Sinem Acar-Burkay

**Essays on relational outcomes in mixed-motive situations**

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**Article 1:**
*Trusting others - the polarization effect of need for closure*

**Article 2:**
*When do we trust cooperators? The effect of trustees’ trait social motives and state social motives on trust*

**Article 3:**
*Economic and relational negotiation outcomes under various social motive compositions*

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Essays on relational outcomes in mixed-motive situations

by

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**GENERAL INTRODUCTION** ........................................................................................................ 7

    AN OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................ 9
    RECAPITULATION .................................................................................................................. 12
    REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 14

**CHAPTER 1: TRUSTING OTHERS—THE POLARIZATION EFFECT OF NEED FOR CLOSURE** ........................................................ 17

    ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... 17
    INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 18
    STUDY 1 .............................................................................................................................. 24
    STUDY 2 .............................................................................................................................. 28
    STUDY 3 .............................................................................................................................. 31
    STUDY 4 .............................................................................................................................. 35
    STUDY 5 .............................................................................................................................. 37
    DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................................... 40
    REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 42

**CHAPTER 2: WHEN DO WE TRUST COOPERATORS? THE EFFECT OF TRUSTEES’ TRAIT SOCIAL MOTIVES AND STATE SOCIAL MOTIVES ON TRUST** ........................................................................ 47

    ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... 47
    INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 48
    STUDY 1 .............................................................................................................................. 51
    STUDY 2 .............................................................................................................................. 55
    STUDY 3 .............................................................................................................................. 59
    DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................................... 63
    REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 64

**CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC AND RELATIONAL NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES UNDER VARIOUS SOCIAL MOTIVE COMPOSITIONS** ................................................................. 67

    ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... 67
    INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 68
    METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................ 75
    RESULTS .............................................................................................................................. 80
    DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................................... 92
    REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 94

**GENERAL DISCUSSION** .................................................................................................... 98

    SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS ............................................................................................ 98
    IMPLICATIONS .................................................................................................................... 99
General Introduction

Over the past few decades, developing, maintaining, and enhancing long-term relationships has become one of the key issues in marketing. Today, most companies focus on managing their relationships with their key customers, partners and investors. Employees who manage such relationships are often called Relationship Managers. Marketing research has also become much more relationship-oriented. Since the mid 1970s when definitions of marketing focused on exchange relationships (e.g., Bagozzi, 1974, 1975; Hunt, 1976; Kotler, 1972), a significant body of research adopting a relational view of marketing has developed (e.g., Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Gundlach & Murphy, 1993; Morgan & Hunt, 1994).

Companies and individuals may be interested in developing and sustaining successful relationships as a result of either genuine or instrumental motivations. On one hand, one may desire a successful relationship because one considers the relationship to be valuable in itself (i.e., genuine motivation). Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998), for instance, argue that “the future relationship is likely to be the most important outcome variable to research… because humans are social animals and therefore relationships are the core of human existence” (p. 184). On the other hand, one may see a successful relationship as a means to an end; in this case, one will desire the relationship because it serves a specific purpose, such as economic gains or profits (i.e., instrumental motivation). Accordingly, some scholars (e.g., Ganesan, 1994; Kalwani & Narayandas, 1995) argue that long-term relationships are important because they enhance performance outcomes, such as competitive advantage, profitability, and customer retention. However, regardless of the intended purpose and motivation, there is a consensus in marketing regarding the importance of managing relationships.

Managing relationships requires an in-depth understanding of how successful relationships compare to unsuccessful ones. In fact, a key goal of relationship marketing theory is to understand how successful relationships are influenced by certain variables, which can be either measured or manipulated by management. Hence, researchers in this field have investigated the attributes of successful relationships, such as trust, commitment, satisfaction, shared values, long-term orientation, relationship quality, and relational capital (Anderson & Sullivan, 1993; Dwyer et al., 1987; Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Morgan & Hunt, 1994).

