Anti-Doping in Sport
A Study of Policy Development since 1998

Dag Vidar Hanstad

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For Jørgen,
Jacob and Jonas
Acknowledgements

I was inspired by my former neighbor to start this project. Every day he arrived from work early in the afternoon in his Mercedes, bigger and more expensive than my old Audi, to a house bigger and more expensive than mine. During weekends and holidays he spent plenty of time with his family and friends in his mountain cabin. My neighbor had a PhD from the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences (NSSS, henceforth NIH). Life as an academic looked alluring for a journalist like me, traveling a lot in a stressful job - usually challenged to reach deadline for the next edition.

Could it be something for me? More than searching for longer vacations I was fascinated by the idea of working in depth with my main interest as a journalist: politics, power and anti-doping in sport.

Many thanks to my former neighbor in Kristiansand, Bjørn Tore Johansen, who encouraged me to go on with the project. Lars Tore Ronglan, an old friend and teammate in handball (with a PhD from NIH), was the next one who supported the idea. He opened some doors at NIH, for example the one into Sigmund Loland’s office. Sigmund was of great help and gave me advice and ideas to go on with a PhD. I do not know what Sigmund actually knew about my academic skills, but I am afraid he overestimated me as a scholar.

However, I am glad that he did not tell about all the challenges I should meet as an academic newcomer. There are some common elements between journalistic and scientific activities, but obviously also differences.

I am grateful for Sigmund’s role as supervisor, which has overlapped with his first period as rector at the NIH. Therefore we early in the process involved visiting professor Ivan Waddington as a co-supervisor. Ivan has for decades done research on doping and anti-doping with a sociological approach, and has been of vital importance. He deserves thanks for his patience to make me think more as a sociologist. The challenge is not fulfilled. In addition Ivan has been vital in his contributions to cleaning up my English.

During my period as a PhD student at NIH I have met many able and helpful colleagues and, in particular, my colleagues at the Department for Cultural and Social Studies, who are involved in history, sociology, philosophy and sport management. Their different interests have provided daily intellectual stimulation and the section’s research seminars, touching all these academic fields, have been of special help for my research. Many thanks to the head of the Department, Matti Goksøyr, for initiating the seminars and his general contribution to the PhD students’ working conditions.

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In addition, in alphabetical order, I want to thank the following for practical assistance during the process: Rune Andersen, Svein Andersen, Ola Bernhus, Trond Glasser, Ken Green, Solveig Jølstad, Tom Floritz Laursen, Øyvind Mehus Sjursen, Hans B. Skaset, Anders Solheim, Andy Smith, Miranda Thurston, Britt Vold, Jens Weinreich, staff at the NIH library, and Tove Riise and Liv Korsmo at the printing office.

Finally, I want to thank my family. First my parents who gave me freedom in childhood, and ever since have supported my choices, also when I considered to start on this project.

One of the objectives in leaving journalism was to stay more at home. In my opinion this goal has been achieved but I am not sure if my partner Trine agrees. I have obviously traveled less than before, but not always been present mentally. It is difficult to leave a PhD project in the office when going home at night, but with Trine’s understanding and support the four years at NIH altogether have been family friendly.

Oslo, 23 April 2009,
Dag Vidar Hanstad
Abstract

The aim of this study is to analyze in a systematic and critical way the many more or less interconnected processes shaping anti-doping work at different levels since the doping scandal in the Tour de France cycle race in 1998. More specifically, this dissertation is an investigation of anti-doping policies in international sport with a particular emphasis on the power relations between units at different levels.

The main research question is: How can the development of anti-doping policy since 1998 be understood?

The main theoretical framework is figurational sociology. Norbert Elias introduces the concept of figuration as a way of overcoming the individual–society dichotomy. Sociology should be concerned with viewing the social world as open pluralities of interdependent people bonded together in dynamic constellations. Elias saw game models as a means of isolating in close focus the intertwining of the aims and actions of pluralities of people, thereby making these complex processes more easily understandable.

The study is comprised of four qualitative case studies. Because of the complexity of the development of anti-doping policy it was necessary to confine the study to some key units and the relationships between them. This was done by picking out one case study at each of the following levels; the global (paper I), international (paper II), national (paper III) and the individual athlete’s level (paper IV).

Paper I examines the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which was established following the World Conference on Doping in Sport convened by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and held in Lausanne in 1999. More specifically, the paper draws upon Elias’s game models to analyze: (i) the way in which the IOC sought to manage this process of change in such a way that its longstanding position as the world’s leading anti-doping organization would be reinforced; and (ii) the IOC’s inability to control this process. The result was that the IOC failed to achieve any of its objectives, its position as the world’s anti-doping organization was actually undermined, and world leadership passed to a new organization which had a significant measure of independence from the IOC.

Paper II explores the process of organizational change within the International Ski Federation (FIS) in relation to the issue of doping. More specifically, the paper examines how the FIS adopted the policy established by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) following a doping scandal in cross-country skiing during the 2001 Nordic World Ski Championship in Lahti, Finland. The roles of different people and organizations in the figuration are analyzed. The analysis focuses on shifts in the balance of power within FIS and the increasing interdependency between FIS and WADA. This led to changes in FIS policy.

Paper III explores the relationships and tensions in doping issues between politicians and bureaucrats in the public sector and the leadership in voluntary sport organizations – core units in the anti-doping activity at national level after the establishment of WADA. More specifically, this is an analysis of the case where the Director General of the Norwegian Department of Sport Policy (DSP) in the Ministry of Cultural and Church Affairs expressed his personal/political opinion about anti-doping in public, and played the game in two figurations. First, the game was played in the sport figuration, where the Director General’s competitors were the leaders of the voluntary sport organization (the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports, NOC). Second, the game moved up a level and was played in a political figuration, where the Director General’s competitors were the political leadership in the Department. The combination of a unified sport figuration and the formal power in the political figuration led to an outcome that no one had intended, namely the resignation of the Director General.
Paper IV explains and reflects critically upon the athlete whereabouts reporting system in top-level sports initiated by the WADA. This system makes it compulsory for athletes who are in a registered testing pool in their national and/or international federation to submit information about their whereabouts. In this way, athletes are required to be accessible for no-advance notice doping tests all year round. The system is controversial. In this article we examine some of the objections to the system and, more specifically, objections connected to ideas of justice and athletes’ autonomy and right to self-determination. The argument is a practical ethical one informed by a survey on attitudes towards the whereabouts system carried out among 236 athletes belonging to the registered testing pool in Norway.

In the dissertation’s introduction the activities on all these levels are woven together to demonstrate how different units and levels are interdependent with each other. In sum, the study shows that the number of organizations in what is defined the anti-doping figuration has increased during the last decade. At global level the establishment of the world Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and the involvement of governments have resulted in what may seem to be a more effective fight against doping. The involvement of governments has included increased funding of anti-doping activity on the global, international and national levels, and a legal framework in which all governments can address the prevalence and use of doping in sport. Since 1998 some of the most extensive doping scandals, such as BALCO and Operación Puerto, have been unmasked by police.

Nevertheless it may be asked whether representatives from public authorities have the expertise that is needed, or whether they operate, within the WADA, more or less as ‘hostages’ to the sports movement? Unlike representatives of most sporting bodies, most public representatives ‘come and go’. Most politicians or bureaucrats are members of the Foundation Board, WADA’s supreme decision making body, for just a short period of time. This gives the representatives from the sports movement with much more stable positions an advantage because they have the knowledge and experience their colleagues are missing.

Within the sports movement there seems to be a general impression that the quality of the anti-doping work has increased, but there are still many national Olympic committees, international federations and anti-doping organizations that do not comply with the World Anti-Doping Code. Among the international federations some of the more commercial IFs have also resisted the implementation of a harmonized set of rules and regulations. The same can be said of some of the world’s strongest elite sport nations.

This causes significant challenges to a core aim of anti-doping activity which, according to WADA, is to protect the athletes’ right to participate in doping-free sport and thus promote health, fairness and equality – or what is called ‘the spirit of sport’. Even though more athletes than previously can compete with athletes who are part of an anti-doping regime, athletes find it unfair that anti-doping work is not fully harmonized. And athletes also find some of the tools in the expanding anti-doping regime are having negative consequences for ‘clean’ athletes. The whereabouts system seems to have produced outcomes that probably were not planned or expected by the WADA.

Based on the four case studies, this dissertation gives a better understanding of the roles of different actors in the anti-doping figuration by focusing on the more comprehensive interdependencies which have developed since 1998.
Abbreviations

ADAMS  Anti-Doping Administration & Management System
ADN   Anti-Doping Norway
ADO   Anti-doping organization
AIOWF  Association of International Olympic Winter Federations
ANADO  Association of National Anti-Doping Organizations
ANOC  Association of National Olympic Committees
ASOIF  Association of Summer Olympic International Federations
BALCO  Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative
CAS  Court of Arbitration for Sport
CoE  Council of Europe
CONSUDE  South American Sports Council
EU  European Union
GAISF  General Association of International Sports Federations
FIFA  Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIS  International Ski Federation
IAAF  International Association of Athletics Federation
IADA  International Anti-Doping Arrangement
IF  International federation
IGO  Intergovernmental organization
IOC  International Olympic Committee
IPC  International Paralympic Committee
NADO  National anti-doping organization
NIH  Norwegian School of Sport Sciences (also NSSS)
NOC  National Olympic Committee
RADO  Regional Anti-Doping Organization
UCI  Union Cycliste Internationale
UEFA  Union of European Football Associations
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WADA  World Anti-Doping Agency
WADC  World Anti-Doping Code
WADP  World Anti-Doping Program
Table of contents

Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... i
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... iii
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. v
Table of contents ....................................................................................................................... vi
List of papers ............................................................................................................................ vii

PURPOSE OF THE THESIS .................................................................................................. 1
   Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
   Outline ................................................................................................................................ 2
   Doping and anti-doping in sport before 1998 ................................................................. 6
   Key concepts ...................................................................................................................... 9
   Research questions ........................................................................................................... 12

THEORY ................................................................................................................................. 13
   General considerations .................................................................................................... 13
   Figurational sociology: key concepts ............................................................................. 16
   Power and game models ................................................................................................. 17
   Blind social processes and unplanned outcomes ......................................................... 18
   Use of figurational sociology in the papers ...................................................................... 20

METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................. 22
   Involvement and detachment ........................................................................................... 22
   Documentation ................................................................................................................... 26
   Interviews ......................................................................................................................... 27
   The quality of the study .................................................................................................... 29

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION ............................................................................................ 32
   Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 32
   The papers ........................................................................................................................ 32
   Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 35
   Part 1: Athletes’ interdependency with other units ..................................................... 36
   Part 2: Implementation of anti-doping policy ............................................................. 43
   Part 3: Elite level athletes’ counter-attack ................................................................. 52

CONCLUDING REMARKS ................................................................................................. 58
   References ......................................................................................................................... 61

PAPERS .................................................................................................................................. 75

APPENDIX: Summary in Norwegian......................................................................................... I
Contact information................................................................................................................... V
List of papers

**Paper I:**

**Paper II:**

**Paper III:**

**Paper IV:**
PURPOSE OF THE THESIS

Introduction

Since the 1990s anti-doping activity has gone through comprehensive changes. Until then just a few units, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), some major international federations (IFs) and a small number of governments were involved. According to Houlihan (2007), the anti-doping regime was characterized by ‘fragmentation of effort, a general lack of momentum and severe lack of resources’ (p. 18). The scandal during the 1998 Tour de France has been described as a watershed (Houlihan, 2002; Teetzel, 2004) because it showed that (i) doping was out of control in a number of sports, (ii) the sport movement was not able to clean up its own house, and (iii) governments in the Western world decided actively to intervene.

The lack of credibility, in particular in the case of the IOC, became apparent some months later by the disclosure of corruption in relation to the bidding process for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City which resulted in the expulsion of six IOC members (Miller, 2008). By the time the IOC organized the World Conference on Doping in Sport in Lausanne in February 1999, with sport organizations and representatives from governments as participants, the IOC was plunged into a full-blown legitimacy crisis (MacAlloon, 2001). This impression was strengthened when many politicians lambasted the IOC for its past inaction on the issue of doping and questioned its moral authority (Houlihan, 2002).

One of the outcomes of the conference was the decision to establish an independent anti-doping organization, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) with the Olympic movement and governments as stakeholders. During the next decade the number of actors involved in the anti-doping activity increased and the credibility of anti-doping work has improved (Houlihan, 2007). The IOC, IFs, national Olympic committees (NOCs) and national anti-doping organizations (NADOs) are among the signatories to the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) and are responsible for adopting and implementing the anti-doping policies and rules (WADA, 2003), while governments have ratified the International Convention against Doping in Sport.
Governments are involved individually but also as members of groups and organizations, such as the European Union (EU), Council of Europe (CoE) and International Anti-Doping Arrangement (IADA). Athletes and their support personnel are, of course, part of the anti-doping activity, which also consists of a number of other units, including many which are not traditionally linked to doping and anti-doping in sport; such as police, customs service, the pharmaceutical industry, lawyers, sponsors and media.

The aim of this study is to analyze in a systematic and critical way the many more or less interconnected processes in anti-doping policy that have been the consequences of the crisis in 1998 and the establishment of WADA the following year. More precisely, the main research question is:

How can the development of anti-doping policy since 1998 be understood?

Outline

In order to analyze the development of the anti-doping policy, we need to understand the development of doping from different perspectives. Because the number of organizations has increased considerably during the last decade, it may be useful to present a model (Figure 1, next page) of the units involved in anti-doping processes. These units are mapped out on four different levels; the global, the international, the national and the individual athlete’s level.

This is a simplified model and it is important to note that anti-doping policy cannot be understood as a static phenomenon. The lines drawn between the levels are only meant as tentative, and several units could be placed on many levels; for instance governments which are part of the national level, are also represented at the international level (e.g. intergovernmental organizations as EU and CoE) and global level (WADA and UNESCO). Some units, such as sponsors, broadcasters, journalists and spectators, are placed at an international level even though they are also represented at the national level. This is done based on the assumption that they are most relevant as power units at this level in terms of anti-doping policy in sport. However, it should be emphasized once more that the figure should not be read as

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1 By January 2009, 632 sports organizations (included government funded organizations such as NADOs) have accepted the Code (WADA, 2009a), and 111 governments had ratified the UNESCO Convention (WADA, 2009c).
2 Athletes and their support personnel are also part of the doping networks too.
Figure 1: Units that constitute the anti-doping network. Some of the units have been part of the network for decades, while others have joined only since the shift in anti-doping policy after 1998. The model should not be seen as a static phenomenon and many of the units in the models are present at more than one level.

static in any way. Many of the organizations in the model consist of several units; for example NOCs are not one ‘unit’, but consist of 205 federations belonging to the IOC.

With so many units as indicated in Figure 1 it is necessary to limit the study to some key actors and the relationship between them. The case studies have been chosen on the basis of what have been portrayed by previous research as the most
significant organizations in the development of anti-doping (Waddington & Smith, 2009).

With four case studies the development of anti-doping is approached from different levels. A main point is that units at different levels are interdependent with each other. At a global level the creation of WADA in the aftermath of the 1998 Tour de France scandal is analyzed (paper I). At the international level one IF’s (more specifically the International Ski Federation) implementation of the WADA policy is analyzed (paper II), while Paper III takes a closer look at challenges in sport policy related to anti-doping at the national level. Finally the level of the individual athlete is studied by analyzing how an elite level athlete is influenced by one of the key anti-doping regulations: the whereabouts information system (paper IV).

The choice of levels is connected to my comprehension of how WADA handles the topic. The WADC has pointed out signatories obligated to the World Anti-Doping Program, such as WADA itself and the IOC (on the global level), IFs (international level), NOCs and NADOs (national level) and the individual athlete.3

A theoretical perspective which can handle and explain complexities and interrelations is needed. In this respect, figurational sociology (also called process sociology) is a useful theoretical framework. It includes concepts such as network (or figuration), interdependency, power balance and unplanned outcomes. These will be outlined in the theory section.

