

\textsuperscript{18} Respondents from Faryab are not referred to individually as data collection in this province was conducted and synthesized by a third person. For more information on the process, refer to the chapter ‘methodology.’
lesser extent that uneducated people, partly because the latter believe that police services imply the payment of a bribe. Poor education among the population is often related to poor knowledge of what police services mean. Likewise, poor education among the police is often connected to ignorance of police law and the ANP code of conduct and irresponsible behaviors while wearing the uniform. The exclusion of local actors and stakeholders of police governance from certain chains of communication better uncovers the underlying power/knowledge nexus, as illustrated by the absence of awareness among respondents of the existence of Family Response Units (FRUs) and Gender and Human Rights Units not only at MoI but also closer to them in the PHQs and DHQs across the country. Overall, the identification of these five parameters highlights the necessity to empower the bottom i.e. improve their access to information and education regardless of the distance to their location, their ethnicity or political affiliation in order to promote inclusiveness in local-level police interactions between those supposed to ensure protection and those supposed to be protected.

Despite self-consciousness of the weak political leverage, community leaders see potential for greater engagement with the local level in the political game over police reform and the development of community-based approaches to policing. To engage with the local level to a greater extent and reflect actual decentralization of governance, they suggest empowering local actors and communities through the development of consultative mechanisms. For example, respondents from Faryab suggested communities should play a more significant role of oversight in police governance processes. They saw consultations in particular and cross-level interactions in general as adequate mechanisms for the monitoring of the performance of police and quality of services. In accordance with this view, a provincial chief of ‘police-e mardumi’ unit likewise recommended that “a bottom-up approach including numerous consultations on the ground should be promoted.” Significant awareness of local actors and stakeholders about how consultations can and should occur was reflected in many more recommendations. It was recalled that community leaders i.e. the local level really matter in governance. As stated by a D-COP in Herat province, “the role of community leaders in society cannot be undermined because they are very powerful. Religious leaders should be convinced first and all the others afterwards.” Awareness of this seemed to have reached higher levels of the government also. A high-ranking official representing GIRoA at provincial level similarly expressed that “religious
leaders should be told to promote police-e mardumi” as a way to reach out to populations while closely relating to religion and thus better conveying the message to populations to whom religion matters to a considerable extent.

Local leaders in Afghanistan still have undeniable influence over their community. Accordingly, for the same D-COP quoted above, it is necessary to “involve the population in decision-making and give them a certain degree of authority on decisions.” Such recommendation was accompanied by an incentive to remember pre-established traditional justice and conflict resolution mechanisms in which local leaders have authority. In the opinion of a P-COP, the ‘jirga’, ‘shura’ and traditional systems of Afghanistan could thus build a very suitable social set-up for community policing in particular. Existing structures, it was pointed out, do not need to be repeated if they are functional. In particular, an official at MRRD in GIRoA recommended greater attention be paid to not multiplying layers of conflict resolution mechanisms (including police) which would increase the potential for conflict by creating antagonism between them. This comment was extended to the necessity to not create several new policing mechanisms i.e. para-military local policing (ALP) and civilian community policing that are conflicting among them, in addition to conflict with pre-existing ones. Adequate communication on community-based policing was also identified as missing in its development. A P-COP highlighted the need to raise general awareness and better reach out to local communities. Such outreach was seen as part of the required move towards the Afghanization of community-based policing, bearing in mind that an Afghan vision is not synonymous of an MoI vision (UNOPS, 2014). Community-policing actors should work with national staff, with a focus on enabling Afghan supervision and feedback, a concerned P-COP pointed out – highlighting that without engaging with nationals and the communities in governance, there cannot possibly be talks of actual community policing.

