Risk management in the humanitarian context

- How can the application of risk management activities to initial registration of refugees in Dadaab increase societal safety?

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SUMMARY

The aim of this thesis is to establish the relationship between initial registration and societal safety, to make the reader aware of how the UNHCR in Dadaab is conducting initial registration, and to show that the application of risk management activities on camp management activities can increase the reliability of an operation. The thesis will show that the identification of vulnerabilities embedded within a system, and implementing measures to control and mitigate, them will prevent a registration crisis. The reason for the research is the incentive to apply risk management theories, developed to understand high technological disasters, to the humanitarian context.

KEY WORDS

Risk management, fault tree analysis, latent failures, initial registration, UNHCR, Dadaab
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ACRONYMS

CARE Christian Action Research and Education
CMT Camp Management Toolkit
DRA Department of Refugee Affairs
DRC The Danish Refugee Council
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GoK Government of Kenya
HfR UNHCR Handbook for Registration
HFE UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies
HRW Human Rights Watch
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
HBS Harvard Business School
HI Handicap International
HRO High Reliability Theory
IOM International Organization for Migration
IP Implementing partners
IRC International Rescue Committee
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)
NGO Non Governmental Organization
NAT Normal Accident Theory
NRC The Norwegian Refugee Council
NSF Norske Sivilingeniørers Forening (The Norwegian Graduate engineers Union)
ProGres one unified database that caters for a wide range of UNHCR operations
STC Save the Children
UNHCR The United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction
UN-OCHA The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WLF World Lutheran Federation
WFP World Food Programme
WTK Windle Trust Kenya
1. INTRODUCTION

Certain parts of this world are defined by civil war, poverty, and famine, which have resulted in the devastating reality that millions of individuals have fled their home countries. Over ten millions of these asylum seekers have been declared refugees by the UNHCR\(^1\). In northwest Kenya, over three hundred thousands of these have sought refuge in the camp complex of Dadaab, making it the world’s largest and most congested refugee camp complex. It is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who carries the responsibility to cater to the protection and assistance needs of these refugees and uphold a sense of control in a context of chaos. To safeguard the rights and well-being of people of concern to the UNHCR, and to maintain a level of functionality in times of stress, the UNHCR have implemented several camp management activities, in which initial registration is one. Initial registration acts as the primary information source for a systematic overview necessary to identify protection and assistance needs.

This thesis will explore the implications that initial registration of refugees in Dadaab has on societal safety. Societal safety is a term developed in the last decade in Norway to define the ability of a community, society or system in place to maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizen’s basic requirements in a variety of stress situations (The Norwegian Parliamentary White Paper No. 17, 2001-2002).

“Every organization is subject to crisis, whether it realizes it or not” (Harvard Business School [HBS], 2004, p. xv), and organizations must factor uncertainty into their planning and decision making. A systematic process of working with safety can help organizations reduce uncertainty and control it to a certain degree (Aven, et al., 2004, p. 64). Thus understanding the role of societal safety and how various activities implements it, are vital components of organizational management.

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\(^1\) The terms asylum-seeker and refugee are often confusing terminologies. According to the UNHCR.org website, “an asylum-seeker is someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been definitively evaluated” (UNHCR.org (n.d.) Asylum-Seekers. Retrieved June 8\(^{th}\), 2011, from http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html. The statistics on 10.4 million refugees was obtained by UNHCR.org. (n.d.). Refugee figures. Retrieved June 8\(^{th}\), 2011, from http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1d.html.
A crisis can cause an organization or system to experience financial setbacks, physiological suffering and environmental damage (Miller, 1988). Boin, Hart, Stern and Sundelius (2005), points out that in extreme cases, how a society responds during a crisis, can make the difference between the lives and deaths of individuals. Thus, how the UNHCR operates during stress situations can critically affect the lives and wellbeing of over three hundred thousand individuals. In addition the UNHCR’s performance also affects the host community. A crisis could even cause the entire organization to collapse (HBS, 2004). Or a crisis could affect the UNHCR’s ability to perform in future operations, as the credibility and reputation of organizations is heavily influenced by the perception of their responses during crisis situations, when citizens look at their leaders, and “expect them to avert the threat or at least minimize the damage of the crisis at hand” (Boin et al, 2005, p. 1). As such the crisis becomes ‘institutional’ (Boin and t’Hart, 2000) or ‘reputational’ (Booth, 2000).

Working to systematically improve societal safety is therefore important. To improve societal safety one must not only operate well in times of stress, but also try to mitigate the possibility and consequences of negative events. Prevention is the cornerstone in a safer society (Norske Sivilingeniørers Forening [NSF], 1991, p. 143), and comes from the field of risk management. Risk management is seen as the continuous identification of vulnerabilities within one’s own operations, and the implementation of safety measures to control them. This thesis will therefore also explore how applying risk management activities to initial registration in Dadaab are important in creating a robust UNHCR operation.

The choice to look at initial registration in Dadaab became obvious due to its overwhelming influence in the lives of so many refugees, and because it is evident from recent trends, that the management of current activities in Dadaab, not only affects the lives of the over three hundred thousand refugees but will continue to concern the lives of countless of individuals yet to arrive in Dadaab. “The influx of refugees from Somalia into Kenya is expected to continue in the near future, increasing the number of refugees in the Dadaab camps and further affecting the UNHCR operation, the host community, and the refugees already established within the camps” (in search of protection and livelihoods, 2010, p. 9). The vulnerabilities
that are exposed within initial registration in this thesis are therefore important not just as lessons to apply to the future, but can shape the faith of individuals in Dadaab.

In addition to exploring the link between initial registration and societal safety, and the role that risk management plays in the discipline of societal safety, this thesis will thus also enhance understanding of the processes, procedures and problems that are embedded within initial registration of refugees in Dadaab. Invariably, this thesis is not inclusive of the debates, dilemmas, and challenges regarding initial registration in Dadaab, but should be seen as an entry point into the diverse and complex processes involved.

1.1. Thesis objectives

There are two objectives I hope to meet with the completion of this thesis. First I aim to present the fundamental role that initial registration plays on the UNHCR’s ability to maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizen’s basic requirements in a variety of stress situations. Secondly, I aim to demonstrate the impact of applying risk management, developed to understand crisis in high tech and industrial crisis activities, to initial registration in order to increase societal safety. In this thesis this risk management activities are defined as the identification of vulnerabilities within initial registration, and the implementation of measures to mitigate those vulnerabilities. This thesis explores these connections by applying risk management activities to initial registration in Dadaab.

By establish the important function that initial registration has on societal safety, I hope to increase its preeminence in the overall management of camp activities, which will hopefully add to its prioritization in the delegation of future resources in the field of humanitarian operations. The influx of refugees will continue in the next decade, so the work to improve the conditions that may threaten their sense of security is vital.

1.2 Background for choice of topic

A significant portion of the academic literature that pertains to societal safety is rooted in literature associated with risk and crisis management (Boin, 2006; Smith,
2006a). Boin (2006) points out that this literature has been mostly illustrated by referrals to the high-technological and industrial organizations and subsequent crisis, which gave birth to the research paradigm of crisis management. However, high-technological crisis are far from inclusive of the crisis evident in modern society today, which transcends political, ideological, social and technological boundaries (Smith, 2006a). As most developed countries are intensely concerned with reliability and risk analysis, and sums of money are invested to develop this theoretical area, (Aven, 2006, p. 2), the same type of focus should be given to developing countries and their operational reliability.

It was my wish when choosing a topic for my master’s thesis to expand the concept of societal safety by applying it not to our own western society and beyond that of a high tech and industrial setting, but to the wider international setting of humanitarian relief work. Societal safety is a concept fitting to apply to humanitarian relief organizations operating in refugee contexts, as refugee context are often defined as complex crisis. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) defines a complex emergency as:

A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country program. (Inter-Agency Standing Committee [IASC], 1994, p. 6).

Refugee camps thus become the community, society or system in place which must maintain critical social functions, protect the lives and health of citizens, and meet their basic requirements, because they operate where the overall organ of that society has collapsed, or is unable to assist in emergency operations.

1.3 Problem to be addressed

To establish the fundamental role of initial registration on societal safety and how risk management activities improve societal safety, this thesis will address the research question:
How can the application of risk management activities to initial registration of refugees in Dadaab increase societal safety?

1.4 Sub-questions

In order to address the problem, it is necessary to answer several sub questions:

1. What is societal safety?
2. What is risk management and how does it apply to society safety?
3. What role does initial registration have on societal safety?
4. What implications does a failure in initial registration have on societal safety?
5. What are the vulnerabilities within initial registration that might hinder the achievement of the objectives set forth by the UNHCR regarding registration?
6. How are these vulnerabilities dealt with in the Dadaab context?
7. What measures can be implemented in Dadaab to improve initial registration and thus increase societal safety?

1.5 The organization of the thesis:

This thesis will first explain the refuge situation in Africa, and Dadaab, to give the reader a contextual understanding of Dadaab. Following is the theoretical section, which is divided in two parts, first introducing a new conceptualization of societal safety that incorporates risk management activities, then elaborating on the concept of risk management.

In order to understand the role that initial registration has on societal safety, we need to understand the concept of societal safety. Due to the ambiguousness surrounding the definitions of the core terms that lie at its definition, the first part of the theoretical section will give a boarder definition of societal safety than that found in the Norwegian Parliament Paper 2001-2002, which is outdated, emphasizes too strongly ‘response,’ rather than ‘prevention and change’ (Smith & Elliott, 1993). ‘Prevention’ and ‘change’ are argued to stem from the field of risk management. Risk management is defined in this thesis as the identification of vulnerabilities embedded within a system and the implementation of measures to control or mitigate them. The thesis
argues that such activities can prevent an unfortunate event from occurring. In order to argue for the importance in applying risk management theories to societal safety, the second part of the theoretical section will define in detail what risk management is, why it is important, and how one can use risk management activities. Because this analysis will use a fault tree analysis to discover potential vulnerabilities within initial registration, this part will also define what a fault tree is, and how to conduct such an analysis.

The following section defines the methodology used to uncover the empirical data which supports this thesis. I have used a qualitative approach, and the reasons behind this choice are presented. Following are also discussions on the strengths and weakness of such an approach, the time challenges this thesis faces, as well as discussion on the thesis’ reliability, verifiability and generalization abilities.

Following is the empirical section which has been divided into four sections. The first section describes the benefits that initial registration has for the UNHCR, the host government and the refugees, as well as introducing the objectives of registration. This empirical data will be used to support the claim that initial registration has a fundamental role on societal safety, presented in the first part of the analytical section of this thesis. The second section of the empirical data describes in detail how initial registration is conducted in Dadaab. It will explain what the process is like for the refugee, and the role of the different partners at initial registration. A systematic understanding is important for the identification of vulnerabilities, and is included here so that the reader can understand how the vulnerabilities are interconnected to the various components of the system. The third part of the empirical data presents information from secondary sources. Two reports are presented. The first report, *from Horror to Hopelessness* was included because it lists factors that caused a registration crisis in 2008. It is included as vulnerabilities that need to be assessed in the current context. The second report, *In search of protection and livelihood* (2010), is included because it holds information regarding the relationship between initial registration and the host community, which I was unable to retrieve during my field study. The information here is vital to give support to the vulnerabilities I later discover concerning the registration of Kenyans as refugees. The fourth and last part of the empirical data, introduces several challenges regarding initial registration which came
out of personal interviews and filed observations, supported by objectives from the UNHCR Handbook for Registration, the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies and the Camp Management Toolkit, sources for guidance on how to conduct initial registration in humanitarian contexts. These challenges will be the building blocks for the identification of vulnerabilities embedded within initial registration in Dadaab.

The analytical section of this thesis is also divided into five parts. As previously mentioned the first part will present the role that initial registration has on societal safety. In order to understand the role that initial registration has on societal safety one needs to understand the consequences of the activity when it is able to achieve the UNHCR objectives for initial registration, and the consequences when the activity is unable to do so. After having established the vital importance of initial registration on societal safety, we must explore how robust initial registration is, and where any potential vulnerability may lie. The second part of the analytical thesis will therefore discuss what vulnerabilities might lead to a failure in the system. These vulnerabilities are discovered using the UNHCR objectives of initial registration. The third part of the analysis will apply these vulnerabilities to the Dadaab context, and see to what extent they are embedded within initial registration conducted there. This thesis will present the vulnerabilities embedded within initial registration by the use of an FTA. The forth part of the analysis will utilize the FTA as a foundation for suggesting measures that should be implemented to mitigate these vulnerabilities. It is the viewpoint of this thesis that such actions as the identification of vulnerabilities, and the implementation of measures, will strengthen the reliability of the system, and thus increase societal safety. The fifth part of the analysis will offer a summary of the analysis by discussing how applying risk management activities to initial registration in Dadaab can increase societal safety.

The thesis finished with a conclusion, reemphasizing the importance or applying risk management activities to operations in order to increase societal safety; topics for further research; and a reference list.
2. CONTEXT

This section will briefly give a contextual understanding of the refugee situation in Africa and in Dadaab. As well as information regarding Dadaab’s location, population composition and the various organizations involved in its operations.

2.1 Current refugee situation in east Africa

Though there has been a decrease in the number of refugees in Africa from 3.4 million in 2000 to 2 million in 2010, ongoing violence, persecution and humanitarian crisis are causing new refugee movements in Africa. Especially the uninterrupted fighting occurring in South-Central Somalia has caused thousands of Somali to flee and seek protection and refugee in the refugee camps in the neighboring countries (In search of protection and livelihoods, 2010, p. 9). Kenya is one such country, where influxes of groups of people from Somalia are daily arriving to seek protection and assistance from the UNHCR and the Government of Kenya (GoK).

2.2 Dadaab refugee complex

Dadaab is the world’s most congested refugee complex. The fifty square kilometer space covers three separate camps, Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley, who are between 5 and 10 km apart. The complex opened at the start of the Somali conflict in 1991 to cope with the influx of refugees from Somalia. As a result of this, most of the refugees in Dadaab hail from neighboring Somalia (94.4%), in which the most prominent group is of a nomadic pastoral background (In search of protection and livelihoods, 2010, p. 10). Locals and the bulk of the refugees share a common ethnic background, of which the majorities are of the Ogandan, Aulihan and Abdiwak clans.

2.3 Location of Dadaab refugee complex

The Dadaab refugee complex is located in Lagdera and Faqfi District in the North Eastern Province in Kenya. The camps are approximately eighteen kilometers from

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3 Please see appendix 3 for an overview of Somali refugees in the Great Lakes Region
4 Please see appendix 1 for a map and overview of the three camps in Dadaab.
the semi-arid town Dadaab, one hundred kilometers below the Somali-Kenya border, and four hundred and twenty kilometers northeast of the capital Nairobi. North Eastern Province of Kenya has a population of 1.4 million people, and like most of the North East Kenya area, the location of the camps is spread across semi-arid land of desert vegetation and no surface water.

Figure 1: Dadaab location map


2.4 Population Statistics

For Kenya, according to registration statistics, the camps collectively held 310,942 refugees in January 2011, which is three times the population they were initially designed to accommodate.
In January 2011, of the 310,942 refugees registered, 94.4% of them were Somalis, while 5.3% were from Ethiopia. 8 other nationalities made up the remaining 0.3%. There was an almost even split between male and females with 154,909 refugees being female (49.8%) and 156,033 being male (50.2%).

Table 1: Camp Population Statistics: summary of all camps by county of origin and sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic of Congo</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>7,539</td>
<td>8,802</td>
<td>6,262</td>
<td>16,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>146,894</td>
<td>146,598</td>
<td>89,183</td>
<td>293,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>154,909</strong></td>
<td><strong>156,033</strong></td>
<td><strong>95,882</strong></td>
<td><strong>310,942</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR (23rd January, 2011).

In January 2011, UNHCR conducted 9339 initial registrations in the Ifo camp (which collectively does initial registration for all three camps). According to a UNHCR registration officer, that was the highest number of initial registrations conducted in a one-month period in the last two and a half years. By January 2011, registered refugees in Dadaab had increased to 322,433 refugees.
Table 2: New Arrivals Registration Trends, 2011: an analysis and projections based on actual persons registered in the UNHCR refugee database (proGres).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Totals per Week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>04(^{th}) - 09(^{th})</td>
<td>2,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10(^{th}) - 16(^{th})</td>
<td>2,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17(^{th}) - 23(^{rd})</td>
<td>2,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total registered</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,881</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR (23\(^{rd}\) January, 2011).

Most refugees who arrive in Dadaab are unable or unwilling to repatriate, and with the Kenyan restriction on free movement for refugees, most “are confined to the camps in Dadaab with limited opportunities for seeking employment or traveling” (In search of protection and livelihoods, 2010, p. 10). Thus the only hope of a life outside the camps for many comes down to the possibility to resettle abroad. An opportunity rewarded to only a few. As no additional infrastructure or land had been granted the refugees, the imbalance between incoming and outgoing refugees has put an even heavier burden on the already stretched resources\(^5\). The chronic overcrowded context has lead to inhuman conditions, which makes the current situation in Dadaab a humanitarian crisis.

2.5 Agencies involved with initial registration in Dadaab

According to the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies (HfE): the exercise of registration and issuing the necessary documentations for refugee status is “the primary responsibility of the refugee hosting government” (p.156). In Kenya, the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) is to handle all refugee related matters, including registration and refugee status determination, “however, the Government’s capacity to undertake the function is at the moment limited” (In search of protection

\(^5\) In January 2011, an additional camp referred to as Ifo II was in the final stage of construction. However, while conducting my field work, construction work on Ifo II was suspended following a directive by the Provincial Commissioner of Garissa. UNHCR is currently negotiating for the continuation of the Ifo II development. Ifo II was constructed to host refugees, who were residing in flood prone areas both outside the camps and inside Ifo.
and livelihoods, 2010, p. 10). In cases where the hosting government does not have the resources or ability to perform such duties, the UNHCR may be called upon to assist (HfE, p.156). Such is the case in Dadaab, where the UNHCR have been invited to assist the DRA with registration activities. Nevertheless, “following the enactment of the 2006 Refugee Bill, UNHCR is planning to gradually hand over responsibility for refugee administration to GoK” (In search of protection and livelihoods, 2010, p. 10).

The UNHCR is in charge of the operational responsibility of Dadaab, e.g. registration, status determination and management of refugee camps, including providing protection and assistance to all persons of concern. UNHCR was established on December 14th, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. The agency is mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees.