The activities on all these levels are interconnected, as will be made clear later in this introduction. The levels will be woven together in the discussion, as illustrated in Figure 2 (next page), which indicates the structure of the introduction to the dissertation.

Some elements in this study have until now hardly been researched, such as the athletes’ duty to submit information on their whereabouts.4 Neither has there previously been a properly sociological analysis of the establishment of WADA. In that respect, I hope this study fills some gaps in the literature.

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3 Included as signatories are also international and national paralympic committees and major event organizations (WADA, 2008c, p. 134).
4 By the time of writing some scholars have contributed with criticism of the system (Christiansen & Møller, 2007; Keyser, Mauron & Miah, 2007; Kreft, 2009; Møller, 2008, 2009). Also Christiansen (2009) has discussed the whereabouts system.
A four year study on anti-doping has grown to consist of more than four papers. I have, in addition to the papers included in this dissertation (Hanstad, Smith, & Waddington, 2008; Hanstad, 2008; Hanstad & Skille, 2008; Hanstad & Løland, 2009)\(^5\), been involved in studies on doping which have focused on efficiency of doping controls (Hanstad & Løland, 2005), bilateral collaboration (Hanstad, 2009), commercial impacts (Solberg, Hanstad, & Thøring, 2009), performance-enhancements and body modification (Breivik, Hanstad, & Løland, 2009), harmonization of anti-doping activity (Hanstad, Skille, & Løland, 2009), health issues (Hanstad & Waddington, 2009) and whereabouts information (Hanstad, Skille, & Thurston, 2009). These papers have increased my understanding of anti-doping policies and also feed, directly or indirectly, into the discussion.

The introduction proceeds as follows: in order to understand the development of anti-doping activity after 1998, a historical sketch of this development is presented. This is followed by clarification of key concepts. Then the dissertation’s research questions are outlined. The theoretical approach of the study is presented, followed by a section on methodology, before the findings and a final discussion addressing the main research problem of the thesis.

\(^5\) The paper on whereabouts information (paper IV) co-authored with Sigmund Løland is a further development of a paper published in Norwegian (Hanstad & Løland, 2007).
Doping and anti-doping in sport before 1998

Athletes have used substances believed to enhance performance since the sport-like activities in ancient Greece. Charmis, the Spartan winner of the 200 meter sprint in the Olympic Games of 668 BC, is said to have used a special diet of dried figs (Finley & Pleket, 1976). Various substances used through the years, for example in Ancient Egypt and Rome, were believed to augment the physical capabilities for athletes (Donohoe & Johnson, 1986).

In the nineteenth century cyclists and swimmers were thought to have used stimulants such as caffeine, cocaine, strychnine, ether and alcohol (Goldman, 1984). But, as indicated by Dimeo (2007a), there is not a great deal of evidence of drug use by other athletes at this time. The use of drugs increased in the first part of the twentieth century. At the annual meeting of the German Swimming Federation in 1933 Dr. Otto Riesser claimed that ‘... sporting competitions are often more a matter of doping than of training’ (cited in Hoberman, 1992, p. 131).

The Second World War led to an increase in drug use in sport. During the war amphetamines were used by combat troops in order to enhance their mental awareness (Donohoe & Johnson, 1986). After the war another anabolic steroids became available. The Soviet Union is said to have been the first nation to use steroids (testosterone) in sport in the Olympic Games in Helsinki 1952 (Beamish & Ritchie, 2006). The use of anabolic steroids, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, can be seen as a consequence of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States because sport was part of the competition between the superpowers (Waddington, 2006; Dimeo, 2007b). Other processes associated with drug use in sport were linked to changes in the wider society, such as developments in the pharmaceutical industry and the so-called medicalization of life (Waddington, 2000).

There are no exact data on the number of athletes using drugs in the 1960s, but statements from athletes, coaches and medical practitioners indicate that it was widespread (Scott, 1971; Silvester, 1973; Ljungqvist, 1975; Donohoe & Johnson, 1986; Todd & Todd, 2001).

Doping as a problem

Even though medical authorities outside sport had expressed concern about doping in the mid-1950s (Dimeo, 2007a) anti-doping activity was not established by the sports
federations until the subsequent decade. Following the death of a Danish cyclist
during the 1960 Games in Rome\(^6\), the IOC established a medical committee in 1961.
It was replaced with a commission in 1967. The Commission was responsible for the
doping controls at the Olympic Games and updating the list of the prohibited
substances. The first doping tests took place during the Winter Games in Grenoble in
1968 – some time after cycling and football had carried out their first tests in
international competitions (Todd & Todd, 2001).

For the following decades the IOC played the leading role in the fight against
doping, but the IOC, IFs and NOCs all carried out anti-doping work with a lack of
enthusiasm and effectiveness (Waddington, 2000; Hoberman, 2001, 2004; MacAloon,
2001; Houlihan, 2002). There were some exceptions prior to the 1980s, including
Belgium, France and the Scandinavian nations, whose governments were actively
pursuing an anti-doping strategy (Houlihan, 2002). Another category consisted of a
much larger number of passive governments (for example Australia, Canada, the UK,
West-Germany and the United States), while a third group included those countries
where governments actively colluded in systematic doping (East-Germany and Soviet
Union) (Houlihan, 2002).

In the following years the number of states involved in anti-doping increased.
In 1991 the governments of Canada, the UK and Australia initiated a Memorandum of
Understanding that outlined what governments could do to create more momentum in
the anti-doping struggle. Later other Western countries signed the Memorandum and
formed the International Anti-Doping Arrangement (IADA) to pursue international
harmonization through the development and implementation of best practice in
national anti-doping programs (Skaset, 2004).

During the 1990s there were also other meeting points for the governments,
for example the Anti-Doping Convention of the Council of Europe and the Permanent
world conference on anti-doping (with its international working group). In all the
forums the governments invited the sport-organizations to take part. But there was
some tension between the governments and the sport world. After the Fourth

\(^6\) A number of writers have stated that the Danish cyclist Knud Enemark Jensen died from his
use of amphetamines, but according to Møller (2005) the claim that the cyclist’s death was
due to his use of drugs is unfounded. The point here is not to identify the case of Jensen’s
death; it is rather to point out that the suspicions (correct or not) led to the first anti-doping
initiatives.
Permanent World Conference on Anti-Doping in London in 1993 the partnership between sport and government appeared to falter (Verroken, 2005).

In the period from the 1960s, many governments were critical of the lack of actions by the sports movement (Verroken, 2005). This was demonstrated during the 1998 Tour de France when, despite clear evidence that drug use was widespread and organized, there was not a single positive doping test carried out by the Tour organizer or the International Cycling Union (UCI). A massive involvement by the French government executed by French customs and police officers revealed the extent of drug use, and after the Tour three team doctors and one masseur were charged under a 1989 Act with supplying banned drugs at sporting events. This threatened to redefine what had traditionally been seen as a sporting issue as a law and order issue to be dealt with by the judicial process, rather than by sports bodies (Hanstad, Smith & Waddington, 2008).

At the 1999 World Conference on Doping in Sport in Lausanne, held in the aftermath of two scandals in 1998 (the Tour the France and the bribery scandal in Salt Lake City) many governments made it clear that they wanted to take a central role in the anti-doping agency that was established following the conference.

The World Anti-Doping Agency

WADA’s mission is ‘to promote, coordinate, and monitor the fight against doping in sport in all its forms’ (WADA, 2009b). The agency lists its own chief activities within several areas, such as code compliance monitoring, cooperation with law enforcement, science and medicine, anti-doping coordination, anti-doping development, education, and Athlete Outreach (WADA, 2009b). There is no unity among observers on WADA’s position. Hoberman (2005) claimed that WADA in the first years in operation achieved a credibility that the IOC never earned, but he also stated that WADA had not expanded its strategy beyond search-and-sanction tactics (Hoberman, 2004). Houlihan (2007) claimed that WADA’s most significant contribution has been the successful implementation of the WADC, which he sees as an ‘extremely successful document which not only introduced a considerable degree

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Hoberman saw two problems undermined the effectiveness; (i) the funding from governments that did not always meet their payment deadline, and (ii) only a few governments had shown a willingness to pursue doping control aggressively (Hoberman, 2005, p. 270). However by 2008 governments were fulfilling their financial obligations (WADA, 2009d).
of harmonisation of policy and practice in anti-doping but also established a framework for continuing and closer cooperation between governments and their domestic federations’ (p.18).

Other scholars have been more critical of WADA. Smith and Stewart (2008) argued that the current anti-doping policy of WADA contains inconsistencies and ambiguities, while Kayser, Mauron and Miah (2007) stated that the policy resembles a war-like ideology similar to the public discourse surrounding the international effort against illicit drugs. Elsewhere Kayser and Smith (2008) suggested that WADA’s policy is a costly, repressive, zero-tolerance approach in elite sport, and that there is an urgent need for a critical systematic examination of the impact of anti-doping policy (p. 87). According to Möller (2007) there are some indications that the fight against doping has taken a Kafka-like turn after the establishment of WADA. He argued that the control systems are so rigid and detailed that they dramatically challenge the autonomy of athletes and become close to meaningless. Waddington and Smith (2009) suggested that WADA’s punitive approach and education programs are likely to have a relatively limited impact, while the policy is likely to be ineffective in terms of protecting the health of athletes (p. 230). They claimed that WADA has manifestly failed to seize the opportunity regarding fresh thinking, ‘not just in relation to technical issues concerned with such things as testing procedures, but also in relation to key issues such as the rationales for anti-doping regulations and for the inclusion of some substances and the exclusion of others from the banned substances and method’ (Waddington & Smith, 2009, p. 45; see also Beamish and Ritchie, 2006).

**Key concepts**

This study is about doping in sport, and in particular competitive sport. Originally the term ‘doping’ referred to a stimulant drink around the eighteenth century and first appeared in an English dictionary in 1899 (Verroken, 2005). Doping is defined in different ways which was indicated by the IOC back in 1965 when the first chairman of the Medical Commission, Sir Arthur Porrit (1965), stated that ‘…to define doping is, if not impossible, at best extremely difficult, and yet everyone who takes part in competitive sport or who administers it knows exactly what it means.’ (p. 166). According to Hoberman (1992) doping in colloquial usage is ‘the boosting of human
performance by artificial means’ (p. 100), but he emphasizes that formulating a widely acceptable definition is problematic because the concept includes different dimensions: the scientific (physiology and pharmacology), the social (norms and thresholds) and the personal (values and intentions of athletes) (p. 101).

This challenge has not decreased. WADA uses no less than eight pages in its own regulations, WADC, when it defines doping operationally as ‘…the occurrence of one or more of the anti-doping rule violations set forth in Article 2.1 through Article 2.8 of the Code’ (WADA, 2008c, art. 1, p. 18). This includes (i) presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in an athlete’s sample; (ii) use or attempted use of a prohibited substance or method; (iii) refusing to submit to sample collection; (iv) violation of applicable requirements regarding athlete availability for out-of-competition testing (including regulation attached to whereabouts information); (v) tampering or attempted tampering with any part of doping control; (vi) possession (vii) trafficking; (viii) administration or attempted administration to any athlete in- and out-of-competition testing of any prohibited method or substance, or any type of complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation (WADA, 2008c, art. 2, p. 18-25).

The term ‘dope’ is often used interchangeably with the term ‘drugs’. Drugs are defined by Mottram (2005) as ‘chemical substances which, by interaction with biological targets, can alter the biochemical systems of the body’ (p. 1), while doping relates specifically to sport. Dunning and Waddington (2003) restrict the term doping to those situations in which drugs are administered without informing, or securing the consent of, those who receive these drugs. This is in contrast to athletes who are knowingly taking performance-enhancing drugs, a practice which Dunning and Waddington do not describe as doping but as behavior involving the use of performance-enhancing drugs.

In more operational terms, WADA considers a substance or method for inclusion in the prohibited list if the substance or method meets any two of the following three criteria: (i) Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or experience that the substance or method, has the potential to enhance or enhances sport performance; (ii) Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or experience that the use of the substance or method represents an actual or potential health risk to the Athlete; and (iii) WADA’s
determination that the use of the substance or method violates the spirit of sport described in the Introduction to the Code (WADA, 2008c, pp. 32-33).

In this dissertation I follow WADA’s conceptual and operational understanding of doping. Although the definition of doping has often been challenged (Beamish & Ritchie, 2006; Loland & Caplan, 2008; Waddington & Smith, 2009), in this dissertation the conceptual difficulties surrounding it will not be a key issue. What is of interest here are the processes that have shaped anti-doping policy during the last decade.

It should be noted that this study is limited to anti-doping in sport. However, many of the actors that are part of anti-doping activity are more concerned with the misuse of drugs beyond sport than in competitive sport. This is particularly the case for governments, which have registered an increased use of drugs in the wider society and particularly among adolescents.

‘Policy’ can be defined in different ways (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). One useful definition is given by Heclo who sees policy as applying to ‘something “bigger” than particular decisions, but “smaller” than general social movements. Thus policy in terms of level of analysis, is a concept placed in the middle range’ (Heclo, 1972, p. 84). Policy is about power, again a term that can be understood and interpreted in a variety of ways. One common understanding is that ‘power’ refers to the ability to exert significant impact on events that matter for the agent and/or others (Collins, 2004). A classical definition of power comes from Max Weber who states that power is ‘…the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in the position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’ (Weber, 1968, p.53). Later Dahl (1957) stated that A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to something that B would not otherwise do.

In this thesis, power is understood not as a property which one person or group has and another person or group does not have, but as a structural characteristic of all human relationships. Changing balances of power, or power-ratios, are a central aspect of the web of human relations, as indicated by Norbert Elias (1978). This will be explained in more detail in the theory section.

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8 The Collins Dictionary & Thesaurus gives 23 meanings of ‘power’ (Collins, 2004).
Research questions

The aim of this study is to analyze in a systematic and critical way the many more or less interconnected processes shaping anti-doping work at different levels since the doping scandal in the 1998 Tour de France. As a consequence of the scandal a number of organizations who took part in anti-doping activity increased. More specifically, this dissertation is an investigation of anti-doping policies in international sport with a particular emphasis on the power relations between units at different levels.

The main research question is: How can the development of anti-doping policy since 1998 be understood?

As indicated above, there are many organizations in anti-doping work, and the possible relations between them are numerous. This complexity may be reduced analytically by breaking anti-doping down to four levels. One case study from each level will be presented. This follows the traditional distinctions of levels in policy studies, and these four levels are also coherent with the structuring and policy making of WADA itself. WADA defines its signatories as follows: WADA itself (included governments), IOC, IFs, NOCs, NADOs (included governments) and athletes.

More specifically, the sub questions are as follows:

- The global: What are the consequences of the increasing involvement by governments in the fight against doping?
- The international: To what degree have international sport federations implemented WADA policy?
- The national: What are some of the (political/power) problems in developing anti-doping policy on a national level?
- The athletes: What are the implications for elite athletes of an expanding anti-doping regime?

In the concluding theoretical discussion of findings, I will seek to transcend these levels and consider how this dissertation may inform the more complete picture of what anti-doping policies during the last decade have been all about.
THEORY

General considerations

Anti-doping activity involves a large number of people and organizations at different levels, as shown in Figure 1. Further, all the units have some influence and they stand in relations of interdependency to the other units in the network. Moreover, national and international elite sport is in many ways contested terrain with many and strong interests competing for mutually exclusive rewards. Thus, the theory used for this study needs to be able to analyze processes and power relations on a variety of levels, from the level of the individual athlete up to the level of global organizations, as well as the link between these levels.

Classical social theories tend historically to fall into one of two main approaches, also called ‘the two sociologies’ (Dawe, 1970): Structure (or social system) theory or agency (or social action) theories. The first group is grand or macro-level theories which seek to provide an interpretation of the social world, such as Marxist approaches, feminist theory, systems theory and critical theory (Houlihan, Bloyce & Smith, 2009). Interpersonal theories on the other hand, such as interactionism, are in the other category. These theories are focusing on relatively small-scale, face-to-face interaction between individuals (Goffman, 1971) and they are concerned with the way in which an individual makes sense of, or interprets, the world in which he or she lives (Coakley, 2007).