Such awareness of the role of consultations among local respondents appeared to be grounded in the historical experience of a pivotal actor of state-owned processes of development, MRRD, and its successful National Solidarity Program (NSP) launched in 2003. NSP prioritized consultative approaches to project formulation and implementation largely including community leaders and the population via Community Development Councils (CDCs) which have since become well-established. Awareness of this success was also observed at higher levels of governance, both
national and international. Several national respondents working in the development sector, for
the government or for NGOs, thus highlighted the NSP consultative set-up as one that was
ignored throughout the police reform process, although it could have provided an inspiring
model to the security sector and fed into the inception of community-based approaches to
policing to promote greater responsiveness to people’s concerns. Emphasizing the lack of
interest of security actors for successful development approaches in the early stages of police
reform, an official at MRRD in GIRoA conveyed that “there were not enough consultations.
CDCs could have been involved much more. At MRRD, we were screaming for more
consultations for police reform.” Similar awareness was acknowledged by several respond-
ants among IC actors, as it was by an international respondent working at UNAMA who explained
that the CDC’s consultation mechanism was taken as a model to the set-up of ADDP community
policing consultations. Such references to the NSP experience in talks of police reform at
different levels illuminated opportunities for cross-sector and cross-level interactions in terms of
sharing experiences and developing ‘best practices.’ As it appeared, references to the relative
NSP success fed into a discourse suggesting that ‘best practices’ from the development sector
could be transferred to the security sector. This suggestion was embedded in the discourse of a
civilian vision of policing that explains police work as the delivery of police services, in a way
that relates to the need-based criteria of the development sector. This sketching of a
developmental approach to police reform builds upon the earlier move towards a greater linkage
between development and security sectors in Afghanistan, envisioned here not only in terms of
political concerns of state security but also covering concerns of popular participation, grass-root
empowerment and sustainable development along the principles of human security.

Within this conceptual framework allocating space to development actors and methods in talks
and projects of police reform, civil society has progressively strengthened its argument in favor
of their mediation in the setting up of local consultations for community-based policing. Their
argument matches the historically critical perspective of NGOs on the extent to which national
governments should play a role in development and their preference for less government
intervention and more margin of maneuver for civil society (Nyborg, 2011). National and
international civil society organizations consider that mediation between police and population is
required to initiate and manage freshly (re-)established communication between the top and the
bottom. In the words of an international respondent working for the ADPP project of UNAMA which has embarked a high number of national partners in the initiative, “the role of NGOs in the process of dialogue is crucial as there is a need for mediation between communities and authorities.” This need is justified by the absence of adequate pre-conditions, such as a structure integrating bottom-up feedback processes, pre-existing methodology, political willingness and a short-term timeframe, for the top to empower the bottom. NGOs, according to several respondents from national partners of UN-led projects such as ADPP and PWMP, bring the added value of extensive experience and expertise in working with local communities on mobilization, advocacy, awareness raising and training activities. The respondents defended the idea that civil society mediation between the population and the police can be effective in closing the gap between people and police by connecting the strategic level to the bottom, as an attempt to enhance local accountability in police reform. Civil society organizations, thus making up for the missing link in decentralized police governance, could arguably be the channel between the central level and the district level, that is, the remote rural areas where local NGOs are traditionally involved\textsuperscript{19}, but where comparatively police are barely present and typically struggle most. Involving NGOs as a third party in cross-level police projects has several implications. Not only does it imply empowering civil society actors and opening space for them in police governance as much as it newly promotes the same for local actors, but it also implies the necessity to enhance the linkage between development and security sectors, in particular, the dialogue between development and security actors on matters of concern to both of them. Put differently, it implies that NGOs/IOs and police/government need to improve the ways they dialogue about their understandings of security and development and communication in jointly set-up projects. If there is no denying that non-governmental organizations by essence do not have a mandate to work in governmental processes, yet the essentially intertwined nature of security and development processes justifies, up to a certain extent, their interactions and engagement with GIRoA according to a vision whereby the activities of security and development actors are mutually complementing. Pursuing this vision builds upon the understanding that, in a fragile state like Afghanistan, NGOs may have interest in cooperating with the government and becoming, due to their unique expertise, a pivotal partner of national

\textsuperscript{19} Although NGOs have great territorial coverage of the country, sometimes to a greater extent than most other actors inc GIRoA, it must be recognized that the problem of dealing with under-governed or lawless areas which they also cannot access remains. This point represents an important path for further reflection and research.
political processes and international state-building processes (ibid). The ways they can become such pivotal partners imply a re-negotiation of their role and therefore the distribution of power between levels, sites and actors as a result of their empowerment. Such re-negotiation implies challenging the status-quo and reshuffling powered dynamics of police governance in a way that could be more representative of the involvement of the different multi-leveled and multi-sited partners.

