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Edifices
Architecture and the Spatial Frameworks of Memory
Errata

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Edifices. Architecture and the Spatial Frameworks of Memory

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p. 184, line 33: for to the expansion of Rossi’s influence and to the translation of his book into English. read to the expansion of Rossi’s influence.
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p. 277, line 1: for Riksantikvaren, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage, read FAD and Statsbygg
p. 277, line 30: for Roede, Berre, and Riksantikvaren read Roede and Berre
p. 299, line 9: for Denmark read Denmark–Norway
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Mattias Ekman
Edifices
The explosion that severely damaged the Government Quarter in Oslo on 22 July 2011 sparked a heated debate in which professionals, authorities, and organisations have contended over whether or not to tear down, restore, or continue to build on the architectural remains. The arguments rested on postulations such as ‘the quarter documents Norway’s political history of the nineteenth and twentieth century’, ‘the two buildings designed by Erling Viksjø are important contributions to the history of architecture and art’, and ‘if the buildings are torn down the perpetrator gets his way’. A dispute like the one in Oslo demonstrates how architecture, which previously only had sustained inert, disciplinary memory for architectural historians and professional rituals of state officials, overnight can come to be regarded as an essential vehicle for national remembrance and sentiments. In the opinions voiced in the public sphere, buildings that were previously defined through their everyday function could be seen to transfigure into spatial concepts, to multiply, and to turn into cues for associated memories of political history, architecture, and terrorism. Triggered by the destruction that was unleashed by the bomb, the intense media dissemination and the dispute have contributed to altering and spreading spatial representations of the Government Quarter. These travel between groups, transform in the minds of individuals and are exchanged with other images of the national community and of an international community. In this thesis I will argue that representations of architecture in memory are not stable and permanent, but rather dynamic and on the move. Whereas architecture usually exists as just one material building or site, its counterparts in people’s minds can only be said to exist as a plurality of entities, employed as they are to structure everyday and institutional remembrance. It is the latter that I will turn to in order to address the role of architecture as a societal mnemonic.
Over the last three decades an interdisciplinary field of scholarship has emerged, reappraising the work of pioneers and establishing a new theoretical apparatus to assess cultures’ engagement with the past. Humanistic memory studies has seen the development of a gamut of concepts for addressing cultures and politics of place-bound remembrance in post-traditional and post-war societies. This thesis will look into one such concept by one of the field’s pioneers. The spatial framework of memory – le cadre spatial de la mémoire – was conceived by French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs as an integral component of the theory of collective memory, developed over three books from the 1920s to the 1940s. Different from the writing of history, according to Halbwachs, to study collective memory does not refer to explorations of the past as such, but to investigations of mechanisms of social psychology in the present, and how these shape every group’s engagement with the past. To regard architecture as a spatial framework of memory means to enquire into its role in such acts of social memory. Following Halbwachs I am less interested in how we recall environments as phenomena in themselves than in how we shape notions of them to support us in the remembrance of other things. I assess the concept in relation to the overarching theory of collective memory and appraise its indebtedness to Halbwachs’s three main intellectual forefathers: Henri Bergson, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Émile Durkheim. Through a rereading of the spatial framework of memory in its original context this study suggests the usefulness of the Halbwachsian concept.

The spatial framework of memory would become one of the sociocultural conceptualisations of architecture and memory from outside of architectural theory to establish itself in the critique of the functionalist city in the 1960s, especially through the considerations of Kevin Lynch and Aldo Rossi. It would also come to stand at the centre of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model of communicative memory and cultural memory, drawn up in the 1980s and 1990s. Understood in the light of the elaborations of the term by Lynch, Rossi, and Aleida and Jan Assmann I propose the spatial framework of memory as a contribution to a theoretical framework for investigating architecture in processes of remembering, for instance how they come to the surface in disputes like that over the Government Quarter in Oslo or in other contexts relating to the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a society rather than to the phenomenal experience of individuals. In addition to the postulation of a general concept, the thesis elaborates on a number of distinctions to address a variety of societal contexts. With the postulation of the spatial framework of memory the thesis stands with one leg in the architectural discourse and one in memory studies, transporting perspectives
between them. The study aims to champion humanistic views in the theory and practice of architecture and urban planning.

With the conceptualisation of the multifarious spatial frameworks of memory the thesis challenges ideas of permanence and singularity, and recognises a shift in focus to the transitory character of architecture and to its associated plurality of perspectives. It is in relation to such an understanding that the title of the thesis should be understood: *Edifices* rather than *buildings* points to the dual nature of architecture as, on the one hand, a mind-external, material construction and, on the other, a structure of thought in memory. *Edifices* and not *edifice* points to the multitude of spatial frameworks of memory that exist for every physical environment, spread among different groups and change over time. The plural form further implies the dispersion of the architectural object over mobile media, such as texts, photographs and drawings, the latter exerting influence over the alterations of the mental representations of the environment. It is with a three-fold appreciation of architecture as physical constructions, as images in memory, and as textual and pictorial artefacts that I will commence the studies of the spatial framework of memory.
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**Introduction**

I emphasise the thought that memory architecture was invisible: it used buildings for its purposes, but we can never see into the actual memories in which these buildings were reflected. It raises the rather interesting thought, that a building lives, not only by its actual visible existence, but by its invisible reflection in the memories of generations of men.


I am certain that those who presently see my theatre are few with respect to the infinite number who will see it in the future; for I am even more certain that the written version, by means of the printing press, will endure many centuries … Those who will come after us (even if the house is ruined) will see it still standing inside their minds because writing has the ability quickly to build every great edifice and instantly to paint all that one says about it and designs for it.

— Francesco Doni, *Pitture*, 1564

In the early 2000s I visited Vukovar, a city in Croatia that had been heavily damaged in the Balkan conflicts of the early 1990s. Disturbed by the all-encompassing devastation of the urban environment I made the city the study case of my diploma project at the Architectural Association School of Architecture (the AA) in London. Through visits, interviews, and readings I

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came to understand how, to the residents who were rebuilding the historical city while living in the midst of debris, ruins, rats, and undetonated mines, the city was necessarily something more than its current material state. Only by looking back to the history of the town and looking forward in time to what it could become once more, the inhabitants could face the struggle of the day. This was not easy, a woman told me, because at the return to Vukovar after a few years as an internally displaced person, the access to her past life was blocked by the total alteration of the environment. She could not localise the places where her former social life had played out. The piles of rubble, at first, did little to remind her of where the houses of her friends or her former workplaces had previously stood.

Architecture, memory, and the AA
At the time when I worked with the diploma project, the AA was one of the architecture schools where the issue of memory was on the agenda as one of the concepts that supported a promotion of humanistic perspectives in architecture. As we shall see in chapters three and four, in architecture theory the term ‘memory’ largely came to be linked to sociologist Maurice Halbwachs’s theory of collective memory, introduced by architects Kevin Lynch and Aldo Rossi in the 1960s. Another scholar who acted as an instigator and source of inspiration, almost with a magical appeal, for those concerned with memory in architecture was historian Frances A. Yates (1899–1981). She had for several decades been affiliated with the Warburg Institute, founded by art historian Aby Warburg and since 1944 incorporated in the University of London. For the appreciation of spatial conceptions to aid memory as well as of memory’s role in architecture, her studies of the classical Greek and Roman mnemotechnic ars memoriae, and its tradition and legacy in the Renaissance art of memory, have proved immensely influential, also in ways, she admitted, she could not predict herself. Some of

1 At the time I was unaware of Aldo Rossi’s formulation of the architecture of cities: ‘By architecture I mean not only the visible image of the city and the sum of its different architectures, but architecture as a construction, the construction of the city over time. I believe that this point of view, objectively speaking, constitutes the most comprehensive way of analyzing the city; it addresses the ultimate and definite fact in the life of the collective, the creation of the environment in which it lives’. A Rossi, The Architecture of the City, ed. P Eisenman, tr. D Ghirardo & J Ockman (1st Amer. edn, Cambridge, Opposition books/MIT Press, 1982) [It. orig. (4th edn, 1978)] , 21. Cf. ch. 4.

2 Yates, ‘Architecture and the Art of Memory [1980]’, 4. The study of the forms of art of memory has, after Yates, become a research field in itself. William Engel explains that ‘Mnemology is concerned primarily with how the classical Art of Memory was figured and reconfigured during the Middle Ages and Renaissance … Mnemology, therefore, with respect to literary criticism and intellectual history, concerns the various ways such systems of thought have been conceived, implemented, and discussed’. W E Engel, ‘What’s New in Mnemology’, Connotations, 11/2–3 (2001–2002), 241–42. Also if Yates’s work received the most attention she was neither the first to initiate critical, historical studies of the art of memory in modern times, nor was

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her writings, notably the 1966 publication *The Art of Memory*, stand as milestones in memory studies of many disciplines. References to her work appear at several places in the thesis.

With the essay ‘Collage City’, written together with Fred Koetter for *The Architectural Review* in 1975, Colin Rowe was one of the first to apply the insights from the study of the art of memory to architectural theory. Rowe had studied the history of architecture under Rudolf Wittkower at the Warburg Institute in the 1940s, the same institution with which Yates was affiliated. She had been a member of the jury that assessed Rowe’s dissertation. Compared to utopian projects like those of Superstudio, Rowe and Koetter asked rhetorically if architecture could also be a *theatre of memory*, not only a *theatre of prophecy*. With reference to Yates’s *The Art of Memory* they argued that

The bibles and encyclopaedias of both the illiterate and the literate, [the Gothic cathedrals] were intended to articulate thought by assisting recollection, and to the degree that they acted as Scholastic classroom aids, it becomes possible to refer to them as having been *theatres of memory*. And the designation is a useful one, because, if today we are only apt to think of buildings as necessarily prophetic, such an alternative mode of thinking may serve to correct our unduly prejudiced naiveté. The building as *theatre of prophecy*, the building as *theatre of memory* – if we are able to conceive of the building as one, we must, inherently be able to conceive of it as the other; and while recognising that without benefit of academic theory, these are both

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*References:*

of them the ways in which we habitually interpret buildings, this memory-
prophecy theatre distinction might then be carried over into the urbanistic
field.\textsuperscript{8}

For Rowe and Koetter the theatre of prophecy referred to how the Modern
Movement saw architecture production. As an alternative they proposed an
approach to architectural design and urban planning that did not attempt to
build utopias with total disregard for what they with Claude Lévi-Strauss
referred to as the ‘collection of oddments left over from human endeavours’,
but which should base itself on the Popperian idea that traditions play critical
roles as incipient theories in the betterment of society.\textsuperscript{9} Instead of the
scientist architect producing prophetic schemes of total design, they called
for a \textit{bricoleur} architect who could assemble new orders from cultural
leftovers. The latter would produce a \textit{collage city} that supports memory as
well as prophecy, within a plurality of systems.

In chapter three I discuss how in the 1950s and 1960s architects began to
reevaluate the Modern Movement’s conception of the past and offer
alternative models of thought with the help of terms like ‘tradition’ and
‘memory’. When Rowe and Koetter published ‘Collage City’ in 1975 the
discourse had been going on for more than a decade and their contribution
lay in their synthetic postulation. If forms of historicism and the return to
architectural traditions were offered as antitheses to the Modern Movement,
the collage city attempted to learn from both and conceive a theory for a
middle way. Memory, in their conception, is at best aligned with prophecy.

Three years before ‘Collage City’, in his book \textit{What Time is This Place?},
Kevin Lynch included a short passage to the general principles of the art of
memory and the memory theatre conceived and built by Giulio Camillo in the
sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{10} He referred to an article Yates had published in
\textit{Architectural Design (AD)} in 1968, under the editorship of architect Rebecca
Pidgeon and architectural historian Robin Middleton.\textsuperscript{11} In 1973 Middleton
was appointed head of General Studies (studies in history and theory) at the
AA.\textsuperscript{12} As with \textit{AD} at the time, the AA was (and still is) based in Bloomsbury

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{9} ibid., 83.
\textsuperscript{10} K Lynch, \textit{What Time is This Place?} (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1972), 54. On Camillo’s memory theatre see
e.g. F A Yates, \textit{The Art of Memory} (1966; repr. edn, London, Pimlico, 1992), 135–74; R Bernheimer,
architectural theory include A Vidler, \textit{The Architectural Uncanny. Essays in the Modern Unhomely}
(Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992), 178–79; M C Boyer, \textit{The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery
\textsuperscript{12} A Higgott, ‘The Subject of Architecture: Alvin Boyarsky and the Architectural Association School ’
\end{flushright}
in central London, the same area that houses the Warburg Institute. Around 1980, in the period before Yates passed away, she was invited to lecture on several occasions, the papers of which were published in the school periodicals *AA Quarterly* and *AA Files*.\(^{13}\)

Yates’s ideas would see their distribution to several generations of architecture students at the AA, particularly through the teaching of Pascal Schöning, unit master of Diploma unit 3, which ran from 1992 to 2008.\(^{14}\) The unit studied architecture with emphasis on ‘image, space-time, memory, contradiction, narrative, overlay, projection, light and film, all seen not in a static but a processual way’, as Schöning put it.\(^{15}\) On various levels and with a variety of definitions, memory was decidedly a central term in the video-based student projects, and the reading lists for the students included Yates’s *The Art of Memory*, Henri Bergson’s *Matter and Memory*, and Marcel Proust’s *In Search of Lost Time*.\(^{16}\) It was in this intellectual environment, during my pre-diploma and diploma studies 2001–2002 and 2003–2004, that I was introduced to Yates and the art of memory, as well as to Bergson’s individualistic theory of memory.

During my diploma year AA Publications published the English translation of Sébastien Marot’s book on memory and architecture, which reviews the art of memory of Yates and the conceptualisations of space in Halbwachs’s works.\(^{17}\) Marot had lectured on issues of memory at the AA in the winter 1997–1998, presenting aspects of Yates and the art of memory and reflections on works by Robert Smithson and Georges Descombes.\(^{18}\) The 1999 book was based on these talks.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{15}\) P Schöning, ‘Marginalia’, in P Schöning et al. (eds), *Cinematic Architecture* (London, AA, 2009), 12.


\(^{18}\) Marot, Conversation with M Elkman.

\(^{19}\) Marot, *Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory*, [88].
Object of study

Virtually all studies in sociocultural memory refer to Halbwachs. *On Collective Memory* offered me the first introduction to his writings. The easiest available source in English, it includes the translation of selected parts of *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* and of the concluding chapter of *La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en terre sainte: Étude de mémoire collective* (henceforth referred to as *La Topographie légendaire*). It was not, however, until I had read the complete German translation of *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, *Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen* that I became aware that the concept *cadre spatial de la mémoire* (spatial framework of memory) could provide a systematic tool for addressing issues of architecture and memory in situations like the one I had encountered in Vukovar.  

In Halbwachs’s three works on memory, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, published in 1925, *La Topographie légendaire*, published in 1941, and *La Mémoire collective*, posthumously published in 1947/1950 and appearing in a critical edition in 1997, the spatial framework of memory is elaborated into a multifaceted concept for the assessment of space and its role for group-bound remembering. The spatial framework of memory, the concept of space that individuals hold of the physical environment, is a stable construct of the mind that is employed to localise and reconstruct other memories. Halbwachs maintains that space essentially is a notional construct in the memory of society’s individuals, at all times in interplay with those of affiliated social groups, like the family, the profession, or the religious community. The view on space, he posits, is always multi-perspectival, for the individual as well as for the group and for society. In the interplay with the spatial frameworks of the different groups, the materiality of the built environment can be considered as the deposit of the former structures and remainders with a significant impact on social orders and politics of memory.

In the rereading of the concept in Halbwachs’s original texts I consider the intellectual context that surrounded him, the evolution of the term and its multiple facets. I demonstrate how the construal of Halbwachs’s concept of the spatial framework of memory (as well as of the collective memory) depends on a careful appreciation of the different origins of the elements of his thought, especially with respect to his three intellectual forefathers Bergson, Leibniz, and Durkheim. Especially with regard to his thinking on space I am of the opinion that Leibniz’s influence has been underestimated.  

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21 Jean-Pierre Cléro forms an exception.
In this respect, the thesis offers a different perspective from previous architectural readings. It aims to contribute to methods of assessing the politics of place-bound memory in the discipline of architecture as well as in other fields that may share such concerns. I assert the relevance of Halbwachs’s theories for the critical construal of architecture’s role in societal remembering.

With *The Image of the City* and *What Time is This Place?* by Kevin Lynch (1918–1984) and *L’Architettura della città* by Aldo Rossi (1931–1997) the theories of Halbwachs are introduced to the architectural discourse. There the notion of the spatial framework of memory transforms and takes on new meanings, and towards the end of the last century Halbwachs’s conception, seen through the lens of architectural theory, meanwhile, became a commonplace reference when dealing with memory in architecture. The spatial framework of memory appears, although rarely under that name, among other places, in the writings of Christine Boyer, Dolores Hayden, Wolfgang Sonne, Sébastien Marot, and Adrian Forty. Its new forms in the architectural context place more emphasis on the built environment than Halbwachs did. For instance, I will argue that the concept *fatto urbano* has not been grasped in its useful complexity, notably in the construal of Rossi’s theory by Rafael Moneo and Peter Eisenman, as a definition of a culturally significant architectural object that needs to be assessed both with respect to its physical materiality and to the multitude of collective representations and associations in the memory of the citizens.22

The thesis also argues for the merit of its development within the theory of *kommunikatives und kulturelles Gedächtnis* (communicative and cultural memory), developed by literary scholar Aleida Assmann (b. 1947) and Egyptologist Jan Assmann (b. 1938) from the 1980s until today. Their systematic assessment of Halbwachs’s theories makes it possible to draw a crucial distinction between mind-internal and mind-external spatial frameworks, both acting as mnemonic tools, and to differentiate between the use of architecture for everyday social and formalised cultural remembering, respectively. Their elaborations prove valuable and the thesis suggests that the breadth of their conceptualisations may be useful in assessing contentious cases like that of the debate on the Government Quarter in Oslo, as well as for other considerations of memory and architecture. I read Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theory of the cultural memory through the lens of the spatial framework of memory.

22 Cf. Critique of the Rossian theory of memory in ch. 4.
In the context of scientific studies of spatial memory, psychologists Amy Shelton and Naohide Yamamoto have formulated a task for their field:

The challenge for future research is to come up with a theoretical framework for organizing the many different types of spatial representations and how they might complement, interact, or interfere with one another. This new framework will need to account for different types of experiences, different degrees of familiarity, different goals for spatial learning and memory, and individual differences in spatial skills. Clearly, visual representations in perception and memory will play a critical role in many of the processes and representations.

A corresponding challenge could be posed for the studies of architecture and memory in the humanities. The spatial framework of memory may contribute to a response to such a challenge. Halbwachs’s original concept, to my meaning, is complex and promising; with its elaborations by Lynch, Rossi, and Aleida and Jan Assmann it becomes broader and more dynamic. It could provide a ‘theoretical framework for organizing the many different types of spatial representations and how they might complement, interact, or interfere with one another’ in the engagement with places, buildings, and landscapes in sociocultural memory, or in issues of memory in architecture. The focus will need to shift from the individual differences of spatial skills to social and cultural mechanisms and developments. Although visual representations will have to play a central role, the theoretical framework especially needs to address how architecture is abstracted into cultural notions and how it takes on symbolic values. Together with the contributions by Lynch, Rossi, and Aleida and Jan Assmann I propose the spatial framework of memory as a concept of architecture and memory, which rests on postulations of the more general theories of collective memory (Halbwachs) and communicative and cultural memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann).

This thesis is motivated by a tendency in architecture as well as in memory studies to equate physical buildings with the spatial representations that individuals and groups form of them in their minds, and by what I see as insufficient appreciation of the relevance of the latter. It is my belief that the theoretical framework presented here can explicate such issues as well as move the attention from theories of architecture and memory that ask how we remember space to those that look at for what reasons we remember space and at what we recall or associate by means of spatial remembrance. I believe

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that it could prove relevant for, at least, three areas that I am presently associated with.

In the field of humanistic memory studies the spatial framework of memory could address the pluralities of spatial images and memories that societal groups associate with architecture. As I will argue later in this chapter, the concept goes hand in hand with a critique of theories that consider the built environment as representing permanence and singularity. A building may exist as only one material unicum in one unique location, but the corresponding spatial frameworks of memory necessarily only exist in plural – for its users and over time. As such, the theoretical framework offers itself as a contribution to a self-critical turn in the field towards studies of ‘multidirectional memory’ (Michael Rothberg), ‘travelling memory’ (Astrid Erll), and ‘dynamic memory’ (Erll and Ann Rigney). The spatial framework of memory could further offer a method of analysing different forms of specialised spatial remembering from commemoration practices at historic sites to the ordering of knowledge by means of library or museum architecture. Related to memory studies is the growing concern with diaspora, migration, and displacement. I have previously attempted to apply Halbwachs’s thinking of memory and space to such issues and believe that the spatial framework of memory carries a potential for addressing the various notions and connotations of the environment that can appear as a reality to migrants.24

In studies of cultural heritage and in the professional realm of cultural heritage administration the spatial framework of memory could provide a theoretical framework for ordering systematically and evaluating the plethora of existing theories and concepts. It may also, for instance, offer tools for analysis of intangible values and memories that our societies let be denoted and connotated by material remnants.

For the discipline and profession of architecture and urban planning the theoretical framework contributes to an increased valuing of humanistic perspectives. With the spatial framework of memory comes an awareness of memory functions of architecture, conscious as well as unconscious. A predominant emphasis on form and structure could be balanced with assessments of cultural and political values that are not discernible in the building’s materiality but nonetheless associated with it. The concept does not, however, only need to be assigned to critical academic studies, but could be employed in architectural production or policymaking. While it potentially

could come handy in culturally complex design tasks, the spatial framework of memory may prove better suited as an analytical tool in processes that precede the design phase: education, critique, writing of reports and plans, etc. Thus, the thesis is a contribution to the recognition of the relevance of humanistic perspectives in architectural theory and practice.

I have pointed to three academic and professional areas in which the spatial framework of memory could be useful. I welcome other professionals and scholars to criticise and broaden my perspectives.

**Context**

In the following I will introduce the intellectual context of the thesis: the interdisciplinary field of humanistic memory studies. Although it is written at a school of architecture, in an environment of history and theory, the study has built its theoretical foundation outside of the conventional boundaries of architecture. This is by no means unique, as we shall see with architects Lynch and Rossi, but it requires careful delineation of the landscape in which it operates. I will give an overview of memory studies in the last three decades before addressing how the concept history surfaces in different disguises in the various discourses of the thesis. I will also consider political and ideological implications of memory studies for the different theorists of the thesis.

‘The past is everywhere’, David Lowenthal reassured us in the 1980s.  
And for two decades or so, an increasing number of scholars told us that our memory of the past, as well as the study of memory, also pervades everything we do. We are obsessed with memory and live in the midst of a memory boom, Andreas Huyssen proclaimed in 1995. Jay Winter argues that we have inherited the fascination with the past from previous memory generations. The first, according to him, focused on the formation of national, social, and cultural identities and spanned from the 1890s to the 1920s. The second addressed the remembrance and forgetting of WWII and the Holocaust and emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. We live the third.

The recent upsurge of memory, at least when it comes to the humanities, has to a large degree moved the emphasis from the individual to society and culture. The early attempts in this direction were made, often independently, in the decennia around 1900. If Halbwachs was one of the first to write

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explicitly and systematically about social and cultural aspects of memory, scholars from various disciplines shared the curiosity about the interaction of individual memory and society, including the likes of Henri Bergson, Aby Warburg, Émile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Arnold Zweig, Karl Mannheim, Frederic C. Bartlett, Walter Benjamin, Ernest Renan, and Marc Bloch.  

In the decades after the war – the same period that sees its renaissance in the architectural discourse – the term ‘memory’ had a marginal role in the social sciences.

In the last two decades of the twentieth century and until today, when the interest in memory has declined in architecture, a renaissance of memory issues arose in the humanities. Older theoretical models of memory have been re-evaluated and new ones developed in order to address historical and contemporary phenomena. With the exchange of old terms for new ones, novel epistemological perspectives have surfaced. Halbwachs’s writings on memory stand at the very centre of these changes. The reappraisals of his work in the 1980s by Yosef Yerushalmi, Gérard Namer, Pierre Nora, Paul Connerton, and Aleida and Jan Assmann have rearranged the theoretical landscape. Notions like ‘history’, ‘myth’, and ‘tradition’ now compete with a whole range of concepts, subsumed under umbrella terms like ‘social memory’, ‘collective memory’, ‘communicative memory’, and ‘cultural memory’. ‘Memory’ has become a leading term; historical sites now seem less attractive to scholars than do sites of memory (lieux de mémoire), even if they refer to the same topographical place and the same societal mechanisms.

In a similar fashion as the slightly earlier interest for memory in architecture, the attention to space in memory studies in the 1980s and 1990s appears not only to be linked to the revival of Halbwachsian thinking but also to Yates’s writings. Aleida Assmann has testified to the relevance of her thesis on the art of memory for German literary studies. The rediscovery of the ancient mnemotechnic strongly influenced the study of memory in literature in the early 1990s, she explains, and people like Renate Lachmann and Anselm Haverkamp would link it with theories of intertextuality, psychoanalysis, and deconstruction. In Nora’s article ‘Mémoire collective’
in the 1978 encyclopaedia *La Nouvelle histoire* Yates is mentioned as the one notable exception to a generation of historians who have not concerned themselves with memory. She is listed in the company of other contributors to the study of memory in other disciplines: psychoanalysts and philosophers like Freud, Bergson, and Lukács, writers like Proust, Joyce, Conrad, and Svevo, and the Durkheimian sociologist Halbwachs. Nora will later draw on Yates and Halbwachs in his conception of *les lieux de mémoire*, the realms of national memory in France.

The editors of the comprehensive *The Collective Memory Reader* (2011) argue that the memory boom is no mere fad: ‘far from declining in relevance, many of the analytical frameworks with which scholars have approached the issues highlighted under the rubric of memory studies represent the outlines of an increasingly important paradigm that unifies diverse interests across numerous disciplines, and consolidates long-standing perspectives within them, in perspicuous ways’. Memory scholar Astrid Erll suggests that memory culture around the turn of the millennium covered the whole cultural sphere and had become a leading concept in the humanities worldwide.

Interdisciplinary positions dominate contemporary studies in sociocultural memory, and contributions from areas such as history, sociology, literature, media studies, cultural studies, cultural history, and philosophy are brought together in the same conferences, volumes, and journals.


Introduction

The new engagement with the past does not stop there; some voices call for the field of memory studies to integrate the perspectives of social and natural sciences with the humanities. This approach holds promises, not so much of finding one definition of memory or reducing several disciplinary perspectives into one unified, but of regarding memory as one discursive construct that can problematise, research, and describe the same subject from different angles and in different languages. It will need to be aware of the limitations that each vantage point will bring with it, as well as to differentiate between the realm of memory that is offered to us as an anthropological given (Huyssen) and the realm that is subject to change in different societies: a cultural given. The first depends on stable biological configurations of the human brain over tens of thousands of years, and the knowledge of it gradually increased through new empirical research. The second concerns the brain’s adaptation to specific cultural contexts: the

Nünning (eds), Cultural Memory Studies: an International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2008); N Pethes, Kulturwissenschaftliche Gedächtnistheorien zur Einführung (Hamburg, Junius, 2008); A Erll & A Rigney (eds), Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2009); Erll, Memory in Culture; Olick, et al. (eds), The Collective Memory Reader. Journals include History and Memory and Memory Studies. In the Nordic academic environment, the context in which this research project has been executed, networks for humanistic and interdisciplinary memory studies include Towards a Common Past? (Lund Univ. et al.) and Danish Network for Cultural Memory Studies (Aarhus Univ., Copenhagen Univ., et al.). Research projects include MemS and National Myths and Collective Memory in a Global Age (Stavanger Univ. et al.) and Time, Memory, Representation (Södertörn Univ. et al.). Publications from these environments include F Tygstrup & U Ekmann (eds), Witness: Memory, Representation, and the Media in Question (Copenhagen, Museum Tusculanum Press, 2008); A Dessingué, et al., Krigsminner: Sola krigsgraver (Stavanger, Hertervig, 2009); A Dessingué, et al. (eds), Flerstemte minner (Stavanger, Hertervig, 2010); A Dessingué & O Ryckebusch, Dunkerke: ville-mémoire (Stavanger, Hertervig, 2011); H Ruin & A Ers (eds), Rethinking Time: Essays on History, Memory, and Representation (Huddinge, Södertörns högskola, 2011); B Törnquist-Plewa & N Bernsand (eds), Painful Past and Useful Memories. Remembering and Forgetting in Europe (Lund, The Centre for European Studies at Lund University, 2012).


38 Halbwachs emphasised this point. In Esquisse d’une psychologie des classes sociales he writes, ‘we must acknowledge that, taking into account our bodies, structure, organic life, senses and nervous system only, there is no such difference between us and the men preserved by the ashes of Herculaneum and Pompeii, or even prehistoric men, as to make us deny that we are their kin… Every new branch on the tree of humanity is of the same substance; the leaves are shaped in the same pattern, the blossoms and fruits are indistinguishable.’ Quote from the Engl. translation: M Halbwachs, The Psychology of Social Class, tr. C Delavenay (London, Heinemann, 1958) [Fr. orig., Esquisse d’une psychologie des classes sociales (1955)], 2.
processes of *enculturation*.¹³ Huyssen has suggested that ‘closely tied as it is to the ways a culture constructs and lives its temporality’, this realm of the memory faculty changes over time and makes remembering different today from yesterday, here from there.¹⁴ This study, following Halbwachs in his three books on memory as well as Aleida and Jan Assmann in their writings, explores territories on both sides of this hypothetical divide of the memory faculty. On the one hand, it acknowledges attempts to address aspects of the spatial framework of memory as constants in human cognition. These pertain to the general functioning of human memory, such as, for instance, how children learn to use the spatial representations of their childhood environment to structure and retrieve memories of the world and social relations, or how humans orient themselves by means of spatial representations. Such topics are today studied empirically by the social and natural sciences but are also integral to the theory of the communicative memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann). On the other hand, this study will look at assessments of culture-specific and historical variations of the collective memory, especially through the work of Halbwachs, Rossi, and Aleida and Jan Assmann.

Whereas readings in cognitive psychology, geography, and neuroscience have accompanied the development of the thesis, the theories themselves have not been employed in the argument. My study remains an interdisciplinary enterprise based in the humanities.

**History in memory**

In *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben* (1874) Friedrich Nietzsche addresses the need of every man and every people for certain knowledge of the past. History can offer that in three ways, he suggests. For the acting and striving man there exists a *monumental* kind of history, for the preserving and admiring man an *antiquarian* kind, and for the man that suffers and needs liberation there is the *critical* kind.

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¹³ Psychologist Merlin Donald argues that cognition and culture are in many ways mirror images. On the one hand, they limit themselves to knowledge in the minds of individuals. On the other, they share that knowledge, which it is possible to transmit across generations, in social and public domains. ‘Collectivity depends ultimately on individual capacity; but this is a reciprocal relationship; [in the course of human evolution] enculturation has become more and more important in setting the parameters of human capacity at the individual level’. M Donald, ‘Hominid Enculturation and Cognitive Evolution’, in C Renfrew & C Scarre (eds), *Cognition and Material Culture: the Archaeology of Symbolic Storage* (Cambridge, Oxbow Books, 1998), 11. Social psychologist and interdisciplinary memory scholar Harald Welzer argues that the brain is configured to adapt to social and cultural situations and it constantly develops, immersed as it is in social life. H Welzer, *Das kommunikative Gedächtnis: Eine Theorie der Erinnerung* (2002; 2nd edn, Munich, CH Beck, 2005), 117–18.

¹⁴ Huyssen, *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia*, 2. In this context I use cultural given as the corresponding term to Huyssen’s anthropological given.
If the man who wants to achieve something great needs the past at all he will master it through monumental history; who on the other hand likes to persist in the traditional and venerable will care for the past as an antiquarian historian; an only he who is oppressed by some present misery and wants to throw off the burden at all costs has a need for critical, that is judging and condemning history.  

Nietzsche’s three kinds of relations to history – one ideological and creative, one traditional and preserving, and one judging and condemning – return in different forms in subsequent models of history and social memory. With its concern for the relations with the past that individuals and societies enter into, rather than for the reconstruction of the past as such, the text has consequently been included as one of the classics in the theoretical development of theories of collective memory. The current study adopts this distinction in directing its attention to the social and cultural mechanisms that characterise how individuals and societies remember and enter into a relation with the past, not to whether the past that is conjured up is true or verifiable, or to the past as a kind of hypothetical realm that can be critically reassembled to become history. This thesis is not a history thesis and does not primarily address theories of history. However, ‘history’, as a term and as a concept, appears in most of the theories and discourses that I relate to. This section gives an overview of the different understandings that ‘history’ may take in the various parts of the thesis.

In an evocative passage Nietzsche describes the relation between the antiquarian and the city:

By tending with loving hands what has long survived he intends to preserve the conditions in which he grew up for those who will come after him – and so he serves life. … The history of the city becomes for him the history of his self; he understands the wall, the turreted gate, the ordinance of the town council, the national festival like an illustrated diary of his youth and finds himself, his strength, his diligence, his pleasure, his judgement, his folly and

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42 Also in the context of architectural history this text has recently been given prominence as an early and ‘impassioned critique of historicist culture’. B Bergdoll, *European Architecture 1750–1890*, Oxford History of Art (Oxford, OUP, 2000), 269.
Edifices

rudeness, in all of them. Here one could live, he says to himself, for here one can live and will be able to live, for we are tough and not to be uprooted over night. And so, with this ‘We’, he looks beyond the ephemeral, curious, individual life and feels like the spirit of the house, the generation, and the city. Occasionally he will greet the soul of his people as his own soul even across wide, obscuring and confusing centuries.45

The quote could illustrate Halbwachs’s description of the role the city architecture takes in the processes of collective memory. For the individual the houses become the supportive framework of three kinds of remembering. One aspect of what he calls autobiographical memory pertains to the self and his own life (‘… history of his self … his strength, his diligence, his pleasure, his judgement, his folly and rudeness …’). The individual memory is intermingled with the collective memory, the other aspect of the autobiographical memory. It refers to a reconstruction of the past and understanding in the present defined by the inscription of the individual in frameworks of thought defined by social groups he is embedded in, like language, time, and space (‘… with this “We”, he looks beyond the ephemeral, curious, individual life and feels like the spirit of the house, the generation, and the city …’). As a third kind, the historical memory covers his subjective and intersubjective understanding of the general history of his city or country, internalised conceptions of an external history that can be imagined but not remembered (‘The history of the city …; he understands the wall, the turreted gate, the ordinance of the town council, the national festival …’).

History, in Halbwachs’s writings on memory, does not have a prominent position, despite the many historic study cases that he brings into his writings in order to shed light onto social mechanisms of memory. Historic cases, it seems to me, are equated with cases of the present, at least in their position as study material, as material for scholarly analysis. Historiography, on the other hand, is viewed as society’s endeavour to construct a temporal frame of reference for collective use. Marc Bloch has pointed to the scepticism about the word ‘history’ in Halbwachs’s circles:

Even the sociologists of the Durkheim school make room for it. They do so, to be sure, only in order to relegate it to one poor corner of the sciences of man – a sort of secret dungeon in which, having first reserved for sociology all that

45 Nietzsche, Advantage and Disadvantage of History, 19.
appears to them susceptible of rational analysis, they shut up the human facts which they condemn as the most superficial and capricious of all. 46

*La Mémoire collective* is the book in which Halbwachs goes farthest in discussing the relation between history and collective memory. 47 In this passage Halbwachs distinguishes between two forms of history. One is written down in books and forms schematic descriptions of periods and chronological successions of events and dates. This written or *general history* is not supported by any group’s biological memory. It exists only in the form of artefacts, although available as mind-external frameworks for the group in its reconstruction of the past as well as for positioning the past of the self and of the group in relation to a wider frame of reference. Because general history is not bound to living people, Halbwachs sees it as essentially different from collective memory. Ideally, he argues, historians add detail to detail to form a whole in a total record of the past. In this way history is unitary.

The second form of history is the historical memory, the internalised general history, carried by the members of groups as internal frameworks of the mind. While the historical memory theoretically could take what Nietzsche refers to as monumental, antiquarian, or critical form, for each group and for each individual, in the discussion in *La Mémoire collective* Halbwachs does not go further in analysing its ideological implications. General history and historical memory exist for any person as an external and an internal framework, and it is to their structural influence on remembering that Halbwachs turns his attention. Hence, history is innocent, for it is only the schematic reconstruction of the past by historians, who attempt to create a fuller description of a unitary history. In this way he avoids treating the implications of how history may be used for ideological reasons in the collective memory.

It may be said, however, that in other parts of Halbwachs’s oeuvre on memory, he goes further in describing power structures and political uses of the past through the collective memory, although not referred to by the term ‘history’. Such studies include the chapter on religion and collective memory and a passage on the noble system of feudalism in *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* 48 and, to some degree, the discussion of the crusaders’

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establishment of altars and churches in the Holy Land to mark out the
topography of their creed.49

In the architectural discourse of the 1950s and 1960s, into which
Halbwachs’s ideas enter through the writings of Lynch and Rossi, ‘history’,
as the historians of the Modern Movement had defined the term, finds itself
under siege by practitioners and intellectuals alike. A construction of
architectural history by art historians like Sigfried Giedion and Nikolaus
Pevsner, serving to legitimise contemporary architectural practice and its
liberation from the past, is attacked and replacement conceptions of the past
are offered in the form of new definitions of ‘history’ and the reintroduction
of concepts like ‘tradition’, ‘culture’, and ‘memory’. With the Modern
Movement ‘history’ had been taken to justify principles of rational
architecture and urban planning, which in their comprehensive application in
the twentieth century had come to be perceived as a threat to the life
conditions in many cities. The break with the past needed to be mended
and the roots in tradition re-established, Ernesto Nathan Rogers argued. Others
likewise offered their new conceptions of architecture’s history and its
relation to the past, voices as different as Jane Jacobs, Robert Venturi, and
Manfredo Tafuri.

Rossi’s approach to history forms one idiosyncratic perspective. His use of
‘history’ and ‘collective memory’ acquires the status of structural elements in
his conception of the city. He does not allow the terms to be ideologically
loaded, and in this respect the approach resembles Halbwachs’s. The city,
Rossi explains, is a repository of the history that has played out there.
Consequently, history is closely linked to architecture. From one point of
view architecture is the trace of human activities, artefacts built over time.
Archaeologists, architectural historians, and urban historians could find
information in the material of the architecture. From a second point of view,
history studies the formation and structure of the city architecture. The
collective memory, on the other hand, Rossi describes with the consciousness
of the collective that makes up the city. It is a rational operation that
actualises and interprets history. In a similar fashion to Halbwachs, Rossi
avoids any analysis of power relations. Even in references to clearly
politically loaded examples, such as Haussmann’s reorganisation of Paris, he
neutralises the ideological implications with reference to the developments in
the city in the nineteenth century. Subscribing to Halbwachs’s analysis, Rossi
suggests that Haussmann’s plan ‘is one of the greatest successes ever …

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above all because its precise reflection of the urban evolution at that moment in history.  

Differently, Christine Boyer rereads Halbwachs and Rossi with ideological glasses. For her, ‘history’ is the public history that the ruling groups define and manifest in official monuments and in the collections of museums. Collective memory is its opposite: a different conception of the past circulated among dominated groups. With Boyer, ‘history’ and ‘collective memory’ are not descriptions of different forms of relations to the past that each individual and each group may entertain, but ideological polarities in a power struggle in society.

In their conceptualisation of cultural memory Aleida and Jan Assmann turn against the dichotomy between collective memory and history of Halbwachs, arguing that no history is completely devoid of memory work, that is, of interpretation, partiality, and identity. Instead they offer a perspectival model of cultural memory. On the one hand, the storage memory contains all kinds of traces of the past, heterogenic and contradictory, fragmentary and uninhabited. On the other, the functional memory represents the selection of those traces for the construction of meaning in the present, the inhabited. Inherent in this model are tools for the analysis of power relations; the specialists responsible for the selection of the canons of the functional memory – scholars, priests, politicians, etc. – stand in the service of power to define the past and supply the group with identity. This is the monumental history of Nietzsche, made operational for the discipline, the Church, or the nation. Aleida Assmann describes how the selection and even obliteration of areas of the past becomes a tool for legitimisation and suppression of oppositions in totalitarian regimes. Equally, for oppositional groups the storage memory could serve the construction of alternative narratives to critique and counteract oppression. Leaning on Halbwachs, Aleida and Jan Assmann replace the dichotomy of memory and history by the idea of inhabited and uninhabited memory. In this way, the general or written history (Halbwachs) cannot be considered neutral. Like the historical memory of the group, it could be selected, inhabited, and employed in its active construction of the past.

Ideology and politics are main objects of analysis in contemporary memory studies, concerned as they are with struggles over what versions of the past should be accepted. If Halbwachs’s theory of social memory did not assess power relations, his detailed studies nonetheless came to have an impact on recent scholarship that does. With the model of communicative

50 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 146.
memory and cultural memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann) the tools for analysis are sharpened.

History, in an architectural memory study like this one, is not defined as something opposite or different from memory (although it is clearly not the same, conceptually). Memory theories and concepts provide the lenses through which this study sees the world to be examined; history appears in several places, but then as specific distinctions, either with reference to the writing of history (political, artistic, architectural) as an academic discipline or to the contents of the history that resulted from such activities, often as it is known by societal groups. The theoretical framework for studies of architecture and memory that I propose, through its system of concepts, will reveal a multitude of relationships that an individual or a group may form to the past by means of architecture, several more than Nietzsche’s monumental, antiquarian, and critical kinds of history. These implications of such relationships, inherent in the different concepts, are of highest relevance. Whether they are denoted by terms like ‘history’ or ‘memory’ or by something else is a less intriguing question.

Objectives

In her article ‘Travelling Memory’, published in 2011, Erll addresses an imminent ‘third phase’ of cultural memory studies.51 The first phase in the early twentieth century, she explains, saw protagonists like Halbwachs, Warburg, Benjamin, and Bartlett. A second started around the time of the publication of Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire and has continued into the early twenty-first century (compare Winter’s third phase of memory generations mentioned above). While some see the demise of memory studies, Erll argues that, for the future, ‘we cannot afford the luxury of not studying memory’ if we want to understand the central motives of some of the pressing issues: terrorism, Islam and the West, wars, the rise of China and India, global warming, etc.52 The second phase, Erll argues, has been characterised by the study of the sites of national memory, following in the footsteps of Nora and failing to see the nation as anything but an ethnically homogeneous society. She calls for studies of memory that travel across and beyond nations and that take on transcultural and transnational perspectives. Rather than following the line of singular cultural identities, in her view provided by

51 Erll employs a broader definition of ‘cultural memory’ than Aleida and Jan Assmann, subsuming under the term the various notions of social memory, collective memory (Halbwachs), and communicative and cultural memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann).
Halbwachs’s conceptualisation of the frameworks of memory, Erll argues to focus on the movement of symbols across time and space in the spirit of Warburg and his study of the transmission of gestures of emotion from pagan antiquity to the Renaissance and into the present, as he demonstrates in the Mnemosyne atlas. ‘What we are dealing with, therefore’, she says, ‘is not so much (and perhaps not even metaphorically) “sites” of memory, lieux de mémoire, but rather the “travels” of memory, les voyages or les mouvements de mémoire’. 53 Taking as its premise that the production of cultural memory is in constant motion, Erll argues that the third phase of memory studies should be the investigation of ‘the paths which certain stories, rituals and images have taken; and not so much by echoing what social groups may claim as their roots: the alleged origins of a cultural memory’. 54

Such a prophecy of future memory studies and rejection of studies of the attachment of cultural memory to places could be read as a disapproval of a study of the spatial frameworks of memory like that of this thesis. What can architecture, place, and landscape – by Erll and others seen to epitomise the antithesis of the transience of physical and temporal movement – offer studies of travelling memory? But what are journeys if not movements from place to place? Also, when in motion memory needs to temporarily settle down somewhere to in fact work as memory figures, as Jan Assmann has pointed out. 55 Abstract thought, at least so Halbwachs has taught us, needs to be localised in places, real or imaginary, as well as in the carriers of groups and points in time to be upheld and passed down. 56 In memory studies place is often regarded as a permanent and stable feature of culture. But when science has replaced the Euclidean three-dimensional space with a four-dimensional space-time continuum, and thinkers like Leibniz since long have asserted the character of space as entia mentalia, a mental entity existing in the mind of the observer, how could the humanities disassociate space from time and thinking minds? Ruth Klüger has searched for a term to denote a place in a particular period, for a particular group of people. A concentration camp is not the same for the interned when it is in operation as for the visitors.

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53 ibid., 11. Michael Rothberg has recently put forward a similar perspective. With the concept multidirectional memory he rethinks collective memory in multicultural and transnational contexts and in the malleable discursive space of the public sphere in an attempt ‘to draw attention to the dynamic transfers that take place between diverse places and times during the act of remembrance’. When I refer to travelling architecture and les mouvements de mémoire later in the thesis I also refer to Rothberg’s perspectives. M Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory (Stanford, SUP, 2009), 11.


to it once it has become a memorial site: ‘Landscape, seascape – there should be a word like *timescape* to indicate the nature of a place in time, that is, at a certain time, neither before not after’. 57 Similarly, this study points to the multifarious spatial frameworks of memory that connect to the singularity of one physical place, over time as well as in relation to the plurality of groups. While the characteristics and associations of the spatial frameworks change with alterations to the memory of the group that uses it, the frameworks also differ between groups. In chapters one and two I will illustrate how, with Halbwachs, the concepts of space come to differ between individuals of a group and between the group and other groups. In chapters two, four, and five I will address different configurations that the spatial framework of memory may establish with the physical environment. I demonstrate in chapter five, with the help of Aleida and Jan Assmann, that the same place may provide various kinds of spatial frameworks of memory, for the same group and at the same time, fulfilling different social and cultural needs. In chapter six, in the particular context of the dispute over the bombed buildings in the Government Quarter in Oslo, I will point to how the spatial images change due to physical changes to the buildings, media exposure, and the interchange of ideas in the public sphere.

This thesis argues that architecture, place, and landscape are *not* permanent or stable features of culture. I leave out the consideration that the materiality of architecture and landscape constantly changes, from one material state to the next, regardless if it is left untouched or if it is ‘preserved’. What is important for this proposition is that the mental representations of a given place only exist in plural and demonstrate a transient rather than a fixed character. Further, considering the way in which the use of places as frameworks for the cultural memory takes after and influences the practice of other groups in similar sites in other places, one may ask if, indeed, architecture and the spatial frameworks of memory themselves do not travel? Following in the spirit of Erll’s travelling memory, I will propose a travelling architecture as part of an alternative approach to any perspective of static places of memory. Just because the materiality of architecture may appear singular, solid, and permanent, it does not mean that its image, in a multitude of minds and groups, and in different periods, can be reduced to a singular and stable representation. The thesis contributes to shifting the focus from the singular materiality of space to a plurality of spatial construct(ion)s in memory. The title reflects this: *Edifices* (and not *edifice*) refers to the plural representations of one place and one architectural object. *Edifices* (rather than

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buildings) further points to the ambiguity of architecture as, on the one hand, constructions of form and material and, on the other, structures of thought. Mental representations of architecture, the spatial framework of memory, give shape to the materiality of the environment, but the opposite is just as true. As a consequence of this line of thought, built architecture can be regarded as a representation of certain collective mental images of space and not only the instigator of its representations in people’s memory. It is in the dynamic interplay between the former and the latter, this thesis argues, that a cultural definition of an architectural artefact can be found. No architecture is neutral; it shapes and is shaped by the interests of groups.

**Approach**

Architecture, as a profession as well as in academia, spans several areas of knowledge. Aesthetic, social, cultural, technological, and economic concerns need to be taken into account, and theory from the humanities as well as from the social and natural sciences can be found in the syllabi of architecture schools. It suggests a multidisciplinary character of studies and research in architecture, both for the discipline seen as a whole and for each student and scholar. With it comes a potential for interdisciplinarity. Multidisciplinarity, according to Julie Thompson Klein, can be understood as an encyclopaedic endeavour, for example through side-by-side collections of different disciplinary perspectives. She argues that only when ‘integration and interaction become proactive, the line between multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity is crossed’. Literature from outside of the discipline is commonplace in architecture, and some of it has been taken up in the informal canon of architectural thought. It is questionable, though, with reference to Thompson Klein’s definition, if theories that have been made native to architectural thinking really make architectural research interdisciplinary. I do not necessarily believe so.

By taking the step to study memory in architecture, as an architect it is inevitable to turn to other disciplines, discourses, and scholars than those of the theories of architecture, regardless if one wants to explore neurological, phenomenological, social, or cultural aspects. The stock of scholarship on memory in architecture is limited and often restricts itself to perspectives established in the trade and the discipline. This problem is by no means

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59 In an architect’s bookshelf such assimilated literature could be represented by the likes of historian Frances Yates, literary critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin, geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, philosophers Gaston Bachelard, Ed Casey, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and sociologist Henri Lefebvre.
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limited to architecture. Memory studies, humanistic and scientific, have over the last three decades become an interdisciplinary concern. The awareness of the limitations of any discipline with regard to addressing such a multifaceted notion as ‘memory’ is evident in most areas of the humanities, in social and political sciences, in geography, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. To transport perspectives across disciplinary borders, from science to the humanities and back, seems beneficial, and even necessary.

This study finds its contextualisation in a multi- and interdisciplinary landscape. The theoretical protagonists brought together here represent disciplinary points of departure in sociology (Halbwachs), architecture (Lynch, Rossi), literature studies (Aleida Assmann), Egyptology (Jan Assmann), and history (Yates, Nora), but common for them seems to be that they have transcended any disciplinary circumscriptions in their own work. To follow the paths of concepts in an attempt to understand their lineage has meant to travel from mnemonic techniques over logic and philosophy to sociology, architecture, and history, or from biology via art history to Egyptology and literature studies.

Also in their own work they represent an interdisciplinary approach. In addition to references to a wide range of theories from philosophy, psychology, and sociology, Halbwachs makes use of autobiographical accounts by people like Chateaubriand or Goethe to illustrate phenomena and support his arguments. Frequently, he also recounts his own memories, inducing general laws from the reflections on such instances. Lynch surveys a comprehensive literature from anthropology, psychology, and sociology, Rossi borrows from geographers, sociologists, and historians, and Aleida and Jan Assmann turn to a plethora of humanistic theories as well as to art and literature. Halbwachs’s and Aleida and Jan Assmann’s turn to autobiographical accounts to complement academic theories may represent an intriguing strategy for concretising theoretical postulations. In the context of this study, where I aim to shift the focus from the physicality of architecture to its forms in memory, we may ask if the treatment of autobiographical records on a par with scholarly theories may contribute to a better conceptualisation of the architecture of the mind.

In my work I have considered Mieke Bal’s idea of the travelling concept as a useful model for the study of the spatial framework of memory and related conceptualisations. Bal argues that concepts can be miniature theories which can be brought in [from other disciplines] as an alternative for the idea of coverage. Within interdisciplinary settings, coverage – of the classics, of all
periods or ‘centuries,’ of all major theories used within a field – is no longer an option. Nor is ‘sloppy scholarship.’

Conce

cepts travel, she insists, ‘between disciplines, between individual scholars, between historical periods, and between geographically dispersed academic communities’, and the scholar can track these movements and assess their differing qualities ‘before, during, and after each “trip”’. Also, if I, for the most part, have attempted to stay within a loosely defined region of the humanities and the social sciences, the itineraries of the concepts have occasionally led the thesis into areas of the natural sciences. It has not been my intention, however, to perform a fully integrative interdisciplinary study.

To find your way in a multidisciplinary landscape requires patience. While it may be fairly straightforward to follow references from one text to another until one has mapped the important voices of a discourse, it may be harder to identify discourses or concepts that one does not know about. Also, concepts do not always allow themselves to be studied in isolation from the field around them, and so I have found myself studying the wider contexts of concepts I have investigated, fields as diverse as spatial cognition, museum studies, and diaspora studies. The different discussions in the thesis, therefore, present themselves as analyses and definitions of concepts as much as historiographies of an interrelated group of cultural concepts.

Underlying the development of the argument of the thesis are three aims that concern academia and the architectural profession. First, I want to expose the concerns of memory in the theory and history of architecture, subsuming under the term also related fields like urban planning, landscape architecture, interior architecture, and cultural heritage – to humanistic memory studies. Architecture’s engagement with the built environment on levels of morphology, materiality, and planning processes could benefit the more social, societal, and cultural studies of space in the humanities and social sciences. Exponents like Lynch and Rossi are in this way introduced to readers who are not native to architecture.

Second, the study attempts to reinforce and advocate a flow of influence from the interdisciplinary discourse on memory into the theory and history of architecture. Theories that have previously made their way into the architectural discourse, like those of Halbwachs, will be brought in anew, this time understood and applied differently. Other theories, which previously have attracted little or no attention, are introduced, like those of Aleida and Jan Assmann. This thesis travels out from architecture and back again. As a

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61 ibid., 24.
result of the engagement with memory studies in this thesis I hope to contribute to establishing a platform for interdisciplinary memory studies in architecture, a mirador for outlooks into foreign, disciplinary landscapes and likewise a beacon for the signalling of things architectural.

Third, I want to promote a humanistic orientation among practicing architects and planners. In the design- and technology-oriented profession, cultural and historical awareness sometimes seems to be considered extraneous. With the thesis I argue for the relevance of cultural and historical perspectives in the shaping of the physical environments to complement advancements towards market adaption and bureaucratisation. History and memory studies ought not only to remain the concern of heritage conservators and scholars. They should come to the forefront of architectural thinking and production. The neglect by the Modern Movement of such issues contributed to a legitimacy crisis in the 1960s. I believe it is vital that the profession of architecture develops an increased cultural responsibility to avoid ending up in a similar situation. In contemporary practice critical humanistic awareness should be radical.

The analysis of the debate on the Government Quarter in Oslo
Chapter six turns in a different direction than the previous chapters. In it I assess the ongoing debate that concerns the future state of the buildings in the Government Quarter in Oslo after a bomb damaged them on 22 July 2011. I will apply the theoretical perspectives I develop in the thesis to the material in order to demonstrate their usefulness.

I have used the Norwegian media database Retriever to identify and get access to feature articles, interviews, letters to the editor, etc. in the daily and weekly printed press. I have also relied on journal articles, books, and official documents and reports published on the web pages of the government, especially those by FAD and Statsbygg. To some degree, I have also referred to spoken statements on radio and television, but my impression is that they are most often less elaborate than written statements. The discussion limits itself to the Norwegian discourse and almost all sources are written or formulated in Norwegian. All translations from Norwegian are mine and where they exist I have used the official English names of organisations etc.

The analysis is further based on my own experience as a contributor to and observer of the debate. Over the course of the first half year after 22 July, I

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63 The chapter was written and edited in the period November 2012 to March 2013.

Different from the other chapters of the thesis chapter six includes several illustrations. They are brought in to help create an understanding of the architecture of the Government Quarter and related issues for readers who have no previous knowledge of the site and to remind those who already know it. Thus, they could be said to help build a spatial framework in the mind of the reader, which can be employed as a set of mental places, \textit{loci}, for memorising the different arguments that I will make in relation to the buildings.\footnote{This study covers English and German, and, to some extent, French literature on Halbwachs.}

**Existing scholarship**

At the time of writing, and to the best of my knowledge, no exhaustive reviews of Halbwachs’s oeuvre, with regard to issues of space or the spatial framework of memory, seem to exist.\footnote{F Paizs, ‘Urban Planning after Terrorism. The Case of Oslo’, M.Sc. thesis, Technische Universität, Berlin, 2012, esp. 20–48.} However, several valuable assessments of selected aspects do exist, often in the form of journal articles or book sections. Despite a widespread interest in Halbwachs and the theory
of the collective memory, the spatial framework of memory has been studied only to a limited degree, even seen in relation to the comparable subconcept ‘the social framework of memory’ (le cadre social de la mémoire). In the following I will summarise what I consider the most important of the existing reviews of the term. The existing assessments can, for the most part, be found in sociocultural memory studies and Halbwachs studies, some also in sociology and geography. Other assessments can be found in the history and theory of architecture; these will all be addressed in chapters three and four.

In Mémoire et société, published in 1987, Gérard Namer (1928–2010) reviews Halbwachs’s theory of memory, including the aspects of space. He leaves aside all that is said about space and the spatial framework in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and focuses exclusively on spatial matters in La Topographie légendaire and La Mémoire collective. In relation to the former, he stresses the dual nature of space as a framework for the memory: on the one hand, as an internal representation, on the other, as physical buildings and immovable locations, both contributing to the localisation and unification of disparate memory contents. The distinction, as I will demonstrate in chapter two, in relation to Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, is what I consider to be essential to the understanding of frameworks in general and to the spatial framework of memory in particular. In chapter five, by means of reflection on the theories of Aleida and Jan Assmann, I will argue for the distinction between mind-internal and mind-external frameworks, in this manner explicating the Halbwachsian ruminations assessed by Namer.

In his analysis of La Mémoire collective Namer dwells on the construction of social and virtual structures of legal and economic space, which he regards as the truly novel aspects of Halbwachs’s thought. The notables of memory, for instance, notaries and their professional milieu, become the centre point for a society’s collective memory. As an administrator of a spatial order that is legitimised by the group consensus, Namer summarises Halbwachs, the notable guarantees ownership and control over land, of physical space, for the members of the group. I will return to this discussion in Notables of memory in chapter two.

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71 The title of Namer’s book is the title that Maurice Halbwachs’s La Mémoire collective was prepublished under in L’Année sociologique. Cf. the discussion in Editions of the works by Maurice Halbwachs in this chapter.

72 G Namer, Mémoire et société (Paris, Méridiens Klincksieck, 1987), 115–24. In some respects Namer’s reading differs from mine. I argue that for Halbwachs the spatial framework is primarily a mental order that societal groups deposit in material space. Out of these deposits the same group as well as others build or revise their spatial frameworks of memory. Cf. ch. 2, esp. Social morphology and Dual nature of space.
In his book *History as an Art of Memory* historian Patrick Hutton has looked at the role of space in Halbwachs’s three books on memory. Places of memory in Halbwachs’s thinking, Hutton argues, are not repositories of individual memory images. Instead, they enable the individual reconstruction of the past by their status as accumulated landmarks and points of convergence for social frameworks of the collective memory. He distinguishes between habit and recollection in Halbwachs’s theory:

In habit, we bear memories forward unreflectively as commonplaces. In recollection, we reconstruct the past retrospectively by localizing specific images in relationships to these well-formed places of memory. The reciprocity between these two moments of memory is dynamic and ongoing. Places of memory, therefore, are like crossroads where habits of mind and particular recollections encounter and reshape one another.

Hutton’s formulations do not clearly indicate if the places referred to are physical or mental, maybe suggesting they are interrelated amalgamates. He does not explicitly distinguish between physical space and a spatial framework of memory. Nonetheless, he conveys a distinction through his suggestion that

Like the mnemonists of the old [the practitioners of the art of memory], Halbwachs suggested that memory is a problem of mental geography in which the past is mapped in our minds according to its most unforgettable places … Halbwachs’s *La Topographie légendaire* is a study of how the memorialist transposes a mental map onto a topographical plane, where it becomes a visible landscape of memory.

His introduction to Halbwachs’s thinking on space in the collective memory includes a ten-page review of *La Topographie légendaire*. He suggests that Halbwachs, who had been ‘the sociologist of collective memory in *Les Cadres sociaux* in the 1920s becomes Halbwachs the historian of commemoration in *La Topographie* by the 1940s’. The study he regards as an inaugural model for historical studies of commemorative landscapes and of the history of tradition.

Despite the many references to *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* Hutton uses the reference to the art of memory to distinguish between mental and

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74 I will return to Halbwachs’s notion of landmarks in *Collective landmarks* in chapter two.
75 Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory*, 79.
76 ibid., 80.
77 ibid., 73–90.
78 ibid., 77.
physical locations in Halbwachs’s writings. Hutton thus makes the suggestion that Halbwachs could be considered to stand in the tradition of the art of memory. My intuition, after having dealt with Halbwachs’s writings for some time, similarly tells me that he may have been knowledgeable of at least some of the basic principles of place-bound remembering in the art of memory. I will return to this conjecture in the section on Leibniz in chapter one. Hutton’s treatment of Halbwachs remains a valuable introduction to some of the central aspects of the spatial framework of memory as well as to a wider contextualisation of Halbwachs’s work in relation to later scholarship on architecture, memory, and history.

Another thorough critique in French of space in Halbwachs’s thinking has been offered more recently by philosopher Jean-Pierre Cléro as a supplementary chapter in the 2008 edition of La Topographie légendaire. Central to Cléro’s argument is the Leibnizian legacy in Halbwachs’s conception of spatial cognition and memory. With reference to Leibniz’s understanding of space as an entia mentalia, a mental entity, rather than a Cartesian space, Cléro points to the limitation of regarding space as a physical entity and thus a percept. At all times, larger spatial entities, buildings or cities, must be conceived by the help of the spatial framework of memory. Only a fragment of the total conception of the environment can be perceived at a time, leaving the rest of the conception to be constructed out of existing concepts. One consequence of such thinking, Cléro suggests, is that physical cities where we can set foot are just as fictional as cities of the imagination, like those of Babylon, Balbek, or Héliopolis. Larger entities of space are mental constructions and constructs, entia mentalia. I will look closer at his critique in the section Leibnizian influence in chapter one.

David Middleton and Steven Brown have written an elaborated summary of Halbwachs’s theory of memory, with special attention to space and the localisation of remembering. In their argument it is clear that the spatial framework of memory, like the other frameworks of collective memory, are

79 Hutton uses Yates and the art of memory as a point of departure for tracing the mnemonic techniques into modern age. In his 1987 article ‘The Art of Memory Reconceived’ he sets out to ‘inquire into [the] revisioning of the art of memory since the eighteenth century. It will search for correspondences between the art of memory as it was practiced in the rhetorical tradition that culminated in the Renaissance and the use of memory as a technique of soul-searching in the Romantic tradition of psychology that culminates in psychoanalysis’. P H Hutton, ‘The Art of Memory Reconceived: From Rhetoric to Psychoanalysis’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 48/3 (1987), 373. Hutton’s proposal that the essential principles of the art of memory continue in the history discipline forms the basis of History as an Art of Memory (1993), a book with which he aims to be ‘raising memory in the midst of history’. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, xv.


81 ibid., 45*.
mental constructs, ‘a series of images of the past and a set of relationships that specify how these images are to be ordered’.

Communities, they argue, let the spatial framework of the group memory inscribe itself into the physical space that the group occupies. Thus, they bring forward the aspect of territorialisation of the physical environment by the collective memory. In my opinion, this dynamic of the interrelation between the spatial framework of one group’s memory and the physical setting is of greatest importance to the thesis of Halbwachs, expressed in different forms in all of his three books on memory. However, the interrelation goes two ways. Not only does the spatial framework of memory alter the physical environment; the built or natural environment in the first place gives rise to a spatial framework of memory, as its topography is internalised and acted upon by the group.

The other side of the territorialisation of memory, or the investment by memory in objects and places, which Middleton and Brown point to in Halbwachs’s theory, comes to view when the material counterpart of the framework disappears. In cases of displacement of people, destruction in war, or the demolition and redevelopment of city areas, for instance, the perceptual supports for the framework are destroyed, forcing the group to more actively sustain a spatial framework of memory that cannot anymore rely on an external representation of the framework. I will return to this aspect of Halbwachs’s thinking at different places in this study.

The review by Middleton and Brown of space and the spatial framework of memory brings out some of the most relevant aspects for those with a concern for the built environment, like architects and urban planners, who wish to study Halbwachs. Because of this, and because of its contextualisation within the larger theory of memory, their critique offers a concise, and recommendable, introduction to Halbwachs and the spatial framework of memory.

The article ‘Memory of Places and Places of Memory’, published by Gérôme Truc in 2012, differs from the other assessments in that it applies Halbwachs’s thinking to discussions on contemporary commemoration at sites of terrorism, thereby displaying motives similar to those of this thesis. It gives a detailed introduction to space and the spatial framework in the collective memory. With reference to passages in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Truc points to Halbwachs’s distinction between vivid memory images of space and accumulatively acquired and abstract spatial

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frameworks. For Truc this is the difference between two different kinds of spatial frameworks, the one corresponding to a familiar physical environment, the other to a robust notion of a distant place or monument. In his words, it is the difference between ‘memory of places’ and ‘places of memory’. In this thesis I will argue for a different reading, suggesting that the spatial framework of memory’s mind-internal notion of space is employed by the memory, regardless if the person is present in the environment or is in a different location. Only by activating the representation in memory can an external environment be recognised as a place one has seen before.

Truc contributes with a thorough introduction to Halbwachs’s thoughts on space and, most importantly, gives his theories a prominent place in relation to contemporary studies of commemorative places in sociology, anthropology, and history. As such, the article offers a plethora of references to scholars and discourses to which Halbwachs should be considered as one of the pioneers. I will return to Truc’s article in chapter six when I address the dispute over the Government Quarter in Oslo.

Separate from scholarship on general aspects of space in Halbwachs’s writings on memory, the concept of topographie from La Topographie légendaire has been very influential in the humanities, especially in history. It has its own entry in the encyclopaedia Gedächtnis und Erinnerung, where it is defined as ‘Space, which makes the contents of the collective memory experienceable’. Nora’s notion of les lieux de mémoire is commonly regarded as an elaboration of Halbwachs’s La Topographie légendaire, despite the fact that Nora only mentions Halbwachs en passant in his work. Tilmann Robbe argues convincingly that Halbwachs’s study is a central influence for Nora in his conception of ‘sites’, understood in a figurative sense, with which the nation’s most significant symbols and memories are associated. Jan Assmann suggests that there is a straight line from Halbwachs’s studies of the places of memory in the Holy Land to Nora and the lieux de mémoire, and

Dessingué maintains that Halbwachs, with *La topographie légendaire*, gives birth to the concept of *lieux de mémoire*. 87 Hutton is even bolder, stating that ‘Acknowledging the significance of Halbwachs’s work directly, Nora follows his method in working backward from the present – upstream if you will – to inventory the many traditions that have enshrined the French national memory’. 88 This thesis, however, will pursue the study of Nora’s *lieux* only as a central reference in humanistic memory studies and for its implication for the writings of Aleida Assmann (see chapter five). Because of the comprehensive scholarship that has dealt with such sites of memory, an in-depth investigation in this context is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Shorter introductions to the Halbwachsian conceptualisations of space and the spatial framework of memory have also appeared. Of the French contributions can be mentioned the nuanced introduction to the collective memory by Jean-Christophe Marcel and Laurent Mucchielli, which reviews a wide range of Halbwachs’s writings and gives an introduction to Halbwachs’s conception of space, among other aspects, not only in the three books on memory but also in other texts, especially in *Morphologie sociale*. 89 English assessments include Paul Connerton’s 90 and Suzanne Vromen’s. 91 German evaluations include Jan Assmann’s, 92 Dietmar Wetzel’s, 93 and that of Wolfgang Grünberg and Anna Körs. 94 There is also one Hungarian review of Halbwachs’s thinking, which has been translated into English. 95

88 Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory*, 88.  
93 D J Wetzel, *Maurice Halbwachs* (Konstanz, UVK, 2009), 65, 69–76. Wetzel predominantly treats space in *La Topographie légendaire*.  
94 W Grünberg & A Körs, “‘Symbolkirchen’ as Bridges or Boundary Stones in a Merging Europe”, in S Bergmann (ed), *Theology in Built Environments* (New Brunswick, Transaction, 2009), 84–87.  
Editions, translations, languages

The major works of Halbwachs were originally published in French. Aldo Rossi published in Italian and Aleida and Jan Assmann’s main titles first appeared in German. The following will introduce the study’s selection and handling of source material: the choice of works, editions employed, and English translations. I will also discuss principles for dealing with the different languages as well as give an introduction to terminology.

Editions of the works by Maurice Halbwachs

Halbwachs published widely, often on issues of space and the city. This thesis does not attempt to cover all aspects of his theories on space, but focuses on the conception of space in the theory of the collective memory, especially seen through the lens of the spatial framework of memory. Three texts by Halbwachs are selected for the analysis. They constitute his major works on memory.


In the same year that Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire appeared Halbwachs started the preparations for the topic of La Topographie légendaire. Between 1925 and 1927, and again from 1935, he systematically prepared lectures on topics from the New Testament, the testimonies of pilgrims, etc. In 1927, and again in 1939, he travelled to Palestine. Presses

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Universitaires de France (PUF) published the book in 1941. A second edition, based on the same original text, was published by PUF in 1971 with a preface by Fernand Dumont and a bibliography. This thesis will rely on the recent edition, prepared by Marie Jaisson and published by PUF in 2008. It is based on and paginated like the widely referenced 1971 edition, but it excludes the preface and bibliography. Typographical errors are corrected and the present edition is supplemented with five essays elaborating various issues of Halbwachs and the concerns of La Topographie légendaire, including the earlier mentioned article by Cléro on space in Halbwachs’s work. It also includes a dossier on Halbwachs as well as supplementary material on La Topographie légendaire, such as photographs, a map, and four indexes to the publication.

Directly after the publication of Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Halbwachs also started to work on the manuscript for La Mémoire collective that would not appear until after his death. It was initiated as a sequel to Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and would partly respond to some of the criticism of the latter. Namer argues that it is not a continuation of his reasoning in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, but the opposite of it and its complement. Halbwachs produced and edited four manuscripts over a period of twenty years from 1925 to 1944. The manuscript of 1944, probably intended for publication, but not in a completed state, was first published posthumously in 1947 in L’Année sociologique under the title ‘Mémoire et société’. It would be known, however, under the title it had when reissued as a separate publication in 1950: La Mémoire collective. Maurice Halbwachs’s sister Jeanne Alexandre, née Halbwachs, and Georges Gurvitch prepared the publication. The first chapter, which had been published separately in Revue philosophiques in 1939, was excluded. Subtitles to the chapters, which had not been originally intended, were added.

101 ibid., 168.
104 ibid., 239–40.
105 ibid., 253. In her notice introducing the 1950 publication of La Mémoire collective Halbwachs’s sister Jeanne Alexandre points to that Halbwachs, over the years of editing, neither revised the overall structure, nor polished the style or supplemented the manuscript with an introduction and a conclusion. J Alexandre, ‘Avertissement’, in M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective (Paris, PUF, 1950), [i].
and passages that the editors called ‘too unaccomplished’ (trop inachevés) were omitted, accounting to about thirty pages.\textsuperscript{109} It does not consider the various versions of the manuscript. A second, revised edition appeared in 1968 on PUF. In 1997 a critical edition appeared on Albin Michel, prepared by Namer in collaboration with Jaisson and had the title La Mémoire collective under which the book had become known. The excluded chapter, ‘La mémoire collective chez les musiciens’, was reintroduced as the first chapter. The subtitles were removed; the same applied to typographical changes made by the earlier editors. The omitted passages were brought back into the text. Chapter 5, ‘La mémoire collective et l’espace’, the most relevant for this study, represents approximately seven pages. The last insertion extends the conclusion from less than two pages to more than five, compared to the 1950 edition. 189 variations of the text in the different manuscripts were inserted as notes on the pages; 45 of those concern the chapter on space. Namer says of the first critical edition that it is as complete as possible with regard to variations of the set of manuscripts available.\textsuperscript{110} This study will use the 1997 critical edition for reference.