In Dadaab, UNHCR has hired the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) to conduct camp management activities in all three camps. LWF is a Swedish humanitarian and development operation for the Lutheran Church, with headquarters in Geneva. According to the LWF information officer, LWF’s success in running camp management activities in the refugee camp Kakuma, located in the west of Kenya, consequently made the UNHCR invite them to Dadaab, to head camp management activities there as well (personal communication, February 3, 2011). The information officer for LWF also stated that one of their responsibilities is to coordinate refugee assistance. Several other IPs assists with education, sanitation and development, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Handicap International (HI), International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Windle Trust Kenya (WTK). Save the Children (STC) is in charge of child protection on the social side, while Christian Action Research and Education (CARE) distribute food for the World Food Programme (WFP). Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) runs medical screening during initial registration and conducts

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6 There are two refugee settlements in Kenya. Kakuma is located in the North West Province in Kenya, below the Sudan-Kenya border. Kukuma majorly host a mix of Sudan and Somali refugees as a result of the movement of Somali refugees from Dadaab to Kakuma to lessen chronic overcrowding in Dadaab. Please See appendix 2 for a map and overview of registered refugees in Kenya.
medical services in the Ifo Camp, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) offers medical services in the Dagahaley camp, while the International Rescue Committee (IRC) conducts medical services in the Hagadera camp.
3. THEORY

The theoretical part of this thesis will be divided into two parts. The first part will aim to work towards a conceptualization of societal safety, and how the term incorporates elements from both the field of risk - and crisis management. Often societal safety is associated only with crisis management, but the term crisis management is ambiguous and needs further clarification. If we take it to represent the management of the crisis event itself, we need to incorporate elements of risk management as well in the definition of societal safety, as crisis management is defined by risk management activities. Part 3.1 will close with the introduction of a new definition for societal safety, expanded from its original introduction in the Norwegian Parliamentary White Paper No. 17, 2001-2002. This definition will be used in the remainder of the thesis, and act as justification for the implementation of risk management activities.

The new definition calls for an awareness of vulnerabilities and the implementation of risk measures to control them. The second part of the theory will elaborate on why risk management is important for societal safety, by emphasizing its role in decision-making. In addition it will present the usage of a fault tree diagram to uncover vulnerabilities, and elaborate on the implementation of measures.
Part 3.1 Towards a definition of societal safety

Olsen, Kruke and Hovden (2007) found that societal safety was originally a politically rooted concept. They found the concept first defined in a report to the Norwegian Parliamentary in 2001-2001 in response to the growing awareness of risk and crisis management in societies (Olsen, et al., 2007). The Norwegian Parliamentary White Paper No. 17, 2001-2002 defined societal safety as: “the societies ability to maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizen’s basic requirements in a variety of stress situations” (Olsen, et al., 2007, p. 69). Part 3.1 will work on broadening the current definition of societal safety. This is because in its current form the definition emphasizes response, and not the critical components of prevention and change (Smith & Elliott, 1993), which is necessary to incorporate in order to increase societal safety.

3.1.1 Societal safety as crisis management

The above definition attaches focus on a society’s ability to operate once negative situations have been manifested. Operating during stress-like situations is referred to as a crisis management (Smith, 2006a). Crisis management got a jump start in the 1980s, therefore when most of the academic literature pertaining to its foundation as written, it was ‘still in its infancy’ (Mitroff, Pauchant & Shrivastava, 1988, p. 106). Therefore the academic literature concerning crisis management uses the term without a clear unifying definition (Boin, 2006; Smith, 2006a), and it is therefore necessary to form a conceptualization of the concept crisis management for this thesis.

The concept of crisis management is a relatively new one, only emerging over the past three decades (HBS, 2004). It is a discipline “consisting of skills and techniques required to assess, understand, and cope with any serious situation, from the moment it first occurs to the point that recovery procedures start” (Goel, 2009 p. 25). Often thus, crisis management is depicted as the management of the crisis event itself, once it has emerged and become manifested within a system (Barton and Hardigree, 1995). All too often, organizations only recognize a crisis once it has taken place, and the role of managers is largely “to take action to try to alleviate the problem and may, as a consequence, prevent matters from getting worse” (Smith, 2006a, p. 3).
3.1.2 Societal safety as resilience

Crisis management is often closely associated with the term resilience. As is the norm with concepts of this nature, resilience has also been used in the academic literature without a clear unifying definition (Manyena, 2006). For the purpose of this thesis, resilience is defined as:

*The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase this capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures* (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction [UNISDR], 2005, p. 4).

The definition of resilience is similar to the definition of societal safety in content. However, where the two might vary slightly is in the specific of their objectives. The variation here is that societal safety is focused on the lives and health of citizens and meeting their basic requirements, while resilience might take a more overarching form. Equal to both terms however is the definition of resilience as the “capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest” (Wildavsky, 1991, as cited in Manyena, 2006, p. 437)

The importance in incorporating the definition of resilience by the UNISDR in this thesis, is that the UNISDR definition elaborates on the concept of maintaining an acceptable level of functioning by stating that “the degree of resilience for a society depends both on the social system’s capability to learn from past disasters and to improve risk reduction measures” (UNISDR, 2005, p. 4). To such the definition of resilience gives an elaborate definition of how to reach the objectives. The recipe of how to reach the objectives of societal safety is missing from the current definition of societal safety.
3.1.3 Societal safety as risk management

It can be argued that risk management should not be defined under the current definition of societal safety, which concerns acting once a stressful situation has been manifested, as risk management activities are activities that take place prior to a crisis situation unfolding (Smith, 2006a). According to Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort (2005) however, “in studies of crisis management, issues of planning, prevention and aftercare have gained importance” (p.6). Olsen et al. (2007), argue that the ability of society to maintain critical functions and practice appropriate crisis management will largely depend on what has been done to prepare for the crisis before it arose (p. 71).

Crisis situations are often defined as periods of urgency and ‘occasions for decision’ (Robinson, 1969, p. 81; Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1997), with elements of surprise (Hermann, 1969) and uncertainty (Rosenthal et al., 2001). The ability to respond and act under pressure, in dynamic situations and with access to ambiguous information is heavily dependent on how well the system is prepared. Such preparedness comes from the field of risk management, and “requires that organizations develop capabilities aimed at recognizing and acting upon early warnings and weak signals around potential problems” (Reason, 1990a, 1997; Turner 1976, 1978).

Not only can risk management activities prepare a system for a crisis, but “when emerging vulnerabilities and threats are adequately assessed and addressed, some potentially devastating contingencies simply do not happen” (Boin, et al, 2005, p. 1). According to Smith (2006b) “the ability of ‘management’ to identify and intervene to prevent crisis from occurring could, therefore, be seen as an important attribute for an organization” (p. 301).

Societal safety aims to be reliable, in the definition that reliability is the “unusual capacity to produce collective outcomes of a certain minimum quality repeatedly” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, p. 153). In such cases there must be a “lack of unwanted, unanticipated, and unexplainable variance in performance” (Hollnagel, 1993, p. 51). These variances occur if vulnerabilities that are present in the organization are left unmanaged to become latent failures (Reason, 1990b; 1997). Latent failures are the cause of many organizational crises (Reason, 1990b; 1997). According to Reason
(1990b) these failures cannot be amended by implementing more ‘engineering fixes,’ rather “further improvements in reliability will require more effective methods of risk management” (p. 476). In order to do so, we need to understand what risk management is.

3.1.3.1 What is risk and risk management?
In order to create a conceptualization of risk management, I first need to give a clear definition of the term risk. The notion of risk has been widely debated in the literature, and the ambiguity around its construction has given rise to literature solely on the attempt to define it. Risk can be both a positive and a negative phenomenon, and therefore does not always necessarily need mitigation (Aven, 2007b). However, for the purpose of this thesis, where the relationship between risk management and societal safety is the focus, risk is defined as the probability and the subsequent consequence of potential problems, threats, inherent vulnerabilities and small-scale failures embedded within a system (Aven, 2007b). Risks are often technically and scientifically calculated and quantitatively estimated as the probability times the consequence of an activity (Aven, 2007b). However, it is important to remember, especially in disciplines connected to social conduct, that risk is also a subjective constructions based on cultural norms and personal experiences. Thus public risk perception has been found to be affected by many factors beyond ‘objective’ risk (Slovic, 1987).

Risk management concerns all skills and techniques required to identify, assess, understand and cope with risk (Aven, 2007b). I understand this process to include an identification of all potential problems, threats, inherent vulnerabilities and small-scale failures embedded within a system, assessment of which are deemed unacceptable, understanding of the interconnectivity of the risks involved, and the implementation of measures to control them. For the remaining part of this thesis, I will define risk management as the identification of vulnerabilities embedded within a system and the implementation of measures to control or mitigate them. Vulnerability is defined as “a fault or weakness that reduces or limits a system’s ability to withstand a threat or to resume a new stable condition” (Aven, 2007a).
3.1.4 Distinguishing crisis and risk management

Stressful situations are often characterized with pending destruction, decision-making under time pressure, ambiguous information, and the involvement of many actors (Rosenthal et al., 2001). Due to time limitations, crisis managers often do not have the same liberty as risk managers to compare a variety of alternative measures, suggestions or solutions, in the hope to implement the most efficient one. Crisis management activities therefore often involve the fulfillment of small objectives and temporary solutions (Smith, 2006a). It is hard to argue that any system of operation should not incorporate long term objectives and analytical processes of evaluation, which only risk management can. The ambiguous and often overflowing amount of information associated with a crisis context further complicates crisis management operations, which unlike risk management do not have the liberty to sort through existing information and acquire more where there is lacking information. That a society’s safety therefore is dependent only on its ability to perform under pressure, and not its ability to prepare for such conduct, let alone prevent crisis from occurring, is an ill defined definition, in need for further elaboration.

Societal safety should not be rooted on risk management principles alone, because crisis management is not the result of failed risk management (Smith, 2006a; Goel, 2009). Due to restrictions and limitations, it is impossible for a system to identify, plan for or analyze, every possible risk it can be exposed to (Banfield, 1973). Unexpected events may occur that are impossible to foresee. Perrow (1984) believes that accidents are normal to organizations, and that large technological systems will sooner or later produce a disaster as a combined result of sheer potential, technical complexity and tight coupling. He, along with other Normal Accident theorists (NAT), believes that certain accidents are inevitable. This view is contradictory to the High Reliability theorists (HRT), who believe that smartly designed and well-maintained organizations with safety cultures embedded within are capable of preventing common pathologies (Rosenthal et al., 2001, p. 9). They believed that a mixture of strategies could turn ‘high risk systems’ into ‘high reliability organizations’ (La Porte, 1996). The HRT emerged along with Charles Perrow’s Normal Accidents (1984) and Aaron Wildavsky’s Searching for Safety (1988) after the Three Mile Island near–catastrophe incident in 1979, when a selected group of
American scholars sought to understand what had happened (Sills, Wolf & Shelanski, 1981). However, though Perrow (1994) believes that accidents are normal and will occur, he does state that trying hard will not be enough, due to the characteristics of the system, however it is better to ‘try hard than not’ (p. 213).

Though I have already argued for a new definition of societal safety that incorporates risk management activities, it is important that the concept does not emphasize too much the distinction between risk and crisis management. According to Smith (2006a), focusing on their separation as two individual entities rather than operating on the same continuum could be more counterproductive than result driven. He aptly quotes that “by separating the two terms out from each other in practice, we may well be contributing to the generation of the potential for failures and the lack of an organizational capacity to deal with them once they occur” (p. 8). Rather any management strategy needs to incorporate aspects from both (Smith, 2006a). It is important that crisis management does not necessarily mean the failure of risk management activities (Smith, 2006a; Goel, 2009), and to such that well implemented risk management eliminates the necessity to practice crisis management. The new definition of societal safety therefore incorporates elements of both disciplines: the ability to react and the ability to prepare.

Here is an example of the necessity for both risk and crisis management activities. The book Harvard business essentials (2004) refers to some crisis as fires: “they start small in some unobserved area. If you smell the smoke and catch the fire early, you will avert a major crisis. Left unattended, these smoldering problems may grow into catastrophic infernos” (p. xviii). Societal safety can be metaphorically understood using the same examples. How fast the fire was controlled and the extent of the destruction defines societal safety. Such aspect depend on the training of the people involved in controlling the fire, and the extent of safety mechanism installed to control it from spreading to other areas. A room with fire protection walls previously installed will have less destruction than a room built with no such mechanism. A room with fire escape instructions in a foreign language will cause more chaos, or with fire marshals with cooperation or delegation issues will cause more damage than necessary. Thus a society that responds well to a crisis, has little damage, however when they fail, the crisis impact increase (Boin, et al, 2005). It is this kind of
preparedness that prevents a stressful situation from escalating into a crisis or disaster situation.

3.1.5 Conceptualization summary: towards a broader definition of societal safety.

Though the objectives of societal safety remain the same as in its original definition, the means to acquire them need further elaboration in my updated definition. Much like the definition of resilience given by UNDIS, the new definition of societal safety needs to not only state the objectives, but how to reach them. As such the evaluation of a society to practice societal safety is still its ability to accomplish its set objectives; however, the degree to which it accomplishes them is measured according to its awareness of its own vulnerabilities, and through the implementation of risk reduction measures. To such, societal safety may be measured by the society’s ability to react to a crisis, due to the careful planning, training, and preparedness of the system, and not just in accordance to the level of threat it faces.

The new definition thus encompasses the theory that risk reduction measures can and will affect the consequence of stressful events. Though no system can fully prevent every type of crisis from escalating, continuous work with risk reduction measures can reduce the possibility of them occurring. Thus my updated definition of societal safety also concerns the fact that risk management as the continuous identification and mitigation of risk, can prevent stressful situations from occurring and/or prevent them from escalating further.

Also added to the new definition is the broader term of society. Societal safety concerns not just a society, but also a community or system in place. This is applicable to the humanitarian context, especially in complex crisis, where often “an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/ or the ongoing United Nations country program must operate” (IASC, 1994, p. 6). According to Kruke and Olsen (2005), in complex crisis “there are many actors involved (refugees and/or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the local population; local, regional, public and private, local and international humanitarian organizations; networks of organizations; etc.)” (p. 278). Societal safety must
therefore incorporate both community and system in place in order to be applied to a broader context.

As such the definition of societal safety to be used for this paper is:

*The ability of a community, society or system in place, to prevent stressful situations from occurring or escalating, and to maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizen’s basic requirements in a variety of stress situations. This ability depends both on the awareness of vulnerabilities within operations, and on the risk reduction measures implemented to control them.*

In this new definition of societal safety, the awareness of vulnerabilities within operations, and the implementation of measures to mitigate them are the variables that define societal safety. In order to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate measures, one must apply risk management.
Part 3.2 Applying risk management activities

In the previous theoretical section I explained why it was necessary for organizations to implement risk management activities. Risk management was defined as the identification of all vulnerabilities within a system and the implementation of measures to control them.

In the previous section it was argued that the implementation of risk management activities could prevent certain crisis from emerging, as applying risk management activities to systems can make sense of the vulnerabilities that a technological development can bring to an organization (NSF, 1991). However, risk analysis can also be used to form a systematic presentation of the risks embedded within a system, which can act as a foundation for decision making. Though I will argue here for the importance of applying risk management activities for the prevention of unfortunate events, it must be recognized that some managers use risk analysis in retrospect to justify their actions.

The findings of risk analysis can act as the foundation for decision-making and can increase the possibility of drawing the right conclusion. Safety is a subjectively created and society developed phenomenon, in which leaders decide what level of risk is acceptable (Hovden, 1990). Risk on the other hand, is a qualitative calculation of probability and consequences of unwanted events (Aven, 2007b), and expresses the threat that undesired events have on human lives, health and material values. Using risk analysis therefore can act as a neutral foundation for decision-making, and increase the possibility for decision makers to make the right decision.

Unfortunately not every system prioritizes safety at the level it should, though it has been proved that focusing on safety in daily operations, is economically beneficial to any organization in the long run (Aven, 2006; Reason, 1997; Smith, 2006a). The wish for social and economic development and the need for social stability are often in conflict with each other (Hovden, 1990, p. 51). Environmental pressures contribute to lead organizations to emphasize efficiency and output targets over safety goals (Sagan, 1993; Heimann, 1998), leading many systems to prefer the short-term goals of productivity, rather than the long-term goal of financial, social, and physical safety.
(Reason, 1997). Often only after a grave incident has occurred does risk management often get prioritized, and consequently this often leads to overreactions and unfortunate prioritizations (Aven, 2007b; Reason, 1997)

The balance game between risk and other considerations also affects the choice of which safety measures to implement in order to increase security (Aven, 2007b). In the evaluation and assessment process regarding the variety of possible measures to implement, a system might opt for the cheaper but less secure option (Reason, 1997). Often as a result of poor safety prioritization, risk management is negatively affected, and undesirable events that could have been prevented, end up occurring within the system. Aven (2008) argues that “the main reason for conducting a risk analysis is to support decision-making. The [risk] analysis can provide an important basis for finding the right balance between different concerns, such as safety and costs” (p. 5).

3.2.1 Identifying the vulnerabilities in your system
Risk management activities was defined first as the identification of vulnerabilities within the system, which left unattended could become latent failures. Latent failures were the cause of organizational accidents (Reason, 1997). There are several methods used to identify potential vulnerabilities which could lead to a failure in initial registration. The most common is the implementation of a risk analysis model, which systematically present risks.

3.2.2 Applying the use of risk analysis
Various risk analysis methods allow for the identification of vulnerabilities by systematically mapping out how things might go wrong and allowing risk to be presented in a concrete and manageable way (NSF, 1991). The objective of a risk analysis is to describe risk by presenting an informative risk picture (Aven, 2008).

3.2.3 Applying Fault Tree Analysis
There are a variety of models used in risk analysis (Vose, 2008). Fault tree analysis (FTA) is one type of analysis and is “very useful for focusing attention on what might
“go wrong and why” (Vose, 2008, p. 40). Fault tree are usually created to calculate failure probabilities, and then becomes excellent decision making tools regarding prioritization of where to implement safety measures. Consequently, it is today one of the most applied analytical methods within reliability- and risk analysis (Aven, 2006).

The method has been widely used within the field of safety engineering and reliability engineering, analyzing safety systems in the space industry and within power plants (Aven, 2006; Vose, 2008). However its application is broadening. Vose (2008) describes how fault trees also can be applied to terrorism. He explains that “one might start with the risk of deliberate contamination of a city’s drinking water supply and then consider routes that the terrorist could use (pipeline, treatment plant reservoir, etc.) and the probabilities of being able to do that given the security in place” (p.40).

There are several descriptions of how to conduct a fault tree analysis available in the literature. The description for this thesis borrows from Aven (2006) Reliability and Risk analysis and Vose (2008) Risk Analysis: A quantitative guide. A fault tree is a logical diagram that shows the connection between a failure in the system (an undesired event occurring) and failures in the system’s component. The undesired event is taken as the root for the tree (the top event). In a fault tree analysis there is only one top event, and all situations that could cause that effect is added to the tree as a series of logic expressions.

A fault tree starts with an outcome and looks at causes that could have made the outcome possible. It is constructed so those immediately below the outcome are possible events that could have made the outcome arise. The fault tree continues with possible events that could have made the first set of events arise, etc.

3.2.4 Implementing measures

The completion of a risk analysis presents the organization’s risk picture (Aven, 2008). This systematic depiction of risks, will act as a foundation for decision-making regarding the implementation of measures to mitigate or control the risks (Aven, 2008). Once potential vulnerabilities are identified, every system should identify a variety of potential measures to control and mitigate these vulnerabilities, as
addressing these vulnerabilities can prevent devastating contingencies from occurring (Boin, et al, 2005). Reason (1997), explains that implementing measures are usually achieved by a mixture of hard and soft applications. He explains that ‘hard’ defenses include technical devices such as physical barriers while ‘soft’ defenses “rely heavily upon a combination of paper and people”, such as rules and procedures or training (p. 8).