A redistribution of power relationships in police governance, however, can only be realistically envisioned as part of the plans of and when endorsed by these that hold normative power i.e. international actors whose influence over policy formulation, to which it ties its aid, critically matters and influences the normative agenda. Thus, building upon the powered relations explored in this chapter, it seems that the promotion of greater engagement with the bottom and more pluralistic decision-making can realistically be permitted only if is part of the liberal agenda of IC actors. In other words, the empowerment of the IC’s national partners tied to external funding and political support allows international actors, at the same time, to promote their own role in police governance in Afghanistan. This allows a ‘state-focused, technocratic and neo-liberal’ (ibid) approach to development that is benevolent to bottom-up processes only as long as they serve the purposes of the top in such a way that reinforces their agenda-based normative power. Despite all claims of greater local ownership of police reform processes, continued scrutiny of how international interactions can support the re-negotiation of the role of NGOs and power dynamics to increase people-centrism, accountability and legitimacy is therefore critical.

With respect to the pilot projects presented in details in the second part of this chapter, major challenges pave the way to their improvement and mainstreaming. The yearly evaluation of the ADPP project (UNOPS, 2014) explains that consultations have significantly impacted community attitudes towards police and police attitude towards population. It reports, in particular, that crime reporting from community to police has increased in frequency and quality, while police have been increasingly called for and successful in managing community disputes. However, monitoring and evaluation of the development of community-based policing models remains particularly challenging. Difficulties include the conduct of field research and the
collection of hard data from which to produce reliable statistics. Statistics and baseline data in Afghanistan, in general, are scarce if they exist at all – including at governmental level as GIRoA does not possess clear and reliable data management systems. Until now, evaluation has been mainly made from soft data whose collection and handling also pose difficulties in that data is often manipulated at both collecting and reporting stage. With monitoring and evaluation, it is the credibility of pilot projects, and in the long term their development or abandonment, which is at stake.

Other challenges relate more specifically to the engagement of civil society organizations in the pilot projects and how the state of their interactions with GIRoA conditions success and failure. According to reporting by UNOPS (2014), the reality of the conduct of community policing projects shows that the right of veto was given to MoI in order to veto innovation proposed by civil society actors. Moreover, GIRoA proved mostly unwilling to channel funds via NGOs, thus demonstrating its technical power in that current funding structures permit GIRoA to limit civil society’s ability to expand. Subsequently, a degree of fear for the government persists among NGOs, for which it is remains difficult to envision GIRoA as an ally rather than an antagonist. ADPP’s experience with the development of community policing has shown (UNOPS, 2014) that ‘Afghan vision’ has been too frequently understood in terms of ‘MoI vision,’ thus leaving civil society actors fearful of the jeopardy of community leadership in community-based policing projects to the benefit of an increasing domination of all ‘police-e mardumi’ activities by GIRoA. This recent feedback illustrates how precarious the state of NGO/government dialogue remains as of today. Along with the need for a focus on greater dialogue between population and police, there may also be an equally important need to focus on improving the dialogue between NGOs and government. A national respondent working for an international development organization depicted the state of communication between them in saying that “a gap separates governmental security and development actors. MRRD, for instance, does not have any security cluster. When development actors call for meetings, no one from the security side is usually invited; rather, these actors are excluded. Law enforcement authorities similarly exclude development actors. The relationship is mutually exclusive.” If community-based approaches to policing are to rely on the effective and efficient linkage between security and development actors, as well as on the mediation of NGOs, all of them must then rapidly foster and improve
dialogue between themselves as a pre-condition to any mediation. Taking a comprehensive approach to police reform envisioned according to the rule of law, such dialogue should legitimately include justice actors. Besides, beyond cross-sector interactions, powered social relations within one sector are equally challenging. Sketched in the case of MoI earlier in this chapter, they exist between and within civil society organizations also.