With the importance of relationships in mind, in this dissertation I study two relational constructs: trust and relational capital. Trust is a key construct, as it is foundational in all relationships (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005), including marketing relationships (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Trust becomes embedded in all exchange relations, and thus it becomes the basis of long-term relationships. Trust is defined as one’s “willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Because trust refers to reliance on someone (i.e., a trustee) whose behavior is uncertain (Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992), there is inherent risk involved in trusting someone. Therefore, one of the primary reasons for the importance of trust is that it enables cooperation in situations that involve uncertainty or risk.
In marketing, for example, consumers need to have trust in a seller or a service provider in order to initiate and continue their purchases whenever the quality of the purchased goods or services is a priori uncertain. Similarly, inter-organizational relationships are complex, contain a lot of uncertainty, and demand flexibility and cooperation. Hence, parties need to trust one another in order to cooperate due to the fact that the future is somewhat uncertain (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). In line with this, the extant research shows that it is crucial to develop and nurture trust in marketing relationships (Wang & Huff, 2007), and that trust is strongly linked to commitment (Moorman et al., 1992) and loyalty (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Sullivan and Peterson (1982), for example, argue that “where the parties have trust in one another, there will always be ways by which the two parties work out difficulties” (p.30). Therefore, to the extent that parties seek a long-term relationship, it is necessary for them to try to build trust.

The second construct that I study, relational capital, is a more holistic construct compared to the construct of trust. Relational capital is similar to social capital (Granovetter, 1985), which refers to goodwill accumulated in a network of relationships; the difference between these two concepts is that relational capital refers to a dyadic relationship rather than to a network of relationships (Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008). Relational capital entails cumulative favorable elements that make a dyadic relationship satisfying; examples of such elements include trust, liking, commitment, and perceived relationship quality (Curhan, Xu, & Elfenbein, 2006; Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006). Hence, relational capital offers considerable benefits to both parties involved.

In this dissertation, I contribute to marketing research by studying how trust and relational capital may be influenced in mixed-motive situations. In mixed-motive situations, such as negotiation and trust dilemmas, interdependent parties are faced with a conflict between a motivation to compete and a motivation to cooperate (Schelling, 1960; Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). Motivation to compete stems from a desire to satisfy one’s immediate self-interest, whereas motivation to cooperate stems from a desire to fulfill a collective long-term interest (Liebrand, 1984). Mixed-motive situations differ from pure motive (i.e., either cooperative or competitive) situations in that mixed-motive situations are both cognitively and emotionally more challenging (Van Der Schalk, Beersma, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2010).

I chose mixed-motive situations as the context for my research because they represent a variety of real-world situations (Komorita & Parks, 1995). In fact, it can be argued that most interactions in marketing are mixed-motive in nature; parties simultaneously experience the motivation to compete to gain short-term profits and the motivation to cooperate to build a relationship. Dyadic (i.e., two-party) negotiation is a classic example of a mixed-motive situation in which negotiators are simultaneously motivated to compete to achieve a good deal and motivated to cooperate to reach an agreement. In trust dilemmas, another example of a mixed-motive situation, parties recognize both the benefits of mutual cooperation and the possible losses associated with being betrayed; thus, they are simultaneously motivated to cooperate to achieve mutual benefits and motivated to compete to gain personal benefits against this risk of betrayal of trust.
Despite the fact that these and many other examples of mixed-motive situations are abundant in the marketing context, and despite marketing scholars’ interest in successful long-term relationships, research on how relational outcomes are affected in mixed-motive situations has remained very limited. Researchers have primarily examined the effects of marketing relationships on the processes and outcomes of mixed-motive situations (e.g., Ganesan, 1993; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985; Srivastava & Chakravarti, 2009). Such research is important since mixed-motive interactions usually do not occur in a vacuum; instead, they usually occur within the context of an existing relationship. However, mixed-motive situations are also important for the development of relationships (Coughlan, Anderson, Stern, & El-Ansary, 2006), and this area has received less attention in previous research. In addition, mixed-motive situations such as negotiation can provide an excellent experimental setting in which to study the development of key relational constructs (Dwyer et al., 1987), such as trust and relational capital.