3.2.5 Theoretical summary and its relevance to my thesis

In the theoretical part of this analysis I have clarified the need for risk management activities in order to identify vulnerabilities embedded in a system. I have argued that this is essential, as vulnerabilities left unmanaged become latent failures, which can cause an organizational accident (Reason, 1997). The following sections will explain how an organizational accident within initial registration, can have negative implications on societal safety. In order to prevent organizational failures, which here will be presented as the inability for initial registration to obtain the objectives of registration, it is essential that the UNHCR identify vulnerabilities embedded within initial registration in Dadaab. This identification will be done by applying a fault tree analysis.
4. METHODOLOGY

This part of the thesis will account for the research design, which is the approach I have taken in order to address the problem and research questions of this thesis. As such the thesis can be clear and open for criticism. It will first introduce why I chose to apply a case study approach to this thesis and a qualitative approach. It will present the reasons for applying informal interviews, challenges involved and how my thesis pertains to the concepts of validity and reliability. Lastly, I will discuss how and if this thesis might be generalized.

4.1 Choosing case studies

There are discrepancies regarding what constitutes a case study, which makes it difficult to find a universal definition of the term. Yin (2003) describes case studies as empirical investigations concerning a contemporary phenomenon in its phenomenon in its actual context, especially when the lines between phenomenon and context are unclear. Berg (2007) elaborates on the definition by stating that a case study is “a method involving systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event or group to permit the research to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions” (p. 283). Because a case study can provide deep understanding regarding a phenomenon, I applied a case study approach to understand not only how initial registration benefits societal safety, but how applying risk management activities to initial registration can affect societal safety.

For this thesis I chose initial registration of Dadaab as a case study. The choice of was firstly an accessibility choice. My colleague and I were able to gain permission to travel to Dadaab. However, as the world’s largest refugee camp, initial registration challenges are as important in that context as any. Secondly, Dadaab has been in existence for over two decades, which means that the UNHCR should be very aware of what they are doing, be familiar with their own practices, should be aware of possible vulnerabilities, and have implement mitigating measures.

According to Yin (2003) if one wishes to answers questions such as ‘what,’ ‘how,’ and ‘why,’ a case study can be said to be best method strategy (Yin, 2003). The sub
questions for this thesis are comprised in the ‘what’ and ‘how’ categories. Thus a case study approach seems appropriate to address such sub questions as ‘what role does initial registration have on societal safety?’, ‘what implications does a failure in initial registration have on societal safety?’ ‘what are the vulnerabilities within initial registration that might hinder the achievement of the objectives set forth by the UNHCR regarding registration?’ and the main research question of ‘how can the application of risk management activities to initial registration of refugees in Dadaab increase societal safety?’

The closeness that follows case studies make the method suitable in descriptions of processes and changes, where the emphasis is on how something occurs, instead of why. Because my thesis focuses on how an organization such as the UNHCR can increase societal safety by the usage of risk management activities, case studies is an appropriate method for this thesis.

Data collecting within case studies emphasizes details, and the method allows for a thorough study where data and analysis are incorporated in a participant’s own perspective (Andersen, 1997). In case studies, a researcher often develops closeness to activities and participants, however every research needs to be aware that such closeness can result in biased and subjective research. In Dadaab I was close to my informants as I spent hours interviewing the same informants or observing the same activities. However, I tried to remain objective throughout my research by asking very few questions, allowing the subjects to discuss and reflect openly without much disruption. Due to the limited amount of time spent in Dadaab, I was forced to schedule several interviews in a short period of time, which allowed me to be close to numerous informants in a short period of time. This did affect my subjectivity, as there was little room to reflect on the information, which might cause biases, until after I had left Dadaab.

Another advantage with applying case studies is that it allows for a multitude of sources. Since the context of my thesis centers on complex crisis, it is important for me to incorporate a variety of participants, and have access to a variety of sources. A variety of sources can give different perspectives on the case and can supplement each other in the explanation of the phenomenon.
4.2 Applying a qualitative method in case studies

Case studies can incorporate either qualitative and quantitative approaches or both (Thagaard, 1998). What defines the decision between them is the problem that the researcher wishes to address (Holme & Solvang, 1996; Jacobsen, 2005). In order to answer my research question, I choose a qualitative approach.

According to Jacobsen (2005) there are four methods to collect data using the qualitative method.

1. Individual, open interviews
2. Open group interviews
3. Observation
4. Document analysis

During my data gathering I applied three out of the four methods. The majority of the data was collected through a series of informal interviews with several key personnel relevant to initial registration. The purpose of the qualitative interviews was to learn about their views regarding the management of initial registration of refugees in Dadaab, and the areas they perceived as challenging. In addition I also used my own field observations at the initial registration site in Dadaab and in Nairobi as well as a series of documents such as past assessments and reports regarding the conditions in Dadaab, several scholarly articles concerning initial registration, the UNHCR Handbooks for Registration, the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, the Camp Management Toolkit developed by NRC, as well as several media accounts and reports concerning registration. Both the observations and the documents were used as building blocks for the interviews, as well as in the identification of vulnerabilities.

I chose a qualitative approach because I wanted data that would uncover the depth of the phenomenon of the thesis and uncover the underlying causes of a failure within initial registration. Qualitative data collection allows for this level of depth as each informant is allowed to reflect upon the phenomenon. This same reflection is not possible in the quantitative approach, which often incorporates a questionnaire, which does not allow for comments or opinions beyond that which is asked.
The weakness in qualitative data collection is that the method does not allow for the same scope of informants that quantitative data collection does, and thus cannot capture width and breadth to the same extent. This is usually due to the fact that qualitative methods are resource-demanding (Jacobsen, 2005). Because of the limited amount of informants, a strict qualitative data collection, cannot say how accurate or adequate the findings are for all participants involved in the process, and thus questions its generalization (Holme & Solvang, 1999). As vulnerabilities are often subjectively defined, if one applies qualitative methods to collect data, one also risks not uncovering vital vulnerabilities necessary for a complete understanding of the phenomenon and the research question. However, I would like to believe, even though I had time restrictions and other complications, that the limited pool of informants still created a large enough scope to capture important variations (Grønmo, 2004).

4.3 The informants
The majority of the empirical data collected for this thesis was collected during a one week period field study in Dadaab. Before arrival to Kenya, my classmate Leikny Bakke Lie and I contacted the UNHCR operation in Dadaab to ask for permission to conduct field observations in Dadaab. The UNHCR Head of Sub Office (Dadaab), Mr. Richard Floyer-Acland and external relations officer to the Sub Office Dadaab, Ms. Bettina Schultz were both positive towards our research objectives, and we were given allowance to stay within the UNHCR headquarters in Dadaab, and travel to the camps in the period Monday, January 31st 2011, to Monday, February 7th 2011. We had originally hoped to stay in Dadaab for three weeks, and Nairobi for two, but ended up staying only one week in Dadaab, and four week in Nairobi. It was necessary to include a field research for this thesis including face-to-face interviews and field observations in order to get a full understanding of the complexity involved with initial registration. The interviews were lengthy, and some informants (ushers, translators, LWF community service employees and refugees) would not have been able to be interviewed without access to the initial registration site.
4.3.1 Informants in Nairobi

During my field research I interviewed several key personnel relevant to initial registration. In Nairobi interviews were undertaken with a UNHCR Eligibility Officer for refuge registration in Nairobi, the Senior Regional Registration Officer for the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region, and the National Project Officer for WFP in Nairobi.

I contacted most of my key informants in Nairobi by email prior to arrival in Kenya, to introduce my thesis and to ask for an interview. I was therefore able to schedule most of the interviews in Nairobi prior to arrival to be conducted the first week of arrival in Kenya (appendix 4 for letter of introduction). However, I was only able to get in touch with a couple of the informants that I had contacted via email. Lacking from my informants are a couple of IPs operating in Dadaab, which could have strengthened the identification of vulnerabilities attached to the referral of refugees.

I had hoped that interviewing initial registration staff in Nairobi and watching their processes would prepare me for Dadaab so that I could utilize my time only at identifying vulnerabilities once in the camps. However, this was difficult since the online information was limited. Though the registration staff in Nairobi was able to give me detailed information on how initial registration was conducted there, their knowledge of initial registration was limited, due to the sever difference in practice as a result of the urban context. In addition the UNHCR officer had never been to Dadaab, and therefore could not comment on personal experiences with the process. However, the interviews I had in Nairobi were able to strengthen my empirical data collection in that it pinpointed several of their own vulnerabilities which I was able to mirror in Dadaab. Had it not been for the fact that I was able to witness these vulnerabilities in Nairobi, it would have been difficult to identify them during the week I spent in Dadaab.

4.3.2 Informants in Dadaab

In Dadaab several interviews were undergone with a UNHCR registration officer. Addition interviews were conducted with UNHCR registration filed officer for Dagahaley, a UNHCR verification officer, and several UNHCR ushers and translators. I interviewed a representative from the STC field office, the information
Officer for LWF, the LWF community supervisor, several LWF community service employees, several LWF security staff members, and a couple of GIZ representatives conducting the medical screening during initial registration.

I also interviewed seventeen refugee families (comprised of household sizes one to seven), some prior to them being interviewed by the UNHCR for refugee status verification, and some post initial registration or while waiting for GoK fingerprinting. As discussed in the theory section of the thesis, risk is both an objective estimation and a subjectively created phenomenon. Therefore it was important to incorporate all involved units, not just those on the operational side of the phenomenon, in order to get an overview of all challenges connected to a system. I interviewed seventeen refugee families during the early morning. The first half was conducted in the second waiting area, while refugees were waiting for the UNHCR registration. The other half was conducted with refugees in the third waiting area, who had either just completed the UNHCR part of the registration process, or who had completed the entire process including government fingerprinting and assessment by LWF. The interviews with the refugee families were conducted using one of the UNHCR’s ushers as interpreters. He was a twenty-year old male, who was a refugee from Somalia. There are challenges involved in using an interpreter when conducting interviews. As a researcher using an interpreter I can’t be sure that the answer I receive from the interpreter are directly translated. A translator might have his own subjective biases that come through his interpretations. However, the answers were varied in content, which could indicate his objectivity.

4.4 The interviews

In order to prepare in the best way possible, I created interview guides before I left for Dadaab. According to Grønmo (2004), an interview guide should be designed so that it to its best ability creates good communication, and where there is good transition between themes to create the best possible flow in the interview process. However I quickly realized that using interview guides for this field study was problematic. First, it became aware that the interview guides made prior to arrival in Kenya, were severely restricted concerning the knowledge of initial registration, and especially concerning how contextual based it is. Sticking therefore strictly to the premade guide
would negatively affect my empirical data, as it most likely would exclude valuable findings. In addition, the time restrictions attached to a one week field research put severe limitations on the ability to reformulate interview guides to adapt to the new findings. To tackle this, most of my interviews were conducted as conversations regarding initial registration, where my objectives was to find out as much as possible about the procedures and processes of initial registration. Grønmo (2004) refer to this type of interviewing as informal, and states that these types of interviews are appropriate when a researcher wishes to go in depth regarding a phenomenon. An informal interview allows for the discovery of new sides to a phenomenon, since the interviewer isn’t restricted to an interview guide or a questionnaire, in which all the questions are predetermined. In informal interviewing the theme will be decided upon prior to the interview, but the conversation can evolve in different directions. This because informal interviewing allows for the interviewer to ask follows up questions during the interview, consequently gathering in depth information regarding the phenomenon (Grønmo, 2004).

The interviews therefore were conducted as a dialogue, where I asked questions regarding specifics concerning initial registration, and how they might affect registration, rather than asking right out for the informants to list what they deemed to be areas of improvements and vulnerabilities with the system. The aim was to discover as many vulnerabilities as possible, both by applying findings from previous literature searches to the Dadaab context, those specifically outlined by the UNHCR representative for the Region in Nairobi, and based on field observations.

I also chose to conduct most of my interviews openly, because I experienced firsthand during my interview with one of the UNHCR registration officers and LWF representatives that some informants were very reluctant to reveal any information that might be pertained as negative. In qualitative research, the phenomenon in which informants wish to portray themselves in the best light possible, is a widely recognized one, and as a consequence can greatly affect the quality of information collected (Befring, 2007, p. 165). In some interviews it was obvious that the informants were inhibited by the interview situation. This became apparent as closer I got to the field level, where I noticed that informants actually conducting initial registration were far more reluctant to reveal vulnerabilities, than those at the
headquarter level in Nairobi. By conducting my interviews as conversations, each informant was given the opportunity to reflect upon initial registration and how it is conducted, and thus creates a picture of the processes and procedures that I might not have been able to identify based only on previous literature findings. I also tried to open all my interviews with a general introduction of the thesis, and that the objectives were not to highlight the UNHCR faults, but to emphasize that systematic failures is evident in all systems, and that a continuous process of identification and mitigation can create resilience. Thus being aware of weaknesses is as necessary as mitigating them. I also tried to split my interviews so that equal amounts of time were created on what didn’t function, as well as what did function. Knowing what areas were conducted successfully, could give me insight into measures already implemented to mitigate vulnerabilities.

4.5 Applying a fault tree analysis

My thesis explores how applying risk management to initial registration can increase societal safety. The risk management activity I chose to identify vulnerabilities was an FTA. I chose the FTA because it is “very useful for focusing attention on what might go wrong and why” (Vose, 2008, p. 40).

Boin (2006) writes that risk and crisis are “often defined in subjective senses as academics tend to speak of [these words] only when people (who exactly remains a matter of discussion) perceive an urgent threat” (p. 86.) In order to keep the identifications of potential vulnerabilities and risks as objective as possible, I have used the universal UNHCR objectives as foundations for the fault tree analysis, making the inability to reach these objectives as the incidents that may cause the top event (failure in initial registration) to occur. I have analyzed vulnerabilities out of these objectives, and not what each participant themselves perceive as such. However, this also means that the vulnerabilities I identify, might not be perceives as such. The fault tree analysis therefore identifies vulnerabilities from an organizational viewpoint. It does not allow for the subjective understanding of risk by the different actors.
According to Aven (2008), risk management relates to all activities, conditions and events that can affect the organization, and its ability to reach the organization’s goals and vision. Identifying vulnerabilities can therefore be guided by the objectives of the organizations. In this thesis I have used a fault tree analysis to identify vulnerabilities within initial registration in Dadaab. I have used the objectives of the UNHCR to identify what a failure in initial registration is, and then the UNHCR Handbook for Registration to identify the factors that might cause a failure in initial registration. Lastly, I have identified the factors that might lead to the failure to reach each objective based on empirical evidence, lessons from the past and the objectives of the organization to guide the identification of vulnerabilities.

For Boin, et al. (2005) crisis management incorporates “fostering collective learning from the crisis experience,” (p. i). Learning from the past is important when identifying vulnerabilities. According to Turner & Toft, (1988), the past can offer “cues which might alert us to related patterns in the foreseeable future” (p. 297). The logic is based on the assumption that “major failures in large-scale systems are not wholly unique, so they can be analyzed to provide information which will reduce the chances of similar events occurring” (Turner & Toft, 1988, p.297; Turner, 1978). Emphasizing learning from the past is vital in safety management activities as organizations are known to be ‘bad learners’ (Argyris & Schön, 1978).

4.6 How the lack of time may have affected my data collection

By implementing empirical data there are several factors for the researcher to consider that can influence the results of the study. According to Jacobsen (2005), it is important that the researcher tries to illuminate mistakes and missing precision in the study, by systematically clarifying those weaknesses that are associated with the research and the results that are presented.

Due to accommodation issues by the UNHCR, my colleague and I were unable to spend the amount of time in Dadaab that we had hoped for in order to fully explore our research topics. Our original wish to spend three weeks in the camps was reduced
to a one week period, in which the UNHCR was only working five of the seven days. This time reduction had several implications on my field research.

Firstly, with limited time I had to make prioritization amongst the various aspects of the registration process, which meant that certain elements of initial registration would receive less focus than others. The process of initial registration of refugees is a complex one, with several components and partners working together. However, there was simply not enough time to get detailed enough information regarding every step, and every involved unit. The process of prioritization was based on the availability of information. Those partners that I was able to schedule interviews with (the ability to schedule prior to arrival heavily influenced this selection), and those aspects that I was able to retrieve reliable information on, were prioritized in this thesis.

The lack of time allowed me to only focus on the initial stage of registration. Initial registration however, is but one section of registration, which also comprises continuous registration, verification and deregistration of refugees no longer of concern to the UNHCR. In order to ensure a successful registration process, consistent monitoring and continuous updating of individual records need to be conducted to ensure that the data reflects the actual population and situation at all times (HfE, p.156). Unfortunately both the lack of time and the lack of obtaining contact with several IPs in Dadaab, and their usage of registration data prohibited, the overall study of registration, and limit the thesis to only concern initial registration.

The lack of time and limited access to the registration site (especially due to the fact that the UNHCR employed police escorts in the transportation between headquarters and the camps), did not allow me to interview several informants that would have benefitted the overall analysis. I would have liked to have conducted interviews with the STC representative at the initial registration site, GIZ field office representatives, female UNHCR registration offices, as well as several more UNHCR registration officers at the field level. I would also have liked this thesis to have contributions from the GoK, including DRA employees from both the field level and the field office.

7 The UNHCR does not work during weekends, which meant that I could not observe the registration process, nor conduct interviews from Friday afternoon to Monday morning. In addition, the dependency on escorted transportation, created hinders on my flexibility to reach the registration site, and I was unable to reach the field on one of the days during my stay.
level. However, due to the lack of DRA approval, I was unable to interview GoK registration officers, or oversee their registration procedure. These contributions would have been valid in a full understanding of the challenges involved with initial registration.

Though I was able to interview several of the GIZ employees at the initial registration site, and observe how they conducted medical screening, our interviews were conducted hastily, and not in an appropriate setting. The observations are lacking the appropriate follow up and confirmation by GIZ field office employees. As for this reason, though I would have liked it to be otherwise, I have chosen not to include vulnerabilities attached to the GIZ medical screening in my fault tree analysis.

The lack of time also influences my ability to ask follow up questions to my informants and thus be able to clear up any misunderstandings or ambiguous statements. The strain of multiple interviews in so few days was also physically and emotionally challenging. Reading through the interviews upon departure from Dadaab, and taking the time to digest its contents, I found holes that I didn’t see when the time was so pressured, that did require further elaboration. Often in situations where time is a factor, a researcher can conduct follow up interviews after the field study is completed. However, due to the context of Dadaab, follow up interviewing was a challenge for me. It is challenging to get a hold of refugees and several of the field officers, as there are limited methods of communication. After return to Norway I contacted both LWF and STC in order to receive follow up information. Though LWF was willing to share contextual information, I never heard back regarding the follow up questions concerning challenges within initial registration.