A final, though critical, challenge exists in the acknowledgment that the relationship between civil society actors and the population is another one that needs consolidating. Statistics quoted by UNOPS (2014) on the basis of data from the Asia Foundation (2012) explained that national and international NGOs count among the institutions with the lowest levels of public confidence among the Afghans (respectively 54% and 53%). Compared to these figures, public confidence in the ANP was at 82 % and in the ANA 93 %. Although few analysts trust these surprising rates as they judge “such data and methodology doubtful in depending on survey answers on sensitive questions in a coercive environments” (UNOPS 2014, p. 11), they at least give an orientation in public confidence trends. A national respondent working for an international development NGO explained this by alluding to problems of image and identity embedded in the history of international and national NGO work in Afghanistan: “NGOs have had an image problem in the past. They were seen as the agents of foreigners in the country. NGOs also made a lot of mistakes while conducting activities which failed or had a negative impact, and hiring the wrong people to conduct activities and trainings. Communities took a dislike on NGOs afterwards.”

Accordingly, continuous self-reflectivity on practices and results is required within civil society. If NGOs are to provide a meaningful contribution, they need to increase their accountability to the population just as they would ask from police as a community policing mediator.

3.5. Concluding Remarks on Multi-Leveled Power Distribution & Resources

The ambition of community-based approaches to policing in Afghanistan is best understood against this police governance context in which the agendas of a multiplicity of actors of different natures, located at different levels and in different sites, demonstrate divergent objectives and interests. Prioritization of these agendas depends on a complex web of powered relations subjected to the advantage of the balance of normative, technical and financial power.
With important effects, normative, technical and financial advantages are not necessarily located in the hands of the same actors. Effectiveness in police governance processes is subsequently impacted by a corresponding dispersion of power which illuminates many hindrances to progress in reform and in the development of community-based policing.

Beyond power dynamics, the lack of strategic direction and planning of all actors in police governance remains the overarching challenge of reform, closely intertwined with issues of coordination and communication between actors. This absence of clear strategic leadership sets the limits of all actors’ engagement in reform, and especially of the normative impulse given by the international community. The establishment of the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) in 2010 aimed to clarify both strategy and leadership issues in police governance, but several structural weaknesses downside the conduct of comprehensive and genuinely inclusive processes. According to an international respondent working close to leadership at EUPOL, IPCB lacks a strong mandate to become the pivotal institution it aspired to be. Despite IPCB, in the words of an international respondent involved in strategic counseling at MoI, “the international community is not structured well enough at the moment to help bring about changes in the ANP”. Particularly with respect to community-based approaches to policing, IPCB has not shown potential for becoming a partner or an institution that can accompany developments. As explained by an international respondent working at the IPCB secretariat, the board’s mandate was drafted in such a way that it does not to reach out to international organizations and both international and national NGOs involved in policing activities and programs in Afghanistan. This means that the most pivotal partners of community-based policing, such as GIZ, the UN and their national partner NGOs, keep being excluded from and deprived of a voice in strategic talks of police governance and reform. In so narrowing its practical mandate and outreach to police actors, IPCB shows it opted for a conventionally top-down approach overseeing once more talks of the necessity to be comprehensive and inclusive of local actors.

Critically, support to decentralized, bottom-up governance processes is not an option that is currently prioritized by central authority at GIRoA either. Even though “people want to participate to the process to achieve stability and the rule of law”, a former high-ranking official at GIRoA recognized, “the people’s counterpart, the government, is also necessary; the
government must be willing to create this space for communities.” Mainstreaming community-based policing and the cross-sector and cross-level exchange of reform ‘best practices’ implies indeed a minimum of governmental willingness to facilitate technical processes that can allow for the building of bridges at different levels (national, provincial, district, and community or village) between sectors (security/development) and ministries (MoI/MRRD/MoJ). Methodology to start building up such bridges exists, as developed by civil society and international organizations. To match the requirements of all stakeholders, revised police governance would be best develop on the basis of greater dialogue, inter-linkages, cooperation and space sharing in the relative benefit (or to the equal detriment) of all. As pointed out by an official working for GIRoA, in the frame of the peace and reconciliation process, conflict resolution is the obvious theme that legitimately justifies bringing together all development, security and justice actors located at different levels. A community leader from a district in Herat province felt it was appropriate to remember that “fighting is not the end of the solution; dialogue should be promoted.” Made with reference to anti-government opposition across the country, the comment is equally applicable to turf battles between sectors, between NGOs and government, within GIRoA/MoI and within civil society. Although such battles will always be, a minimum of efforts can still be put into at least trying to mitigate them and minimize their impact on police reform processes including the pilot projects studied.