Throughout the dissertation, I pose research questions pertaining to relational outcomes in mixed-motive situations. I deal with these questions separately in three chapters, each of which is a separate research article and thus can be read in isolation. In the next section, I present an overview of these three articles.

An overview

Chapter 1: Trusting others—The polarization effect of need for closure

The research reported in Chapter 1 deals with trust. Trust-related issues essentially involve some uncertainty regarding the future behavior of the one who is trusted (i.e., the trustee). Based on this fact, I argue that trustors’ social-cognitive motivation to manage uncertainty, as captured by their need for closure (NFC), should influence the level of trust they choose to place in others.

NFC is defined as desire to look for any firm answer on a given topic rather than to further sustain ambiguity or uncertainty (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). NFC fosters a two-stage epistemic process: “seizing” (the urgency tendency) and “freezing” (the permanence tendency). Seizing refers to high NFC individuals’ inclination to jump to a judgment implied by readily available information as quickly as possible whereas freezing refers to high NFC individuals’ tendency to protect their judgment for as long as possible.

I argue that extreme (either high or low, as opposed to moderate) and persistent levels of trust serve as a firm answer for a trustor in an otherwise uncertain situation. Therefore, I expect that individuals with high, rather than low, NFC will “seize and freeze” upon extreme levels of trust to remove this uncertainty. I further argue that interpersonal closeness with the trustee determines which of these extremes (i.e., high or low) high NFC individuals will seize and freeze upon. Specifically, I predict that high, but not low, NFC individuals will seize and freeze upon low levels of trust in distant others and high levels of trust in close others. That is,
I predict that individuals with a high NFC will have an exaggerated tendency to put high trust in close others and low trust in distant others whereas interpersonal closeness will be inconsequential for individuals with low NFC. I test these predictions in five studies.

In Study 1, I examine the joint influence of trustors’ NFC and their interpersonal closeness (proxied by acquaintance) with their trustees on the level of trust they place in those trustees. Results of Study 1 reveal that trustors’ higher NFC is associated with trust that becomes lower as their interpersonal closeness with trustees decreases. Results also show this effect persists in an actual social interaction involving negotiation.

In Study 2, I systematically manipulate the trustors’ interpersonal closeness with the trustees and compare the effects of NFC on trust at three different levels of interpersonal closeness. Results show that trustors’ high, but not low, levels of NFC are associated with higher trust in close trustees (i.e., close friends) than in distant trustees (i.e., anonymous strangers).

In Studies 3 and 4, I replicate the findings of Study 2 with two different situational (state) manipulations of NFC. Results of these studies show that the effects of situationally evoked NFC on trust are similar to those of individual trait-based NFC. In other words, regardless of whether NFC is state- or trait-based, trustors’ high NFC results in lower trust in distant others than in close others, whereas closeness cues are inconsequential for low NFC trustors.

In Study 5, I show that the interaction effect between NFC and interpersonal closeness on trust persists even in the presence of actual trustworthiness feedback. Specifically, I demonstrate that trustors with low NFC adjust their trust in both close and distant trustees according to those trustees’ actual trustworthiness, whereas trustors with high NFC freeze upon their existing trust judgments (based upon their interpersonal closeness perception) and do not subsequently adjust those judgments according to new evidence regarding the trustee’s actual trustworthiness.

Overall, the findings reported in Chapter 1 offer converging evidence that individuals with high NFC are more sensitive than individuals with low NFC to their interpersonal closeness with the trustee when making trust judgments (i.e., they trust close others more than they trust distant others) and that higher NFC makes one’s established levels of trust more persistent. Given the importance of trust, I believe that the findings presented in Chapter 1 are of considerable interest to a number of scholars interested in the drivers of trust.