Translations of the works by Maurice Halbwachs

One reason for the limited concern with the term spatial framework of memory in the English-speaking field of memory studies seems to be that Halbwachs’s texts have only in part been translated into English. I will introduce the various complications that concern the English translations, as these are the reason why I will rely on the French texts in this study and, consequently, my own translations of original quotations.

Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire exists only in an abbreviated English translation. The 1952 edition appeared in 1992 as ‘The Social Frameworks of Memory’ in Coser’s anthology On Collective Memory at the University of Chicago Press.\textsuperscript{111} Whereas the last four chapters are translated in the full, the first four, which cover 145 pages in the first French edition, are condensed into thirteen pages.\textsuperscript{112} In total, only about half of the original text has been translated. The omitted sections in chapter three include some of Halbwachs’s main elaborations of the frameworks of the collective memory,\textsuperscript{113}
including some of the central discussions of the spatial framework of memory. Some parts of the omissions with a reference to space and the city have been translated into English in Marot’s *Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory*. Because of its title, *On Collective Memory*, Coser’s anthology has also been mistaken for the translation of *La Mémoire collective*. Of *La Topographie légendaire* only the concluding chapter of ten in the first 1941 edition has been translated. It is included as ‘The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land’ in Coser’s *On Collective Memory*. The short translated text has been mistaken for the whole original book. While most of his theoretical reflections are summarised in the final chapter, there are also valuable reflections in other parts of the book, especially in the introduction that outlines the objectives of the study.

A full translation of the 1950 publication of *La Mémoire collective* was published as *The Collective Memory* in 1980. It was rendered into English by Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter. An excerpt from the translation has appeared in *Theories of Memory: A Reader*, and another in *The Collective Memory Reader*. The *Collective Memory* has been mistaken for the translation of *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*. John Sutton argues that inadequate translations are one of the reasons for the critique of Halbwachs’s concepts as vague and for the ‘ongoing and damaging lack of contact between the cognitive and the social sciences’ on the topic of Halbwachs. The editors of the *Collective Memory Reader* have pointed to the incomplete English translations of Halbwachs’s original texts as well as to the lack of full-length critical studies of his works in English. They have also pointed to the lack of English translations of recent French and German scholarship on Halbwachs. Furthermore, even if the limited

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114 Marot, *Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory*, 30–32.
115 Dessingué, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Memory and Forgetting’, 172–73.
120 Sutton, ‘Remembering’, 224.
121 Olick, et al., ‘Introduction’. 25. This thesis supports their argument, displaying references to numerous German and French studies of Halbwachs but fewer to English.
translations could explain the limited number of studies of the spatial framework of memory, it would not explain why there is so little interest in the spatial framework, also by French and German scholars, who have the full texts at their disposal.\textsuperscript{123}

Because of the variable extent to which the texts have been translated and the use of a simpler language than in the original, in particular of the translation of \textit{La Mémoire collective}, I will refer to the French original texts throughout the thesis. All translations from French are mine and any incorrect rendering or misinterpretation is my responsibility. The French original quotations have not been included for comparison in the footnotes to avoid increasing the size of the study unnecessarily. Yet, I have included the original wordings of specific terms, phrases, and concepts, where appropriate, for comparison and better understanding. The three French editions used for reference are readily available in bookshops and libraries for anyone who should wish to compare with the original. Those who have previously read Halbwachs in English translation may react to some of the translations. Often cited passages appear in different guise in this context, especially those from \textit{La Mémoire collective}. For the sake of clarity in the argumentation I have opted for literal translations rather than idiomatic, where there was a choice, gaining in the resemblance with the original style of Halbwachs, but maybe losing in eloquence. I will attempt to compensate for the many omissions in the existing English translation of \textit{Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire} by being generous in my quoting from the French original, demonstrating the complexity and detail of Halbwachs’s thinking on space, aspects of which have been overlooked or neglected in previous attempts to review and apply his theory.

With regard to the central terminology of Halbwachs, the term ‘collective memory’ has established itself as the translation of ‘\textit{mémoire collective}’, leaving aside the different connotations of the term in different discourses. Similarly, ‘\textit{cadre}’ has been established as ‘framework’ in English, giving the ‘social’, ‘temporal’, and ‘spatial framework of memory’. The English translations of Halbwachs’s three books on memory all consistently refer to ‘collective memory’ and the ‘frameworks of memory’. I will follow this established practice. In the recent English translations of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s main works, the German ‘\textit{Rahmen}’ – Assmann’s translation of

\textsuperscript{123}German publications include, but are not restricted to, full translations of the three books on memory:
‘cadre’ – has alternately been translated into ‘framework’ and ‘frame’. The inconsistency may limit the reader’s possibility of spotting the specific Halbwachsian concept behind the term.

The works and translations of Kevin Lynch and Aldo Rossi

Aldo Rossi’s L’architettura della città first appeared on Marsilio in 1966, in the same series as the Italian translation of Lynch’s The Image of the City. Subsequent Italian editions appeared in 1970, 1973, and 1978, the last of which supplied the book with many new illustrations and references and included several forewords from different Italian and foreign editions. In 1995, in collaboration with Rossi, the book was re-edited, removing forewords, illustrations, and added citations. The 1995 edition was reissued by Quodlibet in 2011 and complemented with a bibliography as well as an index of places and architectural works as well as one of names.

An English translation, based on the fourth Italian edition from 1978, appeared as The Architecture of the City on MIT Press in 1982. Paperback prints of that edition are still for sale at the time of writing. I regret that my non-existent proficiency in Italian has meant that I have had to rely on the English edition. In some cases, where appropriate, I have provided the original wordings, in the same manner as for Halbwachs. For the main concepts I will refer to the Italian terms in the 2011 edition. The impossibility of studying the Italian original is admittedly a weakness. Without training in Italian, though, I can observe that shorter passages in the Italian original simply have been omitted in the English edition. Because of the main emphasis on Halbwachs in this thesis, and since the study of Rossi deals with the historiography and conceptual evolution of Halbwachs’s theory, I have not prioritised the issue, but hope that the present study nevertheless contributes to a re-evaluation of Rossi’s treatment of Halbwachs’s theories.

126 Lynch, What Time is This Place?
127 A Rossi, L’architettura della città (1966; repub. 1st edn, Macerata, Quodlibet, 2011), [viii]–[ix].
128 On the translation of the book, see Critique of the Russian theory of memory in ch. 4.
129 E.g. most of the first paragraph of the section on the collective memory has been left out in the English translation: Rossi, L’architettura della città, 148; Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 130.
The works and translations of Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann

Both prominent memory students in the humanities, literature scholar Aleida Assmann and Egyptologist Jan Assmann have since the late 1980s produced a significant body of work that outlines and elaborates their jointly conceived model of communicative memory and cultural memory. Introduced in three articles in 1988, the theory was established in detail by the publication of Jan Assmann’s Das kulturelle Gedächtnis in 1992 and Aleida Assmann’s Erinnerungsräume in 1999, both by C.H. Beck. In 2011 the latter two were published in English as Cultural Memory and Early Civilization and Cultural Memory and Western Civilization. Few of their other publications have appeared in English. In 2008, however, the anthology Cultural Memory Studies, edited by Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, introduced their theory to English readers with Jan Assmann’s ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory’ and Aleida Assmann’s ‘Canon and Archive’. The two texts offer concise summaries of some of the main theoretical points in Das kulturelle Gedächtnis and Erinnerungsräume and can be recommended as introductions to their theories.

My study will be based on Das kulturelle Gedächtnis and Erinnerungsräume, but will occasionally refer to other publications when I believe that they complement or expand the conceptualisations of the main

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131 ‘Kollektives Gedächtnis und kulturelle Identität’ has appeared in English as J Assmann, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, tr. J Czaplicka, New German Critique, 65 (1995). Although Aleida and Jan Assmann can be credited with the prevailing definition of the term cultural memory, at least in the German discourse, it should be noted that the second part of Namer’s book Mémoire et société (1987) is titled Les institutions de mémoire culturelle and contains chapters on the practice of the cultural memory of institutions like libraries and museums. His concept bears strong resemblance to that of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s, and like their concept it is suggested as an extension and complementary term to Halbwachs’s collective memory, treated in depth in the first part of his book. Namer, Mémoire et société. Jan Assmann has mentioned that the term was first proposed at the end of the 1970s within the context of a conference on the literary text. J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 7.

132 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization; A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization. According to Jan Assmann, the two books had been planned as a common enterprise. ‘It is only now, in its English version and at its new home with Cambridge University Press, that our original concept is realized and the two parts reunite, not between two covers but as a pair belonging together and complementing each other’. J Assmann, ‘Foreword (2010)’, tr. D H Wilson, in J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination (Cambridge, CUP, 2011), xii.

With Jan Assmann’s book I will sketch out the model of communicative memory and cultural memory, with Aleida Assmann the model of function memory and storage memory. I will also base the study of terms that function as distinctions of the spatial framework of memory on the latter.

The translations by David Henry Wilson come in clear and fluent English, and I will generally use them as references for the study. The terms ‘communicative memory’ and ‘cultural memory’ work well in English and the link to the original German terms is obvious.

The same applies to ‘functional memory’ (‘Funktionsgedächtnis’) and ‘storage memory’ (‘Speichergedächtnis’). I will use these terms.

When it comes to Aleida Assmann’s terminology of places and spaces of memory, it becomes more complex. Even if Wilson’s language transports the general meaning of the original text, he and the authors cannot compensate for the fact that the German and English terms have their own linguistic and culture-specific connotations. ‘Ort’ may translate as ‘place’, but in some contexts it can read as ‘location’, ‘locality’, or ‘site’. When it comes to concepts like ‘Erinnerungsorte’, ‘Gedenkorte’, or ‘Gedächtnisorte’, Aleida Assmann’s terminology runs the risk of losing its precision when it takes a new form with already heavily coloured concepts like ‘sites of memory’, ‘places of commemoration’, or ‘places of memory’. They could literally imply the same, but have been construed differently in the German and Anglo-American memory discourses.

While the translation of the two books contributes to the fusion of discourses, it also risks contributing to the confusion of them. The fact that some German terms unfortunately have been translated into the same English terms adds to this. For example, ‘Örter der Gedächtniskunst’, ‘Erinnerungsorte’, and ‘Gedenkorte’ have all been

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133 In their many texts elaborating on the communicative memory and cultural memory, naturally, there are also differences and changes in the concepts and the terminology. It is not within the scope of this thesis to address critically such divergences. When I make use of formulations from other texts than the specified I will regard them as supplementary definitions or clarifications of the one Assmann theory. On this topic, cf. e.g. H Winkler, ‘Das Unbewusste der Kultur?’, Erwägen Wissen Ethik, 13/2 (2002), 270; G Winthrop-Young, ‘Zwischen Nil und Net’, Erwägen Wissen Ethik, 13/2 (2002), 272.

134 Even though ‘Kultur’ and ‘culture’ have their own conceptual history. Erll comments on the English translation of the German term ‘kulturelles Gedächtnis’: ‘the term “cultural” does not designate a specific affinity to Cultural Studies as conceived and practiced by the Birmingham School (although this discipline has certainly contributed to cultural memory studies). Our notion of culture is instead more rooted in the German tradition of the study of cultures (Kulturwissenschaft) and in anthropology, where culture is defined as a community’s specific way of life, led within its self-spun webs of meaning’. Erll, ‘Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction’, 4.

135 They have previously been translated as ‘working memory’ and ‘reference memory’ as well as ‘canon’ and ‘archive’. See A Assmann, ‘Canon and Archive’.

136 Nora’s term ‘lieu de mémoire’ and its English and German translations have contributed to the formation of the German as well as the English concepts treated here. Therefore, throughout the thesis I will refer to the French ‘lieu de mémoire’ when I refer specifically to his concept.
translated into ‘places of memory’ in different places in the text.\textsuperscript{137} Similarly, ‘Erinnerungsorte’ finds its equivalent not only in ‘places of memory’ but also ‘places of historical memory’, and ‘sites of memory’.\textsuperscript{138} In the thesis, consequently, I will refer to the English edition for general reference. For specific references to the conceptualisations of space and memory, like those exemplified above, I will use the original German terms. I quote from the English translation but indicate within brackets the original terms, for example: ‘… places of memory [Erinnerungsorte] …’. By doing so, I hope to make the text accessible to English readers, while at the same time adhering to the specificity of Aleida Assmann’s original terminology.\textsuperscript{139} I refer to the 2003 special paperback edition (broschierte Sonderausgabe) of Erinnerungsräume.

**Use of terms**

I generally use ‘term’ to refer to a specific wording and ‘concept’ to denote a small-scale theory implied by the term of a specific scholar. This distinction lies behind my usage of single quotation marks around a word (e.g. ‘memory’) to point to the specific use of the term and italics the first time I introduce a concept that may carry quite different connotations than its general understanding (e.g. *environmental image*). Italics are further used for foreign words (e.g. *kulturelles Gedächtnis*).

Some of the specific terminology has been addressed in the previous section. Concepts like *mémoire collective, environmental image, fatto*

\textsuperscript{137} A Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization*, 296, 322; A Assmann, *Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses* (1999; special edn, Munich, C.H. Beck, 2003), 313, 37. The German formulation ‘Das Gedächtnis der Orte unterscheidet sich jedoch deutlich von den Orten des Gedächtnisses. Während nämlich das Gedächtnis der Orte an eine bestimmte Stelle fixiert ist … zeichnen sich die Orte der Gedächtniskunst gerade durch ihre Übertragbarkeit aus’ has been translated into ‘The memory of places, however, is very different from places of memory. Whereas the memory of places is firmly fixed to one particular location … places of memory are distinguished by the very fact that they are transferable’. The translation misses the point that the ‘Orter des Gedächtnisses’ and ‘Orter der Gedächtniskunst’ connote the mental places, loci, in the tradition of the art of memory. A Assmann, *Erinnerungsräume*, 313; A Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization*, 296. A place of memory, as in the translation of the term Erinnerungsort, comparably, is not at all transferable but fixed: ‘Sites of memory [Erinnerungsorte] differ from monuments [Denkmäler], memorials [Gedenkstätten], and rituals [Gedenkrituale] in that they are never fully congruous with the meaning given to them in retrospect. As historical sites [historische Schauplätze] with their sparse material relics, they are still, for all the symbolic interpretation and exploitation, more than just symbols because they are also themselves. While cultural symbols [kulturelle Zeichensetzungen] may be built up and pulled down, the durability of places [Persistenz von Orten] – which cannot be made to disappear completely even in a new geopolitical order – demands a longterm memory’. A Assmann, *Erinnerungsräume*, 337; A Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization*, 321.

\textsuperscript{138} A Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization*, 321, 22, 23; A Assmann, *Erinnerungsräume*, 337, 38.

\textsuperscript{139} Furthermore, it should be noted that Aleida Assmann also sometimes alternates the use of the terms, especially between different texts. To a certain degree, thus, this study will create its own idiosyncratic construal of her conceptualisations.
urbano, or kulturelles Gedächtnis will be defined as the argument develops. Some more general terms, however, may require a brief explanation. While the use of language is dynamic and changes according to the context, the following indicates general positions rather than clear definitions.

There is an important distinction in the thesis between mental representations or images of space in memory, which Halbwachs’s referred to as spatial framework of memory (cadre spatial de la mémoire), and environments that can be seen, touched, built, or razed, and which appear to the mind as percepts. Halbwachs refers to the latter as material framework (cadre matériel), external environment (milieu exterieur), or material surrounds (entourage matériel). I also refer to it with terms like ‘built environment’, ‘physical surroundings’, ‘material environment’, and the like. As the argument develops, for acts of remembering I will suggest a distinction between the former as mind-internal and the latter as mind-external frameworks of memory.

The term ‘architecture’ I keep as a more general term to refer to material and form aspects as well as to cultural and historical aspects, in the spirit of Rossi’s L’architettura della città. The same applies to ‘city’. I also let ‘architecture’ refer to products of design and planning processes and denote the profession of architects and the discipline of architectural history and theory. ‘Space’ and ‘spatial’ I use in a general sense for any three-dimensional structure. ‘Place’ and ‘site’ are reserved for topographical distinctions, to refer to here and not there. Therefore, two identical houses in a street may provide the same spatial experience, but in two different places.

In addition to the specific concepts of memory, any text needs the general terminology. I use ‘memory’ (without article) to indicate the faculty of remembering, the capacity of the mind to encode, store, and retrieve information. Figuratively I use the word also for the processes of groups, societies, and cultures, then in relation to the specific terms used in the particular context. ‘A memory’, ‘the memory’, ‘memories’, ‘memory image(-s)’, ‘remembrance(-s)’, and ‘recollection(-s)’ denote a hypothetical object or unit in ‘memory’, information stored or retrieved. However, as will become clear in chapters one and five, this thesis subscribes to theories of memory that see remembering as processes of reconstruction and interpretation in the present rather than the retrieval of original and untouched memory images. Consequently, I may speak of the memory(-ies) of my parents or of a certain event as a convenient abstraction and not with

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141 Biologist Richard Semon referred to such units as engrams. Cf. Cultural Memory in ch. 5.
reference to a store of memory images in my mind. Finally, ‘memory activity’, ‘remember’, ‘recall’, ‘recollect’, ‘retrieve’, ‘reconstruct’, and inflections of these words refer to processes of activating and making understandable such ‘memories’. I use ‘social’, ‘societal’ and ‘sociocultural memory’ as general terms referring to socially and culturally conditioned remembering, but keep ‘collective memory’ exclusively to refer to Halbwachs’s concept mémoire collective and ‘communicative memory’ and ‘cultural memory’ as the English terms for Aleida and Jan Assmann’s concepts kommunikatives Gedächtnis and kulturelles Gedächtnis.

‘Image’ is a multifaceted word. I cannot discuss all aspects of it here, but I can at least point to some of them. I primarily employ the word as a synonym for the spatial framework of memory, to refer to a representation or construction of space in mind. Thus, I follow the practices of Halbwachs (Fr. ‘image’) as well as Rossi (It. ‘immagine’). When I use image, consequently, it does not for the most part refer to vivid and two-dimensional picture-like objects of the mind, but rather to three-dimensional, abstract, and collage-like conceptions that people have of an environment. The other central meaning of the term ‘image’ is in many respects related to Halbwachs’s. It is the image that is defined by people like Kepes, Lynch, and K. E. Boulding and which will be discussed in chapter three.

I have no rule for the use of ‘I’ and ‘we’. I try to use ‘I’ when I refer to my arguments or my reading of other people’s arguments (but I may occasionally also use ‘the thesis’ or ‘the study’ instead of ‘I’). With ‘we’ I tend to include myself in the readership of other authors; occasionally I use ‘we’ in the hope of drawing the reader along with me in the argument.

**Thesis structure**

The thesis contains a preparatory introduction, six chapters with the treatise and a conclusion that summarises and discusses the findings. The Introduction addresses the conditions for the study. Chapter one introduces the collective memory as a theoretical basis for the spatial framework of memory. Chapter two makes a reading of the original concept. Chapters three and four contextualise the term as it enters architectural theory and looks at its developments. Chapter five expands the theory through its transformation in newer theories in memory studies. Altogether, the five

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142 Cf. generally ch. 2 and specifically Maurice Halbwachs and L’architettura della città in ch. 4.

chapters establish the spatial framework of memory as a theoretical framework for studies of architecture and memory. It is a construal and amalgamation of thought and a historiography of the concept’s development. Chapter six exemplifies the applicability of the theoretical framework on a concrete case and lets the empirical material contribute to the discussion of the terminology. The Conclusion summarises and points to complementary studies and applications.

Chapter contents
The Introduction has established the intellectual background for the thesis and outlined the areas of scholarship in which it finds its theoretical foundation. It has further introduced the object of study and touched on its objectives, the interdisciplinary approach, existing scholarship, and source material. It has given the reader an indication of the aim of the thesis and how I propose to get there.

Chapter one establishes an understanding of the scholar Maurice Halbwachs and his memory theory. I trace the legacy of his thought in three intellectual forefathers, Bergson, Leibniz, and Durkheim. After that I introduce the collective memory and the frameworks on which the theory depends. I touch on the conceptual pairs of ‘memory’-‘history’ and ‘remembering’-‘forgetting’ and appraise some of the critique of the collective memory. The chapter provides a theoretical contextualisation needed in order to appreciate the spatial framework of memory in its complexity.

In chapter two I treat the spatial framework of memory that Halbwachs developed in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, La Topographie légendaire, and La Mémoire collective. I follow the continuation of thought throughout the works and let each book elaborate on different facets of the term. I understand the development of the spatial framework of memory in the three books to be complementary. In my reading, the three books offer a concept of general postulations and specific distinctions.

Chapter three discusses the intellectual environment of the architectural discourse in the 1950s and 1960s and changes to conceptions of the past, including terms like ‘history’, ‘tradition’, and ‘memory’. I follow the spatial framework of memory and the theory of the collective memory as they enter the architectural discourse through the writings of Lynch and into the intellectual environment of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). I look at The Image of the City and What Time is this Place? and consider the legacy of Halbwachs in Lynch’s conceptualisation of the environmental image. I argue that, despite promising theoretical reflections on questions initially raised by Halbwachs, Lynch does not manage to make productive the
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sociocultural implications of the environmental image. However, Lynch establishes an understanding of a basic level of perception and way-finding for the concept spatial framework of memory.

Next, in chapter four, I turn to Rossi’s L’architettura della città, one of the most influential books on postmodern architecture. I argue that the spatial framework of memory comes to occupy a prominent position at the centre of Rossi’s conceptualisation of the city as a product of cultural collectives. I argue that Rossi has a better appreciation of Halbwachs’s theory than he is able to put into words, or the translators are able to render into English, and I point to some valuable distinctions to the concept fatto urbano, the potential of which, to my meaning, has not been fully recognised. I discuss the critique of Rossi’s and Halbwachs’s theories of memory in architecture and argue against the problematic construal of space and collective memory that Rossi’s book wrongly has spurred.

Chapter five follows a different itinerary, as Halbwachs’s theories enter the memory studies in the German Kulturwissenschaften, where they come to make up the backbone of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s joint theory of communicative memory and cultural memory. The chapter enables a two-fold elaboration of the spatial framework of memory. In the first place, with Aleida and Jan Assmann’s conceptual pair, it is possible to distinguish between two modes of operation: the communicative memory addresses the role of architecture in informal and everyday remembering and the cultural memory its status in the formation and formalisation of society and culture. I propose to distinguish between mind-internal and mind-external frameworks of memory. The former correspond to Halbwachs’s frameworks of memory (social, spatial, temporal, linguistic, historical, etc.), the latter to his notion of external or material frameworks; they are artefacts like books, buildings, or cities, which act as cognitive catalysts in acts of recollection.

Further, I propose to distinguish between explicit frameworks, where the materiality of architecture points to the past by means of decoration, style, or physical marks, and implicit frameworks, where architecture forms the reference point for mnemonic activities, but do not bear witness to the memory function in its form. I further show, with Aleida and Jan Assmann, how it is possible to replace the Halbwachsian ‘memory’-‘history’ dichotomy with a perspectival model of functional memory and storage memory, with the prospect of addressing issues of both memory and history and of remembering and forgetting in relation to the spatial framework of memory. I follow up the considerations with a review of a selection of conceptual distinctions in the writings of Aleida Assmann, exact notions in a cultural memory landscape that offer concise shortcuts to the general concept.
Chapter six takes on a different character than the previous. Based on empirical material and first-hand observation it addresses the debate about the buildings of the Government Quarter in Oslo after a bomb damaged them on 22 July 2011. I argue that the debate essentially is an expression of the contestation over meaning associated with architecture, and that it can be dissected and analysed with the help of the theoretical framework of the spatial framework of memory. A number of conceptual distinctions, which have been developed in the thesis, I bring to bear on the debate to point to the many kinds of spatial frameworks of memory that come to establish a connection to the singular, material site, the material framework. The chapter indicates the prospect of distinguishing between the many roles architecture can take when it is employed as a spatial framework for societal memory. It argues that the processes involving the spatial framework of memory in the dispute suggest that they are changing and on the move, over time and between groups and in relation to other cultural contexts. I argue that architecture in culture is not fixed and permanent, but dynamic and travelling.

The Conclusion summarises the spatial framework of memory and provides a schematic overview of the central postulations and distinctions. It further suggests possible areas of study that could outline additional aspects of the concept. I discuss how the spatial framework of memory can be used to address the gamut of architecture’s dynamic roles in social and cultural remembering, for use in architecture, urban planning, cultural heritage studies, and memory studies.
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Collective memory

Like the Pantheon in the Roman Empire accommodates all cults, provided that they are cults, society accepts all traditions (also the most recent) provided that they are traditions. It also accepts all ideas (also the most ancient) provided that they are ideas, that is, that they have a place in its thought and that they still interest the people of today who appreciate them. From this follows that social thought is essentially a memory, and that its entire contents is made of nothing but collective recollections, but that among them only those subsist that are possible to reconstruct in every period of society, working within the current frameworks.

— Maurice Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, 1925

With theories of collective memory the academic study of remembrance changed scales. In the early 1900s memory was primarily analysed as an individual capability. With scholars like Maurice Halbwachs enquiries into memory took on more complex challenges. Not only does his theory assume as a fact that individual memory in essence is conditioned by social milieus, but it also comes to address recollection from the perspective of society. It enables analyses of how religions, professions, and families fundamentally are social aggregates of individuals who remember in groups, institutionally or informally.

This chapter lays the theoretical foundation on which the spatial framework of memory rests. In the Introduction I pointed to how theoretical

2 Other voices also advocated social and cultural perspectives of memory before Halbwachs and in his lifetime. See e.g. the selection of texts in ‘Part I. Precursors and Classics’ in J K Olick, et al. (eds), The Collective Memory Reader (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011), 63–176. Cf. also Context in the Introduction.
developments in the twentieth century have established a sociocultural vantage point for contemplating memory. Halbwachs’s postulation of a socially conditioned memory stands as one of the central premises. Most subsequent scholarship on social memory builds on or positions itself in relation to Halbwachs. To isolate the study of the spatial framework of memory from the collective memory is therefore not practicable, nor desirable. In my reading of the concept, therefore, the collective memory stands as a premise. I will give a portrait of the key postulates of the theory, addressing its merits and shortcomings, in order to lay the foundation for the theoretical framework of studies of architecture and memory that I propose. One must subscribe to the general validity of the former in order to recognise the virtues of the latter. Considering the remarkable success of Halbwachs’s memory theory in the humanities and social sciences, I do not believe that it is to take it too far, especially not if the premise is accepted on the condition that subsequent scholarship, which critically reformulates some of his positions, is welcomed and appreciated.³

To understand the coming into being of the theory of collective memory I will first outline the intellectual context in which Halbwachs developed his thinking and from where it drew its logic. What role did the thinking of his mentors play in his formulation of a collective memory? Subscribing to the collective memory as a foundational theory has certain implications for the understanding of the spatial framework of memory. One important aspect, which I will discuss at length, is the collective aspect of memory and how it ought to be construed not to run the risk of being interpreted as a categorical position that favours social perspectives over individual. Neither should the social be regarded as the antithesis of the individual or as a metaphor. Another aspect is the central role that the frameworks of memory take in Halbwachs’s thinking. While he shares the assumption with some other contemporaries, it certainly opposes fundamentally the prominent theory of memory put forward by his teacher Henri Bergson. This chapter will address the general role of frameworks for collective remembering and describe their general characteristics. Woven into these discussions I will also touch on issues of history in relation to collective memory and of how forgetting becomes closely bound up to the sustenance of the frameworks.

³ In this chapter, such contributions are discussed in Critique of the collective memory and Frameworks of memory. The model of communicative memory and cultural memory by Aleida and Jan Assmann remains the most relevant in the context of this thesis. See esp. Communicative memory in ch. 5.
**Maurice Halbwachs and the intellectual environment**

Maurice Halbwachs (Fr.: [moˈʁiss ‘albvaks]) was born on 11 March 1877 in Reims, the son of German teacher Gustave Halbwachs and Félicie Halbwachs, née Clerc.⁴ The family was of Catholic German-Alsatian origin and not Jewish, which has sometimes been claimed.⁵ Even so, he pursued an interest in Jewish life and culture, and after he married French-Jewish Yvonne Basch in 1913 he lived a Jewish family life.⁶ The family moved to the French capital when he was two years old, and there he would grow up in an environment of Parisian intellectuals.⁷ In his formative years two figures profoundly inspired him as teachers and collaborators: the philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and the scientist and founder of academic sociology in France Émile Durkheim (1858–1917).⁸ A third and major source of inspiration was the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). I shall briefly introduce their influence on Halbwachs and his conceptions of memory and space.

**Bergsonian influence**

In the 1890s Halbwachs was enrolled as a pupil at the Parisian secondary schools Lycée Michelet and Lycée Henri IV. At the latter he studied philosophy under Bergson, who would soon become an important figure in French philosophy.⁹ As Halbwachs’s first intellectual master, Bergson came to inspire him thoroughly, and traces of his thinking are recognisable throughout Halbwachs’s career, also at times when he had turned Durkheimian in his thought. Mary Douglas points to the fact that ‘when Halbwachs’s own approach was formulated it opposed nearly everything that Bergson taught, courteously but uncompromisingly’.¹⁰ Still, as Dietmar Wetzel argues, although ‘Halbwachs again and again quotes Bergson in his works, the quotations seem rather to have served as a source of inspiration for him and, above all, for delimitation and self-assurance of his own position, indeed increasingly so the more he turned to Durkheim and the social sciences on the whole’.¹¹

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⁴ D J Wetzel, *Maurice Halbwachs* (Konstanz, UVK, 2009), 15.
⁸ For a more general overview of the intellectual influences, see esp. Wetzel, *Maurice Halbwachs*.
⁹ ibid., 16.
In 1896 Bergson published *Matière et mémoire* in which he formulated a theory of memory that is essentially bound to the subjectivity of the individual through two kinds of memories: the one in the form of searchable memory images, the other as habit:

the first records, in the form of memory-images, all the events of our daily life as they occur in time; it neglects no detail; *it leaves to each fact, to each gesture, its place and date*. Regardless of utility or of practical application, it stores up the past by the mere necessity of its own nature. [Our repeated return to the memory images] modify the organism and create in the body new dispositions toward action. Thus is formed an experience of an entirely different order …; this consciousness of a whole past of efforts stored up in the present is indeed also a memory, but a [second kind of] memory profoundly different from the first, always bent upon action, seated in the present and looking only to the future.\(^\text{12}\)

For Bergson place and time are inherent properties of singular memory images of events. This is greatly challenged by Halbwachs, who in *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* posits the independent character of more stable memory constructs pertaining to space, time, and social relations as well as language and general ideas. These social and cultural frames of reference, which the individual depends on in the act of recollection, he calls *les cadres de la mémoire*, the frameworks of memory.\(^\text{13}\) The function of the frameworks could be illustrated with historical remembering. For Bergson historical facts can only acquire meaning when appropriated and given significance by the individual intellect. For Halbwachs it is the other way around. Individual images could be regarded as incomplete fragments that only through localisation in the frameworks of time, space, and the social milieu can be made meaningful. With the postulation that frameworks are fundamental premises for recollection and with the belittlement of memory images, Halbwachs takes a position explicitly against Bergson, using the latter’s arguments to rhetorically propose his own theory. But even if taking such a position means that he ‘undermines his first teacher’s theories more critically than would appear out of context’, Bergson remains a significant point of departure and inspiration for Halbwachs’s thinking, especially in *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* and *La Mémoire collective*.\(^\text{14}\)

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\(^{12}\) Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (New York, Zone Books, 1988) [Fr. orig. (5th edn, 1908)], 81–82. First emphasis is mine.

\(^{13}\) Halbwachs explicitly formulates this hypothesis against Bergson’s. Cf. *Frameworks of memory* in this chapter.

One example is Halbwachs’s view on forgetting. For Bergson, obstacles in the brain hinder remembrance and cause forgetting. For Halbwachs, forgetting is a result of vague and piecemeal impressions that are not reconstructed under the conditions of suitable frameworks. Instead, it seems that Leibniz is the one who comes to provide Halbwachs with the idea of the fragmentary character of memory images and the importance of correct stimuli for their actualisation.

**Leibnizian influence**

From 1898 to 1901 Halbwachs studied at École Normale Supérieure. In 1902 Halbwachs was appointed the position as lecturer at the University of Göttingen in Germany. There he became a member of a German–French commission for an international publication of the writings of Leibniz (1646–1716), which marks the start of his scholarly career. Nominated to be one of the editors, Halbwachs left for Hanover to catalogue Leibniz’s unpublished papers, but due to the outbreak of WWI the publication was never realised. Despite this, Halbwachs’s engagement resulted in a textbook on Leibniz, published as a volume in a book series on famous philosophers. This shift in Halbwachs’s career may suggest a shift from Bergson, as his intellectual source of influence, to Leibniz. It may even have been Bergson who originally proposed to Halbwachs to engage with Leibnizian thought. If that is true, it is ironic that the Leibnizian thinking would support Halbwachs in his later criticism of Bergson’s subjectivist theory of knowledge.

Douglas has pointed out that Halbwachs refers to how Leibniz conceives the human mind as a system in which nothing is ever forgotten; perceptions are stored as ‘conscious memories and indistinct reminiscences’, which, at a later stage, can be summoned up with new attention directed to them. Halbwachs’s theory of memory bears a certain resemblance to Leibniz’s ideas, in that the past is remembered through fragments of percepts and concepts, which can only be reconstructed as memories by activating inner frameworks or external stimuli. This opposes Bergson’s view of memory as

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17 M Halbwachs, *Leibniz*, Les philosophes (Paris, Librairie Paul Delaplane, [1907]). There is widespread disagreement in the literature and in libraries about whether the first edition of the book was published in 1906 or 1907. It seems to me that 1907 is the correct year. The second, expanded edition from 1928 is sometimes also mistaken for the first, see e.g. Douglas, ‘Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs’, 4–5.
containing full representations of past experiences in memory images. Other themes occur in Halbwachs’s writing on Leibniz, which will perhaps exert influence on his later conception of memory. For instance, the engagement with a social conditioning of individual thought may precede his commitment to Durkheim’s social theories:

Experience therefore plays a vital role in our knowledge. It is true that the only way of thinking that has some value and that can found any truth is the demonstration. Expectations or beliefs born of experience are uncertain. Even internal experience does not suffice. ‘Consciousness’, says Leibniz, ‘is not the only means to form personal identity, the relationships with other people or even other imprints can supplement it.20

Another form of influence may come from Leibniz’s conceptualisation of space. Leibniz turns against Newton and his assumption of an absolute space that would have an existence of its own as a substantial reality outside of our minds. Instead he conceives of space as an ideal construction of the mind, which is to be considered as an imaginary construct, both in and outside the world.21 According to Ernst Cassirer, Leibniz’s notion of space, like that of time, is part ‘of the universe of logical forms or, as Leibniz calls it, of the “intellectus ipse”,’ of the intellect itself, and stems from the creative power of the human mind.22

Leibniz posits that ‘Space is the order of coexisting things, or the order of existence for things which are simultaneous’, while, correspondingly, ‘Time is the order of existence of those things which are not simultaneous’ or ‘the universal order of changes’.23 The notion of space is strictly relational; it is informed by the observation of how bodies coexist in time, their relative places, and the rules according to which these relations change.24 Space is the paragon of all possible situations. It is not the order of space that enables the situation of bodies; instead all positions that bodies could exist in make up the notion of space as an ‘order of situations’.25 Markus Schroer suggests that the consequences of such a definition of space cannot be overestimated, with its idea of a pluralism of perspectives. Every situation will give rise to a point

20 ibid., 45–46.
25 ibid., 714.
of view that will differ from all other points of view: ‘With Leibniz’s conception of space nothing less than the contingency of every observation comes into play’. Such an understanding stands at the centre of Halbwachs’s memory theory. In the same way that there are as many collective memories of a given event as there are groups, and there are as many views on the collective memory as there are members of the group, the spatial frameworks of groups’ memory are the multiple viewpoints on a physical environment, which could never be defined outside of these social conceptualisations.

In the first and second editions of Halbwachs’s book on Leibniz about two pages summarise the conception of space. Halbwachs stresses Leibniz’s postulation of space, time, and numbers as *entia mentalia*, mental entities, which only exist as constructions of the mind. In the second edition he explains that ‘Continuity and discontinuity [in Leibniz’s notion of space] relate more to the operations of the mind trying to calculate space itself. Space lends itself to these calculations, as a white sheet ready to receive signs ... Therefore, it is natural to consider it [space] as a symbol, or rather as an opportunity of undefined symbols of a certain order’. In my opinion, this view of space opens up for the contingency of the idea of (inter-)subjective perspectives in Halbwachs’s later writings on memory; there exist as many conceptions of a given space as there are individuals who maintain a relation to it.

It also opens up for the emphasis on the mental conception of space, rather than on material space, in Halbwachs’s spatial framework of memory. Jean-Pierre Cléro has written an essay in which he addresses Halbwachs’s rejection of Cartesian space and embrace of Leibnizian space. With Descartes, Cléro explains, space is full, so no piece of matter can occupy the place that is occupied by another piece of matter. For Leibniz, he continues, space can never be full, as it consists of relations and the relations of

27 The passage is titled *‘L’espace, ordre des situations; son caractère ideal’* (*Space, order of situations, its ideal character*).
29 In *Monadology* Leibniz uses an analogy of the city that evokes Halbwachs’s spatial framework of memory: ‘And as one and the same town viewed from different sides looks altogether different, and is, as it were, perspectively multiplied, it similarly happens that, through the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are, as it were, just as many different universes, which however are only the perspectives of a single one according to the different points of view of each monad’. *G. W. Leibniz’s Monadology. An Edition for Students*, ed. N Rescher (Pittsburgh, UPP, 1991) [orig. Fr. 1714], 200–01. The passage was brought to my attention in M Löw, *Raumsoziologie* (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2001), 28.

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relations. One point in space can maintain any number of relations. Cléro argues that Halbwachs shows a deep concern for the questions of space in his book on Leibniz, and that these questions come to resonate throughout Halbwachs’s oeuvre. Consequently, walls, streets, and houses are created in the minds and constitute a backdrop for social relations and functions. For Halbwachs, Cléro explains, each point in space, like the home, provides a spatial interlacing of a number of social domains: the family lives there, somebody legally owns the house, and the bank in which the mortgage is based is economically tied to the house. Thus, space for Halbwachs is a set of relationships, and it “is designed to stabilise and channel flows of thoughts, of feelings; and the true function of stones is … to speak.”31 Leibniz’s conception of space, so Cléro’s argument goes, inspires Halbwachs to conceive the space of the city in a new fashion: as symbolic and imaginary. The notion of space as a mental entity, symbolic and imaginary, reappears in the guise of the spatial framework of memory in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and the subsequent books on memory. In the reading of his conceptualisation of the spatial framework of memory I will stress the emphasis on the character of space as a mental entity and carrier of symbols.

The art of memory

A further aspect I would like to point to in Leibniz’s work is his relation to classical and Renaissance mnemotechnics. I have found no explicit references in Halbwachs’s work to the art of memory, but I will briefly appraise the possibility that he, through Leibniz, may have been exposed to the principles of use of memorised places, loci in the ars memoriae. Passages like this one, published in 1938 in Morphologie sociale, have made me speculate:

In the place of the Roman Forum, with its basilicas, courts, and statues, one can see only a limited portion of the totality and a collection of physical objects. The political activity that took place there transports us to a different plane. But how can we understand the development of history outside of the physical framework? All the successive generations of Rome put their stamp on the Forum. They had it before their eyes, and they made representations of it.32

31 ibid., 50*. My transl.
The last sentence makes me wonder if Halbwachs alludes to the rhetoric practice in Imperial Rome, employing the architecture of the Forum as loci according to the teachings of Ad herennium, Cicero, and Quintilian.33

I would suggest that it is feasible, maybe even plausible, that Halbwachs learnt about the memory tradition when he prepared the two publications on Leibniz.34 As I have already mentioned, he had travelled to Hanover to catalogue Leibniz’s unpublished papers. In the seventeenth century Leibniz was one of the major exponents of the art of memory. According to Paolo Rossi, it is in the unpublished manuscripts in Hanover that he exposes his deep interest in, and knowledge of, the classical and Renaissance art of memory, including the principle of loci, the places in memory.35 Rossi argues that

[the Ciceronian art of memory] had a profound influence on the formation of a new intellectual culture, which prepared the ground for the development of new logical methods, from those of Francis Bacon to those of Gottfried Leibniz. The treatises on artificial memory were at the centre of a complex of discussions and problems: developments in the arts of discourse and techniques of persuasion, attempts at constructing encyclopaedias of knowledge …, medicine and physiognomy: a range of questions which

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34 For a discussion on the influence of art of memory on Halbwachs through Leibniz, cf. N Packard & C Chen, ‘From Medieval Mnemonics to a Social Construction of Memory. Thoughts on Some Early European Conceptualizations of Memory, Morality, and Consciousness’, American Behavioral Scientist, 48/10 (2005), 1297, 316. Patrick Hutton has pointed to the similarity of Halbwachs’s theory of spatial remembering and the possible connections with the classical art of memory: ‘Although he never made this association with the mnemonic technique of classical rhetoric, it nonetheless lies at the heart of the process that he describes’. P H Hutton, History as an Art of Memory (Hanover, University Press of New England, 1993), 80. Cf. the discussion on Halbwachs and the art of memory in Hutton’s writings in Existing Scholarship in the Introduction. Sébastien Marot, on the other hand, suggests that Halbwachs was unaware of the tradition of the art of memory. S Marot, Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory (London, AA, 2003) [Fr. orig., ‘L’Art de la mémoire, le territoire et l’architecture’ (1999)], 30.

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concerned not just rhetorical theorists, but philosophers, logicians, occult scientists, physicians and encyclopaedists of different kinds.\(^{36}\)

With reference to the unpublished notes in Hanover, Rossi demonstrates that Leibniz had detailed knowledge of the contemporary discourse on the art of memory.\(^{37}\) Frances Yates further describes Leibniz as ‘the most remarkable example’ of the advocates of the art of memory in the seventeenth century.\(^{38}\) Memory, the rules for which he borrowed from Aristotle and *Ad herennium*, Leibniz saw as an integral part of his work on science, logic, and the universal language.

Leibniz knew the memory tradition extremely well; he had studied the memory treatises and had picked up, not only the main lines of the classical rules, but also complications which had grown up around these in the memory tradition. And he was interested in the principles on which the classical art was based.\(^{39}\)

In his writings on memory Halbwachs leaned on Leibniz’s conception of space as symbolic and relational rather than Cartesian, as a product of the mind, an *entia mentalia*. If, through Leibniz, or elsewhere, Halbwachs had learnt about the art of memory and its organisation of memory cues by means of memorised sequences of places, it may have contributed to his distinction between the environment as a physical and material framework and the spatial framework in people’s memory, the representations of space distributed in the minds of individuals. This operative view of space as an instrument in the art of memory may have provided inspiration for Halbwachs’s conception of the spatial framework of memory as a means for remembering other things as well as a notion formed accumulatively over time. Different from singular memories of events, Halbwachs contends, the spatial framework is more stable and we need to keep it in mind at all times in order to bring to mind other memories. We need it to localise things in memory: experiences, social relations, or history. It acts as an organisational tool for our recollection and can be employed repeatedly to reconstruct memories. Such an emphasis on its stability echoes Yates’s description of the art of memory:

*The formation of the loci is of the greatest importance, for the same set of loci can be used again and again for remembering different material. The images*

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\(^{36}\) Rossi, *Logic and the Art of Memory*, 5–6.

\(^{37}\) ibid., 186–90.


\(^{39}\) ibid., 367.
which we have placed on them for remembering one set of things fade and are
effaced when we make no further use of them. But the loci remain in the
memory and can be used again by placing another set of images for another
set of material.\footnote{ibid., 23.}

I will not suggest that the spatial framework of memory is a remodelling of
the principles of \textit{loci} in the art of memory. There is no evidence for that. I am
not even sure if Halbwachs at any time was aware of the similarities between
his conception and the mnemotechnic. It is likely, for a critical scholar like
him, in the early decades of the twentieth century, that the art of memory may
have been too obscure a reference to speak out loud.\footnote{Cf. the discussion of the hostility between science and the art of memory in W Holzapfel, ‘Über das Verhältnis zwischen theoretischer Gedächtnispsychologie und Gedächtniskunst. Eine psychologiegeschichtliche Analyse’, \textit{Psychologie und Geschichte}, 10/3–4 (2002), 247–59.} What, nevertheless,
can be suggested is that amongst the theories that shaped Leibniz’s ideas and,
consequently, amid those that formed the intellectual realm in which
Halbwachs’s thought emerged, the art of memory arguably has its place, if
also in the margin.

\textit{Durkheimian influence}

Durkheim counts as the founder of the academic discipline of sociology in
France and Halbwachs is said to have regarded Durkheim as probably the
greatest of all.\footnote{ibid., 18.} After his stay in Hanover Halbwachs returned to Paris to
study at Paris University, and it was his friend and mentor François Simiand
who introduced him to Durkheim.\footnote{ibid., 18.} Halbwachs moved from philosophy to
sociology and soon he belonged to the circle around Durkheim. His law
thesis from 1909 on land values and expropriation gave French reform
socialists a sociological basis for analysing and fighting social injustice in the
261; Cf. M Halbwachs, \textit{Les Expropriations et le prix de terrains à Paris 1860–1900} (Paris, Cornély, 1909).} During the studies and the writing of his doctoral dissertations,
completed in 1913, he made a living by teaching at secondary schools. From
1905 he became involved in the publication of the sociological journal
\textit{L’Année Sociologique}, founded by Durkheim in 1898, and among its
important collaborators were also Célestin Bouglé, Marcel Mauss, Henri
Hubert, Robert Hertz, and Simiand.\footnote{Wetzel, \textit{Maurice Halbwachs}, 38.}

Douglas says of Durkheim’s thinking that ‘the prospect of individual
thought is impossible to contemplate, almost an absurdity, since language and

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{ibid.} ibid., 23.
\bibitem{ibid.} ibid., 18.
\bibitem{ibid.} ibid., 18.
\bibitem{ibid.} P Rabinow, \textit{French Modern. Norms and Forms of the Social Environment} (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1989),
\bibitem{ibid.} Wetzel, \textit{Maurice Halbwachs}, 38.
\end{thebibliography}
categorization arise together in social intercourse … To understand the social factors [of morality and religion] sustaining individual consciousness was his central program of research’. The social and societal interaction of the individual is paramount to Durkheim’s conception of consciousness, almost to the level of giving collective thought an existence of its own. The various groups that may direct the thought of the individual are the result of the self-organisation of society. This dividing into classes and groups, Schroer summarises Durkheim, is the basic workings of any society, enabling the sectioning of the land it inhabits. Without such classifications society would not function; thus, every society impresses its own organisation on space. There are two inherent perspectives of space in Durkheim’s thinking. One regards space epistemologically – what space means and how it can be conceived; the other looks at space from the perspective of social theory – how the spatial organisation of society changes in complex societies. In both perspectives it can be recognised how the social order is mirrored in its material deposits in space. This perspective becomes a central point in Halbwachs’s later study of the social morphology, a term proposed by Durkheim in a new section of L’année Sociologique in 1898. According to Stephan Egger, it is a field of study, and a reading of societal facts, in which ‘the collective life, the collective work of people in the world, takes on visible, tangible form’. He asserts that Halbwachs extends and deepens Durkheim’s concept and so invents it anew, making it a more coherent theory. Stéphane Jonas goes further to argue that Halbwachs is the real and important founder of social morphology, improving Durkheim’s concept. I will return to social morphology in the next chapter.

In Durkheim’s last work, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, a passage on religious ceremonies of the Warramunga people can be seen to foreshadow Halbwachs’s conceptualisation of a socially conditioned memory:

the mythology of a group is the system of beliefs common to this group. The traditions whose memory it perpetuates express the way in which society
Collective memory represents man and the world; it is a moral system and a cosmology as well as a history. So the rite serves and can serve only to sustain the vitality of these beliefs, to keep them from being effaced from memory and, in sum, to revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness. Through it, the group periodically renews the sentiment which it has of itself and of its unity; at the same time, individuals are strengthened in their social natures.53

Later in the text Durkheim concludes, ‘So we have here a whole group of ceremonies whose sole purpose is to awaken certain ideas and sentiments, to attach the present to the past or the individual to the group’.54 The conclusion points to a central point in later studies of social memory; for collective remembering, and as opposed to history, the past is brought into the life of the present, without expressing a clear division between the past and present.

According to Douglas, when Halbwachs leaves Bergson for Durkheim, and not any other sociologist, he leaves for the enemy.55 With Durkheim he does not only shift from an individualistic to a collectivistic perspective, she argues, but is given an especially good position for attacks on Bergson’s philosophy. Such an antagonistic view of his relation to his two masters may be somewhat schematic and simplified. Bergson remains a central reference for Halbwachs in his development of the theory of memory, not only in *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, but also in *La Mémoire collective*. Halbwachs often employs Bergson’s formulations in order to identify problems, reach his own conclusions and clarify his positions. In several places Halbwachs makes use of Bergson as an opponent of his own rhetoric.

Jean-Christophe Marcel and Laurent Mucchielli argue that Halbwachs has followed up all the important aspects of Durkheim’s thinking, keeping with the intentions of the original project and applying and developing them further.56 His engagement with collective psychology, they suggest, is one of the answers provided by Halbwachs to defend Durkheim’s theses. In his search for the collective influences on the individual mind, especially on memory, he takes a different path than Durkheim did in his theory of collective representations and develops a sociology oriented more towards the individual. Marcel and Mucchielli point to three main axes of these sociological reflections: ‘first the social construction of the individual

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memory, second the formation of the collective memory in different societal groups, and third the collective memory on the level of societies and cultures.\footnote{ibid., 195–96. My transl.} Along similar lines, Douglas has also suggested that

Halbwachs’ gift to Durkheim was to unpack and separate clearly the elements of social life that contribute to the collective memory … To have worked this out within the strong constraints evidently imposed by Durkheim on his colleagues was a signal service to Durkheim himself and a contribution to Durkheim studies.\footnote{Douglas, ‘Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs’, 17.}

The emphasis on the individual in social processes, however, puts him in a position that is easier to defend than Durkheim’s. Halbwachs states explicitly that no remembering goes on outside the individual minds.\footnote{M Halbwachs, \textit{La Mémoire collective}, ed. G Namer (1950; crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997) [orig., ‘Mémoire et société’ (1947)], 94.} It is rather the frameworks of memory that constitute the collective aspect of memory, but these are also part of the individual memory, refined and revised, again and again, in interaction with society.\footnote{On the constitution of the frameworks of memory, see especially Halbwachs, \textit{Les Cadres sociaux}, 98, 103, 28–30, 35.} Alexandre Dessingué demonstrates how Durkheim insists that collective memory is external to and ‘cannot be dependent on the individual consciousness; it has a life of its own’.\footnote{A Dessingué, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Memory and Forgetting’, \textit{Études Ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies}, 2/1 (2011), 172.} It places Durkheim in a very different position than Halbwachs’s and suggests a fundamental disagreement between his and Durkheim’s understanding of sociology and collective thought.

Halbwachs’s intellectual position owes much to Durkheim. To consider him a full-fledged Durkheimian, however, and his thought only an extension of Durkheim’s shrouds the intricate amalgamation of his own as well as of Leibnizian and Bergsonian intuitions. The consistency of Halbwachs’s theory of a collective memory and his conception of space, in my opinion, relies on his careful appraisal and balance of the influence of the three precursors. What in the eyes of many appears as a fixed, disciplinary position of sociology may rather take the form of a three-part and interdisciplinary attribution. It becomes clear, for instance, to what extent Leibniz contributed to the conception of space as a mental entity and maybe also to a predisposition for a socially conditioned self, before Halbwachs even turned to Durkheim. Also, if my own intuition holds true, Leibniz may have given him a glimpse of the use of mental places in the art of memory, suggesting
that the conceptualisation of the spatial framework of memory may be considered as a recent contribution to the mnemonic tradition. It may also be relevant to ask to what degree the strong emphasis on individual experience in Halbwachs’s theory stems from a Bergsonian philosophy – phenomenal and personal experiences, the explorations of childhood, family, and home give colour to his theory.

The professorial years 1919–1944
In 1919 Halbwachs received a professorship in sociology and pedagogy in Strasbourg previously held by the German sociologist Georg Simmel (1858–1918). When the Alsatian city was reattributed to France after the war, the chair continued to exist. From 1922 it became a professorship only in sociology, the first of its kind in France.

Already with his arrival in Strasbourg Halbwachs got interested in societal memory, partly due to the rapid forgetting of WWI and its prehistory in political life. In 1925 he published the first book on memory. Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire springs out of his critical involvement with Bergson’s theory of consciousness within the framework of Durkheim’s collectivistic social theory. Already the same year he started writing the manuscript of La Mémoire collective, which, despite being reworked several times in the following two decades, remained unfinished and unpublished at his death. In the same period he started to prepare La Topographie légendaire.

In the 1930s Halbwachs counted as one of the important successors of the Durkheim school and as one of a few notable sociologists in France, next to Mauss. He joined the interdisciplinary board of Annales d’histoire économique et sociale, a journal founded in 1929 by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre to promote new conceptions of historiography. Halbwachs was a loyal and valued member and published three articles and a number of notices and reviews in the first ten years of its existence.

In 1930 Halbwachs accepted an invitation to take on a guest professorship at the University of Chicago. The hosting department of sociology, founded in 1892 and the first of its kind in the United States, had become a leading

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62 Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs, 24–5.
63 ibid., 27.
65 Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs, 31.
66 ibid., 41. The influence of the Chicago School of Sociology on Lynch’s work is discussed in Kevin Lynch and Maurice Halbwachs in chapter three.
68 Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs, 30.
intellectual milieu for sociology in the post-war period. In Chicago Halbwachs entered into a fruitful collaboration with scholars like Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Louis Wirth. It resulted in an appreciating article of their work, which he published in *Annales d’histoire économique et sociale* in 1932. In 1938 he published an article on collective psychology in the *American Sociological Review*, and in the following year an article on the collective aspects of the mind appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology*, at the time of the publication under the editorship of Burgess. The same volume saw contributions by Chicagoans like Wirth and Park, but also by figures like Kurt Lewin, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Bertrand Russell.

In 1937 Halbwachs was appointed a chair in methodology and philosophy of science at Sorbonne. From 1939 he held the chair in sociology at the same institution. In addition to books on various topics published in the 1920s and 1930s, his study *Morphologie sociale* appeared in 1938 and *La Topographie légendaire* in 1941. The latter has been considered a crossroads in Halbwachs’s thinking on memory, placed in between *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* and *La Mémoire collective* and going deeper into the sociological areas of collective psychology and social morphology. With the study Halbwachs gave the term ‘topographie’ a new meaning. In memory

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69 Coser writes, ‘It seems no exaggeration to say that for roughly twenty years, from the first world war to the mid-1930s, the history of sociology in America can largely be written as the history of the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago. During these years, the department set the general tone of sociological inquiries, published the only major journal of the discipline [American Journal of Sociology], and trained most of the sociologists who made a mark on the profession and who assumed the presidency of the American Sociological Society. Its members wrote the most influential monographs and textbooks’. L A Coser, ‘American Trends’, in T Bottomore & R Nisbet (eds), *A History of Sociological Analysis* (New York, Basic Books, 1978), 311–12.

70 Halbwachs writes, ‘If an original school of sociology exists at the University of Chicago it is not unrelated to the fact that the observers do not have to look far for a subject of study. Before their eyes new phases of urban development without precedent unroll from decade to decade, almost from year to year’. M Halbwachs, ‘Chicago, expérience ethnique’, *Annales d’histoire économique et sociale*, 4/13 (1932), 17.


studies it subsequently came to denote ‘space that makes the contents of collective memory experienceable’.  

With the German occupation of France Halbwachs’s private life cannot be separated from his political and intellectual life, since his Jewish wife, children, and family-in-law came under threat of persecution and extermination.  His mother, to whom he had been strongly devoted, died in 1940. His brother-in-law committed suicide in 1941, and in 1944, at the age of eighty, his parents-in-law were murdered by the Vichy militia, according to rumours in collaboration with the Gestapo. In March 1944 he was appointed the new chair in social psychology at Collège de France, but only after the Jewish professors had been forced to leave their posts, among them his friend Mauss. In addition, he was appointed honorary professor at the Faculté des Lettres de Paris in September the same year, but was arrested by the Gestapo before he could take up the post. Because of the resistance activities of his son Pierre he was deported to Buchenwald on 15 August 1944. He died in March 1945, exhausted by forced labour in a quarry.

**Collective memory and its frameworks**

In the early years of the 1920s Halbwachs started to engage with the theme that would preoccupy him for the rest of his life: the social conditioning of individual memory and the postulation of a collective memory. It would result in three books, the last of which would be published posthumously.

**Collective memory in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire**

The first book, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, has two parts. The first four chapters establish a general theory of a socially constructed memory. The last three exemplify the collective memory in different societal groups:

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79 He already uses the term ‘mémorie collective’ in *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, for example in two of the chapter titles. The emphasis in that book, however, is primarily on the cadres collectifs de la mémoire, the collective frameworks of memory. *Mémoire collective* is more commonly used in the books *La Mémoire collective* and *La Topographie légendaire*.

80 Cf. *Editions, translations, languages* in the Introduction for an account of the coming into being of the books.

the family, religions, classes and professions. With the book, Halbwachs claims to offer a foundation for a sociological theory of memory. He introduces the central aspects of the collective memory by referring to a story of a nine- or ten-year-old girl who was found in the woods in Châlot. Her background could not be established, since she was unable to bring back the memory of her childhood. Halbwachs asks rhetorically what part of her memory this girl would retain, when she is separated from her family and the place where she used to live and forced to live in a place where the language, customs, and people do not resemble what she knew from before. For Halbwachs the girl lacks external factors of the environment and the milieu to enable her to reconstruct her own past. Because when we remember, he says, ‘we will certainly recognise that the greatest number of our memories come back to us when our parents, our friends, or other people remind us of them’. Halbwachs presents his theory as a response to psychological treatises on memory, which consider people as isolated beings. Instead, one should regard the mental operations of the individual in relation to the society he is part of, as this is where he acquires memories as well as recalls, recognises, and localises them. In everyday life we do not only remember ourselves; others help us to remember, or we remember when people ask us things or when we believe they could have asked us. The memory of people around us comes to our aid, and the groups that we belong to give us the means to reconstruct the past ‘on the condition that I turn towards them and adopt, at least temporarily, their way of thinking’. It is in this respect that Halbwachs wants us to see that something exists, which can be referred to as a collective memory, a faculty about which there is nothing mysterious. The individual thought places itself in relation to society, and by means of society’s frameworks it is capable of acts of recollection. The frameworks are also memories, he posits, but stable constructs, not simply constructed from accumulated individual recollections,

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82 ibid., VIII.
83 ibid., VI.
84 He explicates the critique in a later article: ‘There is a serious fault in classical, as well as in associationist and physiological, psychologies because they have limited themselves to the study of the isolated man. They have failed to recognize the many factors which stimulate him from the outside, such as the institutions, customs, and interactions of ideas and especially of language, which, from infancy throughout his life, condition his understanding, his feelings, and his behavior and attitudes in a manner impossible for a man in isolation’. Halbwachs, ‘Individual Consciousness and Collective Mind’, 812. My emphasis. This does not, however, alter the fact that individuals may naturally have different abilities for the ‘preservation of memories [conservation des souvenirs]. It varies from individual to individual, and, without doubt, from species [espèce] to species, outside of any social influence’. Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, VIII n. 1.
85 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, VI.
but shaped from a position in the social group. They are in accord with the predominant thought of society: ‘One could also say, indeed, that the individual remembers by placing himself in the standpoint of the group, and that the memory of the group realises and manifests itself in the individual memories’.

Also individual recollections are collective, according to Halbwachs, in the sense that they are stored, structured, and retrieved according to social frameworks. We make meaningful the memory of having walked alone or having seen or thought things without company by localising it in space, by analysing its form, and categorising it by giving it a name. We employ these frameworks to make it understandable and to inscribe it in a social setting. The reconstructive act of remembrance, he argues, needs to place itself in connection with the total system of general ideas in society ‘that many others than us possess, with people, groups, places, dates, the words and forms of language, with thoughts and ideas, that is with all the material and moral life of society, to which we belong or used to belong’. To understand disparate individual memories we need to internalise and overlay them with external structures, for instance of important events in society:

to recall a series of events, for example those that kept us occupied during the first month of the war, we have to ask questions like these: where was I before the mobilisation, at the moment when we learnt of the outcome of the battle of Charleroi, when Paris was threatened, etc.? It is essential that we position our recollections in relation to such societal events and to the overall spatial distribution. Only then is it possible to retrieve and fix the memories. The influence that collective frameworks have on individual thought not only affects processes of the reconstruction of the past, but equally the perception of the material world. Halbwachs argues that, as little as there is any purely individual memory that is not inscribed in frameworks, there is also no act of perception that does not, at the same time, define and categorise what is seen according to the conventions of the group.

Some of the individual memories, Halbwachs asserts, we reconstruct over and again, and in so doing we keep them attached to our emotions and identity. This has redefined them by positioning them in relation to different

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86 ibid., VIII.  
87 ibid., 23.  
88 ibid., 38.  
89 ibid., 34.  
90 ibid., 274–75.
systems of notions. They have lost their original form and cannot allow the reconstruction out of their parts. Instead,

we should compare them to the stones we find embedded in certain Roman houses, which have been used as materials in the buildings of ancient times, and which certify to their age only because they still show in the erased features the vestiges of old characters, which neither their form nor their appearance would betray.91

For Halbwachs, our recollections, especially those we return to the most, bear little resemblance to any original event or situation; instead, they are coloured by repeated use and only acquire their meaning in every period through the societal framework of that present.

When, like we believe, the collective memory essentially is a reconstruction of the past, when it adapts the image of the ancient events to the beliefs and to the spiritual needs of the present, the knowledge of what was originally is secondary, if not quite useless, since the reality of the past, as a perceptual model to which it has to conform, no longer exists.92

With Halbwachs, the collective memory does not implicate the study of the past, but of mechanisms of the collective psychology that shapes every group’s engagement with the past in the present.

Collective memory in La Mémoire collective

The posthumously published La Mémoire collective appears as a collection of essays, each of them bearing on the same overall theme, but treating different facets.93 It has been considered as a complement to the theory of memory outlined in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, addressing a memory of culture and values rather than a memory of phenomena.94 Some themes reoccur throughout the book, like, for example, that of childhood memories.

In the chapter ‘Mémoire individuelle et mémoire collective’ (‘Individual memory and collective memory’), Halbwachs expands on the collective character of memory outlined in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire. He reminds us that memories of events we experienced alone may also be recalled by others, like when friends whom we meet after a long time tell us of things we experienced on our own, but which we had forgotten about. In

91 ibid., 89.
94 Namer, ‘Postface [La Mémoire collective]’, 262.
the group we can reconstruct the past more fully than by ourselves. In reality, we are never alone. We carry with us at all times friends, relatives, and famous people, through whose opinions we perceive and remember what we experience. The often quoted passage from London, in which the author takes a walk with Dickens, exemplifies this clearly:

I arrive for the first time in London and I take a walk on several occasions, sometimes with one companion, sometimes with another. Now an architect directs my attention to the proportions and dispositions of the buildings. Now it is a historian: I understand how this street has been planned in such-and-such époque, how this house has witnessed the birth of a famous person, how noteworthy incidents took place here or there. With a painter, I am sensitive to the tonality of the parks, and the lines of the palaces, of the churches, the play of light and shadow on the walls and façades of Westminster, on Temple, on Thames. A merchant, a businessman drags me along in the popular routes of the City and stops in front of the shops, the bookshops, the department stores. But even if I have been walking unaccompanied, it is enough to have read the descriptions of the city to take in all the different points of view, the different aspects that I have been advised to look at, simply because I studied the plan. Suppose I took a walk on my own. Could one say that this walk, which I am not able to consider as individual memory, does not only belong to me? However, only in appearance did I walk alone. Passing before Westminster, I thought about what my historian friend told me (or, what counts as the same, what I have read in a history book). Crossing a bridge, I considered the effect of perspective that my painter friend pointed out (or that struck me in a painting, in an engraving). I let myself be directed by the aid of a map. The first time I went to London, the impressions I had in front of St. Paul’s or Mansion House, on the Strand, or in the vicinity of the law courts, reminded me of Dickens’s novels that I read in my childhood: I thus went walking with Dickens. In such moments, under such circumstances, I have not said that I was alone, that I reflected alone, because while thinking I placed myself in this or that group, the one I formed with the architect, or beyond him, with those for whom he was merely the interpreter, or with the painter (and his group), with the surveyor that has designed the plan, or with a novelist. Other people have had these recollections in common with me. Moreover, they help me to recall them: to improve my memory, I turn towards them, I adopt their viewpoint, I re-enter their group, and I continue to be part of it.  

The groups Halbwachs refers to do not necessarily and not only constitute living people whom we interact with in person, but also remote fellows like

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95 Halbwachs, *La Mémoire collective*, 52–3. In the translation I have tried to reflect the stylistic character of repetition and spoken language in the original passage, instead of opting for an idiomatic English.
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deceased relatives, colleagues we have never met, authors and thinkers, coreligionists, compatriots etc. Their influence stays with us whatever we do or recall. Thus, ‘A social “current of thought” is normally as invisible as the atmosphere that we breathe. We do not recognise its existence in everyday life except for when we resist it’.

A person’s individual remembering, consequently, stands at the intersection of a number of groups, whose currents of thought his thinking becomes impregnated with. We cannot always identify the source of the opinions or memories we express; they may stem from persons of this or that group, from newspapers or from books.

Halbwachs also points out that the collective memory can be viewed as the shared denominator of the memories of a group of individuals.

While the collective memory draws its strength and duration from its base in the body of people, it is nevertheless the individuals who remember, as members of the group. In this pool of shared memories, mutually supportive, some will appear with more intensity than others. We would readily acknowledge that each individual memory is a view on the collective memory, that this perspective changes according to the position I occupy, and that this place itself changes according to my relationships with other milieus. It is not surprising therefore that not everyone draws on the same parts of the common instrument.

The collective memory is not a supraindividual entity, but an abstracted notion that refers to the commonality of the pool of individual memories, all of which belong to the same group. It would not exist without the individuals who remember in detail; at the same time, it is more general and encompasses many more aspects than individual thought.

Memory and history
When the individual places himself in the position of the group, he can differentiate between the remembrances that agree with the current group’s collective memory and the remembrances that distinguish him from it. The latter, according to Halbwachs, forms an individual memory, which also lets itself be influenced by society. It uses words, ideas, and events that have taken place in society during or before the lifetime of the person. The borrowed remembrances are conceptions and symbols that the individual can call to mind, but not remember as if he had experienced it himself. In order to remember such an event in its entirety he would need to bring together

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96 ibid., 70.
97 ibid., 94.
disparate fragments dispersed among all group members. Halbwachs distinguishes between two kinds of memory,

one inner or internal, and one external, or a personal memory and a social memory. We could express it more precisely . . .: autobiographical memory and historical memory. The first would make use of the second, because the stories of our life belong, after all, to general history. Naturally, the latter covers much more than the first. On the other hand, it represents the past only in a condensed and schematic form, while the memory of our own life would present a richer and more continuous picture.98

The historical memory (mémoire historique) draws from an external base of a general history (l’histoire en general); the former is the individual’s memory of the latter, his perspective on it. The historical notations of names, dates, and anecdotes of the general history, Halbwachs suggests, are like the epitaphs of bygone events. ‘This history is in fact like a cemetery, where the space is limited, and where it is necessary, at all times, to find space for new graves’.99 Halbwachs argues that the relation of general history to the collective and the historical memory of the group is like the relation of death to life, the remains or traces of life that has been: ‘General history does not begin until tradition has ended, at the moment when the social memory fades or breaks down’.100 As long as the group remembers, history does not have to be written down; it is only under the threat of the dissolution of the group, when the individuals lose the social support to maintain the memory of sequences of events, that the need to record history appears, the point from which the memories of events transmute into history.

Paul Ricœur has pointed to what he deems an unexpected turn in Halbwachs’s introduction to the distinction between history and memory.

Did not the principal dividing line for which the author fought above pass between individual memory and collective memory . . .? And yet the difference is strongly marked: between individual memory and collective memory the connection is intimate, immanent, the two types of memory interpenetrate one another. This is the major thesis of the work. The same thing is not true of history inasmuch as it is not assigned to what is going to become ‘historical’ memory.101

98 ibid., 99.
99 ibid., 100.
100 ibid., 130.
Halbwachs identifies this rupture in the situation of school children who as coming members of the nation need to assimilate its history. The dates, facts, and events they learn can be thought of as nothing but external to their own previous experience. ‘The discovery of what is called historical memory’, as opposed to a general history, Ricœur continues, ‘consists in a genuine acculturation to externality. This acculturation is that of a gradual familiarization with the unfamiliar, with the uncanniness of the historical past’. Halbwachs’s postulations of, on the one hand, the rupture between memory and history and, on the other, the double fundament of historical facts, one in the historical memory of individual minds and one in external history writing, have affected the conception of memory in the works of subsequent memory scholars, including Pierre Nora and Aleida and Jan Assmann. In chapter five the first of the postulations will be reformulated in Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model of the communicative and cultural memory in order to avoid the dichotomy between history and memory. The second postulation offers a useful distinction for the spatial framework of memory between written history as a product of historians and the internalised history that is known by laypersons. When addressing imaginative remembering at historic sites the distinction is crucial, since it can enable us to distinguish between historic knowledge that may be documented in a certain building or site by archaeologists or historians and the imaginative experience of any person visiting a site where he is told a historic event played out or where a famous person lived. The former makes critical use of general history, the latter of individual historical memory.

Critique of the collective memory
Halbwachs’s theory has not been without critique. Colleagues and other contemporaries stood for the first assessments. In his review of Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, from the year of its publication, Marc Bloch raises the question of transmission in the collective memory:

How are memories passed down from generation to generation within a group? The answer obviously varies according to the group, but the question is too important to leave unanswered. Halbwachs, it seems to me, scarcely

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102 ibid., 394.
103 I will elaborate on this argument in Imaginative places – antëische Magie in chapter five.
addresses this question, most often limiting himself to explanations of a certain finality.\textsuperscript{104}

Halbwachs’s analysis of memory transmission from grandparents to grandchildren misses important aspects, Bloch argues, and he points to the different principles for the transmission of traditions in rural societies and in the towns. Halbwachs later incorporated this aspect in his reflections on childhood in \textit{La Mémoire collective}.\textsuperscript{105}

However, Halbwachs had already included a study of transmission in \textit{Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire}, although in the context of collective memory in Christianity.\textsuperscript{106} He identifies how priests take on the role of specialists who monopolise the transmission of the religious collective memory on behalf of the laity. Through rites and ceremonies they repeat the central aspects and ensure stability in the faith. Halbwachs argues that when the meaning of forms and formulas increasingly lost their meaning for subsequent generations, a need for interpretation arose and this gave birth to dogma.