Because they fear progress cannot happen as long as technical power is concentrated at MoI level, some respondents conveyed that IC assistance is still needed for police reform. With particular relevance to the continuation of community-based policing, a mix of international and national respondents working for IOs and NGOs conveyed that the international community, through maintaining foreign aid and conditionalities, still has a role to play in using its normative power to push for greater accountability and responsiveness of the government towards the Afghans in police reform, until technical power be better shared between national actors. Such consideration falls back into the debate over the planned international departure by the end of 2014 and the preparations of a revised post-2015 peace and reconciliation process whereby many wonder whether they represent an opportunity for positive change and greater local ownership, or for larger disaster.
Conclusion

As it was argued in this study, a new breed of approaches to security based on the human security concept suggests putting analytical emphasis on the linkage between security and development to better understand the ways of sustaining the transition from conflict to stability in fragile states like Afghanistan. This assumption opens for a different kind of analysis of security topics from a more developmental perspective, with a focus on the needs of populations. This study of perceptions from the field explored, according to such a human security analytical perspective and put against their historical context in Afghanistan, the emergence and development of community-based approaches to policing as tools of police reform since 2001. As a result of an investigation of how current civilian police programs relate to community needs and views and to current security and development policies, existing community-based policing programs were identified as models that centrally emphasize the need to reform the police into a service (principle of civilianization) whose role, mission and goals should be designed in a way that addresses people’s needs and expectations (principle of people-centrism) while activating a sustained feedback process between the people and the police (principle of democratic accountability and oversight) through the technical and social mediation of civil society organizations (principle of civil society engagement) in SSR. It is argued that the models, in the ways they revisit these key principles of SSR, sketch the guidelines of an updated form of Afghan SSR 2.0 putting greater emphasis on building a humane, accountable and responsible police beyond the basic building of a ‘trained and equipped’ police.

Acknowledging the relevance of community needs and views in police reform was identified as a pre-requisite for the development of this revisited SSR. Interactions with respondents during fieldwork unveiled strong views on police reform at community levels arguing for the meaningful information and shaping of decision-making by popular perceptions of the police and their expectations. Community leaders were pinpointed as persons with relevant influence and authority to be included in consultations whose inspiration was located in the success of the National Solidarity Program of MRRD. Following this acknowledgment, community-based policing pilot projects were first launched by civil society actors. Since 2008/9, community-
based programs have attempted to make space for the involvement of local level actors and promote the establishment of bottom-up processes that can help inform police reform to achieve more accountable and responsive policing. They have aimed to push for the police, currently perceived as a conflict element, to be reformed into an element of conflict management according to a vision of the police as service provider partnering with the population, rather than as a force with a stick. Accordingly, pilot projects have framed an approach to police reform and governance that seeks to bridge security and development sectors, and foster the exchange of ‘best practices’ and complementary expertise between them according to a policy-making vision whereby the activities of security and development actors are mutually complementing. In this framework, civil society organizations make up for the missing link in decentralized police governance, acting as an interface of communication between the central level and the district level. It is argued that civil society mediation between the population and the police can be effective in closing the gap between people and police by connecting the strategic level to the bottom and enhancing local accountability in police reform.

An analysis of the dynamics and challenges of the competing agendas and objectives of a multiplicity of SSR actors that affect the development of community-based policing models revealed that effectiveness in police governance processes is impacted by a corresponding dispersion of power. While the international community undeniably dominates the normative and financial components of police reform, it was identified that the Ministry of Interior Affairs conserves strategic and decisive power to give the green light or veto developments by using its well-established control over technical processes of implementation. From this flows the recognition that reform can neither be formulated without international actors nor implemented without governmental willingness, which leaves very little political leverage to local actors which evolve in a historically centralized system determined by top-down governance practices on which all progress depends. Critically for their development, community-based approaches to policing have not yet been put up on the international normative agenda or included in the top priorities of MoI for program implementation. The most pivotal partners of community-based policing, such as GIZ, the UN and their national partner NGOs, keep being excluded from and deprived of a voice in talks of police governance and reform in strategic fora like the International Police Coordination Board. Neither has the Ministry of Interior Affairs showed
very strong political willingness in their support, despite the creation of a Directorate for community policing and the drafting of guidelines for the implementation of relevant programs. Importantly, both international and national actors remain split between those who focus on centralization and those who focus on empowering local communities. Beyond a split along the lines of international and national which remains valid up to a certain extent, identified power dynamics imply that the empowerment of the local eventually depends on who has the power in each camp and whether they are willing to promote local ownership.