The lack of time also affected my ability to conduct open group interviews. It takes time for a researcher to develop enough trust to be able to conduct refugee group interviews, which I was not able to do in five days. In addition, knowing the strain that the UNHCR was under, and the importance of each minute registering, I did not feel it to be appropriate to remove UNHCR staff members from their duties in order to conduct group interviews. Rather, I interviewed registration officers and other staff individually at the initial registration site, during the transition time between refugee interviews.
4.7 Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability are concepts that refer to specific criteria expected by scientific and academic research (Grønmo, 2004). Validity refers to the data material of the study, and how well the data answer the research problem(s) of the thesis. Reliability refers to how the study was conducted, and if the data material can be perceived as reliable.

4.7.1 Validity

A thesis demonstrated high validity if the data material is conducted in a precise way and addresses the problem of the thesis well. Even if the collected data material contains interesting information, it is necessary for that information to correspond to the contents of the problem. There were several interesting findings regarding initial registration concerning insensitivity to Somali culture and religion (by making Somali women remove their headscarves during initial registration). However, though interesting, it does little to increase societal safety, and thus has been omitted. I have tried to incorporate only those vulnerabilities that have a direct implication on the inability to achieve the UNHCR objectives with registration.

I regard the validity of this thesis to be satisfactory. I have explained my understanding of key concepts within the research question, explained the relationship between societal safety and risk management by applying known theories, and used the universal UNHCR objectives regarding initial registration, combined with direct field interviews and observations in order to help identify vulnerabilities. By using a qualitative approach, I have collected and analyzed information relative to these objectives in-depth, and tailored my interviews according to observed vulnerabilities, while allowing for participant’s own opinions and reflections.

By applying a qualitative approach this thesis I believe I have strengthened its validity. A qualitative approach is appropriate in situations where a researcher has limited knowledge regarding the phenomenon and the chosen research question. As it quickly became evident that I had little understanding of how contextual sensitive initial registration is, and thus little understanding at all regarding how initial registration is conducted in Dadaab, a quantitative method would perhaps have
produced only superficial results, and would have decreased the validity of the empirical findings. Jacobsen (2005) argues that the usage of qualitative interviews rather than quantitative keeps the information true to its context. Though a qualitative approach only allows for a select few interviewees, I have tried to collect the opinions of participants located horizontally and vertically in the management of initial registration, which I believe created enough validity to create trustworthy and reliable conclusions.

Research is defined by the collection of data, the treatment of information, and that the presentation is systematic, according to Jacobsen (2005). I interpret this to mean that a systematic presentation increases validity. I have tried to be as systematic as possible throughout my thesis. The empirical data is raw and categorized by vulnerability, so that the reader can easily distinguish between that which is primary sources, secondary sources, and the researcher’s own observations.

Theoretically, we learn that information should be collected through observations, conversations with involved partners, understanding the operational processes and procedures, and by comparing similar systems, historical data, relevant research, analysis or surveys (Aven, 2007b). To the best of my ability in the time permitted, I have tried to use all these measures in the collection of empirical data. I have observed initial registration being conducted in Dadaab, interviewed key informants involved with initial registration in Dadaab, and to the best of my ability tried to accommodate the different levels and organizations involved. Therefore the empirical data stems from refugees all the way up to the regional registration officer for the Great Lakes region, and from both the UNHCR and IPs. I believe that the information I gathered, creates a valuable beginning into relative vulnerabilities within initial registration, and creates an overview of the challenges currently implemented within initial registration in Dadaab.

4.7.2 Reliability

Reliability is often shown by referring to how independent sources regarding the same phenomenon are in accordance with each other, or if the same research can be conducted multiple times and retrieve the same result. In this methodology chapter of
the thesis I have tried to describe to the reader openly and honestly, both the reasoning behind the methods that I have chosen, as well as the elements that I find are weak or missing from this study. I thus hope a satisfactory level of reliability has been achieved. I have tried to incorporate in my empirical data regarding vulnerabilities discovered through my own observations or interviews, the comments or opinions of various participants, in the hopes of increasing reliability for the existence of that vulnerability. I have tried to limit those vulnerabilities identified only by one individual. Where, I was unable to find information, I have tried to supplement my data with secondary sources.

4.8 Generalizing

Generalization is often difficult when a researcher uses a specific case (Yin, 2003). Grønmo (2004) concurs stating that as long as N=1, there are no possibilities to generalize. My thesis is about initial registration challenges in the context of Dadaab, which can be argued thus limits its possibility to be generalized. Using a qualitative approach also affects generalization, as data collection from only a selected few informants creates difficulties for generalization.

The specific vulnerabilities identified through an analysis of the Dadaab context are applicable only to initial registration in Dadaab. However, the implications that initial registration has on societal safety and what vulnerabilities may cause a failure in initial registration might be generalized. This is due to the fact that these are derived from universal principles prepared by the UNHCR and which are specifically designed to fit any context. To such my thesis can generalize the development of a general understanding of a larger context (societal safety), by studying separate units (initial registration). The claim that risk management activities applied to initial registration will increases societal safety can be generalized.

It was my wish with this thesis to apply safety theory that pertain to the industrial and high-tech context, and apply such theory to a new context (humanitarian relief work). In such a way it can be argued that though I have used a specific case study, I am conducting theoretical generalization. According to Grønmo (2004), theoretical
generalization is the practice in which one applies theories to develop new theories, hypothesis or concepts.

I believe that it would be difficult to argue for the importance of risk management activities in initial registration without analyzing how initial registration is conducted in practice. To such the usage of a case was essential. However, due to its generalization challenges, I have chosen the research question to name the Dadaab context, and to limit the finding to this context. However, I still believe that applying risk management activities to any camp management activities, not just initial registration, and to any context, not just Dadaab, has tremendous effects on the overall societal safety of that area. I base this logic on Berg (2007), who believed in the possibility to generalize certain cases because “few human behaviors are unique, idiosyncratic, and spontaneous” (p. 296).

4.9 Methodological summary
This section has tried to give the reader an overview of the choices I have made regarding the collection and presentation of empirical data. This is in order for the reader to judge the validity of the data collected, how such data pertains to the objectives of this thesis, and how well my study answers the research questions of this thesis. The next part of my thesis will present the empirical data and the analysis.
5. EMPIRICAL DATA
The empirical data of this thesis is divided into four parts. The first section describes the benefits that initial registration has for the UNHCR, the host government and the refugees, as well as introducing the objectives of registration. This empirical data will be used to support the claim that initial registration has a fundamental role on societal safety, presented in the first part of the analytical section of this thesis. The second section of the empirical data describes in detail how initial registration is conducted in Dadaab. It will explain what the process is like for the refugee, and the role of the different partners at initial registration. A systematic understanding is important for the identification of vulnerabilities, and is included here so that the reader can understand how the vulnerabilities are interconnected to the various components of the system. The third part of the empirical data presents information from secondary sources. Two reports are presented. The first report, *from Horror to Hopelessness* was included because it lists factors that caused a registration crisis in 2008. It is included as vulnerabilities that need to be assessed in the current context. The second report, *In search of protection and livelihood* (2010), is included because it holds information regarding the relationship between initial registration and the host community, which I was unable to retrieve during my field study. The information here is vital to give support to the vulnerabilities I later discover concerning the registration of Kenyans as refugees. The fourth and last part of the empirical data, introduces several challenges regarding initial registration which came out of personal interviews and filed observations, supported by objectives from the UNHCR Handbook for Registration, the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies and the Camp Management Toolkit, sources for guidance on how to conduct initial registration in humanitarian contexts. These challenges will be the building blocks for the identification of vulnerabilities embedded within initial registration in Dadaab.
Part 5.1: What is the relationship between initial registration and societal safety?

In order to understand what role initial registration has on societal safety, and thus what implications a failure to conduct appropriate initial registration will have on societal safety, we need to understand why initial registration is implemented; the benefits it plays for the UNHCR, the host government and those that come to Dadaab to be registered; and what its objectives are for those who implement it. Objectives are the ends that can be reasonably achieved within an expected timeframe and with available resources, and are here presented as those set forth by the UNHCR to be adapted for use in virtually any setting.

Studying the objectives of initial registration gives insight into the desired results that the system envisions, plans and commits to achieve by implementing the activity, and will help clarify its role. Objectives are basic tools that underlie all planning and strategic activities, and are effective tools for progress as they ensure an awareness of what must be done. Knowing the objectives of initial registration is vital as an assessment tool, as they help assess if an activity is operating efficiently. If a system cannot reach their objectives, they cannot hope to play the role they were implemented to do.

The benefits of initial registration for the UNHCR, the host government and those that come to Dadaab to be registered are multiple.

5.1.1 How does initial registration benefit UNHCR operations?

Initial registration is a primary source of information about persons of concern to UNHCR: who and where they are, their problems, needs and strengths” (Handbook for Registration [HfR], ¶1). As such, initial registration gives a systematic overview that is “essential for an efficient and cost effective operation” (HfE, p.120).

Appropriate protection and assistance cannot be implemented unless vulnerable groups are identified (HfR, p.7). One example of the importance of initial registration in identifying vulnerable people is that unregistered children often are invisible in a
large refugee context (HfR, p.9). It is critical to know the size and the profile of the refugee population to ensure that one is meeting minimum standards (HfE, p.157). Initial registration is also vital as it plays a crucial role in determining “the amount of food, water and non-food items needed and the extent of shelter, health and sanitation facilities that should be made available” (HfR, p.7). According to a UNHCR registration officer, “if you know where people are living, you know which parts are assigned to each family, it is much easier to police, it’s much easier to keep track of who needs what, it’s much easier to intervene for protection.”

Managing an efficient operation incorporates assessment, and “an accurate enumeration is an essential component of any assessment” (HfE, p.157). For example “if the population figure is higher than reality, the crude mortality rate when calculated will be low or below critical, but in reality there may be more than e.g. 1 death per 10,000 person per day” (HfE, p.157).

According to the UNHCR Handbook for Registration “our donors demand credible and reliable registration data from us which they can base their funding decisions” (¶1). Having an overview which closely resembles the true profile of the population in place is therefore also essential for public information and fund raising (HfE, p.157).

5.1.1.1 The UNHCR objectives with initial registration

The objectives for initial registration, according to the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, are “to obtain working figures on the population of concern, including a breakdown of the population by age, sex and groups with specific need” and “to obtain detailed individual information on the population of concern which will help to better identify protection needs and to deliver more appropriate assistance” (HfE, p.156).

Refugee children are defined according to the UNHCR Handbook for Registration as “those persons who are refugees or other of concern under the age of 18” (p. 9). Unregistered children in refugee or refugee-like context include “military recruitment, sexual exploitation, abuse and violence, early and forced marriage, slavery, trafficking, permanent separation from families, and unauthorized and illicit adoption” (HfR, p. 9).
5.1.2 How does initial registration benefit the host community?
According to a UNHCR registration officer, registration gives an overview over how many people are living in a certain space and is therefore vital in order to identify congestion. The officer also stated that “congestion is not just a space issue; it has a lot of implications that we try to convince government that are really important for the governments benefit and for the people of Kenya also. If there is an epidemic here, then it will affect everybody, not just refugees who live here.” In Dadaab having an overview over the population within the camps is especially important, as the “substantive presence of people in a semi-arid region of Kenya with low population density, has environmental as well as socio-economic consequences for the surrounding area and the host community” (In search of protection and livelihoods, 2010, p. 9).

Initial registration is also beneficial to the host community in that an “orderly registration and medical and security screening is urgently needed to provide protection to the Kenyan host population” (HRW, 2010, p. 15). Initial registration allows the host government to “regulate who is present on its territory and may prevent certain categories of people from entering or remaining in [their country], including those deemed to be a threat to its national interests” (HRW, 2010, p.16).

5.1.3 How does initial registration benefit refugees?
According to the UNHCR Handbook for Registration the “registration of refugees is, first and foremost, a key protection tool” (¶1). Registration is a fundamental component of international protection, as it allows an individual to avail themselves as someone of concern to UNHCR and the host government, and thus be protected against refoulement, arbitrary arrest and detention (HfR, p.6). The purpose of initial registration is also to ensure access to basic rights and family reunification, and to help in the identification of persons in need of special assistance (HfR, ¶1).

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9 Refoulement is the unlawful forced return of refugees to a place where that individual faces a threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (Article 33.1, 1951 UN Convention. Retrieved January 25th, 2011, from http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm. According to the report by the HRW, “since the closure of the [Kenyan-Somali] border, the Kenyan authorities have deported hundreds if not thousands of Somali refugees and asylum seekers back to their war-torn country” (p. 16).
Initial registration is “important in planning for the care and maintenance [of refugees] in the country of asylum” (HfE, p.156). Initial registration is vital for refugee’s survival as it allows them access to certain services and assistance (HfR, p.6). Until a refugee has a document as proof of registration, and thus proof of their identity, they cannot access any assistance or protection. Initial registration can also help the identification of separated family members or the reunification of families (HfR, p.6). Registration also plays a vital role in “identifying [individuals] for which resettlement and local integration are the most appropriate solutions” (HfR, p.6) and “helps to ensure that decisions about durable solutions are voluntary by recording an individual’s agreement to a particular solution” (HfR, p.6).

10 In Dadaab, only a registered refugee gains access to any form of protection and assistance from the UNHCR and their implementing partners. Several of my interviews illustrated this standard by referring to a case which occurred in 2010. In this case a gunshot wounded unregistered refugee arrived in Dadaab in the need of medical attention. Registration officers had to come to the hospital to register the individual, before the refugee was allowed to receive any medical attention.

11 In Dadaab, resettlement is prioritized to those refugees with severe protection issues and those who have been in the camps for decades. As Kenya only allows continuous assistance and services from UNHCR and IPs to be delivered to refugees in camp settings, local integration is not an option for refugees in Dadaab.
Part 5.2: Describing the system

This part of the empirical data is the systematic description of how initial registration is conducted in Dadaab. Before the identification of vulnerabilities within initial registration is possible, a systematic description of the system is necessary. The systematic description will act as a foundation for the identification of potential vulnerabilities embedded within initial registration in Dadaab.

5.2.1 What is initial registration?

According to the UNHCR Handbook for Registration (HfR) refugee registration is defined as “the recording, verifying, and updating of information on persons of concern to UNHCR with the aim of protecting and documenting them and of implementing durable solutions” (p. 6). Registration is often divided into three separate processes: initial registration, continuous registration, and deregistration.

When refugees register for the first time the process is called initial registration. During this process basic information identifying the refugees is documented and stored in the UNHCR database, proGres. Refugees who wish to update information concerning their current civil status, location, or family composition at a later stage must undergo continuous registration. Deregistration is the last stage of registration, and is required when a refugee is no longer entitled to receive protection and assistance from the UNHCR. While initial registration captures a refugee’s basic information for the first time, continuous registration and deregistration ensures that the UNHCR has updated information regarding persons of concern to them (HfR, p. 7), and helps identify vulnerabilities that initial registration might not be able to capture.

5.2.2 Organizations involved in initial registration

Initial registration involves medical screening conducted by the GIZ, the interview by the UNHCR, finger printing by the GoK and a vulnerability assessment carried out by LWF, in that subsequent order.
The role of the GIZ is to visually evaluate refugees to identify those that are in urgent need of medical treatment. They also measure the circumference of every child’s arm to identify children that are severely malnourished. The GIZ also provides a cocktail of vaccines to every child under the age of five.

**Figure 2: Refugees awaiting medical screening by GIZ**

The role of the DRA during registration is to verify that Kenyans are not registering as refugees. Such verification is conducted by collecting the fingerprints of adult refugees, and comparing them with fingerprints stored in the Nairobi database. The role of the UNHCR is to collect detailed information of the refugee population, including their basic information and any special assistance or protection needs. The UNHCR’s role is also to prevent the multiple registration of the same individual.

LWF conducts their own vulnerability assessment, which is a questionnaire, made to identify specific protection and assistance needs. Please see appendix 5, for a copy of the LWF Vulnerability assessment questionnaire. STC is also involved in initial registration. Their role is to identify cases of abuse, neglect, exploitation and violations concerning minors.

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12 Every Kenyan over the age of eighteen receives a national identification card. In order to receive such documentation, their fingerprints need to be scanned by the GoK and stored in a national database in Nairobi. The taken in Dadaab are sent to Nairobi for the GoK to DRA compares the fingerprints against the fingerprints taken for national IDs. A match means that a Kenyan is posing as a refugee.
5.2.3 How is the registration site set up?

In the past initial registration has been conducted in all three camps. A UNHCR registration officer informed me that due to logistic issues and resource constrains, initial registration is currently only being conducted in the Ifo camp (personal communication, January 31st, 2011).

The site for initial registration is a fenced section in the western entrance of the Ifo camp. Encompassed in the site are three separate shaded waiting areas, a smaller tent for medical screening, and a larger tent for the registration interviews and fingerprint scanning. The Ifo site is meant to be a temporary solution.

Inside the main tent, the UNHCR, the GoK, STC and LWF are stationed. Each UNHCR registration officer has an area against the walls, with a chair and a desk, and a bench for the refugee(s) to sit while being interviewed. Each area is separated from the other areas by a piece of hanging cloth. In the middle of the tent are benches where refugees pending interviews can wait.

Each UNHCR registration staff member has their own laptop connected to proGres, an electronic fingerprint scanner to scan a refugee’s index fingers, and a web camera to capture each refugee’s headshot. All information is stored in the UNHCR database, proGres.

5.2.4 Who gets registered and when?

The UNHCR registers all individuals they determine as persons of concern. Persons of concern to the UNHCR are any non-Kenyan in Dadaab that have fled their home country, and where “the person’s life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order” (Kenyan Refugee Act, 2006). Due to the overwhelming amount of refugees arriving in Dadaab, such persons are automatically deemed to be refugees (prima facie).

According to the UNHCR website:

During mass movements of refugees (usually as a result of conflicts or generalized violence as opposed to individual persecution), there is not – and
never will be – a capacity to conduct individual asylum interviews for everyone who has crossed the border. Nor is it usually necessary, since in such circumstances it is generally evident why they have fled. As a result, such groups are often declared ‘prima facie’ refugees. (UNHCR.org)\textsuperscript{13}.

The registration process starts at 6:00-6:30 am every Monday to Friday, when the gates into the first shaded waiting area opens. According to a UNHCR registration officer, the amount of refugees allowed into the registration site is estimated on the prediction that a UNHCR registration officer can register between 80-100 refugees a day (personal communication, January 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2011).

During my interviews I was informed that due to the overwhelming number of refugees arriving in the morning to be registered, UNHCR ushers had asked the UNHCR if they could open the gates earlier, and have the refugees ready to be registered when UNHCR staff arrived at 8:30am (personal communication, February 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2011). The request was implemented, which allowed refugees to pass through the medial screening and be ready for registration by the time that the UNHCR registration staff arrived on site.

The UNHCR employs several refugees to act as ushers and translators during initial registration. I was able to interview a couple of them during my observations on site. As stated by one of the UNHCR employed ushers, more refugees arrive at the gates each morning, than the UNHCR are able to register (personal communication, February 4\textsuperscript{th} 2011). Refugees are therefore given priority based on certain protection standards listed in the Handbook for Registration. Those refugees, who are not ushered into registration that day, are given a token with a date to return on. Those refugees, who arrived at the registration site after the gate has closed, were also given appointment tokens.

A UNHCR registration officer remarked that he deemed registration an emergency, if the tokens handed out had an appointment slip to return after more than 1 week (personal communication, January 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2011). In such cases he would transfer some

of his registration staff working continuous registration, over to initial registration, in order to be able to register more refugees.