Bloch relates the neglect of the study of transmission to Halbwachs’s use of language. As one of the first in the discourse on social memory after \textit{Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire}, Bloch accuses Halbwachs of a ‘slightly vague anthropomorphism’. Sentences like ‘“The group tends to erase from its memory everything that could divide individuals;” the group is, at certain times, “obligated to adopt new values, to emphasize new traditions that are more in accordance with its present-day needs”’, Bloch does not read as literal statements.

Such an omission [in Halbwachs’s formulations], from an author so well-informed about social life, is surprising enough to tempt one to fix the blame on something external to him, [like on] Durkheimian language … It is not that I have any objection to speaking of ‘collective memory,’ just as we speak of collective representations or collective consciousness. These terms are important and expressive, and their use is entirely legitimate, but on one


\textsuperscript{105} Halbwachs, \textit{La Mémoire collective}, 111–12. Halbwachs also contends that a group that persists for several generations, in reality, consists of several groups: ‘But the body of people that constitutes the same group in two successive periods are like two sections in contact with their opposite ends, but which are not connected in any other way and which do not really form one body’. It is the persistence of external distinctions like places, names, and the general character of the group that gives the appearance of continuation of the group. Halbwachs, \textit{La Mémoire collective}, 132.

\textsuperscript{106} Halbwachs, \textit{Les Cadres sociaux}, 178–221, esp. 17–19. I will return to the spatial framework of religious collective memory in the next chapter.
condition: that we do not automatically subsume all of the realities that we label ‘individual memory’ under the name of ‘collective memory’.

The critique offered by Bloch, I should note, is inscribed in a general appreciation for Halbwachs’s ‘extremely rich and suggestive work’, a person he argues has formulated ‘some of the great metaphysical doctrines of our time’, and who ‘pushes us to reflect on the conditions of the historical development of humanity’.

Like Bloch, psychologist and philosopher Charles Blondel, a Durkheimian and colleague from the University of Strasbourg, does call for the distinction between individual remembering and collective remembering and is critical of Halbwachs’s avoidance of the role of sensory intuition and perception for memory. Not to confuse our own experience with that of the neighbour, the reconstruction of ‘this empirically, logically, socially possible past to appear to correspond to our real past, it is necessary that this reconstruction consist[s], at least partly, of something more than commonly shared materials’. Some of this commonly shared material could consist of sensory impressions we keep in memory.

Halbwachs responds to Blondel’s critique, arguing that any memory image would need to be situated within the framework that the person was immersed in when it happened, and any recall of the event would necessarily need to address the framework in relation to which the memory image has been kept. In fact, only as social beings do we have the ability to keep any impressions, he posits.

Like Bloch, Bartlett offers a critique of Halbwachs’s tendency towards anthropomorphism in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, which consists in treating the group or the collective as a subject capable of remembering:

Certainly most of [Halbwachs’s] remarks, in so far as it is possible to give them clear significance, seem to be both true and important. Certainly also Halbwachs is justified in going on to speak in a similar manner of memory in the religious group and in the social class. Yet he is still treating only of memory in the group, and not of memory of the group. As to the former, there need be no dispute whatever.

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108 ibid., 150, 55.
110 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 69.
111 ibid., 67.
Bartlett argues that there cannot be a memory of the group, and therefore no theories of social memory can exist, only of the social determination of remembering. It is my belief that Halbwachs intended to clear his postulations of any such associations, and, in proposing terms such as ‘the collective memory’, or ‘collective frameworks of memory’, he offers convenient abstractions of a theory based on the idea of a socially determined individual memory.\textsuperscript{113} I believe that, in order to speak of socially conditioned individual memory from the perspective of groups or society, there is a need for a set of abstractions that refer to common denominators of a greater number of memories. The term ‘collective memory’, my reading of Halbwachs tells me, does not, by any means, designate any supraindividual or metaphysical subject with its own faculty of memory. It is but an abstraction for processes and entities of thought that are outside of the control of any single individual.

A second period of criticism of Halbwachs’s theory can be said to begin in the formative years of humanistic memory studies in the late 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{114} Amos Funkenstein, like his predecessors Bloch, Blondel, and Bartlett, emphasises the individual base of remembering. He accepts Halbwachs’s term ‘collective memory’ as a description of certain aspects of remembering, as long as one accepts the condition that individual recollection can never be removed from the social context. And while he praises Halbwachs’s work on the collective memory for its merits in understanding historical consciousness, he also makes an objection: ‘Halbwachs does not refrain in his analysis from hypostatization of collective memory, even though he is aware that only the individual remembers sensu

\begin{footnotes}
\item[113] Halbwachs meets the critique in two articles published in the US in 1938 and 1939. In the first he stresses that social interaction needs to be taken into account when considering individual psychology: ‘a collective mentality exists [which] exerts an influence upon all the functions of individual mentality which cannot be understood or explained without it. The consciousness of an individual is not self-sufficient; the ideas of associated men must be related to each other and be considered as parts of a whole which completely penetrates, directs, and organizes them’. Halbwachs, ‘Individual Psychology and Collective Psychology’, 616. In the second he clarifies his position that collective thought is based only in the individual mind: ‘The collective thought is not a metaphysical entity which must be sought in a world apart, in a world equally metaphysical. It exists and is realized only in individual consciousness. It is, in short, only a certain order of arrangements or relationships between individual minds; it is the states of consciousness of a greater or lesser number of individuals comprising the group. For this reason it cannot be understood at all if it is confined within the individual mind; and it is necessary, in order to reach it and study it, to seek in the manifestations and expressions of the entire group taken as a whole’. Halbwachs, ‘Individual Consciousness and Collective Mind’, 818.
\end{footnotes}
When Halbwachs describes collective mentalities as if they had an existence by themselves, like the ‘spirit of the nation’, it is, according to Funkenstein, a romantic inclination of his. We shall return to accusations of hypostatisation later in the thesis, especially in relation to the critique of Rossi’s and Halbwachs’s theories of memory in architectural theory.

More recently, Ricœur sets out to denounce ‘the illusory attribution of memories to ourselves, when we claim to be their original owners’, essentially putting up a defence for Halbwachs’s fundamental postulate of the social conditioning of remembering. His argument, however, evolves into what he considers a ‘rapprochement’ of the ‘sociology of collective memory’ with the ‘phenomenology of individual memory’. He suggests staying with the two models, though complementing them:

Does there not exist an intermediate level of reference between the poles of individual memory and collective memory, where concrete exchanges operate between the living memory of individual persons and the public memory of the communities to which we belong? This is the level of our close relations, to whom we have a right to attribute a memory of a distinct kind. [Ricœur concludes his argument] not with the single hypothesis of the polarity between individual memory and collective memory … but with the hypothesis of the threefold attribution of memory: to oneself, to one’s close relations, and to others. 

Astrid Erll twists the perspective and offers an altogether different model for understanding collective memory. With the support of Jeffrey K. Olick, and with reference to the conceptualisations of memory by Nora and by Aleida and Jan Assmann, she distinguishes between two levels of memory. The first is biologically based and shaped in social contexts; the second refers to a symbolic order, administered by media, cultural and political institutions, and through the practices of social groups. She points out that societies do not remember, but their reconstruction of the past bears resemblance to processes of biological memory. For the proposal of the spatial framework of memory as a cultural theory, I will adhere to Erll’s distinction. For our concern with

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116 Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 122.
117 ibid., 131–32. Dessingué suggests that Ricœur’s writings offer a paradigm shift in relation to the widely perceived dichotomy of individual and collective memory, established by the works of Bergson and Halbwachs, and perpetuated throughout the twentieth century. By subscribing to a notion of a dialogical nature of remembering we are asked to see the multidirectional processes between an inner self and others as fundamental to any kind of remembering. Dessingué, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Memory and Forgetting’, 173.
architecture, with respect to its material forms and its conceptual representations in the mind, such a model provides certain advantages. With the communicative memory and the cultural memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann) we may distinguish between an informal and everyday form of remembering and a formal and institutionalised form. Chapter five will discuss this model in depth.

I will also lay as a premise of this thesis the construal of Halbwachs’s theory that ‘individual memory’ should be considered as a socially constructed form of remembering that cannot be separated from the social context it is immersed in, and which does not stand in opposition to a ‘collective memory’, but is its basis. As a consequence, I see the group members’ memories as specific viewpoints of the collective memory of the group and the collective memory as an abstraction for the shared denominator of these socially conditioned individual memories.

Frameworks of memory

To remember, Halbwachs posits, is fundamentally a constructive act that attempts to turn fragments of impressions into understandable representations by borrowing from the social situation of the present. Only by placing remembrance in the frameworks of time, space, and the social milieu, as they exist at the time of remembering, we can get meaning out of meaningless fragments. The frameworks of memory are not only for memory but also of memory; they are constructs in memory ‘made up entirely of psychological states’. But there is a difference between singular images of memory and the frameworks, Halbwachs explains.

Let us pause for a moment to explain in what sense the disappearance or transformation of frameworks of memory leads to the disappearance or transformation of our memories. There can be two hypotheses. Either there exists between the framework and the [memories of] events that take place a relationship, even though the two are not made of the same substance, like the frame of a painting and the canvas that sits in it. We could think of the bed of a river, whose banks see the water pass by without projecting anything other than a superficial reflection. Or the framework and the events [in memory] are identical by nature: the events are memories, but the framework is also made up of memories. The difference between the former and the latter is that the latter is more stable so we need to observe them at every moment and use

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119 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 103.
them to recover and reconstruct the former. It is the second hypothesis we rally to the support of.\textsuperscript{120}

Bergson had formulated the first hypothesis. Halbwachs clarifies his own position through his rejection of Bergson’s. The latter distinguished between two kinds of memory: one that records in unique memory images the events of our life with their original temporal and spatial contexts, and a second, habitual memory, ‘always bent upon action’ and created on the basis of many successive experiences.\textsuperscript{121} Halbwachs argues explicitly against Bergson that in the act of remembering we start from the present,

from the system of general ideas that are always at hand, from language and the points of reference given by society, that is to say, all means of expression it makes available to us, which we combine to recall either a detail or a nuance of past figures or events, and, generally, our state of consciousness in the past.\textsuperscript{122}

The means we have at hand include language and notions, but also social relations, places and dates. Memories, emotions, and thoughts become inscribed in the total framework of the material and moral life of the groups we belong to; they are connected to our understanding of history, geography, biography, politics, and other familiar frames of reference.\textsuperscript{123} In discussions with others or in personal recollection we connect our intimate remembrances with a social body of thought.\textsuperscript{124} In this way, he argues, what happens to us, and what we remember, is coloured with meaning and significance by the collective frameworks of memory.

It has been noted earlier in this chapter that the \textit{collective memory} can be understood as the common denominator of the individual memory of the group members, as an abstract concept. The \textit{collective frameworks of memory}, differently, should be seen as ‘the result, the sum, the combination of individual recollections of many members of the same society’.\textsuperscript{125} The collective frameworks of memory do not refer to an abstract denominator, but simply to the totality of possible thought in society or in the group. Each

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item 120 ibid., 98.
\item 121 Bergson, \textit{Matter and Memory}, 82. Cf. Bergsonian influence in this chapter. This distinction, which Halbwachs notes is fundamental to psychology, had earlier appeared in Samuel Butler’s \textit{Life and Habit}, published in 1878. Halbwachs refers to Butler, distinguishing between vivid and clear memories of things we have done less often, which strike us with one hard blow, and familiar memories of things we have done repeatedly, but which we often do not remember where and when we have learnt. Halbwachs, \textit{Les Cadres sociaux}, 99 n. 1; S Butler, \textit{Life and Habit} (London, Trübner, 1878).
\item 122 Halbwachs, \textit{Les Cadres sociaux}, 25.
\item 123 ibid., 38–39.
\item 124 ibid., 145.
\item 125 ibid., VII.
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individual holds his part of the totality, and these parts are characterised by their commonality, not by their idiosyncrasy. Involvement in the different groups provides the individual with sets of social constraints within which he reconstructs the past.\textsuperscript{126} It is in relation to the collective framework of the present that we remember; remembrance is the reconstruction of the past attained through the use of elements borrowed from the present. As society changes, the collective frameworks of memory are redefined, and consequently each period in the history of a society will provide different frameworks for the reconstruction of the past. Their slow change, however, gives the appearance of a stable frame of reference, and they can easily be taken to stand outside of the passage of time.\textsuperscript{127} The same notions of the frameworks may be constant over time; their understanding in each period, however, will differ. We can get access to the frameworks of earlier times by starting from the present, by means of reasoning or analogical thinking.\textsuperscript{128} The further back in time we go, the coarser the framework, and the less events we will be able to identify through the framework.

The adaptation of the spatial framework to changes in the physical environment is a continuous process of the mind, leaving older versions of the framework behind.

Every time we place one of our impressions in the framework of our current ideas, the framework transforms the impression, but the impression, in its turn, modifies the framework. It is a new moment, a new place that we add to our time, to our space; it is a new aspect of our group that makes us see it in a new light.\textsuperscript{129}

The continuous adaptation makes us go from one framework to the next, but each framework differs slightly from the previous. A new person changes the configuration of the social framework; a new place or a new moment is added to the frameworks of space and time. Since every individual belongs to several groups, for instance the family, a professional group, and a community, he comes to sustain several collective frameworks into which he can insert memories and impressions.\textsuperscript{130} A single event in memory may thus come to acquire different meanings in relation to different frameworks. Any changes that take place will not only alter the specific elements of the framework, but all of its relations to other elements and frameworks.

\textsuperscript{126} ibid., 110–11.
\textsuperscript{127} ibid., 289.
\textsuperscript{128} ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{129} ibid., 135.
\textsuperscript{130} ibid., 144.
In the *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* Halbwachs spends some time discussing the dynamic relation between memory images and the frameworks in the reconstructive process of memory. The frameworks can either help reconstruct images or series of images by positioning them socially, temporally, or spatially. Or singular memory images can contribute to localising and establishing the surrounding framework – the milieu, the time, or the place.\(^{131}\) There always exists, so Halbwachs argues, a general aspect of unique memory images that can be linked to the current frameworks of memory.\(^{132}\) This is explained by the fact that both the individual images and the framework of memory are constructs of the mind.

The historical framework of memory, outlined in *La Mémoire collective*, Halbwachs describes as somewhat different from other frameworks. When a person learns history in school or through history books, as it were, elements from general history are internalised into that person’s historical memory.\(^{133}\) What appears to the individual to be an external framework is appropriated, and personal memories from early life are reinterpreted in relation to this framework.\(^{134}\) The external, and often national, history manifests itself in specific memories like names, dates, and events, which are internalised into the individual’s historical framework of memory.\(^{135}\) The internalised historical framework of memory shows a different character than the social framework in which the child was immersed during childhood, but it is also employed to localise memories. The social framework, however, is more living and natural than the former, and it is better suited to provide a framework in which the individual can base his thought and reconstruct the past.\(^{136}\) ‘Ordinarily, the nation is too remote from the individual for him to consider the history of his country as anything else but a very large framework, with which his own history makes contact only at a few points’.\(^{137}\) Halbwachs establishes a concept pair that I will develop further in relation to Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theory. The general history, written down by historians, exists as a mind-external framework that the individual can consult by means of reading; the historical memory exists for him as a mind-internal framework that can be consulted by means of reflection. Both assist acts of memory. Concerning architecture I will similarly distinguish between the physical building, as an external spatial framework that supports

\(^{131}\) ibid., 101.
\(^{132}\) ibid., 103.
\(^{133}\) Cf. the earlier discussion on historical memory in *Memory and history* in this chapter.
\(^{134}\) Halbwachs, *La Mémoire collective*, 103.
\(^{135}\) ibid., 113.
\(^{136}\) ibid., 118.
\(^{137}\) ibid., 128.
the reconstructions of the past, and the mental representation of it, as an internal spatial framework.

The postulation that frameworks are structural underpinnings of remembering is not an idiosyncrasy of Halbwachs’s. Other theories of the first part of the twentieth century saw similar conceptualisations. In 1904 biologist Richard Semon suggested that complexes of memory traces, or engram-complexes, could be activated in their whole, when memory received sensory stimuli. In 1932 Bartlett used schema to refer to ‘an active organisation of past reactions [to stimuli], or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response’. Schemata do not refer to mental storehouses of percepts or memory images, but living notions, constantly developing with an effect on all sensational experience, he argues.

More recently, memory scholar John Sutton has included Halbwachs as one of the forerunners of the study of situated cognition and social scaffolding of thought. Social psychologist Gerald Echterhoff has reviewed the collective frameworks of memory in the light of similar developments in psychology. He argues that Halbwachs’s conception of frameworks ‘in an exemplary fashion connects to the contemporary stronger empirically founded state of research … Thereby the productive potential in Halbwachs’s work manifests itself, also in light of current psychological attempts’. Jan Assmann has pointed to the similarity between the frameworks in Halbwachs’s theory and frame analysis proposed by Erving Goffman, a theory that ‘delves into the social prestructure or organization of everyday experience’.

For this thesis’ attempt to better understand the role of architecture for social remembering Halbwachs’s postulation of the frameworks of memory enables us to draw a crucial distinction between architecture that is perceived and architecture that is conceived, remembered. While Halbwachs argued that the understanding of the spatial framework of memory is that of architecture conceived in the mind, the discussion in chapter five will propose the physical environment as a mind-external framework of memory,

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139 Bartlett, *Remembering*, 201.
thus expanding on some discussions inherent in Halbwachs’s thinking as well as on the development of his theory through Aleida and Jan Assmann.

Remembering and forgetting
In Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Halbwachs makes it clear that remembering, as an activity, is entirely dependent on the frameworks of memory. Only when memory fragments are placed in relation to the frameworks of one or several groups is the individual able to reconstruct and make meaning of the past. Forgetting, he postulates, is explained by the disappearance of the frameworks, or parts of them. Singular memories may relate themselves to several frameworks (temporal, spatial, social), and the more often they appear in the frameworks, or at the points of their intersections, the less the risk of forgetting. From time to time society or the group changes – the social organisation of the group may be remodelled because of births, deaths, and marriages, a family may move to a new city, and buildings may be demolished or new ones erected. Such changes cause the group to alter its corresponding frameworks and the cues for certain memories may disappear.

The person who resists changes to the group memory and to the frameworks, and who clings to things that the group has stopped talking about, for example the name of dead ancestors, is like a person who sees what others do not see. He behaves as if he was suffering from hallucinations, Halbwachs explains. Under the social pressure of the group he will keep quiet, and soon also he forgets what no one around him talks about.

Halbwachs introduces additional aspects of forgetting in La Mémoire collective that support and expand the formulations of Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire. An important reason for forgetting he attributes to the separation from a group. He takes as an example the teacher who meets one of his former pupils again. It is likely that the pupil will recall the teacher, but not the teacher the pupil. The teacher has seen many classes over the years and at the end of each year they all scattered. This is true for the pupils as well, Halbwachs explains, but for them the class is less ephemeral and lives on for some time. They belong to the same age and maybe the same social circle. The teacher does not belong to the group in the same manner. The teacher performed the same function in all the classes, but the teacher left a unique

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143 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 279.
144 ibid., 167.
145 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 56.
imprint on all the pupils through his person and his teaching, a memory that the pupils share and remember with the help of one another.

Halbwachs gives another example. Suppose we lose contact with a group of people that we have previously spent time with on a trip. The other members, meanwhile, have continued to socialise. Upon meeting a person from that group again, we may realise that we have forgotten all about it, but he can tell us of things that he remembers from the journey. We could also have remembered, Halbwachs argues, if we had stayed in contact with the group, sharing the subsequent discussions. ‘For if that first recollection [of our individual memory] is obliterated’, he explains, ‘it can no longer be retrieved, because we have, for a long time, not belonged to the group in whose memory it is retained’.\textsuperscript{146} However, the loss of the first recollection can never be total. There always exist certain fragments, which, given the right context, could be used for reconstruction:

there is no such thing as an absolute void \textit{[vide absolu]} in memory, that is to say, regions of our past that are so emptied from our memory that any image projected onto them cannot associate itself with a memory element, where the imagination remains pure and simple, or the historical representation remains external to us.\textsuperscript{147}

Bergson had argued that we forget nothing, because our past is retained in its entirety in memory through complete images of events, with intrinsic references to time and place. Forgetting, he explains, can be explained by obstacles in the behaviour of the brain. Remembering is in part due to the removal of these obstacles. Explicitly against Bergson’s thesis of internal obstacles that cause forgetting, Halbwachs proposes that

what remains are not ready-made images in some subterranean gallery of our thought. Rather, we find in society all the indications necessary to reconstruct those parts of our past that are represented in incomplete or indistinct manner or which we even believe have been completely removed from our memory.\textsuperscript{148}

An incomplete memory makes use of frameworks that pertain to the society outside in order to reconstruct the past. The actualisation of earlier experiences by returning to an environment or seeing a friend may give access to the framework we need in order to reconstruct the past out of the

\textsuperscript{146} ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{147} ibid., 126.
Edifices

fragments. Forgetting, so Halbwachs’s hypothesis can be summarised, should be attributed to changing definitions, unavailability, or loss of the frameworks of memory, the disappearance of outer stimuli that previously had actualised the frameworks of memory: dispersal of the group itself, displacement from, or destruction of the environment of the group. Due to the limitation of how long collective memories can persist, Jan Assmann reasons, Halbwachs’s theory of memory has the priceless advantage of also being a theory of forgetting. Moreover, the theory could address collective forgetting, because if the frameworks that are shared by a group disappear, forgetting affects all its members. Yerushalmi argues that the latter does not refer to past events in the group members’ lives, like individual forgetting does, but rather to the present.

When we say that a people ‘remembers’ we are really saying that a past has been actively transmitted to the present generation and that this past has been accepted as meaningful. Conversely, a people ‘forgets’ when the generation that now possesses the past does not convey it to the next, or when the latter rejects what it receives and does not pass it onward, which is to say the same thing. The break in transmission can occur abruptly or by a process of erosion. But the principle remains. A people can never ‘forget’ what it never received in the first place.

Collective forgetting becomes an issue of transmission, sustenance, and alteration; the collective frameworks of the group define what should be remembered in active or passive acts of recall in the present. In chapter five I shall return to the question of forgetting and discuss the merits of its re-evaluation in the model of Aleida and Jan Assmann.

A basis for the spatial framework of memory

This chapter has addressed how the theory of collective memory is the result of a delicate work of synthesis. Through Halbwachs’s three books a complex conceptualisation of memory is drawn up, which builds on the postulates of his intellectual forefathers, Bergson, Leibniz, and Durkheim. He develops ideas, refines them, and positions himself against them. The construal of the collective memory in this thesis, on the one hand, is based on the careful appreciation of the origin of Halbwachs’s thought. On the other, it is determined by the use I will make of it as a theoretical premise for the spatial framework of memory.

149 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 48.
150 Yerushalmi, Zakhor, 109.
A central claim of the collective memory is that all individual memory is conditioned by the social groups the individual is inscribed in – the family, a profession, a religious community etc. Only by the means of frameworks, collectively shared notions of time, of space, of social relations, and of language, is the individual able to reconstruct the past. Halbwachs opposes Bergson’s suggestion that memory images remain in memory as vivid and complete units, including spatial and temporal specifications. Instead, he argues that fragmentary images need to be localised in the collective frameworks to acquire meaning. The frameworks can be seen as common denominators of separate memories that are stored in memory independently from the images – they took place at the same time of the day, in the same house, or with the same people. They change with time to comply with the views of current society and of the group. The group can only remember what the frameworks enable them to reconstruct; with the alterations or loss of frameworks comes forgetting. In this way, Halbwachs’s theory is a theory of memory as well as forgetting.

The frameworks are essentially mind-internal constructs that enable remembering. They are in part conceptualisations of external things. For instance, the historical frameworks of memory Halbwachs regards as a scheme of dates, names, and places internalised from an external framework of general history, written down in books. Similarly, the material framework refers to the physical environment that presents itself to the senses and lends itself to various practical uses. It makes up a counterpart to the internal spatial framework of memory. In a similar way, it is possible to think of the social framework of memory, for example in the family, as the conception that we have of our relatives, their personalities, and our relationships with them. It is the internal and notional construct that has its counterpart in the physical and social bodies that the group consists of.

Some of the critics of the collective memory have accused it of anthropomorphising the group, of treating it as a subject on a par with individuals, and of hypostatising the abstract notion of collective memory. Halbwachs maintains that there is nothing mystical about collective memory and it does not exist as a supraindividual entity. Instead, it should be understood as the influence that the group psychology has on individual thought. To refer to collective memory, or to collective frameworks, is to refer to the common aspects of a great number of memories spread out over the group members’ individual memory faculties.

These are some of the fundamental aspects of the collective memory. To comprehend the concept of the spatial framework of memory presupposes the general characteristics of frameworks of memory, of which the spatial is but
one. To agree with the postulation of the spatial framework means to agree with the argument that the basic workings of memory depend on frameworks. It is with such recognition in mind that we turn to the next chapter and to Halbwachs’s conception of the role of space for memory.
The spatial framework of memory and collective landmarks

But it happens whenever a collective memory has a double object, on the one hand, a material reality, a person, a monument, a place in space, and, on the other hand, a symbol, that is to say the spiritual significance which, in the mind of the group, attaches itself and superposes the reality. Suppose the group breaks up. Some of the members stay in the place, in the presence of the material object, in contact with it. The others leave, carrying with them the image of the object. At the same time the object changes. The very place it occupies no longer remains the same, because all that surrounds it transforms. It no longer bears the same relations to the different parts of the material world that surrounds it.

— Maurice Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 1941

In the previous chapter we arrived at a rudimentary understanding of the collective memory and the workings of its frameworks. I shall now turn to the specific concept of the spatial framework of memory to see how it ends up as a crystallisation point in the interface between theories concerned with architecture, memory, social life, and cultural forms. The concept, so I suggest, has been veiled by its position as one of the pillars of the collective memory, and this chapter aims at highlighting this particular aspect of the theory.

The linguistic similarity between the spatial, the social, and the temporal framework of memory betrays the fundamental aspects that they share. They are, in essence, mental constructs that each individual sustains in his mind.

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What makes the spatial framework dissimilar from the others is that it is commonly interwoven in an interdependent relationship with a physical dimension. Time and social relations outside of the human mind are not tangible in the same sense as furniture, buildings, or cities. This does not mean, however, that the spatial framework is less conceptual than the others. In this chapter I will demonstrate the richness, complexity, and consistency of the concept that Halbwachs developed in the three books on memory, arguing for its recognition as a fundamental contribution to a theoretical framework for addressing the intersection of architecture and societal memory.

As will become clear in the next two chapters, architectural thinkers embraced Halbwachs’s thinking on space already in the 1960s, making him one of the most important references for highly influential books that shaped a generation of architects. In this chapter I will reassess the spatial framework in its original context and put it forward as a concept that could, once more, and differently than in Kevin Lynch’s and Aldo Rossi’s studies, benefit studies in architecture and memory. In a similar fashion as their works, however, this study is motivated by a concern for deficient attention to humanistic values in architecture and urban planning.

Because of my emphasis on the concept of the spatial framework of memory as a free-standing theoretical framework, and because of its intended application in concerns of contemporary society, I will make a selection of those elements that contribute to the ambitions. Consequently, other elements will not be treated, for instance some of the phenomenal reflections and some matters primarily of historical interest. Since I deal with only certain aspects of a larger theory, I will, from time to time, jump from one place in a book to another in order to keep the focus on the same aspects, thus reading it in a different order than most readers would. I will discuss each book separately, but occasionally I will let the thinking of another source complement the discussion.

Before we continue, let me emphasise that for Halbwachs the spatial framework of memory refers to the mental conceptualisation that the individual holds of an environment. It is individually based in the cognitive faculty of the brain, but at the same time it represents a unique point of view on the collective spatial framework. It could, but does not need to, correspond to a physical environment. The mental conception could be imagined or acquired from fictive places in books or films. The spatial framework of memory, thus, does not denote material buildings or landscapes, but refers to a notion that may stand in a relation to them.
Selected parts of the physical environment of a group play important roles for their spatial framework of memory, entering into a dependence of reciprocal influence. Halbwachs’s use of language, like when he refers to ‘spatial framework’ but leaves out ‘memory’, may sometimes give the impression that it equals the built environment that the individual moves in or perceives. In my understanding, he does not use ‘spatial framework (of memory)’ to refer to the built environment; it is when he uses terms like ‘material frameworks’ (‘cadres matériels’) that he explicitly refers to the organisation or the perception of the physical environment. In Halbwachs’s theory the material environment can be considered the physical counterpart to the spatial framework of memory in the same way that the living members are the counterparts to the concept the individual has of social relations in the social framework of memory. In chapter five, as an extension of Halbwachs’s reasoning, and with the support of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theories, I will propose to regard the material framework as a spatial framework of memory, but of a different kind. Existing as a mind-external rather than a mind-internal framework, it enables the distinction between architecture as material and as mental aid for the memory, both with direct influence on processes of memory.

The spatial framework of memory in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire

Formation of the spatial framework of memory

The formation of the frameworks of memory takes place in childhood. In a passage about the social life and memory of the child in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Halbwachs presents the first considerations of the spatial framework of memory. The social frame of reference of the child of ten or twelve years is somewhat limited, he explains, and it sustains only a vague idea of society as a whole. It belongs to a smaller social circle of the family and friends, whose daily life takes place around the home, in certain rooms, gardens, or streets. Sensational and everyday events take place within this limited environment: ‘Thus, because of the habitual contact that we have with certain objects and people and the repeated impressions of our surroundings,

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3 M Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, ed. G Namer (1925; facs. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1994), 95–98. The passage is omitted in Coser’s English translation. Because of the non-existence of this passage in English language, I will allow myself to quote extensively from this part to provide a smaller corpus of his thinking on space to English speakers.
the dominant images eventually engrave themselves more deeply than others in our mind’. Halbwachs continues the line of reasoning with a quote from Goethe’s autobiography:

When we desire to recall what befell us in the earliest period of youth, it often happens that we confound what we have heard from others with that which we really possess from our own direct experience … [Therefore] I am conscious that we lived in an old house, which in fact consisted of two adjoining houses, that had been opened into each other.

Halbwachs explains that for Goethe the spaces he subsequently describes in detail constitute the framework in which a whole period of his life took place. Rhetorically, he asks to what extent Goethe’s methodical arrangement of the text and clarity in the pictures agrees with the author’s clear and graphic conception and with what the child really saw.

What is often kept in memory of a house where we used to live is less the layout of the rooms, as they would be shown on an architectural plan, than impressions, which, if we wanted to place them in relation to each other, would maybe not make sense and sometimes contradict each other.

While the child is limited to only some environments, the adult possesses a larger frame of reference. ‘Certainly’, Halbwachs points out,

for the adult, the house he lives in and the places in the city he frequently visits most often constitute something like a framework, but he knows that it is only a part of a larger defined totality, and he has an idea of the proportions of the parts in relation to the totality: the spatial framework that encloses the thought of the adult is therefore much larger.

In this way, we should understand the relative importance of the home environment for the child’s thought compared to that of the adult, for whom it only makes up a smaller part of the total spatial framework of memory.

Besides, when we speak about a spatial framework, we do not mean something that resembles a geometrical figure. Sociologists have shown that in many primitive tribes space is not thought of as a homogeneous environment, but its parts are differentiated by the mystical qualities attributed to them: a specific region, a specific direction that is under command of a

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4 ibid., 95.
7 ibid., 97.
spirit or is identified with a specific clan of the tribe. Similarly, the different rooms of a house, specific nooks, specific pieces of furniture, or in the vicinity of the house, a specific garden, a specific street corner, because they usually evoke vivid impressions in the child’s mind and are associated with specific family members, with its games, with specific events, unique or recurring, because its imagination has animated and transfigured them, in some way they acquire an emotional value [for the child].

The spatial framework is fully immersed in the social life of the child, and thus the different places and the associations act like a system of notions set in a spatial structure. This associative spatiality of the child Halbwachs sees as a physical environment that has been internalised and memorised. If architectural principles, material properties, and physical laws define the external world, then social and emotional connotations determine the spatial framework. The internal representation of space sustains a relationship with the physical environment, but does not share the same logic.

The spatial framework of memory and the material framework
For the adult, the home takes a similar role as for the child. If he was to leave a house in which he has spent a part of his life, it could appear as if he was leaving that part of his life behind. And in fact, Halbwachs explains, when the environment is not there anymore, and it stops to evoke the spatial framework in the person’s memory through its presence, there is a danger that the memories associated with all the places in that part of the framework may be forgotten. However, many of the memories from that period will cling to other objects, places, or reflections outside the realm of the home, or a meeting with people who have a relation to that place may evoke the period. For the adult, that environment forms only a minor part of the total framework of space and can more easily be considered dispensable. For the child, differently, a larger share of its framework may have been lost and with it its whole life and all the memories attached to its places and objects.

If a household is dispersed, the family scattered or extinguished, [the child] can count only on itself to preserve the image of his home and everything associated with it. The image, moreover, is suspended in emptiness, since his mind was confined to the delimiting framework, and since he only has an ever so imprecise idea of its place in the totality of other images, a totality that he only encountered after it had already ceased to exist.

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8 ibid.
9 ibid., 98.
For the adult, the spatial framework of memory is not equally dependent on input from the environment that corresponds to it, to the material framework. Halbwachs makes clear the intimate relationship that exists between the two. We should not confuse them. The spatial framework of memory is formed by repeated interaction with the environment, but the resulting construction is not the representation of a geometrical reality, rather a notion created out of it, a conceptualisation.

When the individual is present in a part of the environment, the framework conceived in the mind amalgamates with the perception and produces a total image in his conscious mind. The space of the framework complements and contextualises the perceptive input. It expands the spatial awareness to encompass areas outside of the immediate perception, so that the person knows which room, garden, or street he can expect to find if he was to move out through the door. The framework also lends meanings and associations to space. For instance, a bed that a person observes in a room may be associated with the idea of the child that normally sleeps there and the person’s emotional affiliations to that child. The environment, through its presence to the senses, evokes the spatial framework of memory and the memories and emotions associated with it, and it gives it a sense of reality. Two persons, or two social groups, may assign different meaning to the same environment and, consequently, the spatial framework of the place comes to carry different associative arrangements. Whereas the bed for one of them is associated with his child, for the other it may give associations to his own childhood. The materiality in front of both of them is appreciated and conceived differently.

In the fourth chapter of Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Halbwachs addresses localisation processes of remembrance, the searches in mind that one performs in order to become ‘conscious of the moment in which one has established [acquis] a memory’. 10 If we recognise a person, or an image crosses our mind, we cannot localise the memory until we have become conscious of who or what or what place or situation the person or image relates to etc. It is an intellectual and reflective activity of the mind, he says, that establishes the memories, contextualises, and enriches them.

Localisation does not go through the images, but through the continuity or similarity of frameworks, he argues. He exemplifies this with a self-lived experience of watching the Vallula Massif in Vorarlberg, with its jagged summits standing out against a peculiar blue sky, with two or three pink clouds, and suddenly being reminded of a similar landscape he had thought

10 ibid., 114.
of another evening. At first unable to locate it, it was not until he could place it in relation to a spatial, temporal, and social framework that he could fully remember the similar experience at Saint-Gervais:

I had the impression of an image, for a moment suspended in the void, and which coincided almost exactly with the picture [of the landscape] that unfolded in front of me. It all happened as if a memory arose, without any help from the contexts of time, place, and environment, and it took me almost a minute to explore in my thought the time and place in which it could be placed and to recover its framework.\(^{11}\)

Halbwachs brings in Bergson to assert his own standpoint. Bergson would argue that it is the similarity between the current impression and the memory image that causes the latter to occur in our mind. This helps us to localise the impression. Halbwachs proposes instead that we should understand it as if the frame of mind (*cadre psychique*) that is caused by current impressions of the environment can be localised with the help of the spatial framework of memory. The latter consists of fairly stable notions that we can actualise in mind at any moment to render the current percept complete or meaningful. Halbwachs’s postulation offers a radical twist to the idea of Bergson (and other thinkers) that association in memory goes from one singular percept or memory image to another. Instead, Halbwachs asks us to recognise that it happens as a result of similarities in more stable concepts of space: the one created in mind upon seeing the environment, the other conjured up from memory. Spaces and spatial conceptualisations, rather than perceptual images, connote other spaces and conceptualisations. We should consider that the ability to remember in spatial situations might depend more on spatial understanding than on vivid impressions and memories.

*Remember other things*

By defining space in memory as a framework and not as inherent properties of memory images, like Bergson had done, Halbwachs gives it an essentially different character, emphasising its notional, dynamic, and schematic nature rather than its mathematical and geometrical. What the framework loses in terms of detail and accuracy, it gains in familiarity, flexibility, and operability. Its function in the reconstruction of other memories becomes more important than its status as a signifier of spatial properties and spatial relations. While it certainly may be employed to enable orientation and wayfinding, which we will see in the theory of Kevin Lynch in the next chapter,

\(^{11}\) ibid., 117.
its use for social remembering remains one of the central tasks of the spatial framework of memory. It is the actualisation of space in memory that enables the reconstruction of other memories. We do not remember space as such; we remember it in order to bring to mind events, people, or other places. Its mnemonic function differentiates the spatial framework from space in memory images: ‘when we recall a city – its neighbourhoods, its streets, its houses – so many memories crop up, many of which seem to have been lost forever and which, in turn, help us to discover others’. The spatial framework is the means by which other things can be organised, retrieved, and disseminated, and in order to recollect the memories of events we need to bring it to mind and to be aware of it at all times.

On the one hand, we can bring to mind the spatial framework to search for other memories. On the other hand, we may also stumble, literally and figuratively speaking, upon memories we thought we had forgotten, like when ‘we come back to places where we have spent a part of our life to relive and rediscover details that had vanished’. Halbwachs explained in the account from Vorarlberg how he localised the concept of what he perceived through its similarity with a spatial framework conjured up in memory. In a passage on the illusions of memory, which Halbwachs wrote sometime between 1925 and 1932, and which only came to be included in the critical edition of La Mémoire collective, he addresses memories that seem impossible to localise without stimuli from outside. For such mémoires involontaires (Proust) we have to wait for the right circumstances, but when, for instance, a place comes into the field of our perception, we may spontaneously conjure up memories of events that we have not thought about since they occurred:

we recognise this place and we remember at the same time the state of mind we have seen it in. It seems that the memory remained there, clinging to the façades of these houses, waiting along this path, on the edges of this cove, on this bench-shaped rock. We return there to hold on to the moment and to recapture in our memory a place that otherwise would never have been occupied.

Such situations seem to suggest that the precondition for reactualising these memories lies in the bodily return to the place. The series of perceptions of

12 ibid., 36.
13 ibid., 98.
14 Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 124.
16 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 77–78.
the houses or of the rock result in a unique combination of sensory impressions that directs the mind in the process of remembering exactly those things.

Halbwachs demonstrates a similar concern in *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*. In situations where we return to a place we have not been to for a long time, he reasons, it is not only the case of a one-way process of localising the current frame of mind in relation to an existing spatial framework of memory. In the localities where previous events or periods of our lives played out we may find that the people and the environment have aged and changed, just like ourselves.\(^{17}\) The expectation to find again the social and spatial context of our earlier life, as if it had been preserved in the place, is contrasted with the reality of the current life we see there. We become aware of the gap between the physicality of the place and the spatial framework of its earlier state, including associations, and we perceive the new social orders that now involve the physical structure. At the same time as the impressions cue memories, the mind receives impressions that revise the spatial framework according to the physical and social changes.

The processes of remembering in places are part of a continuous revision work executed by the mind upon the framework. The memories associated with the place, which we before the return to the place may have considered as lost, can simply not by reconstructed without certain cues. We get the illusion, though, of rediscovering these memories when we find ourselves in spatial conditions similar to those in which we experienced the original events.

But from where does this kind of sap come that makes certain memories swell up and gives them an appearance of real life? Is it the former life conserved in them, or is it not rather a new life, which we communicate to them, a borrowed life, drawn from the present, and which lasts only so long as the passing overexcitement or our immediate affective disposition? … when one returns to localities where [events] took place, that is to say, where one believes to find the traces on the façades of the houses, which once saw us passing by … how little remains of the old appearance that is familiar to us … Well, through a mutual exchange, our reconstructed images borrow present emotions of this feeling of reality, which it, in our eyes, makes into existent objects, while the sense of presence, through these connections to the images, comes to identify itself with the feelings that once accompanied the objects.\(^{18}\)

\(^{17}\) Halbwachs, *Les Cadres sociaux*, 26–27.

\(^{18}\) ibid., 26.
Halbwachs challenges the illusion we get of ‘finding’ again memories through the mémoire involontaire. The life-like quality of the remembrance rather results from the amalgamation of the experience of the situation with our memories, than from the pristine condition of these memory images, unattended for a long time somewhere in our memory. In this way, we can understand the importance of sensory impressions from the environment for recollection. The localisation and animation of certain memories can only be enabled through the overlay of the material framework over the spatial framework in memory. I will bring Halbwachs’s argument with me to chapter five and see how this way of thinking could inform the discussion of the acts of remembering and imagination that take place in historic sites, the phenomenon of antëische Magie.

Common denominator

More than to individual properties, the frameworks of memory refer to features that are shared between different memories. Halbwachs takes as an example the recollection of things we may have learnt at a reading. We normally cannot remember the exact date or situation when we learnt it, but all the readings display several similarities: ‘they took place in the same room, on the same day, with the same classmates, or in the same room with the parents, brothers, and sisters’.

With Bergson, Halbwachs explains, we should understand every reading to correspond to a distinct memory (un souvenir définit). Who does not see, Halbwachs asks, that by placing all these memories of the readings next to each other, what we construct is the framework in which these readings took place. The framework enables us, if not to revive the original states of experience, so at least to imagine how they could have been according to these shared circumstances. They enable us to reconstruct the past rather than to recover traces of it. Halbwachs formulates his critique explicitly against Bergson’s thesis:

It is therefore not surprising that even in a recollection, where images (in the sense of unique images) occupy the greatest place, there are also general notions that habit and repetition have fixed in our minds. [We could not prevent such notions from being part of the individual images, unless] we would try to represent images where all the contents is in fact new and unique, in a place unrelated to those we know from other experiences, and in a time that we would not situate within general time or in a defined period of our life. This is how far we would need to go. Besides, notions that precede and follow our impression, and which remain in a more stable form in our consciousness,

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19 ibid., 100.
could not be involved in it: a notion from a book, from printed characters, from a table, a teacher, parents, a lesson, etc.\textsuperscript{20}

Space, like time and social relations, offers constants in memory, stored in a different fashion than vivid memory images. It is not possible, therefore, to derive a general framework of space, time, or the milieu from a series of singular memories. The frameworks of memory, differently, are qualitative views established separately from our impressions, Halbwachs posits. They constitute notions of relative stability and lend continuity to fragmentary memory images. They are common denominators of the individual’s memory, but are also shared in the social collective and offer it a common frame of reference.

\textit{Collective landmarks}

With reference to his own professional and family life, Halbwachs addresses how memories can be localised with the help of \textit{collective landmarks} or \textit{collective points of reference} (points de repère collectifs) in the spatial, social, or temporal framework.\textsuperscript{21} The frameworks should be understood as systems of landmarks and points of references that serve as referential and conditional notions for recollection. The landmarks and points of reference are the connection points between, and shared denominators of, the various frameworks of memory. Singular memory images can be localised by our mental movement from landmark to landmark or from a landmark in the spatial framework to a point of reference in the social or temporal framework.

I am in Strasbourg and I am soon to depart to Paris to take part in an examination jury. I try to recall the place where I stayed at the same time last year, in the period of the same exams. Did I get off on my own in the Gobelins district, where my mother lives, or with my wife and my children at my parents-in-law, who live close to Rue de Rennes? A memory comes to mind: I see myself having breakfast one morning in this period, at a café in the neighbourhoods of the Montparnasse station.\textsuperscript{22}

Halbwachs describes how he recalls vivid details of the breakfast and is led to conclude that he must have stayed at his parents-in-law, near the Rue de Rennes. The affective character of the memory, the feeling of being refreshed in a time of overwork, so Halbwachs reasons, becomes one such point of

\textsuperscript{20}ibid., 100–01.

\textsuperscript{21} The French ‘point de repère’ translates as ‘landmark’ in space or ‘point of reference’ in time or figuratively. I will translate it as ‘landmark’ when it refers to space and ‘point of reference’ in other occasions.

\textsuperscript{22} Halbwachs, \textit{Les Cadres sociaux}, 126.
reference in his personal and family life. He continues by asking where he had stayed before the departure.

Another memory, also emotional, a new individual point of reference comes to my mind. One evening, I arrived at my in-laws after dinner. I was tired and mostly concerned about the health of A. … I tried to offer him some distraction, when I lean out from the balcony. Large modern homes that were erected in our district loomed with their dark shapes and gave me the feeling of suffocation. From the fifth floor, I looked down on the narrow street, as if it was a chasm of silence and boredom. Opposite, an open window allowed me to look into a brightly lit dining room, where an old man with a sullen countenance was reading a newspaper alone in front of a half-emptyed table. All that I saw was consistent with my feeling of sadness. In any case, I remember now that in this period I took my meals in the company of my mother, who had not yet departed, and I came back every night to my in-laws where I stayed until morning.23

In these two related accounts, Halbwachs localises his memories by relating them to the homes of his family members in Paris (collective landmarks in the spatial framework of the family), to the period of the exams and A.’s illness (collective points of reference in the temporal framework of the profession and of the family) and to his mother, wife, children, A. and his parents-in-law (collective points of reference in the social framework of the family). The actualisation of elements in the spatial framework – the flat, the dining room, the balcony – enabled him to reconstruct the emotional state he was in. It was at the connection points of these different frameworks that he could finally localise the memories that he had set out to find. Without the spatial, temporal, and social frameworks, which secured the localisation of memories, Halbwachs concludes, he would not have been able to remember. In the conclusion of the book he returns to the subject.24 In the acts of recollection, he says, we move between collective landmarks and points of reference that we carry in mind and that we share with other members of the groups we are part of. We jump from one to the other in the series of reflections we need to perform in order to localise memory images or recognise impressions: from people, periods, and houses to objects, facts, and emotions. In the Paris example, for Halbwachs, it is essentially the homes and people with relevance to the family that constitute his collective landmarks and social points of reference, and each point is a crossroads for several frameworks of memory.

23 ibid., 127. 24 ibid., 281.
A stage for memory

Recent memories of places, Halbwachs explains, can be picture-like in their character. This marks their difference from the spatial framework, accumulated over time:

The first time we visit a city we examine the houses, monuments, etc. with a curiosity of sharpened attention. We keep a more vivid recollection than if we had stayed there for a long time, without having looked closer at our surroundings.\(^\text{25}\)

The places we see often, on the other hand, turn into abstractions that contain all the particularities that interest us, but which may differ from the original sensory impression.

I live at a specific point in the city. Every day I walk through different areas, more or less distant: in this way I walk through all parts of the city and can now head wherever I wish. Why can I not, in a coherent manner, represent to myself the view of the streets, houses, all the particularities of the shops, the façades etc., but only to a certain limit, which besides is not fixed? When I orient myself according to successive images, up to this limit, why must I direct myself at rather discontinuous landmarks, which, for one or the other reason, are not contained in the indistinctive mass of unnoticed images? It happens because I have very often crossed, in all directions, the neighbourhood of my house; it is because I have connected these familiar images with each other in multiple ways, in a series of reflections, and which I can reconstruct in mind in many ways, starting from many other images.\(^\text{26}\)

The vivacity of the first memories of the environment gives way to familiar schemata, lifeless constructs. They have become intersections for multiple impressions, associations, and information, spread out over the spatial, the social, and the temporal framework. In this manner, Halbwachs suggests, when we first draw the memories to mind, they are filled in and completed by their association to various points of reference; linking the empty schema to the landmarks in our frameworks, it is fleshed out and turns into a rich experience of recollection.

In the chapter on family memory, Halbwachs illustrates how we can make use of such schematised and abstract notions of space. In addition to working like a set of landmarks that allow the localisation of memories, the spatial framework may also serve as a stage or backdrop for events and people, especially when the latter have transfigured into equally stable notions in the

\(^{25}\) ibid., 134.

\(^{26}\) ibid., 132.
frameworks of memory. The stability of the spatial framework is coupled with the ability to entertain associations with memories over time. Places in the framework serve as common denominators for a multitude of scenes of the past.

When Chateaubriand in a well-known page tells how evenings were spent at the manor of Combourg, is this an account of an event that took place only once? Was he particularly impressed, on one evening more than any other, by the silent comings and goings of his father, by the appearance of the hall, and by the details that he throws into relief in his depiction? No: he undoubtedly assembled in one single scene memories of many evenings that had been engraved in his memory and in that of the family. It is the summation of an entire period, the idea of a type of life.27

Chateaubriand’s account, so Halbwachs tells us, is a reconstructed picture, full of details, collected and inserted to evoke different aspects of the characters of the parents or their life. It is a narration and a translation of the past, summarising reflections and feelings in a new composition. With Halbwachs we could regard the spatial framework of memory as a mental stage, a mise en scène, against which we can let the people, objects, or feelings play the roles we assign them in the re-enactment of the past. Every scenery and prop has the capacity to express an entire character or period.

Zone de l’activité technique et zone des relations personnelles
In the second part of chapter VII in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Halbwachs goes at length to address the workings of collective memory in professional and social environments in the contemporary city. In the following I will select some aspects of that discussion to see what the implications are for the spatial framework of memory.

Two zones dominate the modern city. The first, the zone de l’activité technique, the zone of technical activity, is where professionals – professors, bankers, workers, or soldiers – perform the activities required of them by their profession. The techniques ‘consist in knowing and in applying the rules and precepts that in every epoch prescribe for the functionary in general terms the actions, the language, and the gestures of the function’.28 Every profession has accumulated a collective memory of written and unwritten rules that directs the techniques of the profession and specifies what should be done and what not:

27 ibid., 152.
28 ibid., 265.
If a professor does not follow the curriculum, if a judge does not pronounce his verdict in its forms, if a banker applies an illegal rate, in all these cases their activity does not reach its goal.\textsuperscript{29}

The spirit of the profession attaches itself to the specific spaces in the zone de l’activité technique and appears as a naturally occurring phenomenon. It is ‘this kind of spirit that we breathe in with the air, so to speak, when we enter a law court or walk into a bank’, and which can be recognised as ‘the certain collective features of soldiers of all times, which can be explained by the soldier’s life in the trenches and camps’.\textsuperscript{30}

Like the zone de l’activité technique, the zone des relations personnelles organises itself through a material framework and a corresponding spatial framework of memory. I have earlier discussed how, in the accounts of Chateaubriand’s family home and the homes of Halbwachs’s mother and in-laws in Paris, the collective landmarks of the spatial framework consist of the homes and related places of the family. In the social zone individuals, social relations, and family history stand at the centre: ‘It is not concerned with accomplishing a function, but only with fortifying in each of its members the awareness of his social rank or intensifying collective life’.\textsuperscript{31}

For some professions the zone de l’activité technique is clearly separated from the second zone, la zone des relations personnelles, the zone of personal relations. The technical activity is identified with the profession. The factory worker, for instance, leaves his world of personal relations when he enters the door to the factory, and he does not bring the profession with him into his private life after work.\textsuperscript{32} For the judge or lawyer, entering the court building is not to leave the life outside behind. He needs its judgements, values, and facts to be able to perform the function: ‘invisibly, the function, envisaged as a context of technical activities and thought, is immersed in a milieu of activities and thought, which are not technical but purely social’.\textsuperscript{33}

However, not to confuse the function with the social sphere, and to resist external influence, the zone de l’activité technique of the judiciary group visually marks the idiosyncrasy of the function and its distance from other groups by the use of costumes, the apparatus of the tribunal, and the modes of communication.\textsuperscript{34} The connotations of the name and title of the judge, of the court official, or of the president of the court of appeals differ when we hear

\textsuperscript{29} ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} ibid., 265, 66.
\textsuperscript{31} ibid., 268.
\textsuperscript{32} ibid., 246.
\textsuperscript{33} ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} ibid., 243.
them in the technical sphere of the courtroom and when we hear them in the social sphere of the salon, according to Halbwachs.

For the parties of a trial and for the public, [the title] certainly represents a social authority that is contemporary and impersonal. It is the question of an agent who performs a function. More attention is given to his dress than to his person, and they do not ask whether he has a past or whether he has occupied his position for a long time. He is defined in relation to the other members of the court, to subordinates such as the clerks, the defendants, the lawyers, the public. He is the centre of purely technical relations, part of an apparatus that might have been constructed on that day or the day before. All this overshadows the man, his person, and the environment from which he came and in which he still lives. In society, on the other hand, he is imbued with a social prestige that dates from long ago, or that reflects memories of all kinds, some of which are very old. Here it is a matter of the sentiments of the environments from which most magistrates have come, of the people with whom they associate.\(^{35}\)

Halbwachs makes clear in this chapter that each group, in its corresponding zone of modern society, not only constructs a spatial framework with different memories or ethics. The rules for remembering also, and the ways in which remembering takes place, radically differ between the social memory of the family and the memory within highly codified and institutionalised professions. The latter may have been passed down, its precepts for behaviour developed over several generations. The focus of memory shifts with the kind of memory. A zone, thus, could be understood to refer to sets of practices of remembrance that are bound to the physical frame of the profession and to the collectively shared spatial framework of memory of the group. For the professor, the collective memory of the profession dwells in the buildings of universities and libraries; for the judge it attaches itself to the court buildings, for the family the homes and other significant environments. Areas of one zone could overlap areas of other zones – especially where they include public space or where professions interact with one another or with the public – projecting on to them two or more sets of technical precepts and memories. Other spaces are reserved for that zone only, allowing no other profession to lay claim to it. The Government Quarter in Oslo, which will be the topic of chapter six, has, on the one hand, acted as the spatial setting for the professional milieu of the government administration. At the same time, the government buildings, especially with regard to their exterior, make up

\(^{35}\) ibid., 248–49.
collective landmarks in the spatial frameworks of several other groups – architectural historians, citizens of Oslo, or Norwegian nationals.

A relative stability of such an environment over generations, one could speculate, could contribute to optimising the transmission of professional collective memory. The rooms in which the organisation of social hierarchies, precepts, and ceremonies is embedded are repeatedly actualised by performing the duties of the profession. The physical space becomes a constant, perceptual reminder. An environment that remains the same arguably eases the sustenance of memories that the professional has acquired through education or from colleagues. Thus, professional surroundings that continue to serve as the material frame slow down the erosion of collective memory.

**The spatial framework of memory in La Topographie légendaire**

*Topographie*

In *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Halbwachs devoted a chapter to religious collective memory. Some of these arguments can, in hindsight, be regarded as sketches for issues that he would return to in *La Topographie légendaire*, the book he already began to prepare in 1925, the same year as the first book appeared, but which was not published until 1941. Halbwachs develops the line of reasoning in the historically specific study of the legendary topography of the Holy Land parallel to the subject matter of the more general analysis of memory in *La Mémoire collective*, the preparations for which he also had begun in 1925. Subtitled *Étude de mémoire collective*, study of collective memory, *La Topographie légendaire* transfers the theories that he outlines in the other two books to bring to bear on the empirical material.

Halbwachs addresses how the topography of the life of Jesus came to be established in the Gospels. What was the role of the landscape in the formation of the collective memory of early Christianity, and what can the testimonies of pilgrims and travellers from the early fourth century tell us of how space is employed in collective remembrance? He further points to how anchoring of stories in locales becomes an important device for the dissemination of the religious legend. In the introduction he makes a disclaimer of his objectives. It is not a historical study of the places

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themselves, but a study of the role of the places in the formation of collective memory:

We shall not examine whether the traditions of the holy places are exact or conform to old facts. We take them as they are formed, in the moment they appear to us, and we study them over the centuries that follow. If, as we believe, the collective memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past, and it adapts the image of the old facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the present, the knowledge of what was originally is secondary, if not unnecessary, since the reality of the past is no longer there as an immutable model to comply with. The experience we study … is nothing but an experience of a collective psychology, and the laws that we can learn from it could be confirmed by studies of the same kind of other facts.37

A selection process took place in the first or during the second century. The disciples made a collection of places that related to the events that had been selected to become part of the Christian dogma. Originating in testimonies of the disciples who had gathered around Christ and knew of the places of his everyday life, they selected ‘among all the other, the places where Jesus had been tried, crucified, buried, and resurrected, and where he appeared to his disciples’.38

Halbwachs suggests that for the disciples, contact with the places could refresh and revitalise the collective legend at the time, ‘just like we come back to places where we have spent a part of our life to relive and rediscover details that had vanished’.39 He argues that not only are the places selected out of a larger body of locations in which a large amount of stories took place, but because of the presence of direct witnesses and their presumably heated discussions to establish what had happened, ‘we should expect not only a minimum of deformations, errors, and omissions’.40 Since abstract thought is not a recollection and, therefore, cannot be held alive by a group, Halbwachs explains, it is through the selection and arrangement of locales, the rooting of stories in specific places, that the abstract idea survives of a God who dies as atonement for the sins of the believers.41 Places make abstract thought cognisable and memorable through their tangibility. They are as real in the present as they were in the past, and they can at any time restage for the believer the mythic drama of Christ.

37 Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 7.
38 ibid., 123–24.
39 ibid., 124. Halbwachs also writes about such mechanisms in the other two books. Cf. Remember other things in this chapter.
40 ibid., 118.
41 ibid., 124.
For the disciples in the Holy Land the physical environment corresponded to, but was not identical with, the collective spatial framework that was disseminated through the Gospels. Despite the comprehensive destruction of Jerusalem in AD 70, which rendered the environment completely different from how it had been, it could be recognised and passed down by means of persisting place names. For the Christian communities in Europe, far removed from the Holy Land, the topography of the Gospels was a reality because of the spatial framework that they constructed as part of their religious training. The remembered city of Jerusalem could be venerated as an ideal symbolic space, the theatre of the passion, without having to confront it with a radically altered city and concrete reality. During the crusades it was this ideal spatial framework of European Christianity that was brought back to Palestine to root it in the soil. It helped to rediscover in the physical environment the imaginary places which would fill in for insufficient remains, Halbwachs argues. The erection of churches, altars, and monasteries at the places in the Gospels marked the collective spatial framework of the Christian doctrine in the physical landscape. It manifested it as a physical mnemonic system. In Patrick Hutton’s words, ‘the biblical Holy Land was an imaginary holy landscape conjured up during the Middle Ages in Europe and superimposed on the actual terrain of Palestine’. The pilgrims did not discover it when they travelled to Palestine, but carried it with them to establish it there.

Halbwachs’s book points to intriguing aspects of space. The construction of a spatial framework of memory for a larger cultural group, like the Christians, predominantly takes on a fictive and symbolic character, despite its relation to a concrete material environment. It exists, in the first place and for most of the believers, as an imagined topography absorbed from the Bible. The physical landscape comes in the second place. In Christianity, it is constructed in the image of the spatial framework of the creed, not the other way around.

The topographie of other cultural fellowships, like that of a nation or of a citizenry, could be considered along similar lines. Because of the scale and

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42 ibid., 127. Halbwachs explains that there are no known physical traces, which could be remains from the environments in which Jesus served. Halbwachs, *La Topographie légendaire*, 113, 16.
43 He also touches on this topic in the other two books. In *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* Halbwachs argues that the crusaders set out for the Holy Land to find the symbolic image of a place suspended between Heaven and Earth rather than a picturesque setting for Jesus’s life. Halbwachs, *Les Cadres sociaux*, 203. In *La Mémoire collective* he suggests that the crusaders did not seek out the places of the Gospel, but arbitrarily localised the events of the life of Jesus and the early Christian Church in the topography. The spatial framework of Christian collective memory was laid over the physical environment, serving as a master spatiality. Halbwachs, *La Mémoire collective*, 230.
complexity of the physical space, it may be considered first as a spatial framework for the members of these fellowships. Only in portions can the material framework become a reality for any group member; the national or the citizen only moves in or has access to a limited part of the total topographie. This makes it different from a zone de l’activité technique of which a larger share may be available for all fellows. Removing the topographie from its context of early Christianity, in the theory of the spatial framework of memory we could let it denote the totality of the spatial framework of memory and the material framework of a larger cultural group.

Gregariousness and the distribution of collective memory
In the first centuries the newly formed Christian doctrine introduced localities from the existing Jewish traditions into the topography. Halbwachs hypothesises that this was probably done to make them more believable or to lend them credibility by situating them in consecrated places. 45 Nothing, for instance, indicates that Jesus was born in Bethlehem, but the story needs him to have been born in the city of David, close to the tombs of the prophets and patriarchs, as the scripture suggests, in order to be taken to be the Messiah of the Jews. 46

Also, some locations in the Gospels were localised in two physical places at the same time. In the early centuries the Cenacle was located on the Mount of Olives for some and at Gethsemane for others. 47 Throughout the Middle Ages two Courts of Justice, two houses of Caiaphas, and two sites of the Via Dolorosa existed at the same time. Halbwachs explains this with the competition between different traditions. As long as they remain vivid in the collective memory, there is an unwillingness to sacrifice one of the two.

Halbwachs believes to have identified two rudimentary laws that govern the memory of groups. First, he sees a kind of gregarious instinct of memories’ attachment to places, resulting in the tendency for several events in the memory of the group to concentrate in the same place. Through the spatial proximity the memories mutually support each other. Second, he observes that a localisation of a memory can split up to associate itself with several sites in different places, as a tool to repeat, reinforce, and rejuvenate memory by spreading its traces.

45 Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 138.
46 ibid., 139. The Grotto and Nativity scene, therefore, have been located in Bethlehem to remind of David, not of Jesus. Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 63.
47 Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 147.
Concentration in one single place as well as the distribution over a duality of locations in contrasting regions: these are familiar means used by groups of people, not only churches, but also other communities, families, nations, etc., with the aim of fixing and organising their memories of places, but also of times, events, and persons.  

Just as Halbwachs pointed out in relation to the family in *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, specific places turn into collective landmarks, acting as crossroads of association in the group memory. The sites where memories flock may be described as the spatial intersection points of different frameworks. Correspondingly, the distribution of one memory in several places points to the interconnection of several localities in one point of reference in the framework of dogma. Distant spaces enter into a relation because of their relation to the other framework.

**Social morphology**

What Halbwachs demonstrates in the study of the legendary topography is the formation of a spatial framework of memory and its consolidation within the collective memory of a specific cultural group. From being a local group of disciples, it grows to encompass the whole cultural sphere of Europe and other regions of the world. The group constructs the spatial framework of memory from memories set in the locations of a physical landscape, already connoting Jewish traditions. Much later, the framework, developed and passed down through generations of Christians, is projected onto the same landscape, erecting new landmarks in the form of chapels and churches to mark the places of the Gospels. The materiality comes to mirror a symbolic order.

The idea that ‘all societies, family, church, state, industrial companies, etc. have material forms’ Halbwachs took over from Durkheim.  

In 1938 he offered his own perspective in the book *Morphologie sociale*. There he argues that the forms of the physical environment can be studied to reveal social structures of a population that, by nature, will always be bound to a specific and limited geography. The social life and traditions of the extended family, for instance, have their basis in the houses of its members, but every collective also needs a material framework:

The institutions are not merely ideas: they must be grounded on earth, charged with matter, human matter and inert matter, bodies of flesh and bones, buildings, houses, places, aspects of space. All these affect the senses.

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48 ibid.
They are patterns in space that can be described, drawn, measured, their elements and parts counted, their locations and movements identified, their expansion and diminution ascertained. It is in this sense that all vehicles of the social life have material forms.\footnote{ibid., 11.}

Social morphology is the study of institutional patterns deposited in space. It is a method that can be used to interpret, from physical environments, the social structures that create and administer them and to detect the spatial framework that the group employs for its collective memory. Marcel and Mucchielli argue that social morphology sees behind the material forms a totality of factors at work related to the collective psychology of the group.\footnote{J-C Marcel & L Mucchielli, ‘Eine Grundlage des \textit{lien social:} das kollektive Gedächtnis nach Maurice Halbwachs’, tr. J Ohnacker [Fr. orig. (1999)], in S Egger (ed), \textit{Maurice Halbwachs – Aspekte des Werks} (Konstanz, UVK, 2003), 214–15.}

The group’s spatial framework becomes the key to understanding the material reality as a manifestation of society. The \textit{topographie} would be the object of study of social morphology on the level of a religious community.

**The spatial framework of memory in La Mémoire collective**

*Reproduction of spatial frameworks of memory*

A different aspect of Christian memory systems that remains unanalysed in \textit{La Topographie légendaire}, but which is alluded to by Halbwachs several times, pertains to how Christianity in regions outside of the Holy Land in various ways created spatial systems for the dissemination and memorisation of the Dogma, notably through the architectural design of churches and abbeys.

In the chapter on space and the collective memory in *La Mémoire collective* Halbwachs complements his writings on religious collective memory in \textit{Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire} and \textit{La Topographie légendaire} with reflections on the role of ecclesiastic architecture.\footnote{Halbwachs, \textit{La Mémoire collective}, 208–09, 27–32.} Not primarily used for supporting the memory of social relations, he posits, churches and cemeteries are sacred places, where the believers know they will enter into a mental state that they have experienced many times before. Their physical form provides equilibrium for the group over time, when thought and feeling fail to give stable support. The architectural arrangement of churches reflects devotional needs, recalls traditions and thoughts, and...
distributes collective reminders around the building of the most important religious remembrances.

for the priest, better informed of the traditions, all the details of [the church’s] interior layout have a meaning and correspond to a particular direction of religious thought, whereas in the mind of the masses of believers an impression of mystery dominates when in the presence of these material images. … A church is like a book whose characters can be spelled out and deciphered only by a small number [of people].

In this way, Halbwachs explains, the devotional spaces with funeral stones, altars, statues, pictures of saints, etc. arrange remembrance spatially. The material layout of any church in any part of the Christian world brings to mind the same religious memory, based on the topography of the Holy Land. Thus, with every cross we recall the crucifixion that took place on Golgotha, and in every service Jesus again shares his communion like he did in the cenacle. The devotion of the Stations of the Cross re-enact the episodes of the Passion along Via Dolorosa.

The description offered by Halbwachs foreshadows the separation of collective memory into communicative memory and cultural memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann), the topic of chapter five. Different from employing the homes and surroundings of an extended family to support an informal and

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53 ibid., 229.
54 Other scholarship has complemented Halbwachs’s argument. In the age of scholasticism, Frances Yates has suggested, mnemonic tools based on those of the classical art of memory were constructed in the churches as frescoes, with figures that represented and reminded of realms of knowledge and the liberal arts. F A Yates, *The Art of Memory* (1966; repr. edn, London, Pimlico, 1992), 89–92. Henning Laugerud has described how the *Old Norse Book of Homilies* (*Gammelnorsk homiliebok*), with religious sermons from the twelfth century, makes up a practical manual for a Christian mnemotechnic that employs the stave church architecture. He cites from the book: “The choir is a picture of the blessed in heaven, while the nave represents Christians on earth. … The four corner posts of a church are the four evangelists, as the wisdom they hold is the strongest supports of the Christian faith.” This can also be understood on a personal level. “But in the same way that we can speak of the church as an image of the whole of Christianity, we can also say that it is an image of each and every Christian, who, by living in purity, becomes a temple for the Holy Spirit.” … We can read this sermon as fairly specific guidelines for, and a practical use of, the art of memory. The different corporeal and visible elements of the church building, such as the parts of the main body of the church like the nave, choir or pillars, but also pictures and objects in the church, become [mnemonic] “places” in which to store the most central truths and insights of faith”. H Laugerud, ‘To See with the Eyes of the Soul. Memory and Visual Culture in Medieval Europe’, in A B Amundsen (ed), *Arv Nordic Yearbook of Folklore*, lxvi (Uppsala, The Royal Gustavus Adolphus Academy, 2010), 44. Erwin Panofsky has argued that the architecture of the Gothic cathedral similarly can be read as a scholastic summa (compendium of texts), as ‘a system of homologous parts and parts of parts’. E Panofsky, *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism* (Latrobe, Archabbey Press, 1951), 45. For a study on how the pictures of a *Biblia pauperum* were transferred onto the walls of a late fifteenth-century church in Sweden to support the priest in his preaching, see S Tengström, ‘Albertus Pictor och Biblia pauperum i Härkeberga kyrka’, *Religion och bibel: Nathan Söderblom-sällskapets årsbok*, lviii–lix (Lund, Nathan Söderblom-sällskapet, 1999–2000).
Edifices

dynamic family memory, the churches are highly specific as to what aspect of the religious past they are supposed to recall. The specialists of the clergy and the institutionalisation of Christian faith through the Church secure relative stability over time as well as in space and provide the laity with a careful construal of the creed arranged as a spatial mnemonic in the church building. For the family, the individual houses take on unique connotations linked to family memory; for the Christians, all churches contain a repertoire of the same mnemonic references to aspects of religious thought, across individual architectural differences. The former kind of memory is social and communicative; the latter predominantly institutionalised and cultural. It is possible to recognise in the ceremonial use of ecclesiastic architecture a shift from an emphasis on the spatial framework of memory to the material framework of the church interior and objects. These physical artefacts come to materialise the religious memory. The internal framework of memory becomes an external framework, employed actively in processes of remembrance.

Notables of memory
In legal memory Halbwachs recognises further aspects of how space sustains collective memory. Legal groups, like religious and economic groups, do not have a relation to material space based on their proximity to it. This makes them different from families or the inhabitants of a city. They are defined by the distribution of rights and obligations among their members and by images of space rather than material space. In the countryside, Halbwachs explains, the features of the environment, like meadows, fields, woods, farms, and homes, make up a spatial framework of memory with which a notary public or mayor may recall property rights, contracts, leases, etc. The landscape provides a mnemonic system for those initiated or affected. For the group remembrance, the different parts of the environment connote memories of ownership and transactions. The physical framework of the land reinforces the spatial framework and reminds of the contents of that legal memory. In the city, Halbwachs continues, the material frameworks of immovable real estate or mobile material objects, like art or furniture, similarly evoke for the notary public or for the auctioneer the transactions of rights in sales.

The labour provided by workers and the services offered by clerks, doctors, or lawyers do not, to the same degree, form stable relationships to locations, but they nonetheless depend on an infrastructure of factories and offices in which they are carried out. He continues to elaborate on what he referred to

56 ibid., 205.
as the *zone de l’activité technique* in *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*. The spatial framework of the professional memory of a member of an employment tribunal or a union secretary covers all the factories, whose workers concern him, and which recall contracts, laws, and conflicts. Similar frameworks, corresponding to the topography of important buildings and places, can be identified for each professional zone.