The challenge is undeniable, even more so when the international community appears to be unstructured and therefore not in a position to help bring about change. Nevertheless, community-based approaches to policing continue capturing the interest of IOs, INGOS and NGOs which see in them a way to improve the security of their areas of intervention comprehensively complementing their developmental agenda. Ahead of hypothetical moves at the top, it is equally undeniable that community-based policing programs keep progressing in their development at the grass-root level. This happens alongside growing civil society interest for the integration of the police in the scope of NGO peace and reconciliation programs, and rising suggestions that dialogue and policy transfer of ‘best practices’ between development and security sectors is of relevance to police reform. Despite external challenges and internal tensions, community-based approaches to policing therefore show definite potential for modeling revised police governance and SSR 2.0 along a path towards greater police civilianization taking into account the initiatives of bottom-level actors. At a critical historical moment when the 2014 presidential elections are in process and talks of post-2015 peace and reconciliation processes are ongoing, it is argued here that such potential can be exploited, provided these initiatives and actors are taken on board seriously in police reform and feedback mechanisms between the top and the bottom are made a normative priority on the SSR and police reform international agenda.
**Recommendations**

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are offered for consideration:

1) *Empower bottom-level actors and beneficiaries of police services:* Improve their access to information and education regardless of the distance to their location, their ethnicity or political affiliation in order to promote inclusiveness in local-level police interactions between those supposed to ensure protection and those supposed to be protected.

2) *Encourage reflection on the linkage between security and development among security and development actors, and promote the development of a greater dialogue between them:* It is arguably relevant to enhance the linkage between development and security sectors. References to the NSP experience in talks of police reform at different levels illuminate opportunities for cross-sector and cross-level interactions in terms of sharing experiences and developing ‘best practices.’ NGOs/IOs (development actors) and police/government (security actors) need to improve the ways they dialogue about their understandings of security and development and communication in jointly set-up projects. If community-based approaches to policing are to rely on the effective and efficient linkage between security and development actors, as well as on the mediation of NGOs, all of them must then rapidly foster and improve dialogue between themselves as a pre-condition to any mediation in community-based policing activities.

3) *Clarify the meaning of community-based policing:* What does it mean, to whom? How is it best labeled and defined to be understood by all? In the clarification process, particular attention should be given to historical connotations, especially in association with Persian formulations, as they may convey an inappropriate message to the population as to what they role is about. It is important to avoid traumatic associations with militias, historically, and with the Afghan Local Police (ALP) more recently. Careful attention should be given to how populations interpret the chosen labels, and what community people put under these.

4) *Raise awareness on community-based policing among the public:* Adequate communication on community-based policing was also identified as missing in its development. There is a need
to raise general awareness and better reach out to local communities. Such outreach can be seen as part of the required move towards the Afghanization of community-based policing,

5) **Focus on the Afghanization of community-based policing:** If community-based policing should be developed, it may need to be developed in the form of an Afghan variant of community-based policing responding to the specific needs and context of policing in Afghanistan, in such a way that could make the Afghans feel more involved in the process. International community-policing developers should work with national staff, with a focus on enabling Afghan supervision and feedback. Without engaging with nationals and the communities in governance, there cannot possibly be talks of actual community policing.

6) **Encourage reflection on the type of education and training that is most adequate to community-based policing:** Community-based policing needs people who think the police can help the people, solve problems and make decisions. This requires education and training that does not focus on people who obey, but on people who think, solve problems, envision policing in a service-oriented context, and develop interpersonal skills.