5.2.5 What is the procedure for initial registration?

After refugees are ushered into the first waiting area, they are medical screened by the GIZ. After the medical screening, refugees are security checked by guards using metal detectors and then led into a second waiting area. Here they await registration by the UNHCR registration staff. Refugees are registered as a household, which means all family members register at once\textsuperscript{14}. The UNHCR asks for basic information, collects fingerprints and takes head shots of each refugee during their interview process.

After registration by the UNHCR, refugees are escorted to the third waiting area located on the opposite end of the main tent. In the mean time, basic information concerning the refugee (their name, birth date, relationship to other household members [if applicable], and their photograph) is printed on an official government form and laminated. One of the UNHCR ushers then reads the names of the document, and escorts the refugees to another area inside the main tent where GoK undergoes their collection of fingerprint. The GoK uses manually fingerprinting, rather than electronic. Every refugee is therefore fingerprinted twice.

\textsuperscript{14} A household of one includes one refugee, while a mother, father and child registering together makes a household of three. Due to the emergency context, UNHCR has loosely defined criterions of what constitutes a household family. Non-nuclear family members can register together under one household, so can past neighbors.
Ideally, refugees are to be issued a refugee identification card by the GoK if their fingerprints are not found in the Nairobi database, but according to several informants, the GoK has only been able to provide such documentation to a portion of the refugee population.

Once a refugee has been fingerprinted by the GoK, they are given the laminated document as proof of registration. This documentation allows them access to protection and certain assistance by the UNHCR and their IPs in the camps. The refugees then return to the UNHCR registration officer who conducted their interview, to collect a ration card, which entitles them access to food and certain non-food items.

After collecting their ration card, refugees are told to go to the LWF to collect soap. LWF conduct vulnerability assessments per household, and issues 350g to each member of the household. The LWF takes the information gathered during vulnerability assessment, and enters it into the LWF database. An LWF employee informed me that households identified as vulnerable are visited by community service people the following weeks (personal communication, February 3rd, 2011).

5.2.6 What documentations does a refugee receive at the end of the process?

At the end of the initial registration process, refugees are given three different types of documentations. These documentations are:
1. A laminated document issued by the UNHCR, with the pictures, names, date of births, and in households consisting of more than one person the relations to other individuals in the same household, of all members in the household. This documentation serves as a proof of registration, and as proof of refugee status. This document gives access to protection and assistance.

2. Documentation in the form of a ration card, which confirms the right to receive entitlements such as food and non-food items from the IPs.

3. An appointment slip that serves as proof of registration by the GoK. This slip also contains copies of the fingerprints manually taken by the government. In theory, this slip from the government will be exchanged for a refugee status ID issued by the government once it is ready.
Part 5.3: Learning from previous research

There has been a limited amount of publicly published reports regarding vulnerabilities with initial registration in Dadaab. This part of the thesis will however briefly outline the main findings of two previous reports done on camp management in Dadaab, which I was able to come across in my literature study, and which mention challenges with initial registration. The reports provide valuable lessons from the past, which could help in the identification of vulnerabilities.

The first report is included because it identifies several causes of a registration crisis which occurred in 2008. To such it can be argued that it is an attempt to identify vulnerabilities, which could lead to a registration crisis. As such, it mirrors my own attempt with this thesis. The second report is included because it has valuable information regarding the relationship between the local community and initial registration, which I was unable myself to investigate. It thus has valuable information to supplements my empirical data.

5.3.1 The Human Rights Watch report: From Horror to Hopelessness.

The report from Horror to Hopelessness was written by the HRW in 2010, and discussed the three factors that they believed to have caused a serious registration crisis between May and December in 2008 (p. 32). The report was based on research conducted in Kenya between October 6th and 24th, 2008, including in-depth interviews with fifty four Somali refugees (including thirty adult females and four children) in the three refugee camps in Dadaab. In addition the findings was based on fourteen interviews with staff from the UN agencies and IPs, five interviews with staff from Kenyan NGO’s, and further interviews with embassy staff, donor agencies, the DRA and members of the Kenyan Parliament. The report was written to assist the current situation from refugees in the camps, and to offer further recommendations to the UNHCR and the GoK to improve the living conditions of Somali refugees in Dadaab.

From the empirical data gathered, the report was able to conclude that “a registration crisis throughout much of 2008 has meant thousands of unregistered refugees have waited weeks, and in some cases months, to receive food, and struggle to access water
“and healthcare” (p.26). Based on interviews with refugees and UNHCR staff, the report claimed that at least three factors contributed to the registration crisis.

The first factor was the January 2007 closure of the Liboi transit center as a consequence of the Kenya-Somali border closure (HRW, 2010, p. 32). The closure meant that the UNHCR could no longer register all new refugees in one place the moment they entered Kenya (HRW, 2010, p.13). According to the HRW report (2010), “because Somalis are not registered when crossing the border and because Kenya’s DRA does not publish statistic relating to its registration of non-Kenyan nationals in Nairobi, there is no way of knowing how many Somalis traveled directly to Nairobi or other parts of Kenya such as Mombassa” (p. 13)\(^{15}\).

The report also claimed that the closure of Liboi had caused “serious police abuses against Somali refugees between the border and Dadaab’s camps, including systematic bribery and reports of violence, including rape” (HRW, 2010, p. 15). The report claimed that reopening the transit center would significantly protect Somali refugees from Kenyan police abuses (HRW, 2010, p. 15).

Secondly, the report claimed that the UNHCR’s decision to conduct initial registration in only one camp had created problems for refugees who wished to register (HRW, 2010, p. 33). The report stated that “refugees from all camps said that UNHCR turned them away because on some days it said it did not have the capacity to process everyone” (HRW, 2010, p. 34). During interviews conducted with refugees in October 2008, the HRW found that the return trip from the two other camps to the camp conducting initial registration was a factor (HRW, 2010, p. 34). Several refugees claimed that “they had tried to get registered once or twice, but that it was too expensive or too far to continue to make the journey and that they had given up trying” (HRW, 2010, p. 34). The report also claimed to have heard refugee say that “they had heard from other refugees about the registration difficulties they had faced so they did not even try” (HRW, 2010, p. 34) The report concluded by recommending that “UNHCR needs to continue to register all new arrivals in all three camps to avoid a re-run of the 2008 registration crisis” (HRW, 2010, p. 35).

\(^{15}\) Mombassa is the second largest city in Kenya, located by the coast, south of Dadaab.
Thirdly, the report claimed that arriving refugees had problems “getting past corrupt Kenyan private security guards at the gates to UNHCR’s compounds, who demanded bribes” (HRW, 2010, p. 33). According to the report “many refugees said that they could not afford to pay the bribes demanded by Armed Group Kenya security guards whom the UNHCR employs at its gates” (HRW, 2010, p. 34).

Based on an interview with UNHCR on October 18, 2008, the report claimed that UNHCR in Dadaab “were aware of reports that the guards at their gates had taken money from refugees and that earlier in the year they had called a meeting to remind the guards that they were subject to a Code of Conduct” (HRW, 2010, p. 35). The report further stated “two Armed Group Kenya guards were suspended pending investigations into alleged misconduct” (HRW, 2010, p. 35).

5.3.2 The report: In search of protection and livelihoods

The report in search of protection and livelihoods was comprised by the collaboration between DRA and the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Nairobi. The report was written to provide information on the impact of the camps on the host community, and there is vital information in the report regarding how initial registration affects the host community. The report sheds light on the relationship between Kenyans and ration cards. The empirical data outlined in this section will briefly describe this relationship.

The report is based on several independent interviews with at least ten individuals in each of the eight villages the report surveyed, together with extended interviews with strategically-places camp residents, triangulation of information from different information from different informants, focus group discussions, direct observation and a conservative consideration of the figures gives (p. 24). From the empirical data gathered, the report was able to conclude that a large portion of host community households have members holding refugee ration cards.
Table 3: Estimate of refugee ration card ownership in the Dadaab host community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance from the camps</th>
<th>0-10 km</th>
<th>10-25 km</th>
<th>25-50 km</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ration card holders (i.e. host community members registered as refugees)</td>
<td>14.456</td>
<td>10.572</td>
<td>15.472</td>
<td>40.501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Based on table 3, the report concluded that:

At least 40,500 people out of 148,000 (27%) within 50 km are believed to hold refugee ration cards. They include both people who are from the host area originally and others who have moved there from other areas in Kenya, primarily to seek a better livelihood. These are not refugees. (p. 25).

The report also stated that these figures represented conservative estimates and that actual figures may be higher than those presented in table 3.

According to the report the

Practice of registering as a refugee is widespread and it is not considered especially difficult to obtain a refugee card. It is moreover seen as a logical survival strategy for anyone living in the host area. It should also be stressed that although holding a Kenyan ID card and a refugee ration card at the same time has become more difficult due to biometric registration, many host community members have made a choice between holding one of the other. For many, holding the ration card makes more sense as it provides food (which converts to income) whereas a national ID card offers less tangible rights. It is also clear that many do not believe that holding a ration card will in fact deny them of Kenyan identity, as they perceive the Kenyan registration system to be corruptible. So although the ongoing refugee verification process
may eliminate double registration, it is unlikely to reduce significantly the number of ration cards held by the host community. (p. 25).

Kenyans holding refugee cards is costly to the UNHCR and their IPs. The table below will suggests that the WFP looses roughly KSh 363 million (USD 4.9 million) per year to persons who are not entitled to receive food rations.

**Table 4: Benefits for host-community members receiving refugee food rations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Item</th>
<th>WFP ration (kg/person)</th>
<th>Price per unit (KSh)</th>
<th>Cost Value (KSh/person/yr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat flour (kg)</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize (kg)</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans (kg)</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking oil (l)</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn soya blend (kg)</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt (kg)</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | 9072

**Beneficiaries** | 40,000

**Total annual cost (KSh mill.)** | 363

**Total annual cost (USD mill.)** | 4.9

Source: In search of protection and livelihoods, (2010, p. 41). Calculations are based on the WFP food rations, which comprise a diversity of items distributed twice monthly in the camps.
Part 5.4: Challenges involved with initial registration

This section will list challenges concerning initial registration that arose during my interviews and field observations. It will also list observations and comments concerning challenges that revealed themselves through previous studies. They are presented here by category, and as raw data. They will be analyzed and put into context in the analysis of this thesis.

5.4.1 Identifying non prima facie

According to a UNHCR registration officer for Nairobi, the UNHCR schedules individual interviews for all asylum seekers, which has caused a backlog of over two years. During these interviews the UNHCR asks questions which might identify individuals that were involved with certain activities back in Somalia, which could lead to exclusion as a person of concern to the UNHCR. Some of these questions concern the asylum seekers previous occupation. Individuals in whom there are doubts concerning their right to claim status as a refugee are invited for further interviewing (personal communication, January 24th, 2011).

5.4.2 Re-registration of refugees

The UNHCR scans the fingerprints of refugees and compares them against the fingerprints on file in proGres\(^\text{16}\). As fingerprints are unique to each individual, the database can identify refugees that have registered previously by matching that print to an already registered print.

According to the UNHCR senior regional registration officer, the UNHCR scans the fingerprints of refugees down to the approximate age of four (personal communication, January 24\textsuperscript{th}, 2011). The officer stated that though it might not be moral to fingerprint children, the process was necessary to reduce cases referred to as the ‘borrowed children’ incidents. These are incidents in which refugees borrow children from others to register them as their own and thus increasing their household size.

\(^{16}\)The fingerprints are only compared against the refugees who have already registered in Dadaab, and not elsewhere in Kenya or Africa. This is because due to the overwhelming amount of initial registration records collected, the database is not large enough to handle refugees registered elsewhere.
During my observations at the initial registration site in Ifo, the fingerprints of a child came up in the system as having already been registered. However, when the UNHCR officer compared the photograph attached to that file, against the refugee registering, of the child refugee who was going through initial registration, the registration officer could determine that this was not the same child. He rescanned the fingerprints, and this time the print did not match a record previously recorded.

5.4.3 People stay in the camps and don’t register

According to a UNHCR registration officer “[some] people could come and stay in the camps for days or weeks, and we wouldn’t know [they are there] unless they came to be registered” (personal communication, January 31st, 2011). During my interviews with the refugee families, the overall consensus was that refugees waited a few days before they went to be registered (personal communications, February 4th, 2011). The most common reasons for this was that they either didn’t know where registration was being conducted, because they had no one to accompany them, or they lacked the means to get to the registration site. An LWF employee stated that “several people come to the camps and never register, because they don’t need to be dependent on assistance. This is because there is good business in the camps” (personal communication, February 3rd, 2011).

5.4.4 Ration cards

The UNHCR regional officer stated that in Dadaab (especially after the re-verification exercises) there are not a lot of fake cards being made; the problem is that a lot of cards are ‘sold’ by refugees who leave Dadaab, to other refugees (personal communication, January 24th, 2011). Currently the ration card distributed at initial registration is a piece of paper with only a ration card number to correspond to the household file. Neither the names of the refugees, or their pictures are present on the ration card.

5.4.5 Lack of food available

Most of the refugees I interviewed were discontent with the lack of food available during initial registration, and wished that the option for either breakfast or lunch was
available during the time they spent at the initial registration site. One refugee stated that he had the means to buy food, but was not allowed to leave the registration site to buy food while waiting (personal communication, February 4th, 2011). Those families with children commented that they wished there was snacks for the children after vaccination to keep them from crying, and that some sort of nourishment should be available for the elderly, the pregnant women, and all the children (personal communication, February 4th, 2011). The STC informant mentioned that as tedious as it was to wait at the registration site all day in the hopes to get registered and get access to food and assistance, the refugees were not offered any food, which she deemed one of the major problems with initial registration (personal communication, February 2nd, 2011).

5.4.6 Backlog

According to a UNHCR registration field officer for Dagahaley, the amount of backlog depends on the time of year (personal communication, February 2nd, 2011). Usually there are no long delays, what the informant defined as when it took several weeks for a refugee to register. However, the officer also stated that sometimes there are big influxes and the process gets slower. During the interview the informant also stated that there was an incident in 2010, where the backlog was one month. According to the UNHCR Handbook for Registration, registration activities have been hampered by limited resources and understaffing (¶2).

Twelve out of the fourteen refugee families I interviewed had arrived at the registration site at a previous date and given an appointment to return at a later date. Several said that they had arrived when the gate was closed, and that they had been unaware that they had to arrive at the registration site before 6:00am (personal communication, February 4th, 2011). In these cases the refugees said that they were asked to return at a later date. Some families had been at the initial registration site the previous day at 6:00am until initial registration closed at 4:00pm, and then told to come back the following day. In such cases refugees had endured ten hours of waiting at the initial registration site without having been able to be registered.
One refugee said that the queue through registration was very time consuming, and that the wait from when you entered the registration site until you were registered was too long (personal communication, February 4th, 2011). When I asked the refugees if they had suggestions for how to improve the initial registration process, the majority of them replied that they wanted to see an increase in staff and resources. In addition, they hoped that the gate could stay open throughout the day (personal communication, February 4th, 2011).

5.4.7 Identifying protection and assistance needs:

According to the UNHCR regional registration officer, the collection and documentation of specific needs of each refugee, and especially those that are not visible, is one of the major challenges during initial registration (personal communication, January 24th, 2011). There are several non-visible needs that should be identified (HfR). These include “unaccompanied and separated children, child-headed households, single parents and families with small children, elderly persons, particularly the unaccompanied ones, persons with disabilities and their families, persons with special protection concerns and their families, single women, and persons with special medical needs” (HfR, p. 145-146). According to the UNHCR regional registration officer, ideally special needs should be detected as early as possible, however the officer realized that the identification of non-visible needs most likely occurred during continuous registration (personal communication, January 24th, 2011).

The STC informant stated that STC was present at registration to identify unaccompanied minors, because the UNHCR does so many interviews (at times six interviews at once), that there is no time for final details (personal communication, February 2nd, 2011). During the time I sat with a UNHCR registration officer while he conducted interviews, most of the households were comprised of between five and six members.17 This means that between five and six refugee interviews were conducted at once. The STC informant stated that their organization has problems identifying

17 According to a UNHCR registration officer the largest family size recorded was comprised of sixteen family members. This can mean that sixteen family members could have been present during the initial registration interview.
during initial registration, children who have been abused, because the staff is not trained to identify them. She also informed me that the consequence of this lack of identification was that certain vulnerable children had to be identified after registration. However, the informant also stated that STC were able to catch unaccompanied minors at the initial registration site, and that any minor not in the accompaniment of their father or mother should be taken to the STC stand for their guardian to sign a responsibility form.

The STC informant stated that there are issues with confidentiality during initial registration, because it requires a certain degree of privacy (personal communication, February 2nd, 2011). The STC informant used the set up of the initial registration site, as a basis for this claim, stating that a refugee will feel exposed when interviewed at the current site, and not offer up information that is relevant for his/her own protection. The informant stated that “a girl that has been raped will not announce such a fact in a room full of people and when strangers are waiting next to her” (personal communication, February 2nd, 2011).

The UNHCR regional registration officer states that initial registration needs to work on updating the educational sector of their interview process. She explains that in Dadaab only recent education is listed; however there is no means to verify that someone who is enrolled is actually attending the class (personal communication, January 24th, 2011).

Community social workers from LWF who conducted vulnerability assessment during initial registration confirmed that out of the nine hundred household vulnerability assessments they conducted during one day, approximately one hundred households were identified as vulnerable (personal communication, February 4th, 2011). They stated that several of the households identified as vulnerable were followed up the following week by LWF social workers who then visited the households in their blocks in the camps and followed up with appropriate assistance or referrals. At the LWF compound in Ifo I met some of the LWF community service employees who were sorting the vulnerability assessments for entry into the LWF electronic database.
During my field observations at the initial registration site, I observed that during the LWF vulnerability assessments, refugees were not seated, and often only one member of the family answered on behalf of the rest. In addition, LWF at times required only one family member to be present for the vulnerability assessment on behalf of the entire household. Especially during my observations in the morning, I was told by one of the assessment employees that for refugee families who had not been able to conduct the vulnerability assessment before initial registration closed the following day, they required only one member of the household to return the following day to conduct the vulnerability assessment (personal communication, February 4th, 2011).

In regards to protection needs, the UNHCR Handbook for Registration urges the issuance of individual identity documents to each refugee, especially in relevance to female refugees (¶2). However, in Dadaab, household individual documents, and not individual documents are distributed. The only individual document a refugee might get is the refugee identification cards by the GoK. However, as previously stated, this distribution is experiencing severe backlog (personal communications, January 24th and 31st, 2011).

5.4.8 Working with other partners:

The UNHCR Handbook for Registration states that “registration efforts have often fallen short of their goal of making available the comprehensive information about persons of concern needed to guarantee their protection” (¶ 2).

As stated by the UNHCR regional registration officer, the initial registration conducted in Dadaab needs to improve the exchange mechanism between UNHCR and partners (personal communication, January 24th, 2011). The same officer commented, “the UNHCR needs to work on means to acquire better information, and in the cases where they rely on partners make sure they are receiving accurate and reliable information. Mostly because international workers do not have the freedom to move around the camps as certain areas/corners are restricted, which makes it hard to monitor” (personal communication, January 24th, 2011).