By means of the spatial framework, the notary public, the mayor, and the union secretary come to be responsible for the transmission of the memory of the group they act on behalf of. They guarantee the stability of the group by keeping alive the memory of previous legal transactions and agreements. Namer considers the identification of such *notables of memory* (*des notables de mémoire*) to be the ultimate renewal in Halbwachs’s thought.\(^5^7\) The notables are given a mandate to care for the remembrance of the rights and obligations bound to certain locations by the groups that are concerned with that particular legal matter and that part of space. Furthermore, the notables establish a permanent relationship between humans and physical space, which has been agreed upon by society.\(^5^8\)

As I have stressed earlier, Halbwachs is less concerned with the remembrance of the spatial image, as such, than with what the image can help to effectuate in memory. The spatial framework becomes a mnemonic for the notable to localise and reconstruct, at any time, the memory of property ownership and transfer in order to ensure stable behaviour in relation to the physical landscape and buildings.

*Dual nature of space*

In the introduction of the chapter on space in *La Mémoire collective* Halbwachs refers to Auguste Comte, who claims that mental equilibrium relates to the permanence of the objects that surround us. Halbwachs adds that the material framework and the spatial framework that corresponds to it intrinsically are connected to our idea of ourselves. The *entourage matériel* (approx. material surroundings), the furniture, and the interior of the home come to symbolise for us family and friends, who we normally see in the environment, as well as ideas the family may have of fashion and taste, of customs and social distinctions.\(^5^9\) The environment stands for stability and is a guarantor of access to the associative links embedded in it.
Thinking of the environment as stable does not mean that the significance that we ascribe to the environment in the family or in the circle of friends does not change with altering social preferences and habits. The meaning that is bound to the spatial framework may be affected, but as long as the physical space remains more or less the same, the group will not experience change, but be comforted in their idea of the continuity of the environment. After some time in the environment the group learns to act according to it; ‘not only its movements, but also its thoughts become determined by the succession of the material images that represent the external objects’. Halbwachs’s concern is what Namer has referred to as the dual nature of space as framework for the memory: the interior representation (spatial framework of memory) and the material space of immobile places (material framework). It is not as simple as distinguishing between an environment that we perceive and one that we summon up in memory.

As it were, there is no part of collective memory that does not unfold in a spatial framework. … One could say that there is, in fact, no group, nor any kind of collective activity, that does not have any relation to a place or with a part of space, but this is insufficient to explain how it represents the image of the place when it conjures up thoughts about an activity of the group that is associated with the place.

If space is only considered as a physical entity, Halbwachs reasons, it is not possible to understand how the perception of it can trigger any associations in memory. But space is not simply the totality of forms and colours we see. He argues that it is virtually impossible to perceive physical and sensory qualities of things without being influenced by the thought of society and the groups that constantly form frames of reference for our thought. We would need to step outside of any group that has a relation to the built environment, which, according to Halbwachs, is not possible. When a physical place is

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60 ibid., 200.
61 ibid., 195.
62 Namer, Mémoire et société, 117.
63 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 209.
perceived, it, at the same time, amalgamates with our spatial framework of memory and becomes part of it. The associations of the latter appear to rise from the former.\textsuperscript{64} It is in this way that we can understand his postulate, ‘there is no part of collective memory that does not unfold in a spatial framework’, since the latter always overlays the physical space in the act of perception. Already in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Halbwachs had stressed that there is no perception that is not, at the same time, a recollection, conditioned as it is by frameworks of memory to interpret and understand what we see.\textsuperscript{65}

In the conclusion of the chapter on space and collective memory, in the four-page passage that was omitted in the 1950 edition of La Mémoire collective, but reintroduced in the critical edition, Halbwachs makes an effort to clarify the relationship between the material disposition of space and its representations in the spatial framework of the group.\textsuperscript{66} He argues that a place becomes a precondition for the memory of the group only as long as the group has its attention fixed on it and assimilates this part of space into its thought. Therefore, a section of space does not evoke memories by its very material substance or by its existence as a place in which the group moves. Only in an active relationship with the group, when it exists as a stable materiality as well as a mental entity in its dual nature of space, can it come to play the part of a spatial aide-memoire.\textsuperscript{67}

**Altering the spatial framework of memory**

When a group alters the physical environment, it may impose unwanted changes to other collective spatial frameworks of memory, redefining social orders and practical use or eliminating parts that enable those groups to reconstruct certain parts of their past. As I noted in the previous chapter, Halbwachs argues that it is the loss of frameworks or parts of them that is the reason for forgetting. And even if the spatial frameworks of memory are mental constructs, perceptual support from the physical place may strengthen the mnemonic capacity and nourish the mental structure of space. It may also guarantee the shared features of a collective framework that is spread out over many group members.

\textsuperscript{64} The account of the author taking a walk with Dickens in London exemplifies his point. See Collective memory in La Mémoire collective in ch. 1.

\textsuperscript{65} Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 275.

\textsuperscript{66} Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 233–36. For the editor’s comments on the passage, referred to as text 21, cf. Namer, ‘Avertissement [La Mémoire collective]’, 17–18.

\textsuperscript{67} Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 235.
However, long after the material framework of the group has been altered or ceased to have importance in its life, an existing spatial framework can remain the ordering principle of memory:

when the group members are dispersed and do not find anything in their new material surroundings [entourage matériel] that reminds them of home and the rooms they left behind, they remain united across space because they think of the home and its rooms. Even after the priests and nuns of Port-Royal were expelled, nothing was affected as long as the buildings of the abbey were not razed, and those who retained it in memory had not disappeared.68

The collective spatial framework of memory was still cared for, and it allowed them to preserve some of the social order and memories that had been embedded in the previous spatial order. A Canadian woman told me a similar story a few years ago. Her German grandparents had been deported, along with all Germans, from their village in Croatia in the aftermath of WWII. They immigrated to different parts of North America, but kept contact over the years. All their life the social organisation of the diasporic community was structured according to the families they had originally belonged to, the houses they had occupied in certain streets in the village, and the professional position they had occupied. Their social organisation was structured according to the collective spatial framework of memory of the former village, which they had brought with them to the new existences. With Halbwachs we should understand that such behaviour is explained by the fact that

all the processes of the group can be translated into spatial terms, and the place it occupies is but the juncture of all these terms. Each aspect, each detail of this place has a meaning that is intelligible only to members of the group, for each part of the space it occupies corresponds to the many different aspects of the structure and life of their society, at least of what is most stable in it.69

What he proposes in *La Mémoire collective* is a place-centred order of society. The stability of social groups relies on the stability of the surrounding environments. It may be regarded as a conservative stance, as it was written in a period dominated by architecture and urban planning principles defined by the Modern Movement and which saw traditional ways of living change dramatically. In a study on social classes he noted that

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68 ibid., 196.
69 ibid.
We are in fact living in a period characterized by constant, rapid and fundamental change in all the circumstances of life; change that is affecting our modes of thinking and our ideas and beliefs powerfully. Social groups break up, lose their traditions and with them the possibility of surviving amid surroundings no longer favourable to them; they know they are on the wane; sometimes we actually watch them disappear. At the same time others start and develop, bit by bit taking over many elements of those that are on their way out, creating a new environment for men and imposing new ideas and sensibilities on them. 70

Earlier, in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Halbwachs had expressed his feelings about contemporary architecture:

I lean out from the balcony. Large modern homes that were erected in our district loomed with their dark shapes and gave me the feeling of suffocation. 71

Such a view, arguably, could be taken as a critique of the functionalist agenda, and, consequently, Halbwachs’s argument in La Mémoire collective could be read as a premonition of the social repercussions of the comprehensive remodelling of the cities in the twentieth century.

However, even if his statements may be interpreted in this way, seen to his whole oeuvre it becomes clear that Halbwachs recognises such processes of change in many societies and in different historic periods. And while the individual may mourn the changes of the surroundings in any kind of urban transformation, resistance and resilience, he writes, can only spring forth from the group. ‘Certainly, it is inevitable that transformations of a city and the simple destruction of a house trouble some individuals, disturbing and disconcerting them in their habits’. 72 The individuals may regret the loss of trees, walls, or buildings, because of the memories they have attached to the environment, he suggests. The group, however, ‘does not only immediately express its suffering, indignation, and protest. It resists with the full force of its traditions, and this resistance is not without effect. It searches and succeeds partially in re-establishing its old equilibrium in the new conditions’. 73 The group splits its spatial framework up into several frameworks, each corresponding to the period of one specific architectural

70 He observed that the vestiges of traditional social ways of living could still be found in the rural areas. M Halbwachs, The Psychology of Social Class, tr. C Delavenay (London, Heinemann, 1958) [Fr. orig., Esquisse d’une psychologie des classes sociales (1955)], 22.
71 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 127. For the context, see Collective landmarks in this chapter.
72 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 201.
73 ibid.
setting, associating a set of memories. The collective spatial framework of memory that corresponds to a part of space may outlive its physical counterpart.

Thus, when a society has been subjected to fundamental change, it seems that memory reaches back to the memories corresponding to these two successive periods by two different paths. It does not move from one to the other continuously. In reality, there are two times that preserve two frameworks of thought, and it needs to place itself in one or the other to be able to recover the memories localised in the two frameworks.74

Halbwachs’s reasoning is crucial. To a certain degree it undermines critique that has accused him of promoting stability and permanence of the built environment.75 It supports the case that I make in the thesis, namely to argue for the dynamic and pluralistic character of architecture in the spatial framework of memory over time as well as between groups.

Time and the spatial framework of memory
The discussions in this chapter have pointed to the fact that spatial frameworks of memory necessarily exist in plural: one collective framework for each group that has a relation to the environment and one perspective of this collective framework for every individual in the group. In the quote above, Halbwachs also suggests that the frameworks can come to exist in plural for the same group and the same individuals, one for each spatial setting that the group has sustained a relation to. In continuation of the quote, Halbwachs elaborates the idea of two times in the spatial framework:

In order to recognise an old city in the maze of new streets that have gradually encircled and altered it, in the houses and monuments that have replaced or engulfed the buildings of now vanished neighbourhoods, and sometimes found their place as extensions to, and in the space between, the constructions of the past, we do not go back from the present to the past in an inverse movement along a continuous series of constructions, demolitions, street routes, etc., which gradually changed the aspect of the city. To rediscover the old streets and monuments, which are preserved elsewhere or have disappeared, we are guided by the general plan of the old city and brought there in our thoughts.76

74 ibid., 188.
76 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 188.
To go back we employ a different spatial framework than the one that corresponds to the city in its contemporary state. For the group, these successive time periods coexist, but they are not necessarily permeable with regard to the memories. Each of the periods binds to its unique spatial configuration a specific set of landmarks and memories. The group can access these separately and simultaneously.

In her search for a way to point to how a place like Dachau is experienced essentially different as a memorial site and as a concentration camp, Germanist and Holocaust survivor Ruth Klüger has suggested finding a term that distinguishes between the place in different periods and under specific social conditions.

I once visited Dachau with some Americans who had asked me to come along. It was a clean and proper place, and it would have taken more imagination than your average John or Jane Doe possesses to visualize the camp as it was forty years earlier. Today a fresh wind blows across the central square where the infamous roll calls took place, and the simple barracks of stone and wood suggest a youth hostel more easily than a setting for tortured lives … The missing ingredients are the odour of fear emanating from human bodies, the concentrated aggression, the reduced minds. … Landscape, seascape — there should be a word like timescape to indicate the nature of a place in time, that is, at a certain time, neither before nor after.77

In this context a term like timescape is helpful, because it suggests the division of social experience in space into temporal sections, referring to the dynamics of life experience rather than to unchanging Cartesian properties. Consequently, a city or a camp can find its equivalent in several spatial frameworks of memory, one for each epoch of the group. I have previously, and in another context, proposed to refer to them as epochal-spatial frameworks of memory as a distinction to the Halbwachsian spatial framework of memory.78 In the history of the camp at Dachau, and for each group that had a relation to it, the period in which it functioned as a concentration camp provided a different epochal-spatial framework than the periods in which it has functioned as a memorial site.79 As I shall argue in chapter six, in relation to the groups who dispute the future of the Government Quarter in Oslo, arguably, the buildings involved could be said

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to make up one unique epochal-spatial framework for the period that preceded the explosion, one for the period of clearance and construction, and one for the period that will follow the opening of a reconstructed or newly designed Government Quarter, only in the span of ten or twenty years.\textsuperscript{80} A distinction between several epochal-spatial frameworks of memory, shared within the group or between different groups, helps to conceive of the spatial frameworks as the dynamic mental construction of space that I suggested in the discussion of travelling memory and travelling architecture in the Introduction.\textsuperscript{81} While the differentiation of a spatial framework into epochs calls for more elaborate analyses of the division of time periods, its postulation could be useful for challenging ideas of permanence in architecture and landscape.

\section*{A theoretical framework}

The assessment of the spatial framework of memory in this chapter has pointed to its usefulness and versatility. To propose the concept as a theoretical framework for assessing architecture in processes of societal memory does not mean that I am unwilling to consider the inherent limitations. Before continuing I will sum up some of its merits and indicate areas that need further consideration.

I started this chapter by pointing to the essential character of the spatial framework of memory as a mental construct. For Halbwachs, the term denotes the abstracted conceptualisations of space that the individual employs in recollection processes. These are conjured up in mind as stable, but dynamic and constantly changing entities. Only certain parts of the environment are selected to be included in the group’s framework, lending them symbolic and reminding functions for the collective memory. The framework can be seen to reflect group thought as much as it mirrors a geometrical space, thereby taking on the character of something in between a construct and a construction. Different from the social and temporal frameworks, the spatial framework often bears a strong and interdependent relation to the built environment, to the material framework. It consists of accumulated notions of space and spatial interrelations and is not a collection of separate memory images of the environment. It can rather be thought of as

\textsuperscript{80} The distinctions are open to discussion. Arguably, each epochal-spatial framework could be subdivided into smaller epochs or periods. Furthermore, each group may recognise the dividing lines at different points in time.

\textsuperscript{81} See Objectives in the Introduction.
the common denominator of many memory images, the spatial setting that repeats in them.

Different from studies of spatial representations in so-called *cognitive maps* in psychology, ethnography, and geography, the relevance of the spatial framework of memory lies rather in the associative and social functions of collective landmarks in space than in the use of memory constructions of space, catering for orientation and way-finding. The collective landmarks are intersections between several frameworks in the group and display a kind of gregariousness; they come to accumulate diverse associations in the collective memory, as they seem to strengthen and support each other’s presence by offering more mental routes to access the place’s memories. For each person, the spatial framework stands as a system of collective points of reference that supports the localisation of other memories – things we experienced or learnt, colleagues’ opinions, or social relations. The flipside of the associative function is that we can hardly draw to mind a place in the spatial framework of memory, or be reminded of it by seeing it in the material framework, without thinking of what we have experienced there, what we have learnt happened there in history, what our colleague thinks of it, or the people we associate with it. Halbwachs points out that the localisation and contextualisation of memories depend on the correspondence of the perceived material framework with the actualised spatial framework in memory and not on the correlation between the percept and memory images.

Because of its role in ascribing significance to places, for each individual there can be said to exist different systems of collective landmarks in the same spatial framework, one for each group the individual is a member of. Some of these landmarks pertain to the family, some to the profession, some to legal relationships, etc. They change over time, adjusting to constructions, demolitions, and alterations in the physical environment, and to modifications of ideologies, emotions, and norms in the group thought. With Halbwachs we should understand how the group develops and sustains different spatial frameworks in order to correspond to its view of the environment in different times in its history. Through each of these spatial configurations the group members can access the collective memory of that period. I have suggested referring to them as epochal-spatial frameworks. These make up basic, temporal distinctions of space in memory.

I have emphasised the dual nature of space by its division into a spatial framework of memory and a material framework of the physical environment, and I have pointed to some of the many ways in which they may enter into relationships. By reference to the term social morphology, Halbwachs has investigated how the material forms of the environment may
be regarded as deposits of social orders of groups, which, in their turn, are internalised by the same or by other groups to form the basis for new or revised spatial frameworks of memory.

In the analyses of Christian churches and the topography of the Holy Land and zones of professional activities, there is a tendency, to a larger degree than in informal remembering, to employ the material framework as aid to the memory. Via Dolorosa in the spatial framework of the story of Jesus in the Bible, known by all believers, gets its material counterpart in the Stations of the Cross, reproduced in churches all over the world. The division of legal functions and positions according to the profession’s prescriptions is materialised in every courtroom and in the apparatus of a tribunal. Halbwachs’s observations point towards recognising the material framework as a framework of memory on a par with the spatial framework of memory. In chapter five I will suggest referring to the first as an external spatial framework of memory and the latter as an internal, both with the purpose of supporting remembrance. With a profession’s zone de l’activité technique we could understand a concept of space in its dual nature, as a spatial framework of memory and as a material framework, to be employed in its practices of remembrance. With topographie we could similarly refer to the totality of the spatial framework of memory and the material framework of a larger cultural group, such as a religion or a nation. Because of the scale and complexity of physical space it may, with regard to its totality, be considered as a spatial framework of memory. Only in parts can it be accessed and traversed by the group’s members.

In his references to the special function of the clergy in Christianity and to the notables of memory in legal and professional collective memory, Halbwachs has pointed to the distinct character of institutionalised forms of collective memory in relation to informal and everyday forms of, for instance, the family. Authorised functionaries take on the responsibility to define remembrance; the laity has little to say. Through dogma, laws, or contracts, and by means of the spatial framework of memory as well as the material framework, the specialists of the group construe the past for them.

While Halbwachs went at length to describe the difference in use of the internal and external frameworks in different societal contexts, he did not clearly distinguish between informal and formal kinds of collective remembrance. With Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model of communicative memory and cultural memory, the topic of chapter five, it will be possible to draw such a distinction theoretically. While it may be true that institutionalised remembrance employs the material environment as mnemonics to a larger degree than informal, it cannot be said that only the
former, which Aleida and Jan Assmann referred to as cultural memory, makes use of material frameworks for remembering. Instead of seeing the concrete environment of the library, the museum, or the city as cultural memory by metonym, like Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theory implies, I will argue that they make up a mind-external framework that is employed by the communicative and the cultural memory alike, but in different ways and for different purposes.

Before elaborating and reconsidering Halbwachs’s concept with Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theories, I will address its remodelling, which took place in architectural theory in the 1960s. The analysis contextualises the spatial framework of memory in relation to the currents of thought in the architectural discourse and identifies some specifications that are valuable for it role as a theoretical framework.
Edifices
Landmarks of orientation

The named environment, familiar to all, furnishes material for common memories and symbols which bind the group together and allow them to communicate with one another. The landscape serves as a vast mnemonic system for the retention of group history and ideals.

— Kevin Lynch, *The Image of the City*, 1960

In the last three decades, Maurice Halbwachs has benefited from a growing reputation as the founding father of studies of remembrance in social fellowships. Endeavours such as Yosef Yerushalmi’s study of Jewish history and memory (1982), Pierre Nora’s localisation of French national memory in *lieux de mémoire* (1984–1992), Gérard Namer’s study of social and institutional memory (1987), the postulation of *kommunikatives* and *kulturelles Gedächtnis* by Aleida and Jan Assmann (1988), and the study of the practices of social memory by Paul Connerton (1989) stand as milestones in the transport of Halbwachs’s legacy into the humanistic memory studies around the turn of the millennium.

Yet, already in the 1960s, Halbwachs began to acquire a reputation in architecture and the planning professions for his thinking on memory and the physical environment. Through the writings of Kevin Lynch and, more forcefully, through Aldo Rossi the notion of a ‘collective memory’ was

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established in the architectural vocabulary. This term possibly found fertile soil in disciplines and professions that, as a rule, need to address masses of people rather than individuals in their quests for new architectural solutions for transport, industry, and social services, and for housing, leisure, and culture. Despite the two architects’ focus on spatial matters in their readings of the theory of collective memory, the term ‘cadre spatial de la mémoire’, spatial framework of memory, never occurs in their writings. Denoted by other words, the concept, nonetheless, came to have a profound influence on their theories and, subsequently, on a generation or two of architects and planners in Europe and the Americas.

This chapter introduces the architectural discourse in the post-war period with its reformulations of history and the new advocacy of binding architectural planning in the present to issues of the past by means of notions such as ‘tradition’ and ‘memory’. I will argue that the introduction of Halbwachs’s theories to the architectural discourse is accompanied by a more general shift in conceptions of architecture’s relation to the past during this period. It takes place at a crucial moment in the development of the writing of architectural history, and the timing seems to have contributed to the success of Lynch’s redefinition of city architecture as an intersubjective construction of perception and memory, and of Rossi’s conception of the city as a collective and cultural product produced in the course of history. Through The Image of the City (1960), possibly the first reference to Halbwachs in architectural theory, Lynch’s theories come to play a pivotal role in the reformulation of architecture in postmodernism. His postulations of how buildings and other features of the physical environment come to make up landmarks for orientation and way-finding have become an essential reference in architectural theory. For this thesis’s formulation of the spatial framework of memory as a theoretical framework his theories equally mark out a basic level.

The Modern Movement and history
Unlike the term ‘memory’, ‘history’ had a central position in the Modern Movement’s formulation of a new architecture in the 1930s and the 1940s. Art historians like Sigfried Giedion (1888–1968), Emil Kaufmann (1891–1953), and Nikolaus Pevsner (1902–1983), dedicated to the history of architecture, contributed with the idea that functionalist architecture was the logical and inevitable consequence in the historical evolution of architecture. Rather than a break with the past, they saw modern architecture as the result of a break with established authorities of architectural style, responsible for an unjustified turn to historicism in the otherwise modern nineteenth century.
The break in contemporary architecture had led to the realisation on the aesthetic level of the technical and cultural advancements of the Western civilisation in the preceding two centuries. The past was employed by the art historians to legitimise the present.

Following in the footsteps of his teacher, art historian Heinrich Wölfflin (1864–1945), and Wölfflin’s predecessor Jakob Burckhardt (1818–1897), Giedion saw as his task ‘to uncover for his own age its vital interrelationships with the past’.3 He turns against what he sees as an indifference to the recent history among his contemporaries. The new conception of space that Giedion identifies in the architecture of the Modern Movement, characterised by planar surfaces and cultural volumes, he traces back to technological advances of the preceding centuries. It replaces earlier conceptions of space, merely as the consequence of the rediscovery of concrete as a building material and of the development of techniques of mass production of cast and wrought iron, steel, and ferroconcrete. Thus, the eighteenth century had already seen the preliminary stages of what Giedion understands as the growth of a new tradition. The tradition takes form in the nineteenth century, throughout which ‘the masses, poor and rich under the domination of the press, academy, and governments, were always wrong in their taste and judgement’, and flourishes in the first part of the twentieth.4

Like Giedion, Pevsner had studied art history under Wölfflin, among others. Pevsner traces the abstraction of form and the reduction of ornamentation in modernism to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, notably in his book The Pioneers of Modern Design: From William Morris to Walter Gropius (1936).5 Different from Giedion, in his history of modern architecture Pevsner does not argue that technological advances or changing social conditions paved the way for the new architectural style: ‘The Modern Movement did not come into being because steel frame and reinforced concrete construction had been worked out – but they were worked out because a new spirit required them’.6 He finds early evidence of the spirit of the modern style in the architecture of Sir John Soane (1753–1837) and Friedrich Gilly (1772–1800) and later in the works of William Morris (1834–1896) and the Arts and Crafts Movement. Their attempts stand out against prevailing ideas of a nineteenth century that ‘remained smugly satisfied with

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5 N Pevsner, Pioneers of Modern Design: from William Morris to Walter Gropius (London, Faber, 1936).
the imitation of the past’. Not only does Pevsner inscribe the Modern Movement into a historic phase that began with Morris and should be seen as one historical unit, but he also suggests it as the successor of changes in spirit that had already taken place in the late eighteenth century and that rejected the uncritical reproduction of historic styles. He traces the intellectual legacy of functionalism as far back as French rationalism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, thus legitimising modern architecture as the high phase of a century-long tradition.

Kaufmann, like Pevsner, finds the source of twentieth-century architecture in late eighteenth-century attempts by the likes of Boullée and Ledoux. In his study *Vom Ledoux bis Le Corbusier*, published in 1933, he investigates the early era of architectural autonomy, the continuation of which he recognises in the architecture of Berlage, Loos, and Le Corbusier. The period around 1800, he suggests, bears similarity with that of the early twentieth century, not only because of formal and thematic resemblances, but also especially because of the new idealism. He will later argue that the architecture of the period of the French Revolution initiates a development that will continue into the twentieth century.

In three different ways, Giedion, Pevsner, and Kaufmann work towards establishing a historical lineage for contemporary architecture. It is with reference to its continuation of a tradition rooted in the eighteenth century that they recognise the break with the past signalled by the Modern

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9 E Kaufmann, *Vom Ledoux bis Le Corbusier. Ursprung und Entwicklung der Autonomen Architektur* (Vienna, Passer, 1933), 62.
Movement. The break with historicism in the twentieth century again takes up the break with the past that had been initiated a century before, but which was interrupted by ‘reactionaries’.

**New conceptions of the past**
In the post-war period a discourse emerges that comes to broaden understandings of how architectural practice and theory ought to relate to the past. It came as a response to the dogmatic teachings of CIAM (*Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne*) and the environmental consequences of a period dominated by the doctrines of functionalist design and planning. The city architecture of modern society seemed not to offer what it had promised. At the core of the American metropolis contemporaries saw ‘massive structures blot out open space; industrial areas beyond are dumped with factory buildings and the dingy barracks where we house our poor; the residential fringes are dotted with characterless cottages repeated endlessly’.\(^{11}\) Countries like Italy saw large-scale migration into the suburbs of fast-growing industrialised cities, the social consequences of which would be epitomised in films like Luchino Visconti’s *Rocco e i suoi fratelli* (*Rocco and His Brothers*), released in 1960.

The critique of existing conceptualisations of history and the past comes to its fruition in the 1960s. Terms like ‘history’ and ‘historian’ become redefined. Others, which had been in limited use in the inter-war period, are brought back with new connotations; ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, and ‘memory’ are positioned against prevailing notions of ‘function’, ‘technology’, and ‘international style’. The linguistic and conceptual siblings of ‘memory’ – ‘collective memory’, ‘recollection’, ‘remembrance’, ‘reminiscence’, ‘recall’, etc. – come to circulate in an architectural discourse dynamically positioned between the Modern Movement and a new paradigm to be defined, each term having different meanings depending on the user.

It is my impression that the critique of the 1950s and 1960s establishes at least three new ways of conceiving architecture’s relation to the past as alternatives to the dominant art-historical writing of history in the Modern Movement. The first critically reformulates the writing of architectural history; the second provides a conceptualisation of history as a living tradition in the architectural profession rather than as an academic act, and the third pictures architecture as a cultural mnemonic, defined by man’s faculties of perception and memory and society’s relationship with the past, rather than by aesthetic systems. I will briefly touch upon these developments

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before I return to the collective memory and the spatial framework of memory and trace their entry into this discourse.

Critical history

The first of these new conceptions of the past is concerned with the integrity and academic rigour of the architectural historian. The historians of modernism, Pevsner argued in 1961, had taken a step in this direction. He argued that from the nineteenth century, when architects performed the role of historians uncovering principles that could be brought into the design processes, the architectural historian had evolved into a separate profession in the twentieth century: ‘The historian now did his job and the architect did his, and while the personal relations might remain warm, their relation was bound to be no longer the same’.12 Giedion’s relation with contemporary architects was indeed warm. He collaborated with architects around Europe ‘to determine as clearly as possible what directions housing, town planning, or regional planning had to take’ and remained the secretary for CIAM during its entire existence.13 The historian, he explains in Space, Time and Architecture, ‘the historian of architecture especially, must be in close contact with contemporary conceptions. Only when he is permeated by the spirit of his own time is he prepared to detect those tracts of the past which previous generations have overlooked’.14 The historian of the Modern Movement was not a practising architect, but neither acted at a distance from the trade.

In Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture 1750–1950 (1965), architect and historian Peter Collins (1920–1981) criticises architectural historians’ close relationships with practising architects, arguing that the two tasks should not be confounded:

there is a grave danger that modern architecture may be maimed and devitalized if we allow historians to breathe too heavily down practicing architects’ necks. Such eagerness overlooks the crucial difference between the theory and the history of architecture; between the way buildings are built and the way they were built.15

The history, Collins writes, covers a similar historic period as the one outlined by Pevsner and Giedion, but he explains that his intention is to write

13 Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture, 4.
14 ibid., 5.
the history of the architects’ and critics’ ideas of modern architectural form, not the history of modern architectural form itself.\footnote{ibid., 16.} Philosophical and ethical problems underlying the creation of architecture, he argues, are what should be studied by history. With Collins the history of architecture comes to take on the form of a history of ideas rather than a history of art, bringing with it a critical integrity that he thought had been missing.

In Teorie e storia dell’architettura, first published in 1968 (Engl. as Theories and History of Architecture, 1980), Manfredo Tafuri (1935–1994) deals with contemporary criticism of the Modern Movement and its decision to present itself as a ‘radically anti-historical phenomenon’.\footnote{ibid., 14.} Tafuri traces the true origin of modern art and architecture in the revolution of the Tuscan humanists of the Quattrocento. In Brunelleschi’s establishment of a linguistic code and symbolic system based on a ‘superhistorical’ comparison with examples of antiquity, and in Alberti’s rational exploration of the structure of the code, Tafuri recognises ‘the first great attempt of modern history to actualise historical values as a translation of mythical time into present time, of archaic meanings into revolutionary messages’\footnote{ibid., 16.}. These attempts, however, do not so much achieve a rooting in history of contemporary practice as a ‘dehistoricisation’. Brunelleschi’s arbitrary selection of positive and negative elements from history, Tafuri reasons, marks the break in the conception of history as a continuous line in favour of ‘a broken line defined by an arbitrary yardstick that decides, each time, its values and goals’.\footnote{ibid., 30.} According to Tafuri, the quest for building a new history makes Brunelleschi the leading figure of what he sees as the first avant-garde in the modern sense. The Modern Movement, his argument continues, behaves according to existing norms in European culture, established five centuries earlier: ‘the neat cut with preceding traditions becomes, paradoxically, the symbol of an authentic historical continuity. In founding anti-history and presenting their work not so much as anti-historical, but rather as above the very concept of historicity, the avant-gardes perform the only historically legitimate act of the time’.\footnote{ibid., 16.} Gently, Tafuri undermines the history as it was written by the historians of the Modern Movement and distances himself from the activities of the architects, analysing them in a wider cultural perspective.
History as tradition

The second way, in which the discourse of the 1950s and 1960s offers alternative conceptions of the past, also addresses the idea of a break with history. For the leading exponents of this way of conceiving history, practising architects and critics rather than historians, history should not be isolated from the present, but be seen as an asset, a living tradition with relevance to the production and administration of architecture and urban environments.

In Italy, architect and critic Ernesto Nathan Rogers (1909–1969) polemiced against contemporary architecture with an appeal for the appreciation of a national culture, while explicitly demonstrating distance to reactionary nationalists and demagogues. In order for the architecture of a complex and multifarious reality to develop and flourish, he called for re-establishing its roots in a tradition full of the treasures of lived experience. To be modern, he argued, meant to know contemporary history in relation to the whole history and to take responsibility for one’s actions as spiritual contributions to culture. In an article on European architecture that appeared in 1964, Rogers insinuates that modernism’s indifference to the architecture of the past is anti-European, potentially even American:

If there is anything inherent in the European spirit (God keep me from making racial distinctions!) it is a feeling for history, for the simple reason that Europe is the laboratory for history. Indeed, the most sensitive and, actually, the most modern Americans do not come to Europe to improve their technological knowledge, which only in exceptional cases is less advanced than our own, but to admire our public squares, the relationships of our urban organisms, and to become one with their essence. An old square may very well seem odd if it is considered only in the light of ‘practical’ parameters, as it most assuredly would be it if were taken out of its natural context. But this is something beyond the mere forms that they take, for to this day the old square is still the essence of a way of life, and it is only the ultimate truth of this way of life that can be exported, for the purpose of giving substantially new appearances to those forms, appearances inherent in places greatly different from our own.

Along similar lines, architects Reinhard Gieselmann (1925–2013) and Oswald Mathias Ungers (1926–2007) in their 1960 manifesto for the renewal

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21 E N Rogers, ‘Die Präexistenzen der Umgebung und die zeitgenössischen praktischen Themen (Le preesistenze ambientali e i temi pratici contemporanei)’ [It. orig. (1955)], in F Neumeyer & J Cepi (eds), Quellentexte zur Architekturtheorie (Munich, Prestel, 2002), 476.
of European architecture cried out that ‘Creative art is unthinkable without a spiritual clash with tradition’. Dutch architect Aldo van Eyck called for a universally valid approach to solve the environmental problems of his time and to stop the mechanical imitation of modern masters like Picasso, Mondrian, Le Corbusier, and Schönberg. By searching in history, architects could identify the similarities between historical periods, and not, like architects of the Modern Movement, emphasise the differences. ‘The time has come to gather the old into the new; to rediscover the archaic principles of human nature’.

With Robert Venturi’s *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (1966), approaches such as those called for by Rogers, Gieselmann, Unger, and van Eyck find their response as a manual for architectural practice. Venturi declares that he writes criticism of architecture as an architect and not as a critic; history, with him, is internalised into the professional’s work in the present. Historic precedents are assessed. Renaissance, Mannerist, Baroque, Rococo, as well as nineteenth- and twentieth-century examples serve to discuss solutions to form issues that have repeatedly resurfaced in history. In this way, Venturi’s select history of architecture does not aim to reconstruct chronological history or a development of schools, but analyses specific issues like ambiguity, contradiction, contrast between inside and outside, etc.

Venturi’s book has been characterised as a superficial reduction of history in the present and as an attempt to ‘edit history in the likeness of the present’. I would suggest that his approach, alternatively, could be said to offer a different stance towards the past and a restoration of an engagement with past professional practice. Thus, it represents an attempt by Venturi to write himself into a tradition of an essentially European history of architectural practice and constitutes an analysis of issues of form seen

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26 Venturi’s appreciation of contrasts between the inside and outside of buildings, which he exemplifies with e.g. Frank Lloyd Wright’s Johnson Wax administration building and Sir John Soane’s Bank of England, is the polemic reversal of Giedion’s argument of the urge of interpenetration of inner and outer space, as it had been developed by Borromini in Sant’ Ivo and continued in the Eiffel Tower and Tatlin’s project for a monument in Moscow in 1920. ibid., 71–89; Giedion, *Space, Time and Architecture*, 49–53.

from the perspective of the practising architect.\textsuperscript{28} It is the return of tradition, a re-establishment of a sense of historical continuity within the profession.

A different claim for architectural continuity can be seen in the influential \textit{The Death and Life of Great American Cities} (1961), written by journalist and activist Jane Jacobs (1916–2006). In the introduction she explains that the book is an attack on ‘the principles and aims that have shaped modern, orthodox city planning and rebuilding’ in American cities, propagated by the likes of Ebenezer Howard, Lewis Mumford, Sir Patrick Geddes, Catherine Bauer, Clarence Stein, Sir Raymond Unwin, and Le Corbusier.\textsuperscript{29} She directs the attention to the existing inner city districts and their socioeconomic variety, addressing issues such as pavement security, child upbringing, and qualities of neighbourhoods that have developed over time.

The reason for bringing Jacobs’s book into this discussion of new conceptions of the past can be found in chapter ten of the book, named ‘The need for aged buildings’. Jacobs writes:

Cities need old buildings so badly that it is probably impossible for vigorous streets and districts to grow without them. By old buildings I mean not museum-piece old buildings, not old buildings in an excellent and expensive state of rehabilitation – although these make fine ingredients – but also a good lot of plain, ordinary, low-value old buildings, including some rundown old buildings.\textsuperscript{30}

Her argument is that flourishing diversity in a city district only arises when there is a mix of high-yield, middle-yield, low-yield, and no-yield enterprises. Such a mix can only exist in the same neighbourhood if there are old buildings next to new ones, where the costs for construction since long have been amortised. Expensive construction costs of newer buildings require a high overhead of the enterprise occupying them, which means that they have to be high profit or well subsidised. Old buildings in a not so good state, Jacobs explains, promote diversity in the primary uses of the building stock.

With Jacobs the economics of time, the changing economic premises of buildings over decades and generations enter into the architectural discourse as a key factor for the success of city architecture. Buildings that represented

\textsuperscript{28} Architect Steen Eiler Rasmussen has provided a similar study that, like Venturi’s, flattens hierarchies established by historians. In \textit{Experiencing Architecture} he studies spatial experience through themes such as colour, scale, and rhythm and turns to architectural exemplars of disparate historic periods to create a reference manual for the benefit of contemporary architectural design. S E Rasmussen, \textit{Experiencing Architecture} (London, Chapman & Hall, 1959) [Da. orig., \textit{Om at opleve arkitektur} (1957)].


\textsuperscript{30} ibid., 200.
large investments in an earlier period become the bargains of the present. To promote a good socioeconomic development in a city district, too many older buildings ought not to be demolished. Her line of reasoning is profoundly different compared to the conception of historic architecture we find in the histories of architecture of the Modern Movement. The architecture of the past is seen as an economic factor rather than a cultural or aesthetic one. Age as such and the building’s poor condition become the value, not its period or style. Jacobs shifts the focus entirely from singular, representative buildings as aesthetic expressions to the average and trivial architecture that does not stand out for its high quality or uniqueness. The issue of tradition and continuity is given a quite different form from that of Rogers, van Eyck, or Venturi. It represents an extraprofessional continuity of architecture based on real estate value and social ethics. The tradition that should be passed on to new generations consists of an administration of urban districts to, at all times, and for socioeconomic reasons, uphold a diversity of architectural age in the stock of buildings.

Architecture as mnemonic
A third conception of the past that develops from the 1950s introduces an appreciation for how the built environment makes up a stability-providing construction, which, through perception and memory, come to support cognitive functions. Leaning on theories from philosophy, psychology, and sociology, its advocates argue for the importance of architecture for reasons of individuals’ sense of orientation, well-being, and recollection, as well as of social and cultural collectives’ historical awareness and identity.

A strand of such appreciations comes to pursue phenomenological studies in architecture. These are concerned with man’s intimate and emotional relationship with the built environment, especially that of the home and of childhood environments, accessed through dreams, reveries, and memory. The architectural writers take as their point of departure the writings of phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), but indirectly Halbwachs seems also to have asserted influence on the development. Bachelard’s *La poétique de l’espace* appeared in French in 1958 and an English translation was published in 1964. His application of phenomenology to architecture, notably to the dwelling, becomes a major source of influence for architects. The emphasis on the role of the home, especially that of the childhood home, as a support for personal remembering reminds strongly of passages in Halbwachs’s *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*: 

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Of course, thanks to the house, great many of our memories are housed, and if the house is a bit elaborate, if it has a cellar and a garret, nooks and corridors, our memories have refuges that are all the more clearly delineated. All our lives we come back to them in our daydreams. A psychoanalyst should, therefore, turn his attention to this simple localization of our memories. I should like to give the name of topoanalysis to this auxiliary of psychoanalysis. Topoanalysis, then, would be the systematic psychological study of the sites of our intimate lives. In the theater of the past that is constituted by memory, the stage setting maintains the characters in their dominant roles. At times we think we know ourselves in time, when all we know is a sequence of fixations in the spaces of the being’s stability … Memories are motionless, and the more securely they are fixed in space, the sounder they are … For a knowledge of intimacy, localization in the spaces of our intimacy is more urgent than determination of dates.  

Bachelard knew Halbwachs’s *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* well, and with the idea that the house in memory enables the adult to move in the spaces of his life in order to reconstruct past experiences, he introduces a conceptualisation that is similar to Halbwachs’s concept of the spatial framework of memory for private remembrance. As I will discuss later in this chapter and in the next chapter, when the latter’s theories are introduced by Lynch and Rossi, such intimate and emotional aspects of remembering in the built environment are left out in favour of collective and societal aspects. They come to be associated with the phenomenologists rather than with Halbwachs and the urbanists Lynch and Rossi.

Later attempts further the legacy of Bachelard’s ruminations for a generation of architects. In *Body, Memory, and Architecture*, published in

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31 G Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, tr. M Jolas (Boston, Beacon Press, 1994) [Fr. orig. (1958)], 8, 9. Cf. Halbwachs’s formulation: ‘[For the child,] the different rooms of a house, specific nooks, specific pieces of furniture, or in the vicinity of the house, a specific garden, a specific street corner, because they usually evoke vivid impressions in the child’s mind and are associated with specific family members, with its games, with specific events, unique or recurring, because its imagination has animated and transfigured them, in some way they acquire an emotional value’. M Halbwachs, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, ed. G Namer (1925; facs. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1994), 97. Cf. *Formation of the spatial framework of memory* in ch. 2.


Landmarks of orientation

1977, Kent C. Bloomer and Charles W. Moore elaborate on Bachelard’s thoughts to take on an operative character for architectural design, in which memory becomes linked to the centre place of the hearth or the patio of the traditional house:

Although we cannot see the inside of our body, we do develop memories of an inside world that include a panorama of experiences taken from the environment and etched into the ‘feelings’ of our identity over a lifetime of personal encounters with the world. We populate our inside world with the people, places, and events that we ‘felt’ at one time in the outside world, and we associate those events with the feelings themselves. The centerplace of the house, like the body, accumulates memories that may have the characteristics of ‘feelings’ rather than data. Rituals over time leave their impression on the walls and forms of the interior and endow the rooms with artifacts which give us access to previous experiences. These centerplaces in the house are the regions where the memories of the self can be ritualized and new memories belonging to the family can be accumulated and re-experienced away from the distractions which must occur along the outer boundaries of the house.34

According to the authors, modern architecture with large picture windows and no centre place could suppress or empty the architecture of meaning and memory. For them, ‘memory’ becomes a key concept in the normative assessment of architectural style.35

In the remaining part of this chapter and in the next chapter I shall address two studies in which ‘memory’ predominantly comes to refer to functions of orientation in the built environment. They avoid an individualistic and philosophical approach to architecture and memory, like that of Bloomer and Moore, but recognise individual remembering primarily as a socially conditioned activity. It is the social and cultural aspects of Halbwachs’s theories, rather than the personal and phenomenal, which stand at the centre, next to those of other sociologists and anthropologists, geographers, and psychologists. The focus is on how the physical environment is perceived and

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34 Bloomer & Moore, Body, Memory, and Architecture, 49–50.
35 A later book by Moore and Donlyn Lyndon gives a similar, normative approach to architecture and memory. The authors refer to the mnemonic feats that Cicero performed in the Roman Senate by means of memorised places, as of the art of memory, and observe how the environment should be formed to make it easier to remember, because ‘Places that are memorable are necessary to the good conduct of our lives; we need to think about where we are and what is unique and special about our surroundings so that we can better understand ourselves and how we relate to others. This mental intermingling of people, places, and ideas is what makes architecture interesting’. D Lyndon & C W Moore, Chambers for a Memory Palace (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994), xii.
conceived intersubjectively. The function of architecture as a mnemonic, in Lynch’s case in relation to perception and formal legibility, and for Rossi as a means for historical continuity and collective identity, offers distinctly different conceptions of the relation to the architectural past than did the historians of the Modern Movement. Like Jacobs did in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, they step outside of the architectural profession to find other theoretical approaches to the past and the built environment. In chapter four I will discuss Rossi’s contribution to the study of architecture and memory. For the remainder of this chapter I will turn to the American context, where Halbwachs’s theories first had an impact on architectural theory.

**An image of architecture**

Halbwachs was by no means the only one to direct attention to people’s mental representations of space in the first half of the twentieth century. Significant contributions had been made in psychology, ethnography, and geography, often in attempts to decipher mechanisms of orientation and navigation or to map general definitions of spatial cognition. In this section I shall try to convey how, and in what way, Halbwachs’s concept ends up in the theory of Lynch. My account, however, should be read with the awareness that Halbwachs’s contribution is but one of several influences on the intellectual environment that Lynch surrounded himself with. It is not with the idea of a mental image of the physical environment that Halbwachs comes to contribute, but with a concept of the kind that implied its embedment in social configurations. I will argue that what attracted Lynch was the symbolic and cultural performance that Halbwachs shows is related to the sustenance of mental images of space. However, to understand from where Lynch’s engagement with such images came I shall first introduce his twelve years older colleague and collaborator.

*Gyorgy Kepes and the mental image*

One of the strongest influences on Lynch and his conception of the *environmental image* can be found in his collaboration with the Hungarian painter, designer, and art and architecture theorist, Gyorgy Kepes (in Hungarian György; 1906–2001), who had moved to Chicago in 1937. Kepes first taught at the New Bauhaus in Chicago, later renamed the Institute

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of Design and founded by his compatriot and collaborator since 1930 Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, before he was offered a position at the department of architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1945. In 1967 he founded the Center for Advanced Visual Studies at MIT.

With *Language of Vision*, published in 1944, Kepes, who was strongly influenced by gestalt psychology in the work of Rudolf Arnheim and the members of the Berlin school, advances a critique of the contemporary living environment. In the study he posits that formlessness characterises contemporary human existence, but with the advance of sciences of the social and psychological realm, a new visual language can be developed to become one of the means to ‘re-unite man and his knowledge and to re-form man into an integrated being’. In his introduction Kepes goes on to argue that the physical environment had been extended and reshaped, partly by new architecture and partly by new visual tools that enable us to discern what previously had been outside the realm of comprehension. ‘Vision’, he maintains,

is primarily a device of orientation; a means to measure and organize spatial events … To orient oneself in walking requires a different spatial measurement than is required in riding a motor-car or in an aeroplane. To grasp spatial relationships an orient oneself in a metropolis of today, among the intricate dimensions of streets, subways, [elevators], and skyscrapers, requires a new way of seeing [and] necessitate[s] new idioms of spatial measurement and communication of space.

The reorientation of the language of vision would benefit not only the orientation in a physical realm, but, equally important, in ‘human spheres’. The latter would constitute a new, symbolical order of psychological and intellectual experiences that responded to the ‘dynamics of social events, and the new vistas of a mobile, physical world’. Kepes’s book is seated in a contemporary visual language and shows an appreciation of the recent generations of artists and architects. Positively, it offers itself as a

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38 Kirsten Wagner points out that Kepes, next to Arnheim, likely was one of those who had introduced the Gestalt-theoretical approaches to the American art practice and theory. The Berlin school included members like Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Koffka, and Kurt Lewin, all of which emigrated from Germany to the US in the 1930s. ibid., 324–25. Kepes’s as well as Arnheim’s gestalt studies would become sources of inspiration for Norberg-Schulz’s *Intentions in Architecture*. For a study on psychology’s role at the intersections of history, art, and architecture in the twentieth century, see M Jarzombek, *The Psychologizing of Modernity* (Cambridge, CUP, 2000).
40 ibid., 13–14.
41 ibid., 14.
contribution to addressing existing problems, not as a critique of society.\textsuperscript{42} But if \textit{Language of Vision} promises a continuation and consolidation of a tradition of modernist aesthetics, in my opinion, Kepes’s 1956 book, \textquote{The New Landscape in Art and Science}, contains a fierce critique of modernity in the middle of a treatise that continues to address issues of perception, as if it was a sequel to the previous book:

A century and a half of industrial civilization has transformed the face of our environment. The virgin forests and lakes, the orchards and fields of early cultivation, are woven into a common landscape by ribbons of concrete and steel which bear traffic roaring by at relentless speeds … buildings of steel and glass outstrip the energy and strength of nature’s structures … The Modern metropolis, a giant focus of our unsettled world, spreads our upon the land in widening rings of visual disorder.\textsuperscript{43}

The lavishly illustrated and multifaceted volume, which includes his own writing as well as seventeen texts by artists like Naum Gabo and Fernand Léger and architects like Walter Gropius and Richard J. Neutra, as well as numerous quotations from thinkers of all times, had been prepared and written between 1947 and 1952, but was not published until 1956.\textsuperscript{44} A way to address the problems of modernity’s visual disorder, Kepes explains, goes through our mental images of the external environment. His concept is linked to a revival of the term ‘image’ in the 1950s and 1960s in cognitive psychology, taking the meaning of a mental representation, and in economy, with the understanding of a collective idea or principle that carries the views of the group on an object, person, or other group.\textsuperscript{45} In the same year as Kepes published \textit{The New Landscape in Art and Science} K. E. Boulding published \textit{The Image}, a study of mental imagery that claimed that ‘Behavior depends on the image – the sum of what we think we know and what makes us act the way we do’.\textsuperscript{46} According to Lynch, Boulding’s book would serve as a

\textsuperscript{42} In one of the introductory essays Sigfried Giedion suggests that Kepes’s endeavour ‘bears witness that a third generation is on the march, willing to continue and to make secure the modern tradition which has developed in the course of this century’. S Giedion, ‘Art Means Reality’, in G Kepes, \textit{Language of Vision} (Chicago, Paul Theobald, 1944), 6.

\textsuperscript{43} Kepes, \textit{The New Landscape}, 69.

\textsuperscript{44} ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{45} Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt’, 319.

\textsuperscript{46} K E Boulding, \textit{The Image. Knowledge in Life and Society} (1956; pb edn, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1961). Quoted from blurb. Boulding’s image displays certain similarities to the frameworks of memory in Halbwachs’s theory. Boulding writes: ‘I am not only located in space and time, I am located in a field of personal relations. I not only know where and when I am, I know to some extent who I am’. And further: ‘What I have been talking about is knowledge. Knowledge, perhaps, is not a good word for this. Perhaps one would rather say my Image of the world. Knowledge has an implication of validity, of truth … It is this Image that largely governs my behavior’. He continues: ‘The image is built up as a result of all past experience of the
theoretical underpinning of his and Kepes’s work, although he claims that they were unaware of it at the time of writing *The Image of the City*. As conceptualisations of the world, Kepes suggests, the images mediate between man and the external world:

Sensed forms, images and symbols are as essential to us as palpable reality in exploring nature for human ends … We make a map of our experience patterns, an inner model of the outer world, and we use this to organize our lives. Our natural ‘environment’ – whatever impinges on us from outside – becomes our human ‘landscape’ – a segment of nature fathomed by us and made our home.

It is possible to recognise in the poetic descriptions distinctions also present in Halbwachs’s thinking. ‘Our natural “environment”’ could be seen to correspond to the material framework in Halbwachs’s thinking, and the ‘inner model of the outer world’ or ‘our human “landscape”’ to the mind-internal spatial framework of memory. We can use the latter to make meaning of ‘our surroundings and the world at large, individually in our personal images, socially in images we share with men of our time and condition’. Yet, the objective of the miniature theory offered in Kepes’s introduction differs from that of Halbwachs; as a painter and teacher Kepes is more concerned with the role of the visual than with the role of the social and, consequently, with the development of a new visual sensibility, acquired through intellectual analysis and the emotional delight of perception.

In modern life, Kepes suggests, the inner model is in disharmony with the outer world. New form patterns must be learnt in order to find a position in which we can cope with the world of forms: ‘Like the forest and mountains of medieval times, our new environment harbors strange menacing beasts; invisible viruses, atoms, mesons, protons, cosmic rays, supersonic waves’. He calls for a sensuous mapping of the forms and configurations of the new world. It is the ‘dimensions of light, color, space, forms, textures, rhythms of

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possessor of the image. Part of the image is the history of the image itself’. The images, Boulding explains, are also defined by the social setting: ‘Part of our image of the world is the belief that this image is shared by other people like ourselves who also are part of our image of the world. In common daily intercourse we all behave as if we possess roughly the same image of the world … It is this shared image which is “public” knowledge as opposed to “private” knowledge’. Boulding, *The Image*, 4, 5, 6, 14.


49 ibid.

50 ibid., 17.

51 ibid., 19.
sound and movement’ of this different environment that we need to grasp in order to discover the ‘potentialities for a richer, more orderly and secure human life’. Kepes embraces the environment of modernity, seeing the ‘kaleidoscopic pattern which shocks and numbs our sensibilities’ as a potential good. He suggests that this outer world should be brought into harmony with the inner mental model, learning new sensibilities from artists, architects, and designers, who can ‘present us with the new wonders and riches of our contemporary world in their affirmative, optimistic statements, showing us how use can be made of them. By these means’, he argues, ‘we can savor the tastes and experience the pleasures of our modern birthright’.

The mental image offers itself as the spatial framework of memory that Kepes suggests needs to be adjusted to the visual expressions of the physical framework of the society of the modern. Kepes presumes that the character of the image needs to change in the course of history to follow aesthetic configurations of the physical environment, and he implies that coming to a new equilibrium is a question of adaption. I believe we can use his thinking to raise questions of an architectural nature concerning Halbwachs’s theory. To what degree, for instance, do new aesthetic or architectural paradigms influence the processes of acquiring new mental images – spatial frameworks of memory – and the adjustment of the old? Do paradigm shifts in architecture and urban planning as well as major reconstructions resulting from war or redevelopment cause the need for stabilising periods, in which a new cultural equilibrium of mind can be found? Acting as representatives for the dominant groups of society in their work with shaping the physical environment – what is the role of architects and planners for the politics of the collective mental images of society? Questions like these were the concern of Kepes in his teaching and research, but they also came to stand at the centre of the work of his colleague.

Kevin Lynch and Gyorgy Kepes
Kevin Lynch (1918–1984) worked together with Kepes at MIT. He had begun to train as an architect in the mid-1930s at Yale, the last school of architecture in the United States to continue in the Beaux Arts tradition.
Dissatisfied with the studies he enquired about studying with Frank Lloyd Wright at his school at Taliesin. In 1937 he joined Wright for a year and a half, but left because he did not want to ‘get swallowed up’ by the milieu.\footnote{Lynch quoted in Banerjee & Southworth, ‘Kevin Lynch: His Life and Work’, 18.} Lynch went on to study engineering, got bored, and started studying biology. After having served in the army during the war, he pursued a Bachelor’s degree in city planning at MIT, fulfilling a dream he had nurtured since the time at Yale.\footnote{ibid., 19.} He graduated in 1947, and in 1948, after a brief position at the Greensboro Planning Commission in North Carolina, he was offered a teaching position at MIT, which he accepted.

Lynch’s book *The Image of the City* was published in 1960 at the Joint Center for Urban Studies, a cooperative venture of MIT and Harvard University.\footnote{Lynch, *The Image of the City*, v.} It remains Lynch’s most influential writing and is one of the bestselling books of all time with over 200,000 copies printed of the first edition and about 5,000 still printed every year.\footnote{Ellis, ‘Revisiting *The Image of the City*’, 6.} The study was based on the findings of the research project at the Center for Urban and Regional Studies at MIT that Lynch worked on together with Kepes. Lynch had worked out some of the underlying ideas for the project during a study trip to Italy in 1952–1953.\footnote{The travel journals and an early text based on the experience bear witness to their early development. K Lynch, ‘The Travel Journals (1952–53)’, in T Banerjee et al. (eds), *City Sense and City Design. Writings and Projects of Kevin Lynch* (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1990), 107; K Lynch, ‘Notes on City Satisfactions (1953)’, in T Banerjee et al. (eds), *City Sense and City Design. Writings and Projects of Kevin Lynch* (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1990).} Lynch later recalls that in discussions with Kepes, walking down the Boston streets in 1954, the ideas matured into the theme of the mental image of the city.\footnote{Lynch, ‘Reconsidering *The Image of the City*’, 152.} In a working paper, written as a part of the research project, they propose a definition of ‘the image’, or, to be more precise, they say, ‘the schema’ of the city. With reference to visual perception, they assume four levels of organisation of the mental image:

1.) the **visual field**, the immediate image as recorded by the eye: bound and finite, in perspective, shifting, instantaneous, etc.
2.) the **visual world**, the visual field reinterpreted in terms of everyday experience, stable, without perspective, of constant color and size, panoramic, and extended present.
3.) the **schematic world**, a generalized picture or image of a specific physical reality; abstract, independent of time and of the actual presence of the
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particular reality (although this must have been present to the eye at least once).

4.) the realm of stereotypes, also an abstract timeless image; now no longer referring to any specific reality, but rather to a class of them.62

The authors explain that the study will only concern the visual world (2) and the schematic world (3). The paper is interesting in that it suggests differentiations that remind of Halbwachs’s more detailed distinctions.63 Lynch and Kepes speak of perception, Halbwachs of memory, but they both address the images of space in mind. Although the social aspects are only implied in the fourth level, the realm of stereotypes, the others have their counterparts in Halbwachs’s theory; the visual field can be compared to vivid, fragmentary, memory images of a singular exposure to an environment. These are the first-time impressions. The visual world for Halbwachs is the form in which the impressions of the visual field reach the conscious mind. Pre-existing notions of the frameworks of memory colour the incoming stimuli, making them into schematised and dynamic constructs from vivid, static images. Therefore, according to Halbwachs, there is no perception that is not informed by earlier experience. The schematic world is the counterpart of the spatial framework of memory. It comprises the abstracted notions of our mind. The realm of stereotypes may be compared to certain aspects of the group images of space, as collectively shaped notions of space that influence the perception or memory of an environment.

In the brief note Lynch and Kepes do not refer to any social aspects, not even on the level of stereotypes. For Halbwachs, differently, the social is the essential reason and precondition for the frameworks of memory. Yet, the distinctions they propose suggest a theoretical complexity of their research project. Kepes has a profound influence on Lynch’s work. In the preface of The Image of the City Lynch writes, ‘The detailed development and concrete studies are my own, but the underlying concepts were generated in many exchanges with Professor Kepes. I would be at a loss to disentangle my ideas from his’.64 The model of different levels of perception, however, which they conceived together, does not find its way into The Image of the City. It is the image, or the schema, that becomes the central issue of the book.

62 K Lynch, ‘Discussion in Progress: The Image of the Urban Environment’, in Research project: The Perceptual Form of the City, doc no. 125773, MC 208, Box 1, General Statements 1 (Boston, MIT, Institute Archives and Special Collections, pub. online) <http://hdl.handle.net/1721.3/35693> accessed 24 Nov. 2012
63 Cf. e.g. Frameworks of memory in ch. 1 and Remember other things, A stage for memory, and Collective landmarks in ch. 2.
64 Lynch, The Image of the City, vi.
Lynch had tested some of the methods used in the book in a small study on childhood memories of cities made in collaboration with Alvin K. Lukashok and published in 1956. Although the physical and visual features of space are at the centre of the analysis, the results prompt the authors to reflect on the role of social and cultural associations of the memories of certain spaces, like the differences in perceived beauty or social status of different neighbourhoods. They summarise by stating that ‘Knowledge of how people react to their physical environment, and how they invest it with emotional qualities, is quite as important as knowing the technical or economic or sociological resultants of a given form’. 65

The image of the city

*The Image of the City* sets out to ‘consider the visual quality of the American city by studying the mental image of that city which is held by its citizens’ and focuses on the clarity and legibility of the forms of the cityscape and how they contribute to the orientation in the city. 66 The insight from the study, Lynch argues, could inform planning professionals in remodelling the external environment to improve the mental image people have of it. 67 The ‘strategic link’ in the process of way-finding – a term he has been credited with coining in the book – is the environmental image. 68 Lynch outlines its main theoretical features in the first chapter, *The Image of the Environment*, and elaborates on its many features and his theoretical references in appendix A, *Some References to Orientation*. 69 It is ‘the generalized mental picture of the exterior physical world that is held by an individual. This image is the product both of the immediate sensation and of the memory of past experience’. 70 It is used to interpret information and to guide action, and the ordered environment, internalised into this environmental image, enables one ‘to find a friend’s house or a policeman or a button store’. 71 The original function of the environmental image, so he argues, is to permit purposeful mobility and the basis for emotional and social associations.

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65 A K Lukashok & K Lynch, ‘Some Childhood Memories of the City’, *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 22/3 (Summer 1956), 152.
67 ibid., 12–13. What was unforeseen, Lynch later writes, was that the study, ‘whose principal aim was to urge on designers the necessity of consulting those who live in a place, had at first a diametrically opposite result. It seemed to many planners that here was a new technique … that allowed a designer to predict the public image of any existing city or new proposal’. Lynch, ‘Reconsidering *The Image of the City*’, 156.
70 ibid., 4.
71 ibid.
A two-way process forms the image. The observer takes in the environment and structures it, and, in turn, the image shapes the way in which the observer directs his attention and sees the external environment:

The environment suggests distinctions and relations, and the observer – with great adaptability and in the light of his own purposes – selects, organizes, and endows with meaning what he sees. The image so developed now limits and emphasizes what is seen while the image itself is being tested against the filtered perceptual input in constant interacting process.\(^2\)

Lynch portrays the environmental image as an accumulated but fairly static construct. He would later revise this view, arguing that the image is essentially dynamic and changes over time, for example with the maturation of the person and changes to the city.\(^3\)

Kirsten Wagner has written a concise study of the structural and gestalt-theoretical premises for Lynch’s study.\(^4\) She points to the sources of influence for Lynch’s concept of the environmental image. One of these sources is his close collaboration with Kepes at MIT and the distinction between a mental image of the environment and its corresponding external landscape, outlined in *The New Landscape in Art and Science*. The theoretical side of Kepes’s concept is not, however, systematically elaborated in the text, but remains a personally shaped concept. Wagner argues that Lynch takes over not only the concept of the environmental image from Kepes, but also the gestalt-theoretical perspective of the legibility of form in the city, as well as the idea that the modern metropolis, in opposition to the historical city, does not offer a totality of form, a gestalt, but instead the formlessness of the urban sprawl.\(^5\)

A second sphere of influence for Lynch’s concept is the scholarship in psychology and anthropology that considers man’s conceptualisations of space. According to Wagner, the literature takes up about two thirds of Lynch’s bibliography and gives him and his readers a broad understanding of the function of the mental image of the environment, particularly with respect to orientation and way-finding.\(^6\) In my opinion, Lynch’s study is an inventive synthesis of various sources, complemented with his own research. The field he related to was also concerned with the psychological functions of human navigation, and Lynch would lean on several inventive studies

\(^2\) ibid., 6.
\(^3\) Lynch, ‘Reconsidering The Image of the City’, 157.
\(^4\) Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt’.
\(^5\) ibid., 327–28.
\(^6\) ibid., 332 n. 33. Geographic literature also plays an important role.
from other disciplines, such as C. C. Trowbridge’s ‘On Fundamental Methods of Orientation and Imaginary Maps’ from 1913.\textsuperscript{77} And while his book today is considered a groundbreaking study in architectural and urban theory, which, among other things, ‘challenged modernism’s visual leveling of the urban environment’,\textsuperscript{78} it also enjoys the status of a seminal book in the field that is concerned with what is now generally referred to as the study of cognitive mapping.\textsuperscript{79}

Kevin Lynch and Maurice Halbwachs

A third area of influence, which Wagner only mentions in passing, comes from social and sociological studies of the city. Halbwachs stands as the most evident authority, but inspiration also came from the urban historian Lewis Mumford (1895–1990) and from the intellectual milieu of the Chicago School of Sociology.\textsuperscript{80} Lynch appreciated the postulates of \textit{La Mémoire collective} enough for him to return to them a decade later in \textit{What Time is This Place?}, published in 1972. Halbwachs’ book had been published posthumously in 1950 and Lynch must have read it in French.\textsuperscript{81} Lynch recounts several of the social and cultural aspects of the spatial framework of memory – although never referred to by that name – in the two chapters that outline the theory of the environmental image. \textit{The Image of the City} displays one of the early examples of the use of terms like ‘memory’, ‘collective memories’, and ‘common memory’ in architectural theory in the second half of the twentieth century and what may be the first reference to the writings of Halbwachs. Lynch’s book appears around the same time as the publications of English translations of Halbwachs’s \textit{Morphologie sociale, Esquisse d’une psychologie des classes sociales}, and \textit{Les origins du sentiment religieux}, thereby contributing to the early post-war focus on Halbwachs in the social

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{Trowbridge referred to \textit{imaginary maps}, which approximately can be said to correspond to Lynch’s environmental image.} C C Trowbridge, ‘On Fundamental Methods of Orientation and “Imaginary Maps”’, \textit{Science}, 38/990 (19 Dec. 1913).
\bibitem{H F Mallgrave & D Goodman, \textit{An Introduction to Architectural Theory. 1968 to the Present} (Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 7.}
\bibitem{Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt’, 323.}
\end{thebibliography}

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sciences in the English-speaking world (only later, in the 1970s and 1980s, will the humanities develop an interest in his writings).  

In addition to the pragmatic functions of enabling purposeful mobility Lynch sees in the environmental image a frame of reference for the organisation of activities, beliefs, or knowledge. The image takes on social functions:

It can furnish the raw material for the symbols and collective memories of group communication. A striking landscape is the skeleton upon which many primitive races erect their socially important myths. Common memories of the ‘home town’ were often the first and easiest point of contact between lonely soldiers during the war.  

In this way, the environmental image takes on an emotional quality among the people who share associations to a part of the city; their images become ‘soaked in memories and meanings’. Lynch transposes the idea of the social and cultural functionality of the environmental image from Halbwachs; it is used as a framework to which the memories of events, knowledge, and social relations are attached. ‘The landscape serves as a vast mnemonic system for the retention of group history and ideals … Maurice Halbwachs makes the same point in reference to modern Paris, when he remarks that the stable physical scene, the common memory of Parisians, is a potent force in binding them together and allowing them to communicate with each other.’  

Mumford’s books, in particular The Culture of Cities, published in 1938, made their presence felt on Lynch. The Culture of Cities inspired him to pursue an urban-focused architectural education. In the book Mumford lays

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83 Lynch, The Image of the City, 4.

84 ibid., 1.

85 ibid., 126.


87 Ellis, ‘Revisiting The Image of the City’, 49. Ellis writes that ‘This book was the first contact Lynch had with Mumford’s work, and his incredibly passionate reaction was the first sign of their eventual friendship. …
out a ‘social concept of the city’ that he forms on the basis of a ‘sociological concept of the city’. He distinguishes between two sides of the city: one that acts as a physical frame for domestic and economic activities, and one that takes the role of a special framework for common life and collective drama, a consciously dramatic setting for the more significant actions and the more sublimated urges of human culture … It is in the city, the city as theater, that man’s more purposive activities are formulated and worked out, through conflicting and cooperating personalities, events, groups, into more significant culminations.\textsuperscript{88}

Furthermore, Mumford stresses the importance of socially structured environments for our sense of balance and well-being:

[Men’s] unified plans and buildings become a symbol of their social relatedness; and when the physical environment itself becomes disordered and incoherent, the social functions that it harbors become more difficult to express.\textsuperscript{89}

Along similar lines, Lynch emphasises the importance of the environment for emotional security and ‘harmonious relationship between himself and the outside world’.\textsuperscript{90} Such ideas can, however, also be found in the reasoning in Kepes’s \textit{The New Landscape in Art and Science}\textsuperscript{91} as well as in the opening passage in the chapter on space in \textit{La Mémoire collective}, where Halbwachs, with reference to Auguste Comte, suggests that mental equilibrium is dependent on the relative stability of surrounding objects and physical space.\textsuperscript{92} Much mental illness, he writes, comes with the breakdown of the relationship between inner and outer environments. Our image of the external world is so attached to the self that it can feel like leaving our own personality, if we were to move to new surroundings.

The research that Lynch undertook at MIT should also be seen against the background of the social discourse on urbanity in the first decades of the twentieth century in the United States.\textsuperscript{93} With regard to sociological studies of the city, it was the Chicago School that dominated that discourse – the

\textsuperscript{88} L Mumford, \textit{The Culture of Cities} (London, Martin Secker & Warburg, 1938), 480.
\textsuperscript{89} ibid., 481.
\textsuperscript{90} Lynch, \textit{The Image of the City}, 4.
\textsuperscript{91} Kepes, \textit{The New Landscape}, 18–19.
\textsuperscript{93} Banerjee & Southworth, ‘Kevin Lynch: His Life and Work’, 2. Neither Mumford nor any of the scholars of the Chicago School appear in the bibliography of \textit{The Image of the City}. 
same academic environment that had seen Halbwachs as guest professor in the 1930s. Malcolm Miles argues that Lynch, by linking the planning profession with studies of urban experience, situates himself in a broad and holistic approach beyond the conventional boundaries of planning and architecture [that] follows the Chicago School’s ethos in as much as that ethos was derived from Georg Simmel’s construction of a specifically metropolitan viewpoint. Drawing on principles of interdisciplinarity practised by the Chicago School, the Joint Center for Urban Studies, under the auspices of which Lynch’s study was published, had been founded to bring together scholars from several disciplines and professions in the study of the city. Furthermore, the Chicago School provided a role model for its approach of direct contact with the communities under study, for instance through interviews, as it had been advocated in the teaching by Park and Burgess or demonstrated by Frederick M. Thrasher. The latter spent eight years tracking down more than a thousand youth gangs in Chicago for his study The Gang (1927). Lynch employs similar principles in his method of direct contact with people in the city through surveys and interviews. Because differences in ‘social class and habitual use cause people to see a city with very different eyes’, Lynch later notes, he did not regard his study as a predictive theory that could assist the planner in identifying a general public image by studying form, but instead believed that its ‘principal aim was to urge on designers the necessity of consulting those who live in a place’.

The Chicagoan Park had studied with Georg Simmel in 1899–1900 and his thought came to influence Park’s conceptualisation of modern urban civilisation. Through the study of human ecology, a concept introduced by Park in 1915, which regards the city as a human habitat and natural product of the social life led by civilised man, the scholars of the Chicago School of

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94 Cf. the discussion about Halbwachs and the Chicago School in The professorial years 1919–1944 in chapter one.
98 Lynch, ‘Reconsidering The Image of the City’, 156.
the 1920s and 1930s came to further a European legacy of social thought, especially that of Simmel, but also of the likes of Durkheim and Marx. However, according to Jens Tonboe, linked as their thinking was to the study object of Chicago, which at the time grew with 50,000 inhabitants per year, it developed in its own direction and came to form a ‘relatively loose system of sociological concepts and perspectives that express some common, historically and objectively existing phenomena. It is ideally described as forms and processes’. Mirroring neither the structural societal level of Durkheimian thinking nor the social-psychological level of Simmel, it pragmatically focused on the level of communities. Others have claimed that the adaption of biological ideas to the study of the city in human ecology illustrates that the Chicago School in fact lacked a viable theoretical orientation.

In ‘Urbanism as a Way of Life’ Wirth refers to Simmel’s well-known argument that social distance arises in the metropolis due to the physical proximity of the citizens. The consequence, he argues, is that the ‘urban world puts a premium on visual recognition’, and the urban dweller becomes sensitised to seeing the role of things denoted by their surface appearance, such as the uniform of the functionary, instead of recognising the personality behind it: ‘We are exposed to glaring contrasts between splendor and squalor, between riches and poverty, intelligence and ignorance, order and chaos’. Miles claims that the emphasis on visual recognition is crucial to the legacy of the Chicago School and that Lynch translates it ‘into a structural approach to urban design, breaking with a privileging of architectural elements over their settings and the spaces between them, but not breaking with the distance of the eye’. The moving elements of people and their activities, Lynch explains in the opening section of The Image of the City, are just as important as stationary objects. The image of the city that each inhabitant holds is a composite of the different senses involved in the perception, but also of other concerns. Following Wirth’s argument, Lynch posits that in order to understand the city we need to consider how it is perceived and identified, not only what it is by itself.