7) **Dust off the debate over the complementing combination of para-military and civilian policing in Afghanistan, according to the ‘gendarmerie’ model:** There may be an actual need for the para-military facilitation of civilianization, regardless of discourses promoting a 100% civilian ANP. If so, such facilitation should by all means be much more balanced than has been done until today. As long as a clear strategy is designed, the combined use of civilian and para-military policing, matching the historical constabulary nature of ANP, could be imagined either temporarily or as part of a long-term vision.

8) **Clarify the compromise made over ALP in the Afghan National Police Ten Year Vision and its consequences on the development of community-based policing:** It is important that the line between civilian community-based policing and the para-military quasi-policing of ALP be drawn very clearly. As long as such lack of clarity and differentiation over the ALP status will persist, the population will remain skeptical to any sort of community-based policing activities.
9) Encourage reflection on the unnecessary overlap of existing and planned policing structures in Afghanistan: Existing structures, it was pointed out, do not need to be repeated if they are functional. In particular, greater attention should be paid to not multiplying layers of conflict resolution mechanisms (including police) which would increase the potential for conflict by creating antagonism between them. This can be extended to the necessity to not create several new policing mechanisms i.e. para-military local policing (ALP) and civilian community policing that are conflicting among them, in addition to conflict with pre-existing ones.

10) Integrate community-based policing in the development of the new Policy on UN Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, based on lessons learnt from Afghanistan: In a complementary manner to an Afghan discussion of community-based policing, there may be a need for an international doctrine laying the foundations of a shared understanding of policing principles such as community-based policing. Such doctrine could allow for harmonizing the practices of a multiplicity of actors in international projects involving community-policing activities.

In the emerging field of community-based policing in Afghanistan, tracks for further research are manifold. As part of the debate over competing definitions of community policing, a comparative study of the understandings of community-policing and the role of a community police developed by the various actors of community-based policing in Afghanistan would be meaningful. Besides, it was identified that good statistics to evaluate properly the impact of community-based policing programs are lacking. Hence, it would be interesting to quantitatively investigate how beneficial the work of community policing programs to encourage the reporting of crimes. Such research could be part of a broader mixed methods study of civil society-driven consultations and the long-term impact they have. Further research could also explore whether and how community-based policing envisioned as a policing strategy implemented in the recovery phase of post-conflict countries, with the use of the local expertise of NGOs, can contribute to re-establishing the rule of law over lawless and under-governed areas. Finally, additional research in what kind of education and training is relevant for community-based policing could inform and contribute to the design and revision of appropriate curricula.
References


Appendix

The following questions are examples of questions that were used as guidelines to conduct interviews during fieldwork. They have not necessarily been asked in the way they are written, or asked at all. They may give an idea of the themes which were touched upon in the discussions.

1. Can you tell me about the training provided to young police recruits here at [...]? How does the training given here differ or relate to the training given in the other police training centers in the country?

2. There has been an explosion of police trainings here in Afghanistan, especially since 2010. Is it a challenge to face such a multiplication of trainings? In specific, is coordination an issue?

3. IPCB has been mandated with the mission to coordinate police trainings in cooperation with MoI and its diplomatic board. Do you participate in the coordination effort at this level? Would you mind telling me how you see it from your perspective?

4. There are many discussions about the concept of ‘community policing’ which is a major focus of UN and EUPOL police training and police-related activities. In Dari, the concept is labeled ‘police-e mardumi.’ Is this a new label to an old policing system? Is there space for such a role of the police – where the police deliver services to the population- in Afghanistan? Would you mind sharing with me your opinion about this concept?

5. There is sometimes confusion in discussions about the police between ‘community policing’ and the ALP. Do you also see confusion on this topic? Would you mind sharing with me your opinion about the ALP?

6. In my research, I am interested in the relation between the police and the population. To what extent is there a dialogue between communities and the police about what the population’s security needs are and how the police respond to it?
7. I know there are various traditional practices and systems of security, justice and conflict resolution in Afghanistan. How does the work of the police relate (complement or conflict) with these practices and systems?

8. I believe there is a strong link between policing and justice. Would you mind sharing with me your opinion on the matter?

9. As you know, there are many ongoing discussions about women and the Afghan police. Would you mind sharing with me your opinion on this topic?

10. To conclude: May I ask for your assessment of the developments in police reform since 2002 and your vision of the future of the police beyond 2014?