According to Houlihan, Bloyce and Smith (2009), the decline in macro-level theorizing represents a welcome corrective as these theories tended to over-simplify at a general level complex social processes. One alternative retreat has been into atomistic social perspectives which center the individual rather than class, community, ethnicity, gender or nation. They state that “…the privileging of an atomistic and individual approach to social science over the analysis of collective interests and behavior has arguably gone too far’ (Houlihan, Bloyce & Smith, p. 3).

For a study of interdependencies between organizations at different levels, which also includes the individual athlete, there is a need for exploring the composite unit, here defined as the anti-doping activity as a whole, in terms of the interrelationships of its component parts. The interdependency of the different units cannot be explained if one studies each of them separately.
Figurational sociology meets these requirements by starting with the figuration; ‘a structure of mutually oriented and dependent people’ (Elias, 1994 [1939], p. 316). By doing this it differs from other approaches that take the individual, the social structure, or a whole society as the basic unit for analysis. Figurational sociology brings together in one approach the nexus of power, emotion, subjectivity, conflict and control, and shows how they undergo long-term transformation (Newton & Smith, 2002, p. ix). A main objective of figurational sociology is to 'think processually' by always seeing social relations as emerging and contingent processes (the theory is also called process sociology).

Further, figurational sociology also offers an appreciation of the ways in which power (both the sources of power, and unstable power-balances) are handled, which in this case is one of the requirements for a proper theoretical framework. Power, not seen as a static phenomenon but as a process, is best conceptualized in terms of relative balances that are continually in flux.

Figurational sociology has grown out of the work of Norbert Elias (1897-1990). Elias was seeking to synthesize the elements of different paradigms and to establish what he called a 'central theory' which he hoped would facilitate greater continuity of theorizing and research internationally, intergenerationally, and between rival perspectives (Dunning & Mennell, 2003). His first main work was the Civilizing Process, first published in 1939 (Elias, 1994 [1939]). The Civilizing Process is an attempt to trace some key aspects of development in the most powerful societies in Western Europe, mainly Britain, France and Germany, from the Middle Ages to the early twentieth century. van Iterson, Masterbroek & Soeters (2001) indicate three interrelated levels of the theory: (i) state formation and monopolization of violence and taxation, (ii) changing standards of manner and morality, and (iii) emotional

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9 More social theorists than Norbert Elias have tried to transcend the distinction of structure and agency, for example Bourdieu (1977) and Giddens (1984). Both theorists can provide interesting perspectives on the research problems discussed in this dissertation. One reason for selecting a figurational sociological approach is that it has already been used quite successfully in the study of doping (Waddington & Smith, 2009). The theory has proven its worth, so to speak. Moreover, by using figurational sociology this study can build to a larger extent upon this previous research in the doping area.
control, conscience formation and personality structure (p. 498). It should be noted that Elias argued that there is no zero-point of civilization and therefore no development from an uncivilized to a civilized social condition. The central elements of the civilizing process are:

[A]n elaboration and refinement of social standards regarding the control of ‘natural’ functions and the conduct of social relations generally; a concomitant increase in the social pressure on people to exercise self-control; and, at the level of personality, an increase in the importance of ‘conscience’ as a regulator of behaviour (Dunning & Sheard, 2005, p. 7).

The authors state that external restraints grew more subtle and all-pervasive in the course of this process, and the use of direct force was pushed increasingly behind the scenes. At the same time, social standards were more deeply and firmly internalized. These elements of the civilizing process were interrelated.

One aspect of this dissertation is the analysis of the establishment of the global level of anti-doping in terms of WADA. Figurational sociology as conceived of by Elias did not have any explicit discussion of globalization. However, Elias was describing and analyzing global processes earlier than most others because the civilizing process is part of a broader trend of global diffusion. According to Bloyce (2004) ‘…he was addressing issues such as growing Western influence (…) long before the current spate of publications concerning such trends’ (p. 78). Elias’s concepts are later developed by figurationalists, in particular by Maguire (e.g. 1994, 1998, 1999) who, among other things, insists that global processes are not unidirectional, but multidirectional, involving a series of dynamic power balances.

In the following, key concepts of the figurational approach will be presented. These include the concept of figuration itself, interdependency, power-ratios and unplanned outcomes.

10 According to Dunning (1999) it is useful to think of Elias’ theory as operating on two levels; (i) as an empirical generalization about the overall trajectory of personality structure, habitus formation and social standard, but also (ii) as the hypothesizing of a connection between these personal circumstances and an equally demonstrable tendency towards more effective forms of state centralization and control (p. 43).
Figurational sociology: key concepts

The concept of ‘figuration’ is the central organizing concept of Elias’s figurational sociology (Murphy, Sheard, & Waddington, 2000). Elias (1994) describes a figuration as ‘a structure of mutually oriented and dependent people’ (p. 316). For him social life can only be understood if human beings are conceptualized as interdependent rather than autonomous, and therefore figurations arise (van Krieken, 1998).

The concept of ‘figuration’ is linked to Elias’s critique of the portrayal of human beings as *Homo clausus*, a view of individuals as self-contained and separate from other individuals who are impacted upon by overarching ‘social structures’ which are conceptualized as separate from the people who comprise them. In eschewing the dominant *Homo clausus* tendencies to be found in much orthodox sociological writing, Elias introduces the concept of figuration as a way of overcoming the individual–society dichotomy. Sociology should be concerned with *viewing the social world as open pluralities of interdependent people ‘bonded together in dynamic constellations’* (Murphy, Sheard & Waddington, 2000, p. 92). In Elias’s words:

> The figurations of interdependent human beings cannot be explained if one studies human beings singly. In many cases the opposite procedure is advisable – one can understand many aspects of the behaviour or actions of individual people only if one sets out from the study of the pattern of their interdependence, the structure of their societies, in short from the figurations they form with each other (Elias, 1978, p. 72).

One part of my analysis includes the athlete level of the anti-doping campaign. However, it is important to note that athletes are not conceptualized in individualist terms as rational agents but as agents interwoven in the more extensive social web of interdependencies that constitute anti-doping policies. Elias emphasizes his views on the status of individuals in his sociological reflections on Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, to many people a symbol of the lone genius. In his *Mozart: Portrait of a Genius* Elias (1993) states that the maturing of a talent of genius is not an autonomous, inner process that takes place more or less in isolation from others. Instead, the creation of
great works of art is dependent on the social existence of their creator, of his or her development of and experience as a human being among others (p. 50).

Elias sees interdependency as something people cannot freely choose but as a universal feature of social life *per se* – as one of the principal building blocks of social life (Elias, 1978; Dunning, 1999). He does not use the concept of interdependence in a harmonistic way, but rather as an aspect of all relationships; thus people or organizations in conflict (e.g. the USA and the USSR in the Cold War period) may be bound together by interdependent ties which are largely based on mutual hostility.

**Power and game models**

Power is a structural characteristic of all human relationships and is central to this study. Figurationalists reject the possibility that some people or groups of people (as organizations) are omnipotent and others completely powerless. Whether the power differentials may be large or small, a balance of power is always present where there is functional interdependence between people. Elias describes it like this: ‘Power is not an amulet possessed by one person and not by another; it is structural characteristic of human relationship – of *all* human relationships’ (Elias, 1978, p. 74). As a process, it is best conceptualized in terms of relative balances that are ‘dynamic and continually in flux’ (Murphy, Sheard & Waddington, 2000, p. 93).

Elias (1978) saw game models as a means of isolating in close focus the intertwining of the aims and actions of pluralities of people, thereby making these complex processes more easily understandable. On a theoretical level the game models, like Elias's more general process-sociological approach of which they are a part, are designed as a way of moving towards a resolution of the age-old problem within sociology; the relationship between the individual and society, personality and social structure or, in its currently popular formulation, the agency/structure debate.

Elias's approach recognizes that human action is, to a greater or lesser degree, consciously directed towards achieving certain goals and that all human action necessarily involves both cognition and emotion. In this sense it fully takes into account the fact that humans are thinking and feeling animals and that, in the highly individualized societies of the modern world, each individual have his or her own pattern of intentions, preferences and desires.

Elias developed the game models as simplified analogies of more complex social processes and they focus attention, in particular, on changing balances of
power, or power-ratios, as a central aspect of the web of human relations. Game models are outlined in paper I (Hanstad, Smith & Waddington, 2008, pp 232-234) and are used to analyze how the IOC as the most powerful organization in the sporting world tried to control the anti-doping work after the scandals of the 1998. The attempt failed because the game became too complex to control. For IOC the ‘game’ had outcomes that were not planned or foreseen. Another example in this study is how the increasing interdependency between the International Ski Federation (FIS) and WADA resulted in a shift in the balance of power within FIS, which led to changes in FIS policy (paper II).

**Blind social processes and unplanned outcomes**

As games become more complex through the involvement of more and more players, they become more and more opaque to the individual player. Within this context, it becomes increasingly difficult for any player or group of players to put together an accurate mental picture of the course of the game as a whole. However strong the individual may be, he or she will become less and less able to control the moves of other players and the course of the game. From the point of view of any individual player, an intertwining network of more and more players functions increasingly as though it had a life of its own. In summary, the game models, and in particular the more complex models, which are outlined in paper I, indicate the conditions under which players may slowly begin to encounter a problem: that a game process, which comes about entirely as a result of the interweaving of the individual moves of many players, takes a course which none of the individual players has planned, determined or anticipated (Elias, 1978, p. 95: italic in original).

Within the context of this study the game models are useful precisely because they demonstrate that the outcomes of the complex interweaving of the actions of different players, even where these actions are more-or-less consciously directed towards the attainment of certain goals, may include – in the case of complex games almost certainly will include – outcomes which no single player or group of players intended. Within the context of doping, the ‘game’ is the game of implementing, or resisting the
implementation of, a given anti-doping policy. However, as this dissertation will demonstrate, the outcomes are often others than planned.

Unplanned outcomes are, as Elias pointed out, not unusual but on the contrary, everyday occurrences in social life. Despite their everyday character, very little attention has been paid by sociologists to the analysis of such unplanned outcomes, although Merton (1936, 1949) has attempted to theorize what he called ‘the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action’. As Mennell (1992) has noted, a key difference between Elias and Merton was that Merton focused in particular on what might be regarded as an oddity of social life, namely, the ‘self-fulfilling prophesy’ prophecy\(^{11}\), while, as Dopson and Waddington (1996) have pointed out, Merton himself acknowledged that he dealt mainly with ‘isolated purposive acts rather than with their integration into a coherent system of action’ (Merton, 1936, p.895). In contrast, Elias emphasized the everyday character of such processes.

To sum-up, figurational sociology offers a theoretical approach which is appropriate for a study which focuses on anti-doping activity consisting of interdependent processes on different levels. In summary, the following principles, identified by Goudsblom, may be held to constitute key aspects of figurational sociology.

1. Human beings are interdependent, in a variety of ways; their lives evolve in, and are significantly shaped by, the social figurations they form with each other.
2. These figurations are continually in flux, undergoing changes of different orders – some quick and ephemeral, others slower but perhaps more lasting.
3. The long-term developments taking place in human social figurations have been and continue to be largely unplanned and unforeseen.
4. The development of human knowledge takes place within human figurations, and forms one important aspect of the over-all development (Goudsblom, 1977, p. 6).

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\(^{11}\)This refers to a situation in which we make our own predictions come true, e.g. a team has a tough fixture against a good team, they decide they cannot possibly win so they play badly and do indeed lose.
During the last decade scholars within organizational studies have paid increasing attention to the work of Elias.\textsuperscript{12} Dopson (2005) argues that, in general, writers in management studies and organizational analysis tend not to think about movements in processual terms. In other words, they tend to view organizations statically rather than as the constantly developing and inevitably fluid processes which they inevitably are. Figurational sociology emphasizes the need to see processes as processes rather than as movements from one static state to another.

\textbf{Use of figurational sociology in the papers}

In Papers I, II and III figurational sociology is used explicitly. The power relations between different actors regarding the IOC, FIS and national politics in Norway are analyzed by using game models. In the fourth paper Elias is used implicitly.

In Paper IV a different approach is brought into the discussion. Firstly, the paper uses an approach from practical ethics which includes not only an analysis of the interdependencies of the anti-doping system but also an evaluation of the rationality of the arguments being launched in the debate. The question is not only who are providing views and arguments in the debate and why, but whether these arguments seem to hold water as legitimate arguments. In this sense, the article has a normative perspective. This does not mean that the authors position themselves strongly on one or the other side of the debate. The conclusion is conditional: if one accepts anti-doping as a legitimate policy, and if the tools of the whereabouts system are reliable and do not represent unreasonable burdens on athletes, the system can be defended as a logical extension of anti-doping.

Secondly, in Paper IV Foucault’s work on discipline through surveillance is used as a specific description of the potential modes of domination that are inherent in the whereabouts system. It will be an overstatement to describe the paper as ‘Foucauldian’ but there may be a need to look closer at distinctions and similarities between Elias and Foucault. In Foucault’s (1977) \textit{Discipline and Punish}, which is relevant in my study, the author interprets the modern self as a disciplined and docile body and as a result of the many and subtle disciplinary schemes of modern society

\textsuperscript{12} Examples of this are to be found in the special issue of the journal (Organization, 2001), the book \textit{The Civilized Organization} (van Iterson, Mastenbroek, Newton, & Smith, 2002), and the special issue of European Sport Management Quarterly (EASM, 2008).
(Smith, 1999). Together with the Foucauldian emphasis on discourse analysis, this deviates from the Eliasian approach with figurations containing complex and shifting power balances among interdependent units (Newton & Smith, 2002). However, as an element of a larger analysis wrapped up in the discussion below, the study adds insights about athletes’ experiences and points of view that are valuable also to a figurational analysis.
METHODOLOGY

Discussions on doping stimulate moral engagement. According to Waddington (2000) doping normally calls forth the strongest public condemnation and a sense of moral outrage. Following Elias’s argument, he therefore suggests that we analyze doping as a social phenomenon in a relative detached way, insofar as we are able to put our own values (at least temporarily) aside. By standing back ‘...we are more likely to generate explanations which have a high degree of what Elias called “reality congruence” or “reality adequacy” ’ (Waddington, 2000, p. 92). Therefore, the first part of this section treats Norbert Elias’s concepts of involvement and detachment (Elias, 1956; 1987). They are considered as appropriate, not least because of my background as commentator and journalist. My earlier role as a journalist will be explored in this chapter, before I outline the execution of the research.

The dissertation is based on a single qualitative case study (the main study) which consists of four sub-unit of analysis (the four papers) and therefore can be called an embedded case study. One of the major strengths of the case study approach is the opportunity to use many different sources of evidence (Yin, 2009). In the second section, I will outline my use of case studies. In order to reflect upon and judge the quality of the overall study and each case study, the third section of this chapter comprises discussions of validity and generalization.

Involvement and detachment

Elias suggested that practical problems should be resolved by what he described as a ‘detour via detachment’ (Elias, 1956). His argument was that, when engaged in research, we should seek to maintain an appropriate balance between involvement and detachment. In his essay ‘The Fishermen in the Maelstrom’ Elias (1987) discusses an episode from an Edgar Allen Poe story. The story is about two brothers in their boats who were immobilized by their fear when finding themselves in a storm – whirlpool. The situation made it difficult to analyze what was happening to them, or to take effective action to maximize their chances of survival.

One of the brothers began, after a while, to some degree, to calm down. By standing back and controlling his fear, he was in a position to see his own situation in a more detached way and therefore was able to identify certain patterns within the
whirlpool. It gave him a sufficient degree of control to secure his own survival. He came to the conclusion that cylindrical objects sank more slowly than objects of any other shape, and that smaller objects sank more slowly than larger ones. He lashed himself to a cask which sank much more slowly in the whirlpool, and the storm eventually blew itself out before the cask was sucked down. However, his brother remained immobilized by his fear, and the boat with his brother in it descended rapidly into the whirlpool (Elias, 1987, p. 45-49).