100 For a detailed analysis of the term and its theoretical basis in Simmel and Durkheim, see Tonboe, ‘Rummets sociologi’, 222–37.
101 Ibid., 220. My transl. His emphasis.
105 Lynch, The Image of the City, 2.
Group images

The developed mental image will limit and emphasise our perception, but it will also be tested and altered according to new perceptual input or information, Lynch argues. Because of the continuous formation and remodelling of the environmental image in sensory and motor interaction with the outer landscape, the mental construct comes to differ slightly from person to person. And yet, even though each individual possesses a singular image, Lynch continues, ‘there seems to be a substantial agreement among members of the same group. It is these group images, exhibiting consensus among significant numbers, which interest city planners who aspire to model an environment that will be used by many people’. With group images, or public images, Lynch distinguishes between the ‘common mental pictures carried by large numbers of a city’s inhabitants: areas of agreement which might be expected to appear in the interaction of a single physical reality, a common culture, and a basic physiological nature’, and idiosyncratic images held by the individual. The former can thus be regarded as the abstracted common denominator of the individual images of a given group. This brings Lynch close to Halbwachs’s argument that the spatial framework of memory is formed on the basis of accumulated experiences in the same place, and it is the reactualisation of the framework that enables the reconstruction of memories of events. Halbwachs illustrates this with a group of pupils, who may have studied in the same rooms during the same days of the week for a period of time. The shared denominators of the remembered activities form the social, spatial, and temporal frameworks that each of them needs to reconstruct what they have learnt. Lynch’s empirical findings suggest the validity of such a generalised, commonly shared idea of space, not as an exclusive concept that all should have, but as a central aspect of most people’s individual image.

Even if Halbwachs, like Lynch, attributes both an individual quality and shared features to the spatial framework of memory, with the distinction between the individual and public image Lynch contributes with a distinct terminology; it is then possible to refer to the shared features of the environmental image or the spatial framework of memory by group image or

106 ibid., 6.
107 ibid., 7.
108 ibid.
109 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 100. It seems unlikely that Lynch had read the book. He does not cite it in The Image of the City or in What Time is This Place?: The basic definitions and formation processes of the spatial framework of memory are not elaborated as clearly in La Mémoire collective as in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire.
public image and not lose the understanding of their basis in the individual minds. Halbwachs seldom refers to something like a collective spatial framework of memory, even though it is implicated in several contexts with reference to the social or cultural associations of the framework, not, like Lynch, with reference to the perceivable spatial or architectural features. Caution should be exercised when using such terms, so that it is not mistaken for an entity external to the memories and minds of individuals, but is understood as a part of the individual images within the group, the shared denominator. Neither Lynch nor Halbwachs ascribes the mental image of space to a supra-individual subject; they merely argue that it is conditioned by the individual’s engagement with the social life of the group. Thus, it may be preferable to refer to it as group environmental image or group spatial framework of memory.

A further aspect of the group images in Lynch’s argument echoes a central hypothesis of the theory of the collective memory: such shared spatial notions differ from group to group, also when they refer to the same physical space. Not only are they associated with a whole realm of group-specific memories and values, they may also, because of cultural differences in the general understanding of space and social orders, exhibit fundamental differences in their configuration.¹¹⁰

In the section *Structure and Identity* in the introductory chapter Lynch proposes to analyse the environmental image into three components. The *identity* of the object makes it distinct from other things; it comprises the individuality and the recognition as a separable entity. Its *structure* is “the spatial or pattern relation of the object to the observer and to other objects”.¹¹¹ Finally, the *meaning* of the object refers to its practical or emotional significance. He gives an example of the three components:

Thus an image useful for making an exit requires the recognition of a door as a distinct entity, of its spatial relation to the observer, and its meaning as a hole for getting out. These are not truly separable. The visual recognition of a door is matted together with its meaning as a door.¹¹²

The problem with the meaning of environmental images, Lynch asserts, is that it is not easily manipulated by altering the physical environment. ‘The image of the Manhattan skyline may stand for vitality, power, decadence, mystery, congestion, greatness, or what you will’.¹¹³ Therefore, he continues,

¹¹⁰ Lynch, *The Image of the City*, 131–33.
¹¹¹ ibid., 8.
¹¹² ibid.
¹¹³ ibid., 8–9.
it is wise, if the purpose is to build cities that can be enjoyed by people from any background, to exclude issues of meaning and concentrate on the clarity of form. Lynch concludes by pointing out that for the remainder of the book he will focus on the identity and structure of the images of the city. This means to exclude issues of meaning. From this point on, the study deviates from Halbwachs and his social theory of the spatial framework of memory.\footnote{For a summary of the subsequent critique of Lynch’s study, some of which refers to the failure to include social aspects in the study, cf. Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt’, 328–30.}

\textit{Landmarks of orientation}

The findings of the environmental image of American cities include few, if any, references to meaning on a social and cultural level. Still, some of the distinctions of the \textit{imageability} of urban form that Lynch proposes, such as the \textit{node} and the \textit{landmark}, relate to aspects in Halbwachs’s theory. It is unlikely, I believe, that they originated from Halbwachs’s theory; they probably reached him from scholarship in geography, psychology, and ethnography, of which he was knowledgeable, and from gestalt theory and his collaboration with Kepes. Lynch draws attention to the legibility of the environment and how formal elements of the urban landscape and architecture are organised in patterns to allow for orientation and way-finding. These belong to spatial and conceptual categories that the individual mind uses to cognise the perceived environment, inherent in each environmental image:

1. \textit{Paths}. Paths are the channels along which the observer customarily, occasionally, or potentially moves. They may be streets, walkways, transit lines, canals, railroads. …

2. \textit{Edges}. Edges are the linear elements not used or considered as paths by the observer. They are the boundaries between two phases, linear breaks in continuity: shores, railroad cuts, edges of development, walls. …

3. \textit{Districts}. Districts are the medium-to-large sections of the city, conceived of as having two-dimensional extent … and which are recognizable as having some common, identifying character. …

4. \textit{Nodes}. Nodes are points, the strategic spots in a city into which an observer can enter, and which are the intensive foci to and from which he is traveling. They may be primarily junctions, places of a break in transportation, a crossing or convergence of points, moments of shift from one structure to another. …

5. \textit{Landmarks}. Landmarks are another type of point-reference, but in this case the observer does not enter within them, they are external. They are usually a rather simply defined physical object: building, sign, store, or mountain.\footnote{Lynch, \textit{The Image of the City}, 47. My abbrev.}
Landmarks and nodes in Lynch’s study are elements with objectively describable features of space, singled out by the mind because of their salience or centrality as crossroads in patterns of movement. They are perceptual entities that guide, enable, or restrict movement, and they are collective in the sense that they will stand out visually for all people and, therefore, as Lynch pointed out, be describable as general or universal features of the environment. The visual elements, such as the nodes and landmarks, have lent him fame in subsequent scientific studies of spatial memory.\footnote{In scholarship on cognitive maps in the fields of geography, cognitive psychology, and neuropsychology, Lynch’s term landmark has evolved to more generally designate known places in the mental images of space. R G Golledge, ‘Place Recognition and Wayfinding: Making Sense of Space’, \textit{Geoforum}, 23/2 (1992), 200.} As I have described in the previous chapter, Halbwachs refers to \textit{points de repère collectifs}, translatable into collective landmarks in space and points of reference in time or figuratively. For him, collective landmarks are intersubjective and group-related points in space. They are not universal, but relate to a specific social milieu in a certain period of time. For every group, the landmarks act as crossroads for different frameworks of the collective memory. In the account referred to in the previous chapter, where Halbwachs tries to recall where he stayed last time he travelled to Paris to take part in an examination jury, such points of reference are exemplified with the house of Halbwachs’s mother and the flat of his parents-in-law.\footnote{Halbwachs, \textit{Les Cadres sociaux}, 126. Cf. \textit{Collective landmarks} in ch. 2.} The salience of the homes as landmarks in his spatial framework is caused by their social significance for him and his family, not their physical features. The points of reference may take the form of Lynchian landmarks of orientation, but only as long as they are also social indexes or nodes in one or another group the individual is a member of.

With Lynch’s landmarks we arrive at a distinction between two levels of spatial entities that stand out in the spatial framework of memory of the individual: one, the landmark of orientation that is visual and universal and devoid of any connotations to meaning other than those enabling a sense of orientation and way-finding, and, two, a collective landmark that connotes social meaning, in the sense that it is an intersection point where it overlaps collective points of reference, which stand out in the social and temporal frameworks of memory, like the places that are important for the family in certain periods of one’s life.

\textit{Social aspects of the image}

In 1972 Lynch publishes \textit{What Time is This Place?}. The introduction declares that the book ‘deals with the evidence of time which is embodied in the
physical world, how those external signals fit (or fail to fit) our internal experience, and how that inside-to-outside relationship might become a life-enhancing one … [It discusses] place as an emblem of past, present, and future time’.

The book takes the form of a patchwork of evocative ideas, theoretical considerations, and anecdotes rather than a clearly structured argument and analysis. Thus, it exhibits a distinctly different stylistic quality than *The Image of the City*. Halbwachs is also an important reference in this book; *La Mémoire collective* is listed as one of the twenty-three selected readings, alongside *Remembering*, the book written by another pioneer of socially conditioned memory, the psychologist Frederic C. Bartlett. The book outlines a landscape of considerations of time for the analysis and planning of the urban environment. Lynch also introduces thoughts on a social understanding of the environmental images of space, which could have become valuable for architects and urban planners, but with the lack of elaboration these attempts come to a halt.

As an example, Lynch suggests that the reason why people keep physical things is their familiar connections; they can act as family mementoes. This reflection leads him to acknowledge that the problem in large new suburban communities is to maintain ‘some continuity of image and association despite the physical and social upheaval to which their inhabitants have been exposed. Since images and associations must be useful for both original and new inhabitants, the histories of the immigrants should be interwoven with the history of the new setting’.

The argument could have become a useful reflection on the environmental image for the planning professions, but after two brief examples of immigrants looking for recognisable features in space, in an attempt to illustrate the claim, he continues to another reflection.

A short section in the book is called *Group Time*. It summarises Halbwachs’s postulation that social interaction in the group conditions individual memory and creates a ‘group past’ and a ‘group future’, which help to select, explain, retain, and modify memories. Lynch develops the argument in relation to space: ‘Group memories are supported by the stable features of the environment, which becomes “a spatial emblem of time.”’

He illustrates and develops the argument further with a passage from Isak Dinesen (pseud. for Karen Blixen):

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119 ibid., 248–49. For Bartlett’s criticism of Halbwachs, see *Critique of the collective memory* in ch. 1.
120 ibid., 39.
121 ibid., 125.
[She] was forced to sell her African estate, and the Kikuyu living there were driven off. They pleaded to be relocated together, and she comments: ‘It is more than their land you take away … It is their past as well, their roots and their identity. If they were to go away from their land, they must have people round them who had known it … Then they could still, for some years, talk of the geography and history of the farm, and what one had forgotten the other would remember. As it was, they were feeling the shame of extinction falling on them.’

Again Lynch touches on an intriguing aspect of the environmental image, an aspect that Halbwachs also testifies to in *La Mémoire collective*: the ability to remember together with the social group and with the help of the mental image of an environment the group has left. However, Lynch does not elaborate, but continues on to another reflection. Is it tempting to think of what an analytical elaboration of this reflection could have contributed with in the context of urban planning policies of the early 1970s, especially with regard to relocation of citizens in redevelopment areas in existing urban environments or the migratory flows into new urban suburbs.

**Architecture, perception, and memory**

Against the background of the changes in the conceptualisation of the past in the architectural discourse of the 1950s and 1960s, I have tried to give a picture of the theoretical landscape that Halbwachs’s spatial framework of memory entered into. Touching on Kepes’s attempts to identify modernity’s new images of the environment through studies of art and architecture, I continued to address the synthesis of theory from many sources, which forms the underpinning of Lynch’s *The Image of the City*. While drawing on some of the social aspects of the spatial framework in the collective memory, Lynch does not follow Halbwachs in the social and cultural direction, but turns to understand how the legibility of form in the physical landscape affects people’s ability to form mental images of it, and its effect on

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orientation and way-finding. His theory enters into another realm than that of Halbwachs’s collective memory. With the focus on perception and spatial cognition, his thinking establishes a subsocial level of the spatial framework of memory. It relates itself more to geography and psychology than to the humanities. In the context of this thesis, the analytical framework outlined in The Image of the City could rather be seen as the beginning of subsequent theories of architecture and perception as well as of spatial cognition. It stands as a reference to the theoretical framework of this thesis with regard to perception and spatial memory; the study of landmarks demonstrate how important the salient features of space are for our orientation, pointing to the social status of tall and imposing buildings throughout history and to the fact that many cultural landmarks – buildings or sites of cultural importance (cf. ch. 4 and 5) – often also are landmarks according to the definition of Lynch.

In the next chapter, social and cultural connotations stand at the centre of the conception of architecture and the city. With the proposal to widen the definition of architecture to include aspects of its history, of collective memory, and of processes of change, the importance of the physical form object is marginalised, compared to the period of functionalism. For Rossi, the ideas of Halbwachs play an important role, and Rossi could be seen to import their social and cultural complexity to his thinking. He does not write theory with the aim of it being used as a handbook, in the same way as Lynch does. There are no methods outlined in L’architettura della città. This has not prevented the book from becoming exceptionally influential for architects and urban planners in the 1970s and 1980s, contributing to important changes in the understanding of architecture, and establishing the idea that the built and imagined environments are crucial for collective remembrance in society.

124 In the context of urban planning and architecture, one field of study that takes up Lynch’s studies is Man – Environment Studies, which, according to Amos Rapoport, ‘is concerned with the systematic study of the mutual interaction of people and their built environment. … While basing its knowledge of people on the findings and approaches of a number of social and behavioural sciences, it differs from them by its stress on the physical environment which, by and large, these disciplines have neglected’. A Rapoport, Human Aspects of Urban Form. Towards a Man-Environment Approach to Urban Form and Design (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1977), 1. For a survey of the term ‘image’, including references to the contributions from Bartlett, Boulding, Kepes, and Lynch, see Rapoport, Human Aspects of Urban Form, 40–47.
Cultural landmarks

Expanding the thesis of Halbwachs I would say that the city itself is the collective memory of the people, and as memory it is linked to the facts and to places, the city is the locus of collective memory. This relationship between the locus and the citizens therefore becomes the predominant image, the architecture, the landscape, and as the facts retreat into memory, new facts emerge in the city. In this altogether positive sense, the great ideas move through the history of the city and give shape to it.

— Aldo Rossi, L’architettura della città, 1966

In the mid-1950s the Italian journal Casabella Continuità had become one of the important sites of architectural critique under the editorship of Ernest Nathan Rogers. Italy was a place in Europe of lively discussions on architectural theory, ‘where almost all theoretical statements have been characterised by a keen awareness of history’. The contributions came from architects as well as historians of art and architecture. The Modern Movement was re-evaluated, as was the relation to a more distant past, partly in the comments written by the editor and partly in the presentation of contemporary or historical projects and in the reviews of books. Issue number 215 of 1957, notably, includes an editorial entitled ‘Continuità o crisi? (Continuity or Crisis?)’, written by Rogers, a review by Aldo Rossi of the recent study by art historian Stephan Tschudi-Madsen on the neglected Art

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1 A Rossi, L’architettura della città (1966; repub. 1st edn, Macerata, Quodlibet, 2011), 149. Transl. by Alice Labadini. Rossi’s emphasis.
Nouveau style, and a joint article by Rossi, Gau Aulenti, Vittorio Gregotti, and others on the problems of contemporary architecture. Rogers deliberately directed his critique against the vision of modernism by CIAM and offered a summary of his arguments for positioning architecture in relation to tradition, while, at the same time, making clear that it did not mean submitting to historicism. Words like ‘history’, ‘tradition’, ‘culture’, ‘heritage’, and ‘the past’ flourished in the articles of the journal in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

**Aldo Rossi**

In this chapter I will turn the attention to Aldo Rossi, one of the architects who operated in the Italian context just described, and look at the use of Halbwachsian thought in his influential formulation of a theory of the city. I will argue that Rossi’s elaboration has been misconstrued and point to how his theory offers valuable distinctions to Halbwachs’s spatial framework of memory. With _fatto urbano_, culturally pregnant architecture can be conceptualised as the totality of its material form, available as an external artefact that can be trawled archaeologically for traces, and its representation in the collective imagination, unfolding over time. The distinction of _vital_ and _pathological permanences_ point to the _fatto urbano_’s double support of the citizens’ remembrance: for informal and social as well as for official and institutional memory. It is because of the multilayered complexity that I will suggest referring to the _fatto urbano_ as a _cultural landmark_.

Already before he finished his studies in architecture, Rossi had begun to publish articles on the history of architecture and societal issues in journals like _Voce comunista, Il contemporaneo, Comunità_, and _Società_. In 1956, on an invitation from Rogers, he joined the editorial staff, and in the years of Roger’s editorship, until 1964, Rossi would write 31 articles, including book articles.
reviews and essays. Already with the article on the concept of tradition in Milanese neoclassical architecture, published in Società in 1956, Rossi began to formulate new ideas of how to relate to the architectural past. Identifying the acute situation of the expanding cities, he did not, however, call for the preservation of historical city centres threatened by demolition. In an article on English town planning published in 1961, Rossi talks of planning processes that need to balance between commercial developers and ‘the useless lovers of antiquity’:

The destruction of old centres, in London as in Milan, in Rome as in Paris, is inevitable and is serious only insofar as it leaves us unprepared for what is happening. If, however, new ideas succeed in interpreting the course of history, we may really look forward to a new and positive era.

Instead, as described in his article ‘Nuovi problemi’ (‘New Problems’) from 1962, Rossi’s concern was the contemporary Italian city, radically transformed by rapid urban growth in the post-war period, to such an extent that the contrast between the city fabric and the countryside no longer existed. The bond between man and his surroundings, Rossi argued, should be strengthened. To do this, the architect needed to address the great civic tasks of commercial centres, universities, cultural centres, and public buildings. In her article on Rossi and the cultural context of the debate over urbanism in Italy in the 1960s, Mary Louise Lobsinger argues that ‘Rossi sought to identify the specific nature of the forces acting upon the city, and this goal stood in contrast to architects preoccupied with describing the effects of population growth and the unravelling of the city’s periphery’. Addressing this new task for architects of understanding the growing cities, Rossi turned to scholarship on urban conditions. In 1964 Aldo Rossi published a study that investigates the morphology and typology of the city, including a classification of building types, analyses of areas, and the forces that change the city and the buildings, the most important of which he

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10 Rossi, ‘Directional Centers in Italy’, 103.
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considers to be economy. He based his thesis on the argumentation in Halbwachs’s 1928 La population et les tracés de voies à Paris depuis un siècle, a revised edition of two chapters from a study on the expropriations in Paris, originally published in 1909. In the article, Rossi did not refer to Halbwachs’s notion of the collective memory, but indicated that a similar but more complex study of psychological, aesthetic, and cultural perspectives should follow.

The architecture of the city

In 1966 Rossi published the book L’architettura della città as a part of a series of international texts on urban planning at the publisher Marsilio. It was based on earlier articles, lectures, and notes, and Rossi claims to have written it around 1960. Rossi addressed the contemporary discourse on the city in urban planning, drawing on architects, urban planners, and urban historians like Francesco Milizia, Reinhard Baumeister, Camillo Sitte, Marcel Poëte, Fritz Schumacher, Hans Benno Bernoulli, Werner Hegemann, Pierre Lavedan, Lewis Mumford, Steen Eiler Rasmussen, André Chastel, and Kevin Lynch. Rossi further emphasised the importance of studies of collective psychology and sociology and especially praised the French scholars for their contribution to conceiving the city as a collective man-made artefact – sociologists and anthropologists like Marcel Mauss, Maurice Halbwachs, and Claude Lévi-Strauss and geographers like Paul Vidal de la Blache, Albert Demangeon, Maximilien Sorre, Jean Gottman, and Jean Tricart.

Central to the thesis is the critique of what Rossi calls naïve functionalism. He uses the concept fatto urbano to refer to architectural objects as manifestations of cultural and historical processes and as functional and material objects.

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13 M Halbwachs, La population et les tracés de voies à Paris depuis un siècle (Paris, Cornély & PUF, 1928) [rev. edn of Les expropriations et le prix des terrains à Paris (1909)].
14 Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 151, 245 n. 61.
I believe that any explanation of urban artifacts in terms of function must be rejected if the issue is to elucidate their structure and formation … we reject that conception of functionalism dictated by an ingenuous empiricism which holds that functions bring form together and in themselves constitute urban artifacts and architecture.\(^\text{17}\)

His argument is formulated as a polemic against the doctrine of functionalism, especially in the formulations by sociologist Max Weber, anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, and geographer Georges Chabot. ‘The question “for what purpose?”’, Rossi explains, ‘ends up as a simple justification that prevents an analysis of what is real … In the studies of the classifications of cities, [the concept of function] overwhelms and takes priority over the urban landscape and form’.\(^\text{18}\) Different functions need to be attributed with different values, Rossi claims, for example, those of economy and production. Form, the capacity of architecture to ‘embrace many different values, meanings, and uses’, but also other aspects of the fatto urbano, need to be taken into account to understand the significance of the permanence of buildings and the transmission of culture through the built environment.\(^\text{19}\) To only look at function ‘oversimplifies reality and humiliates fantasy and liberty’, he argues.\(^\text{20}\) Function in architecture should thus only be considered as a component of a larger analysis:

Even if a classification of buildings and cities according to their function is permissible as a generalization of certain kinds of data, it is inconceivable to reduce the structure of urban artifacts to a problem of organizing some more of less important function. Precisely this serious distortion has impeded and in large measure continues to impede any real progress in studies of the city.\(^\text{21}\)

In L’architettura della città Rossi formulates a definition of architecture that takes into account other meanings of architectural production and administration than practical functions. Such a definition of architecture points to the conceptualisations of Halbwachs in his three books on memory. For Halbwachs, architecture is not only the pragmatic framing of activities, but often part of complex societal or cultural functions. For example, in La Topographie légendaire, he describes how Christians established a topography of sites, altars, and chapels in the Holy Land with the main

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\(^\text{17}\) Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 46. In my discussion of the different concepts of Rossi I will allow myself to move back and forth between different parts of the book. Rossi often elaborates a theme in several places, and so the individual passage may not offer the full picture.

\(^\text{18}\) ibid.

\(^\text{19}\) ibid., 118.

\(^\text{20}\) ibid., 167.

\(^\text{21}\) ibid., 47.
objective of establishing a landscape of mnemonic markers to structure and disseminate the religious dogma to the community, not in the first place as an answer to the practical needs of establishing sites for assembly and worship. Halbwachs was not, however, the only reference of Rossi. One of the merits of Rossi’s _L’architettura della città_ is the interdisciplinary rigour with which he brought together a vast range of disciplinary scholarship on the city as well as study cases from classical cities, medieval, and modern developments. The resulting conceptualisation of the city as a collective construction over time and an open-ended process offers a radical break with town planning conceptions of the twentieth century, like those of Le Corbusier and Ludwig Hilberseimer, which assumed the possibility of constructing an ideal city, once and for all. This break corresponded to a shift in the academic architectural debate of the time, which has been described as a ‘turn from investigating the continuity and tradition of architectural modernism and the critique of modernism as a style toward the problems of the city and town planning’. Rossi’s text thus positions itself as one of the cardinal texts to define a superseding paradigm in architecture.

Lynch’s _The Image of the city_ had been published in Italian in 1964 in the same book series as _L’architettura della città_, and an article based on his study had appeared in _Casabella Continuità_ in 1965. Rossi praises Lynch’s work, explaining the importance of his study as regards the orientation in the city as well as the formation and evolution of the sense of space _(senso dello spazio)_ and conceptualisation of space _concezione dello spazio_. Lynch also inspires Rossi to conceive of the city as constituting differentiated parts, defined by their structure and intersubjective perceptual order rather than by their function. This leads Rossi to recognise a distinction between the city centre and the residential districts, each with their own monuments and ways of life, each with a different character, shaped by the place, and to turn

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22 This has also been asserted by G Lupfer, ‘Aldo Rossi (1931–1997). L’architettura della città’, in T Nebois et al. (eds), _Architectural Theory From the Renaissance to the Present. 89 Essays on 117 Treatises_ (Cologne, Taschen, 2003), 784.


25 Rossi, _The Architecture of the City_, 34. The reference to Lynch’s book, the English original as well as the Italian translation, was already present in the first Italian edition. Rossi, _L’architettura della città_, 198 n. 5.

against the theory of zoning, as it had been proposed by Ernest Burgess and Robert Park of the Chicago School of Sociology in their studies of Chicago.\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Maurice Halbwachs and L’architettura della città}

Of greater influence to \textit{L’architettura della città} are the works of Halbwachs. In the first Italian edition Rossi refers to four of Halbwachs’s studies, including two works on collective memory, and in the American edition from 1982 he refers to seven.\textsuperscript{28} A subsection of chapter three – \textit{The Collective Memory} – and the first three sections of chapter four – \textit{The City as Field of Application for Various Forces; Economics, The Thesis of Maurice Halbwachs, and Further Considerations on the Nature of Expropriations} – directly address Halbwachs’s theories.\textsuperscript{29} References to him can also be found in other places in the book. Rossi praises his studies of the city, arguing that ‘Halbwachs maintains that economic factors by nature predominate in the evolution of the city up to a point when they give way to more general rules … the sum total of economic factors fails to explain fully the structure of urban artifacts \textit{[fatti urbani]}. Instead, he reasons, it should be explained by the development of social groups and ‘the complexly structured system of the collective memory … Few works on the city based on these premises have been conceived with such a rigour’.\textsuperscript{30} Rossi also expresses his appreciation for the authors who, like Halbwachs, ‘base their studies on collective psychology, which in turn is linked to sociology’, arguing that ‘Collective psychology has bearing upon all the sciences where the city as an object of study is of primary importance’.\textsuperscript{31} Certainly, as Rossi knew, Halbwachs was concerned to see collective psychology as the foundation upon which sociology could be based.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{27}Burgess proposed that cities organise themselves in concentric residential districts around city centres. Rossi challenged this idea by claiming that smaller parts of larger cities constitute autonomous units, much like cities in themselves.


\textsuperscript{29}Rossi, \textit{The Architecture of the City}, 130–31, 39–52.

\textsuperscript{30}ibid., 140.

\textsuperscript{31}ibid., 112.

\textsuperscript{32}Jean-Christophe Marcel and Laurent Mucchielli point out that Halbwachs as early as 1905, in his first two articles, had formulated a clear opposition between individual and collective psychology and would become an ‘impassionate labourer on a collective Psychology’, as the only sociologist of the Durkheim school to follow up on the intentions of Durkheim. J-C Marcel & L Mucchielli, ‘Eine Grundlage des \textit{lien social}: das kollektive
In the following I will attempt to trace Halbwachs’s conceptualisation of space, outlined in his three books on the collective memory, in the writings of Rossi. Although Rossi nowhere explicitly refers to the term ‘cadre spatial de la mémoire’, spatial framework of memory, it is my impression that it is precisely what he refers to in sentences like: ‘Maurice Halbwachs advanced [the study of the city as an object of nature and a subject of culture] further when he postulated that imagination and collective memory are the typical characteristics of urban artifacts [fatti urbani].’ The environment cannot be reduced only to its physical manifestation, but also exists in the collective memory; it is both a material framework and a spatial framework of memory. Rossi uses formulations like ‘image of space’ (‘immagine dello spazio’), ‘idea of space’ (‘nozione dello spazio’), ‘idea of place’ (‘nozione dello luogo’), and ‘concept of space’ (‘concetto dello spazio’). In my reading I will generally take them to be analogous to the spatial framework of memory. Rossi sometimes refers to the individual and sometimes sees it in relation to a collective or the citizenry, for example in reference to the city’s image. Halbwachs, similarly, had used other general words to refer to his notion of the spatial framework of memory, especially the French ‘image’ or ‘image spatiale’. If one reads Rossi’s book with the spatial framework of memory in mind when he uses these terms, the proximity to Halbwachs’s theories stands out more clearly. It may sometimes be easier to see the ideas of Halbwachs protrude from Rossi’s argumentation, when he does not explicitly refer to him. Rossi’s references, as others have also pointed out, can sometimes obscure the stringency of Halbwachs’s original ideas. With Halbwachs’s


34 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 33.

35 The Lynchian concept environmental image, arguably, contributed to Rossi’s conceptualisation. For Rossi’s recognition of Lynch, see The architecture of the city in this chapter.

36 This specific reading of Rossi’s image is only possible by subscribing to a certain simplification of the term. The complexity inherent in the concept image in Rossi’s writings, as well as in those of Halbwachs, Kepes, and Lynch, draws the attention to the need for more in-depth studies. I will not pursue that in this context, but limit myself to the definitions offered here and elsewhere in the thesis. Cf. other discussions of image in Use of terms in the Introduction and Gyorgy Kepes and the mental image in ch. 3.

37 Tieben, e.g., argues that Rossi lacks scholarly precision in his use of the term collective memory. Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 155.
conceptualisations of space clear to us after chapters one and two, I will allow myself to read Rossi’s text as references to entire notions in Halbwachs’s thinking, not only as free-floating statements and quotations.

**Locus**

In the introduction to the book, Rossi presents an understanding of the city as architecture:

> By architecture I mean not only the visible image of the city and the sum of its different architectures, but architecture as construction, the construction of the city over time … [this point of view] addresses the ultimate and definitive fact in the life of the collective, the creation of the environment in which it lives.\(^{38}\)

With some themes persisting over time and getting stronger, he argues, and some disappearing, history builds the city as constructs of memory images and forms that exist in the minds of the citizens side by side with the contemporary physical city. Neither the former nor the latter can alone explain the city conceived as complex man-made (arte-) fact. The individual place in the city, the *locus solus* (same in Italian; *luogo* is sometimes translated as *locus* in the English translation), makes up distinct parts of the urban totality, in which urban and architectural interventions engage with the singularity of the place. It is determined by factors of space and time, topography, form, acting as ‘the seat of a succession of ancient and recent events, by its memory’.\(^{39}\) Rossi relates locus to context (*ambiente*), but he sees the latter as a form of illusionism, used in urban preservation to make a scene for architecture that ‘serves to preserve forms as they are and to immobilize life, saddening us like would-be tourists of a vanished world’.\(^{40}\)

The context, he posits, can be regarded as a permanent feature in the city that keeps itself isolated from social and technological evolution, ‘so-called contextual preservation’. He suggests that it ‘is related to the city in time like the embalmed corpse of a saint to the image of his historical personality’.\(^{41}\) Locus, differently, should make visible the whole history of its architecture,

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\(^{38}\) Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 21. In a text published the same year as *L’architettura della città* Rossi writes, ‘One has to distinguish between the city and the architecture of the city as a collectively made object, and architecture for its own sake, architecture as a technique, as an art form that is ordered and passed on in a traditional way. In the first instance it is a collective process, slow and traceable over a length of time, in which the whole of the city, society and humanity with all its different forms play a part. In this way the urban evolution, the changing face of the city, is a slow and indirect process which needs to be studied by following its laws and peculiarities’. A Rossi, ‘Architecture for Museums’ [It. orig. (1966)], in J O’Regan (ed), *Aldo Rossi. Selected Writings and Projects* (London, Architectural Design, 1983), 18.


\(^{40}\) ibid., 123.

\(^{41}\) ibid., 60.
taking into account ‘the apparently unresolvable conflict between design as a rational element and an imposition, and the local and specific nature of place’, what makes it unique.\(^{42}\)

**Fatto urbano**

The architecture in the locus can be referred to as *fatto urbano*, the Italian translation of the French *fait urbain*, approximately urban phenomenon or urban condition.\(^{43}\) ‘Architecture’, Rossi says, ‘attesting to the tastes and attitudes of generations, to public events and private tragedies, to new and old facts [*fatti (urbani)*], is the fixed stage for human events’.\(^{44}\) It cannot be isolated from the history of the city and only understood in light of the present times. The tendency to do so, Rossi maintains, has led to ‘one of the greatest fallacies of urban science’.\(^{45}\) In the *fatto urbano*, he argues, the built architecture amalgamates with the history of their creation; ‘such elements which originally start out as means tend to become ends; ultimately they *are* the city. Thus the city has as its end itself alone, and there is nothing to explain beyond the fact of its own presence in its own artifacts [*che la città è presente in queste opere*]’.\(^{46}\)

According to the English translators of Rossi’s text, Diane Ghirardo and Joan Ockman, the *fatto urbano* implies ‘not just a physical thing in the city, but all of its history, geography, structure, and connection with the general life of the city’.\(^{47}\) Lobsinger adds to their comment that the meaning of the term is ‘diametrically opposed to ideas such as plan as process, user participation, or the emphasis on transitory perceptual experiences as producing meaning and structuring experience of the city’.\(^{48}\) These statements are helpful. To fully appreciate the nuances of the *fatto urbano*, it is also useful to look at Rossi’s dissection of the term.

\(^{42}\) ibid., 126.
\(^{43}\) The term is also indebted to Durkheim’s *fait social*. Social facts, Durkheim explains, are clearly defined phenomena that are distinct from organic or physical phenomena. Duties performed as husband or citizen, as believer, or in the profession belong to ‘a category of facts which present very special characteristics: they consist of manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him’. É Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, tr. W D Halls (New York, The Free Press, 1982) [Fr. orig. (1895)], 52. Belgin Turan has suggested translating *fatto urbano* to ‘urban fact’ instead of ‘urban artefact’ to retain some of the connotations of Italian and French to the activities and processes that have produced the urban object. B Turan, ‘Is ‘Rational’ Knowledge of Architecture Possible? Science and Poïèsis in L’Architettura della Città’, *Journal of Architectural Education*, 51/3 (Feb. 1998), 165 n. 28. I have opted for retaining the original term, as I have with a number of specific terms in the thesis. Cf. *Editions, translations, languages* in the Introduction.
\(^{44}\) Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 22.
\(^{45}\) ibid., 61.
\(^{46}\) ibid., 162. His emphasis.
\(^{47}\) ibid., 22 n. *.
One of Rossi’s examples of the *fatti urbani* is the Palazzo della Ragione in Padua, a building that has existed since the fourteenth century, and which has sustained a great number of functions through its history, currently being used commercially.\(^{49}\) He points to the dual composition of such places. On the one hand, it is an architectural and material construction; on the other, it is the idea of the building, ‘our most general memory of it as a product of the collective’.\(^{50}\) The latter gives the built environment its value. Their amalgamation is the *fatto urbano*.

Different from Halbwachs, for whom it is the spatial framework of memory that comes to organise memories of events, history, emotions, etc., for Rossi, through the *fatto urbano*, this organisation is positioned in relation to both the spatial framework of memory and to the material framework. The city and its *fatti urbani* could be regarded as a repository of history, again emphasising the dual nature of space. First, it is a physical artefact, built over time, the materiality of which can be studied and trawled for historical information by archaeologists and architectural historians. Second, it is the city seen as ‘not only the real structure of the city but also of the idea that the city is a synthesis of a series of values. Thus it concerns the collective imagination’.\(^{51}\) These two perspectives may at times overlap, and cities like ‘Athens, Rome, Constantinople, and Paris represent ideas of the city that extend beyond their physical form, beyond their permanence; thus we can also speak in this way of cities like Babylon which have all but physically disappeared’.\(^{52}\) In the section on Athens, in which Rossi exemplifies his previous discussion of Halbwachs’s collective memory, he goes even further in the distinction of architecture into material space and space of memory, describing the city that was a political and administrative centre in antiquity:

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\(^{49}\) Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 29–32.

\(^{50}\) ibid., 29.

\(^{51}\) ibid., 128. In a later text Rossi elaborates on the mnemonic relationship that people enter into with architecture and objects. ‘The question of things themselves, whether as compositions or components – drawings, buildings, models, or descriptions – appears to me increasingly more suggestive and more convincing. But this is not to be interpreted in the sense of “vers une architecture” nor as a new architecture. I am referring rather to familiar objects, whose form and position are already fixed, but whose meanings may be changed. Barns, stables, sheds, workshops, etc. Archetypal objects whose common emotional appeal reveals timeless concerns. Such objects are situated between inventory and memory. Regarding the question of memory, architecture is also transformed into autobiographical experience; places and things change with the superimposition of new meanings’. A Rossi, ‘An Analogical Architecture’, tr. D Stewart [orig. (1976)], in K Nesbitt (ed), *Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture. An Anthology of Architectural Theory 1965–1995* (Princeton, PUP, 1996), 349.

In this ancient organization [of the city state] it seems that the physical aspect of the city was secondary, almost as if the city were a purely mental place. Perhaps the architecture of Greek cities owes its extraordinary beauty to this intellectual character’. 53

Collectivity

The mental conception of space, one part of the dualism of the *fatto urbano*, Halbwachs calls spatial framework of memory. Lynch refers to it as environmental image. But where Halbwachs and Lynch hesitate to see anything but individual conceptions or images of space, 54 even if they are ever so much conditioned by the social milieu, Rossi tends to emphasise the totality of individual spatial frameworks of memory as an abstracted and unified collective image or construct of thought. Despite his somewhat unclear wording, which has contributed to getting him accused of making a subject of the abstract notion of the city, 55 it is my impression that Rossi, nonetheless, is aware of the distinction between specific individual conceptions of space and, in an abstracted sense, collective or shared spatial constructs, of which the individual may have his own perspective. His focus, however, is not on the individuals, but on the collectives of the city. Each individual, Rossi says, may have good or negative memories associated with an urban artefact, but it is the totality of such experiences that constitute the city. 56 He follows up on this a few pages later, distinguishing between those who form an idea of a place without having walked through the building, street, or district: ‘the concept that one person has of an urban artifact [*fatto urbano*] will always differ from that of someone who “lives” the same artifact [*fatto*]’. 57 Rossi is less interested in the individuals, who sustain differing spatial concepts of the urban artefact, than in the collective citizenry that shapes the architecture of the city. He is less clear than Halbwachs with respect to defining what groups this collective is constituted of, but explains

54 ‘The environmental image [is] the generalized mental picture of the exterior physical world that is held by an individual. This image is the product both of immediate sensation and of the memory of past experience’. K Lynch, *The Image of the City* (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1960), 4. Rossi has certainly picked up Lynch’s point: ‘Naturally we must also take into account how people orient themselves in the city, the evolution and formation of their sense of space. This aspect constitutes, in my opinion, the most important feature of some recent American work, notably that of Kevin Lynch. It relates to the conceptualization of space’. Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 34.
55 Tieben writes, ‘Halbwachs had already made a subject out of the “collective memory”. Rossi went further and referred to the city as the place of this collective memory and made it into a subject with its own consciousness’. Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 159. My transl. I believe it is incorrect to accuse Halbwachs of subjectivisation of memory. Cf. the discussion in *Critique of the collective memory* in chapter one.
57 ibid., 33.
that ‘in an art or a science the principles and means of action are elaborated collectively or transmitted through a tradition in which all the sciences and arts are operating as collective phenomena’. In the context of Rossi’s book, such arts and sciences may be understood as the professions and disciplines dealing with the study and planning of architecture and the city, including political bodies. It is only in relation to such groups that individuals may be of interest to the study of the city; inscribed in professional traditions it is the individuals who propose and effectuate changes to the *fatti urbani* and to the city. Tieben has articulated this aspect:

For Rossi, society defined the framework in which the artist and architect, respectively, moved, acting on behalf of society, although this may surely not always have been the case. Thus, this argumentation followed Halbwachs’s conceptualisations; according to his view the memory contents of the individual were characterised by the social milieu.

Rossi introduces an aspect of the social collectives that has not been extensively treated in Halbwachs’s writings on memory: separate professionals as exponents of collective thought. Rossi asks rhetorically, ‘But what can psychology tell us if not that a certain individual sees the city in one way and that other individuals see it in another? And how can this private and uncultivated vision be related to the laws and principles from which the city first emerged and through which its images were formed?’

Certainly, though, some people become especially influential in the conceptualisation of space as agents of a social group or cultural sphere:

When Bernini speaks disdainfully of Paris because he finds its Gothic landscape barbarous, we are hardly interested in Bernini’s psychology; instead we are interested in the judgement of an architect who on the basis of the total and specific culture of one city judges the structure of another city. Similarly, that Mies van der Rohe had a certain vision of architecture is important not for ascertaining the ‘taste’ or the ‘attitude’ of the German middle class relative to the city, but for allowing us to appreciate the theoretical basis, the cultural patrimony of Schinkelesque classicism, and other ideas with which this is connected in the German city.

In the idea of the city itself, Rossi asserts, we find the actions and thought of individuals which pertain to the collective, and, as such, not all things in the

60 Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 114.
61 ibid.
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*fatti urbani* are collective; ‘yet, the collective and the individual nature of urban artifacts [*fatti urbani*] in the end constitutes the same urban structure. Memory, within this structure, is the consciousness of the city’. And despite the individuals and the particular local traditions that may characterise a city, it is ultimately dependent on the general laws of urban dynamics in the development of the city. Urban growth is not spontaneous, Rossi explains, but should be searched for in spatial images of the collectives. ‘Rather, it is through the natural tendencies of the many groups dispersed throughout the different parts of the city that we must explain the modifications of the city’s structure’.

With Rossi’s emphasis on individuals we are reminded of Halbwachs’s analysis of the notables of memory in *La Mémoire collective*. The notary public, the mayor, and the union secretary act on behalf of groups in the collective memory of legal matters. They are authorised to maintain the memory of property ownership and transactions, contracts, etc. to ensure the stability of relationships between man and the physical environment. Similarly, the individual exponents in the city’s collective memory, according to Rossi’s argumentation, a Bernini or a Mies van der Rohe, could be seen as notables of the city’s memory in matters of architecture. They are believed to make appropriate judgements on the basis of their specific professional memory. In this sense, the group appoints notables for its collective memory, professionals who, by means of the architectural organisation of the city, administer the memories attached to it as well as offer their interpretations and legitimise the practice of architecture.

**Permanences**

From urban historians Marcel Poëte (1866–1950) and Pierre Lavedan (1885–1982) Rossi takes the theory of *permanences* (*la teoria della permanenza*). The concept helps him to distinguish between the different roles the *fatto urbano* can take for remembrance. Certain forms persist in the city architecture, Rossi explains, partly as physical monuments (*monuménto*, from Latin *monumentum*, meaning memory, memorial, or token of remembrance), which refer to streets, zones, and areas as well as to buildings, some of which are visible as forms in city plans. He refers to Poëte’s observation of how cities tend to develop along existing urban elements; sometimes the *fatti urbani* persist virtually unchanged, sometimes only the locus persists after

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62 ibid., 131.
63 ibid., 162.
Representing the continuity of certain aspects of a *fatto urbano*, such permanences in the city, Rossi suggests, can be regarded either as vital and propelling elements (*elementi in modo vitale, elementi propulsori*) or as pathological elements (*elementi patologici*). The latter he exemplifies with Alhambra. Its earlier role was as the seat of Moorish and Castilian kings, a function that once dominated Granada. Now it is emptied of function and stands isolated in the city, he says. The Palazzo della Ragione in Padua, on the other hand, he takes to represent a propelling element of permanence; the building’s functions have changed over time and it functions today as a retail market. While Alhambra, considered as a *fatto urbano*, a spatial framework of memory, only supports historical narratives that are distanced from the private life and memories of the citizens, the Palazzo della Ragione gives access to the past by living it in the present; the memory of history is entered through a realm of personal experience.

In *La Mémoire collective*, Halbwachs offers a distinction between historical memory – the individual’s knowledge of history, events that can be learnt of and imagined, but not remembered as personal experiences – and autobiographical memory – belonging entirely to the individual as references to an informal, self-experienced past. While pathological permanences like Alhambra could be said to act as a spatial framework of the historical memory only, propelling permanences could be seen to support autobiographical memory as well as historical memory. The personal memory gives access to the imagination of the history, to an external realm of experience. While the two kinds of memories may relate to the same *fatti urbani*, it is clear, not least by their names, that Rossi advocates the propelling and vital permanences to the pathological, where both personal and historical remembering takes place. Rossi offers a useful distinction between two kinds of *fatti urbani*, which both pertain to the individual’s engagement with general history. Both open up for historical imagination, the personal appropriation of an external history, which is supported by historic sites. In vital permanences the imagination goes through the informal collective memory of everyday life, in pathological permanences remembrance is channelled through memory institutions’ official construal of the past. For our purpose, the usefulness of such categories may not be to point to the one as preferable to the other, but to see how *fatti urbani* can

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67 Yet, in some cases, like in German Quedlinburg, the preservation of a whole district is justifiable to Rossi, even with its city life of ‘obsessive quality’, because of its character as a museum of Gothic and German history. Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 123.
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operate on two different levels with regard to historical memory. In the next chapter I shall return to see how the permanences may help to differentiate the concept of the imaginative places of the *antëische Magie*.

A framework of communicative and cultural memory

The duality of Rossi’s definition of the *fatto urbano* and of the architecture of the city and his frequent return to the notion of collective memory in relation to these terms have provided his readers with the challenge of how to understand the concept of memory in Rossi’s theory. According to Tieben, Halbwachs had already made the collective memory a subject, and, with reference to formulations like ‘Expanding the thesis of Halbwachs I would say that the city itself is the collective memory of the people, and as memory it is linked to the facts [fatti] and to places’, he argues that Rossi follows Halbwachs on this point and makes the city a subject, if one is to take them literally. Equating the city with memory, Tieben continues, covers the fact that there exist parallel forms of collective memory, like spoken and written transmission, film, photo, rites, and artefacts, and that the city thus only forms a part of the collective memory. In his analysis, Tieben seems to subscribe to an understanding of the notion of the city as a material entity, and, consequently, to regard it as memory means to consider materiality a memory, which is the same as hypostatising memory. With reference to Jan Assmann, Tieben distinguishes between the communicative memory and the cultural memory. The realm of the former refers to the individual memory faculties, distributed over the minds of the citizens. It is constantly revised and actualised in interplay with other members of the same social groups. The latter includes the mnemonic aids society creates outside of the mind in order to transport memory to different places and future times. It includes rites, texts, art, buildings, and cities. These artefacts are memory not by metaphor, but by metonym; the thing comes to stand for the cognitive act that engages with it, that reads or interprets its signs, thus drawing on the memory in a process similar to that of recollection. It is by assigning Rossi’s notion of the city as the citizens’ collective memory to the latter, to the cultural memory, that Tieben clarifies the issue of subjectivisation. Rossi’s architecture of the city is collective memory, insofar as the physical artefacts

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68 Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 159. He uses Jan Assmann to reject Halbwachs on this point. Cf. n. 55.
69 Rossi, *L’architettura della città*, 149. Transl. by Alice Labadini. The translation of the American edition is different: ‘One can say that the city itself is the collective memory of its people, and like memory it is associated with objects and places’. Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 130.
70 For a more comprehensive introduction to communicative memory and cultural memory, see Two realms of the past in ch. 5.
recall to the citizens, in interpretable forms and signs of the materiality, the processes of its coming into being, of having been altered, and of having been part of history.\footnote{Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 160.}

The sentence quoted above, though, could also be read differently: ‘The city’ should not be defined as the materiality of the buildings, but as a construct in the collective memory of the citizens. If one, in this way, regards it as a spatial framework of the collective memory, one could see that it, by character, connects itself to architecture and places. Thus, the city is the totality of individual memories, which relate themselves to the buildings and spaces of the city. With such a reading one arrives at a notion of the city that is devoid of materiality. Rossi states several times in the book that his notion of the city as a man-made fact \textit{[fatto]}, just like its components the \textit{fatti urbani}, cannot solely be considered as its material deposit. Sure, as material artefacts ‘Cities become historical texts’, Rossi says, possible to study with the help of archaeologists and architectural historians (cultural memory), but equally important, he asserts, is its image in the memory of the citizens, connoting the understanding of history and tradition and individual and group-related remembering (communicative memory). In addition to ascribing the memory of the city to the realm of the cultural memory, in my opinion, with Rossi it is crucial to consider its role as a framework of the communicative memory or, in Rossi’s words, ‘the collective imagination’. He is clear on the fact that the two views complement each other and overlap. In one, the city is seen as a material artefact, in the other it is seen as the study of the formation and a synthesis of values: ‘The first and second approaches are intimately linked, so much that the facts they uncover may at times be confounded with each other’.\footnote{Rossi, \textit{The Architecture of the City}, 128.} In fact, the distinction Rossi sketches out resembles the distinction that will become paramount to Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model of memory. So while Tieben may be correct in describing Rossi’s concept of the city and the \textit{fatto urbano} as cultural memory by metonym, to my understanding, Rossi also includes in his concept the role of architecture as spatial framework of the communicative memory, the informal memory of individuals and social groups. The architecture of the city and the \textit{fatto urbano} cannot be restricted to only one of the two modes of memory.

To distinguish between the material manifestation of architecture and its conception in collective memory, it is not necessary to refer to Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model of communicative and cultural memory. Halbwachs
distinguished between internal and external frameworks of memory, referring specifically to the built environment as ‘material framework’ as opposed to the ‘spatial framework of memory’. As I will demonstrate in chapter five, the advantage of doing so is that Aleida and Jan Assmann associate the communicative memory with informal, unspecialised, and everyday remembrance and cultural memory with formalised, specialised, and institutionalised memory. The material framework, I posit, is used also in the processes of the communicative memory and the spatial framework of memory in processes of cultural memory. The fatto urbano can, according to my view, be seen as an internal as well as an external framework of remembering, made use of in processes of communicative as well as of cultural memory.

The fatto urbano and social morphology
A central position in Rossi’s thesis is occupied by his summary of Halbwachs’s study of expropriations in Paris and a discussion on related cases. With Halbwachs, Rossi comes to the conclusion that acts of expropriation normally occur because of larger tendencies in the development of cities, expressing the collective needs of the city. They do not focus on this or that street or building, but on a larger system of the city; they are not extraordinary phenomena, but most typical and normal in the city’s evolution. Individuals like Georges-Eugène Haussmann, and Napoléon III who commissioned him, come to stand for the needs and politics of the city administration.

To avail ourselves to Halbwachs’s point of view, one may or may not approve of Haussmann’s plan for Paris when judged solely on the basis of its design … but it is equally important to be able to see that the nature of Haussmann’s plan is linked up with the urban evolution of Paris in those years; and from this standpoint the plan is one of the greatest successes ever, not only because of a series of coincidences but above all because of its precise reflection of the urban evolution at that moment in history.

This study of changes in the city brings Rossi closer to what Halbwachs subsumes under the concept social morphology. As social groups exist and move in space, Halbwachs postulates, they shape the physical environment

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73 Cf. esp. The spatial framework of memory and the material framework, Social morphology, and Dual nature of space in ch. 2.
74 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 139–52.
75 ibid., 146.
76 Halbwachs took over the term from Durkheim. See Durkheimian influence in ch. 1.
according to their image of space. Buildings, roads, and divisions of land are external manifestations of social groups of the present and of the past.77 Social morphology is the study of the physical forms in order to decipher social reality.

The consequence of this way of thinking, Halbwachs demonstrates in his books on collective memory, is that physical structures can be considered as the externalisations of pre-existing spatial frameworks of the group memory, shared images of space.78 Also, societies or groups take over existing structures – a house or a city – by inheriting, conquering, or buying, and bear upon them to alter them according to their own image. The spatial frameworks of memory give shape to the built environment, which, in turn, forms the spatial frameworks of memory of its inhabitants. In his section on the collective memory, Rossi quotes Halbwachs’s description of this process in *La Mémoire collective*:

> When a group is inserted into a part of space, it transforms it to its image, but at the same time, it yields and adapts to the material things that resist it. It retreats into the framework it has constructed. The image of the external environment and the stable connections it maintains to it move to the foreground of the idea it has of itself.79

Rossi continues by stating his position as an expansion of Halbwachs’s thesis. After having suggested that the city may be considered as the collective memory of its citizens, he continues: ‘the city is the *locus* of collective memory. This relationship between the *locus* and the citizens therefore becomes the predominant image, the architecture, the landscape, and as the facts [*fatti*] retreat into memory, new facts emerge in the city’.80 Since the city, as Rossi declared in his introduction, should be understood as a conceptual as much as a material entity, the statement can be freely

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78 What are the drawings and models of the architect if not the communication of his mental image of the building that is to be built, shared with his collaborators in order to evaluate or construct the edifice? Consequently, Rossi refers to ‘the constant polemical urge of architects to design systems in which the spatial order becomes the order of society and attempts to transform society’. Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 113.
79 Halbwachs, *La Mémoire collective*, 195. The translation is mine. In the Italian original Rossi quotes from the French 1950 edition. The American edition translates his quote thus: “‘When a group is introduced into a part of space, it transforms it to its image, but at the same time, it yields and adapts itself to certain material things which resist it. It encloses itself in the framework it has constructed. The image of the exterior environment and the stable relationships that it maintains with it pass into the realm of the idea that it has of itself.’” Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 130.
80 Rossi, *L’architettura della città*, 149. Transl. by Alice Labadini. Rossi’s emphasis. The translation of the American edition is slightly different: ‘the city is the *locus* of the collective memory. This relationship between the *locus* and the citizenry then becomes the city’s predominant image, both of architecture and of landscape, and as certain artifacts become part of its memory, new ones emerge’. Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 130.
reformulated as follows: it is the city as a man-made artefact – understood to refer to the spatial framework of memory as well as to the material framework – that is the place for the citizens to attach their memories. Their relation to the physical city forms their spatial framework of memory, but the citizenry forms the physical environment according to their spatial framework of memory. Rossi further argues that ‘The collective memory participates in the actual transformation of space in the works of the collective, a transformation that is always conditioned by whatever material realities oppose it’. A socio-spatial order, conceived by a dominant group, is externalised from its collective imagination into built architecture in the city, and the built architecture, in return, impacts the group’s image of space.

Rossi offers a lucid illustration of such mechanisms earlier in the same chapter. With reference to Halbwachs’s *La Topographie légendaire*, Rossi exemplifies the principle of reciprocal influence of the spatial framework of memory and physical space. The spatial image of the Catholic Church, he posits, maintains a universal spatial framework, characterised by the topography of the Holy Land as defined through the Gospel, in which each place connotes acts or events of the Christian doctrine. While this heavenly space is transcendental and invisible, it may manifest itself in material places of sanctuaries. Thus, the shared image of religious space has been externalised into a physical topography to visually signify immaterial qualities; from the spatial framework of memory a material framework has been created in the landscape, a reproduction that includes both a memory image, relating to a known religious concept, and the materials of the built artefact, relating to the senses.

Rossi mentions another reference to the mechanisms of social morphology in passing:

When one goes to a charitable institution, the sadness is almost something concrete. It is in the walls, the courtyards, the rooms. When the Parisians destroyed the Bastille, they were erasing the centuries of abuse and sadness of which the Bastille was the physical form.

According to Belgin Turan, ‘It is evident that Rossi discerns various immaterial and temporal phenomena such as collective history, memory, individual experience, or individual suffering within the form of architecture; within the physical, spatial object’. With reference to the passage just

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81 Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 130.
82 ibid., 103.
83 ibid., 101.
quoted, Turan reads Rossi’s assertion as a claim that the perceptual engagement with architecture, with the walls of the charitable institution and the Bastille, may provide the observer with knowledge of what has happened there, that past events somehow are recorded in the materiality of the walls. Turan continues:

Even if the space (or the architectural object) is the location of such experiences and somehow embodies temporal phenomena as well, is there any way of reading this from its form, from its material? Is there a door opening to such a moment of transcendental knowledge? Would it be really possible to read the sufferings of thousands imprisoned within the walls of the Bastille, even if those walls did survive today?\(^{85}\)

Turan responds to some of his own questions in a footnote:

This is not to say that the Bastille if it had survived would not convey anything today, but … whatever meaning it would have, would have been contingent upon a prior knowledge of the Bastille’s history. That message would not have emerged directly from the walls themselves.\(^{86}\)

Turan’s critique is perhaps a fair critique, if we are to read the words of Rossi literally. I would suggest another reading. First, with the workings of the social morphology fresh in mind, the Bastille and the charitable institutions could be considered as architectural solutions to, and deposits of, the societal organisation of punishment and charity at the time. The physical forms can, in their turn, be interpreted by the likes of archaeologists, historians, or sociologists, yielding information about the society that shaped the architecture. Rossi suggests this as one of the ways in which the city can be regarded as a repository of history.\(^{87}\) Such a reading is maybe often, like Turan suggests, but not always, contingent upon prior knowledge of the building typology or other historical information. Also the apprehension of architecture about which nothing is known may enable the observer to conjecture the reason for its creation. This explanation corresponds to Tieben’s analysis of architecture in Rossi’s *L’architettura della città* as cultural memory by metonym or, as I will refer to it in the next chapter, as an external spatial framework of memory.

The second aspect of interpretation may lie closer to Rossi’s immediate intention, bearing in mind that he refers to the Parisians tearing down the Bastille. The architectural object of the Bastille, in Rossi’s vocabulary, was a

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\(^{85}\) ibid.

\(^{86}\) ibid., 165 n. 53.

\(^{87}\) Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 128.


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*fatto urbano*, a physical object and, at the same time, a conceptualisation in the minds of contemporary Parisians, a collective landmark in their spatial framework of the city. Memories of repressive acts – self-experienced or heard about – were associated with the *fatto urbano*; the citizens would likely recognise their spatial framework of memory in the physical building, instinctively cueing unpleasant memories and associations. The razing of the material part of the *fatto urbano*, the physical building of the Bastille, would remove it as a perceptual reminder in the city. This interpretation supports my suggestion to consider the *fatto urbano* partly a physical object and partly a component of the spatial framework of memory of the citizens.

Cultural landmarks

The extensive elaborations of Halbwachs’s ideas in *L’architettura della città* contribute to making it a pioneering theory of architecture and the city. Addressing the complex interrelation between society and the materiality that it surrounds itself with, Rossi does not, however, elaborate on how to identify and define the groups that produce the changing images of the architecture or to describe the processes with which these groups assign, reassign, and erase meaning associated with the *fatto urbano*. Regardless of this, the book offers a radical new conception of the city and has proved highly successful.

Rossi distinguishes himself from Halbwachs in the sense that he places an emphasis on *fatti urbani*, which stand out because of architectural qualities of size, form, history, or permanence: palaces, amphitheatres, churches, etc. A similar focus on noteworthy architecture is virtually absent in Halbwachs’s works on memory.88 Unlike Halbwachs, Rossi does not specifically point to architectural features as a determinant for the formation and support of the spatial framework of memory, but he points out that the form of architecture may express and sustain cultural ideas. The landmarks in the city, the *fatti urbani*, do not primarily refer to salient, perceptual landmarks of orientation, like those of Lynch, or to collective landmarks of social groups, as defined by Halbwachs. More importantly, they are architectural objects that stand out to the citizens because of their architectural features and the references to the history of the city. They may cue the memory and imagination of the

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individual, like the collective landmarks, but they also support history writing and official commemoration as shared points of reference for the citizens. If, as we have seen, pathological permanences only support institutionalised remembering and history, vital permanences also cue the informal collective memory. The former excludes the informal groups’ experience in the act of historical and cultural remembrance. It is clear from the names given to them by Rossi that he is critical of the pathological permanences. I shall not, however, like him, argue that one is favourable, but acknowledge the two as different kinds of *fatti urbani* and, thereby, as two distinctions of the spatial framework of memory. The common denominator of the permanences is their status as cultural landmarks.

With such a definition of the *fatto urbano*, it is possible to draw up three levels of landmarks: the Lynchian landmark of orientation, universally recognisable in visual salient buildings or places, and which assists way-finding; the Halbwachsian collective landmark, which offers an intersection of the social, temporal, and spatial frameworks of memory for the group and supports social relations and remembering; and the Russian cultural landmark of the *fatto urbano*, which connotes formal history and cultural memory, in addition to informal memory, and which acts as a reference point in the culture of the city or the country.

We could take the cultural landmark to refer to architecture that supports memory on several levels. For the citizenry, it has double status as a concrete and material object (external spatial framework) and as an image in the collective memory (internal spatial framework). It can be employed for localising memories either as mental representations or by perceiving them in situ. Furthermore, if it is a vital permanence, it can be employed for informal and everyday remembering among families and friends and in professions, like those of the sellers and buyers in Rossi’s example from the market in the Palazzo della Ragione in Padua (communicative memory), but also for institutionalised and formal remembering by notables like historians, politicians, architects, etc. Rossi’s distinctions foreshadow the next chapter’s distinction between internal and external frameworks and between communicative and cultural memory. Both are inherent in the *fatto urbano*. The complexity of the term has not, as far as I am aware, been appreciated thoroughly in other readings of Rossi. As we shall see later in this chapter, these various aspects and their amalgamation in the *fatto urbano* have often been overlooked in criticisms primarily directed against his figurative use of
language in a postulate like ‘the city itself is the collective memory of the people [la città stessa è la memoria collettiva dei popoli]’. 89

To refer to the fatto urbano as well as, on the larger scale, to ‘the architecture of the city’ as an external as well as internal spatial framework of memory is useful. In the context of the collective memory of a larger group, like communities, citizens, or nationals, the term offers itself as a combinatorial concept that, at the same time, refers to the artefact of the physical building and its representation through drawings and photographs, and to its conception in the mind of the citizenry.

Critique of the Rossian theory of memory

When L’architettura della città reached the English-speaking audience with the American publication The Architecture of the City in 1982, it had already been published in five languages and several editions. 90 In the introduction to the American edition Rossi wrote that the book had already ‘influenced a generation of young European architects’. 91 Peter Eisenman and Rossi edited the book on the basis of the Italian revised fourth edition from 1978, including illustrations and forewords from the different editions as well as additional references and many illustrations that had not been included in previous editions. 92 Diane Ghirardo had translated it under the supervision of Ellen R. Shapiro, the first editor of Oppositions Books; later it was corrected and refined by the new editor Joan Ockman as well as by Eisenman and Rossi. 93

Eisenman has provided a reading of Rossi’s book that has had a strong influence on subsequent readers. In the preface he presents the book’s publishing history as a cultural artefact itself, recognising the context of its initial publication and the development in the years until the American publication. He stresses that the text ‘is not so much a literal transcription of

89 Rossi, L’architettura della città, 149. Transl. by Alice Labadini. In the American edition it translates as ‘the city itself is the collective memory of its people’. My emphasis. Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 130.
92 P Eisenman, ‘Editor’s Preface’, ibid., 0; S Frank, IAUS The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies: An Insider’s Memoir (Bloomington, AuthorHouse, 2011), 117.
the original as a carefully revised edition – revised so as to provide the style and flavour of the original without encumbering it with some of the rhetorical and repetitive passages which are part of the original text’.\(^4\) The English audience, he implies, receives a different book than the Italian readers did sixteen years earlier. Likewise, in his own introduction, Eisenman declares that the edition not only introduces the book but also the figure of Rossi, which the book anticipates. Eisenman attempts to ‘collapse and dislocate the time and place of the evolution of Rossi’s ideas’ into the artefact that is the book.\(^5\) According to himself, this includes introducing the text also with references to his personal discussions with Rossi, to Rossi’s recent book *A Scientific Autobiography*, and to his term analogous city, which was introduced in the foreword to the second Italian edition.\(^6\)

Eisenman’s emphasis on Rossi’s preoccupation with memory shines through already in the title of the introduction: *The Houses of Memory: The Texts of Analogy*. In his reading of Rossi and the argument on permanences, however, Eisenman establishes a relation between the notions of history and memory in an attempt at simplification:

> History exists so long as an object is in use; that is, so long as a form relates to its original function. However, when form and function are severed, and only form remains vital, history shifts into the realm of memory. When history ends, memory begins.\(^7\)

His formulation is the reversal of the hypothesis provided by Halbwachs and which provides the point of departure for Rossi: ‘General history does not begin until tradition has ended, at the moment when the social memory fades or breaks down’.\(^8\) It has implications for the consideration of the *fatti urbani*. The continued use of a *fatto urbano* over generations means that it remains active in the unfolding of the collective memory of the present. It retains its role in relation to an ongoing tradition and not a general history that exists only outside of the social group. By breaking with the continuous use, the past is separated from the memory of the living group that has been using it and has to be written down as history in order to survive.\(^9\) In Halbwachs’s

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\(^4\) Eisenman, ‘Editor’s Preface’, 0.
\(^5\) ibid., 1.
\(^8\) Halbwachs, *La Mémoire collective*, 130. Neither in the preface of the book nor in the introduction does Eisenman relate the concept of collective memory to Halbwachs.
\(^9\) Aleida and Jan Assmann define this as a transfer from the realm of the communicative memory to the cultural memory, from informal to institutionalised remembering. Aleida Assmann has referred to sites that the
terms, memory breaks down and is replaced by history. For Rossi, it is an unavoidable fact that all *fatti urbani*, at some point in history, must change their function according to social and technological changes in society. Unlike Rossi and Halbwachs, for Eisenman it is the form that remains vital, when the function and the users disappear, associating memory with the form and materiality itself, not with the group that makes use of it.

Eisenman prepares the reader for an interpretation of Rossi’s concept of memory of the city as something tangible and concrete, without suggesting its framework-like function for collective memory, like Halbwachs does, or by pointing to the objects’ metonymic relation to the processes of cultural remembrance, like Aleida and Jan Assmann do. In Eisenman’s interpretation, Rossi hypostatises memory into material form and turns the architecture of the city into a remembering subject. The city is ‘a theater of human events. This theater is no longer just a representation; it is a reality. It absorbs events and feelings, and every new event contains within it a memory of the past and a potential memory of the future’. The imprint of architectural form on the city, in Eisenman’s reading, constitutes the urban history; the events that unfold around it accumulate into the memory of the *fatto urbano*: ‘With the introduction of memory in the object, the object comes to embody both an idea of itself and a memory of a former self’. Such a reading opposes the theory of Halbwachs, the essence of which is what Rossi aims to convey with his text. Sven-Olov Wallenstein has argued that Eisenman, through his introduction, projects his own issues onto Rossi’s book, among them the idea of the analogous city in which elements of concrete cities become fiction, where ‘real history transforms into a collective memory’. Eisenman, I believe, may have contributed to promoting the widely held understanding, in the subsequent architectural discourse, of collective memory as a (metaphysical) property intrinsic to architectural form, not as a term denoting the socially conditioned faculty of remembering of the citizenry, in which architecture is implicated in the form of a mental image, a spatial framework of memory.

The American edition was not the first introduction to Rossi’s thought in English. Previous to the translation of *L’architettura della città*, Eisenman, as one of the editors of the *Oppositions* journal, had given the English-speaking public an introduction to Rossi’s ideas.

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100 Cf. The spatial framework of memory and the material framework, *Social morphology*, and *Dual nature of space* in ch. 2 and *External frameworks of memory* in ch. 5.
102 ibid.
audience an introduction through an article by Rafael Moneo. ‘Aldo Rossi: The Idea of Architecture and the Modena Cemetary’ was originally published in Spanish in 1973 and was translated by Angela Giral for the *Oppositions* summer issue 1976. The same year, Moneo moved to New York to take up a teaching position at the Institute of Architecture and Urban Studies (IAUS), the institute that published the *Oppositions* journal and book series. The article situated Rossi in relation to Casabella Continuità and the *Tendenza* movement and gave an overview of central themes of *L’architettura della città*. It also offered an analysis of Rossi’s project on the Modena cemetery in an attempt to demonstrate the relationships of Rossi’s thinking with his built work.

In his discussion of Rossi’s book, Moneo distinguishes between remembering as an act done by the collective of citizens who live in the city, and memory as a faculty of the architecture of the city, sometimes put in quotation marks to point to an understanding of it as a trope. Like Eisenman will do after him, Moneo conceives of the city as a subject with its own faculty of remembering: ‘The city is faithful to its own “memory,” a term that Maurice Halbwachs already applied to the city’. He continues by quoting Rossi, but lets the statement stand for itself, unexplained:

‘The city is the *locus* of collective memory. Memory thus becomes … the conducting thread of the entire complex structure … the collective nature and the individuality of urban facts [*fatti urbani*] arrange themselves into the same urban structure. Within this structure memory becomes the conscience of the city.’

In the description of the Modena cemetery project, however, Moneo offers a brief description of the role of architecture for memory that more correctly points to Rossi’s as well as Halbwachs’s positions. For Moneo, the architecture of Modena cemetery situates the social milieu that makes use of the place for its rituals of death. It becomes the spatial framework for their remembering. He asserts that

Architectural form must support such meaning: that is, its meaning in the collective memory through which one may then understand [the architectural]

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107 Rossi quoted in ibid. The abridgement in the quote is Moneo’s.
work, assimilate it and situate it in the world of known objects; this support establishes a relationship with the deep and so often forgotten world of our experience.\textsuperscript{108}

In this passage, Moneo comes closer to the understanding of the \textit{fatto urbano} as support for collective remembrance, both as a material framework and as a spatial framework of memory.

One of the readers of Moneo’s article is Lynch. Seemingly unaware of his own importance for Rossi in \textit{L’architettura della città}, not yet published in English, he dismisses Rossi’s thinking. Lynch argues that to separate architecture as an autonomous discipline, like Rossi does according to the article, is rooted in the false idea of separating man from his habitat and treating them as two separate entities. Collective memory in Rossi’s thinking, he states, becomes separated from social life.

[For Rossi] The city is a permanent structure, which, through its monuments, ‘remembers’ its past and ‘realizes itself’ as it develops. Architecture is divorced of function; it is collective memory, a pure, sophisticated formal game. Physical structure is abstracted from social structure, and becomes a thing of fascinating, independent possibilities. These attitudes unfold into monstrous, seductive flowers.\textsuperscript{109}

Lynch subscribes to Moneo’s interpretation and criticises Rossi for making the city architecture into a subject with its own faculty of memory, and he even suggests that Rossi separates architectural form from social life, implying that memory, for Rossi, only is memory in form and of form and not a product of a cultural collective.

For an architect of the generation born around the time Rossi was introduced to American readers, and who started to study in the 1990s when \textit{L’architettura della città} had lost some of its influence on the architectural discourse, the enormous influence that Rossi’s book exercised on architects of previous generations cannot easily be grasped. Ellin has pointed out that the Venice Triennale of 1973, organised by Rossi, the publication of Moneo’s article in \textit{Oppositions} in 1976, as well as Rossi’s affiliation with the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies (IAUS) in New York City from 1976 to 1979 contributed to the expansion of Rossi’s influence and to the translation of his book into English.\textsuperscript{110} Suzanne Frank of the \textit{Oppositions} editorial group refers to Ockman, translator of \textit{L’architettura della città} and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[108] ibid., 15.
\end{footnotes}
associated editor of the journal, who has ‘credibly suggested that this book … as well as Venturi’s Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture … were trailblazing’.

People like Kenneth Frampton should have been awestruck by the book. Other appraisals, like this one by Lupfer, suggest that with the attention focused on the history of the city, ‘its durable values and its potential for development, Rossi decisively stimulated the debate on town planning and heritage conservation’.