Chapter 2: When do we trust cooperators? The effect of trustees’ state social motives and trait social motives on trust

The research reported in Chapter 2 examines the influence of trustees’ social motives—that is, their preferences for the distribution of outcomes between themselves and another party (McClintock, 1972; Messick & McClintock, 1968)—on how much they are trusted by others. Research suggests that social motives can be based on individuals’ trait-
based, chronic, internally driven social value orientations (i.e., prosocial vs. proself orientations), as well as on state-based, temporary, situational demands (e.g., instructions from the management) that induce either a cooperative or individualistic motivation. It should be noted that situational demands can induce cooperative or individualistic motivation in individuals with either a prosocial or a proself orientation; for example, a proself individual can be put in a cooperative salesperson role. Consequently, the research reported in Chapter 2 investigates the joint influence of trustees’ trait social motives (prosocial vs. proself) and state social motives (cooperative vs. individualistic) on the level of trust others place in them.

Specifically, based on the argument that outcomes in interpersonal relations can best be predicted by a personality × situation interaction (Van Lange, 2000), I propose that cooperatively motivated trustees are trusted more than individualistically motivated trustees, but only when they have prosocial, rather than proself, trait social motives. I further propose that trustors’ perception of the authenticity of the trustees’ cooperative behaviors is the mediating mechanism for this effect. I test these hypotheses in three studies.

In Study 1, I examine the interaction effect between trustees’ state social motives and trait social motives on trust when information about both is made explicitly available. Results revealed that trustors use available information regarding trustees’ trait social motives and state social motives to decide how much to trust them; specifically, they trust cooperative trustees more than individualistic ones, but only when the former have a prosocial (vs. proself) social value orientation.

In Study 2, I investigate the interaction effect of trustees’ state and trait social motives on trust when information about these motives is not readily available but may be discovered through communication during negotiation. Results show that this interactive effect holds even when explicit information about trustees’ state and trait social motives is not available but may be discovered through interaction, such as in negotiation.

In Study 3, I replicate the results of Study 2 and also establish that the perceived authenticity of trustees’ cooperative behaviors mediates the interaction effect of their trait and state social motives on trust. In other words, cooperatively motivated prosocial trustees are trusted more than cooperatively motivated proself trustees because the cooperative behaviors of the former are perceived to be more authentic than those of the latter.

Overall, these three studies provide evidence that trust depends largely on personal factors (i.e., trait social motives) and on the joint influence of personal and situational factors (i.e., the interaction of trait social motives and state social motives). Due to the ubiquitousness of personal and situational factors in trust-related issues, the research findings reported in Chapter 3 have valuable implications for both scholars and practitioners.
Chapter 3: Economic and relational negotiation outcomes under different social motive compositions

Negotiation occurs whenever two or more parties cannot achieve a goal alone and therefore communicate with each other with the aim of reaching an agreement on a mutually acceptable outcome (Pruitt, 1983). The potential outcomes of negotiation can be divided into two categories: economic outcomes and relational outcomes (Curhan et al., 2006; Thompson, 1990).

Although buyer-seller interactions in marketing form a natural setting for negotiation, there is a surprising lack of research on negotiation within the marketing literature. Moreover, despite marketing scholars’ growing interest in the determinants of successful long-term relationships, research on how negotiation affects buyer-seller relationship development has remained very limited. In an attempt to fill this gap, the research reported in Chapter 3 examines how negotiators’ relational capital and profits are affected in negotiation.

Specifically, through the negotiation study reported in Chapter 3, I investigate the effect of dyad composition with respect to social motives (i.e., cooperative, individualistic, and mixed) on profits and relational capital. Dyad composition is an important variable to research, as negotiating dyads may have a mutually cooperative, mutually individualistic, or mixed (i.e., cooperators negotiating with individualists) social motive composition.

I test alternative hypotheses, developed based on different literatures (i.e., experimental game and negotiation), in a simulated negotiation experiment. Results show that mixed dyads, compared to cooperative and individualistic dyads, engage in more problem solving strategies, which in turn help them to achieve higher profits. Results also show that cooperative and mixed dyads, compared to individualistic dyads, use more relationship management strategies, which in turn help them to experience higher relational capital.