The story points out very clearly a kind of circularity which is by no means uncommon in the development of human societies (Waddington & Smith, 2009). Elias did not conceptualize the relationship between involvement and detachment in dichotomous terms, but as a continuum where blends of involvement and detachment are located (Mennell, 1992; Murphy, Sheard, & Waddington, 2000). As noted by Waddington and Smith (2009) a relatively detached analysis is likely to result in a relatively realistic analysis of the situation, and this in turn will provide a more adequate basis for the formulation of relevant policy. They also noted that it is important to work out an approach that differs between the sociological detachment and ideological involvement. The authors stated that it required special efforts of detachment in their work ‘…especially in relation to such an emotive issue as drug use in sport’ (p. 15).

My own role

Working on this study, the concepts of involvement and detachment have been important also for me. Firstly, based on my nationality it may seem difficult to be relatively detached about doping and anti-doping. Gilberg, Loland and Breivik (2006) have stated that ‘…Norway is called the “homeland of preambles” and has adjusted to a self-defined role as a moral leader with regard to sport ethics in general and the attitudes to doping in particular’ (p.334).

Secondly, working as a commentator on one of Norway’s leading newspapers for decades, I have written several stories in which my opposition to doping has been clear to the reader (e.g. Hanstad, 1997, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b; 2003a; 2003b).
A search on an electronic database called Retriever\textsuperscript{13} gave 185 hits on my name and ‘doping’ between 1996 and 2004 (and that list was not a complete set).

As a commentator it was my role to present a personal opinion on topics such as doping. In the role of researcher it is necessary to be more detached but in other ways there are not huge differences between the roles. Writing on similarities and differences between journalist and social researchers, Ragin (1994) states that in both cases the process of gathering and selecting evidence goes hand in hand with developing the focus of the investigation and the report. Both strive to get valid evidence, and they analyze and arrange evidence before they can offer their conclusions. Among the differences, Ragin states that social researchers almost always address social theory in some ways, and researchers usually reach the audience indirectly – through the work of journalists. This has been the situation also for me (e.g. Verdens Gang, 2008; Politiken, 2009).

Nevertheless, I have been attentive to my role as a researcher. In this study I have made an attempt to explore, discuss and analyze issues within anti-doping policy without being normative. Although Paper IV on whereabouts information written with Sigmund Loland is one of normative practical ethics, the approach here is also one of a relative detached analysis of arguments. We start the paper with the question in the title: ‘Elite level athletes’ duty to provide information on their whereabouts: Justifiable anti-doping work or an indefensible surveillance regime?’ (Hanstad & Loland, 2009). We conclude conditionally that if anti-doping work in terms of a control regime is accepted at all, out-of-competition testing which includes a reporting system is a logical further step. This is not a full justification. Among our reservations are the possible extensive practical costs for athletes, and the premises that the system can easily be complied with and is completely reliable. Furthermore, we state that the principled objections against the system have a more universal relevance that has to be taken seriously. Questions of justice, autonomy and right to self-determination really concern the very premises of anti-doping work in general.

I have now sketched and discussed my background. Before I detail methodological considerations, a short explanation will be given about the authorships of the four

\textsuperscript{13} Retriever is a provider of news monitoring in the Nordic region. The company works in close collaboration with various media houses.
papers. As an overall view it is important to stress that the research is a result of collaboration with experts of many kinds. Three of the papers are co-authored with colleagues. I initiated each paper, carried out most of the data collection (including all the interviews and a survey which is used as background in paper IV) and wrote the first draft of all the papers. Hence, in all four articles I am first author and the main responsible for the research.

It should be emphasized that all three papers are result of team work. In paper I, Andy Smith did an extensive review of English language newspapers and Ivan Waddington contributed to the analysis and in the writing of the final version. The analysis in Paper III was written in close collaboration with Eivind Å. Skille, while Sigmund Loland contributed in both the conceptualization and analysis in Paper IV.

**Case study**

This study’s aim is to find out more about how the development of anti-doping policy can be understood. The four papers contribute to this by discussing topics such as how and why the IOC failed to control the process at the World Conference on Doping in Sport in 1999, and how the FIS adopted the WADA-policy. When contemporary phenomena within a real-life context, such as today’s anti-doping work, the case study method is appropriate (Yin, 2009). Stake (2005) states that the case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied:

> By whatever methods, we choose to study the case. We could study it analytically or holistically, entirely by repeated measures or hermeneutically, originally or culturally, and by mixed methods – but we concentrate, at least for the time being, on the case. (Stake, 2005, p. 443, italic in original)

In that respect, the cases were chosen because they make it possible to shed light on how units on four different levels of anti-doping policy have become increasingly interconnected during the last decade. When the study involves more than one unit of analysis each subunit adds significant opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insight into the overall study. The study as such, then, can be called an embedded case study (Yin, 2009).

While I could have selected other cases on each level, the choices have been influenced by personal interest, knowledge, accessibility to informants and the
project’s budget.\textsuperscript{14} My project has not been static but has undergone adjustments since the project description was approved in the spring of 2005. Although the main research question is the same as in 2005, I have found issues with greater relevance for my research question than previous topics during the research project. My improved knowledge in the field of anti-doping has directed attention to new topics that had not been previously researched, such as the whereabouts information system.

Yin (2009, p 98-114) draws attention to six sources in case studies: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical artifacts. I will in the next section I explain my use of sources. Firstly a brief overview of the sources of each paper:

- Paper I is based largely on documentary sources, in particular IOC documents and newspaper articles, with one interview as a supplement.
- Paper II is based mainly on interviews but also uses several different kinds of documents.
- Paper III is based largely on documents, newspaper articles and interviews.
- Paper IV is based on documents and data from a survey.

Methodological considerations are outlined in each paper and I will just call attention to some general challenges.

**Documentation**

Included as documents are written reports of events, agendas, minutes of meetings, formal studies, newspaper articles, other coverage in mass media, literature (books) and archival records. The most important use of documents in case studies is, according to Yin (2009), to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources.

**Archive material**

In my study, Paper I is the one that most evidently is based on the examination of published materials, in particular on IOC documents, official documents from other organizations, and newspaper reports. Because of the limitations of access to the IOC’s archives,\textsuperscript{15} I was dependent on other institutions to get the necessary

\textsuperscript{14} A PhD student at NIH has annually 20,000 NOK in operating equipment to cover participation on conferences, literature, transcription of interviews and traveling expenses (e.g. for interviews). Personnel resources have been used to finance the project.

\textsuperscript{15} http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_1014.pdf
information about IOC’s preparations for the World Conference on Doping in Sport in February 1999. The IOC prepared several documents specifically for the Lausanne conference and thanks to the Department of Sport Policy within the Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs I got access to the documents that provided invaluable insights into IOC strategy. Without these documents my co-authors and I would not have been able to give an analysis that pinpointed so clearly the unplanned outcome for IOC.

Newspapers
Newspaper articles have, to various degrees, been utilized. Journalists all over the world covered the Lausanne conference and gave almost identical descriptions of what was going on, not at least in their use of quotations from the speeches given by government representatives. In some papers the use of newspapers has been restricted to papers in English and the Scandinavian languages. One example is Paper II on doping in cross-country skiing and in particular the so-called ‘Lahti-scandal’ in 2001. The media coverage was sufficiently extensive in Scandinavian newspapers and I have not felt it necessary to use sources from other parts of the world. Here it should be emphasized that newspaper articles were used only for validation purposes (to check the facts of the incident and to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources).

Interviews
Interviews are one of the most important sources ‘… because case studies are about human affairs or behavioral events. Well-informed interviewees can provide important insight into such affairs or events’ (Yin, 2009, p. 108). My original plan involved the comprehensive use of interviews because I had, as a former journalist both experience with and access to key persons in the field. I ended up using interviews as a main source of data collection in two of the cases (Paper II and III), although interviews were also used in other papers, mainly as supplementary data. In Paper I (the establishment of WADA) the documents gave a sufficiently comprehensive and reliable picture that we used only a single interview as supporting evidence. With a few exceptions the interviews were semi-structured and based on an interview guide with the topics I wanted to cover. With my experience as a journalist I
felt confident in the interview situation and therefore wanted the conversation to be as flexible as possible. In some interviews I started by asking the informant to say a little about his/her background which was of relevance for my study. The interviews lasted from 45 to 120 minutes and were tape-recorded and transcribed. In some interviews I made additional notes to ease the analysis of the evidence.

I did not code or categorize the interviews but used a more holistic approach to the data based on a thorough reading of the interviews which were then used in combination with other sources. The following were the major challenges associated with the interviews:

Access to informants
In Paper II (doping in FIS) interviews were a key source. Interviews were undertaken with eight key actors in anti-doping work within cross-country skiing at the international level from the 1980s until today; interviewees included former and current members of the FIS Council, former and current members of relevant FIS Committees, employees of FIS and WADA. Four European nationalities were represented in the selection. Some of the interviewees had not been proactive in the first phase of anti-doping policy (when there was a lack of anti-doping activity in the federation), but it is difficult to find anyone who will admit to having been antagonistic to the change process, or anti-doping work in general and, in retrospect, all actors will say that they support, and supported, anti-doping activity within the FIS. In this particular case practical circumstances made it difficult to gain access to those who were the key actors in the 1980s and 1990s, but I was able to cover the incidents with my selection of informants, combined with other sources.

In Paper III (sport policy in Norway) I had access to all key sources needed for the study. Those involved were interviewed several times in the years after the case took place in connection with the publication of two books on Norwegian sport (Hanstad, 2002c; Hanstad & Goksøyr, 2005).

There are ethical considerations when planning and carrying out interviews. Fontana and Frey (2005) point out some traditional concerns, such as informed consent, right to privacy and protection from harm. Without exception, informants in my sample were familiar with the interview situation. All were carefully and truthfully informed about the research, and were offered an opportunity to read a transcript of the
interview. The informant’s right to privacy and protection from harm was, perhaps, particularly relevant because most of the informants were high profile persons. In my role it was important to establish a relation of trust, and to emphasize that I was not looking for sensational information but data relevant to my study on anti-doping policies.

In addition to these qualitative sources, I have used quantitative data from a survey. In Paper IV results from a survey were used as background for the discussion. Data analysis and statistics are outlined in Hanstad, Skille and Thurston (2009). The survey included the athletes (n=236, response rate=80.8%) in the registered testing pool belonging to Anti-Doping Norway and was conducted in October/November 2006. The athletes were asked to indicate, on a 1-6 Likert scale, to which degree they agreed with each statement. The questionnaire also contained some open-ended questions that allowed the athletes to elaborate on their responses by adding a qualitative comment. The survey was approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, which is the Privacy Ombudsman for research (in universities/university colleges) in Norway.

The quality of the study
Traditionally concepts of validity and reliability, developed within quantitative research, have been the classical way to evaluate qualitative social research (Seale, 1999). During recent years there has been a development of alternative criteria in qualitative research, such as replacing internal and external validity with trustworthiness and authenticity (Lincoln & Guba, 2000), and validity with plausibility and credibility (Hammersley, 1990). Moreover, the extended value of a study is often referred to as generalization or, in qualitative studies, transferability. I will, first, employ the concept of internal validity, understood as interpreting meanings and presenting different perspectives, with a view to describing, explaining and understanding the object of study. And, second, I will apply the concept of generalization in order to discuss the extended relevance of the findings of this study.

As mentioned in the introduction, each paper (or case) represents an autonomous study on one particular level of analysis (from the global to the athlete’s level). The cases are described one by one in the published articles while each of the
cases is a subunit in the overall study. In the discussion section, the four cases are brought together to explain how units on the various levels have been increasingly interconnected during the last decade.

Internal validity is about causal relationship and convergence (Seale, 1999; Yin, 2009). Only if the internal validity is strong the study can be considered to make a contribution to knowledge in the particular field of research. This also applies to the levels between each subunit of the analysis (each paper) and the overall study (this dissertation). While all the four papers draw on different sources, a common procedure to gain high internal validity has been used. This procedure also counts for the overall study (outlined previously). For example, in Paper II, the use of interviews and several kinds of documents and newspaper articles can be considered as a procedure of validation. In Paper III, the use of documents, newspaper articles and interviews validates the convergence of the paper. Although the concept of validity is not treated explicitly in each paper, the papers are underpinned by procedures of quality evaluation when being peer reviewed. Most importantly, strong internal validity in each paper contributes to the internal validity of the overall study. In sum I will claim that my discussions below of the development of anti-doping policy, are based on a various but coherent empirical evidence.

Is it possible to make generalizations from the single cases? Some authors claim that generalization is not tenable and even that such claims to generalization undermine the strengths of the case study method (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Others, such as Flyvebjerg (2004) state that the case study ‘is a necessary and sufficient method for certain important research tasks in social sciences’ (p. 139). Yin’s (2009) opinion is that analytical generalization is possible if previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study. One example is provided by the work of Dopson and Waddington (1996) who used a similar approach to that used in this dissertation, focusing on game models and unplanned outcomes, in their study of organizational changes in health service management. Such studies are identified by Stake (2005) as instrumental case studies, a term he uses when ‘a particular case is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization’ (p. 445). Like the study of health service management by Dopson and Waddington, the case study of WADA is an example of managing change in organizations more generally – a process which is difficult to manage and which normally has unplanned outcomes. But my co-authors and I also
wanted to gain an improved sociological understanding of what happened in this particular case of the establishment of an independent anti-doping agency. In that respect Paper II and III have similarities to Paper I.

As like Paper IV, the three papers can also be classified as intrinsic, meaning that ‘the study is undertaken because, first and last, one wants better understanding of this particular case’ (Stake, 2005, p. 445). While Stake in the 1994 edition of the *Handbook of Qualitative Research* claimed that no attempt is made in intrinsic case studies to generalize beyond the single case, in the latest edition he suggests that it can be seen as a small step toward more extensive generalization (Stake, 1994; 2005).

Nevertheless, in this study I want to tell something primarily about the development of the anti-doping policy during the last decade. This is done by using four sub-units of analysis. The generalizing in the overall study is done by reflecting upon the four single cases in the context of the main research problem.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction
Before discussing the findings, the four papers in the study will be presented. The papers constitute the core of the thesis. However, instead of repeating the research questions, findings and discussions from each published paper I have attached sub-questions to emphasize the level of analysis of each paper and how these sub-questions can contribute to answer the main research question: *How can the development of anti-doping policy since 1998 best be understood?*

After presenting a summary (abstract) from each paper, I will continue by moving the discussion one step ahead to a more general level and examine in more detail how the different levels are related to each other.

The papers

**Paper I**, co-authored with Andy Smith and Ivan Waddington, is a case study linked to sub question 1: What are the consequences of the increasing involvement by governments in the fight against doping?

**The Establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency: A Study of the Management of Organizational Change and Unplanned Outcomes.**

The paper examines the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which was established following the World Conference on Doping in Sport convened by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and held in Lausanne in 1999. More specifically, the paper draws upon Elias’s game models to analyze: (i) the way in which the IOC sought to manage this process of change in such a way that its longstanding position as the world’s leading anti-doping organization would be reinforced; and (ii) the IOC’s inability to control this process, with the result that the IOC failed to achieve any of its objectives, its position as the world’s anti-doping organization was actually undermined, and world leadership passed to a new organization which had a significant measure of independence from the IOC.
**Paper II**, sole-authored, is a case study linked to sub question 2: To what degree have international sport federations implemented WADA policy?

**Drug Scandal and Organizational Change within the International Ski Federation. A Figurational Approach.**

The paper explores the process of policy change within the International Ski Federation (FIS) in relation to doping. More specifically, the paper examines how the FIS adopted the policy established by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) following a doping scandal in cross-country skiing during the 2001 Nordic World Ski Championship in Lahti, Finland. The qualitative case study reported draws upon interviews with key actors and the analysis of documents and media text. The paper utilizes a figurational sociological perspective and, in particular, the concept of game models, in order to analyze the roles of different people and organizations in the figuration, and how the increasing interdependency between FIS and WADA and the resulting shift in the balance of power within FIS, led to changes in FIS policy.