According to UNHCR informants and several employees of LWF, only the UNHCR has access to proGres. However, the UNHCR sends out the latest demographics of the
populations in the camps every two weeks. According to the information officer for LWF, the UNHRC is also willing to give a rundown of certain groups if requested, which can be used in planning and proposals (personal communication, February 3rd, 2011).

Though WLF conducts their own vulnerability assessments, which they enter into their own electronic database, the LWF information officer stated that the LWF works very closely with the UNHCR (personal communication, February 3rd, 2011). The informant also stated in the interview that CARE has better information on statistics and information on which children need help than the UNHCR, and therefore if one wants to retrieve specifics, one should go to the IPs, while the UNHCR can provide a general overview.

As mentioned by a UNHCR registration field officer for Dagahaley, “the fingerprinting by the GoK is a slow process, and therefore a major hitch for initial registration” (personal communication, February 2nd, 2011). This means that even if a refugee has been registered by the UNHCR, they often need to come back another day to complete the registration process (the government part), in order to get their ration card and have access to food. Another UNHCR registration officer reflected on the challenge to work with partners by stating that this complicated the UNHCR’s ability to extend their registration hours (personal communication, January 31st, 2011). The officer stated that “the capacity [to prolong our hours] is there, however, it’s a challenge technically. It’s a challenge with the partners.” The office stated that the reason why initial registration activities were not conducted on weekends was because the GoK did not work during the weekends.

The STC informant stated that often a UNHCR registration officer will identify an unaccompanied minor and direct that child to the STC area (personal communication, February 2nd, 2011). During the same interview I asked what STC’s relationship was with the LWF, however the informant was not sure what the LWF did, and was unsure if the services they offered was protection based.

One of the days that I arrived at the initial registration site the power was gone, which meant that the UNHCR registration officers did not have access to proGres and could
not register refugees. I spent that morning with the LWF community social worker at their compound. After lunch the community social worker informed me that the UNHCR officers had gone home due to the lack of registration opportunity. The following morning at the initial registration site one UNHCR registration officer asked me where I had been the previous day. When I explained to him the situation he informed me that they had indeed had problems with the power in the beginning of the day, but had gained the power back by midday, and had continued to register refugee until 4:00pm.

5.4.9 Regarding female staff
During my field observations with a male UNHCR registration officer, I saw him interview both female headed households and single women. Some of the refugee employed translators were women, but the majority of them were male, and it was the male refugees who did most of the ushering. The STC representative was a woman, so was the community service worker for LWF; however she was not always present at the initial registration site, giving off the illusion that her role was symbolic more than practical. Lastly, during the week that I conducted field observations at the initial registration site, there were no females conducting the LWF vulnerability assessments.

5.4.10 Access to the registration site
The head community supervisor for LWF believed that every camp should have their own registration center, because it is too far for people in the other camps to come to Ifo to get registered (personal communication, February 2^{nd}, 2011). Several UNHCR ushers informed me that it was far to travel even for refugees living at the opposite end of Ifo, because of the size of the camp (personal communication, February 4^{th}, 2011).

According to a UNHCR registration officer “if we know of people who are pending registration, then we will transport them” (personal communication, January 31^{st}, 2011). However, according to my interviews with the fourteen refugee families, not one of them had been offered transportation by the UNHCR (personal communication, February 4^{th}, 2011). Some of the refugees stated in their interviews that they had the means to take public transportation, and had done so. Others stated
that they had walked to the initial registration site. Of those who had walked, some
displayed dismay in their interviews, for having not been able to take transportation
due to their lack of means. One refugee states that his family had to wake up at 4am,
in order to make it before those who had the means to take public transportation
(personal communication, February 4th, 2011).

5.4.11 Empirical data collected regarding the closure of Liboi

A UNHCR registration officer was able to shed light on the situation regarding the
closure of Liboi (personal communication, January 31st, 2011). The officer confirmed
that the transit center, which did registration and screening of refugees, “was closed to
reflect the closure of the [Kenya – Somali] border.” However, the boarder closure has
not affected the amount of refugees fleeing into Kenya, which has flowed steadily
since the closure. In addition, the UNHCR registration officer did not see the closure
of the transit center as a major obstacle, as he stated that “just because you have a
center opened at the border, doesn’t mean that people are going to go through it”
(personal communication, January 31st, 2011).

5.4.12 Empirical data collected regarding registration in only one camp

During an interview with a UNHCR registration officer, several challenges regarding
conducting initial registration in only one camp were opinionated. (personal
communication, January 31st, 2011). It was claimed that challenges arose as a result
of the multiple partners present at each site. In Dadaab, a different medical IP is
located in each camp, and decentralizing initial registration (meaning having initial
registration in all three camps), was claimed to cause logistical challenge for the three
medical IPs. The officer stated that “if you go for decentralization, you need to reach
an agreement with all three on getting the vaccines, having the staff there at a certain
time each day, there’s space, so it’s a logistical challenge to decentralize all these
things.” Also, decentralization is a problem for the GoK, “who has limited resources
no, as they are still building up their capacity.”

The officer continued claiming that there are network issues concerning the database
that causes problems for decentralization. He stated that “if you decentralize, you
have to be able to ensure that all three locations have equal access to the database and that it is not too slow, with too many users.” Also “the fingerprint system can only handle a certain number of machines connected to the database at once, so even if you decentralize, you are multiplying the number of users, then you are in a situation where you would have to divide into separate servers.” Lastly, “dividing [the database] into separate servers, means that at the end of the day you have to consolidate all the data and make sure that there us o redundancy and everything is done according to procedures.”

The same UNHCR officer however did not see conducting initial registration in one camp as a major obstacle as “refugees knew automatically where to go, because everyone knows. And they’ll just show up at the door, without us sort of handling them” (personal communication, January 31st, 2011).

5.3.13 Empirical data collected regarding bribes from security guards
The LWF community service supervisor commented on the issue regarding security guards bribing refugees at the registration site by stating that “she had heard of no such thing, and that refugees are all treated equal, with the exception that children, elderly, sick and large families are prioritized” (personal communication, February 4th, 2011). The LWF information officer committed that he “had not heard of it, and if anything corruption lay with resettlement, not with registration” (personal communication, February 3rd, 2011). The head UNHCR officer confirmed that neither he had heard about bribes regarding guards. None of the refugees I interviewed either mentioned bribery being undertaken in Dadaab, but said that they had encountered problems at the border crossing from Somalia into Kenya, and that they had encountered briberies when they were caught by GoK officials on their trip down to Dadaab.
6. ANALYSIS

The analytical section of this thesis is also divided into five parts. As previously mentioned the first part will present the role that initial registration has on societal safety. In order to understand the role that initial registration has on societal safety one needs to understand the consequences of the activity when it is able to achieve the UNHCR objectives for initial registration, and the consequences when the activity is unable to do so. After having established the vital importance of initial registration on societal safety, we must explore how robust initial registration is, and where any potential vulnerability may lie. The second part of the analytical thesis will therefore discuss what vulnerabilities might lead to a failure in the system. These vulnerabilities are discovered using the UNHCR objectives of initial registration. The third part of the analysis will apply these vulnerabilities to the Dadaab context, and see to what extent they are embedded within initial registration conducted there. This thesis will present the vulnerabilities embedded within initial registration by the use of an FTA. The forth part of the analysis will utilize the FTA as a foundation for suggesting measures that should be implemented to mitigate these vulnerabilities. It is the viewpoint of this thesis that such actions as the identification of vulnerabilities, and the implementation of measures, will strengthen the reliability of the system, and thus increase societal safety. The fifth part of the analysis will offer a summary of the analysis by discussing how applying risk management activities to initial registration in Dadaab can increase societal safety.
Part 6.1 Understanding the role between initial registration and societal safety

The first section of this analysis presented the implications that a failure in initial registration would have on societal safety; by emphasizing the important role that initial registration has on the UNHCR’s ability to maintain critical social functions, protect the lives and health of refugees and to meet their basic needs. The section argues that if initial registration was unable to present a systematic overview there would be implications on the delegation of assistance, and that if special needs were not identified during registration, this could have serious repercussion regarding protection.

6.1.1 What contributions does initial registration have on societal safety?

In refugee camps, and to that extent Dadaab, the UNHCR is mandated by the United Nations to safeguard the right and well-being of refugees. They are also responsibility for the efficient operation of camp management. Consequently, the UNHCR is the system in place that must maintain critical social functions, protect the life and health of the refugees and meet their basic requirements under a variety of stress situations. The ability for the UNHCR to reach these objectives is defined as social safety.

Though the benefits of initial registration are multiple for the UNHCR, the host government and the refugees, only some of those listed in section 5.1 have implications on societal safety. The greatest contribution that initial registration gives to societal safety is its ability to produce a systematic overview and profile of the current population inside the camps. A systematic overview not only increases the UNHCR’s ability to maintain critical social functions, protect the life and health of the citizens and meet their basic requirements, but it also influences the UNHCR’s ability to operate efficiently and cost effectively (HIE, p.120). Efficiency and cost effectiveness are key words in societal safety as stressful situations are defined as periods of time pressure, dynamic conditions and limited resources (Rosenthal et al., 2001). The ability therefore to accomplish a job with a minimum expenditure of time, cost and effort is crucial.
A systematic overview is a token of control, as it gives UNHCR “information about persons of concern to UNHCR: who and where they are, their problems, needs and strengths” (HfR, ¶1). Facts and figures regarding the number of people of concern to UNHCR are vital for planning and preparedness (HfE). Information gathered through initial registration acts as a foundation for decision-making regarding camp management, protection, and assistance distribution, and has several benefits for the UNHCR to maintain critical functions, protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet their basic requirements.

Initial registration can help protect the lives and health of refugees as it allows an individual to avail themselves as someone of concern to UNHCR and the host government, and receive protection from refoulement and from arbitrary arrest and forcible recruitment (HfR, p.6). Registered refugees also gain access to food, water and non-food items, as well as education, health and sanitation facilities, which nonregistered refugees do not have access to.

A systematic overview can help meet a refugee’s basic requirements as it helps control congestion, and contributes to a systematic distribution of assistance. The UNHCR’s responsibility to protect and assist lie mainly with the population of concern, and an overview over how many this incorporates is important when delegating resources. Initial registration provides the necessary knowledge to:

1) Provide enough assistance to all beneficiaries,
2) Give appropriate assistance, and
3) Distribute aptly.

1) Initial registration allows the UNHCR to know how much food, water and non-food items are needed, and the extent that educational, medical and sanitation facilities need to be available to the population of concern, in order to meet the minimum standard set forth by the UN. Because of the already stretched resources, and the overwhelming influx of new refugees arriving in Dadaab, the calculation of distribution that allows for enough assistance to cover minimum standards, is importance in order to guarantee that every refugee gets access to assistance. Without a systematic overview, there would be no way to guarantee that refugees received the
amount of assistance they needed to cover the minimum standards set forth by the UN.

Without initial registration the UNHCR would not be able to identify those who were persons of concern and those who were not, and the UNHCR would have to provide protection and assistance to everyone. Distributing only to persons of concern is important to the UNHCR for cost efficiency, as it prevents delivering unnecessary assistance and using resources that could have been applied elsewhere. If donors know that their resources are not being wasteful, they might be inclined to keep giving. Resources from donors are vital in order for the UNHCR to keep operating, and are thus vital for societal safety. Without the support of the donor community, the UNHCR does not have the measures to implement initial registration and other camp management activities.

2) In order for the UNHCR to give appropriate assistance, it needs to know what type of assistance each refugee requires. It is not enough to give enough assistance; the assistance also needs to be appropriate to the context (Anderson, 1997). As such, initial registration needs to capture cultural or religion specifics that might influence aid distribution, as inappropriate assistance could be rejected or cause resentment, (i.e. providing pork to believers of the Muslim faith).

Initial registration identifies a refugee’s visible and non-visible vulnerabilities and records their protection and assistance needs. Initial registration is often “the first contact between UNHCR, or one of its partners, and an individual of concern” (HfR, p. 34), and as thus is the chance to immediately capture vulnerabilities and special needs. This initial capture is important as certain vulnerable groups (i.e. unaccompanied children), might never be identified except during initial registration (HfR).

3) The appropriate distribution of assistance entails knowing where to distribute. The recording of residency during initial registration, allows the UNHCR to gain a systematic overview over how many people are residing in each area. This information is useful in making sure that each area is receiving enough assistance to tailor to the population residing there. To such initial registration is important in that it can help maintain critical social functions by not overloading existing functions such...
as hospitals, schools and sanitation facilities. In addition to the benefits initial registration has for the distribution of protection and assistance, knowing how many people live in an area is important for congestion issues. Identify congestion is vital in order to prevent diseases and epidemics, which have devastating effects on at the UNHCR’s ability to protect a refugees health.

6.1.2 What implications does a failure in initial registration have on societal safety?

The failure to achieve the objectives stated by the UNHCR has several implications on societal safety. In the context of these objectives, a failure to conduct initial registration is the UNHCR’s inability to produce a systematic overview of the population of concern, or the inability to obtain detailed enough information to provide refugees with protection and appropriate assistance (HfE, p. 156).

A failure to conduct initial registration leads to the lack of a systematic overview. The lack of a systematic overview creates problems for the maintenance of social functions, as there are no means to control that the need for assistance matches the resources available. In a system already stretched for resources, proper delegation of the available but limited resources are a necessity in order to provide enough and appropriate assistance. Without knowing the size of the population UNHCR caters to, it is difficult to know how much of each type of assistance is needed. Too many people needing medical treatment, but with too little of it available, can overload hospitals and fatigue staff. Too much food can create spoiling issues, and too little food can create malnutrition issues. There are also security issues and stability concerns regarding the fair and accurate distribution of food. To prevent riots or other forms of social unrest, the UNHCR needs to be able to distribute to the minimum standards, and in a matter deemed sufficient by the population they cater to.

The inability of initial registration to produce working figures can be financially draining for the UNHCR. It is important that the overview reflect the population in the camps. From the report *In search of protection and livelihoods* (2010), we learnt that over forty thousand Kenyans held ration cards and were registered as refugees, which cost the WFP 4, 9 USD annually. This sum represents unnecessarily draining
of the already limited UNHCR resource supply, and influences the ability of the UNHCR to maintain critical social functions and distribute aid to persons who are dependent on it for their survival.

The inability of the UNHCR to register refugees in a timely manner has major implications on societal safety. In addition to preventing a systematic overview of the current population of concern, it also prevents the access to entitlements by refugees who depend on it for survival. This is because only registered refugees have access to entitlements from the UNHCR and IPs. Without initial registration a refugee cannot access food, water and non-food items, as well as education, health, sanitation facilities, and other forms of assistance. To such an extent the failure to conduct initial registration has major implications on the ability for a society to protect the lives and health of refugees and to meet their basic requirements.

The HRW report *from Horror to Hopelessness* (2010), introduced in 5.3.1, gives insight into the problems that a failure in initial registration can cause for refugees. The report states that during a registration backlog in 2008, refugees that:

Should have had free access to water, [...] did not (and were forced to beg and share with others). Many had difficulties in accessing healthcare because—contrary to official UNHCR and NGO policy—they were turned away for not having food ration cards, the only evidence of registration. (p. 33).

That there is a direct association between quality of life and an individual’s sense of security seems obvious (NSF, 1991). Access to food, a clean and healthy environment, and an awareness of good and available medical assistance, are necessary elements in the perception of safety (NSF, 1991). The information gathered during initial registration allows for this type of assistance to be available. The collapse of critical social functions will have devastating effects on the protection of life and health and in the ability to meet a refugee’s basic requirements.

For many, the knowledge that one’s basic necessities will be available in the morning is all that is required to create a sense of security (NSF, 1991). The connection therefore between health, safety and the environment is evident in that a sense of security is an important contributor for good health (NSF, 1991). If the UNHCR
become unreliable in its distribution, in that it does not have the resources to distribute
fair and accurately, this might cause unnecessary stress and psychological
implications on the refugee population, which might lead to an overall decrease in
health.

As previously mentioned, it is also important for the UNHCR to be able to provide
appropriate assistance, in order for it to meet a refugee’s basic requirements. The
inability to identify severe protection and assistance needs can have severe
implications regarding the protection of vulnerable groups such as women and
children. The lack of identification of these vulnerable groups could cause forced
marriages, sexual exploitations, slavery, and unauthorized and illicit adoptions to
occur undetected in the camps\(^\text{18}\) (HfR, p. 10). Anderson (1999) stated that it was
important to tailor assistance to the needs of the population and not in regards to our
own perception of assistance. To such an extent the assistance provided needed to be
contextual based, and gender and cultural sensitive. An overview of what assistance is
appropriate can only be accomplished through an overview over the population of
concern. “Lack of [reliable] information or collection of information for too narrow a
purpose or too short a planning horizon can hinder future decision-making and slow
the [identification and implementation of appropriate] durable solutions” (HfR, p.7).
Thus initial registration must not only acquire a systematic overview of the population
size, but also detailed enough information to tailor to the specific protection and
assistance needs that emerge.

Though a failure in initial registration can have severe implications for unregistered
refugees, it also has consequences for registered refugees. In cases where there is a
backlog in registration, unregistered refugees do not have access to basic necessities
such as water or food. Refugees must then depend on other refugees for entitlements,
which puts a strain on registered refugees and threatens their livelihoods. According
to the HRW (2010) report, during the registration crisis in 2008, “many registered
refugees shared their food, water, and shelter with the unregistered” (p. 33). Having

\(^\text{18}\) Separated children are defined according to UNHCR handbook for registration as “those boys and
girls separated from both parents, or from their previous legal or customary primary caregiver, but not
necessarily from other relatives.” (p.10). Separated children are differentiated from unaccompanied
children who is separated from both parents and any adult who by law or custom is responsible for
them.
refugees living in an area without being accounted for also puts unnecessary strains on public services, such as sanitation facilities, and go unaccounted for in the assessments of congestion or in calculations of garbage disposal. Too much garbage or broken sanitation facilities could contaminate drinking water, and start epidemics. Unregistered refugees are also not medical screened, and can therefore not receive appropriate medical assistance, which could cause illness to spread throughout the camps, another source for the outbreak of epidemics. In addition, according to the Handbook for Registration “*the physical and emotional pressure created by crowds or long queues should not be underestimated*” (p. 145). Therefore the inability of the UNHCR to conduct initial registrations in a timely manner, causing backlog and long waiting lines at the initial registration site, can “*make people anxious and, in many cases, angry*” (HfR, p. 145), which can have implications for protection and staff security.