For exploratory purposes, I report the results of individual-level analyses to better understand the effect of negotiators’ and their counterparts’ social motives. Furthermore, to examine long-term effects, I report the results of a follow-up survey conducted seven months after the original study. Results of the survey indicate that relational capital persists over the long term.

Overall, findings reported in Chapter 3 indicate that mixed and cooperative dyads produce greater benefits than individualistic dyads. Given the prevalence of negotiation in interpersonal relations in general, and in buyer-seller settings in particular, the research findings reported in Chapter 3 have implications for a broad readership.

Recapitulation

The current dissertation comprises three chapters. Each chapter is presented as a separate research article. In Chapter 1, I examine how trustors’ need for closure polarizes their trust judgments depending on their interpersonal closeness with trustees. In Chapter 2, I
investigate the joint influence of trustees’ state social motives and trait social motives on how much they are trusted. In Chapter 3, I investigate the influence of different social motive compositions of negotiation dyads on their relational capital and profits. The findings reported in these three chapters are expected to contribute to the trust and negotiation literatures. Moreover, because issues of trust and negotiation are integral to buyer-seller relationships in marketing, the findings are particularly relevant for both marketing scholars and practitioners.
References


The papers of this dissertation (pages 16-97) are not available in BI Brage, due to copyright matters:

- Paper 1:  
  Chapter 1: Trusting others - the polarization effect of need for closure

- Paper 2:  
  When do we trust cooperators? The effect of trustees’ trait social motives and state social motives on trust

- Paper 3:  
  Economic and relational negotiation outcomes under various social motive compositions

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Summary of the findings

To summarize, this dissertation includes three chapters, each of which is a separate research article, on relational outcomes in mixed-motive situations. Chapter 1 uncovers how trustors’ social-cognitive motivation to manage uncertainty, which is captured by their need for closure (NFC; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), has a polarizing effect on their trust in others. Because issues of trust inherently involve uncertainty, and because NFC is directly related to one’s level of comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, it is predicted and documented in five studies that a trustor’s high, but not low, NFC can lead to polarized (i.e., very low or to very high) trust judgments in social interactions, depending on the social distance between the trustor and the trustee. That is, individuals with a high NFC have an exaggerated tendency to put high trust in close others and low trust in distant others. Furthermore, findings reported in Chapter 1 also show that individuals with high NFC have difficulties overcoming their initial high or low trust judgments even in the presence of actual trustworthiness feedback.

Research reported in Chapter 2, which is based on the premise that social behavior is a function of characteristics of the person and the environment (Lewin, 1935; Van Lange, 2000), examines the interaction effect between trustees’ assigned social motive (i.e., cooperative or individualistic) and their social value orientation (i.e., prosocial or proself orientation) on how much they are trusted. Previous research suggests that trustees’ social value orientation and situationally induced social motives values may each contribute separately to the level of trust that is placed in the trustees. Additionally, however, they may also interact to influence the trust that is placed in the trustees. The result of this interaction can depend on the match or mismatch between a trustees prosocial or prosocial disposition and that trustee’s cooperative or individualistic social motive (induced by the trustee’s environment). Results of the three studies in Chapter 2 provided converging evidence that trustees were trusted more when they had a cooperative rather than individualistic social motive, but only when they had a prosocial (vs. proself) social value orientation initially. Findings reported in Chapter 2 are remarkable in that they held even when the trustors were not informed about either the social value orientation or the role of the trustees but rather implicitly inferred the this information from the trustees’ behaviors. Mediation analysis results showed that these findings were explained by the perceived authenticity of the trustees’ cooperative behaviors.