**Paper III**, co-authored with Eivind Å. Skille, is a case study linked to sub question 3: What are some of the (political/power) problems in developing anti-doping policy on a national level?

**Politicians, bureaucrats and a voluntary sports organization – the power play of Norwegian sport policy in the matter of anti-doping**

The aim of the paper is to understand the tripartite relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the public sector and the leadership in voluntary sport organizations. In so doing, we conduct a case study of a specific incident in the history of sport policy, based on written texts (newspaper articles and books) as well as interviews (personal information) from those involved. With Elias’s game models as the theoretical framework, we analyse the case where the Director General of the Department of Sport policy (DSP) expressed his personal/political opinion about antidoping in public, and played the game in two figurations. First, the game was played in the sport figuration, where the Director General’s competitors were the leaders of the voluntary sport organization (the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports, NOC). Second, the game moved up a level and was played
in a political figuration, where the Director General’s competitors were political leaders in the Department. While the Director General was used to playing one-to-one, the combination of opponents within the sport figuration and in the political figuration led to an outcome that no one had intended, namely the resignation of the Director General.

**Paper IV**, co-authored with Sigmund Loland, is a case study linked to sub question 4: What are the implications for elite athletes of an expanding anti-doping regime?

**Elite level athletes’ duty to provide information on their whereabouts: Justifiable anti-doping work or an indefensible surveillance regime?**

The paper explains and reflects critically upon the athlete whereabouts reporting system in top-level sports initiated by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). This system makes it compulsory for athletes who are in a registered testing pool in their national and/or international federation to submit information about their whereabouts. In this way, athletes are required to be accessible for no-advance notice doping tests all year round. If such information is not submitted, or if the information provided is incorrect and athletes cannot be found when a no-advance notice test is supposed to be taken (a missed test), they may be given a warning. In most sports and national anti-doping organizations, three such warnings within 18 months may be regarded as a violation of the doping regulations and may lead to exclusion from sport for a period of between three months and two years. The system is controversial. In this article we examine some of the key objections to the system and, more specifically, objections connected to ideas of justice and athletes’ autonomy and right to self-determination. The argument is a practical ethical one informed by a survey of attitudes towards the whereabouts system carried out among 236 athletes belonging to the registered testing pool in Norway. We conclude that if the basic principles of anti-doping work are accepted, WADA’s whereabouts system represents nothing other than an efficient extension of this work.
Discussion

With the main research question in mind, it will be discussed how actors from different levels have become increasingly interconnected during the last decade. I will first revisit the anti-doping figuration presented in the earlier model (Figure 1, next page). It showed units at four different levels, but it was emphasized that it should not be understood as a static phenomenon because several units could be placed in many levels.

I have confined the study to some key actors and the relationship between them. The selection has been made on the basis of a combination of incidents and power relations in the period covered by the study. The four case studies show how athletes, governments, international federations, the IOC and WADA have become increasingly linked together. First I re-introduce the model to give an overview for the discussion (Figure 3). The arrows indicate how the analysis is organized.

**Part 1**: Athletes are used as the point of departure. I begin by considering the position of an individual athlete in the Norwegian registered testing pool and discussing her interdependency with the other units. This is done by pointing out how an athlete in one particular sport and country is related to, and therefore constrained by, athletes in another sport in another decade (1A in the figure). This is followed by an analysis of how the 1998 crisis led to new actors in the fight against doping (1B and C in the figure).

**Part 2**: The second part of the discussion looks closer at the implementation of the new policy since 1998/1999. I will emphasize governments’ growing involvement by analyzing how governments and intergovernmental organizations have handled doping at an international level for the last decade (2A in the figure), and I look closer at some challenges at the national level in developing anti-doping policy (2B).

**Part 3**: The discussion ends up where it started: with the athlete. I will analyze how some parts of the new anti-doping regime may have had some outcomes that WADA did not foresee or plan. This is discussed in terms of what I have called ‘the counter-attack by athletes’, indicated as arrow 3 in the figure.
Figure 3: The figure explains how units of different levels in the anti-doping figuration are linked together in the discussion which is organized in three parts. Part 1 (arrows 1A, 1B and 1C) is about athletes’ interdependency with other units. Part 2 (arrow 2A and 2B) is about implementation of the anti-doping policy. Part 3 (arrow 3) is about what can be seen as a counter-attack by athletes.

Part 1: Athletes’ interdependency with other units

Each quarter of the year an individual athlete belonging to the Norwegian registered testing pool has to report her whereabouts for the next three months to the relevant national and international federation. Some of her team-mates in the national federation find the system unproblematic but many hold that it affects the joy of sport and their everyday lives as elite athletes. This is also her view. In the survey on
athletes’ attitudes towards the whereabouts system, an athlete expressed this view in the following way:

Anti-doping work is very important, but the requirement to report, and the risk of a doping verdict when the doping control officer shows up and you are not there, I think is wrong. It will be a relief to escape this the day I retire.

(Author’s translation)  

How could the whereabouts system, which was ostensibly introduced to protect clean athletes, end up with such a consequence? More than 40 per cent of athletes in the Norwegian testing pool stated that the joy of being an elite level athlete was reduced because of the WADA whereabouts system.

The aim of this part of the discussion is to examine how athletes in different sports are interdependent with each other (arrow 1A in Figure 3), and how the number of units involved in anti-doping increased as a consequence of the Tour de France scandal of 1998 (arrows 1B and 1c in Figure 3) which led to the establishment of WADA and a more extensive anti-doping campaign.

The whereabouts system is the point of departure for the discussion (Hanstad & Loland, 2009, p.4-5). It was introduced as a compulsory system in the WADC which came into force in 2004 after the creation of an independent organization five years earlier. An updated version of the whereabouts system came into force on 1 January 2009.  

A Norwegian athlete’s relationship to cyclists in the Tour de France of 1998 (arrow 1A in Figure 3)

The whereabouts system affects athletes in different ways. One example is the sanctions attached to the system. Three warnings within an 18-month period may be regarded as an anti-doping rule violation. 62.2 percent of athletes in the Norwegian testing pool stated that they disagreed with the statement that three warnings should be regarded as a doping offence. One of the athletes in the testing pool, an Olympic  

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16 The quotation is from the survey carried out on elite level athletes belonging to the Norwegian registered pool in 2006 (Hanstad & Loland, 2009; Hanstad, Skille & Thurston, 2009).

17 The changes will be explained in Part 3 of the discussion.
medalist, stated that he found it completely unacceptable that athletes could risk exclusion because of this system:

> It is a system that is based on everyone being sinners. It is created by people with good intentions and a decent goal, but they miss completely and abuse their power in a way that in no organ other than sports would ever be approved. Systems like these belong in very different political systems than that which is called democracy.

The system of whereabouts information was introduced in 2004 as part of the new anti-doping regime introduced in 1999. As noted earlier, the creation of WADA was an immediate consequence of the doping scandal in the 1998 Tour de France. More than ten years later it still impacts upon our individual Norwegian athlete, who is of a different gender, a member of another IF, and who participates in a sport with quite different physical and psychological needs from the cyclists of the Tour the France.

An individual athlete is interdependent with many other athletes and groups of people in addition to the cyclists who were part of the 1998 Tour de France scandal. This includes team-mates, athletes within her own testing pool, athletes in other testing pools, athletes who are not part of a registered testing pool, with her national ADO, with WADA, and so on, all of which can collectively be seen in figurational terms. Athletes are also interdependent with units outside sport. Thus, athletes’ actions in this respect can best be viewed in terms of the networks of social relationships of which they are inevitably a part (Green, 2003).

But how have the actions of the cyclists in the 1998 Tour had such an influence on our Norwegian athlete and her team-mates? Why did not other scandals such as those involving Ben Johnson in 1988 or Katrin Krabbe in 1992 or the Chinese swimmers in 1994 (Todd & Todd, 2001) have the same impact?

To understand why the 1998 Tour de France tells us something about the link between an individual athlete and the cyclists, and more generally about the development of anti-doping policy for the next decade, we have to understand one key aspect of the 1998 Tour scandal. In particular it is important to note that the widespread use of drugs was not revealed by anti-doping procedures within the Tour itself; indeed, not a single rider failed a drug test with the Tour (Waddington, 2000).
Rather, it was the actions of French customs and police that revealed the extent of doping. French police found doping substances in hotels or vehicles used by four teams. At least three team doctors, three masseurs, two team directors and several riders were charged by police with offences under France’s anti-doping laws (Waddington & Smith, 2009). This indicated that doping was widespread, systematic and organized; in short, drug use seemed to be institutionalized within the structure of professional cycling. Waddington and Smith (2009) describe what they call a ‘culture of tolerance’ in relation to the use of performance-enhancing drugs, while Hoberman (2003) states that the traditional doping controls were ‘…useless or even fraudulent, depending on how one viewed the integrity of its officials’ (p. 107).

Hence, suspicion was thrown on the integrity of the officials. This impression was strengthened during the following months when those involved in professional cycling – and in particular the governing body, the UCI – did not indicate any willingness to tackle the widespread use of drugs. Instead, the UCI protested against the French government for not allowing it to handle the doping uncovered at the Tour. The protest was rejected because doping among the riders in one of the five or six most popular world sports events was a matter of public concern and one which would consequently be dealt with by the police and courts (Houlihan, 2002).

There were no significant groups within professional cycling who were prepared to challenge the widespread acceptance of drug use (Waddington, 2000). If this had happened, and the UCI had started to clean up its own sport, the relationship between the Norwegian athletes and the cyclists may have remained relatively loose and tenuous. Certainly the IOC did not have any plans to convene a world conference on Doping in Sport prior to the scandal, an independent anti-doping organization was not then on the agenda, and the existing anti-doping regulations at international level did not have any elements which required athletes to report on their whereabouts.

Because of a series of actions and policy consequences which were triggered by the 1998 Tour de France, the actions of the riders and the UCI were to have a considerable influence on the development in anti-doping, and this continues to affect the individual athlete one decade later. The discussion above demonstrates how an individual athlete’s situation cannot be adequately understood except by locating her within a more extensive figuration with interconnections to both other athletes in other sports and countries and to the governing bodies of sport at various levels. The
development of anti-doping policies can only be understood by taking these interconnections into account.

**IOC and new actors in a more credible fight against doping (arrows 1B and 1C in Figure 3)**

Because the UCI did not take responsibility for handling the doping crisis, the IOC came under pressure to act. This impression was strengthened when IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch issued a statement which made it clear that he disagreed with the anti-doping policy in his own organization. Samaranch claimed that the IOC’s list of prohibited substances and methods was too long (and that those substances which were not harmful to health should be removed from the banned list). This was a legitimate question, but in the context of the crisis it was seen by many as irresponsible. Richard W. Pound, IOC Vice President at the time and later the first chairman of the WADA, stated that ‘…[w]e needed to restore some sense of integrity in the fight against doping in sport’ (Pound, 2006, p. 93).

The IOC was under pressure to change its approach on doping. Central to its objective of re-establishing its authority as the leading anti-doping organization was the initiative to organize a conference on doping in sport, held in Lausanne in February 1999, and the proposal to establish a new agency to coordinate the worldwide fight against drug use in sport. It was initially described by the IOC as the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Agency (Teetzel, 2004). The proposed structure of the agency is described in Paper I (Hanstad, Smith & Waddington, 2009, p. 234-237). The concern here is with the increasing involvement of different units from the model in Figure 1 in the establishment of the new agency:

The IOC proposed that the new agency should be governed by a council to be presided over by the IOC President. The council was to consist of three representatives each of the IOC, the international federations (who could also be IOC members), the national Olympic committees, and athletes designated by the IOC Athletes Commission. In addition, there were to be three other persons representing sponsors, the pharmaceutical industry and the sporting goods industry. Under this proposal, the three remaining members of the council were to be representatives of international governmental organizations.
The involvement of governmental organizations, under these proposals, was to be kept to a minimum; they were to have only three members on an eighteen-member council and their functions were to be largely confined to the control of trafficking in prohibited substances (Hanstad, Smith & Waddington, 2008b).

This was not the outcome of the Lausanne Conference in February 1999. Cabinet members and ministers, seen as both representatives of their own government at national level or groups of governments at international level, attacked the IOC. The British sports minister Tony Banks, speaking on behalf of the 15 European sports ministers and with the support of government representatives from the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Norway, rejected the proposal giving the IOC a leading role in the agency with Samaranch as chair of the Council, and also rejected the proposal to have representatives of pharmaceutical companies and sponsors on the agency (Rowbottom, 1999).

Later the same year WADA was created with both a Foundation Board and an Executive Committee consisting of 50 per cent of its membership from public authorities and the remainder from a variety of sports stakeholders, including the IOC, IFs, NOCs and athletes. The agency is financed by equal contributions from sport movement and governments. One of the aims for the new agency was to ensure harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping programs at the international and national levels with regard to detection, deterrence and prevention of doping (WADA, 2003). Regarding doping controls, out-of-competition testing was seen as a key concept and athletes’ whereabouts information a necessary tool to carry out effective tests.

It is clear that action from governments during the Lausanne conference in 1999 was crucial for the establishment of a new anti-doping organization that was independent not only in formal terms (as proposed by the IOC) but also in practice. Sports organizations were (and are) also constrained by other actors to increase anti-doping activities in sport. Many of these other actors, such as for example sponsors, media and TV right-holders, may not at first sight be thought of as part of an anti-doping figuration.

It is however clear that attitude among sponsors and TV broadcasters have altered over the years, and that this has affected many IFs and national organizations. For example, in the case of cross-country skiing, the so-called ‘Lahti scandal’ in 2001, which is analyzed in Paper II (Hanstad, 2008), the championship’s sponsors covered
up their logos during a press conference about the doping scandal because they did not want to be associated with doped athletes. It was later reported that the scandal had cost the Finnish Ski Association three million euros in both direct and indirect losses in which sponsorship was one key part (Helsingin Sanomat, 2002). FIS did not announce any numbers, but in 2002 (after new doping scandals in the Olympic Winter Games) the race director stated that ‘…the cross-country sport must fight for its existence’ (FIS, 2002).

In cycling several sponsors have withdrawn as a consequence of the doping cases. As indicated previously, cycling did not, in contrast to the FIS, accept that there was a serious doping problem even after the Tour de France crisis of 1998, but the changing attitudes of sponsors, together with the involvement of police, may have given rise to what Waddington and Smith (2009) tentatively suggest may be a ‘sign of change’ in professional cycling. Professional cycling is a highly commercialized sport, and it cannot continue in its present form without the continued large-scale financial backing of sponsors. As a consequence of sponsors’ change of attitude to doping, the sports federations have been constrained to change their approach to doping.

But doping cases continue to occur in cycling. Developments in Germany, the biggest commercial sport market in Europe, are of particular importance in this matter. The 2009 version of the Tour of Germany was cancelled due to the organizer’s problems in finding sponsors. This was related to the decision of ARD and ZDF (the German public service broadcasters) not to cover the Tour de France. According to ARD’s Chairman Fritz Raff, the doping cases had greatly reduced the sporting value of cycling's premier event. ‘Therefore, the scheduling value of the event also has been greatly reduced’ (USA Today, 2008).

To sum up: an individual athlete’s interdependency with cyclists in the Tour de France of 1998 was the point of departure for this part of the discussion. The incidents during the cycle race were seen as evidence of a lack of effectiveness in the doping controls carried out by the organizers and the UCI. This led to pressure upon the IOC which decided to create an independent anti-doping organization which, following a barrage of criticism from representatives of public authorities, led to

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18 The income from sponsorship and corporate partners for the cross-country skiing branch of the Finnish Skiing Association did not return to the level before the 2001 World Skiing Championships until 2005 (Helsingin Sanomat, 2005).
increased involvement by governments. Four years after the creation of WADA the Olympic movement approved the agency’s anti-doping program which, among other initiatives, included a requirement for individual athletes, in Norway as elsewhere, as well as cyclists and other elite level athletes to report their whereabouts to the relevant federations.