Achieving working figure trusted by implementing partners create a unified camp management approach, but more so, producing reliable data is necessary for donors to keep funding. Knowledge concerning overviews is vital in regards to public information and fund raising (HfE, p. 157). The Camp Management Toolkit (CMT) 2008) writes that:

> One of the challenges we’ve had in the camps is ensuring accurate beneficiary lists. […]Certain aspects] have resulted in the registered camp population being considerably higher than the population actually residing in the camp. In the absence of a functioning strategy to address this issue, there has been a decreasing level of trust in the numbers, and there has been tension with several activities we’ve undertaken. (p.279)

Thus a decrease in the trust of data provided by the UNHCR could influence donor’s ability to give.
Part 6.2: The vulnerabilities that can lead to a failure in initial registration

A failure in initial registration is the inability to reach the objectives set forth by the UNHCR. The UNHCR objectives for initial registration, according to the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, are “to obtain working figures on the population of concern, including a breakdown of the population by age, sex and groups with specific need” and “to obtain detailed individual information on the population of concern which will help to better identify protection needs and to deliver more appropriate assistance” (HfE, p. 156). Any factors that might challenge initial registration from reaching these objectives are vulnerabilities that need to be identified and mitigated.

In order to produce working numbers on the population of concern, the UNHCR needs “to ensure that only persons of concern are registered, that all persons of concern are registered and that each person is registered only once” (HfR, p. 34). Any factors that challenge the UNHCR’s ability to do so are vulnerabilities that need to be identified and mitigated.

In order to obtain detailed individual information on the population of concern, the UNHCR needs to “make note of those who may be in particular need” (HfR, p. 34). Any factors that challenge the UNHCR’s ability to do so are vulnerabilities that need to be identified and mitigated.
Initial Registration Fails

The UNHCR is unable to create working figures

The UNHCR is unable to identify protection needs and deliver more appropriate assistance

6.3.1: The UNHCR registers persons who are not of concern to the UNHCR

6.3.1.1: Kenyan nationals are registered as persons of concern

6.3.1.2: Somali refugees who are not prima facie are registered

6.3.2: The UNHCR is not able to register all persons of concern to the UNHCR

6.3.2.1: Refugees stay in the camps without registering

6.3.2.2: Refugees have transportatio issues regarding access to the registration site

6.3.2.3: Refugees have problems reaching the registration site

6.3.3: The UNHCR registers the same person of concern to the UNHCR multiple times

6.3.3.1: Refugees do not know where to get registered

6.3.3.2: Refugees have a lack of UNHCR resources and staff

6.3.3.3: The UNHCR uses only fingerprint scanning in the verification of refugees

6.3.4: The UNHCR is unable to identify persons of concern to the UNHCR who have special needs

6.3.4.1: Refugees do not disclose information relevant to their protection and assistance needs

6.3.4.2: Special needs are captured by other IPs, but not shared with the UNHCR

6.3.4.3: Where the UNHCR relies on information from other IPs, these are unable to deliver

6.3.4.4: Kin relationships cannot be verified

Fault tree analysis
Part 6.3 The Dadaab Context

In this section I will analyze how a failure in initial registration is possible in Dadaab, by presenting the vulnerabilities listed in the empirical section as they apply to the Dadaab context. The vulnerabilities follow in accordance to the FTA I have created to assess initial registration in Dadaab. Please see the end of this document for the FTA analysis.

The vulnerabilities presented here are derived from the FTA. I have included in the FTA only those vulnerabilities I found to be present in the current context, and are therefore all of equal importance as current vulnerabilities within the system. I have not included those vulnerabilities that were present in the past, but seemed to be irrelevant in the current context (i.e. bribes with guards), nor the closure of the transit center, as the UNHCR registration officer confirmed that even if such a center existed, there is no guarantee that refugees would pass through it.

6.3.1 Registering only persons of concern

Achieving a systematic overview that matches the population of concern within the camps, means ensuring that initial registration registers only persons that are of concern to the UNHCR (HfE, p. 34).

In humanitarian emergencies such as the one occurring in Dadaab, the international humanitarian relief operations implements assistance that matches the minimum standard set forth by the UN. Unfortunately however, the world is such today that people do survive on rations lower than that agreed upon to be the minimum standard set by the UN. Thus, often in third world countries, or areas with extreme poverty and harsh living conditions, the assistance that the UN and their IPs implement to persons of concern, is of a higher standard or in larger quantities than the assistance available to the communities in vicinity. Such is also the case in Dadaab, where the assistance offered by the UN and their IPs to refugees, create a higher standard of living that that of local Kenyans. Often in such cases, locals will try to gain access to the entitlements that the people of concern to the UN has access to. Or refugees will try to gain access to the entitlements in order to sell them for a profit (In search of protection and
livelihood, 2101). According to the report *In search for protection and livelihood* (2010), and a UNHCR eligibility officer, this is exactly what is happening with initial registration in Kenya, where Kenyan nationals are trying to register as refugees and get access to entitlements from the UNHCR and their IPs.

The Nairobi and the Dadaab context vary in how they conduct refugee status interviews; in that Nairobi allows itself the possibility to conduct lengthy interviews to determine if someone has a background which excludes them from being considered a person of concern to the UNHCR. This creates a backlog, which is tolerable as being declared a refugee in Nairobi, does not allow you access to any material assistance. In Dadaab however, allowing for a detailed interview process to the extent conducted in Nairobi, would create a severe backlog, rendering thousands of refugees without access to food or material assistance.

In the context of the UNHCR operations in Dadaab, there are several challenges that may cause the UNHCR to be unable to register only persons of concern. These challenges include:

1) Kenyan nationals are registered as person of concern
2) Somali refugees who are not prima facie are registered

**6.3.1.1 Kenyan nationals are registered as person of concern**

In order to prevent the registration of Kenyans posing as Somali refugees, the GoK manually fingerprints all newly registered people before they are able to receive ration cards and documentation of their refugee status. These fingerprints are sent to Nairobi for comparison against all the fingerprints of Kenyan nationals over the age of eighteen, which are taken in order for Kenyans to be issued national identification.

The fact that the database in Nairobi only contains the fingerprints of Kenyans over the age of eighteen has implications on the objective that initial registration should only register persons of concern. The vulnerability with this safety mechanism is that it still allows Kenyans under the age of eighteen to pose as refugees. The possibility increases by the fact that initial registration requires no form of identification, as the majority of the refugees who arrive in Dadaab do not carry any form of identification.
Kenyans under the age of eighteen can register as their own household, as long as they say they are over the age of eighteen. However an increase in single households comprised of young males might raise suspicion. Where registration of Kenyans under the age of eighteen is likely to occur is through the ‘borrowed children’ syndrome. The borrowed children syndrome was coined by Susanne Butcher in our interview to represent the incidents where households ‘borrow’ children during initial registration to pose as their own, and thus add to their household size, creating a false representation of the population of concern inside the camps.

The extent that the GoK is able to prevent the identification of Kenyan nationals due to their fingerprint recognition system is questionable. Firstly, the fingerprints need to be manually sent to Nairobi in order to be compared with those on file in the national database, as they are manually taken and not compared to a database on site. It seems that the time taken for the fingerprints to be manually sent to Nairobi, verified, and then reported back is a timely one, which allows for a Kenyan to gain access to entitlements temporarily. The process looses credibility if fingerprints are compared to those on file in accordance with the issuance of the Kenyan refugee identification cards, which is suffering a tremendous backlog. In addition I am not sure what the implications are if a person registering is identified as a Kenyan, and the eventual follow up. If there is none, there is no incentive to keep Kenyans from posing as refugees. If the comparison is experiencing backlog, Kenyans who are not identified as Kenyans, might falsely assume that the process is faulty and unable to identify Kenyan national, and encourage other Kenyans to register as persons of concern as well. The report *In search of protection and livelihood* (2010), was able to provide figures that over forty thousand Kenyans were registered as refugees, and credited this to the fact that many refugees did not register with Kenya to get IDs, and would therefore not be identified by the database in Nairobi.

### 6.3.1.2 Somali refugees who are not prima facie are registered

Due to the mass influx of refugees arriving in Dadaab, the UN have declared all Somali refugees as ‘prima facie’ refugees, which allows for the removal of refugee determination interviews. “In some prima facie operations, the screening-out of armed elements and others who are determined not to be refugees is a difficult
process” (HfR, p. 143). Where the registration process differs in Nairobi than Dadaab is that in Nairobi the registration process still allows for further individual questioning for those refugees that the UNHCR have doubts are persons of concern. Usually this doubt is rooted in questions regarding their former employment, which might implicate their connection to criminal activities in Somalia.

The UNHCR do not allow for further interviews, as the interview process must be quick in order to be able to register all refugees. The fact that the UNHCR does not allow for refugee status interviews has implications on the objective that initial registration should only register persons of concern. The vulnerability connected with the lack of detailed interviewing of Somali refugees, especially in regards to former employment is that allows for Somalis who are disqualified as refugees, due to their recent activities in Somalia, the possibility to register as persons of concern to the UNHCR. Though these refugees have fled, and may have reason to do so, their past activities should exclude them from gaining access to entitlements and protection.

6.3.2 Registering all persons of concern

Achieving a systematic overview that matches the population of concern within the camps, means ensuring that initial registration registers all persons that are of concern to the UNHCR (HfE, p. 34). In order to encourage refugees to get registered, the UNHCR has connected registration with access to entitlements. The connection is such that only registered refugees gain access to protection and assistance by the UNHCR and their IPs. This is a grave incentive to encourage refugees to want to get registered, as unregistered refugees do not have access to food, water and non-food items, education, health, and other entitlements. When asked why refugees had come to be registered during my field interviews, every interviewee declared that they were registering in order to have access to food and other forms of material assistance.

Since refugees know that registration is tied up to the distribution of assistance, the UNHCR has implemented a measure which most likely ensures that families will bring all their children to initial registration, decreasing the possibility that children are left at home due to registration accessibility problems. However, such an incentive might increase the need to acquire ‘borrowed’ children, while it decreases the possibility that they ‘leave’ their own children at home.
In the context of the UNHCR operations in Dadaab, there are several challenges that may cause the UNHCR to be unable to register all persons of concern. These challenges include:

1) Refugees stay in the camps without registering
2) Refugees have problems reaching the registration site
3) The UNHCR is not able to register refugees in a timely manner

6.3.2.1 Refugees stay in the camps without registering

Refugees are informed of the access to entitlements through registration, by information posters around the camps, other refugees, and through public announcements at the initial registration site. The picture taken in Ifo camp by Eugene, a Kenyan national employed to assess the BPRM projects in Dadaab clearly illustrates how material assistance is of focus when campaigning for refugees to be registered, however, it also highlights how the protection aspect attached to registration is neglected.

Figure 5: Initial registration information sign, taken near the market social hall in Ifo.

The fact that the information campaigns regarding initial registration emphasizes material assistance has implications on the objectives that initial registrations should register all persons of concern. The vulnerability with the incentive is that it allows for refugees who do not need material assistance to go unregistered. According to interviews conducted in Dadaab, there were refugees who stayed in the camps without being registered, and it was implied that they did so due to the fact that they did not require material assistance. Even though these refugees do not require material assistance and are therefore not vital in a systematic overview intended for the efficient and cost-effective distribution of aid, refugees who go unregistered have several implications for other aspects of societal safety. Having refugees living in an area without being accounted for puts unnecessary strains on facilities that anyone can access, such as sanitation facilities, and go unaccounted for in the assessments of congestion and garbage disposal.

The implications of the miscommunication regarding registration and its benefits have other implications on societal safety, as refugees who do not register are without access to UNHCR protection. According to the CMT (2008), the role of registration is to capture the entire population consisting of refugees – even though they may not be in need of material assistance – as it relates to their legal status (CMT, 2008, p.278). As it is stated in the Toolkit:

In the context of refugee protection, being a “refugee” in an asylum country carries certain rights over other foreigners who may be in the same country. As such, being registered is a necessary part and first step in the process that confers this status on an individual who then has access to the rights. Refugee status ensures protection from refoulement – involuntary or forced return of refugees who have a well-founded fear of persecution, from which refugees are protected under customary international law – and from arbitrary arrest and forcible recruitment. (p. 278).

6.3.2.2 Refugees have problems reaching the registration site

The location of initial registration has changed several times during the last few years. In the past initial registration was conducted in all three camps, then in 2008 only
conducted in Dagahaley. Currently initial registration is conducted only in Ifo. According to a UNHCR registration officer, the reason for this is because the database cannot support too many access points, and that registration in several camps causes logistic issues.

The vulnerability with having only one initial registration site is multiple for refugees. In the report *From Horror to Hopelessness* it was listed as one of the causes for the registration crisis in 2008, as it hindered several refugees from being able to access the initial registration site. During my interviews with the refugee families, several reported that they had been in Dadaab for a few days before going to the initial registration site to be registered. The refugees reported that the reason for this delay was that they either did not know where to get registered, or they had trouble reaching the registration site.

Firstly, having initial registration change location must cause confusion for refugees, especially if the change of location is not followed up with the appropriate information. The information sign posted in Ifo regarding initial registration, illustrates this lack of information. This sign informs refugees that registration is done at the UNHCR offices (which I assume to mean the UNHCR field offices located in each camp). This we know is not the case, as these offices are not the site of initial registration, only continuous registration. Lastly the information sign is written in English only, which is problematic as most of the refugees are not literate, let alone literate in English.

Secondly, through my interviews with refugee families during initial registration several expressed concerns of the logistical issues in trying to reach the registration site. Several refugees, especially those with large families consisting of young children had to use public transportation in order to make it to the registration center at Ifo. Large families might not have the means to acquire transportation for all family members, which might hinder their ability to reach the registration site.

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19 On May 31, 2008, Ifo and Hagadera camps were declared full and registration continued only in Dagahaley camp to encourage all new arrivals to settle there (*From Horror to Hopelessness*, p. 33).

20 Though not pertaining to initial registration in Dadaab, one family did inform me that when crossing the border from Somalia to Kenya they had been stopped by men who threatening to send them back to
6.3.2.3 The UNHCR is not able to register refugees in a timely manner

Despite the incentive to get refugees to register, a systematic overview is dependent on the UNHCR’s ability to register them as they arrive. One of the greatest challenges therefore when it comes to initial registration regards the UNHCR capability to process refugees in accordance to their arrival.

Backlog, defined as an accumulation of unregistered refugees waiting to be registered, arises when the UNHCR is unable to register in accordance with the refugees awaiting registration. From the report *From Horror to Hopelessness*, we know that a sever backlog occurred in 2008. We know from interviews conducted now in 2011, that backlog is still an occurrence within initial registration in Dadaab, due to the mass influx of refugees arriving in Dadaab.

In times where the backlog surpasses one week, in that a refugee receives an appointment slip to return the following week to get registered, a UNHCR officer informed me that the UNHCR removes registration staff from continuous registration and puts them at the initial registration site to conduct interviews for the UNHCR. This shows that the UNHCR are aware of backlog, and that they implement measures to try to mitigate the backlog once it occurs. The vulnerability with this safety mechanism is that it affects the ability of continuous registration to conduct their responsibilities, as it decreases the staff able to process request concerning continuous registration. It also strains the staff left to conduct continuous registration when others are removed to the initial registration site. In a population concerning over three hundred thousand refugees, most household compositions are temporary: daughters marry, mothers die, spouses divorce and remarry, and children are born (HfR, p. 157). In addition, “families entering during a mass influx may have been separated during their flight” (HfR, p. 157) and want to join an already established household after initial registration. Thus continuous registration is a vital aspect in order to keep working figures on the population of concern.

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Somalia. In the exchange for a bribe they would be allowed to pass. The family explained that they only had enough money for one of their daughters, and thus had to leave one of them behind.
6.3.3 Registering each person only once

Achieving a systematic overview that matches the population of concern within the camps, means ensuring that initial registration registers each persons of concern to the UNHCR only once. The measure implemented by the UNHCR to prevent multiple registrations by the same individual is the use of biometrics. Biometrics is “automated methods of recognizing the identity or verifying the claimed identity of an individual based on physical characteristics” (HfR, p. 141). In Dadaab, the UNHCR uses fingerprint recognition in order to prevent a refugee from registering multiple times.

In the context of the UNHCR operations in Dadaab, the challenge that may cause the UNHCR to be unable to register persons of concern to the UNHCR is that:

1) Refugees under the age of four are registered multiple times

6.3.3.1 Refugees under the age of four are registered multiple times

In order to prevent persons of concern from registering multiple times, the UNHCR fingerprints each refugee and scans those prints against the biometric data of all previously refugees registered in Dadaab, whose fingerprints are located in the UNHCR proGres database\(^{21}\). As fingerprints are identical to each individual, the lack of a match guarantees that the individual has not previously registered in Dadaab, just as a match reveals that the same refugees has registered previously in Dadaab. However, the scanner can only with confidence identify and compare the fingerprints of individuals above the age of four, as children under the age of four do not have fingerprints developed enough to be unique to that individual. In the cases where the fingerprints are underdeveloped, the scanner often does not recognize the fingerprints in order for them to be stored, or the scanner will match the fingerprints with a previously registered case of another individual. The UNHCR officer can decide if the child has been registered previously by comparing the headshots of the case with that of the child being registered.

\(^{21}\) Due to long standing practices and several registration verification exercises conducted over the years in Daadab, the UNHCR has all registered refugees on file with their matching fingerprints. Any scan can therefore with confidentiality reveal if a refugee has previously registered or not.
The fact that the fingerprint verification system can only recognize the fingerprints of children over the age of four has implications on the objective that initial registration should only register persons of concern once. The vulnerability with this safety mechanism is that it still allows for refugees under the age of four to register multiple times with different families, and the incidents that Susanne Butcher referred to as ‘the borrowed children’ incidents. A refugee family can ‘borrow’ the children of neighboring households during initial registration, and expand their ration card to match a higher family size. Currently there is no way of knowing to what extent this vulnerability has influenced UNHCR’s ability to produce a realistic reflection of the population size, however the awareness of this vulnerability by the UNHCR staff does insinuate that the possibility of abuse by ‘borrowing’ children is a realistic threat.

6.3.4 Identifying those with needs

Obtaining detailed individual information on the population of concern which will help to better identify protection needs and to deliver more appropriate assistance, means ensuring that initial registration is able to identify those who may be in particular need.

The importance of initial registration on the identification of vulnerabilities is emphasized in the UNHCR Handbook for Registration as it may very well be “the only occasion during a the refugee life-cycle when staff will have direct an opportunity for direct and thorough contact with the entire population, since registration staff will, at some point, interact with every individual refugee during a face-to-face interview” (p. 142). Though “many refugees who are registered usually obtain essential protection through UNHCR’s assistance programs […], registration represents a unique opportunity to ensure that those persons with special needs receive assistance appropriate to those needs” (HfR, p. 142).

The “UNHCR has broadly defined a number of special needs categories for the purpose of identifying persons requiring special protection or assistance interventions” (HfR, p. 142)\textsuperscript{22}, specifically emphasizes the identification of vulnerable

\textsuperscript{22} See Section 17.4.9 in the UNHCR Handbook for Registration – Record special protection and assistance needs for definitions of these categories.
children and females. However, in the context of the UNHCR operations in Dadaab, there are several challenges that may cause the UNHCR to be unable to identify those persons of concern who are vulnerable and need special assistance or extra protection. These challenges include:

1) Refugees do not disclose information relevant to their protection and assistance needs
2) Special needs are captured by other IPs, but not shared with the UNHCR
3) Where the UNHCR relies on information from other IPs, these are unable to deliver
4) Kin relationships cannot be verified

6.3.4.1 Refugees do not disclose information relevant to their protection and assistance needs

The set up of the registration site, the lack of food and water being provided, the absence of individual interviews, the misallocation or lack of female staff, and the lack of specific protection and assistance questions by the UNHCR, all have implications on the UNHCR’s ability to collect detailed information.