Findings reported in Chapter 3 are based on data from a large simulated negotiation experiment, in which economic (i.e., profits) and relational (i.e., relational capital; Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008) outcomes of negotiations in homogeneously cooperative and homogeneously individualistic dyads were compared to those in mixed dyads (i.e., cooperators negotiating with individualists). Interestingly, the results showed that mixed dyads performed better than cooperative and individualistic dyads with respect to profits and performed as well as cooperative dyads with respect to relational capital. Exploratory individual-level analyses provided insight into the role of cooperators and individualists in
mixed dyads. Results also showed that relational capital persisted beyond the study period and also predicted negotiators’ future behavioral intentions (i.e., willingness to negotiate with the same counterpart), whereas profits did not.

Implications

The research findings presented in this dissertation have several implications for scholars and practitioners. These implications are addressed in this section.

The main finding of Chapter 1, which shows that NFC polarizes the effect of interpersonal closeness on trust, implies that one can predict a trustor’s level of trust in a trustee by assessing or manipulating the trustor’s NFC and by assessing or manipulating the interpersonal closeness between the trustor and the trustee.

As discussed in Chapter 1, NFC can be measured as a stable personality trait via established scales. Alternatively, NFC can be situationally induced through manipulations that increase the benefits of possessing closure, such as noise (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), mental fatigue (Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996), and/or time pressure (De Dreu, 2003; Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991; Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Pierro, Mannetti, De Grada, Livi, & Kruglanski, 2003; Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998). Specifically, when time pressure is high, when mental fatigue increases, or when there is noise in the environment, individuals may be more prone to polarized and persistent trust judgments. That is, depending on their perceived interpersonal closeness with the trustee, they may have high or low, but not moderate, levels of trust, and these levels will be difficult to alter. On the other hand, when time pressure decreases, when mental fatigue is low, or when there is no noise in the environment, individuals may tend to have moderate trust judgments, which may change in the light of new information regarding trustworthiness of the trustee.

Perceptions of interpersonal closeness may be manipulated as well. The same trustee may be perceived as closer or more distant depending on the trustor’s point of reference; for example, a colleague may be perceived as more distant when compared to a close friend but perceived as closer when compared to a stranger. Perceptions of interpersonal closeness may even be altered through subtle manipulations of incidental similarity (e.g., sharing a birth date or initials), because similarity induces a sense of social connection, thus increasing perceived interpersonal closeness (Jiang, Hoegg, Dahl, & Chattopadhyay, 2009). Hence, a high NFC trustor’s level of trust in a trustee may be altered by changing the trustor’s perception of interpersonal closeness with that trustee.

The main finding of Chapter 2, which indicates that individuals with a proself social value orientation are trusted less than individuals with a prosocial value orientation when placed in cooperative roles, clearly implies that both state social motives and trait social motives should be taken into account when the aim is to build trust. The practical implications of the findings provided in Chapter 2 highlight the dangers faced by those who might seek to build trust through situationally induced cooperative motives without the appropriate
supporting prosocial social value orientation. In the absence of such a prosocial social value orientation, trust suffers even when the environment induces cooperative motives in the trustee. Consequently, it is difficult for proself trustees to build trust by playing a cooperative role.

Although extant research shows that social motives can be situationally evoked by, for example, instructions (Deutsch, 1960), incentive structures (De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliet, 1998) and expectation of future interaction (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984), for organizations, findings reported in Chapter 2 imply that they need to be careful when assigning cooperative roles to their employees because, when trustees’ assigned cooperative roles mismatch with their social value orientation (i.e., when proselves are put in cooperative roles), this results in low levels of trust in those trustees. Hence, organizations that are interested in building trust need to make sure that their employees’ assigned cooperative roles match their social value orientations.

The findings of Chapter 3, which reveal that mixed negotiation dyads achieve higher joint profits compared to cooperative and individualistic dyads and that mixed and cooperative dyads achieve higher relational capital compared to individualistic dyads, imply that negotiating parties need to be aware of each other’s social motives. In the light of these findings, it would be wise for negotiating parties to try to mismatch their counterparts’ social motives in order to form mixed dyads. When they lack knowledge of their counterparts’ social motives, however, they may wish to adopt a cooperative motivation, in light of the fact that both profits and relational capital are hurt when both parties adopt an individualistic motivation. Furthermore, the finding that the effects of relational capital persist in the long run implies that companies should try to build high relational capital if they are interested in building a long-term relationship.