**Part 2: Implementation of anti-doping policy**

The WADA was established in 1999 and the World Anti-Doping Code was approved four years later. The aim of this section is to examine how anti-doping policy has been implemented around the world. The concept of interdependencies between different units on different levels will be utilized. In particular, the role of intergovernmental organizations (arrow 2A in Figure 3) and public authorities (arrow 2B in Figure 3) will be emphasized.

We can first revisit some of the actors from the discussion above. International federations adopted the new anti-doping policy differently after 1999. Some IFs, such as the International Ski federation (FIS), adopted a more vigorous anti-doping policy. In the case of the FIS, this followed the doping scandal in cross-country skiing during the 2001 Nordic World Ski Championship in Lahti, Finland. After the organizers and WADA had carried out in-competition and out-of-competition doping controls a total of six cross-country skiers were sanctioned for violations of the doping regulations (Virtapohja, 2002). The scandal resulted in immediate organizational change within the FIS. The power balance in the federation’s Council changed between those who wanted to promote, and those who had resisted, a more active anti-doping policy.

Members in the Council are representatives of their national ski-federations and Paper II (Hanstad, 2008) illustrates how different cultures influenced the FIS’s attitude to doping. Members from nations with a poor reputation on doping were able to control the development until the 2001 scandal, and the President was not willing to be a frontrunner in this battle. After a gradual change of attitude, the President decided to work in close collaboration with WADA, a new actor that entered the scene as the external power that was missing before the scandal. As a consequence of the close collaboration with WADA, the FIS signed the World Anti-Doping Code in 2003.

Other IFs put up fierce resistance to the involvement of WADA policy in general and the WADC in particular. Houlihan (2007) states that the more
commercial IFs, such as golf, tennis and football, have resisted compliance. These sports control highly professionalized and highly commercialized sports, and this has provided them with their own power-base to resist the incursion of WADA. In cycling, the UCI feared the possibility of riders being able to sue the international federation by bringing cases to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) but, more importantly, the UCI, like the International Football Federation (FIFA), feared the harmonization of penalties (the 2003 WADC had two years as a minimum) would transfer power and control over punitive measures from the respective international federations to the newly emerged institution. The result was that FIFA and UCI were officially affiliated with the program, while in practice they hesitated to implement all its requirements.

The consequence was a lack of harmonization between sports (even though the establishment of the Code indicated significant improvements). For athletes in sports which did fully implement the code this could be seen as unfair but athletes were more concerned with what was going on in their own sport and found that competitors from different countries in their own sport were treated differently. Athletes in the Norwegian registered testing pool were concerned about the lack of commitment in other nations to carry out anti-doping work. One of the respondents who stated that this was unfair made the following comment:

What disappoints me is that the system doesn’t work in other countries. Competitors [foreign competitors] can tell that they are not tested outside world-cup competitions. A change has to take place. (Author’s translation)

It is not clear if this athlete had the sport federations or the governments in other countries in mind. What is clear is that the survey carried out by the author in 2006 showed a concern that athletes were treated differently in different countries. This was also indicated in an earlier study (Hanstad & Loland, 2005) which estimated that anti-doping work could be characterized as good in no more than around 20 nations among the 202 NOCs (today there are 205). Not even half of the NOCs tested their own athletes for doping. Among the approximately 90 that did so, less than half had programs that met the demands of the WADC. Only around 40 had their own national
anti-doping organization (NADO), a unit which involves the public authority and/or
the NOC in the country.

However, if we also consider the WADC requirements for a registered testing
pool, whereabouts information and out-of-competition testing, then fewer committees
can be considered to be functioning well. If the requirement for a good NADO is
taken to include ISO-certification, taking out-of-competition tests for WADA, and the
following of World Anti-Doping Program (WADP) and conducting a reasonable
number of efficient controls, we are down to about twenty NADOs that met these
requirements. Figure 4 is an attempt to describe these facts. The authors have later
indicated that 6-8 NADOs can be described as best-practice organizations within the
field (Loland & Hanstad, 2008). 19

Figure 4: Estimates of the quality of anti-doping work on national level in 2005 (Hanstad &
Loland, 2005, p. 4).

Since this study was carried out the number of NADOs has increased by 2009
to 117 (WADA, 2009a). This is not to suggest that anti-doping work in all these
nations is of a good standard, but it is an indication that more nations are taking part.

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19 The estimates were done through document analysis and interviews. For more details, see
Hanstad & Loland, 2005). The number of registered NADOs has increased since 2005 and is
now about 130.
The growing involvement of intergovernmental organizations in anti-doping (arrow 2A in Figure 3)

In this part I will look more closely at the role of governments in the new environment of anti-doping after 1998. When discussing public authorities’ involvement we need to remember that governments belong to different levels in the model. Even though they are placed at national level in Figures 1 and 3, governmental involvement is also a phenomenon at the global level through the UNESCO Convention and at the international level through intergovernmental organizations such as EU, CoE, IADA and the South American Sports Council (CONSUDE).

The increasing number of governments involved in anti-doping is one of the key changes in post 1999 anti-doping policy. Writing in 2004, Houlihan noted that although almost all governments had signed the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport and signaled their intention to formally recognize and implement the World Anti-Doping Code. Nevertheless, he saw some signs that the policy context was not propitious and that some policy actors were less enthusiastic than in 1999 (Houlihan, 2004). However, Houlihan’s fears appear not to have been realized, because five years later the same author stated that the increasing interests of the EU, the active involvement of the US government and the development of the UNESCO Convention were among the significant changes in the immediate environment of WADA (Houlihan, 2009). These governmental organizations have not seen doping in elite sport in isolation but within a broader context with a significantly increased use of drugs among adolescents, women, and recreational athletes. Drug use, and particular anabolic steroid use, has come to be seen as a public health challenge (Yesalis & Bahrke, 2005).

What is clear is that the anti-doping figuration consists of more units than in the pre-1998 period, and that more governments than previously are actively involved. It is probably fair to say that the core group consists of the same nations as in 1999 (IADA nations such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, UK and the Scandinavian countries) but other governments are becoming more involved.

Moreover, governmental involvement is no longer purely voluntary. In order to integrate the WADP into government policies it was transformed into the UNESCO

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20 The Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in sport was not a legally binding document for the governments but can be seen as a moral commitment (Marriott-Lloyd, 2007). By February 2009 192 governments have signed the Copenhagen Declaration.
International Convention Against Doping in Sport (UNESCO, 2005) (henceforth referred to here as the UNESCO Convention). The Convention provides a legal framework in which all governments can address the prevalence and use of drugs. According to the anti-doping specialist at UNESCO, Paul Marriot-Lloyd, this is significant because ‘there are specific areas where only governments can progress anti-doping efforts’ (Marriott-Lloyd, 2007, p. 1). This was the case of the scandals in the Tour de France in 1998 (Waddington, 2000), BALCO in 2003 (Longman, 2003), the Winter Olympics in Turin 2006 when Italian Police raided the Austrian biathlon and cross-country teams’ housing (Macur, 2006), and finally the Operación Puerto in Spain in 2006 when a military and civilian police force raided clinics and several apartments in Madrid (Abt & Macur, 2006).

By March 2009, 111 governments had ratified the Convention (WADA, 2009c) and failure to ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Convention by January 2010 could result in ineligibility for international events such as the Olympic Games (WADA, 2008c). Taking into account the obligations which it imposes on signatories, the UNESCO Convention represents a power resource that, at least formally, forces all nations to come into the fold, making it much more difficult for nations that have neglected anti-doping to continue in the same way. Therefore Houlihan (2007) is correct when he states that ratification is a considerable achievement and indicates a substantial level of support from governments.

This impression was strengthened in 2009 when WADA joined forces with Interpol, a network of bureaus in 187 countries and with status as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) since 1971 (Interpol, 2009). During a ceremony when the agreement was signed (2 February), Interpol’s Secretary General, Ronald K. Noble, suggested that the use of drugs in sport may be seen as part of a wider network of criminal activities. ‘[T]he reality is that when an athlete takes illegal performance-enhancing drugs, this is just one piece in a larger network of criminality’ (Associated Press, 2009a). The sports movement is helpless to solve the problem beyond ‘the piece’ without the involvement of governments or governmental organizations. The WADA Chairman, John Fahey, puts it this way: ‘Governments have the power, influence and tools to tackle some of the major issues that are outside the purview of the Sport Movement’ (Fahey, 2009, p. 1).

But could it be that the involvement of governments may also present new problems? Back in 1999 the governments acted as ‘watchdogs’. From distance they
criticized the sporting world for its lack of effort and it was argued that any solution must involve governments in a core position in the new agency. Today governments are onboard but might not they themselves fall into what might be seen as a trap? One scenario is obvious:

The 38-member Foundation Board is WADA’s supreme decision making body, composed equally of members from the Olympic movement and governments. The governments are mainly represented through intergovernmental organizations such as the EU, CoE and CONSUDE. Five years after the establishment of WADA, Hans B. Skaset, who was a member of the Norwegian delegation at the Lausanne Conference as Director General in the Ministry of Culture\(^\text{21}\), stated that governmental representatives would continuously be at risk of being taken hostage by the Olympic Movement (Skaset, 2004). His argument was that ‘ministers come and go’ – as evidenced by the fact that the list of members from governments had changed considerably since 2000 – while, on the other side, representatives of the Olympic movement had not changed at all.

This remains the situation today and means that most expertise and experience is concentrated in the latter group. For example, the EU is following the ‘troika principle’ for its representatives in the Foundation Board by changing its representatives every 18 months (WADA, 2009e). The lists of participants at the Foundation Board meeting in May 2006, 2007 and 2008\(^\text{22}\) show that ten members from the sports movement were present at all three meetings, while just two representatives from the governmental side were present at all the three meeting. 11 representatives from sports movement have been members of the Foundation Board since 2002 or longer. This might affect how WADA runs its business. While governments give WADA greater credibility, many of their representatives may not have the knowledge to participate fully and critically in WADA decisions.

To sum up: During the last decade governments as a group have become considerably more involved in anti-doping. Intergovernmental organizations take part and in particular the UNESCO declaration seems to be a tool for a stronger

\(^{21}\) Skaset has been engaged in anti-doping since the 1960s. As Director General in the Ministry of Culture he was, among other things, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group of the Council of Europe’s Anti-Doping Convention (1990-94) and Chairman of the IADA (1995-96) (Hanstad & Skille, 2008).

\(^{22}\) Minutes of Meetings: http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=289. WADA Foundation Board has two meetings annually.
commitment by providing a legal framework in which all governments can address the prevalence and use of drugs. The role of police and customs has also become considerably more important since the initiative from these units during the Tour de France in 1998. However, there is no sign that the traditional anti-doping involving drug testing of athletes will be reduced. In the next part I look more closely at some of the problems involved in developing anti-doping work on the national level.

Challenges at national level in developing anti-doping policy (arrow 2B in Figure 3)

The quotes from athletes in the Norwegian testing pool indicate that they are part of an anti-doping regime that works well. This has been confirmed by scholars (Verroken & Mottram, 2005; Gilberg, Breivik & Loland, 2006) who, among other things, have called attention to Norway’s involvement in the early stages of anti-doping work. The government has for decades been a key unit. Since the early 1990s the NOC received specifically assigned funding for its anti-doping work and the government was internationally one of the frontrunners in creating independent NADOs. Anti-Doping Norway (ADN) was established in 2003 with the NOC and the government as equal partners.23

One question to ask as a point of departure is whether governments should prioritize involvement in WADA, for example Norway pays more than 90.000 USD annually (WADA, 2009d)24, and the NADOs in their work against drug use in sport and society. These agencies’ focus is on doping among elite level athletes and it could be argued that this should be the responsibility of the sporting world. Many of the federations at national and international level have a turnover of millions of dollars and are in the position to finance both their own anti-doping work and the WADA. However, IFs and NOCs do not contribute directly to the WADA funding. The IOC covers the expenditure from the Olympic Movement while governments around the world cover the other part – approximate 12 million US dollars annually. At national level there are different funding models. In Norway lottery money (state) finance both ADN and the NOC.

23 ADN has a Board with representative from the two stakeholders. The agency is fully financed by the government.
24 Norway’s contribution for 2008 was 90.593 USD and is stipulated to 97.706 for 2009.
For decades, the relationship between the government and the Norwegian NOC has been characterized as good. For example, in 1994 the government and the NOC agreed to establish a working group on anti-doping, which was formalized in 1997. The mandate was to make a plan for practical anti-doping work, which was launched in 1999 (KKD, 1999). Later, sporting organizations and state have cooperated on different topics, not at least in activity at international level (Hanstad, 2009). In this relationship Hans B. Skaset had gained a unique position as Director General in the Department of Sport in the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, with a twofold power basis. On the one hand he, as former president of the NOC and active in anti-doping for decades, had the sport-specific knowledge which the minister needed, and therefore he took part in sport-related policy making. On the other hand, he was responsible for implementing the sport policy and for administrating the economic resources to sport. Skaset’s use of power is seen in the increased use of goal-targeted subsidies during his time in the department. Anti-doping is by Goksøyr, Andersen and Asdahl (1996) referred to as Skaset’s ‘pet’, something that was visible in the budget. In 1995 the NOC received 7.1 million NOK and in addition 2 million to the national anti-doping laboratory.

Nevertheless, in 2000 the Director General stated that he was not satisfied with the NOC leadership’s approach to anti-doping. After two Olympic athletes failed doping tests prior to and during the summer games in Sydney, Skaset stated that he could not see any other solution than holding back state subsidies to elite sport if the leadership of the NOC did not take an explicit stand against doping. According to Skaset, this was the only way for the Norwegian state to avoid being associated with sport’s ethical gray zones. As long as the NOC leaders protected their own athletes who tested positive in Sydney, Skaset saw it as an indirect acceptance of experiments in the ethically problematic terrain. He saw it as analogous to the debate on the case of nutrition supplements during the Atlanta Olympics (1996), and the (Norwegian) debate about the use of altitude chambers. As long as Norway accepted such artificial achievement-enhancing means, Skaset argued, it contributed to a negative reputation about Norway as anti-doping campaigners. He emphasised, however, that this was his personal opinion.

This initiated what should be called the ‘Skaset case’ which is detailed in paper III (Hanstad & Skille, 2008). It shows how Skaset, as a relatively powerful official within the sport figuration, met coordinated resistance. It was no longer possible for him to use the usual strategy and play a one-to-one game against competitors who
were not strong enough to beat him alone. Instead the NOC representatives made a strategic decision not to attack Skaset but instead confront the political leadership of the Ministry, Skaset’s superiors. Now the play of power was out of his hands and during some days the game was impossible to control for any who were involved. The outcome was that Skaset resigned, which was one of the outcomes that was not planned or foreseen.

The ‘Skaset case’ points up several key issues within policy, for example the relationships between bureaucrats and politicians, and the sport organization’s autonomy. But it also raises issues about challenges at national level in developing anti-doping policy. Hoberman (2002, 2005) connected Skaset’s resignation with sportive nationalism. He stated that sportive nationalism, among other things, is evident in the many public demonstrations of support for athletes who are known to have doped.25 It was towards this Skaset objected, partly because Norway was considered internationally as one of the best nations regarding anti-doping.

However, despite the ‘Skaset case’ Norway is commonly considered one of the frontrunners in anti-doping. Hoberman pointed to several other examples of sportive nationalism that are more striking and may cause more concern for anti-doping activity. He stated that governmental sponsorship of elite athletes requires a delicate balancing act: ‘It must promote national competitiveness while supporting, or appearing to support, the campaign against performance enhancing drugs’ (Hoberman, 2005 p. 250). He added that such a contest between national ambitions and anti-doping norms has occurred in various societies around the world, including Australia, Jamaica, Russia, the US and Italy.

Nevertheless, it seems that nations are under more pressure than before to initiate robust anti-doping activities. Russia is a recent example. After being involved in several doping scandals in recent years (Strom, 2009) one of the most successful nations in the Olympic Games has been heavily criticized for its lack of commitment to anti-doping, for example in WADA’s own report on Code compliance and implementation. WADA noted several problems related to the enforcement of the domestic Russian legislation in the anti-doping field, including the impossibility for foreign DCOs to operate within Russian territory. In addition there were difficulties in

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25 Hoberman (2002) also claimed that sportive nationalism undermines doping control by creating incentives for many officials (both governmental and sport) to tolerate doping by athletes and physicians who are willing to collaborate.
allowing cross-border transportation of samples, transporting samples inside Russian territory, and importing and exporting doping control equipment (WADA, 2008a).