The UNHCR Handbook for Registration recommends that the registration sites need to be prepared to conduct interviews in a quiet place (HfR, p. 11). In Dadaab, the interview areas are separated only by a thin piece of cloth, and often other households are waiting in close proximity to the household being interviewed. As the STC representative confirmed, refugees may be less inclined to discuss their vulnerabilities in open and in close proximity to others.

The UNHCR Handbook for Registration also states that “it is also useful to have food and drink available” (HfR, p. 11). In Dadaab there isn’t any food offered to any refugee, neither child nor adult during their time at the registration site. The implication of this is that a lack of food or drink might cause fatigue in refugees, which again might influence their interest in voluntarily disclosing information regarding their vulnerabilities and special needs.
The UNHCR Handbook for Registration states that registration should begin with household units to establish if an individual is unaccompanied, and to record the details of accompanying family members (p. 36). It then requires that “persons of concern should be registered individually” (HfR, p. 36). The handbook also states that “women asylum-seekers should be interviewed separately without the presence of male family members” (p.155). In Dadaab, the UNHCR does interview on a household basis, where all refugees are interviewed with their accompanying household members, and is thus able to identify unaccompanied individuals. However, in Dadaab the UNHCR process is not followed up by conducting interviews with the refugees individually. Though it is unnecessary to conduct individual refugee interviews for refugee identification purposes, as all Somali refugees are identified as prima facie, it is however important in order to identify special protection and assistance needs. The use of individual interviews encourages and permits refugees to fully represent themselves (HfR, p. 13). The absence of individual interviews may affect a refugee’s willingness to speak open regarding their personal needs. In addition, if the refugee is seeking protection against one of his/her family members, the process implements information to surface, as refugees are not inclined to ask for protection against the person they are being interviewed together with.

According to the UNHCR Handbook for Registration, “people – and women in particular – should be automatically assigned an interpreter and interviewer of the same sex” (HfR, p. 155). Though the UNHCR registration officers were a mix of male and female representatives, there was no guarantee that women headed households, or single women were ushered to be registered with female staff members. There has been research conducted according to camp management activities, which suggests that sexual exploitation against female refugees by UNHCR staff members occurs in refugee settings (Olsen & Scharffscher, 2004). Although there were no reporting to my knowledge of sexual abuses or exploitations connected to initial registration in Dadaab, having female staff members conduct the refugee interview of single females or female headed households, mitigates the possibility of such cases occurring in the future. Refugee females might also be more inclined to report these cases to a female registration officer.
6.3.4.2 Special needs are captured by other IPs, but not shared with the UNHCR

The CMT (2008) explains that “the camp management agency should advocate strongly for all operational partners to use the same registration data” (p. 280). During my observations at the field office for the LWF, it seemed that the information collected during the LWF vulnerability assessments were only updated in their own database, and not entered into proGres. The LWF comment regarding specifics being better captured by IPs, rather than the UNHCR, might suggest that there are challenges connected to information sharing regarding specific needs among the IPs and the IPs and the UNHCR. This implies that though specific needs are identified, they might not be captured by the UNHCR not stored in their database.

6.3.4.3 Where the UNHCR relies on information from other IPs, these are unable to deliver

The vulnerability assessments conducted by the LWF during initial registration can imply that the UNHCR recognizes their limitations during initial registration, and have taken further measures to ensure that vulnerable refugees are identified. The LWF conducts vulnerability assessment that are detailed enough to recognize specific vulnerabilities, as it asks direct protection and assistance questions. However, this safety mechanism still has vulnerabilities connected to it, in the form of its execution during initial registration. Firstly, the questions are asked to the household, rather than to each individual refugee, and there were incidents where only one family member needed to be present for the analysis. They are also asked in the same area that the UNHCR conducts their registration interviews, and the process is subjected to the same challenges regarding the lack of privacy. As previously mentioned these factors have implications on a refugee’s ability to disclose sensitive information. The UNHCR Handbook for registration states that registration should “maximize the use of female registration staff” (p. 142), and that there should be equal number of women officers, interviewers and interpreters working with registration activities (p.13). I realized that that several questions were not asked, regarding HIV and rape, which might have something to do with the LWF’s lack of female staff.
6.3.4.4 Kin relationships cannot be verified

According to the Handbook for Registration, “in the interest of protecting the unity of refugee families, whether nuclear (relations defined by blood) or extended (relations defined by custom, adoption and/or blood), it is crucial that the composition of every refugee’s family be carefully assessed” (p. 157). However, in Dadaab there is no mean to verify the kin relations given during initial registration, as the majority of the refugees arrive without any form of legal documents (such as a passport or a marriage or birth certificate), which can identify them, their status, or kin relations. The lack of proper identification, registration and documentation of separated children, keeps UNHCR registration officers from properly identifying those children that are being cared for by a legal and customary primary caregiver, or those cared for by other family relatives, kinfolk or neighbors. This is especially important in the Dadaab refugee setting, where UNHCR loosely defines what the composition of a household is. It is vital to identify, register and document kin relations to protect children who might be subjected to such risks as early or forced marriage, sexual exploitation, slavery, and unauthorized and illicit adoptions cannot be identified during initial registration.23

According to the UNHCR regional registration officer, Dadaab is one of the few refugee camps in the world who distribute birth certificates to new born babies, which protects both the mother and the child. In Dadaab, proofs of refugee status and ration cards are distributed to the head of household, and not to each individual refugee. Consequently these documents are often issued to husbands or male relatives. Until the GoK is able to distribute refugee identification cards to all refugees, refugees will not have individual identification cards. The implications of this are several concerning the protection of women. According to the Handbook for Registration:

Women who lack adequate registration and personal documentation, including identity cards, marriage certificates, divorce certificates, and birth certificates for their children have sometimes been denied freedom of movement and access to basic rights. Refugee women have been unable to claim or inherit

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23 Separated children are defined according to UNHCR handbook for registration as “those boys and girls separated from both parents, or from their previous legal or customary primary caregiver, but not necessarily from other relatives.” (p.10). Separated children are differentiated from unaccompanied children who are separated from both parents and any adult who by law or custom is responsible for them.
property upon return, to seek support for children from estranged husbands or partners, or have been arrested and detained by police because they do not have proper documents (p. 12).

Female refugees without individual identification cards are dependent on male family members for access to food, and essential services, and cannot seek protection (HfR, p.12). This is a grave vulnerability with initial registration, especially if the woman is seeking protection against the man who holds her identification papers, and she cannot access her papers which allow her to seek protection.
Part 6.4: Implementing measures of mitigation

The FTA in the previous section presented a systematic overview over how initial registration might fail, and the potential vulnerabilities embedded within the context of initial registration in Dadaab, that might lead to such a failure. Once managers know which vulnerabilities might lead to a registration crisis, they can implement measures to mitigate or control them. This part will discuss where managers should implement measures.

6.4.1 Strengthening the relationship with GoK

The FTA identified several vulnerabilities concerning the role of the GoK within initial registration, especially in regards to the GoK verification process concerning fingerprints. The analysis discovered several factors that might cause the registration of Kenyans as refugees, implying that measures to strengthen the importance of Kenyan National IDs for Kenyans, to guarantee verification of the fingerprints collected in Dadaab against the national database, and to strengthen repercussions for Kenyans who register as refugees, need to be implemented. In addition the GoK needs to produce the necessary individual refugee documents, which will not only establish a sense of recognition on behalf of the GoK towards the Somali population on their territory, but also enhance the protection of refugee women and children as they will receive their own proof of registration.

6.4.2 Strengthening the relationship with IPs

Where the UNHCR depends on other partners to do aspects to strengthen the objectives of initial registration, the UNHCR needs to ensure that the IPs performs to the standard required by the UN. The FTA identified that there were several weaknesses regarding how the LWF were conducting their vulnerability assessments, which implies that the UNHCR needs to implement measures that guarantee that the LWF implement female staff, that all members of a household to be present during registration, that staff ask all the questions on the vulnerability assessment, and that protection issues and special needs are referred back to the UNHCR.
6.4.3 Strengthening the UNHCR interview process

The FTA identified several vulnerabilities connected to the registration site and location. During my field research there were plans to establish a new initial registration site in Ifo II, however, as long as this remain only as plans, thousands of refugees must endure registration in the current context. While the UNHCR awaits the new registration location, it should implement measures to interview women and children in private quarters.

Without the necessary resources that are required to establish lengthier interviews which allows for the capturing of vulnerabilities, it is difficult to argue that the UNHCR can afford to conduct individual and lengthy interviews. However they could implement measures by better allocating the resources they already have: by relying on other IPs to identify what they cannot, and by establishing some form of schedule allowing female registration staff members to interview female refugees.

6.4.4 Using data collection from other sources for verification

The FTA identified vulnerabilities attached to the multiple registrations of children, and should implement mitigating measures. What the UNHCR could do is compare their registration data with other societal function in the system such as educational records and hospital birth records.

6.4.5 Strengthening information campaigns

The FTA identified several vulnerabilities attached to the current information available to refugees concerning initial registration. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, addition information campaigns need to be established. According to the FTA these need to be written in the Somali language and be presented both orally and verbally. They need to incorporate not only where to get registered, but also the times of registration. In addition, the information needs to emphasize both the protection side of registration, as well as the access to material assistance (HfR, p. 146).
Part 6.5 Analysis summary

In the theoretical section I argued that the identification of vulnerabilities and implementation of mitigating measures can prevent crisis from occurring, and thus increase societal safety. After presenting the empirical data it wanted to show in the analytical section of this thesis how the identification of vulnerabilities, led to the implementation of mitigating measures, which could prevent a failure in initial registration in Dadaab.

The first section of this analysis presented the implications that a failure in initial registration would have on societal safety; by emphasizing the important role that initial registration has on the UNHCR’s ability to maintain critical social functions, protect the lives and health of refugees and to meet their basic needs. The section argues that if initial registration was unable to present a systematic overview there would be implications on the delegation of assistance, and that if special needs were not identified during registration, this could have serious repercussion regarding protection.

After having justified why it was important to prevent the failure of initial registration, I had to look at the factors that might cause initial registration to be unable “to obtain working figures on the population of concern, including a breakdown of the population by age, sex and groups with specific need” and “to obtain detailed individual information on the population of concern which will help to better identify protection needs and to deliver more appropriate assistance” (HfE, p.156), which are the universal UNHCR objectives regarding registration. Using the UNHCR Handbook for Registration I was able to identify that initial registration would have “to ensure that only persons of concern are registered, that all persons of concern are registered and that each person is registered only once” (HfR, p. 34), and that initial registration could “make note of those who may be in particular need” (HfR, p. 34).

Once having identified what was necessary in order for initial registration to achieve its objectives, the analysis presented several vulnerabilities embedded within initial registration in Dadaab, which affected the ability of UNHCR “to ensure that only
persons of concern are registered, that all persons of concern are registered and that each person is registered only once” (HfR, p. 34), and that initial registration could “make note of those who may be in particular need” (HfR, p. 34). The vulnerabilities were identified using the empirical findings and presented using a FTA, which is appropriate when trying to discover ‘what can go wrong.’

Once the vulnerabilities had been identified and systematically presented, the FTA was used to discuss measures that the UNHCR needed to implement in order to decrease the vulnerabilities identified in the FTA that affected the UNHCR’s ability “to ensure that only persons of concern are registered, that all persons of concern are registered and that each person is registered only once” (HfR, p. 34), and that initial registration could “make note of those who may be in particular need” (HfR, p. 34). The FTA acted as a platform from which decisions regarding mitigating measures were taken.
7. CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to answer the research question: *how can the application of risk management activities to initial registration of refugees in Dadaab increase societal safety?*

The implications that initial registration in Dadaab has on societal safety are multiple. If the UNHCR is unable to obtain a systematic overview over the population in place, congestion issues might arise which could lead to epidemics and an overload on infrastructure, which could make critical functions collapse. A systematic overview is also necessary in the distribution of assistance. If the UNHCR is unable to provide the essentials for a minimum standard, such as food, safe drinking water, and shelter, or social resources such as access to information, education, and health care, this can have grave implications on the refugee’s health and wellbeing. It can lead to malnutrition, depression, starvation, epidemics and increased mortality. If the UNHCR in unable to identify protection and special needs, forced marriage, sexual exploitations, and abuse regarding women and children might go unnoticed and unmanaged, implicating the UNHCR’s ability to protect the lives and health of its refugees.

In order for initial registration to continue to be a reliable system of operation by providing a systematic overview and identifying protection and assistance needs, the UNHCR needs to assure that there is a “*lack of unwanted, unanticipated, and unexplainable variance in performance***” (Hollnagel, 1993, p. 51). The theoretical analysis of this thesis argued that such variance comes from vulnerabilities which are left unmanaged within a system. If vulnerabilities are left unmanaged within a system, they develop over time to become latent failures, which are the cause of organizational accidents (Reason, 1997). In order to prevent unwanted, unanticipated and unexplainable variance in performance, the UNHCR needs to identify vulnerabilities within initial registration in Dadaab and manage them. The identification of vulnerabilities and the management of them are risk management activities.
Applying risk management to initial registration this identifies vulnerabilities and manages them, which is necessary in order to keep the activity reliable. If the activity becomes unreliable this greatly decreases societal safety. The identification of vulnerabilities is often conducted using a risk analysis, which acts as a foundation for decisions regarding measures to implement to mitigate or control the identified vulnerabilities. The thesis should therefore be able to conclude that if the UNHCR considers the vulnerabilities identified in this thesis pertaining to initial registration in Dadaab, and implement measures to mitigate or control them, societal safety will increase not only in that it will prevent an organizational accident from occurring, but also in that it will improve the UNHCR’s ability to maintain critical social functions, protect the lives and health of refugees, and meet their basic requirements.
Further Research:

There are several areas of further research within this topic and within the context of Dadaab that could have strengthened the results of this thesis. As outlined in the methodology chapter of this thesis, the inclusion of more informants, especially female staff members, IP representatives, and the GoK registration officers, could have caused a better vulnerability assessment, as well as ideas regarding measures that could be implemented.

Research could have been pushed to include a better understanding of the relationship between the usage of the overview collected during initial registration, and how IPs reflect on the process.

I hope that the lessons of applying risk management activities can be implemented in other contexts not only regarding initial registration but other forms of camp management, in order to strengthen societal safety in the humanitarian context. According to Turner and Toft (1988):

> Although major large-scale failures are high-intensity events, they also occur with low frequency within any one industrial sector, so to learn from them we must make use of a wide range of comparisons from different industrial sectors. To facilitate such comparisons a framework must be developed which aids recognition of similar types of casual patterns, disregarding the differing contexts in which they may occur. (p. 297).

I thus hope that the vulnerabilities that I uncovered in my analysis will act as a basis for similar vulnerability assessment, and can provide information which will reduce the chances of similar events occurring. Thus further research should be attempted to analyze risk in other initial registration systems in order to collect similar types of casual patterns, and increase an awareness of vulnerabilities.

Lastly, initial registration is just one component of registration within Dadaab, and an equal importance should be given to continuous registration and deregistration of refugees. Due to research constraints during this thesis, such topics are not explored in this thesis and are thus subject for further research.
References


Appendix 1: Map and overview location of refugee camps
Appendix 2: Map and overview of registered refugees in Kenya
Appendix 3: Overview of Somali refugees in the Great Lakes Region

Somali Refugees in the Region
As of March 2011

Total Number of Somali Refugees
684,475

Total Number of IDPs*
1,460,000

*Figures on Somali refugees come from official sources in neighboring countries. The data shown on this map was provided primarily in February-March 2011. Total IDP figures are estimates. They are based largely on data obtained from the Population Movement Tracking System, which is not designed to calculate cumulative population totals, only population movement trends. **Population figures for Somalia in Yemen are currently unavailable.
Appendix 4: Letter of introduction sent to IPs

Til: unicefesaro@unicef.org
Sendte elementer
7. January 2011 13:30
To whom it may concern,

I was hoping you could help me as I am having a hard time finding the appropriate contact persons.

My name is Jeanneth Nodland, and I am a graduate student from the University of Stavanger. Later this month, my colleague and I are arriving in Nairobi to conduct fieldwork related to our master thesis. We will be spending 2 weeks in Nairobi, and 1 week in Dadaab in accordance with UNHCR.

My research will be related to individual registration processes in Dadaab of incoming refugees. My dissertation for my masters will look at the factors which challenges or promotes refugee registration in Dadaab, in order to determine to what extent registration can be an effective mean in quantifying the population in place, and reach the goal of providing better assistance.

The research will include a descriptive analysis of current registration practices, objectives by various organizations, and how registration reflects these in its implementation. It will also look at coordination and cooperation with other actors, and how data gathered during registration can be of assistance to other sectors/clusters (water, health, environment, shelter, children, protection).

Would you be able to refer me to someone who might have knowledge on how the registration done in Dadaab reflects practices done by UNICEF? What does the UNICEF hope to acquire through individual refugee registration, and what have UNICEF experiences been regarding individual registration of arriving refugees. I am coming to Nairobi at the end of this month/early February and would appreciate any information as to who I might be able to contact. I am already in contact with WFP for interviews and would like to have UNICEFs input as well.

Thank you so much for your time.

Kind regards
Jeanneth Nodland
Appendix 5: Copy of LWF's vulnerability assessment

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Ration card number. ..........................................................

Period of stay in the camp prior to registration and social vulnerability assessment

Kindly tick the box on the right if client fits in the description

- Is the Family head (HOF) over 60 years? □
- Is the HOF PH/WD/blind/defast/physically challenged/mute? □
- Is the HOF PLW/HIV/AIDS (If voluntarily disclosed) status? □
- Is the HOF Unaccompanied Minor/Seperated child (under 18 years) □
- Is the HOF Female and the family size over 6? □
- Is the HOF pregnant woman? □
- Is somebody in the family a survivor of SGBV? (FGM/Age/FEM) (If voluntarily disclosed) □
- Is somebody in the family a survivor of slavery/trafficking (If voluntarily disclosed) □
- Is the Family head above 18 years but at risk? (divorced/minority/orphans/lioness) □
- Is somebody in the family critically ill □
- Is somebody in the family associated with combatants? □

RECOMMENDATIONS/ACTION

Issue with Non-food items (specify exact need) ...........................................

Ref to:
- CARE Gender and Development for SGBV related issues
- CARE Counselling unit
- Handicap International for all disabilities
- NCCSC for persons at risk (Singles/Youth/young mothers/HIV/AIDS/CSW/Discussed)
- Save the Children for all child related cases
- NRC/LWF for shelter cases at appropriate
- MAF/SWISS Daghaley/TEC Hageides and GTZ Ifo for chronic medical problems medical
- UNHCR for registration if client is unregistered
- Notify the police/protection in case client needs special protection

Other appropriate action not listed above ..........................................................

Name and Signature of interviewing officer/incentive worker ..................................

Date: ..................................................................

Place of Interview (UNHCR field office, LWF office or at the Block) .........................

Camp: ..................................................................

1