Future research

The findings reported in this dissertation point to several areas that are ripe for future research. A number of potential future research directions have already been discussed in each chapter. In this section, I will further elaborate on these ideas.

The first area to be considered for future research involves extrapolating whether the polarizing effect of NFC on the relationship between social distance (i.e., interpersonal closeness) and trust applies to other types of psychological distance. As touched upon in Chapter 1, according to construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998, 2003), various types of psychological distance (e.g., temporal, spatial, social and hypothetical distance) have similar effects on cognition. That is, the more distant an entity is from an individual psychologically, the higher and more abstract will be the level at which it is construed, whereas closer entities are construed at a lower, more concrete level. This happens because, as people move away from the direct experience of things, they have less information and more uncertainty about those things (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Accordingly, higher NFC should
be associated with have higher trust in a trustee at a lower psychological distance from the
trustor than in a trustee at a higher psychological distance. Therefore, based on construal level
theory, individuals with higher NFC should have higher trust in a trustee when the trustee is
physically close to them than when the same trustee is physically distant from them. Similarly,
higher NFC should be associated with higher trust when a trust-related issue takes place in the
near future versus when the same issue takes place in the distant future. To the best of the
author’s knowledge, these are novel hypotheses. Accordingly, further work is required to test
whether these predictions indeed hold.

Second, it would be interesting to explore the societal consequences of the polarizing
effect of NFC on trust. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the current findings may complement
previous findings on the positive relationship between heightened NFC and conservative
values (e.g., in-group bias and out-group derogation). That is, trust may indeed be the
underlying mechanism for many conservative social consequences of NFC. For instance,
people with high NFC may display increased in-group favoritism, right-wing attitudes, and
other conservative attitudes because they have low trust in out-group members. Hence, future
work can examine whether trust (or lack of trust) contributes to high NFC individuals’
conservative mindset.

Third, along with the study of trust, the study of trustworthiness—that is, the
willingness of a trustee to reciprocate a trustor’s trust—is an important topic that is worthy of
investigation. Relationships may fail in the absence of trustworthiness (Van den Bos et al.,
2009; Lahno, 1995). Therefore, for a mutually beneficial relationship, trust appears to be a
necessary but not a sufficient condition; it should be reciprocated with trustworthiness.
However, in Chapter 1, I studied trust only on the part of the trustor whereas in Chapter 2, I
measured trustees’ trustworthiness only in one of the three studies. Thus, I was unable to
make any concrete value judgments about the adequacy of trustors’ trust judgments, as the
validity of one’s trust in another can be judged only in the light of the trustee’s
trustworthiness. Any discussion of trust, however, raises questions of whether a trustor’s trust
is adequate (i.e., trust begets trustworthiness). Therefore, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 may be
extended by studying the validity of trustors’ trust judgments by examining trustees’
trustworthiness.

A fourth area that is worthy of further investigation is the general nature of trustees’
behavior (i.e., their behavior in all areas, not restricted to trustworthiness) to explicate the
factors that contribute to the level of trust placed in those trustees. For instance, although the
results reported in Chapter 2 show that cooperatively motivated trustees are trusted more than
individualistically motivated ones, but only when the former have a prosocial rather than a
proself social value orientation, it remains unknown whether those trustees do indeed differ in
their verbal and/or non-verbal behavior. Hence, future work is required to understand whether
and how prosocial trustees’ behavior actually differs from that of proself trustees when they
are assigned to a cooperative role.