To be classified as not compliant with the Code may have consequences for participation in the Olympic Games, which seems to have led the Russians authorities to take a more active anti-doping stand. In March 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev told Agence France-Presse (2009) that the testing system in Russia must be modernized and tightened up in a bid to crack down on athletes using performance-enhancing drugs.

To sum up: Even though the growing involvement of governments is important because they can contribute with funding and credibility to anti-doping activity, some challenges remain. Sportive nationalism has been a common phenomenon which may involve conflicting interests for governments that support elite sport. It is claimed that the so-called ‘Skaset case’ is an example of sporting nationalism even though it is also indicated that this was a case in which a state bureaucrat made his personal political opinion on anti-doping public through the media, which had unplanned outcomes.

**Part 3: Elite level athletes’ counter-attack**

In the model (Figure 3) we are back to the individual athlete, other members of the Norwegian testing pool and athletes in general. During the last ten years the daily routines of elite athletes have been increasingly regulated. Athletes have been subject to a new set of rules and regulations (the WADP), more sports and nations are now taking part in anti-doping activities, the quality of doping controls has improved, and police and customs officers are more involved than previously. While members of the testing pool in Norway support anti-doping work, many are critical of some parts of the system. For example, Olympic champions such as Kjetil André Aamodt and Lasse Kjus (alpine skiing) and Gunn-Rita Dahle Flesjå (mountain biking) expressed strong criticism of the whereabouts system when it was first introduced (Lund, 2004a, 2004b; NTB, 2006). Their argument was that the system was unfair because only a few countries in the world had implemented it and many athletes could train and compete without the
stress of being required constantly to submit information. A second argument was that it was a violation of individual privacy, autonomy and right to self-determination.26

On an international level the system initially received relatively little attention, although there were a few cases which aroused some interest. These included the cases of two Greek sprinters who were suspended by the IAAF after incidents during the 2004 Olympic summer games (IAAF, 2006); the British Commonwealth 400 metres champion Christine Ohuruogu was among four British athletes suspended during one year (BBC, 2006); and most strikingly, the Danish cyclist Michael Rasmussen, who at the time was the leader of the race, was sacked by his team Rabobank during the Tour de France of 2007 and later banned for a period of two years for a combination of failing to provide whereabouts information and missed tests (Ferdinand, 2008). But these cases did not raise more general questions about the fundamental principles of the system.

This changed dramatically after the new revised Code and the International Standard for Testing came into force on 1 January 2009. The new system is more comprehensive and, from the perspective of the athletes, more demanding. Athletes in the registered testing pool are now required to indicate a meeting point for one hour each day the whole year around (which for many athletes involved a change from five days), athletes have to be available for the whole period (one hour), the window for this meeting point is between 06.00 and 23.00 (not from 05.00 in the morning as for example had been the case in the UK until 2009), and they have to report their whereabouts on a quarterly basis for the forthcoming three months.

This was understood as a tightening of the system. Many athletes also found the reporting system, the Anti-Doping Administration & Management System (ADAMS), difficult. In January a group of 65 Belgian athletes in cycling, football and volleyball asked a court to rule on whether the whereabouts system was in breach of European Union privacy laws (Hart, 2009; Slater, 2009). ‘It gives WADA a pass to invade privacy of athletes’, said the lawyer representing the 65 athletes (Associated Press, 2009b). In tennis some players also expressed their discontent, while USA Today described the new system as ‘Big Brother looking in on their private lives’ (Robson, 2009). Among the most severe critics was Rafael Nadal, the world No 1, who condemned the rules as showing ‘a lack of respect for privacy’, while Britain’s

26 Similar to findings in the 2006 survey (Hanstad & Loland, 2009; Hanstad, Skille & Thurston, 2009)
Andy Murray criticized the new regime as unworkable. He told *The Times* that ‘…these new rules are so draconian that it makes it almost impossible to live a normal life’ (Eason, 2009).

Among other critics were sixteen world and Olympic rowing medalists who published an open letter branding the rules ‘an impractical and unworkable regime’ (Quarrell, 2009), while Olympic pole vault champion Yelena Isinbayeva said that it would be impossible for athletes like herself to know where they will be in two months; ‘this is unfair, it does not work’, she told BBC (2009a). The athletes in general and football players in particular received support from their international bodies. UEFA President Michel Platini commented that his organization did not approve of players being available 365 days a year for testing. He told Associated Press (2009c) that players should be exempt from testing when they are on holiday.27

More concern for WADA was probably the statement by EU Sports Commissioner, Jan Figel, who told Reuters that the agency should put the procedure on hold until EU had given a legal opinion on it in the coming months (Ennis, 2009). In April a working party of the European Union (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party) published an advisory opinion on the International standard on the protection of privacy and personal information in which whereabouts information was one of the issues. The group stated that the provision of data is justified mainly by the need to conduct effective out-of-competition testing program, but it added that ‘…this requirement must be met by processing only relevant, proportionate personal information in compliance with data protection principles’ (EU Working Party, 2009, p. 5). The group concluded the report by inviting ‘WADA and anti-doping organizations to reassess the collection of whereabouts as it is conceived today, and more in general, the current retention period of processed data’ (p. 18).

In its response WADA President John Fahey told Associated Press (2009d) that the panel offered ‘no constructive solutions’ and ‘could potentially undermine the

27 In a working meeting between FIFA and WADA 6th of April 2009 WADA acknowledged the new FIFA Anti-Doping Regulations. In identical press releases on Internet 8th of April FIFA (2009) and WADA (2009) it was stated that the current FIFA Anti-Doping Regulations have been understood by WADA and will now be tested in practice, prior to reassessment for 2010. FIFA’s opinion is that in team sports such as football, it is sufficient to provide the whereabouts of a team, and not those of individual players. However, later the same month WADA (2009g) found it necessary to clarify the information and stated that all team sport athletes, including footballers, must comply with the whereabouts rules like athletes in individual sports.
fight against doping in sport’. In the same period WADA met resistance from one of EU’s member states, Spain, who passed legislation that allows athletes in the country to refuse nighttime doping tests between 11 p.m. and 8 a.m (Associated Press, 2009d).

Even though many athletes publicly supported the system, among them the tennis champion Roger Federer (Harman, 2009), the Olympic swimming champion Rebecca Adlington (Roughley, 2009) and the Olympic javelin champion Andreas Thorkildsen (Krug, 2009)\(^\text{28}\), WADA was now coming under attack from leading sportspeople and representatives of powerful sporting organizations. What had been seen as an isolated critique from a few individuals was now developing into an organized campaign by groups of athletes with support from international federations, lawyers, athletes’ organizations and not, at least, media-representatives, some of whom are harshly critical of the new WADA requirements. At the time of writing the outcome of this conflict is not clear, but what is clear is that WADA did not anticipate this development.

From the perspective of figurational sociology, planned policy developments, such as the whereabouts system, always are likely to have a number of unplanned outcomes, because they are a ‘logical outcome … of the complex interweaving of planned and unplanned social processes’ (Dunning, Malcolm, & Waddington, 2004, p. 199). Let us look closer at both the planned and unplanned outcomes of the whereabouts system.

The planned outcomes are obvious. Athletes can no longer just disappear for days or weeks prior to championships – actions that were common before the system was established (Hanstad, Skille & Thurston, 2009). If they do so they will receive warnings for failure to submit necessary information and/or missed tests\(^\text{29}\). It is also more easy to carry out effective out-of-competition testing because the anti-doping organization (ADO) has (or should have) one meeting point for the athletes every day. This is the reason for the support from the IOC President Jacques Rogge who, in

\(^\text{28}\) Roger Federer said the system is necessary because doped athletes will not get caught if the doping control officer calls and says ‘Look, I’d like to test you maybe in two days.’ The guy is cheating and they are smart, right? Andreas Thorkildsen said it is really not a big problem because he had been working with such a system for many years. During the spring 2009 WADA (2009h) published quotes in international media by athletes who were positive to the whereabouts system. No comments were posted from athletes who expressed concern…

\(^\text{29}\) Here it has to be added that the system may have weaknesses. The former Balco supplier, Victor Conte, told BBC in an interview that athletes may take a detour around the system. ‘An athlete can continue to duck and dive until they have two missed tests, which basically means that they can continue to use drugs until that time’ (BBC, 2008).
relation to the dispute between WADA and FIFA, has said that the whereabouts system is essential if the fight against doping is to be effective (Stutchbury, 2009).

The Norwegian survey reported previously revealed that the athletes agreed in principle with Rogge in that they perceived the system as necessary in order to carry out doping tests efficiently and effectively. However, the survey also showed that the system had had some outcomes that could hardly have been planned or intended by WADA. Of particular concern, for the ADOs, must have been that some of the athletes had developed negative attitudes towards anti-doping work because they perceived the whereabouts information system to be frustrating and unfair. As pointed out elsewhere (Hanstad, Skille & Thurston, 2009c) these attitudes were related to:

1. the technical challenges faced by athletes in sending and amending the required information if they were to avoid violating the whereabouts requirements;

2. athletes’ perceptions of the system as unfair because of what they perceived as the discrepancy between an infringement and the resulting sanction; and

3. athletes’ perceptions of the system as being unfair because there was too much variation in how the system had been implemented in different nations.

It is reasonable to assume that it was not WADA’s intention that ‘clean’ athletes should be labeled ‘guilty’ for a doping offence when the system was established. This issue was the one that athletes in the Norwegian testing pool reacted most strongly against. The comprehensive media coverage in 2009 shows that they are not alone. It is reasonable to assume that WADA will have been surprised by these reactions.

During the hearing process for the 2009 version of the Code, athletes committees at national and international level supported the system (Anti-Doping Norway, 2006; WADA, 2008b) and the sporting world had generally seen the system as a vital tool to carry out out-of-competition testing. For that reason it had been initially difficult for individual discontented athletes to express their views publicly – before high profile athletes and some organized groups went public.

To sum up: Despite all the good intentions by WADA (to protect clean athletes), the system of whereabouts information has generated some unplanned outcomes, which may have some implications for the future of anti-doping work. Some athletes have become alienated by the particular form the system has taken,
with a lack of harmonization and standardization across nation states and a perception that it is unfair and unnecessarily punitive.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has analyzed the development of the anti-doping policy since the scandal in the Tour de France of 1998. This particular incident was important because it showed that doping was widespread in at least some sports, and that the sport movement was not able to handle the challenge. This led some governments to take a more active stand in relation to doping in sport. One of the outcomes of the scandal was the World Conference on Doping in Sport held in Lausanne in February 1999, which led to the establishment of an independent anti-doping agency, WADA, later the same year with governments as an equal partner with the Olympic movement.

The development of anti-doping policy since 1998 has been analyzed by drawing upon figurational sociology. Concepts from Norbert Elias’s theoretical framework, including interdependencies, power ratios and unplanned outcomes have been used. This framework has also been used for the discussion in the introduction of the dissertation which has emphasized how the many units at different levels have been increasingly interconnected since the 1998 scandal.

The increasing involvement by governments is one of the factors that have resulted in what some have argued is a more effective fight against doping. Governments have, in contrast to the period prior to 1998, taken a much more active position in anti-doping work. They have, in addition to their WADA involvement, transformed a common policy into the UNESCO Convention which provides a legal framework in which all governments can address the use of drugs. Operations by governmental units, such as police and customs, have unmasked drug use, for example BALCO in the US and Operación Puerto in Spain. This seems to have taken anti-doping work in a new direction.

Regarding WADA, governments’ financial contribution to the agency constitutes 50 per cent of its funding and governments take part in decision-making by the Foundation Board. Nevertheless, it is timely to ask whether representatives from public authorities have the expertise that is needed, or whether they operate as hostages by the sports movement. As noted earlier, representatives of public bodies ‘come and go’. Most politicians or bureaucrats are elected for limited periods of time, and most countries have their representative in the Foundation Board for 1-3 years. This gives the representatives from the sports movement with much more stable
positions an advantage because they have the knowledge and experience their governmental colleagues are missing. 11 of 19 current members of the Foundation Board, representing the sports movement, were elected in 2002 or earlier.

WADA is seen as a much more credible key-actor in anti-doping than the IOC, which had been the frontrunner in the fight against doping until 1998. A standardized framework of rules and regulation, the WADC, has increased the harmonization between different nations and different sports, even though it remains well short of full harmonization. There are still many NOCs, ADOs and IFs which are not compliant with the WADC. WADA’s own report on compliance in 2008 indicated that several nations among the most successful in the Olympic Games are carrying out anti-doping work which does not meet the required standards. So far the IOC has not implemented the power given to it in the Olympic Charter which states that only sports that adopt and implement the Code can be remain in the program of the Olympic Games. This should be a concern for those involved in anti-doping work if the sporting organizations are not to be subject to effective sanctions for failing to implement the anti-doping regulations.

In that respect the more commercial IFs, such as golf, tennis and football, all of which have their own power-base, have resisted the incursion of WADA and the implementation of aspects of the WADA Code. Even though IFs such as the UCI and FIFA have signed the WADC it is clear that some mistrust remains and from time to time conflicts occur between the organizations.

Seen as a group, there are signs that the 33 IFs in the Olympic movement have gone through an improvement in the anti-doping activity. The role of WADA has been of some significance in this regard, but they have also been constrained by other organizations, many of which would not perhaps normally be thought of as part of an anti-doping figuration, such as sponsors, media and TV right-holders. Attitudes among sponsors and TV broadcasters have altered in recent years, and this has affected most IFs and national organizations.

According to WADA, a core goal in anti-doping activity is to protect the athletes’ right to participate in doping-free sport and thus promote health, fairness and equality – or what is called ‘the spirit of sport’. The factors that are mentioned above have given more athletes than previously an increased opportunity to compete with athletes that are part of an anti-doping regime. But some of the tools in the expanding anti-doping regime have been perceived as having negative effects for ‘clean’
athletes. The whereabouts system seems to have resulted in outcomes that may not
were planned by the WADA.

My key aim in this study has been to understand the development of anti-
doping from 1998. The development has involved many significant processes. I have
tried to handle this complexity via a series of case studies at different levels of anti-
doping activity, and with a perspective from figurational sociology that facilitates a
greater understanding of complex processes.

Firstly, as in most social processes and policy developments, power relations
are of key significance. Since 1999, public authorities and WADA clearly have
established a power platform with other sport organizations in a new and less
powerful position. This has led to intensifying anti-doping work.

Secondly, planned social processes almost always have unplanned outcomes.
Or, more precisely, although social and political life unfolds based on certain
regularities and is therefore to some extent predictable, unplanned events frequently
occur that may have a crucial impact on the intended outcome. One example from the
anti-doping campaign is the 1999 Lausanne conference and the misjudgment of the
IOC in the late 1990s when power was largely transferred to governments and public
authorities. Another and more recent example may be the introduction of the
whereabouts system and the further strengthening of anti-doping work. WADA
moves to enforce, and to strengthen its position further, might result in significant
challenges in the years to come.

Whatever course anti-doping policy may take, a more comprehensive
sociological understanding of the phenomenon as outlined in this dissertation may be
a critical tool not only in understanding anti-doping, but in managing and handling it.
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PAPERS

Paper I:

Paper II:

Paper III:

Paper IV:
Paper I
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
A Study of the Management of Organizational Change and Unplanned Outcomes

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Abstract This article examines the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which was established following the World Conference on Doping in Sport convened by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and held in Lausanne in 1999. More specifically, the article draws upon Elias’s game models to analyse: i) the way in which the IOC sought to manage this process of change in such a way that its longstanding position as the world’s leading anti-doping organization would be reinforced; and ii) the IOC’s inability to control this process, with the result that the IOC failed to achieve any of its objectives, its position as the world’s anti-doping organization was actually undermined, and world leadership passed to a new organization which had a significant measure of independence from the IOC.