The afterlife of Halbwachsian and Rossian theories of memory

In 1980, two years prior to the appearance of The Architecture of the City, Halbwachs’s La Mémoire collective had just appeared in an English translation by Francis J. Ditter and Vida Yazdi Ditter. It was the first of his books on memory to be translated into English. The availability of the book in English at the time when Rossi’s book became widely read likely contributed to the proliferation of Halbwachs’s ideas in the architectural discourse, especially those from La Mémoire collective. Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and La Topographie légendaire would not become available in English until 1992 and then only in part. It seems that these two books, neither in their original language nor in the translations by Lewis A. Coser, have come to the notice of the architectural discourse. They rarely appear in the bibliographies of architectural theory.

In the 1995 December issue of the journal Daidalos, dedicated to the theme of memory in architecture, Wolfgang Sonne suggests that Rossi has taken over a conceptualisation of space and memory from Halbwachs that essentially is metaphorical: ‘Halbwachs sees space … as the true actor of memory: because the mind is too capricious, the space of the city preserves the recollection’. Sonne does not recognise in Halbwachs’s theory the differentiation between the material framework of physical space and the mental representation in the spatial framework of memory and thus reads Halbwachs as if the remembering individual only engages with physical space in acts of recall. But it is not Halbwachs or Rossi that Sonne is most critical of, but the followers who take Rossi’s metaphor for real: ‘The
comparison between city and memory, whose metaphorical rhetoric was neglected by Rossi’s adepts, finally becomes part of the stock of common knowledge in the form of this cryptic apodictic’. Sonne incorrectly criticises Halbwachs for only remembering by means of the physical and not the remembered environment – ‘every reader can disprove in no time by simply recalling any place from his past’ – and Rossi for considering architecture a memory in itself – ‘The city itself does not remember anything. It is pointless to imagine what Troy might have thought of itself beneath the heap of rubble; the city only became significant for those who excavated it. Human beings with a memory and recollections are required to make a city talk’.

In the book on the vocabulary of modern architecture, Words and Buildings (2000), Adrian Forty addresses Halbwachs’s and Rossi’s contributions to the term ‘memory’, as one of the latest chapters in its history. Forty explains that Rossi reintroduced it to offer a new rationale to replace functionalism in architecture. By binding society’s memory to the built environment, the destruction of the latter would be understood as an assault on the collective memory. The understanding ‘that the inhabitants of a city shared a collective memory manifested in the buildings of the city’ Rossi had taken over from Halbwachs. According to Forty, in the theory of collective memory, ‘with its shortcomings and ‘weaknesses’, especially as it was outlined in La Mémoire collective, Halbwachs ‘went to some trouble to argue … that memory relates not to an actually existing physical space, but to the particular mental image of the space formed by that group’. Forty thus directs the attention to an aspect of Halbwachs’s thinking that stands at the centre of the argument of this thesis: the acknowledgement of the spatial framework as a stable construct of memory with which groups reconstruct the past. He points out, in relation to Rossi’s theory, that ‘it is not urban artefacts [fatti urbani] that are the agents of memory, but their mental images’. In this way Rossi cast Halbwachs’s ideas in an ‘idealist framework that was quite alien to Halbwachs’s own thought’ and formulated a poetic

117 ibid.
118 Cf. here Frameworks of memory in ch. 1 and the introduction to ch. 2.
120 ibid., 217–18. The perceived shortcomings of the book can in part be explained by the fact that La Mémoire collective was an uncompleted manuscript by the time of Halbwachs’s death in 1945. Changes imposed by the editors of the 1950 edition and renderings by the translators of the 1980 English edition may also have contributed to making it appear unfinished in its thought. On the editing, see Editions of the works by Maurice Halbwachs in the Introduction. On the translation, see Translations of the works by Maurice Halbwachs in the same chapter.
121 Cf. esp. the introduction to ch. 2.
rather than a theoretical conception of memory that did not take into account important nuances of Halbwachs’s original theory.

I have argued in this chapter that Rossi had a detailed knowledge of Halbwachs’s theory, but that he, arguably, was not as stringent in his own thinking and articulate in the formulation of his ideas. Rossi gave Halbwachs’s ideas new forms of quite different character, but I would suggest, that is possible to perceive Rossi’s conceptualisations as a supplements to the Halbwachsian concept. For instance, I have proposed to see the *fatto urbano* as, on the one hand, a physical object and, on the other, a mental image of it in the collective thought. To appreciate its dual nature implies to recognise the part of it that exists in people’s memory as an agent for remembering. The next chapter will see a reconsideration of this model, and I will propose to regard also the physical environment as a mind-external framework or agent of memory, complementing the mnemonic function of the inner frameworks.

Other attempts to revitalise the theories of Halbwachs in the architectural discourse around the turn of the millennium include Christine Boyer’s *The City of Collective Memory*, published in 1994, and Sébastien Marot’s ‘L’Art de la mémoire, le territoire et l’architecture’ from 1999. An English translation of the latter appeared in 2003 as *Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory*. Although thoroughly different in their character, the texts have in common that they try to free Halbwachs’s thinking from the readings by Rossi and by his interpreters Eisenman and Moneo.

In his essay, Marot offers one of the rare summaries in architectural theory of Halbwachs’s conception of space and the spatial framework of memory. Marot has identified that many of the references to space in *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* have been omitted in Coser’s English translation and should be credited for having translated some of the omitted passages for the English translation of his essay. As I have pointed to in the Introduction, although there are several reviews of Halbwachs’s thinking on space and memory, Marot’s review may be one of the better introductions for readers in architectural theory. The book is also interesting because it draws a link

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122 E.g. Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, e.g. 21–22, 29, 32. Cf. *The architecture of the city* in this chapter.
125 ibid., 30–32.
126 ibid., 30, 31 nn. 28–36.
between the mental places in Halbwachs’s theory and those in the art of memory, as Frances A. Yates described them.  

Also Boyer’s comprehensive study links the theories of Halbwachs with those described by Yates, covering a vast range of cultural perspectives on the nineteenth- and twentieth-century city. What began as a critique of historical preservation, urban design, and postmodern architecture evolved into an exploration of ‘how images from the nineteenth century have been translated into contemporary views of the city, how the restoration of former architectural and neighbourhood traces forged a hybrid layering of architectural sites and a constant migration from one time period to another’.  

Boyer shows her preoccupation with Halbwachs already in the title of the book, but although notions of memory appear and reappear throughout the book, the consideration of Halbwachs’s thinking is limited to a handful of passages. In her quest for a reformation of urban planning, she rhetorically establishes a dichotomy of memory and history in the city. On the one side, Boyer posits the collective memory, based on the interaction of social groups and linked to their mental conceptions of space in the spatial framework of memory. On the other, she places the symbols of a constructed public history, displayed through representative civic architecture and through disciplinary and systematic arrangements of objects in museum spaces.

Memory, Halbwachs argued, stands opposed to this narrative history, for memory always occurs behind our backs, where it can neither be appropriated nor controlled. Collective memory, moreover, is a current of continuous thought still moving in the present, still a part of a group’s active life, and these memories are multiple and dispersed, spectacular and ephemeral, nor recollected and written down in one unified story. Instead, collective memories are supported by a group framed in space and time. They are relative to that specific community, not a universal history shared by many disparate groups. History on the other hand gives the appearance that memory persists in a uniform manner, being handed down from one period of time to another and passing successively from place to place.

In the passage Boyer introduces Halbwachs’s distinction between collective memory and general history as a polarity in a political struggle, construing

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127 For a discussion of the influence of Yates and the art of memory on the architectural discourse, see Architecture, memory, and the AA in the Introduction. For a discussion of the legacy of the art of memory in Halbwachs’s thinking, see The art of memory in chapter one.


129 Cf. History in memory in the Introduction.

his theory in a manner alien to Halbwachs as well as Rossi. The former exists in the minds of the (dominated) group members, she asserts, the latter is positioned outside of their minds, formalised in books, documents, and administered by (dominating) institutions. For Halbwachs, there are not necessarily any political implications in the distinction. He divides memory into autobiographical memory, which concerns personal and social experience, and historical memory, which makes meaning out of the general history for every individual.\textsuperscript{131} The general history, structured and schematised through historical writing, can only exist for the individual as a representation in the historical memory. The official memory of Boyer’s history, disseminated through architectural monuments or museum collections, is in Halbwachs’s understanding a part of the collective memory of groups, like the nation or the city. It corresponds to the historical memory and not to the externalised general history. Where Boyer sees a political dichotomy between memory and history, Halbwachs only sees the distinction between mind-internal and mind-external processes of group memory.

Halbwachs postulates that all acts of remembrance, in all cultures and through history, are conditioned by the social thought of the present. Boyer reads Halbwachs differently and suggests that the collective memory, as mental faculty, is a cultural specific; collective memory exists only under certain societal conditions. Such conditions do not exist in the contemporary city:

Remembering and recollection today have achieved new importance as the contemporary metropolis becomes a source of constant exchanges in and relays of information, and represents a physical site in which images and messages seem to swirl about, devoid of a sustaining context. Recall no longer refers exclusively to psychological memory – our ability to recollect forgotten experiences and retie them to conscious awareness. Nor is memory considered to be collective, in the sense that it is linked to the social and physical space of a people and related to the transmission of values and traditions. The presence of interpretative systems that translate memories and traditions into meaningful contemporary forms have vanished once and for all.\textsuperscript{132}

In Boyer’s study, the theoretical legacy of Halbwachs takes on a new guise in her agenda for urban planning, quite alien to Halbwachs (and to the growing field of interdisciplinary memory studies that builds on his legacy). She has, nonetheless, written Halbwachs into a complex and rich study of Western cities in modernity and given prominence to his legacy in the architectural

\textsuperscript{131} Halbwachs, \textit{La Mémoire collective}, 99.
\textsuperscript{132} Boyer, \textit{The City of Collective Memory}, 28.
Edifices
discourse through repeated references to the collective memory, among other places in the title and in central concepts.

In a recent text (2012), Boyer brings the collective memory and Halbwachs back into the architectural discourse. By now she accepts the hypostatisation of memory into built architecture as a natural basis for her argument: ‘Since architectural collective memory is literally carved or erected in stone, and thus tangible, monolithic, recognizable and permanent, it has been called the archetypal collective memory’. What Halbwachs referred to as external frameworks of general history – history books and other documents – and of material frameworks – physical buildings, cities, and landscapes – Boyer refers to as a historical memory that has been petrified. The shift in definition from Halbwachs’s historical memory, which denotes what the individual recalls of general history, to Boyer’s historical memory as material artefact seems to have fixed the idea of architecture as concretisation of memory in architectural theory. It should, however, not be taken to indicate that Halbwachs ever intended any such interpretation. The collective memory, according to him, refers to the act of reconstructing the past by individuals, conditioned by its social milieus and employing the environment as one of the supporting frameworks. Memory does not exist independently from human subjects in the materiality of an artefact: ‘[The collective memory] does not preserve the past, but it reconstructs it, with the aid of material traces, rites, texts, and traditions left behind by that past, but also with the aid of recent psychological and social factors, that is to say, with the present’. Without the acts of reactualisation of the reminding traces no collective memory exists.

A second phase of Halbwachsian theories of memory in architecture?
I could ask myself why Boyer’s book, or Marot’s for that matter, has not exerted as much influence on the architectural discourse as Rossi’s book. Could it be that when The City of Collective Memory appeared in the mid-1990s, architects were leaving postmodernism’s historical preoccupation and entered an era of supermodernism (Hans Ibelings)? Abstract form languages, in part revived from the Modern Movement’s developments, became new norms, and again, like during modernism, for practising architects, terms like

133 M C Boyer, ‘Collective Memory Under Siege: The Case of “Heritage Terrorism”’, in C C Crysler et al. (eds), The SAGE handbook of Architectural Theory (Los Angeles, Sage, 2012), 325.
134 ibid., 328.
‘memory’, ‘history’, or ‘tradition’ would not connote favourable values. Curiously, in the decade when the humanities took on memory studies with full force, architecture seems to have left them.

From the 1960s to the 1980s Halbwachs’s notions of the spatial framework and the collective memory had a prominent position in the remodelling of architectural theory and practice. Lynch’s environmental image, and, to some degree, also Kepes’s conception, was remarkably successful, but with regard to Halbwachs’s theory, it did little to promote its merits. Rossi went much further in his rewriting of the definition of the architecture of the city, some of the essential features of which he developed on the basis of Halbwachs’s theory. Halbwachs became a figure that architectural writers needed to position themselves in relation to, if they were to assess Rossi’s theory. Implicitly, through the notion of the spatial framework of memory, and explicitly, through the term ‘collective memory’, Halbwachs’s thought came to permeate a postmodern awareness in architecture. Although widely criticised for his way of referring to memory as inherent in the materiality, Rossi contributed to raising the concern among architects to see architecture not only as form, function, and material, but, to a larger degree, as a vehicle for social and cultural processes and values. He did not, however, succeed in providing the discourse with the distinction between architecture’s role as a material framework and as spatial framework of social memory. Neither did he provide the key to understanding material architecture as memory, namely by reference to it as metonym, as Jan and Aleida Assmann have successfully done in their subsequent theories.

With the fatto urbano, Rossi has provided a useful concept that addresses culturally significant pieces of architecture in the city. These are as much material manifestations as they are constructs in the collective imagination. With reference to Lynch’s visually salient landmarks of orientation and Halbwachs’s socially significant collective landmarks, we may regard the fatti urbani as cultural landmarks. Important nodes in the culture and fabric of cities, such entities take the form of a mind-external material framework and a mind-internal spatial framework of memory. Furthermore, with vital permanences, a distinction of the fatto urbano, we may take them to support the informal and everyday memory of the citizenry as well as the formal and institutionalised memory of architects, historians, and politicians. With pathological permanences, on the other hand, only the official and institutionalised forms of remembrance are encouraged.

In the first phase of Halbwachsian theories of memory in architecture Rossi was the main advocator of his thinking. With the theoretical framework of the spatial framework of memory, outlined in this thesis, I hope to contribute
to what could become a second phase of interest in his ideas. When this thesis advocates memory studies in architecture, it is not a gesture of conservatism or historicism. Studies of memory, here, are posited against memorylessness and against unawareness of cultural values attached to architecture. A concern for memory is not advanced as an alternative to preoccupations of form, but offered as a supplement to critical humanistic perspectives. It promotes an increased consciousness of societal processes that produce meaning in architecture and urban environments and recognises that no building or urban environment is neutral; it shapes, and is shaped by, group interests and it always connotes group values. Understanding such mechanisms could contribute to shifting the view from seeing architecture as singular, material, and permanent to appreciating it as a totality of mental images, images which only exist in plural and which differ between groups and change over time. Such a view lends more importance to architecture’s movements and orchestration in society than to its statics. In the next chapter I shall address a more recent model of memory, which, like Rossi’s, is an elaboration of Halbwachs’s theories. It will contribute to supplement the spatial framework of memory and to clarify some issues that were not explicated in the works of Halbwachs and Rossi.
Cultural memory and external frameworks

Whereas chronologically ordered history books provide information for a nation’s historical consciousness, the nation’s memory finds its expression in the landscape of its places of remembrance. The strange bond between distance and proximity gives them their aura, and through them one seeks direct contact with the past. The ‘magic’ of the place of memory results from its status as ‘contact zone.’ Holy sites that establish a link with the gods have existed in all cultures, and places of memory may be regarded as their modern equivalent, because these too are expected to provide a connection with the spirits of the past.

— Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume, 1999

In the German discourse on memory in the humanities Aleida and Jan Assmann occupy a prominent position next to people like Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora. Through the communicative memory and cultural memory, a theoretical model that has received widespread

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2 On the differences between the discourses in Germany, the United States, and Britain, see A Erl, 'Travelling Memory', Parallax, 17/4 (2011), 5–6. For introductions to the German discourse, see: A Erl, Memory in Culture, tr. S B Young (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) [Ger. orig., Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen (2005)]; N Pethes, Kulturwissenschaftliche Gedächtnistheorien zur Einführung (Hamburg, Junius, 2008); T Robbe, Historische Forschung und Geschichtsvermittlung: Erinnerungsorte in der deutschsprachigen Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen, V&R, 2009); S Hobuss, 'German Memory Studies: the Philosophy of Memory from Wittgenstein and Warburg to Assmann, Welzer and Back Again', in A Dessingué et al. (eds), Fierstemte minner (Stavanger, Hertervig, 2010); J K Olick, et al., 'Jan Assmann (Contemp.)', in J K Olick et al. (eds), The Collective Memory Reader (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011).
acknowledgment for its conceptual clarity, they uphold the legacy of Halbwachs’s memory theory by criticizing and refining it.\(^3\)

Jan Assmann (b.1938) studied Egyptology, classical archaeology, and Hellenic studies in Munich, Heidelberg, Paris, and Göttingen.\(^4\) He worked as an independent scholar at the German Archaeological Institute in Cairo from 1967 and held a chair in Egyptology in Heidelberg between 1976 and 2003. Since 2005 he has been honorary professor at the University of Konstanz.

Aleida Assmann (b.1947) studied English literature and Egyptology in Heidelberg and Tübingen.\(^5\) In 1993 she was appointed a chair in English literature at the University of Konstanz, which she still holds. She has collaborated professionally and academically with her husband Jan Assmann since the 1960s.

In the first part of this chapter I aim to demonstrate how their model of memory, with all its distinctions, offers a useful theory for developing and distinguishing not only the collective memory, but, more importantly for the study, Halbwachs’s conceptualisation of the spatial framework of memory. The terminology of Aleida and Jan Assmann, to my meaning, eases the application and enhances the specificity of the concept of spatial framework of memory. Aleida and Jan Assmann use the communicative memory to restate certain parts of Halbwachs’s theory and thus delineate it from the cultural realms referred to by the other part of the conceptual pair, the cultural memory. I will introduce the latter and with it the perspectival organisation of memory contents into functional memory and storage memory. It replaces the dichotomy of memory and history and inscribes the tension between remembering and forgetting in the concept of cultural memory.

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\(^5\) A Assmann, ‘Curriculum Vitae’ [PDF document], July 2012.
In the second part of the chapter I will address definitions and distinctions of the spatial framework that can be derived from Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model of memory. Differently than in their model, I will insist on using the notion of the spatial framework also when referring to material artefacts. In this way, I use the distinction sketched by Halbwachs and elaborate on it with the help of the theory of Aleida and Jan Assmann. A number of general distinctions are added to the spatial framework of memory and, finally, I suggest including in the theoretical framework a selection of precise terms, suggested by Aleida Assmann to address the politics of European sites of memory in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as conceptual shortcuts to the general postulations and as complements to similar distinctions proposed by Halbwachs and described in chapter two.

**Dimensions of memory**

At the beginning of the book for which he is most known, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis* (1992; Engl. as *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 2011), Jan Assmann outlines a model for the study of human memory that comprises four distinctive dimensions, shaped in social and cultural contexts outside of the brain. Three of them refer to pragmatic and functional everyday memory. *Mimetic memory* (*das mimetische Gedächtnis*) refers to stabilising procedures of actions: handling tools, cooking, playing sports, but also to manners and customs, which depend on mimetic traditions. It is acquired by imitating others or by reading codified instructions. The *memory of things* (*das Gedächtnis der Dinge*) describes the relations people form with objects they surround themselves with, from beds, chairs, crockery, clothes, and tools, to houses, streets, villages, towns, cars, and ships. They all represent our concepts of practicality, comfort, beauty, and, to a certain extent, our own identity. Objects reflect ourselves – they remind us of who we are, of our past, of our forebears, and so on.

Jan Assmann has later explained the world of objects that man surrounds himself with as a stabilising drive, representing a *will towards form* (*Wille zur Form*). The form world of objects is characterised by its regularity over longer time periods, and it is through the study of the morphology of the things that we can position them spatially and temporally. He sees the will towards form as an expression of mnemonic performance.

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7 ibid., 6.
(Gedächtnisleistung) and of a formation of tradition (Traditionsbildung) in the group. The memory of things, formed outside of the body, corresponds to what Halbwachs refers to as entourage matériel, the material surroundings of the family and friends.\(^9\) It can be compared to the spatial framework of the home and its physical counterpart, as it comes to serve as a shared repository of familial and social values, attached to material objects.\(^10\)

The communicative memory (das kommunikative Gedächtnis) is the realm of language and everyday communication. Language and the ability to communicate are learnt from society and develop in social milieu. Remembering is thus inscribed in social and societal processes and cannot be explained only by the study of the individual mind and brain. Jan Assmann takes this dimension of memory to correspond to Halbwachs’s concept of the collective memory, with some exceptions.

When these three dimensions go beyond the functional and take on meaning and significance, they transcend the limits of pragmatism and enter the dimension of semantics in the domain of the cultural memory. In an article on cultural memory that precedes the book, Jan Assmann describes the two dimensions as the distinction between informal and everyday situations and the cross-generational transmission of ‘all knowledge that directs behavior and experience in the interactive framework of a society and one that obtains through generations in repeated societal practice and initiation’.\(^11\) I will take a closer look at the two main modes of memory that stand at the centre of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theory, the conceptual pair communicative memory and cultural memory, and reflect upon how the spatial framework of memory comes to relate to the two.

**Communicative memory**

The concept of communicative memory, devised by Aleida and Jan Assmann in collaboration, is the development of Halbwachs’s collective memory and an attempt at clarifying his theory. In the introduction of the terms to an

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\(^{9}\) J Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 6.

\(^{10}\) Halbwachs writes, ‘Let us leave aside the considerations of convenience and aesthetics. The material surroundings [entourage matériel] carry our mark and that of others. Our house, our furniture, and the way they are organised, the arrangement of the rooms in which we live, remind us of our family and the friends that we often see in this framework … Furniture, ornaments, paintings, utensils, and knickknacks circulate within the group, they are the topics of appreciation and comparison and provide, at all times, insights into the new directions of fashion and taste, as well as recall for us older social customs and distinctions’. M Halbwachs, *La Mémoire collective*, ed. G Namer (1950; crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997) [orig., ‘Mémoire et société’ (1947)], 194.

English audience, Jan Assmann has described how they worked out the terminology:

The term ‘communicative memory’ was introduced in order to delineate the difference between Halbwachs’s concept of ‘collective memory’ and our understanding of ‘cultural memory’ (A. Assmann). Cultural memory is a form of collective memory, in the sense that it is shared by a number of people and that it conveys to these people a collective, that is, cultural, identity. Halbwachs, however, the inventor of the term ‘collective memory,’ was careful to keep his concept of collective memory apart from the realm of traditions, transmissions, and transferences which we propose to subsume under the term ‘cultural memory.’ We preserve Halbwachs’s distinction by breaking up his concept of collective memory into ‘communicative’ and ‘cultural memory,’ but we insist on including the cultural sphere, which he excluded, in the study of memory. We are, therefore, not arguing for replacing his idea of ‘collective memory’ with ‘cultural memory’; rather, we distinguish between both forms as two different modi memorandi, ways of remembering.12

Following Halbwachs’s postulations of the parts of the collective memory that correspond to the communicative memory, Jan Assmann underlines the social conditioning of individual memory. It is the individual who remembers, but the group determines how and what he remembers. This is the reason why collective memory should not be considered as a metaphor (I will return to this aspect later in this chapter). The different frameworks of memory (social, spatial, temporal, linguistic, etc.) are needed for the individual to reconstruct his memories and supply them with meaning. The frameworks, in turn, are acquired in the social interaction in time and place:

a person’s memory forms itself through his or her participation in communicative processes. It is a function of their involvement in a variety of social groups – ranging from family through religion to nation. Memory lives and survives through communication, and if this is broken off, or if the referential frames [frameworks]13 of the communicated reality disappear or change, then the consequence is forgetting. From the individual’s point of view, memory is a conglomeration that emerges from participation in different group memories. From the perspective of the group, memory is a matter of

13 Aleida and Jan Assmann use the German ‘Rahmen’ to correspond to Halbwachs’s use of the French ‘cadre’. ‘Rahmen’ has sometimes been translated as ‘frame’ in Jan Assmann’s Cultural Memory and Early Civilization and in Aleida Assmann’s Cultural Memory and Western Civilization. This departs from established practice in English translations of Halbwachs, where ‘cadre’ is translated as ‘framework’. Cf. Translations of the works by Maurice Halbwachs in the Introduction.
knowledge that is distributed among and internalized by each member. All memories go to make up an independent system, whose elements both determine and support one another, whether in the individual or in the group. Memory is individual in the sense that it is a unique link between the collective memory (of the various group experiences) and the experiences specific to the person concerned.\(^\text{14}\)

Halbwachs had pointed out that in these processes the frameworks are constantly revised and positioned according to the present. The past of the communicative memory never exists as a pure fact, but always as a construction related to the social identity of the present. The remembering of the group thus does not aim at writing their own history, but at founding, at all times, present experience and projections on the future in conceptions of the shared past. Again, in the early preparatory article Jan Assmann summarises the communicative memory; it is a dynamic and non-institutional everyday process of communication that is ‘characterized by a high degree of non-specialization, reciprocity of roles, thematic instability, and disorganization’.\(^\text{15}\)

Jan Assmann’s review of the collective memory is also his support of the foundational conceptualisations of Halbwachs’ thesis. He shows that, for Halbwachs, the collective memory was not a metaphor, but a social phenomenon: ‘The fact that only individuals can have a memory because of their neurological equipment makes no difference to the dependence of their memories on the social frame [framework]’.\(^\text{16}\) He rejects any comparison with a Jungian collective unconscious, a memory that is biologically hereditary and expresses itself as a Proustian mémoire involontaire. Halbwachs, Jan Assmann contends, means nothing of the sort, but conceives of memory as communicable and non-hereditary mémoire volontaire.

In my view, it is not the [Halbwachs’s] ‘socio-constructivist’ expansion but, on the contrary, the individual and psychological contraction of the memory concept [by the likes of Bergson] that obscures the ways in which the past is given communicative and cultural presence. Groups ‘inhabit’ their past just as individuals do, and from it they fashion their self-images. Trophies,

\(^{14}\) J Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 23.

\(^{15}\) J Assmann, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, 126.

\(^{16}\) J Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 33. On this point Jan Assmann has received strong support from social psychologist and sociologist Harald Welzer, who explains that the growth and maturation of the brain in children occurs in constant social interaction and that the development of a consciousness that could exist beyond a communicative situation is not possible. Consciousness and memory are founded in the dialogue between several brains. Since the information the brain handles is social by nature, it is doubtful, Welzer reasons, that there could exist something like an individual memory. On Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theory, see esp. Welzer, *Das kommunikative Gedächtnis*, 13–15.
certificates, and medals adorn the cabinets of clubhouses as well as the shelves of individual sportsmen, and there is not much point in calling one tradition and the other memory.\textsuperscript{17}

The difference between thought and memory, just like Halbwachs demonstrates in relation to the formation of the topography of places of Jesus’s life in the Gospel, lies in the fact that thought is abstract and memory concrete.\textsuperscript{18} ‘Images must take on a form that is imaginable’, Jan Assmann argues, ‘before they can find their way into memory, and so we have an indissoluble merging of idea and image’, into what he suggests calling \textit{memory figures (Erinnerungsfiguren)}.\textsuperscript{19} Three features characterise memory figures: a relation to time and place through the temporal and spatial frameworks of memory, to a group through the social framework of memory, and a capacity for reconstruction.

To start with the latter, memory is not the preserved past or pure facts, but always reconstructed by means of societal frameworks in the present, and thus it is continually subject to processes of reorganization according to the changes taking place in the frame of reference of each successive present. Even that which is new can only appear in the form of the reconstructed past, in the sense that traditions can only be exchanged with traditions, the past with the past.\textsuperscript{20}

In order to reconstruct the past the group needs to actualise the frameworks of time, space, and the social milieu. Membership of a living group provides the member with a specific identity that comprises forms of communication, ideas, emotions, and values on the basis of which the individual can represent the group and adopt its attitude.

Also the attachment of collective memory to space and time follows the thesis of Halbwachs. Jan Assmann stresses the connectivity of groups to points of crystallisation – in the events and festivals of the calendar or in the inhabited space:

what cities are to town-dwellers, the countryside is to rural communities. These are all spatial frames [frameworks] for memories, and even – or especially – during absence they are what is remembered as home. Another spatial element is the world of objects that surround or belong to the individual – his \textit{entourage matériel} [material surrounds] that both support and

\textsuperscript{17} J Assmann, \textit{Cultural Memory and Early Civilization}, 33.
\textsuperscript{19} J Assmann, \textit{Cultural Memory and Early Civilization}, 23–24.
\textsuperscript{20} ibid., 27.
Edifices contributes to his identity … Any group that wants to consolidate itself will make an effort to find and establish a base for itself, not only to provide a setting for its interactions but also to symbolize its identity and to provide points of reference for its memories.21

With Jan Assmann’s outline of the communicative memory and its frameworks, we are able to delineate the areas of Halbwachs’s collective memory that relate to the role of social remembering in everyday situations. Architecture, here, takes the form of a spatial framework for informal and non-specialised remembering, where anyone can take part and where the roles change. The communicative memory is disorganised and transient and is essentially bound to the minds of individuals. The brain is its biological basis, and, therefore, the contents of the communicative memory will not live longer than three or four generations before disappearing, unless they are formalised. There exist as many collective spatial frameworks of memory as there are groups and as many perspectives on the framework as there are members in the group. Over time the frameworks change according to changes in and of the group.

Spatial frameworks of the communicative memory
Before addressing the cultural memory and how architecture may act as its spatial framework, I will turn the attention to some of the basic roles of places for the communicative memory. These pertain to the most private of the social realms that the individual belongs to: that of the memory of the family and of close relations.

Familial places – Generationenorte and Heimat
In Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and in La Mémoire collective, Halbwachs emphasises the surroundings of the family and close relations as especially important for remembering, the first environment that the child is inscribed in and remembers with the help of. For the child, the home and other places of the family are the first places to be mapped out in the spatial framework of memory, with which its initial conception of the world is structured. Like Halbwachs, Aleida Assmann introduces her discussion of places of memory with reference to Goethe and stresses that it is the places that associate personal relations and emotions that come to stand out in the spatial framework of memory rather than lend importance to architectural

21 ibid., 24–25.
qualities. For Goethe, it is the square where he lives and his grandfather’s house.

The symbolic power that Goethe attributes to these places seems to be connected with memory. Both places embody memories that he shares as an individual but that far transcend his own life. Here, the individual memory gives way to that of the family, and the context of an individual life is inextricably bound to that of people who were once within that context but are now no longer there. Thus in both places, individual memory merges with one that is more general.22

From Halbwachs’s general observation of the relevance of the childhood environment for remembering – for any child, in any society – Aleida Assmann takes the step to establish the idea of Generationenorte. Rendered as ‘generational places’ in Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, Generationenorte literally translates as ‘places of generations’, pointing to such places’ ‘firm and long-established ties with family histories [in] an unbroken generational chain’.23 At the centre of sedentary cultures, processes of modernity – migration to industrial centres, war, and displacement – have increasingly made the Generationenorte scarce. Aleida Assmann lets Nathaniel Hawthorne portray the phenomenon in the mid-nineteenth century:

This long connection of a family with one spot, as its place of birth and burial, creates a kindred between the human being and the locality, quite independent of any charm in the scenery or moral circumstances that surround him. It is grounded less on love than on instinct. The new inhabitant – who comes from a foreign land, or whose father and grandfather came – has … no conception of the oysterlike tenacity with which an old settler, over whom his third century is creeping, clings to the spot where his successive generations have been imbedded. … The spell survives.24

Being bound to a place over generations Hawthorne considers archaic and the opposite of ideals of the mobile modern man. For Aleida Assmann, Hawthorne represents the one side of a dichotomy of modernity. The upkeep and transmission of memory and the emotional attachment to the spatial framework of Generationenorte, she reasons, are an anti-ideal for a

22 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 283.
‘functionalist perspective’. That perspective is what connects the *Generationenorte* with *les milieux de mémoire*, the ‘real environments of memory’ that Pierre Nora positions as the antithetical term to *les lieux de mémoire*.25 For Nora, it describes the milieus lost in modernity’s break with tradition, through industrial growth, the dissolution of the peasant culture, and the external and internal colonisation. He suggests that we have seen the end of societies that had long assured the transmission and conservation of collectively remembered values, whether through churches or schools, the family or the state … of ideologies that prepared a smooth passage from the past to the future or that had indicated what the future should keep from the past.26

Aleida Assmann is critical of Nora’s postulation and points out that it is not sufficient to attribute the transition from *milieux de mémoire* to *lieux de mémoire* only to modernity’s break with tradition and historicism.27 Seen from a German perspective, this dichotomy does not suffice to explain the sites of memory that exist today. The atrocities of the Nazi regime, she argues, emptied entire *milieux de mémoire* and replaced the *Generationenorte* of Jewish tradition with memorial sites and *lieux de mémoire* all over Europe. Repositories of collective memory are replaced by written history and commemoration.

With Aleida Assmann it is possible to regard *milieux de mémoire* as related to the *Generationenorte*, and not only for describing what has been lost in modernity. The former are for communities and societies what the latter are for families. They are forms of informal memory practice that binds itself to an environment over generations and thus becomes threatened by any act of displacement or destruction of the community or alteration of the environment.

In their introduction to the concept *Heimat*, approximately ‘home’ or ‘homeland’, in *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte* (2001) – the German response to the French *Les lieux de mémoire* – Etienne François and Hagen Schulze explain how *Heimat*, far into the nineteenth century, was a legal term describing the place one belonged to by birth or marriage and in which one had the right to practice civic professions or to acquire land.28 Because of overpopulation in the mid-nineteenth century, large numbers of Europeans

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26 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, 7.
27 A Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization*, 323–24.
migrated into industrial cities or to the New World, affecting 85 per cent of the population in the span of the century. Around the turn of the century, two thirds of Germans lived in a different place than where they were born. *Heimat* had now come to emotionally denote the place where one was born and had spent one’s childhood. According to François and Schulze, the alienation of so many people living elsewhere caused a change in the relation to the place of origin; it fostered nostalgia, homesickness, and yearning for the *Heimat*.

I would like to propose *Heimat* as a conceptual sibling to Aleida Assmann’s *Generationenorte* and consider them both as distinctions to the spatial framework of memory.29 *Generationenorte* could describe how individuals continue to live in the physical environment that corresponds to the spatial framework of one’s childhood (as well as that of the older members of the family), constantly updating the framework through interaction with the current physicality and the current social life playing out there. *Heimat*, differently, describes the distanced situation where the material framework of home is not available on the everyday basis, but can be called upon as a spatial framework of memory to remember social relations of the family and experiences from one’s life. Repeated returns serve to adjust the spatial framework of memory to the current situation, lessening the experience of temporal difference between the two.30

Suzanne Vromen has written on nostalgia in Halbwachs’s work on memory. She argues that nostalgia for him has a liberating effect on the individual:

> it allows evasion from the coercion of social bonds … Nostalgia becomes for Halbwachs the exercise of individual freedom in the recall and ordering of experience, a freedom which permits the individual to emphasize positive experiences selectively. He was careful to point out that nostalgia does not represent escape from all social bonds; these remain, but their nature is altered

29 This distinction of two kinds of relation to the sites of family memory corresponds to the distinction that Halbwachs draws up with regard to religious memory and space in *La Topographie légendaire* between the Christians, who stayed in the landscape of the Gospel, and those who settled in foreign places: ‘But it happens whenever a collective memory has a double object, on the one hand, a material reality, a person, a monument, a place in space, and, on the other hand, a symbol, that is to say the spiritual significance which, in the mind of the group, attaches itself and superposes the reality. Suppose the group breaks up. Some of the members stay in the place, in the presence of the material object, in contact with it. The others leave, carrying with them the image of the object. At the same time the object changes. The very place it occupies no longer remains the same, because all that surrounds it transforms. It no longer bears the same relations to the different parts of the material world that surrounds it’. Halbwachs, *La Topographie légendaire*, 128–29.

because they have lost their coercive power. Because people in the past are fixed in a well-defined framework, evocation is done without arousing expectations, without fears of evil or hopes for good. Social bonds thus acquire a quality of equanimity which they did not have previously.31

The spatial and social frameworks belong to the past and are pacified in their social influence on the present reconstruction of memories. The present vantage point offers the freedom to lay stress on new aspects and judgements. At the same time, the loss of continuity is felt. In the nostalgic condition of dislocation the ‘past furnishes an idealized image of old customs and thus provide[s] a sense of social continuity’.32 Such a productive construction of the past, with the help of a spatial framework of a previous era, is not only possible for people who left the Generationenorte, but also for subsequent generations of the migrants. Georgia Lagoumitzi has pointed out how such an idealised spatial framework of memory can be institutionalised and passed down for millennia in diaspora.33 For Pontic Greeks, living in or coming from Pontus (Eastern Turkey) and other regions around the Black Sea, Greece is the nostalgic homeland for the descendants of Greek colonies established hundreds or even thousands of years earlier. Lagoumitzi’s study indicates that for people of diaspora also seemingly transitory identities of Heimat can be stabilised in cultural forms and identities, up to such a level that a modern state like that of Greece offers ‘repatriation’ for Pontic Greeks. Thus, we could see Generationenorte and Heimat as two complementing categories; both are at work in different forms in the same societies. Generationenorte describes sedentary forms of spatial organisation of social memory in families, which modernity seems not to have managed to make entirely obsolete, for instance in rural regions. It may disappear in its traditional appearance for the majority of the people, but it can also take on new forms. Similarly, Heimat may not only be seen as a product of two centuries of industrialisation and mass migration, but a spatial organisation form of memory of those who have left or their descendants.

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32 ibid., 62.
Cultural memory

Halbwachs had analysed cultural contexts in which remembrance becomes organised and structured and the connotations of the spatial frameworks more regulated. In contemporary society the professionals in the zone de l’activité technique uphold the collective memory of the profession that is inherited from previous generations of the trade, the notables of memory are authorised to recall legal memory, and the clergy of the Church take on specialised forms of interpretation in the religious collective memory. Halbwachs also demonstrated how, in early Christianity, the Gospel structured the dogma around topographic places in the Holy Land as a consolidating mnemonic, and how the creed was passed down to subsequent generations by rites and ceremonies performed by specialists in the Church administration. What Halbwachs described are stabilising processes of group memory that make it different from informal memory. It enters into what Jan Assmann describes as ‘the realm of traditions, transmissions, and transferences’. These aspects of Halbwachs’s work, and other phenomena of institutionalised and specialised memory, Aleida and Jan Assmann have subsumed under the term cultural memory. But despite Halbwachs’s efforts to describe situations of institutionalisation and transmission of memory within such milieus, he did not separate them from other, more informal kinds of collective memory.

So while Aleida and Jan Assmann credit Halbwachs for the communicative memory, they primarily attribute their theoretical conceptualisation of cultural memory to art historian Aby Warburg (1866–1929) and his concept of social memory. ‘To put their attempts into a concise formula’, Jan Assmann explains, ‘one could say that Warburg studied culture as a phenomenon of memory, and Halbwachs memory as a phenomenon of culture. Warburg is interested in the mnemonic formability [Gedächtnisförmigkeit] of culture, Halbwachs in the cultural shapability [Kulturgeprägtheit] of memory’. Inspired by the research on memory

34 See esp. Zone de l’activité technique et zone des relations personnelles, Topographie, Reproduction of spatial frameworks of memory, and Notables of memory in ch. 2.
conducted by biologist Richard Semon (1859–1918), Warburg would develop, although not in a rigorous and systematic manner, a conceptualisation of a cultural form of memory manifest in the art of different culture spheres. On the panels of the *Mnemosyne* project, named after the goddess of memory and mother of the nine muses in Greek antiquity, he mounted photographs of artwork from different periods, sometimes supplemented with contemporary illustrations and advertisements, to study the transmission of gestures of emotion from pagan antiquity to the Renaissance and into the present. For Warburg, the social memory addressed the issue of how that cultural inheritance was appropriated and administered. The artwork was loaded with ‘mnemische Energie’, mnemonic energy, which could be released at the sight or touch of it. In relation to baroque art, Warburg notes that ‘the task of social memory as a “mnemonic function” emerges quite clearly: through renewed contact with the monuments of the past, the sap should be enabled to rise directly from the subsoil of the past’.

Mental states were transported in the *pathos formulae* (*Pathosformeln*) of sculpture. For Warburg, art becomes a memory organ external to the body, in which *engrams* of experiences of suffering are stored. As exemplars, art transports the emotions as a form of gesture language, available for artists to access.

The engram was a term coined by Semon to refer to the biological changes in the brain caused by sensory stimuli. Thus, he believed the memory of an impression or an event was stored in hypothetical units of memory and could be retrieved from memory through processes of stimulus and response, which he called *ecphorisation*. Warburg transported this conceptualisation to art to suggest that the storage of emotional experience in visual symbols served the transmission of memory of cultural expression.

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40 Warburg quoted and translated in ibid., 245.

If Halbwachs provides Aleida and Jan Assmann with a comprehensive and systematic theory, Warburg’s conception of social memory is rather an intriguing collection of fragmentary thought, which they have turned into the systematic concept of cultural memory. Astrid Erll has suggested that Warburg’s ‘writings are more a quarry providing inspiration for subsequent scholars than the source of clear-cut theoretical concepts’, but that he managed to give ‘an example of how cultural memory can be approached via the level of material objects’. She also points out that, according to his dictum Der liebe gott steckt im Detail, God is in the detail, Warburg’s was interested in investigating artistic material in an inductive manner, not developing theory.

Two realms of the past
Because of its basis in the brain, communicative memory is vulnerable. According to Jan Assmann, studies in oral history have asserted that the living memory in illiterate and literate societies does not reach further back than about eighty years, or three to four generations. After that time, there will be no more living witnesses to an event. Already forty years after an event or period seems to be a critical threshold for the transmission of the experiences of eyewitnesses, as ‘those who have witnessed an important event as an adult will leave their future-oriented professional career, and will enter the age group in which memory grows as does the desire to fix it and pass it on’. Jan Assmann exemplifies this with Tacitus, who in the year 22 noted that the last person who had experienced the republic had died, and with the 1980s, forty years after Hitler’s persecution and annihilation of the Jews, which saw an increased activity to secure archive material and testimonies from survivors.

Jan Assmann refers to the ethnologist Jan Vansina and the floating gap, a concept that describes the phenomenon of the time period that extends beyond the eighty or so years in the past, which can no longer be captured through living witnesses, and which has not yet been secured for transmission to new generations. A break occurs, and what had previously circulated in the communicative memory is in need of being fixed. The floating gap, Jan Assmann points out, ‘is followed by textbooks and monuments, for example,

44 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 34.
45 ibid., 36.
the official version rather than myths of origin’. The relation to the past, beyond the floating gap, is essentially different from the self- and group-experienced communicative memory. He suggests distinguishing between two modes of memory: the identity-securing and foundational communicative memory, on the one side of the floating gap, and the institutionalised cultural memory, on the other. The latter does not actualise the past in the present, like the former does, but focuses on temporal fixed points; the past ‘tends to be condensed into symbolic figures to which memory attaches itself – for example, tales of the patriarchs, the Exodus, wandering in the desert, conquest of the Promised Land, exile – and that are celebrated in festivals and are used to explain current situations’. History and myth blend into a remembered rather than recorded history:

The Exodus, for instance, regardless of any historical accuracy, is the myth behind the foundation of Israel; thus it is celebrated at Pesach and thus it is part of the cultural memory of the Israelites. Through memory, history becomes myth. This does not make it unreal – on the contrary, this is what makes it real, in the sense that it becomes a lasting, normative, and formative power.48

In this process, the character of the cultural memory becomes sacred and it is no longer upheld through everyday activities, but sustained by ceremonies keeping the foundational myth alive in the present. The transition from communicative to cultural memory is a removal of memory from the everyday life and routine and an insertion of it into ceremonies and festivals. Jan Assmann explains that the polarity of the two kinds of memory is clearly distinguishable in certain societies, for example in ancient Egypt. In other societies, like our contemporary Western, he continues, it is rather the case of a sliding scale in which the two forms can be considered the extremes, where practices of memory cannot necessarily be ascribed to either of the two.

The latter point is crucial for the context of this study. For our purpose, in outlining a theory to address contemporary or recent historical cases, like that of the dispute over the Government Quarter in chapter six, the gradual scale

46 ibid., 37. There exist practices of memory that bridge the floating gap between the origin and the present, such as, for example, genealogies, which provide an unbroken link of succession. J Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 35. Halbwachs pointed to such a passage from an informal to an institutionalised form of collective memory in one of his analyses of religious memory in Christianity. Only after the last direct witnesses to Jesus’s acts were gone, and with them the possibility of verification, a body of doctrinal and legendary accounts was collected and constructed. M Halbwachs, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, ed. G Namer (1925; facs. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1994), 202–03. Cf. also the increasing specialisation of the clergy from the third and fourth centuries. Halbwachs, *Les Cadres sociaux*, 198.


48 ibid., 38.
between communicative and cultural memory needs to be recognised. They are not offered as two clear-cut categories, but as qualitative descriptions of informality and formality, in contact and sometimes overlapping.

Unlike the communicative memory, the cultural memory is not everyone’s property. It is guarded, or carried, by specialists like shamans, bards, priests, teachers, artists, scholars, etc. Its distribution is controlled and institutionalised, participation in it restricted.

In some cases, people must prove their competence (or their membership) by means of formal tests (as in classical China), or by mastering relevant forms of communication (e.g., from Greek in the Greco-Roman world, French in 18th-century Europe, to Wagner operas to be played on the piano at home). Meanwhile, others are excluded from such knowledge. In Jewish and Ancient Greek culture these ‘others’ included women; in the golden age of the educated middle classes, it was the lower strata of society that were left out.49

Jan Assmann refers to Halbwachs’s studies of early Christianity and how the clergy developed out of the laity to take on the role of interpreting the texts. By the fourth century the specialisation of memory transmission and dissemination had been embedded in tradition or the cultural memory.50 The specialists of the cultural memory become separated from everyday life and acquire a special status in society.

In Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model the cultural memory relates itself to a fixed and absolute past. But no memory can preserve the past. Like the communicative memory, the cultural memory reconstructs it according to frameworks of each contemporary society, just like Halbwachs had pointed out in relation to the collective memory. Furthermore, the cultural memory needs to be formed culturally.

As cultural memory is not biologically transmitted, it has to be kept alive through the sequence of generations. This is a matter of cultural mnemotechnics, that is, the storage, retrieval, and communication of meaning. These mnemotechnics guarantee continuity and identity, the latter clearly being a product of memory.51

The neurological basis of the communicative memory is exchanged for culture, ‘a complex of identity-shaping aspects of knowledge objectified in the symbolic forms of myth, song, dance, sayings, laws, sacred texts, pictures, ornaments, paintings, processional routes, or – as in the case of

49 ibid., 40.
50 ibid., 48–49; Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 198, 201.
51 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 72.
Edifices

Australians – even whole landscapes’. 52 Like Aleida and Jan Assmann have exemplified elsewhere, other symbolic manifestations include buildings, floor plans, monuments, or memory institutions like museums, libraries, and archives, in which linguistic and visual forms are embedded or organised according to set rules, to act as media for the cultural memory. 55

External frameworks of memory
To use ‘cultural memory’ to refer to the reminding function of a material artefact calls to mind similar ways of speaking, using nouns like ‘souvenir’ – French for ‘remember’ or ‘memento’ – Latin for ‘remember!’ . Kerwin Lee Klein suggests that contemporary scholars’ use of ‘memory’ to refer to artefacts is a revival of an older practice that has not been in general use since the eighteenth century. 54 It may appear counter-intuitive to associate artefacts – material as well as immaterial – with memory, since things are not memories and they do not have a memory faculty. 55

Like the communicative memory, the cultural memory refers to acts of making meaning of the past. While the communicative memory refers to unstructured and everyday remembering, the cultural memory denotes remembering in formalised settings in institutions, organisations, or societies. To refer to the domain of artefacts as cultural memory does not entail suggesting that a book, a painting, or a museum makes up a memory faculty like the human brain. It is not a metaphor either, Jan Assmann asserts in a response to criticism directed at the concept. Instead, he argues, it is a metonym ‘based on material contact between a remembering mind and a reminding object’. 56 In a similar manner as ‘the White House’ may be used to refer to the presidential administration of the United States, regarding

52 ibid., 73. The separation of certain forms of social remembrance under the term ‘cultural memory’ answers to some of the critique that has been directed at Halbwachs and the collective memory: ‘The use of a metaphor of individuality [in ‘collective memory’] conceals (a) the novelty of structures of the public sphere in culture, of materialised tradition, of accumulating symbol systems (“intelligent tools”), (b) the temporalisation of the environment through buildings of different ages, monuments [Denkmäler], street names, (c) the peculiar form of communication in myth and ritual, of art and historiography as the factual use of the past by society’. H Cancik, et al., Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe, ii (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1990), 311. My transl. Their critique is quite the opposite of the accusations of anthropomorphism and hypostatisation, rather a call to do so by differentiating the terminology.
55 Cf. the accusations of hypostatisation, anthropomorphism, and subjectivisation of memory in Halbwachs’s and Rossi’s work. See Critique of the collective memory in ch. 1 and Critique of the Rossian theory of memory and The afterlife of Halbwachian and Rossian theories of memory in ch. 4.
56 J Assmann, ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory [2008]’, 111.
material forms as ‘memory’ is a way of speaking that refers to the human cognitive acts engaged with the artefact. Reading, perceiving, or, in other ways, experiencing or comprehending artefacts semantically or symbolically is comparable to acts of remembrance.

Things do not ‘have’ a memory of their own, but they may remind us, may trigger our memory, because they carry memories which we have invested into them … On the social level, with respect to groups and societies, the role of external symbols becomes even more important because groups which, of course, do not ‘have’ a memory tend to ‘make’ themselves one by means of things meant as reminders.57

Erl is has lent them her support, just like Aleida and Jan Assmann came to Halbwachs’s help:

There is no such thing as a pre-cultural individual memory; but neither is there a Collective or Cultural Memory (with capital letters) which is detached from individuals and embodied only in media and institutions. Just as socio-cultural contexts shape individual memories, a ‘memory’ which is represented by media and institutions must be actualized by individuals, by members of a community of remembrance, who may be conceived of as points de vue (Maurice Halbwachs) on shared notions of the past. Without such actualizations, monuments, rituals, and books are nothing but dead material, failing to have any impact in societies.58

We have learnt from Halbwachs that in the collective memory, the part of it that Aleida and Jan Assmann refer to as communicative memory, memory images as well as the frameworks are entities of memory. In the reconstructive act the individual needs to actualise frameworks in memory in order to localise and make meaning of memories. A building in the spatial framework, conjured up in memory, may in this way come to remind us of earlier visits, of those who live or work there, or it may remind us of our historical memory of the changes to the building over time or historic events that took place there. By activating the spatial framework of memory, we can reconstruct the past. The remembering activity employs only what exists in memory.

We employ material artefacts in a similar way. Halbwachs refers to the material framework of the external environment as something essentially different from its representation in the spatial framework of memory. He suggests that in history and in religion both mind-internal and mind-external

57 ibid.
frameworks exist, which aid remembrance – the latter in the form of history books, interior arrangements of churches, liturgical objects, etc. In relation to the environment, Gérard Namer refers to this distinction by Halbwachs as the dual nature: on the one hand mental, on the other physical.\textsuperscript{59} I suggest transposing this dualism to frameworks of memory in general. I want to suggest that texts, paintings, museums, and city plans can be considered as frameworks of memory, instead of (cultural) memory by metonym.\textsuperscript{60} This may avoid accusations of hypostatising memory by referring to it as objects and steer clear of giving the impression that the past lies embedded in the dead material, instead of it being reconstructed in the act of recollection. With my suggestion I do not wish to replace Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model of understanding, but to offer one that may prove intuitively more accessible as well as more consistent with the model of mind-internal frameworks of memory, as postulated by Halbwachs. It moves the focus from what is inherent in the object to its catalytic role in acts of remembrance.

An advantage of the proposal is that it frees the material artefact from primarily being associated with cultural memory. In societies like the contemporary, material artefacts are, to a large degree, also employed in the realm of informal communicative memory. Internal spatial frameworks of memory may dominate the use in communicative memory; external frameworks are indispensable in cultural memory, but neither can be limited to only the one kind. In commemorative places and cultural heritage sites the material environment is employed for historical remembering and imagination by the laity as much as by the specialists, and the appointed notables of highly formalised remembering, like priests, lawyers, or scholars, need to employ internal spatial frameworks to at all be able to structure the learning and recall of canonical texts.

Referring to artefacts as frameworks of memory is to suggest that the frameworks are not only internal to the mind, but also exist outside of it and can be actualised by reading, seeing, or, in other ways, experiencing the object. Processes of communicative and cultural memory may, in this way, draw on both internal and external frameworks. When I write this text, or you read it, we may both refer to our memories and frameworks of the mind –


\textsuperscript{60} My proposal has a parallel in the term cultural frameworks proposed by Ann Rigney as an extension of Halbwachs’s social framework and to refer to group remembrance by means of lieux de mémoire, the ‘process whereby places, texts and artefacts become the focus of collective remembrance and historical meaning’. A Rigney, ‘Plenitude, Scarcity and the Circulation of Cultural Memory’, \textit{Journal of European Studies}, 35/1 (2005), 18. The development of the argument of this section has also benefitted from the critique and elaboration of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s concept cultural memory in J v Dijck, \textit{Mediated Memories in the Digital Age} (Stanford, SUP, 2007), 1–14.
writing and reading skills, language proficiency, and academic knowledge that we have acquired previously in order to formulate the text or make meaning out of it. But we may also refer to external frameworks – other books, dictionaries, or websites – which we can consult when certain arguments or references prompt us to seek more knowledge, or when there are words that we do not understand. The signs from the external frameworks of the artefacts amalgamate with the internal frameworks of our memory in the cognitive act of reading, giving rise to an experience of understanding, insight, or emotion. The act can be referred to as cultural remembrance, since it employs memory in the process. It is on this level that the form and materiality of the book, artwork, or building metonymically comes to denote the act that plays out in our mind. The external as well as internal frameworks become cognitive catalysts. On the level of institutions and professions, which can only rely on individual minds for a certain period of time, stable external frameworks of archives and libraries are paramount to supplementing the oral transmission of precepts and codes from one generation of specialists to the next, or from one cohort to another. It is with the distinction of architecture as both internal and external framework, employed for communicative as well as for cultural memory, that I adopt the Halbwachsian and Assmannian model of memory.

My suggestion to treat artefacts as frameworks of memory implies a different understanding of the role of specialists of the cultural memory than the one Jan Assmann has argued for. He follows Halbwachs in suggesting that the practice of cultural memory, like communicative memory, needs present frameworks of the group in order to interpret ‘the texts that no longer speak directly to that particular age, but have become to a degree alienated from the present’. Understanding has been given up in favour of interpretation, and the contemporary frameworks enable this interpretation. But Halbwachs also considered how material traces from the different pasts are employed in the processes of reconstruction on a similar level as the frameworks of the present. In relation to the rituals of collective religious memory in Christianity, he emphasises the duality between material and mental frameworks:

[The collective memory] does not preserve the past, but it reconstructs it, with the aid of material traces, rites, texts, and traditions left behind by that

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61 J Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 49.
past, but also with the aid of recent psychological and social factors, that is to say, with the present.  

Similarly, I would argue that the interpretation, in every period, depends and falls back on the materiality of these external frameworks. It is not entirely free to invent, but needs to return to the material artefacts and incorporate them in its construal. The reconstruction of the past presented by the specialists thus presents itself as an act of combining the influence offered by the contemporary internal frameworks of memory (language, society’s values, group-specific codes, etc.) and presently existing external frameworks of memory (historic or contemporary texts, buildings, artwork, etc.).

Like the cultural landmarks of Rossi’s *fatti urbani*, a building or other material environment may be seen as an external spatial framework that complements an internal framework. It comes to support informal and everyday remembrance in the family, the citizenry, or the national fellowship, but also the formal recollection by the notables of history, architectural history, religion, etc. They are salient points of the cultural fellowship – churches, museums, palaces, or places of commemoration. Recalling Halbwachs’s definition of the collective landmarks as points in the spatial framework that form associative intersections with other frameworks of memory, it is possible to regard the cultural landmarks as nodes in the internal and external spatial framework, where other frameworks of the communicative and cultural memory meet. Thus, the cultural landmarks are places where the informal and everyday memory of citizens becomes influenced by the authorised memory of the nation, of the religion, or of professions, through guided tours, brochures, and signs. In Halbwachs’s terms, it is where the general history permeates individual memory and becomes internalised into people’s historical memory. As I argued in chapter four, we ought to see the cultural landmark as the amalgamation of internal and external frameworks, the site of overlapping informal and formal remembering, and the spatial crossroads for other frameworks and gregarious collective memories.

Functional memory and storage memory

Whereas the separation of collective memory and written history is central to Halbwachs’s theory of memory, most explicitly formulated in *La Mémoire collective*, in their formulation of the cultural memory Aleida and Jan

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63 Cf. *Cultural landmarks* in ch. 4.
64 Cf. *Collective landmarks* in ch. 2.
Cultural memory and external frameworks

Assmann replace the dichotomy with a different model.\(^5\) Abandoning the idea that writing history can be free from memory work – interpretation, partiality, and identification – they suggest that the pair memory–history should instead be referred to as inhabited memory–uninhabited memory. Thus, Aleida Assmann sees Halbwachs’s model as a distinction between memory that is connected to a group or an institution and memory that is free from a specific carrier; between one that bridges past, present, and future, and one that splits past from present and future.\(^6\) It is the difference between, on the one hand, one that determines what to remember and what to forget in order to provide values and to support identity and norms, and, on the other, one that is interested in everything, seeking to establish truth and suspending norms and values. Instead of a clear polarisation of two contradictory realms, Aleida Assmann proposes a perspectival model of two complementary modes of cultural memory: the inhabited functional memory (Funktionsgedächtnis) and the uninhabited storage memory (Speichergedächtnis). The former relates to the group; it is selective, normative, and future-oriented. In the foreground, the functional memory of a nation, a Church, or a profession actualises a small fraction of the total possible memory. The functional memory comprises canonised texts or works of art, ‘which are destined to be repeatedly reread, appreciated, staged, performed, and commented’.\(^7\) Space and attention are limited in the curricula of schools and universities, in the number of commemorative days in the calendar, and in the canons of religion, literature, or art.\(^8\) Carefully selected and administered by authorised institutions like universities, museums, or libraries, the forefront of the cultural memory serves to distinguish the group from others and to promote cultural fellowship. The latter, Aleida Assmann explains, includes

that which has lost its living relevance to the present. This ‘memory of past memories’ is what I would like to call ‘storage memory.’ We are all familiar with the continuous process of disposal of forgetting, the irretrievable loss from generation to generation of valued knowledge and live experiences. But not all is lost forever; a small segment is assembled and preserved in cultural archives, and it is possible for historical knowledge to reclaim some of these

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\(^{6}\) A Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization*, 123. Assmann also refers to Friedrich Nietzsche and Pierre Nora as proponents of an oppositional model of memory–history.


\(^{8}\) Cf. Jan Assmann’s introduction to the notion of canon, its history and definitions: J Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 78–110.
Edifices

disembodied relics and abandoned materials and perhaps even reconnect them with the functional dimension of cultural memory.\textsuperscript{69}

It is in the background that all bits and pieces, currently unused or meaningless, can be found, ‘de-contextualized and disconnected from their former frames which had authorized them or determined their meaning’.\textsuperscript{70} Archives and stores hold this reservoir that could be used in historical scholarship and future alterations of the functional memory. Aleida Assmann points out that the two modes can be seen in relation to the structural role of frameworks, in the sense of Halbwachs. While the storage memory contains the unframed and unreconstructed, the functional memory places the bits and pieces in relation to the frameworks, thus establishing meaning and memory. She summarises:

On the cultural level, storage memory contains what is unusable, obsolete, or dated; it has no vital ties to the present and no bearing on identity formation. We may also say that it holds in store a repertoire of missed opportunities, alternative options, and unused material. Functional memory, on the other hand, consists of vital recollections that emerge from a process of selection, connection, and meaningful configuration; they are – in Halbwachs’s terms – culturally framed. In functional memory, unstructured, unconnected fragments are invested with perspective and relevance; they enter into connections, configurations, compositions of meaning – a quality that is totally absent from storage memory.\textsuperscript{71}

The distinction between functional and storage memory is the distinction between active and passive. If the functional memory remembers, the storage memory forgets, but only for the time being. It is a suspended remembrance, not a total loss of memory. Irreversible forgetting, Aleida Assmann shows, is due to neglect or disregard or to more active destruction of memory, as was the case in regimes like those of Hitler and Stalin, which attempted to eradicate the traces of certain cultures, periods, or phenomena of the past. Hence, the storage memory is situated somewhere between forgetting and remembering.

Elena Esposito suggests exchanging ‘functional memory’ and ‘storage memory’ with the terms ‘Erinnerung’ (approximately ‘recollection’) and ‘Gedächtnis’ (approximately ‘memory’).\textsuperscript{72} While the former denotes active reconstruction, the latter, as a faculty, refers to the dynamics between

\textsuperscript{69} A Assmann, \textit{Cultural Memory and Western Civilization}, 124.
\textsuperscript{70} A Assmann, ‘Canon and Archive’, 99.
\textsuperscript{71} A Assmann, \textit{Cultural Memory and Western Civilization}, 127. Assmann’s emphasis.
remembering and forgetting. To do this, the conceptual pair can include the essential aspect of forgetting in memory. Literary societies, for example, Esposito argues, actively forget by transferring memory to texts, thereby increasing the possible amount of remembrance and making reconstruction of the past increasingly a question of localisation and retrieval.\footnote{Cf. also Esposito in \textit{Explicit and implicit spatial frameworks} in this chapter.} The advantage of referring to \textit{Erinnerung} and \textit{Gedächtnis} instead of functional and storage memory, Jan Assmann asserts, in acknowledgement of Esposito’s proposal, is that

This dichotomy could be operative on an individual as well as on a collective level of the dynamics of memory. Memory \([\text{Gedächtnis}]\) would then be a faculty, always also encompassing the unconscious and the implicit and the pluralistically and heterogeneously organised, which operates through acts of remembrance and forgetting \([\text{Akten des Erinnerns und Vergessens}]\); remembrance \([\text{Erinnerung}]\), on the other hand, is their respective functionalisation.\footnote{J Assmann, ‘Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: eine Replik’, \textit{Erwägen Wissen Ethik}, 13/2 (2002), 276. My transl.}

In this study I will employ the terms functional memory and storage memory, while keeping in mind the considerations of Esposito and Jan Assmann. Referring to them as \textit{Erinnerung} and \textit{Gedächtnis}, or any appropriate English translation of the words, I believe, risks confusing the specific concepts of more general terms. Functional memory and storage memory, at least in the humanities, are idiosyncratic terms, easy to recognise in their specificity.

\textit{Tasks of functional memory and storage memory}

Aleida Assmann points to three of the tasks the functional memory has to perform: legitimisation, delegitimisation, and distinction. Quite different from Halbwachs who, on the whole, avoided the topic, she asserts that power and memory are closely connected, and rulers aim to control the past and its commemoration in the present. The selection of traces of the past in the shaping of the functional memory creates a historical genealogy that legitimises current power structures. ‘The problem with this official memory’, Aleida Assmann contends, ‘lies in the fact that it depends on censorship and coerced rites of commemoration. It lasts as long as the power that it supports. It drives out any unofficial remembrance that might present itself as a critically subversive functional memory’.\footnote{A Assmann, \textit{Cultural Memory and Western Civilization}, 128.} The second task of the functional memory is delegitimisation. While regimes actively allow themselves to forget, thus withdrawing some parts of the past from
circulation, the opposition attempts to revitalise that which has been forgotten in order to delegitimise the existing rule, to move the forgotten traces from the storage memory into the functional memory.

A fairly recent example of delegitimizing memory is the commemoration in 1989 of Imre Nagy, who was Prime Minister of Hungary in 1956 when the Soviet troops moved in to crush the uprising, and who was subsequently executed. His memory had been erased from the history books by the Communist regime and carefully kept out of the public eye. But it could not be extinguished, and indeed its exclusion only made it all the more solid. In 1989 a group of dissidents staged a symbolic funeral, initially at a cemetery in Paris; but the same year they reburied their hero with full ceremonial honors and mass media coverage at the cemetery in Budapest. Imre Nagy now became the symbolic figure of counter-memory and a decisive influence on the process of de-Stalinization in Hungary.76

The counter-memory thus anticipates a redefinition of functional memory that will come into play once those currently in power lose their influence. The third function is the creation and support of identities and the distinction of the group from other groups. It aims at constructing a collective identity for all members of the group with shared references. Aleida Assmann exemplifies this with the national movements that reconstructed or invented traditions in nineteenth-century Europe to provide ‘the people’ of the emerging nation states with identities.77

These aspects of the functional memory and the storage memory will become important elements of the study in chapter six. Legitimisation and delegitimisation, and the struggle for influence over cultural interpretation, turn out to be some of the central mechanisms in the dispute over the memory connected to the Government Quarter in Oslo. Thus, I will emphasise the importance of Aleida Assmann’s analysis for the assessment of political and ideological forces acting out on society’s different spatial frameworks of memory.

The task of the storage memory, Aleida Assmann continues, is to provide a reservoir for future functional memories. It is fundamental for all cultural renewal and change and remains the corrective for the functional memory of any society. ‘If the borders between functional memory and storage memory remain permeable, elements can be exchanged, patterns of meaning can be altered, and even the general framework can be restructured’.78 In totalitarian

76 ibid., 128–29.
77 ibid., 129.
78 ibid., 130.
regimes the border may be closed, preventing alternatives, criticism, and contradictions from surfacing. They miss the vital role of contextualisation and critique for the functional memory. Aleida Assmann emphasises that also the storage memory needs its supporters; it is no more natural or spontaneous than functional memory; it needs to be supported by institutions that preserve, conserve, organize, open up, and circulate cultural knowledge. Archives, museums, libraries, and memorial sites all play their part in this task, as do research institutes and universities, by resisting the automatic expulsion of the past from everyday memory just as they resist its deliberate exclusion from the functional memory. These institutions have a special license to relieve memory of its direct social usages.79

The storage memory thus requires an institutional and architectural infrastructure. How this spatiality is organised, and which role it takes in relation to societal remembering, will be the focus of a later part of this chapter, The spatial frameworks of cultural memory.

Spatial frameworks of the cultural memory
Leaning on the principle of placement in the art of memory, as described by Frances Yates, in Halbwachs’s study of the topography of the Holy Land in the Gospel and in Nora’s conception of les lieux de mémoire, Jan Assmann asserts the importance of placement for the cultural memory.80 Only that which has a place in memory can be passed on. A-topos, placelessness, is the status of that which does not pass the censorship in the transcendence from the communicative to the cultural memory.81 As Nora has shown, places need not be physical, but can equally be places in a figurative sense: places for the mind. Just like Halbwachs before him, he makes clear that even when we speak of topographical places, we generally refer to our concept of them. As lieux de mémoire, Verdun or the Eiffel Tower are really not so different from the Marseillaise; they are predominantly cultural conceptualisations and memory intersections that can hardly be reduced only to their physical properties.82 Places are paramount to the cultural memory, both in their

79 ibid.
80 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 44.
82 Gérôme Truc has suggested translating lieux de mémoire as nodes of memory, suggesting their non-spatial and intersecting character, which brings the term closer to the understanding of collective landmarks (Halbwachs) or cultural landmarks. G Truc, ‘Memory of Places and Places of Memory: For a Halbwachsian Socio-ethnography of Collective Memory’, International Social Science Journal, /203–204 (2012), 156 n. 4.
material form and in their mental form. In the following sections I will elaborate some of the ways in which I, with Aleida and Jan Assmann, see architecture and landscapes take the roles of frameworks of the cultural memory, as internal and/or external spatial frameworks. These are, in essence, elaborations and supplements to the ways in which Halbwachs regarded the use of the spatial framework of memory and, thereby, contributions to the expansion of the scope of the concept.

Explicit and implicit spatial frameworks of memory

When we enter into the realm of cultural memory, the specifics of form in architecture and in cities takes on an importance that Halbwachs has only briefly addressed in his study of the collective memory. The appearance of the materiality becomes key to some of the kinds of remembrance that make use of the surroundings as framework. In this respect, places and buildings are employed on at least two levels in the processes of cultural memory. On the first level, a building, for example a nineteenth-century museum, may have been intended by the architect as an architectural object displaying the style of its time or features characteristic of its typology, etc. Its plans, façades, and ornamentation prompt the visitor’s knowledge of the style and period in the history of architecture. As a framework of memory it displays intentional architectural form. In Jan Assmann’s words, it is ‘accentuated by signs’.

Moreover, the museum architecture may show signs of ageing that were not conceived in the original creation, for example in the form of weathering, alterations, or ruination. Like we shall see in chapter six, the splinters of the bomb that went off in the Government Quarter in Oslo caused damage to parts of the materiality and scarred otherwise intact building parts. The building displays markers of age, of events that have taken place, and of maintenance, and by the sight of it the visitor may recall events in history or

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84 J Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 44. His emphasis.
just reflect over time that has passed. These are also accentuations by signs, but signs that were not intended at the time of conception. Like the intended signs, however, they are explicit in the physical form. Both the intended and unintended signs are possible to survey and record in drawings, photographs, models, etc. These visible marks act as tokens of passed time and of the course of events. They are indexes pointing to historical or art historical memory of individuals and groups or to written history in books and archives.

On the second level, places can also be assigned the role of a medium of memory without expressing it in their form. Jan Assmann says they are ‘raised to the status of signs, that is, they are semiotized’. The materiality of the landscape of the Holy Land does not reveal to the disciples the life of Jesus through its materiality, but it acts as a cultural mnemonic for the community, structuring and cuing the dogma of Jesus’s life. The museum, similarly, may take on the role of a setting associated with events and periods in art history or in the history of the nation, without it being expressed architecturally. The cues for memory are not visible in the physical configuration and are not possible to record graphically in the same manner for the place that is ‘raised to the status of signs’ as for the place that is ‘accentuated by signs’. Both levels, however, arguably point to memories that lie beyond the form of the materiality itself, which cannot be reconstructed without other interpretative frameworks, internal or external, actualised in the remembering mind. These may consist in pre-existing and internal frameworks of history, politics, or architectural history, or in external frameworks of photographs, history books, books on the history of architecture, professional experience, etc., in order to decipher and enlarge what one sees.

On the two levels – the material or imagined architecture accentuated by signs as well as that raised to the status of signs – the building takes on the role of a spatial framework which, together with the temporal and social frameworks, enables the group to structure and reconstruct the past. I suggest calling the museum in the first example, ‘accentuated by signs’, an explicit spatial framework of memory. Correspondingly, the second example, the museum ‘raised to the status of signs’, can be referred to as an implicit spatial framework of memory.

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framework of memory.\textsuperscript{86} As is the case for many sites of the cultural memory, the environment often acts as both an implicit and explicit framework, as an invisible as well as a visible index to the cultural memory. In such cases, it may be useful to speak of implicit and explicit aspects of the spatial framework.