In connection with the above-mentioned fourth area for future research, a fifth area
pertains to trustors’ assessment of the trustees. The findings in Chapter 2 clearly show that
trustors are able to distinguish between “real” cooperators (i.e., cooperatively motivated prosocials) and “fake” cooperators (i.e., cooperatively motivated proselfs); as a result, they place lower trust in cooperatively motivated proself trustees than in cooperatively motivated prosocial trustees even when they are given no explicit information about trustees’ social value orientation or state social motives. Nevertheless, based on current research, it remains unknown how trustors are able to make this distinction. This area could particularly benefit from qualitative research to gain an in-depth understanding of trustors’ ability to detect a mismatch between trustees’ personalities and assigned cooperative roles.

A sixth future research agenda concerns how the research reported in Chapter 3 could be extended. As mentioned before, although mixed dyads are common and important, they are understudied. Moreover, research on mixed dyads is of both theoretical and practical importance. Although Chapter 3 provides an enhanced understanding of mixed dyads, it also calls for further empirical research on mixed dyads. Future research is called for to uncover the boundary conditions under which mixed dyads achieve high profits and relational capital. Additional variables that enter the equation may change the outcomes in mixed dyads. For instance, power imbalance between the cooperator and the individualist in a mixed dyad may change the direction of profits and relational capital in those dyads. Although Olekalns and Weingart (2008) have argued that such situational characteristics would define the direction of behavior and outcomes in mixed dyads, to the best of the author’s knowledge no research has yet tested their argument. Hence, it would be interesting to do so in future work.

Conclusion

This dissertation aims to contribute to our theoretical and practical knowledge of relational outcomes in mixed-motive situations. Throughout the dissertation, I posed research questions pertaining to relational outcomes in mixed-motive situations. I dealt with those questions separately in three chapters, each of which is a separate research article.

In Chapter 1, I examined how trustors’ NFC polarized their trust judgments depending on their interpersonal closeness with the trustees. Results showed that trustors’ high, but not low, NFC was related to high trust in close others and low trust in distant others. Results also showed that higher NFC makes one’s established levels of trust more difficult to change.

In Chapter 2, I investigated the joint influence of trustees’ state social motives and trait social motives on how much they were trusted. Results showed that cooperatively motivated trustees were trusted more than individualistically motivated ones, but only when the former had a prosocial rather than proself social value orientation.

In Chapter 3, I examined the effect of various social motive compositions of negotiation dyads on their relational capital and profits. Results showed that mixed dyads achieved higher profits than individualistic and cooperative dyads while cooperative and mixed dyads achieved higher relational capital than individualistic dyads.
As already noted in the pertinent sections of this dissertation, Study 1 in Chapter 1, Study 2 in Chapter 2, and Chapter 3 are all based on the data set derived from a single simulated negotiation study. The reason for this is that, along with the main variable of interest that I manipulated (i.e., social motivation), I also measured two participant personality traits that were of theoretical interest (i.e., need for closure and social value orientation) in the same study for reasons of curiosity and convenience.

Specifically, in order to avoid possible demand characteristics, I measured participants’ need for closure and social value orientation one week before they arrived at the laboratory to participate in the negotiation experiment. Upon their arrival in the laboratory, I manipulated participants’ social motivation through instructions and a tablet computer lottery. Next, participants negotiated a purchase agreement for 25 minutes. Once the negotiation was complete, I measured participants’ relational capital and profits through a questionnaire, which also included items assessing participants’ demographics and their prior acquaintance with their counterpart in the negotiation. When the participants completed the questionnaire, they were told that the negotiation study was over, and they were asked to play an investment game with the same counterpart. In this game, one dyad member was assigned to the role of the investor (i.e., trustor), while the other dyad member was assigned to the role of the broker (i.e., trustee). Finally, seven months after the negotiation study, I contacted the participants via e-mail asking them to answer a follow-up questionnaire.

This negotiation study revealed several interesting and novel findings, all of which would be difficult to cover in one research article. Hence, I divided the main findings into three themes upon which I built the three research articles included in this dissertation. All research material from this study is available from the author upon request.
References