\textit{An art of cultural memory}

I have elsewhere suggested calling a metalevel of the spatial frameworks of cultural memory an \textit{art of cultural memory}.\textsuperscript{87} The term alludes to the classical art of memory, which employed mental representations of buildings and streets to organise and help recall the contents of speeches or the details of a court case, and to Aleida and Jan Assmann’s concept cultural memory. By an art of cultural memory I understand the role architecture is assigned as a spatial mnemonic for scholars, librarians, and archivists in their work with organising, localising, and accessing external frameworks of the cultural memory – books, documents, artwork, specimen. As an external spatial framework, it primarily structures the search and maintenance of collections of material artefacts, but doubles as a memorisable spatiality that can help the specialist to remember the order of the collection, the order of the frameworks. It is a highly specific spatial framework that points to other external frameworks. Its spatial devices include the layout of floor plans and sectioning of museums, libraries, or archives, the division of rooms and systems of display and storage – vitrines, shelves, filing cabinets, and card indexes.

The plan and ornamentation of the museum, as an \textit{explicit} spatial framework, may help us to identify the building as of a particular period or style. For the art historian, additionally, each building, room, or wall may also point to the frameworks of other documentation; individual artefacts like paintings, photographs, drawings, texts, or classificatory aggregates like periods, oeuvre, discourses, etc. can be consulted in the act of cultural remembrance that involves the museum. Similarly, on the \textit{implicit} level, the spatial order structures the other frameworks. In the museum, a particular hall may be assigned a certain artist or period, and the curator can structure his

\textsuperscript{86} Sébastien Marot has sketched a comparable distinction for architecture and urbanism of ‘literal memory’ (conservation, monuments) – approximately corresponding to the explicit spatial framework of memory and ‘phenomenal memory’ (for places where there are few or no visible traces of the past) – analogous to the implicit framework. S Marot, \textit{Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory} (London, AA, 2003) [Fr. orig., ‘L’Art de la mémoire, le territoire et l’architecture’ (1999)], [85–86].

knowledge of previous hangs and of the artist’s paintings, but he may also bring to mind collections, catalogues, and literature concerning the artist.

The collective landmarks in the spatial framework of memory, as Halbwachs defined them, are points where different frameworks of the collective memory intersect. In chapter two I exemplified this by reference to his account of trying to recall whether he had stayed at his mother’s or at his in-laws’ when he went to Paris to take part in exams the previous year.88 His relatives’ homes took the role of topographical crossroads in his spatial framework of Paris, overlapping with notable points of reference in the social framework of his family (his mother and in-laws) and temporal framework of his familial and professional life (the annual exams, the period of illness of A.). I also suggested labelling cultural landmarks those salient points in the spatial framework of cultural memory that act as crossroads for internal and external frameworks and for communicative and cultural memory.89 The architectural spaces in the art of cultural memory can be referred to as second-degree cultural landmarks. They are effective systems of densely organised landmarks, each of which carry indexes pointing to other external frameworks of the cultural memory. In the museum, the halls are landmarks for artists, periods, or schools; in the library, the shelves structure the art history literature, a spatial logic based on the system of order in the library catalogue; and in the storages, the oeuvre of the artist is tightly packed, but easily retrievable.

The architecture of the museum, the library, and the archive is positioned somewhere in between a concrete organisation of collections of material objects and a memory system of abstract knowledge orders, at the same time spatial and epistemological. The arrangement of the artefact or the specimen in the building could be seen as a pre-ordered system of memorisable loci, or places, to be internalised into the spatial framework employed in the art of cultural memory. Implicitly conveying ordering principles of knowledge, the spatial order organises a realm of cultural memory that stretches far beyond its specific collection.

As the metalevel of the spatial framework of cultural memory, the second-degree cultural landmark supports an advanced mnemotechnic, developed in specialist and scholarly practices to structure larger taxonomies. It is the technique of making classifications spatial. In Germany, such practices are studied under the term räumliche Wissensordnungen (spatial orders of

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88 Cf. Collective landmarks in ch. 2.
89 Cf. Cultural landmarks in ch. 4 and External frameworks of memory in this chapter.
knowledge).\textsuperscript{90} Such mnemotechnics, Esposito has argued, are the results of a historic development towards relegating memory to books and artefacts instead of memorising them. She refers to the use of documents to ‘archive’ memory as a parallel augmentation of the ability to remember and the ability to forget.\textsuperscript{91} The documents ‘archive’ the contents of memory and allow us to forget them as long as there exist techniques to find them again – through references, keywords, classifications, markers, or spatial orders. The mind is freed from memorising facts, Esposito points out, allowing the activation of other abilities and leading to a more effective and abstract approach to administering the past. In the art of cultural memory, ordered forgetting enables remembering more by means of the structured use of spatial frameworks. In this way, the art of cultural memory doubles as an art of cultural forgetting.

Spatial frameworks of functional and storage memory
The architectural infrastructure of the functional and storage memory provides additional distinctions to the spatial framework of cultural memory. On the one end of the perspectival gamut, the functional memory is performed in commemorative sites, in open-air museums, in exhibition halls of museums, on stages of theatres, in ceremonial spaces of the nation, and in TV and radio studios. On the other end, specialists cater to the upkeep of the storage memory in archives, storages, libraries, museums, and conservation studios. Also seemingly forgotten traces are administrated as a form of archive; the sites of not yet excavated remains from earlier societies are registered and regulated by law, so as not to be destroyed when new roads or buildings are planned.

The nineteenth-century museum is a cultural memory institution that acts as a spatial framework both for the functional memory and for the storage memory.\textsuperscript{92} The halls of permanent or temporary exhibitions pass on and revise the functional memory. Pedagogical ordering into schools, artists,

\textsuperscript{90} For an introduction, see e.g. R Felfe & K Wagner, \textit{Museum, Bibliothek, Stadtraum: Räumliche Wissensordnungen 1600–1900} (Berlin, LIT, 2010). In their contribution to the volume, Jeanne Pfeiffer and Raymond-Josué Seckel argue that for the arrangement of the library of aforementioned Aby Warburg (the attributed forefather of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s concept cultural memory), ‘The aim of Warburg was to design a spatial disposition (arrangement) that enables the free circulation from one department to another and unite them in a route denied by any disciplinary classification. For him, the objective was to fabricate an agreement between the series of thought within the arrangement of books and the physical route through the four floors of the building’. J Pfeiffer & R-J Seckel, ‘Der Grundriss der Bibliothek, oder wie der Raum die Konzeption des Kataloges bestimmt’, in R Felfe & K Wagner (eds), \textit{Museum, Bibliothek, Stadtraum: Räumliche Wissensordnungen 1600–1900} (Berlin, LIT, 2010), 84–85. My transl.

\textsuperscript{91} Esposito, ‘Eine Erinnerung an das Vergessen’, 248.

\textsuperscript{92} This argument is based on my study of the Norwegian national gallery. Ekman, ‘Architecture for the Nation’s Memory’, 152–54.
genres, or periods circulates and supports identity-promoting distinctions of regional, national, or Western art. In the basements or back rooms, or in other buildings, the specialists of the archives, libraries, storages, and conservation studios maintain, organise, and research the storage memory. In these activities elements repeatedly move from the spaces of the functional memory to those of the storage memory, and back again.

Memorial, historical, or heritage sites can also be seen to furnish a community with a spatial framework both for the storage memory and for the functional memory. As a site of storage memory, the materiality can be trawled for informative traces, which can be used by archaeologists and historians to reconstruct an understanding of the past. As a site of functional memory, it may be assigned messages and symbols with the purpose of influencing a collective identity, for example architectural monuments or statues of prominent historic persons. The latter may be explicit frameworks that display memory cues in their material form, like the sites just mentioned, or form implicit frameworks, where memories have been linked to an existing materiality.

*Receptive places – Erinnerungsorte*

Discontinuation of the use of a site of the group’s spatial framework of communicative memory is a change from *Generationenorte*, or other environments employed actively as frameworks of the memory of communities or cultural groups, to *Erinnerungsorte*. The *Erinnerungsort*, so Aleida Assmann explains, corresponds to the end of engagement with the place by the groups that dominated it, due to abandonment or the destruction or dispersal of the group. The remains constitute a place open to the construction of meaning.  

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93 Meusburger, Heffernan, and Wunder have lucidly summarised the struggles of function memory in such places: ‘political regimes and elites seek to control the distribution of emblematic images in public space. Some places are more visible, prestigious, frequented, or symbolically significant than others. To be effective, mnemonic devices need to be specifically designed and deliberately located to channel public attention to certain events and interpretations and, crucially, to prevent future generations from ever even becoming aware of selected historical events. In this sense all memorials are simultaneously about remembering and forgetting … Like a well-conceived theater set, a successful commemorative landscape spotlights only certain parts of the scene, leaving some actors and events obscure. Jubilee celebrations and rituals of intimidation alike are staged at prominent public venues with the aim of impressing people, achieving a collective catharsis, demonstrating the superiority of a given political idea, revealing the powerlessness of individuals and groups, and eliciting emotions favourable to those in power’. P Meusburger, et al., ‘Cultural Memories: an Introduction’, in P Meusburger et al. (eds), *Cultural Memories: The Geographical Point of View* (Dordrecht, Springer, 2011), 9.

94 With regard to the translation of the term *Erinnerungsorte*, see *The works and translations of Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann* in the Introduction. Aleida Assmann has used the term with slightly different connotations throughout the book. I will not use it as an open, general term, but with one specific meaning:
In order to survive and to be relevant, a story that replaces [supplementär ersetzt] the lost milieu must be told. Places of memory [Erinnerungsorte] are dispersed fragments of a lost or destroyed way of life [Lebenszusammenhang]. With the abandonment and destruction of a place, its history is not yet over; it holds on to material relics, which become the elements of narration and therefore again reference points of a new cultural memory. Such places, however, require explanation; their significance must be secured through linguistic transmission.95

It is the material remains that characterise Erinnerungsorte. Different than intentional monuments, commemorative places, and commemorative rituals, they do not carry symbolic value, but only point to themselves as archaeological and historical evidence, ready to be construed.96 It has no living bond to collective memories; its only path to the past is via the materiality or through other historical sources. The Erinnerungsort is open for appropriation, to become a framework of a cultural memory. It exhibits architectural features or signs of time, but it has not yet been formed into an explicit spatial framework of cultural memory.97 In the vocabulary of this study, Erinnerungsorte stands out as the only term that specifically refers to the materiality. It is a materiality that is available to interpretation and meaning making.

Aleida Assmann argues that when there is absolutely no connection to the past, such as in the cases of complete destruction of entire physical and social environments of Jewish culture by the Nazi regime, it is not the case of an Erinnerungsort, but of vergessen der Orte, forgetting of places.98 A topographical point in a landscape or a city that carries no material traces, the place itself cannot remember. Only through remains can it remind or trigger curiosity. Plaques, photographs, or commemorative acts must compensate for the absence, if such sites should be able to serve as a framework of cultural memory. It needs other frameworks in the act of memory – books, recorded interviews, drawings, documents, etc. Only then can they be ‘raised to the

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96 A Assmann, Erinnerungsräume, 337. In this example, Erinnerungsorte is translated as ‘sites of memory’: A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 321.
97 Nora has suggested a similar difference between lieux d’histoire and lieux de mémoire, places of history and places of memory: ‘To begin with, there must be a will to remember. If we were to abandon this criterion, we would quickly drift into admitting virtually everything as worthy of remembrance … Without the intention to remember, lieux de mémoire would be indistinguishable from lieux d’histoire’. Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, 19.
98 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 310.
status of signs’ and turned into an implicit spatial framework of cultural memory.

**Imaginative places – antëische Magie**

A phenomenon that reminds of the *mémoire involontaire* of places described in chapter two, Aleida Assmann has described as _antëische Magie_, antaec magic. Just like the former spontaneously cues autobiographical memories at the return to places one has left behind, the latter supports the imagination of the past by visits to historic places, where we have learnt that important events took place or famous people lived. It is an act of cultural remembrance of the individual: ‘the longer the way through historical time, so it can be summarised, the more vivid the imaginative interest in shortcuts, immediate touch, and direct contact’. She refers to it as our expectation that the sensory involvement with the materiality of historic sites will intensify the experience of the past, provided we have already learnt about its history.

Aleida Assmann speaks of Marcus Tullius Cicero, one of the theorists of the art of memory in Roman antiquity, who testified to the imaginative value of places for the structuring of memory. In _On Moral Ends_, Cicero tells of his visit to the academy in Athens, a few years after the city had been sacked and plundered:

> We arrived at the Academy’s justly famous grounds to find that we had the place to ourselves, as we had hoped. Piso then remarked: ‘I cannot say whether it is a natural instinct or a kind of illusion, but when we see the places where we are told that the notables of the past spent their time, it is far more moving than when we hear about their achievements or read their writings … Such is the evocative power that locations possess. This is how I am affected right now. I think of Plato, who they say was the first philosopher to have regularly held discussions here. Those little gardens just nearby not only bring Plato to mind, but actually seem to make him appear before my eyes. Here come Speusippus, Xenocrates and his pupil Polemo, who sat on that very seat we can see over there. Even when I look at our own Senate-house … I often think of Scipio, Cato, Laelius and above all my grandfather. Such is the evocative power that locations possess. No wonder the training of memory [the art of memory] is based on them.’

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99 Cf. _Remember other things_ in ch. 2. ibid., 163. I will draw on a few different texts in which Aleida Assmann has sketched out the term. Cf. n. 83.


Similarly, Aleida Assmann relates to the experiences of visiting historic places in Italy recounted by Petrarch in the fourteenth century – ‘while we wandered not only in the city [Rome] itself but around it, at each step there was present something that would excite our tongue and mind: here was the palace of Evander, there the shrine of Carmentis, here the cave of Cacus …’\(^{102}\) – and by the sixteenth-century humanist Justus Lipsius:

A special emphasis is on the eyes, which in this case are the only true guides to knowledge. [In Italy] you will set not set foot anywhere or turn your eye, without coming upon some monument or acquiring the memory of some ancient custom, some old story … When those great men enter not only into the mind but almost into the eye, while we step on the ground on which they themselves so often trod.\(^{103}\)

A temporal organisation of the past is made spatial; chronology is transformed into a topology of history, in a manner reminiscent of the art of memory. The written tradition, Aleida Assmann explains, ‘is brought to vivid life by … autopsy; the spiritual legacy of the past becomes accessible to the senses through the informed eye’.\(^{104}\) Aleida Assmann describes the distinction between the appropriation of a historical past by reading and by sensory experience, respectively, as the mediated and linguistic continuity of texts and the immediate and symbolic contiguity of images. She also recognises the distinction in the writings of nineteenth-century jurist and anthropologist Jakob Johann Bachofen, who distinguishes between two roads to knowledge,

the longer, slower, more arduous road of rational combination and the shorter path of the imagination, traversed with the force and swiftness of electricity. Aroused by direct contact with the ancient remains, the imagination grasps the truth at one stroke, without intermediary links. The knowledge acquired in this second way is infinitely more living and colorful than the products of the understanding.\(^{105}\)

Aby Warburg similarly distinguishes between the two ways to knowledge, suggesting that engagement with antique sculptures facilitates a ‘visual

\(^{102}\) Letter of April 1341 from Francesco Petrarca to Giovanni Collonna. Quoted in A Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization*, 294. My abbrev.

\(^{103}\) Letter of 3 April, 1578 from Justus Lipsius to Philippe de Cannoy. Quoted in ibid., 293. My abbrev.

\(^{104}\) ibid.

revival of the memory matter’. According to Aleida Assmann, it was Warburg who proposed the term *antëische Magie* in order to describe the ‘discharge of latent memories released by direct contact’. It refers to the Greek myth in which Heracles wrestled the giant Antaeus, son of Poseidon and Mother Earth. As long as the giant would remain in physical contact with the Earth, his mother, he would gain new strength and be unbeatable. Heracles eventually defeated him by lifting him up in the air, separating him from his life-giving mother. The motif of Hercules lifting Antaeus has been frequently reproduced in art since antiquity and Warburg used the motif in his image panels, for example in the Mnemosyne Atlas.

Transferred to the built environment, Aleida Assmann understands *antëische Magie* as the way we ascribe historic sites the capacity to make the past tangible for us. We seek in historic places an intensification of experience different from the historical facts we learn in books or in school. Trips to buildings, towns, and landscapes of historical significance or curiosity, find their reward in the site-bound *antëische Magie*. Aleida Assmann describes it as the ancient, inner willingness of pilgrims and Grand tour tourists to strengthen historical knowledge through subjective experience. She argues that contemporary equivalents can be found in site-bound museums, commemorative places, and documentation centres; through sensory tangibility, affective coloration and appropriation, we expect them to deepen our insight into the past and the remembering of historical facts. If the histories we have learnt lose the ground that testifies to them, if the site is cleared from traces, it would imply that the history of the site could lose its earth-bound potency and suffer a fate similar to that of the giant Antaeus, who lost his strength when lifted from the ground. In the eyes of the community that maintains history, the ground of the Erinnerungsordt indeed possesses powers as an evocative structure for the imagination.

Upon arriving at a site, the perceptual input from the materiality establishes a link to the historical memory we have brought with us or which we acquire at the site: in the mind, the spatial percept overlays the spatial framework of

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107 A Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization*, 163. In none of the texts where she discusses the concept does she give a reference to where Warburg used the term originally. I have not been able to identify the source.

memory. I am tempted to borrow Halbwachs’s thought on what happens when we experience the *mémoire involontaire* (Proust) upon returning to places where we have not been for a long time and read it in the context of historical memory, not autobiographical memory:

But from where does this kind of sap come that makes certain memories swell up and gives them an appearance of real life? Is it the former life conserved in them, or is it not rather a new life, which we communicate to them, a borrowed life, drawn from the present, and which lasts only so long as the passing overexcitement or our immediate affective disposition? … Well, through a mutual exchange, our reconstructed images borrow present emotions of this feeling of reality, which it in our eyes makes into existent objects, while the sense of presence, through these connections to the images, comes to identify itself with the feelings that once accompanied the objects.¹⁰⁹

Does a similar phenomenon also take place if the events that took place were not our own, but events from history? Naturally, they are emotionally coloured, no matter whether they stem from exciting childhood adventures of medieval kings or from the disturbing learning of the Holocaust. Is there also, in such cases, a mutual exchange, where ‘the reconstructed images’ of the past ‘borrow present emotions of this feeling of reality’ of the historic environment before our eyes? The internal spatial framework is altered by the percept; at the same time, the spatial framework that we bring with us informs our perception and overlays it with our historical imagination. It is an external framework that we perceive, but the interpretation of the material signs is based on the existing frameworks of our minds – spatial, social, linguistic, and historical. The percept vivifies our historical knowledge and adds to memory our own experience of having been on the site. At the same time, the knowledge lends significance to the materiality. The amalgamation of external and internal spatial frameworks seems to trigger the imagination to stage in mind scenes of history against the architectural backdrop.

We could compare this to the discussion of vital and pathological permanences in the last chapter.¹¹⁰ The historical imagination of the *antëische Magie* is present in both kinds of *fatti urbani* – in the vital, where history is imagined through present life activities that take place there, and the pathological, where the history of the site is approached at an emotional distance, for example in sites that have been turned into museums. The former site is characterised by its informal, unorganised character of memory. The visitor, or the person who sustains a relation to the site on a day-to-day

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¹¹⁰ See *Permanences* in ch. 4.
basis, imagines freely. The latter, the pathological permanences, are institutionalised and controlled. Historical remembering may here only take place according to given rules; opening hours, guided tours, leaflets, postcards, or audio guides direct the attention of the visitor. The histories of place are selected; they belong to the functional memory of national history or of the society that maintains the sites. Understood as two distinctions of the antëische Magie, we may take them not only to refer to sites in cities that have existed for a long time, but to any site that the group ascribes historic events to or where relics indicate previous cultural activity. While vital sites of antëische Magie have their seat in the remembering of individuals and informal groups, the pathological are the places where the unstructured imagination meets the edifying cultural memory.

**Affirmative places – Gedenkorte**

In the study of French national remembering, Pierre Nora has investigated how national fellowships concretise in what he calls the lieu de mémoire, the site of memory, a ‘significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community’. 111 As I have already mentioned, in the twentieth century, according to Nora, the lieux de mémoire replaced the milieux de mémoire; these real environments of memory are exchanged for an institutionalised culture of history and remembrance. 112 Without the living memory bound to such places, what remains is the embodiment of a barely surviving memorial consciousness. The lieux de mémoire

make their appearance by virtue of the deritualization of our world – producing, manifesting, establishing, constructing, decreeing, and maintaining by artifice and by will a society deeply absorbed in its own transformation and renewal … they mark the rituals of a society without ritual … Lieux de mémoire originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no longer occur naturally. 113

The lieux de mémoire are collective places that crystallise values and secure the identity of the national fellowship. They should be understood as

112 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, 7.
113 ibid., 12.
conceptual and mental sites rather than physical ones, include those that are
topographical or architectural. Nora asserts that

Even an apparently purely material site, like an archive, becomes a lieu de
mémoire only if the imagination invests it with a symbolic aura. A purely
functional site, like a classroom manual, a testament, or a veteran’s reunion
belongs to the category only inasmuch as it is also the object of a ritual.\(^{114}\)

The sites are neither permanent nor static; they are concepts which are
constantly recreated by use and reference, by rites and rituals.

Topographical sites make up one kind of lieux de mémoire. They ‘owe
everything to the specificity of their location and to being rooted in the
ground – so, for example, the conjuncture of sites of tourism and centers of
historical scholarship, the Bibliothèque nationale on the site of the Hôtel
Mazarin, the Archives nationales in the Hôtel Soubise’.\(^ {115}\) They are different
from monumental sites of memory, Nora argues, because of their different
attachment to the physical site.

Statues or monuments to the dead, for instance, owe their meaning to their
intrinsic existence; even though their location is far from arbitrary, one could
justify relocating them without altering their meaning. Such is not the case
with ensembles constructed over time, which draw their meaning from the
complex relations between their elements: such are the mirrors of a world or a
period, like the cathedral of Chartres or the palace of Versailles.\(^{116}\)

Aleida Assmann equates the topographical lieux de mémoire with the term
Gedenkort. At the same time, she removes the connotation to the specific
context of modernity’s break with tradition and memory, which Nora
ascribed to them, and places them in the same category as the experiences of
anteïsche Magie by Cicero, Petrarch, and Lipsius, reappearing over the
course of Western history.\(^ {117}\) The Gedenkorte are the result of breakdowns
and ruptures of social contexts and cultural frames of meaning, Aleida
Assmann asserts:

Like tools and utensils that have lost their original function and links with
daily life and have been collected as relics by museums, ways of life,
attitudes, actions, and experience undergo a similar metamorphosis when they

\(^{114}\) ibid., 19.
\(^{115}\) ibid., 22.
\(^{116}\) ibid.
\(^{117}\) On Aleida Assmann’s different reading of Nora’s terms, see Familial places – Generationenorte and Heimat in this chapter.
are taken from the context of contemporary life and turned into national and cultural memories.\textsuperscript{118}

\textit{Gedenkorte} are Erinnerungsorte, where the narratives of the past have been stabilised and turned into normative spatial frameworks of the cultural memory. They belong to the functional memory of society; the significance attributed to the places is defined and embraced by the dominant group(s), legitimising their version of the past. They support the dissemination of illustrative persons and events of exemplary deeds or terrible suffering. ‘Bloodstained episodes of persecution, ignominy, defeat, and death have a prominent position in the mythical, national, and historical memory, and they become unforgettable if a group translates them into a form of binding remembrance’.\textsuperscript{119} It is the \textit{Gedenkort} that stabilises the story of the cultural memory. We can compare the \textit{Gedenkort} with the pathological permanences with institutionalised antëische Magie, places that have been turned into museums or documentation centres. Fundamentally a spatial framework of functional memory, the \textit{Gedenkort} works on the level of remembrance of larger communities: nations, religions, people.

\textbf{Unsettled places – traumatische Orte}

If the \textit{Gedenkorte} provide spatial frameworks for the functional memory, Aleida Assmann’s \textit{traumatische Orte} can be seen to offer spatial frameworks for undecided and uneasy cultural memory. They are sites where affirmative construal is blocked, due to psychological pressure or social taboos, and cannot become \textit{Gedenkorte}.\textsuperscript{120} On the level of the group, Aleida Assmann lets us understand that \textit{traumatische Orte} could be seen to embody shameful elements that cannot be expressed, but remain inaccessible as unspeakable and ungraspable in the group that employs the site as a spatial framework.\textsuperscript{121} On the level of society and culture, she argues, where a number of groups appropriate the same sites for their memory, memory processes become increasingly delicate. She points to the most emblematic of the \textit{traumatische Orte}:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{118} A Assmann, \textit{Cultural Memory and Western Civilization}, 323.
\textsuperscript{119} ibid., 312.
\textsuperscript{120} ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Cf. the concept of silence: ‘we cannot accept the commonplace view that silence is the space of forgetting and speech the realm of remembrance. Instead, we offer the following definition of silence. Silence, we hold, is a socially constructed space in which and about which subjects and words normally used in everyday life are not spoken. The circle around this space is described by groups of people who at one point in time deem it appropriate that there is a difference between the sayable and the unsayable, or the spoken and the unspoken, and that such a distinction can and should be maintained over time’. R Ginio, et al., \textit{Shadows of War: A Social History of Silence in the Twentieth Century} (Cambridge, CUP, 2010), 4.
\end{flushright}
The multi-layered complexity of Auschwitz arises not least from the heterogeneity of the memories and perspectives of those who claim the place as theirs and those who come to visit it. For the Poles who administer the camp in their own country and have made it a central place of memory in the history of their nation’s suffering, its meaning is quite different from that of the Jewish survivors, whereas Germans and their descendants will again see it quite differently from the descendants of the victims.\footnote{\textit{A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization}, 313–14.}

The place as a spatial framework supports a variety of functional memories, each one different for every group that sustains a relation to it: one emotional, the other historical, symbolic, or political. But even if it should enjoy relative stability of significance within each group, the equilibrium is challenged by the other groups’ views. Thus, the site is as much connected to the storage memory as to the functional memory; it offers all that one seeks in it or knows about it. It has a double character: an Erinnerungsort open for the projection of memories as well as a normative and affirmative Gedenkort, a spatial framework of the storage memory as well as of the functional memory. The traumatische Ort is unsettled.

**Reconsidering the spatial framework of memory**

This chapter has introduced the two modes of remembering proposed by Aleida and Jan Assmann to distinguish between two realms of Halbwachs’s collective memory. The informal communicative memory lives in the communicative situations of social groups and has its basis in the brains and its members’ acts of recollection. The cultural memory is administrated by specialists and institutionalised in order to pass down and stabilise remembering over generations. The remembrance is based in the cognitive faculties of the authorised notables and makes use of frameworks of memory and artefacts.

Aleida and Jan Assmann have explained how material artefacts like books, artwork, buildings, or cities may be considered cultural memory by metonym. They are memories insofar as they refer to the act of memory that engages with them. I have argued that their role in such acts could be likened to that of the frameworks of collective memory, described by Halbwachs. I suggest referring to artefacts in general as external frameworks of memory and to the built environment, specifically, as an external spatial framework of memory. Describing material artefacts as frameworks and not as cultural memory may direct the attention to the act of remembrance as much as to the
materiality, avoiding hypostatisation of memory. Furthermore, as an external framework, the communicative as well as the cultural memory can be seen to employ the material surroundings; this enables the assessment of both kinds of remembering on one and the same site.

In the second part of the chapter I introduced two concepts that describe certain roles of the spatial framework of communicative memory for families. I continued to introduce some distinctions to the spatial framework of cultural memory, between visible marks of explicit spatial frameworks and non-visible marks of the implicit spatial frameworks, and between frameworks of the canonised and active functional memory and those of the passive storage memory. I also suggested seeing, in the complex spatial schemes of knowledge organisation in archives, libraries, and museums, a metalevel of the spatial framework of cultural memory that draws on ancient mnemotechnics to improve the processes of localisation and retrieval by specialists. Finally, I introduced a selection of specific terms by Aleida Assmann that allows us to conceptualise a variety of places of memory in Western society.

In the Introduction I referred to psychologists Amy Shelton and Naohide Yamamoto and asked whether this study could contribute to establishing a theoretical framework to organise the many different types of spatial representations in society and culture, to understand how they complement, interact, or interfere with one another. I proposed that Halbwachs’s conceptualisation of the spatial framework of memory could provide a step towards such a theoretical framework. In chapters one and two I investigated the original context of the term to establish a theoretical foundation and the basic definitions of the term, and in chapters three and four I followed the theory into the architectural discourse in the 1960s and saw how Lynch and Rossi developed it. The architectural contextualisation enriched the spatial framework of memory with several specifications. With the help of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s differentiation of the two realms of collective memory into communicative and cultural memory, I have demonstrated how the concept of the spatial framework of memory could be expanded to address not only informal, social settings, but also varying spatial practices in social and cultural remembering. This chapter has broadened Halbwachs’s term and introduced supplements to the overall theory, adding general distinctions and concise shortcuts to specific forms of spatial frameworks.

I would suggest that Halbwachs’s original concept has been reinscribed into a new theoretical context to become a versatile theoretical framework,

\[\text{Cf. Object of study in the Introduction.}\]
Edifices

which, against the background of collective, communicative, cultural memory, capacitates to address the gamut of architecture’s dynamic roles in social and cultural remembering. Also, if the theoretical framework is not exhaustive, to my meaning, it demonstrates a robust structure, which subsequently can take up further distinctions and specifications. I have placed the emphasis on contemporary, Western society, but have also referred to other examples, when these have added to the general postulations. It has led me to include specific concepts that could act as shortcuts to contemporary issues of spatial memory. I will summarise the proposed theoretical framework for studies of architecture and societal memory in its entirety in the Conclusion. Before that, in the next chapter, I will turn to the debate on the Government Quarter in Oslo to see what the spatial framework of memory may contribute to in order to assess the roles of the government architecture for familial, professional, art historical, and national memory, the alterations and rearrangements of its memory contents, and to discover specificities that may contribute to complementing aspects of the concept.
And now, after the terror attack, there is no doubt that it will take a new and towering place in our collective consciousness … In our shared memory and in the history of architecture, Viksjo’s government high-rise will be standing steady as the mountain and as a composed and sophisticated piece of architecture and maybe also a symbol of the society we wish to be. The high-rise will continue to tower – not oppressively and brutally – but with a self-consciousness that cannot be bombed to pieces.

— Anne-Kristine Kronborg, ‘Folkets høyblokk’, 2011

Friday 22 July 2011, at 15.17, an unknown Norwegian, Anders Behring Breivik, drives a delivery van into the Government Quarter in the city centre of Oslo (Figure 1). He parks it close to the wall, next to the entrance to the High-rise. At the time, the functions of the building include the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Justice, and it makes up the most prominent of the quarter’s nine buildings. Behring Breivik ignites the fuse of the 950 kilo fertiliser bomb at the back of the car and walks away. At 15.25 it goes off, severely damaging the High-rise, the R4 building, and the S block, and causing limited damage to parts of the Y block and the G block, all of the

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1 A-K Kronborg, ‘Folkets høyblokk’, OBOSbladet, /6 (2011), 13. All translations from Norwegian in this chapter are mine.

Norwegian government (Figures 2–7). Additional buildings in a radius of about five hundred metres are afflicted, including damage caused to windows and interiors of about one thousand shops, cafés, and private businesses. Because the bombing occurs during the Norwegian general summer holiday, of the about 3,100 employees normally at work in the quarter only well over ten per cent are at work. Eight people are killed. Two hundred are injured, ten of them severely. Meanwhile, Behring Breivik drives his second car towards the island Utøya outside of Oslo and begins the massacre in the summer camp of AUF, the youth organisation of the Norwegian Labour Party, around 17.21.

The double one-man attack was the most devastating act of aggression on Norwegian soil since WWII. It has come to have profound influence on Norwegian society because of its impact on so many areas of society, targeting officials of the state administration and politically active youth from the whole country. This chapter will only address one of the many debates that followed the 22 July attack, only one of the processes of change that it spurred. As such, it extracts fragments of a societal context with the aim of illuminating the concept of the spatial framework of memory that this thesis postulates. I turn to the debate on the Government Quarter to observe how architecture that previously only sustained inert professional and disciplinary memory for architectural historians, overnight can come to be regarded as an essential vehicle for national remembering and sentiments.

The start of the debate
With an article titled ‘Considering tearing down the high-rise’ (‘Vurderer å rive høyblokken’), published in the morning the second day after the bombing of the Government Quarter in Oslo, the newspaper Aftenposten set the tone for an intense debate in the year that followed. It reported from a crisis meeting the government had held the evening before. Like the English word ‘consider’, vurdere means to think carefully about something, to assess a situation before making a decision. In everyday language, however, it often implies a standpoint that the consideration is already drawn towards, in the sense of ‘Thinking about tearing down the high-rise’. Judging by the response, many readers seem to have understood the title in the second way, also if the article reports of the coming process of evaluation, quoting the Secretary General,4 Morten Ruud, of the Ministry of Justice:

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3 The names of the buildings are literal translations of the official names of the buildings in Norwegian: Høyblokken (also H-blokken), R4, S-blokken, Y-blokken, and G-blokken.

4 I have used the titles of officials at the time of the specific reference.
Figure 1. Aerial photo of the Government Quarter in Oslo, before the explosion.

Figure 2. The High-rise after the explosion, seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass.
Figure 3. The R4 after the explosion, seen from Grubbegata.

Figure 5. The Y block in 2012, with temporary window covers. Seen from Johan Nygaardsvolds plass.
Figure 4. The S block after the explosion, seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass.
Figure 6. The G block after the explosion, with temporary covers in the windows.

Figure 7. Plan of the Government Quarter in Oslo.
A more long-term theme is if the worst destroyed buildings at all can be restored. ‘There has to made an assessment [vurdering] of whether the high-rise and the other premises facing Grubbegata [the street in which the bomb went off; Figure 8] have to be demolished, or if they could be restored. It is too early to tell.’ … That assessment can only be done when the police have finished their investigation, and after the premises have been secured.\(^5\)

The same day, NTB, the leading Norwegian news agency, sent out a news message with an interview with the Public Construction and Property Management (Statsbygg), key advisor in construction and property affairs and property manager for the Norwegian government. It carried a more neutral title than the previous article, ‘Statsbygg does not know if the High-rise has to be torn down’. On the question of whether the ‘famous landmark’ needs to be demolished, the Director of Communications in Statsbygg answers,

‘We hear them saying that, but we have our own experts on building construction and securement who need to assess the situation before we conclude’ … Njaa Rygh denies that Statsbygg has started to work on a plan for what they will do if it shows that they have to demolish.\(^6\)

The next day, several newspapers ran the news message under the same title.\(^7\)

Before a week had passed, several architects and people of related professions had cried out in the press to state the architectural and historical importance of the High-rise, warning against drawing hasty conclusions with regard to demolition.\(^8\) In the half year or so that followed, the dispute over whether to tear down the damaged buildings or to restore them acquired momentum. The debate that unfolded came to involve architects, engineers, and art historians, but also influential politicians and leaders of governmental and non-governmental organisations working with architecture and architectural heritage. The proposals in the debate rested on one or several postulations, such as, if the buildings are torn down, the perpetrator gets his

\(^5\) ‘Vurderer å rive hayblokken’, Aftenposten Morgen, 24 July 2011, sec. 1, 24. I have chosen to write ‘High-rise’ and ‘Government Quarter’, with capital letters, to reflect the common use of them as names or terms in Norwegian, similar to ‘the White House’ or ‘Westminster’. However, the use of capital letters differs in practice, also within the government, and in quotations I have used capital words only when the author has done it in the original Norwegian text. I use the official English names of organisations where such exist.


\(^7\) In the newspaper Romerikes Blad it was titled ‘Maybe has to be demolished’. ‘Må kanske rives’, Romerikes Blad, 25 July 2011, sec. 1, 6.

way, or the quarter is an expression of Norway’s modern, political history, or the two buildings designed by Erling Viksjø are important contributions to history of art and architecture and an expression of democracy. The debate, I will argue, shows how architecture, which previously predominantly sustained an inert professional and disciplinary memory for architects, conservators, or art historians, or a spatial framework for the civil servants of the state administration, a zone de l’activité technique, overnight came to be regarded as an indispensable vehicle for national remembering and sentiments. Architecture, previously defined through aesthetic, practical, and representative functions, could be seen to transfigure into one or several cultural concepts and sets of symbols, circulated in the public sphere.

This chapter offers an analysis of the debate. I view it through the lens of the theoretical framework provided by the spatial framework of memory, established in the previous chapters. With the help of the conceptual apparatus, I demonstrate how the government buildings provide Norwegians with a mental site for cultural and political memory, in addition to its role as a place for individual, familial, or professional remembering. The physical state of the buildings appears to be intrinsically connected with, not only the conceptual representations people make of the architecture, but, more importantly, the cultural values and conceptions of a national past that come to be associated with the representations. I will claim that such associations are not autonomously formed opinions of the individual, but notions shaped collectively; professionals and scholars take to instruct the public and politicians in the knowledge and interpretation of history, art, and architecture, and influential people, like political leaders and directors of architecture and heritage organisations, supply the arguments with legitimacy. When considering the debate, it is useful to reflect upon what kinds of professionals take part in the debate. While the government, represented by the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform, and Church Affairs, hereafter referred to as FAD, will eventually decide on issues pertaining to the future of the physical buildings, a possible memorial on the site, and the way in which the quarter will be used on a practical level, the processes of change in the conceptualisation of the Government Quarter depend on many other actors in the public. The reflections I offer here are

9 In this chapter, I do not intend to give the term ‘vehicle of remembering/memory’ the specific connotations as in Yosef Yerushalmi’s use in relation to the history and memory in medieval Jewry. Bearing his usage in mind, however, I use it a bit more freely as a trope. Y H Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (1982; repr. edn, Washington, UWP, 1996), xxix, 27–52.

10 It is not my intention to write a critical history of the Government Quarter and, therefore, I do not assess whether claims by the debaters are historically correct or not. I am interested in the reasons for their claims and the role of architecture in supporting such claims.
Figure 8. The street Grubbegata after the explosion. The G block in the background and the R4 to the left.

Figure 9. The G block. 2006.
based on the exchange of opinions in the press and on documents and reports
produced by the government, but also on my observation of its development
over time as well as my involvement in it. I thus adopt a different approach
than that employed in the previous chapters in order to address the processes
that reshape the spatial frameworks of the Government Quarter and the
dispute over what memories the buildings should associate.

In the following, I will first consider how the Government Quarter may
have acted as a spatial framework of memory before the bombing. The
increase of media exposure in terms of graphic and written material leads me
to discuss how the spatial frameworks of memory relating to the quarter start
to change on 22 July 2011. Subsequently, I will consider the different parties
of the debate and how contents associated with the buildings move between
different groups, professions, and the general public. The movements suggest
changes to an existing infrastructure of the nation’s functional memory and a
prospective absorption of the Government Quarter into its canon of symbolic
sites. I further assess the role of the buildings for use as a collective spatial
mnemonic and look at the comprehensive legitimisation of the opinions in
the debate in the winter 2011–2012. Finally, I will consider how the
Government Quarter has turned into a receptive Erinnerungsort, probably on
the way to become an affirmative Gedenkort. From the moment of the
explosion, the representations of the quarter in multifarious spatial
frameworks change fundamentally and begin to travel between groups and in
and out of the country. Associated memories grow in number and
importance. My reading emphasises the importance of the architecture, both
as a physical location and in the form of mental representations, for the
canonical processes of the nation, in the role it has been assigned as a
vehicle of national memory.

A spatial framework of memory
The Government Quarter is located in the centre of Oslo with public streets
running through it (Figures 1, 7). It comprises nine buildings, built over a
century and a half, which are connected underground. Before the explosion
almost 160,000 square metres gross floor area housed fourteen of the
seventeen ministries and the Office of the Prime Minister. 50,000 square
metres were rendered unusable. The affected buildings were the 1906
G block, designed by Henrik Bull, and the only part of a planned government

11 For the details of my involvement and the sources used, see The analysis of the debate on the Government
Quarter in Oslo in the Introduction.
12 Rygh & Weiby, Faktaark Regjeringskvartalet.
Figure 10. The High-rise seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass. 2009.

Figure 11. The Y block before the explosion, seen from Akersgata.
building complex to be built (Figure 9), the High-rise from 1958 (Figures 2, 10) and the Y block from 1969 (Figure 11), designed by Erling Viksjø, the S block from 1978 (Figures 4, 12) and the R4 from 1988 (Figures 3, 13), both designed by Viksjø Arkitektkontor under the direction of Per Viksjø, Erling Viksjø’s son.

Prior to the 22 July bombing Oslo citizens had walked through the quarter on their way to or from the commercial and leisure streets in the city centre or the neighbouring public library Deichmanske (Figures 14, 57). They may have passed in front of the High-rise in a bus or driven through the tunnel under the Y block (Figure 15). People who worked for the government and thousands of others who had their workplace in the area would know the streets and buildings from their everyday life. Visitors to Oslo from other parts of Norway, or from abroad, would not necessarily have passed by the buildings, located as they are in an area off the shopping streets, the cultural institutions, and the tourist trails.
Figure 13. Entrance to the R4. 1996.
Figure 14. The public library Deichmanske. 2005.

Figure 15. The entrance to the Hammersborg tunnel underneath the Y block. The High-rise and the G block in the background.
Figure 16. Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on the roof terrace of the High-rise. 1991.

Figure 17. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg on the top floor of the High-rise. 2009.
Figure 18. The High-rise depicted on the first page of the supplement to Morgenbladet: ‘The Canon of Architecture. The Twelve Most Important Buildings in the Norwegian Post-war Period’.
Norwegians also knew the Government Quarter from political reportage in newspapers and on television. Press photographs show politicians posing in front of one of the buildings, or prime ministers, like Einar Gerhardsen, Gro Harlem Brundtland, or Jens Stoltenberg, receiving foreign heads of state on the top floor of the High-rise, like Nikita Khrushchev, Josip Broz Tito, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Barack Obama (Figures 16, 17). People with an interest in contemporary architecture and cultural issues in general may have picked up that the High-rise had been appointed the third most important building in the canon of Norwegian post-war architecture, selected and published in 2007 as an attachment to the commenting weekly *Morgenbladet* (Figure 18).

On different levels, most adult Norwegians possessed some kind of spatial and conceptual notion of the buildings in the Government Quarter, even if it was fragmentary. With Halbwachs it is possible to understand such a notion as a part of their internal spatial framework of memory, accumulated through sensory impressions from the site, by reading articles, or by seeing photographs and TV pictures. With repeated exposure, vivid percepts and distinct experiences are schematised into spatial images that come to act as interconnections of memories of events, emotions, and knowledge. Only by transforming the spatial memory into an abstracted notion, it becomes possible to navigate and localise oneself in a larger spatial environment like that of the Government Quarter, with its different streets, façades, and interiors. Such complexes of space are impossible to overview at one glance from any one viewpoint; only with a model of spatial relations, conjured up in memory, is one able to handle the interrelations and hierarchies of visual landmarks and places within the environment. Also concerning the immediate situation of orientation, any environment needs to be internalised and conceptualised before it can appear as three-dimensional space to consciousness and not just visual stimuli. In people’s spatial framework of memory, the quarter would likely contain more detail for those who worked in or around the quarter, who occasionally passed by it, or who pursued an interest in the architecture or the political history. It was probably less

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13 Search performed in the NTBscanpix image database, <http://www.scanpix.no>, on 21 Apr. 2012. We see the prime ministers point away from the government building to other assets of Oslo, presumably to the fjord, to Holmenkollen ski jump, and to the nature reserves Nordmarka and Lillomarka. The High-rise did not have the same pictorial importance as the White House or the Reichstagsgebäude in Berlin.

detailed and graspable for those who had only seen parts of it depicted in the press or on television. For most people, presumably, the concept of the quarter was more focused on the visually and politically salient High-rise, fairly often represented in media. Media had directed little attention to buildings like the R4 and the S block.

For the inhabitants of Oslo, the quarter may also be the associative landscape of personal recollections of events that took place there; for example, the Hammersborg tunnel underneath the Y block keeps reminding me of the evening ten years ago when unknown people assaulted two friends of mine and me. Before 22 July, for Norwegians the Government Quarter also made up one of the central backdrops for the public mediation of the activities of the state administration, next to buildings like the parliament building (Figure 19) and the Royal Palace (Figure 20). Thus, on the level of the nation, I would argue, a shared denominator can be identified in the spatial framework of the collective memory of most Norwegians. The commonality lies less in the spatial layout and architectural details, of which the knowledge and mental capabilities may vary substantially, but rather in the status of the quarter as a conceptual site in memory, where associations and knowledge relating to the political life could be placed, organised, and
retrieved.\textsuperscript{15} We picture previous and present prime ministers receive foreign heads of state on the same roof terrace or on the same top floor. In photographs we see politicians of present and past administrations pose for the cameras outside the same entrance. As Halbwachs has suggested, these places can be thought of as a mental \textit{mise en scène}, against which the events that we recall or learn of play out. They are mental representations of space in memory that do not exist as a number of individual images, one for each event we remember, but rather as a dynamic, but stable construct. The shape of one such place in the spatial framework of memory may take on different appearances according to each situation of recall, but it is still conceived of as one topographic or architectural place. It is the same place, the same building, at different times.

We may refer to the shared mental image of space as the collective spatial framework of memory, an abstraction that denotes the shared denominator of all spatial frameworks held by the group members.\textsuperscript{16} However, the group is not only the sum of its members, but is reflected in every member who, from occasion to occasion, adopts the view of this or another group. Therefore, it is not only as a common denominator of individual frameworks that the collective framework can be understood, but also as a group-related construct that every member comes to sustain as part of his own framework and as part of his identity as a group member. The Government Quarter thus comes to make up spatial representations in the mind of the individual on the level of

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure20.png}
\caption{The Royal Palace in Oslo. 2010.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. \textit{The spatial framework of memory and the material framework, Remember other things, and Collective landmarks} in ch. 2.
\textsuperscript{16} Cf. \textit{Frameworks of memory} in ch. 1, the introduction to ch. 2, and \textit{Group images} in ch. 3.
individual experience, on the level of collectives, like the profession, and on the level of culture, like national politics and symbolism. The spatial knowledge of the quarter is the same, regardless of which group the individual places himself in, but each group identity directs the attention to certain places and parts of the buildings and supplies the spatial framework with sets of memories.

**Governmental zone de l’activité technique**
For people who work in the quarter, the civil servants and the administrative and technical staff, or for people who entertained everyday relations to the buildings for other reasons, the buildings would make up collective landmarks in the spatial framework of memory, the spaces interconnection points of informal social memory related to the professional environment.\(^\text{17}\) Not only visually salient buildings, but any street, room, or corridor within this environment may have significance to the individuals and remind of things learnt or experienced in their career, or it may remind them of colleagues and a period of professional life.

\(^\text{17}\) Cf. Collective landmarks and Zone de l’activité technique et zone des relations personnelles in ch. 2.
The workplace of the government further makes up a spatial framework of the professional memory of the state administration, a zone de l’activité technique. The political and non-political government officials have accumulated a collective memory of written and unwritten regulations that direct their behaviour and routines. The techniques of the zone, Halbwachs explains, ‘consist in knowing and in applying the rules and precepts that in every epoch prescribe for the functionary in general terms the actions, the language, and the gestures of the function’. The buildings of the state administration come to signify hierarchies and roles and support administrative traditions over time. The prime minister needs to know how to perform his duties in specific forms and how to relate to his staff. Hierarchies of responsibility need to be retained by means of titles and roles. Meeting rooms, offices, and corridors come to organise spatially the rituals and procedures of the trade, not unlike the way the church interior supports the priest’s performance of the sacraments or the tennis court the game between the two players (Figures 21, 22). Portrait series on the walls maintain the knowledge of the genealogy of the state administration (Figure 23). The premises of the Government Quarter are thus not only the spatial framework of personal experiences related to the career, but more importantly an architectural apparatus for acquiring, sustaining, and disseminating the memory of highly specific behaviours of the officialdom, developed and modified continuously since the state first started to use the area. They

Figure 22. The conference room in the addition to the High-rise, built in 1990.

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Edifices contribute to securing order and continuity from one period to the next. Those who have embodied the spatial structures of the practice introduce their meanings to the newly arrived. The architecture influences the way in which the officials conceptualise their profession.

Media exposure and revision of the framework

Soon after the bomb went off, a torrent of photographs, videos, maps, graphics, written and spoken descriptions portraying the devastated territory saturated national and international media. I shall leave aside the international impact, especially in the other Nordic countries and in the rest of Europe, and focus on the national situation. In Norway the exposure was intense. A search in the NTBscanpix image archive with the search term ‘regjeringskvartalet’ (‘the government quarter’) produces 120 times as many photographs dated to the one-year period following 22 July 2011 compared to the year before.19 A fifth of them, or almost 2,500 pictures, were published in the week after the bombing, which is more than one and a half times as many as those published in the preceding ten years. Also the exposure on television was exceptional. Most channels covered the events extensively. For instance, at 16.00 on 22 July, about half an hour after the explosion, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation NRK started broadcasting a television programme that would run continuously for 36 hours.20 On their website alone, a search for ‘regjeringskvartalet’ gives almost 5,000 hits.21 In addition to the media coverage, a number of people who were unfortunate to be in the area during or after the explosion were forced to take in the new environment by direct experience. Later, many came to see the site for themselves and others have passed by or observed the High-rise at a distance, visible as it is from various places in Oslo (Figure 24).

Most Norwegians were subject to strong influence in the time after 22 July, and the previously held images of the Government Quarter in their spatial framework of memory were affected. The people who had only a vague understanding of the government buildings arguably developed a stronger one, and others, who knew them well, altered theirs and added details. New information, associations, and emotions would be supplied to the spatial configuration; the entrance to the building now became an immediate index of the position of the van that carried the bomb, of the hole it had blown in

19 Search carried out 7 Nov. 2012 on <http://www.scanpix.no>. An increase from 20 to 900 images can be documented from the year before the attack to the year after for the search term ‘høyblokken’ or ‘høyblokka’, the two alternate spellings of the definite form of ‘høyblokk’ (‘high-rise’).
6 Disputed spatial frameworks of memory

Figure 23. Meeting room in the G block. 2006.

Figure 24. The High-rise, seen from the opera house in Bjørvika. 2012.
Figure 25. The entrance to the High-rise, seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass.

Figure 26. Still from the video shot in Grubbegata immediately after the explosion. The air is filled with dust. Left, the canteen of the High-rise, right, the R4.
the ground, of the people who had been killed in the reception and on the square, and of the rubble and destruction visible – all of which was uncannily encapsulated in the video a man shot when looking for survivors in the street Grubbegata, parts of which was broadcasted over and again on television in the following days, and which many can replay in their memory to this day (Figures 25, 26). For those directly affected, the quarter turned into a site of emotionally disturbing experiences and of mourning over lost family members or colleagues. It turned into a place of fear and shock. The attributes and connotations to people’s spatial frameworks changed overnight and so drastically that it is possible to talk of two different frameworks for each individual, one before and one after. The one epochal-spatial framework, to use the term I introduced in chapter two, ceased to exist on 22 July 2011, or thereabout. From the moment of the blast a new framework came into being, gradually developing to become a more salient landmark in people’s memory, coming to carry immediate associations to terror and suffering and, with time, also aspects of national memory: political history, art, architecture, and resilience. The two frameworks become, so we should understand Halbwachs, two different paths of mind to access memory related to different periods.

Attention has been directed to the fact that Halbwachs seldom addressed the role of media for the collective memory. For example, Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney have pointed out that Halbwachs was aware that “media” of all sorts – spoken language, letters, books, photos, films – also provide frameworks for shaping both experience and memory” but that ‘he himself did not discuss [it] at great length’. They illustrate Halbwachs’s awareness by referring to the famous passage in which he takes a walk in London. Upon seeing the well-known vistas of the city, he recalls what friends – painters, architects, historians – have told him, or what he read in Dickens’s novels as a child, coming to the conclusion that he is, actually, taking a walk with Dickens. As an extension of the observation, Erll and Rigney argue that cultural memory is essentially dynamic constructs, built through ‘repeated media representations, on a host of remediated versions of the past which

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23 Cf. Time and the spatial framework of memory.


“converge and coalesce” into a *lieu de mémoire*. They are primarily concerned with what Rigney elsewhere has called *mobile media* like texts or images. In Halbwachs’s writings on memory there are many references to other kinds of media of the collective memory. They could, however, rather be referred to by the term *immobile media* – with an intentional allusion to the German word for real estate, *Immobilien* – to denote the motionless property of land and buildings.

I use Erll and Rigney’s point to highlight an aspect that was not included in Halbwachs’s original conception of the spatial framework of memory, but which I argue has been disclosed in this chapter’s study of the Government Quarter dispute. The bombing on 22 July 2011 caused an immense increase in the circulation of mobile media referring to the government architecture: images (photographs, video, TV pictures, drawings) and texts (articles in newspapers and periodicals, books). In this chapter I have indicated that such mediation has contributed to altering people’s internal spatial frameworks of memory, probably to a much larger degree than direct perception of the altered buildings. To a very small degree, and arguably mainly for those who were there at the time of the blast, visual impressions of the physical buildings contributed to people’s revised spatial framework of communicative memory. Different from the material framework of the Government Quarter, only existing as a singular, physical artefact, an immobile medium, the internal spatial framework of memory feeds from percepts originating in the materiality as well as in the mediations of it in images and text, the mobile media. The latter are not necessarily representations or remediations of the existing materiality, but can also be historical photographs or drawings, depicting earlier states, or plans suggesting a future condition.

In the discussion of social morphology and the dual nature of space in chapter two, I referred to Halbwachs’s emphasis on the interchange between the spatial framework of group memory and the physical environment. The group makes its surroundings an externalisation of its spatial framework of memory, and the environment in turn becomes internalised as a revised spatial framework of memory. This chapter suggests that the external frameworks of the Government Quarter include immobile and mobile media, physical buildings as well as images and texts.

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28 Cf. *Topographie, Social morphology, and Dual nature of space* in ch. 2.
Aleida and Jan Assmann have made the mobile and immobile media of memory the matter of importance in their model of memory. Rites, texts, images, buildings, and cities metonymically make up cultural memory; they are artefacts with which societies structure the recall of different pasts. In the previous chapter I referred to architecture as an external framework of memory. While this intuitively may be taken as a reference to the physical building, the immobile medium, my proposal is that to regard architecture as an external spatial framework is to refer also to its (re-)presentations through mobile media of images and texts. The High-rise of Viksjø, as an external and material framework, is not only the battered concrete building in the centre of Oslo, but also the photographs and drawings of it and the articles written about it. Together they offer a combinatory framework for communicative and cultural remembering. Such an attribution of a particular building to several kinds of artefacts may make it more logical to conceive of how architecture does not necessarily disappear from the functional memory of the nation when its material manifestation is destroyed.

Parties of the debate
The increase of public attention to the quarter’s ruined state, combined with private and public grief, paved the way for an active and emotive debate regarding its future. Pragmatically enough, it came to polarise itself on the options of demolition and restoration, especially with regard to the High-rise, the most contended of the buildings. Few people, if any, have argued for the demolition of the G block, the first building, inaugurated in 1906 and designed in a combination of art nouveau and Norwegian dragon style (dragestil; Figure 27). Likewise, there has been wide agreement that the R4 and S block could be demolished. What I want to address here are the motives and arguments that surfaced in the debate, especially those related to the appeal for restoration of the High-rise and the Y block. I do not intend to consider the prospective states of the buildings or argue for demolition or restoration, but to scrutinise the societal and cultural memories that have been claimed to be lost if the buildings are demolished. I ask what notions of the national past the contributors suggest are remembered by the architecture and how such suggestions have contributed to initiating processes of altering the

29 The process of reviving the interest in the building’s architectural style was initiated already in the early 1980s. Some of the rooms were restored to their original states and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage argued for its importance in a protection plan in 1986. S Tschudi-Madsen, ‘Enighed gjør stærk – symbolisme og stil’, in R Malkenes (ed), Den gamle regjeringsbygningen 100 år – et bygghver og et embetsverk ([Oslo], Finansdepartementet, 2006), 28.
Figure 27. Stairs in the G block. Example of dragon style (dragestil). 2006.
Government Quarter in people’s spatial frameworks and the associated connotations.

Halbwachs stressed the importance of the spatial framework of memory for the reconstruction of the past and of social relations, symbols, and beliefs of the family, the profession, or religion. Lynch acknowledged that ‘the question of meaning in the city is a complicated one. Group images of meaning are less likely to be consistent at this level … Meaning, moreover, is not so easily influenced by physical manipulation … The image of the Manhattan skyline may stand for vitality, power, decadence, mystery, congestion, greatness, or what you will … So various are the individual meanings of a city’. With this statement he discontinued the pursuit of meaning in city architecture and considered instead the legibility and structure of the built environment. Rossi acknowledged certain complexes in the city as permanent reference points for the citizenry, especially with regard to historical remembering, and Aleida and Jan Assmann have contributed with an analytical framework for assessing the politics of memory in nation states and cultures, precisely addressing the meaning of architecture. Let me take up the discussion where Lynch left, following in the spirit of Halbwachs, Rossi, and Aleida and Jan Assmann, in an attempt to reflect upon what the image of the Government Quarter in Oslo means for the different groups in the aftermath of 22 July and how such meanings have changed and been exchanged.

The debate sees the distinction between several groups that can be said to have an interest in the future state of the Government Quarter. These groups are not clearly delineated or defined, and each individual may be a member of several of them. On the level of close relations, the employees of the left-wing government make up the group targeted directly in the attack and whose future workplace depends on the outcome of the process. They have families and friends who are also affected. Other people, who happened to be in the quarter, make up another directly afflicted group. They belong to various groups and have not managed to unite their voices to the same degree as the officials. Other larger groups that have been targeted are the citizens of Oslo, who have had their city centre attacked, and the national and cultural fellowship of Norwegians that saw their democratically elected state administration assaulted.

On the professional level, the governmental administration of politicians and civil servants has been severely afflicted. In addition to the traumatic experiences of some of the employees and the loss of colleagues,

approximately 1,580 workplaces were rendered unusable.\footnote{Statsbygg, \textit{Regjeringskvartalet. Føringer for videre arbeid} (Oslo, FAD, 2012), 5.} Even though all political parties have been targeted in the attack on the parliamentary system, the Norwegian Labour Party (Ap), whose youth organisation AUF was targeted on Utøya the same day, can be singled out as a separate interest group, with its values and its representatives directly targeted.

Practising architects make up another professional group with an interest in the debate, as do the related and partly overlapping groups of architectural historians, conservators, artists, and art historians, distributed over a number of state institutions and non-governmental organisations with concern for the built heritage. Other professionals who have engaged in the debate include sociologists, geographers, psychologists, and engineers. Naturally, several of the people who have spoken out belong to two or more of the groups; one of the involved architects has a daughter that survived Utøya, and the state officials of the government were themselves targets in the bombing and have colleagues who died or were injured, thus giving their position a combined professional and private character.

Many, but not all of the people of the parties have their residence in Oslo and consider themselves as part of its citizenry. Most of the people mentioned are nationals of Norway; the cultural fellowship has frequently been evoked in the debate. Only to a limited degree has the fellowship of European and Western culture been capitalised upon in the debate, in the form of references to Norway’s connection to an international art scene, represented in the Government Quarter by the artwork of Pablo Picasso (Figure 28), to the government’s appeal to foreign governments and specialists, which resulted in the report by Statsbygg, published online on 26 January 2012, and to the turn to Ground Zero as a referential situation.\footnote{For Picasso, see Nipen, ‘Bygningene formet det nye Norge’; S E Hansen, ‘Picasso-veggen’ er blitt et symbol’, \textit{Østlandsposten}, 13 Aug. 2011, 22–23; L Anker, ‘Regjeringsbygget: fra Grubbegata til New York: Pionerarbeid med Picasso’, \textit{Alle tider}, 2 (2011). For the report, see nn. 31, 69, and 89. On the references to Ground Zero, see M Ekman, ‘Merket av minner’, \textit{Stavanger Aftenblad}, 10 Sept. 2011, sec. Debatt, 37; K Knutsen, ‘Kampen om Ground Zero’, \textit{Stavanger Aftenblad}, 12 Sept. 2011, sec. Debatt, 26; ‘Vil lære av Ground Zero’, \textit{Dagens Næringsliv}, 24 May 2012, 48; ‘Aasrud til Ground Zero’, \textit{NTBtext}, 25 Sept. 2012.}

These are essentially the groups that make up the parties of the dispute.

The people who speak out act implicitly or explicitly on the behalf of one or several of the groups. It can be observed in the debate how individuals take on the role of either self-declared or formally assigned spokespersons, in some cases against the will of other group members. The contributors could be seen to compete for influence on the general public, readers who themselves belong to one or several of the groups involved.
Figure 28. Artwork by Picasso is drawn up on the wall before it will be sandblasted by Carl Nesjar, left. On a landing in the High-rise.

Figure 29. Public meeting at Oslo Museum, 25 Oct. 2011. From the left: Lars Roede, Erling Fossen, and Janne Wilberg.
Communicative and cultural memory in the debate

In the communicative situations of informal social circles, individuals circulate memories – experiences, information, opinions, and emotions. The future of the Government Quarter is only one of several interconnected issues that have been discussed and thought over intensively in most areas of society after 22 July 2011. The circulation takes place in the homes, among friends, in the workplaces, in social media, and in radio programmes, television shows, or public meetings (Figure 29). Such arenas cater for occasions on which the collective memory of diverse groups interacts, spreads, and develops. With Aleida and Jan Assmann’s terminology, they can be understood as platforms for informal and everyday communicative memory, where individuals ground the present experience and prospective future in shared conceptions of the past. The communicative memory is the realm of collective notions of the past, distributed in the minds of individuals, biologically based in their brains. In the minds of Norwegians, the government buildings make up the spatial framework used for arranging the various associations to the quarter.

In the debate in the press the communicative memory comes in contact with the formal cultural memory of groups with responsibilities for the administration of national history and the history of architecture and art. If the communicative memory, according to Aleida and Jan Assmann, is characterised by transience and non-specialisation, the cultural memory is distinguished by stability and specialisation. Through interviews and letters to the editors of the newspapers, historical narratives and motives are drawn up and professional opinions voiced. In this manner, the cultural memory moves from one professional or political milieu to another, as well as into the everyday discussions of Norwegians – professionals and laymen alike. The cultural memory flows into the communicative memory and adjusts it. The readers expand their knowledge, revise their symbolic connotations, and alter their opinions and emotions. Cultural ideas are formed and consolidated on the level of the individual.

33 Public meetings that addressed the architecture in the Government Quarter after 22 July include the debate in the Oslo Museum, 25 October 2011, with talks by Lars Roede, Erling Fossen, Peter Butenschøn, and Janne Wilberg (Figure 29), the seminar on AHO, 2 November 2011, with talks by Lars Roede, Hans-Henrik Egede-Nissen, and myself, the meeting of the senior group of the Oslo Architectural Association, OAF Senior, 16 November 2011, with a talk by Ulf Grønvold, and the seminar at AHO, 12 March 2012, with talks by Randall Mason, Christian Ebbesen, and myself. There have also been several discussions in radio and on television.

34 Cf. Communicative memory in ch. 5.

35 Cf. Two realms of the past in ch. 5.
On the level of the professional and academic parties involved, the debate can be regarded as a process of formation and revision of the cultural memory. Perspectives on the issue are externalised from reflective minds into published texts. Well-formulated arguments reach a number of readers upon publication and are stabilised in the public sphere, as they are archived in libraries and databases. For art or architectural historians, the communicative memory may consist of the actively communicated knowledge of their disciplines, that which is talked about in the corridors, in seminars, or in conferences. What their discipline can relate to in total, however, may be thought of as its cultural memory: the scholarship, the lectures, the exhibitions, the articles, and the books; the collections of documents and drawings in archives and storages, the library collections of books, the conferences, and the totality of material buildings.

The canon and curriculum of the discipline – that which is most talked about, dealt with, and considered the most important – are the active foreground of this stockpile of traces and indexes of the past. Aleida Assmann calls it the functional memory. It is a minor selection of the cultural memory that is held active by the discipline and that serves to legitimise the current worldview of the discipline. The rest, the totality of documentation – heterogeneous, fragmented, and not yet or no longer actualised – belongs to what she names the storage memory. It is carefully guarded and monitored in archives, libraries, and storages as well as in the stock of physical buildings and buried remains. It contains material for the potential revisions of the functional memory.

**Canonisation of Viksjø’s architecture**

At the time of the bombing, the oeuvre of Erling Viksjø (1910–1971), architect of the High-rise and the Y block, had already started to move from the storage memory to the functional memory of the discipline. Through public dissemination it had slowly began to be promoted as part of the functional memory of the nation. A public reappraisal was offered in the 1999 exhibition on Viksjø’s architecture at the Norwegian Museum of Architecture (Norsk Arkitekturmuseum). In the foreword to the exhibition catalogue, curator of the exhibition Eva Madshus writes:

Today, many young people are intensely preoccupied with the functionalism of the 1930s. Other people lead campaigns to revive classicism. For the time, however, a shadow lies over the 1950s and 1960s. The Norwegian Museum of

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36 Cf. Functional memory and storage memory in ch. 5.
Architecture has therefore chosen to direct the attention to a misjudged epoch and an underestimated architect in this exhibition on Erling Viksjø.\textsuperscript{37}

Madshus also points to important factors for the production of the exhibition. Hallvard Trohaug decided to write a doctoral dissertation in art history on Viksjø at the same time as the exhibition was planned, and Per Viksjø, Erling Viksjø’s son, donated his father’s archive to the museum (Figure 30). The donation of the archive makes material traces of the past at the disposal for research; it widens the available storage memory. The dissertation points to these and other traces, selects, and supplies them with meaning; the exhibition and the catalogue distribute the findings to professionals and the

\textsuperscript{37} E Madshus, ‘Forord. En utstilling om arkitekt Erling Viksjø’, in H Trohaug (ed), \textit{Arkitekt Erling Viksjø} (Oslo, Norsk arkitekturmuseum, 1999), 2. The catalogue contains a professional biography, an introduction to naturbetong (the patented technique for concrete casting and surface treatment developed by Viksjø and civil engineer Sverre Jystad and used in the Government Quarter), a selection of works, including the Government Quarter high-rise, a text on the art in his buildings, an essay on monumentality in Viksjø’s architecture, and a CV.
general public. These are changes to the structure of a delimited field of the cultural memory that enables the transport of Viksjø’s oeuvre from the storage memory to the forefront of the history of architecture, and suggests that it is included in a revision of the functional memory of national art history.

Other attempts at reappraisal of Viksjø’s architecture include the protection by the Cultural Heritage Management Office in Oslo (Byantikvaren) of three of his office buildings in Oslo in 2007, the inclusion of the High-rise in the post-war architecture canon by the weekly Morgenbladet the same year.
Edifices (Figure 18), and the national protection of Viksjø’s Tromsø Bridge in 2008.\footnote{For a more comprehensive introduction to the re-evaluation of Viksjø’s architecture, see L Maliks, ‘Kan en bygning være demokratisk?, *Fortidsvern*, /4 (2011), 16–17.}

In 2010 an exhibition on post-war modernism, in which Viksjø’s architecture played a central role, opened at the The National Museum of Art, Architecture and Design (Nasjonalmuseet for kunst, arkitektur og design), a newly founded institution into which the Norwegian Museum of Architecture had been subsumed (Figure 31).\footnote{Cf. the catalogue: E Johnsen, et al., *Brytninger: norsk arkitektur 1945–65* (Oslo, Nasjonalmuseet for kunst, arkitektur og design, 2010).} At the time of the explosion, FAD and Statsbygg had nearly finished a state property protection plan (*landsverneplan*) for the quarter that included protection of all buildings except for R4, but it had not been formally passed.\footnote{Cf. the working document: *Beskrivelse av verneforslag for regjeringskvartalet og Victoria terrasse. Høring av delplan av Landsverneplan for Fornyings-, administrasjons-, og kirkedepartementet (FAD)*, (Oslo, FAD Statsbygg, 2010). Riksantikvaren was involved in the process and had agreed with FAD’s selection of buildings to be protected. Riksantikvaren & A Skjetne, Telephone conversation and email correspondence with M Ekman, 13 Mar./14. Mar. 2013; Riksantikvaren, ‘Bygningene i regjeringskvartalet’ [website], updated 8 Aug. 2011, <http://www.riksantikvaren.no/?module=Articles&action=Article.publicShow;ID=129444> accessed 10 Mar. 2013.} In August 2011, as a direct response to the bombing, the National Museum launched an online exhibition devoted exclusively to the High-rise, based on documentation from when the building was new (Figure 32).\footnote{Nasjonalmuseet for kunst, arkitektur og design, ‘Erling Viksjø og Regjeringsbygningen’ [website], updated [Aug. 2011], <http://harriet.nasjonalmuseet.no/regjeringsbygningen/index.html> accessed 22 Apr. 2012.}

*Canonisation of the Government Quarter*

Whereas dissertations, catalogues, or exhibitions, produced within and largely for the professional and scholarly communities, may have limited distribution to the general public, appeals through letters to the editors of the most-read newspapers spread over a larger community. They cross the boundaries of groups and are available to everyone. Not all initiatives have come from those who have a desire to speak out; much of the debate has been arranged by the newspapers in the form of interviews of persons whose opinions the editors consider relevant to bring into the discourse. In the first weeks of the debate the range of cultural motives quickly establish themselves. One of the leading Norwegian newspapers, *Aftenposten*, interviewed Lars Roede, architect and previous director for Oslo Museum, for the 25 July issue. In the article written by Kjersti Nipen, he explains that the attack ‘hit the architectural centre point for Norwegian nation building’.\footnote{Nipen, ‘Bygningene forment det nye Norge’.} The architecture of the Government Quarter, according to Roede, has been the centre of Norwegian history since 1814, the year Norwegian sovereignty
6 Disputed spatial frameworks of memory

Figure 32. First page of the online exhibition of the High-rise architecture, launched in Aug. 2011.

Figure 33. The church Trefoldighetskirken.
was transferred from the king of Denmark to the king of Sweden and the Norwegian constitution was written. The institutions and buildings, not only those of the government, but also of the public library Deichmanske (Figures 14, 57), the church Trefoldighetskirken (Figure 33), and the quarter Empirekvartalet with buildings like Militærhospitalet and Fødselsstiftelsen (Figures 34, 35), have contributed to the formation of the nation. The first government building, the reader learns, was designed by Henrik Bull and completed in 1906, the year after the dissolution of the union with Sweden, and it mirrors ‘the need of the state to mark a solid nation’. Roede also mentions the High-rise and the Y block, designed by Viksjø, and asserts that ‘These remain the foremost exponents of modernism in Norway in the 1950s’.

The journalist further lets Roede state the importance of the material techniques used by Viksjø in the façades and point to the integrated art in the concrete walls, signed Pablo Picasso and Carl Nesjar, concluding that it is ‘A central work of Norwegian architecture’. The article also refers to comments by Nina Berre, Director of Architecture at the National Museum. Berre emphasises the unique material techniques developed for the High-rise and
argues that they are an expression of Norwegian modernism. As one of the most important post-war buildings

the High-rise can also be considered as a symbol of the social democracy that evolved in Norway, with the grid architecture that parcels the building into series of rectangles. ‘This equality and regularity can symbolise the democratic values the building represents’, Berre says [Figure 36].

43 ibid. Leif Maliks and Ulf Grønvold later reject that the architecture of the High-rise could represent democracy. Maliks, ‘Kan en bygning være demokratisk?’, 18; U Grønvold, ‘Maliks, Viksjø og bevaring’, Fortidsvern, 1/1 (2012), 28. Grønvold argues that ‘A raster façade is neither democratic – nor social democratic. If it expresses something it is order and rationality. Therefore it is as straightforward with a rasterised façade on high-rises that house multi-national corporations on Manhattan and Norwegian bureaucrats in Akersgata’. Anne-Kristine Kronborg has also been sceptical about such symbolism. Kronborg, ‘Folkets høyblokk’.
The reader should understand that the quarter is ‘a continuous cavalcade of Norwegian architecture’ and that the High-rise is ‘the masterpiece of Erling Viksjø’. Nipen concludes the article by quoting from the previous year’s
proposal by Riksantikvaren, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage, to protect the buildings of the Government Quarter because ‘the [building] complex documents the evolution of the state [statsmakten] and mirrors the attitudes and available resources framing its evolution. The Government Quarter possesses a large symbolic value related to the development of modern Norway’.

It could be useful in this context to bring into the discussion Rossi’s term *fatto urbano*.\(^{44}\) It refers to buildings or building complexes that are physical constructions as well as mental conceptions. The *fatto urbano* is the amalgamate of the material framework and a spatial framework of memory, to which Rossi believes the citizens’ collective memory is bound – its history of coming into being, events of a social or political character that took place there, and its role in the city history. It does not consider architecture as physical artefacts isolated in the present, but as entities stretching out in time as historical objects and products of the citizenry. For Rossi, the *fatto urbano*, as the history of its own coming into being, eventually becomes the reason for its own existence.

In articles like that by Nipen, the Government Quarter is presented not primarily as physical buildings with architectural qualities. Largely, it is presented as an associative structure of the mind, a spatial framework of memory for Norwegians, which ought to connote historical memories and symbolism. The grid architecture of the façades of the High-rise, we are asked to accept, is not only pleasing to the eye, but should connote equality and democracy. The building does not just display modernistic forms, but is the foremost exponent of modernism in Norway. Bull’s building was erected in a pivotal period of Norwegian history, and we are told to see the building in this historical context. I would suggest that the Government Quarter in the debate is proposed as a *fatto urbano*, that is, as much a cultural product of the collective of Norwegians over two hundred years as the site of architectural remains. According to Roede, Berre, and Riksantikvaren, and others who rally to their support within the next months, the quarter consists of physical buildings of high architectural quality, but it is also a mnemonic for Norwegians, reminding of narratives deemed important to the nation. It is physical and mental, individual and collective, contemporary and historic. Its physicality points to the processes of its coming into being, to its different historical states, and to affiliated events. It is indicated that the latter are the former’s *raisons d’être*.

\(^{44}\) Cf. *Fatto urbano* in ch. 4.
Revision of the functional memory of Norway

This early article asserting the importance of the political history and the history of architecture and art is prototypical of many of the coming contributions. It brings knowledge of historical events and processes from academic environments into public circulation, but the ‘facts’ come as ready-made selections, carefully construed for the national self-awareness. The buildings are ‘central works’ and ‘masterpieces’ that ‘document’ and ‘mirror’ political processes of ‘nation building’ and ‘symbolise social democracy’. Both 1814 and 1905 are referred to in the article, the most emblematic years in the historical chronology of Norway’s self-image, also when none of the political processes of those years explicitly are claimed to have exerted influence on the coming into being of the architecture. This may be read as an attempt to secure the canonisation of the buildings and the associated narratives by linking them to already canonised history. The gregariousness (Halbwachs) of the different memories seems to spring from a wish to legitimise some of them by the means of other, already established ones. The articles do not so much contribute to the public debate with facts from critical history, but rather position the government architecture in relation to established lieux de mémoire (Nora), the symbolic nodes and connection points of the national memory. The debate, positioned at the intersection of the communicative and cultural memory of overlapping professional and national interests, I believe, can be regarded as the public arena for shaping the active memory of the nation. In the wake of 22 July, it is the process of rearranging the functional memory, the small operative and inhabited fraction of the cultural memory, which is sanctioned by the cultural fellowship of the Norwegian nation. Articles like Nipen’s implicitly suggest that the architecture of the Government Quarter, at least the buildings by Erling Viksjø and Henrik Bull, should take the place of architectural sites in a national canon, as a spatial framework of the functional memory of the nation.

To some degree, the quarter was already a part of a spatial framework of national memory, but rather to recall political events of the government and, as I suggested earlier, the visits by foreign heads of state. It did not, to a large extent, connote nationalistic pride or a mythical story of nation building and

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45 Cf. Affirmative places – Gedenkorte in ch. 5. There are certainly similarities between the suggested character of the Government Quarter in Nipen’s article and the topographical lieux de mémoire. The latter ‘owe everything to the specificity of their location and to being rooted in the ground – so, for example, the conjuncture of sites of tourism and centers of historical scholarship, the Bibliothèque nationale on the site of the Hôtel Mazarin, the Archives nationales in the Hôtel Soubise’. P Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’, Representations, 26/1 (Apr. 1989) [Fr. orig. (1984)], 22.
sovereignty. On the contrary, several contributions to the debate have pointed out that the Government Quarter lacked the symbolic quality that can be found in the parliament building or in the Royal Palace. Journalist Marie Simonsen argues that the buildings of the Government Quarter are primarily a workplace, not a symbol most people or the government have a strong relation to … Before 22 July few knew [the High-rise as a concept referring to the prime minister], which is likely because journalists do not use the High-rise as a metaphor for the government or for power. The building has never been synonymous with the prime minister. In fifty years it has not managed to become a symbol, even if it has Picasso on the walls … if anything, it symbolises the labyrinths of bureaucracy.

In a dispute in *Fortidsvern*, the periodical published by the Society of the Preservation of Norwegian Ancient Monuments (Fortidsminneforeningen), the topic is addressed again. Architect Ulf Grønvold argues that the High-rise symbolises the executive power of the democracy and that media uses pictures of it as an illustration of that power. He also refers to that political demonstrations address the government at the High-rise and not at the Royal

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Palace (Figure 37). Art historian Leif Maliks argues that it is the Royal Palace that represents the executive power of the state. It is in front of this building that every new government is portrayed by media after having received its blessing by the head of state, the king (Figure 38). He nonetheless admits that symbols of the national memory could change. ‘It does not prevent that events like those of 22 July could dislocate such connotations, but they probably do not alter fundamental facts; potent symbols rarely come into existence overnight’.49

Earlier I pointed to the increase in images associated with the Government Quarter. Searches carried out in the Nordic media archive Retriever Research similarly illustrate the dramatic increase of the use of the term ‘regjeringskvartalet’ in journalistic material.50 Prior to the attack the total amount of articles in paper-based Norwegian periodicals containing the term amounts to a little less than 7,000. One year after the attack the number of articles including the term has more than doubled to well over 15,700. The occurrence of the term increased from almost 600 articles the year before to a little less than 9,000 in the year after, or more than fifteen times the

Figure 38. The new government of 2009, posing for in front of the Royal Palace.

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50 ‘Regjeringskvartalet’ most often refers to the Government Quarter in Norway, only occasionally to similar sites in other countries.
A memory walk through the Government Quarter

The establishment of the Government Quarter as a site of the nation’s functional memory is partly the result of the massive media focus since 22 July. Maliks suggested that national symbolic connotations could be dislocated. I believe there are several indications that the 22 July events are influential enough to cause the creation of a new, potent symbol of the Government Quarter in the course of a few years. Important to that symbol is

51 For the term ‘høyblokken’ or ‘høyblokka’, the increase is about thirteen times compared to the previous year. It is probably not as indicative, since the term more often relates to other high-rises than ‘Regjeringskvartalet’ relates to other government quarters.
the mental image of the architecture that people need in order to structure historical and political connotations. As a spatial framework of national memory it needs to be defined and construed.

With defined I mean, in this context, the processes of finding shared, architectural features or places, the common denominators that most people will include in the image of the quarter in their own internal spatial framework of memory. The contributions of the architects and art historians, I would suggest, have it as one of their unspoken agendas: what aspects or places in the quarter are worth knowing? After having been exposed to countless pictures, reports, and opinions, some places or features appear as more important: the two main façades of the High-rise – and not the façades of the Y block, G block, S block, or R4 – with the grids of concrete elements that circumscribe the windows (Figures 36, 39); Grubbegata and the entrance to the High-rise from that side, which in our memory includes the image of the bomb van, the crater after it, and the rubble after the explosion (Figures 8, 10, 25, 40); the landings of the stairs of the High-rise with the integrated artwork sandblasted into the concrete walls (Figure 41; Not, however, the artwork in conglo-betong, a conglomerate concrete technique with a polished stone surface employed in the façade of the annex on the Akersgata side of the High-rise; Figure 42); the materiality of the naturbetong in the concrete surfaces of the High-rise and the Y block (Figures 43, 30; Not, however, the granite of the G block façade; Figure 6); etc.52 It also seems that people are more willing to recognise as important the buildings that have been designed to have a monumental character, in the sense of being impressive and representative, like the High-rise and the G block, than those with less self-aggrandising style, like the Y block, the S block, and the R4.

With construed I refer to what these places point to in terms of cultural memory, beyond their pure form. We learn to interpret the raster façade as markers of ideals of the architectural period of modernism, representing equality and democracy with architectural form.53 The gaping windows – at least this is my impression from the many depictions – used in media in the

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53 Critique has been directed at the suggestion that the architecture connotes equality and democracy. See e.g. Kronborg, ‘Folkets høyblokk’; Maliks, ‘Kan en bygning være demokratisk?’.
Figure 40. Grubbegata Street after the explosion. The Y block to the left and the S block to the right.

Figure 41. Artwork on the landings in the High-rise, c.1959.
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Figure 42. *Conglo-betong* in the façade of the High-rise annex.

Figure 43. *Naturbetong*. 
days that followed 22 July seem to portray feelings of suffering, loss, and grief (Figure 44).54 The entrance used to refer to photographs depicting the coming and going of politicians. Now it rather reminds of the dead and wounded and the vulnerability of the state administration. The street Grubbegata is directly linked to the discussions of security before and after 22 July. The artwork by Carl Nesjar, Pablo Picasso, and others is said to point to the young generation of artists and to relations with the international avant-garde at the time (Figure 28).55 Nils Anker, a representative of ICOMOS, lets us understand that the ‘natural concrete’, naturbetong refers to the granite façades of the first government building by Bull and offers an interpretation of a ‘peculiar Norwegian character’.56

Some references are visible in the materiality, such as, for instance, the fenestration of the façades of the High-rise, the surface treatment of the concrete, or the sandblasted artwork. These belong to what I have earlier referred to as explicit aspects of the spatial framework of memory.57 They are formal expressions in the material intended by the architect and artist. To the explicit spatial framework belong also the marks of damage from the explosion (Figure 45). They are visible, but not originally intended. When it is argued that the Viksjø buildings should be restored to make it impossible to see any marks of the explosion in the materiality, it expresses a disinclination to let the quarter become an explicit spatial framework, a reminder of the 22 July events.58 It implies that the explicit sides of the framework are believed to be effective mnemonic cues and that it is possible to forget or ignore the associations of the spatial framework as long as the visible signs are not present.

Other references to cultural memory are not expressed in the architecture. They form implicit parts of the spatial framework that are ‘raised to the status of signs’, not ‘accentuated by signs’, as Jan Assmann formulates it.59 Fully restored buildings, or parts of buildings that have not been damaged, would

57 See Explicit and implicit spatial frameworks of memory in ch. 5.
58 Hans-Henrik Egede-Nissen put forward this opinion in the seminar at the AHO, 2 November 2011.
recall the events of 22 July and aspects of the political history, despite the lack of any explicit signs. As a site of *antëische Magie* (Aleida Assmann), it reminds us of what we have learnt to associate with the spatial framework of
that place. The sensory involvement with the materiality intensifies the experience of our historical memory. Like for Cicero and his friends, who vividly pictured Plato walking in the ruins of the academy in Athens, for Norwegians to stand in the Government Quarter may intensify their feelings and imagination related to 22 July, even if all visible traces should have been concealed. Many Norwegians went to the site where it happened; to observe for oneself and walk through the surroundings seems to intensify the experience. Their visit capitalises on the antaeic aspect of historic events. If the event, like Antaeus in the myth, loses contact with the ground, it becomes deprived of the potency of the material site in our imagination. On the site, history and the past concretise into tangible impressions. Even newly designed government buildings, erected in the place of the existing, would probably carry connotations to the 22 July events and to Norway’s political history before and after, even without any visible signs. If the architecture of Viksjø was razed, new architecture may not be able to free itself from associations of what has been lost and what has taken place there.

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60 Cf. Imaginative places – antëische Magie in ch. 5.
61 Cf. Berlin Stadtschloß that has not been forgotten decades after its destruction or the recently demolished Palast der Republik. Cf. n. 90.
Edifices

For the explicit spatial framework, like for the implicit, more knowledge is needed than what we get from the visual observation. We need to know in what way this concrete façade differs from any other concrete façade and why it is important or beautiful. Regardless of whether it is explicit or implicit, in the framework the building is essentially an index pointing to other realms of knowledge, written down in books and documented in libraries, storages, and archives. Having learnt something about the art and the architecture, for example in newspaper articles, as individuals we may go back in our minds to the places of the spatial framework to localise and reconstruct our memory of those readings or add new facets to existing memories. Similar to the passing from place to place, from *locus* to *locus*, in the mental architecture of the classical art of memory and picking up mental images that we have placed there as reminders of things we want to remember, we can move from place to place in our mental representation of the Government Quarter and be reminded of the most important issues or symbols related to it. In our minds we can trawl through our spatial framework, ‘walk’ from Grubbegata (Figures 8, 40) to the entrance (Figure 25), via the windows and the concrete in the façade (Figures 36, 43), to the art in the landings (Figures 28, 41), to the rooms on the top floors where prime ministers held meetings and received guests (Figures 16, 17, 21, 22). Throughout the mental walk we pick up associated memories of things we learnt from media or elsewhere. The spatial framework of memory enables the reconstruction of other memories as an intuitive art of memory.

The scholar can perform the same mental walk, but at each place pick up things not from his own memory, but from artefacts like literature, drawings, or photographs. In this process of cultural remembering – which I have employed myself in the writing of this chapter – the mnemonist scholar can retrieve, organise, and compile statements and significations and assess their validity and relevance. If the art of cultural memory, described in the

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63 For the reader who is unfamiliar with the buildings of the Government Quarter, the photographs that illustrate this chapter offer a possibility to create a preliminary spatial framework of the architecture, as a ready-made series of mental places.

64 For a discussion on remembering by means of artefacts, see *External frameworks of memory* in chapter five.
Disputed spatial frameworks of memory

previous chapter, normally is a highly specialised technique for organising spatial complexes of memory and knowledge in purpose-built edifices like museums or libraries, the practice of structuring cultural memory by means of the spatial framework of the government architecture becomes an informal and spontaneous art of cultural memory. Instead of an arrangement of rooms, tables, and shelves, the places and features of the buildings make up what I have called second-degree cultural landmarks, which offer associative intersections with external frameworks of articles, books, and photographs.

The choice of places and features emphasised in the public debate corresponds to the selection of places in the architectural discourse. After 22 July a great number of photographs depicted the R4 building on fire (Figure 3). Its architectural value, however, has been considered to be considerably lower than Erling Viksjo’s buildings, and so the contributors to the debate have simply avoided referring to it, leaving it unsaid that it could be demolished. The architects and art historians instead put forward in the debate the key buildings and architectural features that they argue should be included in the collective spatial framework of the new national memory, and they supplied it with a set of associations and references. What was proposed for the nation already existed in the functional memory of the disciplines of art and architecture.

Phases of the debate

About five or six dozen newspaper articles and a dozen or two articles in periodicals, in my opinion, make up the core of original contributions to the debate in the first half-year or so. The opinions come from architects, artists, architectural historians, and art historians – several of them hold, or have held, prominent positions in cultural and academic institutions. Some also come from other professions related to urban planning and the building industry. Most people express their views in interviews or letters to the editor. In addition, there are dozens of government-produced documents and reports and numerous journalistic reports on the development of the different processes related to the quarter. Looking back at the debate of the first half-year or so, one and a half years later, I see a development in three phases. The first two or three weeks saw an immediate response by people who contributed to quickly mapping different aspects of political history and the

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65 Cf. An art of cultural memory in ch. 5.
66 The R4 building was the only building in the quarter not to be included in the suggested protection plan for the Government Quarter, authored by FAD and Statsbygg in 2010. It was suggested that the G block, the High-rise, Møllergaten 19, the R5, the S block, and the Y block as well as the avenue of linden trees in front of the High-rise were protected. Beskrivelse av verneforslag (FAD).
history of art and architecture that would form arguments for the restoration of the High-rise. The reasoning is sketchy rather than coherent and characterised by urgency.

The next three months, approximately until November 2011, consisted of a consolidation of the arguments. It could appear as a communal enterprise, in which individual professionals and scholars seemed to feel obliged to fill in where they saw aspects or details missing, with respect to architecture, art, and history, but also to commemoration policies after 22 July and to psychological issues relating to the employees who worked in the buildings. The different aspects are discussed in depth, filled in, and supplemented. After that phase, in my view, little has been added to the perspectives, concerns, and symbolism already presented in the debate.

The third phase turned the debate in a different direction. On 8 December 2011 Statsbygg delivered a report to FAD that included several externally produced documents. FAD announced that it would publish the report in the first week of January 2012 together with its decision on what to do with the

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69 I argued for this in the seminar at AHO, 12 March 2012. I based my assertion on a comparison of recent debate articles (November 2011–March 2012) with the classification of the arguments of the debate so far, which I presented at the seminar at AHO, 2 November 2011. I refer to the media analysis report carried out by Statsbygg and also give an overview of the perspectives in the debate as well as maps the role of the contributors. Statsbygg, Medieanalyse – regjeringskvarterets framtid – akteren med meninger (Oslo, FAD, 2012).

Government Quarter.\textsuperscript{71} The media had already reported that a working group existed, and many feared that the conclusion in January would suggest demolishing the High-rise.\textsuperscript{72} It was a reasonable concern. A few weeks earlier Rigmor Aasrud, Minister of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs (FAD), had said that if the report showed that the constructive parts of the High-rise had been weakened in the explosion, it would be torn down. Also if it had not been weakened, she opened up the possibility of demolition, as one of two scenarios.\textsuperscript{73}

In the months from November 2011, until some weeks after the report was eventually published, on 26 January 2012, the debate flourished. The contributions of the third phase were not so much aiming at supplying the debate with additional facts or opinions, but at supporting the circulating statements with legitimacy. Most of what was said repeated the claims of earlier statements. After that the debate activity was limited and the media focus was directed at the trial of Anders Behring Breivik, which took place from April to June 2012.

\textit{Legitimisation}

Shortly before Christmas 2011 the Director General of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage, Jørn Holme, called for the restoration of the High-rise, paralleling a prospective reconstruction with that of the highly symbolic Håkonshallen in Bergen, a royal residence and banquet hall from the thirteenth century that was damaged by an explosion in 1944 and reconstructed between 1955 and 1961 (Figure 46). Holme explained that ‘Like a history book the Government Quarter recounts the development of the Norwegian state, from simple conditions to one of the richest countries in the world’.\textsuperscript{74} He affirmed the qualities of the architecture, the treatment of

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\item \textsuperscript{73} Before Christmas, Aasrud was asked about her opinion on the concrete High-rise: ‘I believe that the debate about the buildings is irrelevant in a situation where many people were killed. And I have to admit – I grew up in the countryside and I do not think such concrete blocks are beautiful. But I promise that it will not have an influence on the decision I take and the advice I give my employees … Security will be important and matters much to me … Functionality is also important … We need to consider issues of conservation … The feelings of the employees are also important.’ O Mjaaland & W Fuglehaug, ‘Riksantikvaren krever fredning av Høyblokkene’, Aftenposten Morgen, 21 Dec. 2011, sec. Nyheter, 4–5. Already a few days after the bombing, Aasrud had expressed doubt that the High-rise could be restored: ‘With my naked, untrained eye I get the impression that it will be extremely demanding to restore the government block [the High-rise]. The damage is so enormous’. Dahlum, et al., ‘Kan bli minnesmerke’.
\item \textsuperscript{74} J Holme, ‘Høyblokken – et nasjonal monument’, Aftenposten Morgen, 21 Dec. 2011, sec. Debatt, 6. The Directorate had already in early August expressed that they wanted to wait until more was known about the
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Figure 46. Håkonshallen, Bergen. Construction begun in the 1240s.

concrete, and the integration of the art. The High-rise turned into ‘a building that expressed new ideals about the role of art in public environments. … Architecture and pictorial art became so intimately combined that they appear inseparable’.

In a similar manner, representatives of most of the organisations concerned with cultural heritage and the built environment entered into the debate to sanction the case for restoration of the High-rise and the Y block. The Foundation for Design and Architecture in Norway (Norsk Form), official advisor to the Ministry of Culture, referred to the buildings as ‘a historical point of reference in our democracy’,75 the Cultural Heritage Management Office in Oslo (Byantikvaren) appealed for not making the mistake of tearing down a building that likely will be valued in the future,76 and Oslo Museum emphasised the role of the High-rise as

condition of the buildings before taking part in the debate. At the time, FAD and Statsbygg worked on a protection plan in collaboration with Riksantikvaren. Cf. n. 66.

a materialised storyteller of history. It says much of the development of the
Norwegian modern democracy, and represents important architecture
historical values. Furthermore, it is obviously important urban history. And, as
we have seen, tragically, in relation to 22 July, new layers are constantly
added to that history. Because the building holds many histories and symbolic
values, we hope that the building will be preserved.77

Also non-governmental organisations were asked about their views. A voting
member of ICOMOS’s international scientific committee on 20th Century
Heritage, Nils Anker, stressed that the building was a symbol of ‘the welfare
state’s belief in the future and its optimism. The restored building could also
symbolise that the most destructive forces could not break the government or
the democratic values of our society’.78 The organisations Society for the
Preservation of Norwegian Ancient Monuments (Fortidsminneforeningen)
and Norwegian Heritage (Norsk Kulturarv) both argued that the decision
should be raised from the level of FAD to the level of the prime minister.79

The representatives of museums and cultural heritage organisations could
be regarded as the notables of the disciplinary memory of art and architecture
in a similar manner as Halbwachs saw notaries, auctioneers, and union
secretaries as authorised representatives of legal memory.80 The conservators
and architects are appointed by the municipal or state administration or by
peers in the organisations to advice and make judgements in certain matters.
The institutions they head should administer the cultural memory upheld by
the historic buildings and environments, just like the institution of the notary
public ensures the remembrance of transactions of land and contracts.

In the same period, the journalists brought other notables into the debate to
give their legitimising opinions. Leading parliamentary politicians were
consulted to account for the position held by the parties, as were central
politicians of the Oslo municipality, like the Governing Mayor and the Vice
Mayor for Environment and Transport.81 A former prime minister also gave

78 Anker, ‘Et hus til ettertanke’.
<http://podkast.nrk.no/program/kulturnytt.rss> accessed 9 Nov. 2012. Secretary General of
Fortidsminneforeningen, Elisabeth Seip, gives her support for the preservation of the High-rise, quite aware of
the secrecy surrounding the report she had authored for Statsbygg and FAD, which had not yet been published.
80 Cf. Notables of memory in ch. 2.
81 Erik Solheim of the Socialist Left Party (SV), Minister of the Environment with responsibilities for cultural
heritage, stresses that the building is a symbol of the rebuilding after the war, of international modernism, and
2012) <http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.7968844> accessed 12 Nov. 2012. He will later add that ‘We have
a national and international obligation to take care of [the High-rise].’ E Solheim, ‘Stygt storting?’,
his opinion. Other legitimising voices active in this period include CEOs of significant Norwegian property developers, prominent firms of architects, the artists who executed the original artwork of the building, and the daughter and grandchildren of Erling Viksjø. Also, at least three times, in opinion polls Norwegians were asked for their views on whether to tear down the High-rise or not. Another process of legitimisation is related to the debate that went on at the same time concerning where, and in what form, the official memorials after 22 July should be placed. I will return to address that process later.

The Government Quarter, a Gedenkort
Aleida Assmann has pointed to how the official functional memory serves to legitimise regimes. By the selection of canons of political history, literature, music, art, and architecture, as well as of the sites to which these official memories are attached, the dominant cultural and political sphere directs the

Democratic Party (KrF) and leader of the Parliament’s 22 July committee, argues that the High-rise should be torn down because of reasons of economy, function, and security. ‘Hareide: – Høyblokken bør rives’, NTBtakst, 19 Dec. 2011. He later explains that ‘I recognise the many cultural heritage values in the building but, obviously, we cannot keep all old buildings.’ Jan Tore Sanner, deputy of the Conservative Party of Norway (H), and Gjermund Hagesæther of the Progress Party (Frp) support the decision by the ministry to postpone the conclusion. Their parties have not concluded on whether they favour demolition or restoration. Trygve Slagsvold Vedum of the Centre Party (Sp) and Ola Elvestuen, deputy of Norway’s Social Liberal Party (V) and Vice Mayor for Environment and Transport in Oslo, hope that the High-rise can be saved. M Ronning, ‘Tommelen opp for utredning av høyblokken’, NTBtakst, 26 Jan. 2012. Governing Mayor in Oslo, Stian Berger Røsland (H), argues that a highly symbolic building such as the High-rise should be restored to its previous state. ‘Byrådslederen vil ikke endre Oslo etter 22. juli’, NTBtakst, 21 Nov. 2011.

Kjell Magne Bondevik (KrF) argues for the demolition of the R4 and the S block and for the restoration of the High-rise. K M Bondevik, ‘I et fornyet regjeringskvartal’, Aftenposten Morgen, 31 Jan. 2012, sec. Debatt, 6. Later, in June 2012, other former prime ministers are consulted: Kåre Willoch (H) hopes it will be preserved, Thorbjørn Jagland (Ap) is of the opinion that the symbolic values of restoration as well as of demolition have been exaggerated, and Odvar Nordli (Ap) says he would not miss the building, if it was torn down. T Bergsaker & S Prestegård, ‘Splittet. Eks-statsministre har ulikt syn på høyblokkas skjebne’, Dagbladet, 29 June 2012, sec. A, 8.

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See Tasks of functional memory and storage memory in ch. 5.
attention to certain symbolic entities of the past. The unwanted elements of the cultural memory are kept outside of circulation and influence by means of censorship, destruction, neglect, and ignorance. The process of legitimisation of historical and symbolic perspectives on the government buildings in Oslo offers a complementary perspective to Aleida Assmann’s. In a parliamentary democracy like that of Norway, with free speech, the public debate takes the form of a struggle for influence over a changing functional memory of the nation.\textsuperscript{89} Whereas several of the contributors are official advisors to the government, the interchange of arguments has, to a large degree, been exposed in media. The decision-making processes are kept within the government, but the documents produced by and for the government as a basis for decisions have been published on the Internet after the decisions have been made, at least this is what FAD claims.

On the one hand, the process of legitimisation reveals itself as a didactic dissemination and repetition of certain themes, in the hope of establishing the Government Quarter as a spatial framework of national memory. It is my impression that the implicit aim of those in favour of restoration is to transfigure the quarter into a Norwegian \textit{Gedenkort}, a normative site for the commemoration of exemplary deeds and heroic suffering in Norwegian history. As a \textit{Gedenkort}, the quarter can be added as a cultural landmark in the greater spatial framework already supporting the nation’s functional memory: sites of decisive historic battles, like those in Hafrsfjord (late ninth century, Figures 47, 48) and in Stiklestad (1030, Figure 49), royal residences like Håkonshallen (1240s–, Figure 46), Akershus Castle and Fortress (1290s–, Figure 50), and the Royal Palace (1849, Figure 20), and modern political sites like the parliament building (1866, Figure 19) and Eidsvollbygningen (c.1770, Figure 51).

I observe that the contributors aim at consolidating the selection of values and symbols to be collectively associated with the spatial framework of the Government Quarter. It is a process of turning the functional memory of the history of art and architecture and the current communicative memory of collective grief into a stable functional memory of the nation, bound to the site and publically recognised. In order to be embraced by Norwegians in general, I get the impression that the complexity of historical and art

\textsuperscript{89} In what may seem as its zeal for complying with the ideas of free speech and transparent political processes, FAD published all attachments to Statsbygg’s report of November 2011, including a document written by the German Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) that was marked with ‘VS – Nur für den Dienstgebrauch’, a confidential document on the disposition, planning, and security of German government buildings, not to be circulated publicly. It was later blanked out in the online document. Statsbygg, \textit{Questions from the Norwegian Directorate of Public Construction and Property regarding experience with planning and operation of government buildings} (Oslo, FAD, 2012).
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Figure 47. Battle at Hafrsfjord, late 9th c. Painting by Ole Peter Hansen Balling. 1870.

Figure 48. Monument over the battle at Hafrsfjord by Fritz Røed. 1983.
Figure 49. Depiction of St Olaf being killed at Stiklestad in 1030. Olavsfonnalet, early fourteenth century, Nidaros cathedral, Trondheim.

Figure 50. Akershus Castle and Fortress, Oslo. Construction begun in the 1290s.
Figure 51. Eidsvollbygningen. c.1770.

Figure 52. The rows of linden trees in front of the High-rise. 2008.
historical narratives bound to the buildings needs to be simplified and preferably tied to existing cultural symbols. For instance – and this is not my recommendation of how to do it, but an extrapolation of how the site could ideally look according to such a line of thinking – a Government Quarter Gedenkort that captures select events in Norway’s modern history in an intelligible manner could include: one, the rows of linden trees lining the entrance on one side of the High-rise (Figure 52) and the only remainders of Empirekvartalet from the period following 1814, when the status of Christiania (Oslo) changed from a provincial city of Denmark to the capital city of Norway; two, the 1906 building, the first government building to be erected on the site, tied in time to Norwegian autonomy following the 1905 dissolution of the union with Sweden; three, the High-rise as the marking of the social democratic welfare state after WWII, with concrete art associated with the international art world through Picasso; and four, a reminder of 22 July in the form of a memorial or visible marks from the explosion. For a publicly embraced Gedenkort, symbolic conciseness allows for better remembrance; details should be left to the notables of the national memory, like historians and architectural historians, and other material remnants than those mentioned are preferably removed to not obscure the simplicity of the normative site of memory.

On the other hand, and more explicitly than the aim to establish the quarter as a spatial framework of the nation’s functional memory, the legitimising voices contributing to the debate attempt to influence the decision making of the government with regard to the question of demolition or restoration. Vanished architecture does not necessarily lead to the forgetting of it or its cultural connotations – compare, for instance, with the disputes over the demolition of Palast der Republik in Berlin and the prospective reconstruction of Berlin Stadtschloß on the same site (Figures 53, 54).90 Indeed, even if there are no physical remnants, the known location as such seems to be enough to ground remembering, as Halbwachs demonstrated with regard to the legendary topography in the Holy Land, where no material traces from the environment of the time of Jesus remain.91 In Stiklestad, to

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take a Norwegian example, nothing remains of the battleground from 1030, only the place names in the area.\textsuperscript{92} And like the chapels built by Christians from the fourth century onwards on sites accounted for in the Gospel, a church was erected in 1180 on the spot where it was said that St. Olaf had perished a century and a half before (Figures 48, 55).

Despite such considerations, the debate on the Government Quarter in Oslo seems to imply that the preservation of certain of its buildings provides the ultimate legitimisation, suggesting its transfiguration into a cultural landmark in the spatial framework of national memory. A decision to restore some of the buildings is perceived as an acknowledgement of the values and symbols ascribed to them by the milieus concerned with architecture and cultural heritage. If the government does not follow the advice given by the institutions it has authorised would be understood as an expression of distrust.

The report ‘The Government Quarter. Provisions for subsequent work’ (‘Regjeringskvartalet. Føringer for videre arbeid’) by Statsbygg, with supplements written by external consultants, was published online by FAD on 26 January 2012.\textsuperscript{93} It offers a number of conclusions to direct the


\textsuperscript{93} Statsbygg, \textit{Regjeringskvartalet Føringer}, 3. Cf. n. 70.
subsequent work and four scenarios for the planning processes. The report recommends co-locating government premises in the quarter for reasons of departmental interaction, security, and its 200-year tradition as a site for the state administration. It further concludes that it cannot be verified whether there will be any psychological effects on the victims and their relatives, if the damaged buildings are torn down or restored, respectively, but it asserts that, according to a consensus in the ‘specialist literature’ (*faglitteratur*), a memorial should be established in respect of the victims, and the building parts most associated with the attack should preferably be modified to provide no visual reminders. Of the damaged buildings, not counting the G block, the High-rise is regarded as the most important, followed by the Y block. The report also concludes that only minor damage has been inflicted on the primary load-bearing structures of these buildings, but considerable damage has been caused to façades, interiors, and technical installations.

On the press conference on the occasion of the publication of the report, Minister Aasrud of FAD emphasises that no decision has been made with regard to what buildings should be restored or demolished, but she informs that the investigations and development of scenarios, including several stages

Figure 54. Postcard with Berlin Stadtschloß. 1920s.
of quality assurance, will continue until the end of 2012.\textsuperscript{94} She invites the public to contribute, especially through the blog that FAD keeps open for comments until 1 April 2012, and announces that the decision will finally be made in 2013.\textsuperscript{95} The debate sees little activity during the summer and autumn 2012,\textsuperscript{96} but a group of consultants have been appointed to develop different scenarios for the buildings of the quarter to be finished in the summer 2013.\textsuperscript{97}

On 1 January 2013, in a comment to the press, Minister Aasrud encourages a new debate about what should be thought of when building a new Government Quarter, and who is of what opinion.\textsuperscript{98} She further mentions that

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some buildings have to be demolished because of their bad conditions. It does not seem to apply to the High-rise, of which she says that the ministry will need to consider what the most appropriate way of using the building is, practically and concerning heritage values. She reports that the ministry also looks at possibilities of incorporating the Deichmanske library building into the Government Quarter. At the time of the final editing of this chapter, March 2013, the future state of the High-rise and the quarter is still undecided.

*Commemoration of the 22 July events*

Considerations of how the Government Quarter may function as a national site for the memory of the 22 July bombing and the Utøya massacre has only been discussed to a limited degree in the first year of the debate. A number of people have commented on where a memorial could be located, but few have reflected on how it could be organised and what roles it might take publicly.99 One of the latter was Ketil Knutsen, historian and memory scholar, who offered a reflection on national policies of remembrance in his comparison of a prospective site for remembering of 22 July and the newly opened memorial at Ground Zero, New York. Pointing to the political function of national memory, he suggests that

> The potential of the monument *minnesmerke* is that it functions as a constant reminder of who we are and where we are going as a nation through its physical presence in a landscape where people travel. In this way, it socialises new generations into society, builds common identities, and communicates values. In many cases, places of memory *minnesteder* could also be used to justify political projects.100

With reference to historian Jan Bjarne Bøe, Knutsen suggests that a site of commemoration, like that of the Government Quarter after 22 July, constitutes a marker that directs the attention to a certain side of the past, as a guideline for the present and direction for the future. With its form and

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choice of site, the monument offers an index to who and what should be remembered and forgotten, respectively.

In the previous chapter I distinguished between originally intended architectural features and later added marks as two explicit aspects of the spatial framework of memory. These are associative signs, visible in the architecture and therefore different in character from the implicit aspects that are projected on to features of the architecture. A built memorial to the victims of the 22 July events could make up an explicit framework of memory. The architecture is ‘accentuated by signs’ (Jan Assmann) that are placed there deliberately to remember certain things. The existing buildings, if they are restored, may instead be seen to constitute an implicit monument of the explosion; it is ‘raised to the status of signs’. The associative images exist in the minds of Norwegians as automatic connotations when they see or think of the government buildings, but neither architectural elements nor damages caused by the explosion remind of the bombing. Different from the former, the latter will not only point to 22 July memories, but also be capable of recalling political history and aspects of the history of art and architecture that precedes the attack.

Concerning the question of whether or not the Government Quarter should be made into a memorial to the 22 July events, the debate on the demolition or preservation of the High-rise becomes entangled with other debates that have characterised the public sphere since July 2011. In the aftermath of the bombing in central Oslo and the massacre on Utøya, the government gave the Ministry of Culture (KUD) the mandate to form a group that should evaluate the establishment of minnesmerker or minnesmonumenter (both approximately ‘monuments’ or ‘memorials’) to honour the dead, the survivors, the rescue teams, and the volunteers.101 On 22 December 2011 the group was organised under the direction of former Minister of Culture, Åse Kleveland, and came to include the secretary general of KUD, the director general of FAD, representatives of the support groups of victims from the two sites and their relatives, and the secretary general of the youth organisation AUF. At the beginning of the report, the group makes a distinction of terms by introducing a third term that had not been included in the mandate: minnessted (approximately ‘place of memory’). The group defines the terms minnesmerke and minnesmonument as ‘a designed element,

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permanently placed in the public space to remind of a person or event’. They come as signs or boards in stone or bronze, or as reliefs, busts, statues, or buildings with clear references to the object of remembrance. *Minnesteded*, they say, are more dynamic places that could, but do not need to, include clear references to what should be remembered through descriptions or monuments. Equally important, they argue, a *minnested* is ‘a place for reflection on an event and its consequences’ that, different from *minnesmerke* or *minnesmonument*, does not direct the attention to only one incident, but could cater for other memories. It could consist of a larger site, thus not restricting itself only to a *minnesmerke* or a *minnesmonument*. It ‘appears as less static and controlling’, they assert.

As a surprise to many, the group ends up suggesting a national place of memory, or *minnested*, of the bombing of the Government Quarter to be located at Nisseberget, in the park surrounding the Royal Palace in central Oslo. Nisseberget did not play any role during or after the 22 July events, but, as the broadcasting company NRK was quick to point out, it had been the place for a memorial stone erected by the Quisling-led Nazi government in 1941, in honour of the Icelandic historian and poet Snorri Sturluson (1178–

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102 ibid., 8.
The recommendation rests on practical grounds, the group asserts, and it is only because of the uncertainty of the reconstruction processes in the Government Quarter that they do not suggest the latter as the national place of memory. In its evaluation of the different places, however, the report emphasises the ‘obvious relevance’ of the Government Quarter because of its ‘proximity to the event, from the beginning one of the criteria for a place of memory in Oslo’. It also states that ‘The place is already established as a place of memory that people go to’, and if it is not chosen for a national place of memory, a ‘beautiful and dignified marker [markering] over the deceased’ should be established on the site. The group delivers the report to the government on 25 April 2012. On 22 June the same year, only weeks after Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg has visited the memorial on Ground Zero in New York, Minister of Culture Anniken Huitfeldt and Minister Aasrud announce that the future Government Quarter will include a national place of memory as well as a monument (minnesmerke) for the 22 July bombing. A temporary place of memory will be located between the Y block and the Deichmanske library for the period in which the quarter will remain a building site (Figure 57). Public Art Norway (KORO), the government’s professional body for commissioning art in public spaces, is appointed for the task of establishing the sites.

In his article on the importance of place in Halbwachs’s writings on memory, Gérôme Truc has shown how the designation of a place for commemoration in another place than on the site where the commemorated event took place frees the latter to be what he, with Kenneth E. Foote, calls rectified. The place is restored to normal order, so that it can be used like before the event. The proposal to position a memorial for 22 July victims at Nisseberget may mirror a pragmatic stance of the group to rectify the Government Quarter for the need of the state administration, avoiding the
allocation of space to a place of memory and its association with connotations to the terrorist attack in the centre of political representation.

A receptive place
With Aleida Assmann, an Erinnerungsort can be described as a remaining physical site that has ceased to function as a collective spatial framework of the communicative memory of one or several groups.\textsuperscript{108} The material remains are emptied of the active memory of the groups that used it and left open for new constructions of meaning. The absence of living memory, Assmann suggests, has to be replaced by linguistic transmission. It needs to change from being a spatial framework of communicative memory to one of the cultural memory. Since 22 July, all professional activity that made use of the affected buildings has stopped and moved to other, temporary premises, except for the work of clearing the debris and safeguarding the thousands of graded documents that had been spread by the blast. According to Statsbygg’s calculations, the affected parts of the quarter will remain a building site until sometime between 2018 and 2027, depending on the choice of scenario.\textsuperscript{109} The discontinuation of active use of the site by different

\textsuperscript{108} Cf. Receptive places – Erinnerungsorte in ch. 5.
\textsuperscript{109} Statsbygg, Regeringskvartalet Føring, [28].
groups, especially by the government administration as a part of their zone de l’activité technique, suggests the status of the quarter will be as an Erinnerungsort, at least until it can be used again by state officials and citizens. The debate has demonstrated that the site has been considered to be receptive to meaning, in the sense that it has been understood to be able to reflect new values, which were not previously associated with it, at least not by Norwegians in general. The material remains, which most people cannot get access to see, other than through media representations, do not necessarily tell us anything through their materiality. It is the contributors to the debate who suggest the selection of important parts and places within the quarter, and ascribe to them the meanings we should recall upon seeing them or thinking of them.

It is possible to argue that the Government Quarter is not an Erinnerungsort. The groups who used to work in the site continue to function, but in other locales, and those engaged in the debate more than before use the spatial framework of the site for professional and political considerations. Nonetheless, there has been a break in the active use of the site that will stretch out in time for so long that most other groups, except for those working on its reconstruction, will focus less and less on the quarter. People may pass through the area on a daily basis again, but there will be few mediated images of politicians in front of the High-rise or on its top floor other than in reportages relating to 22 July commemorations or the process of reconstruction (Figure 58). It will cease to function as a spatial framework of the zone de l’activité technique of the government administration. New, temporary premises will support the rituals for the next couple of years or decade. The rupture also made groups that did not previously focus their attention on the buildings attentive to it, like practising architects and conservators. The public engagement with the site, greater now than before the blast, seems to point to a need for filling in the emptiness of meaning after the government administration left the site, in a manner that reminds of Aleida Assmann’s Erinnerungsort.

In the conclusion of his study of the legendary topography of the Holy Land, Halbwachs postulates two basic laws that seem to govern the organisation of cultural memory in places. He suggests that sites that have previously been consecrated with cultural memories easily attract new memories. Even memories of events that have nothing in common, he reasons, nonetheless come to strengthen each other by being situated in the same place. Collective memories, so he suggests, display ‘a kind of'
Figure 58. 1st anniversary of the 22 July bombing and Utøya massacre at the Government Quarter, with Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and HM King Harald V.
gregarious instinct'. He infers this from the observation that most places of Jesus’s life, as they were accounted for in the Gospel, made use of sites that already carried strong symbolism in the collective memory of the Jews. So Jesus is said to have been born in Bethlehem, the city of David, and to have died in Jerusalem, the great religious centre of the Jews. It appears as if such a gregarious character of collective memory can be identified also in relation to the Government Quarter, at least when considering the many representatives of the political and cultural establishment who have laboured to bind to the quarter a multiplicity of memories. They have referred to a variety of aspects of political history and the development of the modern Norwegian state, to history of art and architecture, and to the remembrance of the events of 22 July, many of which are bound to other symbolic crystallisations of national remembering: to the state administration of the new nation after 1814 and the sovereign nation after 1905, to the social democratic welfare state’s development after WWII, and to a liaison in the Norwegian art world with an international celebrity like Picasso.

The aspects that have been given prominence in the debate seem not to compete with associations and symbolism bound to other sites of the nation and the state, but to provide supplements. The Government Quarter fills in and adds to the memories affiliated with the parliament building (symbol for parliamentary democracy and the representation of the provinces), the Royal Palace (the residence of the head of state, the king, and the making of Oslo into a capital in the nineteenth century), or the Eidsvoll building (the writing of the Norwegian constitution). These complementary aspects, together with the gregarious character of the memories, suggest the validity and vitality if the Government Quarter was turned into a new, affirmative Gedenkort for the Norwegian nation. As a spatial framework of the functional memory of the nation, it would rise from the ruins of the Erinnerungsort and from the rupture of social and cultural frames, caused by the bombing and the massacre. It remains to be seen if the government will decide to tear down some of the historical relics of the proposed revision of the spatial framework of the functional memory of the nation.

It is tempting to conjecture that the process of creating a commonly embraced cultural concept of the Government Quarter may already have come so far as to no longer be dependent on the physical buildings. The quarter seems to be on its way to transfigure into an immaterial entity. If all

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111 ibid., 139–44.
existing architecture is torn down, the spatial framework of the quarter loses its material part, left as an empty site, just like the one where the Berlin Stadtschloß and the Palast der Republik stood in Berlin, reconstructed only in memory or through photographs. It would contribute to making the place even more abstract, with a mythical rather than real character. Such a place is a *Gedenkort* without physicality, an incorporeal entity, located as an image in the collective spatial framework of memory. The symbol may not be weakened, but it may be strengthened, compared to if the buildings are left standing.

**The orchestration of the spatial frameworks of memory**

In the Introduction, in relation to Astrid Erll’s article ‘Travelling Memory’, I raised the issue of the travelling character of architecture and of spatial frameworks of memory. The debate over the Government Quarter is an example of cultural processes that redefine the spatial frameworks affiliated with the quarter. They move, change, split up, consolidate, and are exchanged. The one physical site finds its representation in multifarious spatial frameworks of memory, spread over the minds of many individuals and groups. What I have shown here is how the rupture caused by the explosion sparks reactions in certain milieus. By making public their opinions, they contribute to redefining those of other groups. We have seen how the spatial frameworks of the Government Quarter, with the symbolic weight ascribed to them by architectural historians and others, have embarked on a journey, implicitly in the hope of being established in the national fellowship, explicitly to restore some of the damaged buildings. I have also conjectured how the spatial frameworks of memory, because of the drastic increase of media exposure, for most people, have become clearer images that carry with them different and stronger connotations.

As an immediate consequence of the bombing, the spatial framework of the Government Quarter also travelled outside of Norway in countless photographs and headlines, to establish itself as one of the sites via which the Western world recalls terrorist attacks, akin to Oklahoma in 1995, New York and Washington DC in 2001, Madrid in 2004, or London in 2005. In this comparative act, the Norwegians also needed to understand their own site of terror in relation to established conceptions that had travelled to Norway from abroad, and relate it to political motives quite different from the latter
three examples. The bombing itself may be seen as an act that defies a presumed permanence of architecture, but regardless of whether the buildings will come to stand or be torn down, the explosion came to act as a catalyst for processes of cultural change. The architecture proved not to be permanent in terms of its national conceptualisation, but was destabilised overnight. The multitude of spatial frameworks that existed in the memory of the different groups began to be revised and exchanged between them. The modification processes implicating these mental images will, no doubt, influence the future physical state of the Government Quarter. In the Introduction, I suggested that the title *Edifices* referred to the representation of the singular physical building in a plurality of spatial frameworks, and that the term points to the ambiguity of architecture as, on the one hand, a construction of form and material and, on the other, as thought constructions in memory. The discussions of this chapter imply that to use the word in the plural also mirrors architecture’s multiple representations over time and in different immobile and mobile media.

Figure 59. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, HM Queen Sonja, Secretary to the Gov. Nina Frisak, and HM King Harald V meet in the Government Quarter, 24 July 2011.

Cf. the study by Michael Rothberg in which he argues that memory articulated in the public sphere necessarily cross-references and borrows from that of other cultural spheres: ‘pursuing memory’s multidirectionality encourages us to think of the public sphere as a malleable discursive space in which groups do not simply articulate established positions but actually come into being through their dialogical interactions with others’. M Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory* (Stanford, SUP, 2009), 5.
Conclusion

Let us now gather our thoughts, close our eyes, and go back in time to the furthest point possible for us, so far as our thoughts can still focus on scenes or on people that we store in memory. Never do we go outside of space.

— Maurice Halbwachs, *La Mémoire collective*, 1997

Images of space in memory appear to be fundamental in processes of social life and culture. In this thesis I set out to identify a theoretical framework that could organise different types of spatial representations and the way they may complement, interact, or interfere, to be employed in studies of architecture and memory in the humanities. Through analyses of selected works of Maurice Halbwachs, Kevin Lynch, Aldo Rossi, Aleida Assmann, and Jan Assmann, and in the study of the debate over the Government Quarter in Oslo after 22 July 2011, I have successively outlined up a concept of architecture and memory. Before contemplating the results, I will summarise its main features.

The spatial frameworks of memory

Different from the previous chapters, in the following I intend to consider the spatial framework of memory as a theoretical framework under one, as a synthesis of several lines of thinking. Therefore, I will not account for the indebtedness of the different aspects to the different theorists, as I have previously done, but instead outline the basics of the concept seen in its

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Edifices

coalessence. It may be useful to compare with the schematic overview in Figure 60, below, while reading the following.

Summary
In its most fundamental understanding, the spatial framework takes the form of stable but dynamic notions, accumulated over time in the memory of individuals. Schematised and abstracted, these spatial representations need to be actualised in order to reconstruct other memories. Pertaining to physical counterparts or being of entirely fictitious or imaginative character, the spatial frameworks can be manoeuvred in thought to get access to other, similarly stable frameworks – social, temporal, and linguistic. In this manner, they take on the role of spatial mnemonics, an innate equivalent to the use of mental places in the art of memory. We remember space in order to remember other things.

Subsuming under the term a variety of conceptual distinctions, the concept rests on two postulates. First, architecture, seen from a memory perspective, always exists in plural. From the perspective of the individual, the spatial framework that corresponds to a building, a city, or a landscape, together with its connotations, takes on a different character, depending on the group that he for the moment identifies with. His framework offers a point of view on the collective framework of each group. Seen from the perspective of society, the physical environment is mirrored differently in the spatial framework of every specific group. There are as many frameworks as there are groups that sustain a relation to that part of the environment. Furthermore, over time, the framework of space takes on new forms and recalls different memories, thus existing in plural also for each individual and for every group. I have referred to such temporally delineated frameworks as epochal–spatial frameworks of memory.

Second, recollection is assumed to be an individual act, biologically based in the brain, but by definition conditioned by social collectives. Following Halbwachs, this thesis does not recognise a dichotomy between individual and collective memory as two different types of remembering. Differently, the collective is thought of as inherent to individual thought, questioning perspectives that regard individual recollection as isolated from social settings. The individual places himself in relation to the group and makes use of the collective frameworks of thought when he localises and reconstructs the past, whether in private or in social settings. The frameworks of social relations, of time, and of space are constructs originating in social interaction and distributed in the memory of the group members. The individual has his own perspective on the collective frameworks of the group, and the group’s
collective frameworks can be regarded as a common denominator of the individual outlooks on the framework.

In acts of remembering, the individual may actualise the spatial framework in memory, but he could also employ percepts from the environment. The latter have been referred to as material or external frameworks of memory, suggesting their similar role as catalysts for processes of remembrance such as that of the internal spatial frameworks. It is only with reference to the cognitive act that material artefacts could be considered as memory, metonymically speaking. To differentiate between architecture as internal and external spatial framework of memory is to recognise the dual nature of space.

An aspect of the dual nature of space is what can be referred to as social morphology or the study of the material form of societies, the family, the state, or industrial companies. Dominant groups in a part of space externalise onto the physical environment the forms they have conceived in the collective spatial framework of their minds. It turns into a material framework for all the groups that move through the space or have a relation to it, and it is internalised as the new spatial framework of their memory. Through the work of representatives like politicians, urban planners, architects, or other influential professions, which in the context of social remembrance can be called notables of memory, larger societies like the citizenry of a town or a nation constantly alter the material surroundings according to changes in their internal framework (to cater for growth, transport, trade, etc.), which in turn is revised to correspond to the environment’s current physical state and to be used as a new basis for decisions. In this way, we can speak of a territorialisation of the physical landscape by the collective memory of the ruling group, an investment of mind in matter. To consider the mechanisms of social morphology and the dual nature of space suggests a shift from regarding physical environments as original and primary and their representation in memory as their reproduction or something that comes after, to recognising the conceptions of space as inherent to social memory dynamics, sometimes preceding, sometimes following, and sometimes differing from the external material forms.

Central to the definition of the mind-internal spatial framework is that its actualisation in memory primarily is a means to localise other memories – experiences, people, emotions, history, or symbolism. When the act refers to informal and everyday situations in which group members informally search for the past, it takes place in the communicative memory. Such acts play out in the company of the family, friends, or colleagues and are characterised by reciprocity of roles, non-specialisation, and changeability. When the act of
remembering refers to formal and institutional situations, in which specialists, the notables of memory, search for the past with the support of artefacts like books, artwork, buildings, or archives, databases, or cities, it can be considered as part of the cultural memory. While earlier high cultures may have drawn a distinct line between the realms of communicative and cultural memory, our contemporary society rather sees a sliding scale, where internal and external frameworks of the memory are employed together and in different configurations, and where memory contents move from one side of it to the other.

Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish between explicit and implicit spatial frameworks. Explicit frameworks or aspects of frameworks denote intended or unintended visual marks, like style, ornamentation, patina, or damage. They are accentuations by signs. The architecture has been created or altered to provide cues to certain memories. For implicit frameworks or aspects of frameworks, the architecture is correspondingly raised to the status of signs; it is semioticised. It comes to associate certain memories over time without referring to them by formal cues. Both the explicit and implicit aspects of the spatial framework of memory are only indexes that point to other frameworks or to different memories and are not in themselves self-explanatory. The architectural style of a building requires pre-existing or additional knowledge of architectural history, either from memory or from books, in order to be recognised. A building in which a historic event took place, but where the materiality was not altered as a result of the event, does not, by its appearance, denote what happened and cannot be understood without certain knowledge of history, either brought there or acquired on the site.

Moreover, the spatial framework may either support the storage memory or the functional memory of the discipline, the society, or the nation – the two extremes of a perspectival scale of the cultural memory. As spatial frameworks of storage memory, the spaces of archives and libraries support the institutionalised work with the heterogeneous and contradictory mass of traces from the past, all the bits and pieces currently not ordered into coherent narratives. Spaces of exhibition halls in museums, normative sites of commemoration, and carefully selected historic and political buildings, on the other hand, structure the legitimisation and identity building of the functional memory. They organise and disseminate the canons of national history, art, architecture, etc.

Within the spatial framework of an environment – the neighbourhood, the city, or the country – some spatial entities stand out because of their significance to the processes of remembering. Such entities can be identified
Conclusion

on, at least, four levels of societal memory. One, on a perceptual level, visually salient buildings or environmental features stand out as universal landmarks of orientation, supporting the cognitive act of identifying our whereabouts and finding the way in larger areas of space that we cannot overview in one glance. The thesis has not addressed the landmarks of orientation in detail, but acknowledges the study of imageability of environments as a bordering field of study and which becomes relevant as a subsocial level of the spatial framework of memory.

Two, on the social level, collective landmarks are shared locations of the group and associative connection points between the landmark and points of reference in its social and temporal frameworks of memory. For instance, the homes of family members make up such intersections in the communicative memory of the family, offering themselves as mnemonics of relatives, family history, and values. We may speak of a tendency towards gregariousness of memory in the collective landmarks, indicating that sites already invested with memories seem to attract new memories.

Three, the cultural landmarks of historical buildings, places of commemoration, or museums are points in the framework where informal social groups’ everyday practices of communicative memory interact, overlay, or come into conflict with the institutionalised cultural remembrance, performed by notables of memory like historians, art historians, or conservators. They provide transfer points, where the content of the functional memory of the nation is disseminated to be taken up by the communicative memory, but also where the processes of dissemination occasionally go in the other direction. With the term fatto urbano we could understand such cultural landmarks not only to serve both the communicative memory and the cultural memory, but also to make up external and internal spatial frameworks and have explicit as well as implicit aspects. The term thus points to the amalgamation of materiality and collective imagination, of general history and collective memories, pointing to such publicly important architectural objects or complexes as intricate cultural composites.

Four, the second-degree cultural landmarks offer intersections between different external frameworks of memory in the architecture of archives, storages, and libraries. The landmarks are components of the specialised mnemonic I have called an art of cultural memory, in which classifications of art, history, or science are organised into spatial systems of buildings, rooms, shelves, tables, and archival cabinets. The landmarks act as referential indexes to other external frameworks of the cultural memory, artefacts or other classifications.
In addition to the general theoretical framework summarised above, I have also suggested including an apparatus of conceptual shortcuts to point to the shape and use of spatial frameworks in particular cultural contexts. The *entourage matériel* denotes the environments and material objects families surround themselves with and invest their memory in. *Generationenort* describes the accumulations of *entourage matériel* over centuries, places in which generations embed and structure their collective memory. I have suggested *Heimat* as a corresponding term to describe situations where such an intimate chain of attachment to the *entourage matériel* is broken, but where the previous *Generationenort* is maintained as a spatial framework of collective or cultural memory, in migrated and diasporic communities.

A number of distinctions specify the roles spatial frameworks take in specific contexts of social remembrance. In the *zone de l’activité technique*, the spatial layout of the buildings and premises of a profession is employed to organise and pass down the informal and formal memory of precepts, rituals, and hierarchies. In the material landscape the *topographie* structures a set of religious beliefs through mnemonic sites, exemplified through the erection and administration of chapels and churches in the Holy Land in the places of significance in Jesus’s life according to the Gospel. Religious collective memory, moreover, can be seen to support and stabilise itself through the reproduction of spatial frameworks in the material architecture of churches and chapels.

What is left after a site has ceased to function as a spatial framework for a group is an *Erinnerungsort*, a place whose remaining and meaningless materiality is in need of reinterpretation and redefinition. The result of such a process may be a *Gedenkort*, a place that normatively construes the past by means of the site, or a *traumatischer Ort*, in which the site’s affirmative interpretation is blocked because of disputed, unspeakable, or shameful elements. A central feature of these places lies in the phenomenon of *antëische Magie*, the strengthening of an individual’s or a group’s historical imagination through the visual appropriation of the physical environment where historic events are said to have taken place.
Figure 60: Schematic overview of the spatial framework of memory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>kind of space</th>
<th>kind of memory process</th>
<th>shortcut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>spatial framework of memory</strong></td>
<td><strong>landmark of orient.</strong></td>
<td><strong>environmental image</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>internal</strong></td>
<td>memory for orientation</td>
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<td>in memory</td>
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<td><strong>communicative memory</strong></td>
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<td>collective landmark</td>
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<td><strong>cultural memory</strong></td>
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<td><strong>external</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>material framework</td>
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<td>2nd degree</td>
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<td><strong>functional memory</strong></td>
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<td>cultural landmark</td>
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<td><strong>storage memory</strong></td>
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<td>immobile media</td>
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<tr>
<td>(building, city, landscape)</td>
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<tr>
<td>mobile media</td>
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<tr>
<td>(photo, text, painting)</td>
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<td><strong>entourage matériel</strong></td>
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<td>Generationenorte</td>
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<td>Heimat</td>
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<td><strong>zone de l’activité technique</strong></td>
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<td>topographie</td>
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<td>Gedenkorte</td>
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<td>traumatische Orte</td>
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<td>antëache Magie</td>
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<td>notables of memory</td>
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<td><strong>art of cultural memory</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Erinnerungsorte</td>
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Further studies

During the work with the thesis several issues have surfaced, which only to a limited degree were treated in the main sources or which deviated too much from the main concern. This study has been suggested as a contribution to the establishment of a theoretical framework of architecture and memory in the humanities, and some of the following issues could indicate further areas of study that might complement it.

Central to the notion of collective memory are the social groups. In acts of remembrance, the individual places himself in the position of the group and reconstructs the past by means of collective frameworks. In his three books on memory Halbwachs refers to a multitude of different smaller or larger groups, but rarely discusses what makes up a group or what defines the specific groups that he analyses. Lynch and Rossi also presuppose the existence of social and cultural groups, but offer few descriptions. The same applies to Aleida and Jan Assmann. Scholarship in sociology and social psychology could arguably provide conceptual tools for the assessment of groups in relation to the spatial framework of memory on the micro level, for instance the delineations and overlaps of groups, group conduct, the dynamics between the collectivity and the group members, etc. On the macro level of society, other fields of study could also contribute to understanding the complexity of group identities and dynamics in relation to space: nationalism, globalism, transnationalism, migration, diaspora, etc.

Various aspects of time are important features in the theories of Halbwachs, Rossi, and Aleida and Jan Assmann, and my analysis of the dispute over the Government Quarter in Oslo has demonstrated dramatic alterations to the spatial frameworks over a fairly short time period and a rapid change from a condition of stability of meaning to a more volatile state. Exchanges of and alterations to the spatial framework cannot be assessed without considering time. A central aspect of the plurality of the spatial framework of memory lies in the temporal accentuations; certain frameworks stay stable within a group for a long time, but suddenly the inertia is challenged by external forces, like when the bomb detonated in the Government Quarter. Terms like Ruth Klüger’s timescape and my epochal-spatial framework of memory suggest possible paths of analysis, but offer relatively crude chronological images. Other philosophies of time may be

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more useful for assessing the development of frameworks over time and the interchange between groups. Chronological perspectives may seem too limited in their one-dimensional scale, just as it may be to consider the *travels* of the spatial framework.\(^3\) I would like to raise the question of whether the spatial frameworks of memory should be studied in their *orchestration* over time, with an allusion to musical notations and the transport of motifs by different instruments, changing in intensity over time, sometimes appearing in chorus, and sometimes as individual voices. An analysis of group-bound frameworks’ developments over time could expose the totality of the *arrangement* of architectural representations, which, like a symphony, is only possible to perceive as an accumulative product of time and social interaction. To analyse the orchestration of the memory related to a site, as I have attempted to do in chapter six, may appear as the dissection of the cultural composite that Rossi has termed *fatto urbano* into its various components: the affiliated groups and their notables of memory, the processes developing over time, the forums of memory exchange, the various spatial frameworks and landmarks, and the associated values and memories.

A further aspect that I have only briefly touched upon in the thesis is the mediation of spatial frameworks through *mobile media* (Rigney), such as photographs, drawings, and texts. What is the difference between built architecture and mediated representations of it, when it comes to their role as a framework of memory? What about replicas of architecture in other places, e.g. plaster casts in museums or reconstructions of historic architecture – are they to be considered as mobile or immobile media? To what extent should virtual worlds in computer games or websites be considered as locations (immobile media) or as documents (mobile media)? Studies of these and other questions of media and mediation of architecture could make an important complement to the study of the spatial framework of memory.

Lastly, I should mention the relation of the spatial framework of memory to scientific studies. Scholarship in geography, psychology, and neuroscience has expanded the theories of how man perceives, cognises, and remembers space. Studies in spatial cognition, context-dependent memory, situated cognition, cognitive maps, way-finding, spatial memory, etc. could broaden the understanding of the basic mechanisms that underlie the social and cultural functions of the spatial framework of memory. In this thesis such aspects have predominantly been represented by the work of Kevin Lynch.

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\(^3\) For a study of different patterns of time and temporal continuity in collective memory, see E Zerubavel, *Time Maps. Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past* (Chicago, UCP, 2003).
Widening such perspectives may inform the study of architecture and memory in society.

**Application**

The concept of the spatial framework of memory has intentionally been outlined as a free-standing theoretical framework. It is, to a large degree, rooted in memory studies in sociology, architecture, and *Kulturwissenschaft*, but in addition it draws on a plethora of other humanistic perspectives. Its position at the intersection of the different fields suggests its usefulness in a variety of contexts. It is not my intention to limit the scope of possible application and elaboration; instead I leave to others to determine its potential and limitations. Nonetheless, from my standpoint and with my experience, I would like to suggest a few directions into which it could be fruitful to take the concept of the spatial framework of memory, anticipating some of its reasonable applications. I am aware that because some of the following pertains to professional practice I run the risk of being accused of confusing the critical responsibility of the scholar with the creative and operative task of the architect, planner, or conservator. Such was Peter Collins’s critique of architectural historians, who ‘breathe too heavily down practicing architects’ necks [overlooking] the crucial difference between the theory and the history of architecture; between the way buildings are built and the way they were built’.  

A similar concern has recently been voiced by memory scholar Jeffrey K. Olick, who fears that memory studies has become part of and economically dependent on the *memory industry*, and that its critique and theories increasingly are employed and applied outside of academia. I will not address such questions in depth here, but merely suggest that there is reason to hope, at least for an architectural theorist with a background in practice, that critical theoretical thinking should, and could, underpin professional work.

In the Introduction I argued that architecture and place have been criticised as too permanent or stable features in studies of memory, despite the historiographies of places of memory in anthologies like *Les Lieux de mémoire*, which have demonstrated that memory attached to such places

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5 J K Olick, ‘Worlds of Memory’ [conference paper], *Towards a Common Past?*, Lund University, 14–16 May 2012.
Conclusion

certainly changes over time.\textsuperscript{6} As a counterargument, the concept of the spatial framework of memory may demonstrate precisely the transience and multiplicity of place in social memory. With the study I contend that place and architecture are of great importance to sociocultural memory, not due to their presumed stability, but because of the cognitive advantages that physical or mental places have for the organisation of the past, especially with regard to social and cultural collectives. Cities, landscapes, and sites need to be addressed in memory studies – not at the cost of other objects of study, but as a fundamental and integrated aspect of the processes of communicative and cultural memory. To dissect the spatial frameworks of memory means to confront readings of the environment that regard it as something singular, stable, and permanent.

In studies of diaspora, migration, and (post-)national identity, space often takes the form of memory constructions. The homeland is constructed anew in the host country, its framework strongly influenced by, or set up against, the new environment and its cultural and political connotations. Space takes on a temporal character; the place one came from is linked to periods of the past and the new place to the present life, for better or for worse. I have previously sketched out how Halbwachs’s spatial frameworks of memory can be used to reflect on the complexities of space in contexts of displacement and repatriation.\textsuperscript{7} The concept put forward here offers a larger analytical framework that can contribute to the assessment of place in migratory and diasporic communities and the dislocation of meaning and identity related to places that seem to follow the displacement of the group.

Processes of memory politics linked to the built environment, like the one I have addressed in chapter six, and to the construction and administration of memorials could benefit from analyses of their cultural-political organisation. The spatial framework of memory could contribute to dissecting the different stakeholders, interests, and memories, and their connection to physical or mental spaces or objects. Awareness of the mechanisms of social memory and of groups’ differing construal of place can be heightened and the foundation for making decisions enhanced. With the distinction of internal and external frameworks the attention could be directed not only to the


physical artefact, but also to the specific group images, acknowledging the plurality of architecture in memory.

In professional milieus of urban planning and cultural heritage conservation, the spatial framework of memory could help rethink existing theories for urban and rural landscapes’ relations to the past. In the work with registration and plans, its apparatus of distinctions could address the various historical memories or symbolism bound to locations and architecture and distinguish between institutionalised memories (history, art history, architectural history) and the informal communicative memory of local communities. The accountability for such issues may further the appreciation of the built environment as a spatial framework of the collective memory of families and neighbourhoods in places where the architecture has little or no importance for written history or for architectural history. It can also provide tools for assessing various kinds of intangible or immaterial heritage bound to architecture, but not expressed visually in it, like traditions, professional rituals, and cultural symbolism.

As a last example I will mention how aspects of the theoretical framework could be advantageous for investigating the organisation of knowledge artefacts in architectural space, as I have briefly touched upon in chapter five. In studies of museums, libraries, or archives, the notion of the second-degree cultural landmark as a cognitive support for what I have called an art of cultural memory could prove a relevant theoretical perspective. It emphasises the role of spatial representations in memory for the classification and architectural organisation of knowledge.

**A theoretical framework for studies of architecture and memory**

Through a rereading of Halbwachs’s writings on memory, with a particular focus on space, I have suggested the concept spatial framework of memory as a theoretical framework for humanistic studies of architecture and memory. I have proposed complementary specifications of the concept by looking at its transformations in the writings of architects Lynch and Rossi in the 1960s and in the works of memory scholars Aleida and Jan Assman in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, I have demonstrated the theoretical framework in the analysis of the debate over the Government Quarter in Oslo after the bombing on 22 July 2011. In the Conclusion, I have summarised the findings and suggested possible studies that could complement the concept and

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indicated areas of application. The theoretical framework proposed in the thesis offers an understanding of architecture as *edifices* rather than *a building*: as the multiple spatial frameworks of different groups, media, and times and as complex systems of notions and beliefs. It is time to leave it to the readers to assess.

The study has only scratched the surface of the potential use of the theoretical framework that the spatial framework of memory makes up. I have outlined some of the main realms of a dynamic and pluralistic concept for studies of architecture and societal memory, while others remain to be uncovered in evaluations and elaborations by future scholarship.
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Figure 1 Aerial photo of the Government Quarter in Oslo, before the explosion. Source: Fornyings-, administrasjons- og kirkedepartementet <http://blogg.regjeringen.no/regjeringskvartalet/> Accessed 25 Mar. 2013.

Figure 2 The High-rise after the explosion, seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass. Photo: Thomas Winje Øijord/Scanpix. Source: <http://www.bygg.no/image/37238/1/37238_1.jpg> Accessed 25 Mar. 2013.


Figure 8 The street Grubbegata after the explosion. The G block in the background and the R4 to the left. Photo: Olas fotoblog. Source:


Figure 12  The S block seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass. 1980. Photo: unknown. Source: *Regjeringskvartalet 3. byggetrinn* (Ferdigmelding nr. 223, Statens bygge- og eiendomsdirektorat, 1980).


Figure 15  The entrance to the Hammersborg tunnel underneath the Y block. The High-rise and the G block in the background. Photo: Schybba. Source: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/61554587@N00/5991261191/sizes/o/in/photostream/> Accessed 25 Mar. 2013.


Figure 22 The conference room in the addition to the High-rise, built in 1990. Photo: unknown. Source: Høyblokken i Regjeringskvartalet. Påbygg for Statsministerens kontor og lokaler for regjeringen. (Ferdigmelding nr. 360, Statens bygge- og eiendomsdirektorat, 1990).


Figure 26 Still from the video shot in Grubbegata immediately after the explosion. The air is filled with dust. Left, the canteen of the High-rise, right, the R4. Photo: Andreas Helgesen. Source: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_1barHYa5e0> Accessed 25 Mar. 2013.


Figure 28 Artwork by Picasso is drawn up on the wall before it will be sandblasted by Carl Nesjar, left. On a landing in the High-rise. Source: <http://digitaltmuseum.no/things/regjeringsbygningenhyblokka/NMK-A/NAMF.00603.034> Accessed 25 Mar. 2013.
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Figure 45 The damaged canteen annex to the High-rise. The draped High-rise in the background. Photo: Trond Isaksen/Statsbygg. Source: <http://www.statsbygg.no/Aktuelt/Nyheter/River-deler-av-kantinetaket/> Accessed 26 Mar. 2013.


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Figure 57  Arne Garborgs plass, the site chosen for the temporary place of memory. Photo: Helge Høifødt. Source: <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2c/Arne_Garborgs_plass_mot_vest.jpg> Accessed 25 March 2013.


Figure 60  Schematic overview of the spatial framework of memory.

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