Key words • Elias • figurational sociology • game models • IOC • WADA

Introduction

The most significant development in anti-doping policies in sport in recent years has, without doubt, been the establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which was set up following the World Conference on Doping in Sport convened by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and held in Lausanne in 1999. Although the Lausanne conference received widespread media coverage, it is perhaps surprising that, given the undoubted significance of the establishment of WADA, the development of WADA, as Miah (2002) has noted, has received relatively little attention from social scientists. While some academics have commented on the policies which have been developed by WADA – often
in quite critical terms (Hoberman, 2004; Kayser et al., 2007; Miah, 2002; Smith and Stewart, 2008) – there has been almost no detailed analysis of the circumstances surrounding the establishment of WADA. The one significant exception relates to the work of Houlihan (1999, 2001), which does provide a useful starting point for understanding the developments leading up to the establishment of WADA. However, although Houlihan points to some important aspects of this process, his analysis of the power struggles which were involved is not fully developed, while his work remains on a largely descriptive level and does not raise the more general theoretical issues relating to either the development of WADA itself or to processes of managed change in sports organizations more generally.

The object of this article is to provide a detailed and theoretically informed analysis of the circumstances surrounding the establishment of WADA. More specifically, the article will draw upon Elias’s game models to analyse: i) the way in which the IOC sought to manage this process of change in such a way that its longstanding position as the world’s leading anti-doping organization would be reinforced; and ii) the IOC’s inability to control this process, with the result that its position as the world’s anti-doping organization was actually undermined, and world leadership passed to a new organization which had a significant measure of independence from the IOC.

The analysis in this article is based mainly on the examination of published materials. It draws in particular on three kinds of material: IOC documents, official documents from other organizations, and newspaper reports. The IOC and its working parties prepared several documents specifically for the Lausanne conference and these provide invaluable insights into IOC strategy in relation to the conference and to the establishment of a new anti-doping organization. These documents were distributed to conference delegates and the authors obtained copies from the Department of Sport Policy within the Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs. We have also analysed other official documents from other key actors, such as the Council of Europe and the European Commission, as well as published testimony relating to the establishment of WADA which was presented to the United States Senate. Finally, we have drawn upon the extensive press coverage of the Lausanne conference in the UK and the United States.

**Origins of the Lausanne Conference**

The immediately precipitating event which led the IOC to convene the World Conference on Doping in Sport, held in Lausanne from 2–4 February 1999, was the doping scandal in the Tour de France cycle race in the previous year. Actions by French customs and police during the Tour had shown conclusively that drug use in cycling was not something which was done by a few individual riders acting on their own initiative, but that it was widespread, systematic and organized; in short, drug use was institutionalized within the structure of professional cycling. And since professional cycling is an Olympic sport, the IOC was also implicated in this scandal.

The pressure on the IOC to respond to this scandal would have been consid-
erably reduced had those involved in professional cycling – and in particular the
governing body, the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) – indicated a willingness
to tackle the widespread use of drugs. However, this did not happen; indeed,
events in the Tour and in the following months indicated that there were at that
time no significant groups within professional cycling who were prepared to
challenge the widespread acceptance of drug use (Waddington, 2000).

But perhaps the most significant constraint on the IOC to take action was the
intervention of the French government in the form of French customs and police
officers. Not only was it the police and customs who revealed the extent of drug
use but, after the Tour, three team doctors and one masseur were charged under
a 1989 Act with supplying banned drugs at sporting events, thus redefining what
had traditionally been seen as a sporting issue as a law and order issue to be dealt
with by the judicial process, rather than by sports bodies. Sports bodies have
traditionally sought to deal with problems ‘in house’, without recourse to the law,
and this development constituted a potentially serious threat to the authority of
sports bodies in general and to the IOC in particular.

This, then, was the context within which the IOC convened the Lausanne
meeting in February 1999. The central role of the Tour de France in precipitating
the conference was explicitly recognized by the President of the UCI, Hein
Verbruggen, in a briefing paper for the Lausanne conference, in which he referred
to the ‘negative events’ during and after the Tour and the ‘avalanches of discus-
sions and articles’ which had followed; as Verbruggen bluntly put it, ‘cycling did
cause this crisis’ (Verbruggen, 1999). As Houlihan (2002) has noted, much
policy-making in the area of drugs and sport has been scandal-driven and the
convening of the Lausanne meeting by the IOC fits this pattern very well.

The IOC in Crisis

What Verbruggen called the ‘avalanches’ of media coverage of organized drug
use in an Olympic sport represented extremely bad publicity not just for the UCI
but, hardly less so, for the IOC. Moreover, the difficulties for the IOC were com-
pounded by the fact that, in the years immediately preceding the Tour de France
scandal, the IOC’s own role in controlling the use of drugs in sport had increas-
ingly come under attack and the IOC’s public image in this regard was looking
increasingly battered.

Although the IOC was not the first sporting organization to institute drug
tests – for example, FIFA’s drug tests at the 1966 World Cup in England pre-
ceded the first drug tests at an Olympic Games by two years – the IOC had, since
the 1960s, taken an increasingly central role in developing anti-doping policy in
sport on a world level. Initially, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the IOC
had seen its role as being limited to ensuring that local organizing committees for
the Olympic Games made arrangements for drug testing of competitors and alert-
ing national Olympic committees to the need to promote drug-free sport. By the
late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the IOC was increasingly adopting a policy
leadership role, most notably through the accreditation of laboratories for the
analysis of samples and through the establishment and maintenance of what
became the benchmark list of banned substances and practices, producing the first such list in 1971. As Houlihan (2002: 157) has noted, the ‘IOC’s centrality to policy-making was in part through intent and partly through a concern not to lose, by default, control over a high-profile issue in sport to governments’.

But in the years prior to the 1998 Tour de France scandal, the reputation of the IOC as the upholder of high sporting ideals and, in particular, as the defender of drug-free sport, was coming increasingly under attack. In the years after he became IOC President in 1980, Juan Antonio Samaranch presided over what has been described as ‘an almost total commercializing of the Olympic Games that has converted the “Movement” into an advertising vehicle for the multinational corporate sponsors and American television networks that are the foundation of his power’ (Hoberman, 2001: 245). Although this strategy was hugely successful in commercial terms, disquiet was increasingly expressed that the IOC’s growing concern with commercial issues was undermining its commitment to anti-doping policy. In this regard, Hoberman (2001: 245) has suggested that the:  

strategy of public moralizing about doping . . . concealed the IOC’s longtime underfunding and delay in implementing drug testing that might really work, since real controls would expose major athletes, alienate Olympic corporate sponsors, and put an end to record breaking in certain events.

He adds that, for Samaranch and his closest associates, ‘doping was primarily a public relations problem that threatened lucrative television and corporate contracts . . . worth billions of dollars’ (Hoberman, 2001: 242). Certainly, it is clear that, over a long period of time, IOC drug testing had proved almost spectacularly unsuccessful in catching athletes who used drugs; drug testing at the Olympic Games between 1968 and 1996 produced just 52 positive drug tests in an athlete population of about 54,000, or less than one per thousand (Hoberman, 2004). And, as MacAloon (2001: 213) has noted, the IOC, despite this poor record, ‘kept promoting a rosy picture of its own efforts and accomplishments’ with regular claims by Samaranch that ‘we are winning the war on drugs’. MacAloon adds that, in ‘an environment of general frustration, [these] claims . . . had been taken by informed experts and activists as baseless public relations statements likely to confuse the public and comfort the dopers’. Given this situation it is not surprising that, as Houlihan (1999: 184) has noted, ‘Many commentators . . . detected a lack of enthusiasm among senior members of the IOC for an intensive anti-doping programme’.

This critical view of the IOC was reinforced by persistent allegations of suppressed positive test results and reported positive tests where no action had been taken at previous Olympic Games. At the Moscow Olympics in 1980, no positive test results were reported, but the urine samples were re-tested after the Games by the German drug-testing expert Dr Manfred Donike, who found that 20 percent of the samples tested positive for testosterone (Teetzel, 2004). Four years later, when nine positive drug tests appeared to implicate finalists at the 1984 Los Angeles Games, the urine samples were sent to the head of the IOC Medical Commission, Prince Alexandre de Merode, and subsequently disappeared. Professor Arnold Bennett, a member of the IOC Doping Committee for the Los
Angeles Games, speculated that the samples had been destroyed to avert a public relations disaster; he said:

"It would have done quite a lot of damage if five or six . . . of the positives . . . had led to the medal winners, as undoubtedly it would have done. Some of the federations and IOC are happy to show that they're doing something in getting some positives, but they don't want too many because that would damage the image of the Games. (cited in Hoberman, 2001: 244)

Twelve years later, Don Catlin, head of the IOC accredited laboratory in Los Angeles, claimed that towards the end of the Atlanta Olympics there were several positive tests for steroids which were not announced (Hoberman, 2001). It is also clear that, in the early 1990s, senior officials of the IOC were aware of the widespread use of drugs by Chinese swimmers, but they chose not to inform FINA, the international federation for swimming, while Samaranch publicly declared that 'I do not think the Chinese are using drugs' (Houlihan, 2002: 54).

Not surprisingly, these scandals were associated with a growing loss of confidence in the IOC’s moral commitment to anti-doping. Thus, in the late 1990s the IOC was already facing a progressive decline of its moral authority. This crisis became even more acute in the months between the Tour de France and the Lausanne conference when allegations surfaced concerning corruption in relation to the bidding process for the next Winter Olympics which were due to be held in Salt Lake City in 2002; these allegations eventually resulted in the expulsion of six IOC members. As MacAloon (2001: 206) has noted, by the time the Lausanne conference was held in February 1999, ‘the two imbroglios were powerfully reinforcing each other, as the IOC plunged into a full-blown legitimacy crisis’.

This legitimacy crisis posed a major threat to the status and authority of the IOC. However, it also provided an unexpected opportunity for the IOC to restore its battered public image and to re-establish its authority within the world of sport. The Lausanne conference was the IOC’s response to this crisis and it was clearly designed to re-establish the IOC on the moral high ground of sport and to re-affirm the IOC as the leading anti-doping organization in world sport. That the leadership of the IOC was clearly aware of both the threat and the opportunity is suggested by the very great care which it took in the planning of the agenda and, indeed, in all other aspects of the conference. As we shall see, this detailed planning was designed to try to ensure that the IOC retained full control of the conference proceedings, to minimize any criticism of the IOC and to re-assert the IOC’s claim to pre-eminence in anti-doping in world sport. However, the IOC was just one player – albeit the central player – in a very complex game with many players and, as is common in such situations, the IOC, despite its detailed planning, found it impossible to control all aspects of the game with the result that the conference led to certain outcomes which the IOC had not planned and which it almost certainly did not want. Before we examine the Lausanne conference in more detail, it will be useful to say a little more about Elias’s game models which provide the theoretical basis for much of our analysis of the conference and the conference outcomes.
Elias’s Game Models

Elias’s game models have been used to analyse a variety of both sporting and non-sporting situations, from changes in health service management (Dopson and Waddington, 1996) to football hooliganism (Williams et al., 1984) and unplanned aspects of the development of boxing (Murphy and Sheard, 2006). Elias (1978) sees game models as a means of isolating in close focus the intertwining of the aims and actions of pluralities of people, thereby making these complex processes of interweaving more easily understandable. On a theoretical level the game models, like Elias’s more general process-sociological approach of which they are a part, are designed as a way of helping to move towards a resolution of the age-old problem within sociology which has variously been described as the relationship between the individual and society, personality and social structure or, in its currently popular formulation, the agency/structure debate. In this regard, Elias’s approach recognizes that human action is, to a greater or lesser degree, consciously directed towards achieving certain goals and that all human action necessarily involves both cognition and emotion, and in this sense it fully takes into account the fact that humans are thinking and feeling animals and that, in the highly individualized societies of the modern world, we each have our own more-or-less individual pattern of intentions, preferences and desires. At the same time, however, Elias also emphasizes that the outcomes of complex social processes cannot be explained simply in terms of the intentions of individuals; indeed, it is important to recognize that the normal result of complex processes involving the interweaving of the more-or-less goal-directed actions of large numbers of people includes outcomes which no-one has chosen and no-one has designed.

Elias developed the game models as simplified analogies of more complex social processes and they focus attention, in particular, on changing balances of power, or power-ratios, as a central aspect of the web of human relations; in this context, it should be borne in mind that games are contests and that all the game models are based on two or more people measuring their strength against each other. Power, conceptualized not as a property which one person or group has and another person or group does not have, but as a structural characteristic of all human relationships, is central to Elias’s approach. Within the context of understanding the IOC’s attempt to manage the doping crisis, the game models are useful precisely because they demonstrate that the outcomes of the complex interweaving of the actions of different players in the game, even where these actions are more-or-less consciously directed towards the attainment of certain goals, may include – in the case of complex games almost certainly will include – outcomes which no single player or group of players intended. Within the context of the doping crisis, the ‘game’ was, of course, the game of implementing, or resisting the implementation of, a given anti-doping policy strategy.

Elias’s most simple game model involves just two people, one of whom is a much stronger player than the other. The stronger player can, to a very considerable degree, constrain the actions and limit the options of the weaker player to make certain moves, whereas the weaker player is much less able to constrain the actions of the stronger player. However, the weaker player does have some
degree of control over the stronger for, in planning his or her own moves, the stronger player has at least to take the weaker player’s moves into account. In other words, in any game the participants always have, though in considerably varying degrees, some control over each other. Where the differential between the players’ strengths in the game (that is the balance of power or their power-ratio) is very great, the stronger player has not only a higher degree of control over his or her opponent but also a higher degree of control over the game as such. The stronger player is thus able significantly to control the course of the game, not only by winning, but also by determining the manner of the victory and perhaps the length of time taken. In a very simple game of this kind, we are able to understand the course of the game largely in terms of the goals and plans of the stronger player.

However, let us now consider a two-person game in which the two players are of roughly equal ability (i.e. of roughly equal power). As the differential between the strength of the players decreases, so the ability of the stronger player to force the weaker player to make certain moves diminishes, as does the stronger player’s ability to determine the course of the game. Correspondingly, the weaker player’s control over the stronger player increases, but, as the power balance between the two players becomes less unequal, so the course of the game increasingly passes beyond the control of either. As Elias put it:

Both players will have correspondingly less chance to control the changing figuration of the game; and the less dependent will be the changing figuration of the game on the aims and plans for the course of the game which each player has formed by himself. The stronger, conversely, becomes the dependence of each of the two players’ overall plans and of each of their moves on the changing figuration of the game – on the game process. The more the game comes to resemble a social process, the less it comes to resemble the implementation of an individual plan. In other words, to the extent that the inequality in the strengths of the two players diminishes, there will result from the interweaving of moves of two individual people a game process which neither of them has planned. (1978: 82; original emphasis)

Elias considers a variety of game models from, in increasing order of complexity, multi-person games at one level (e.g. in which one player may be playing simultaneously against several other players, or in which two sides each containing several players compete against each other) through to multi-person, multi-level games. In this latter group of game models, the number of players increases and the structure of the game becomes increasingly complex. It is these more complex game models which are most useful for shedding light on complex processes in modern societies, such as the processes involved in, for example, planning and implementing sport policy strategies.

It is important to note that, as the number of players and the complexity of the game increase, and as the power differentials between the players diminish, so the course of the game becomes increasingly unpredictable and increasingly beyond the ability of any single individual or group of players to control. We noted earlier that, in the case of a simple two-person game played between players of very unequal ability, the course of the game can be explained largely in terms of the plans and goals of the stronger player. However, as the number of interdependent players grows, it also becomes clear how little the game can be controlled and guided from any single player’s or group’s position; indeed, the
opposite is the case, for it becomes clear how much the course of the game – which is actually the product of the interweaving moves of a large number of players – increasingly constrains the moves of every single player. The development and direction of the game become more and more opaque to the individual player and, within this context, it becomes increasingly difficult for any player or group of players to put together an accurate mental picture of the course of the game as a whole. However strong the individual may be, he or she will become less and less able to control the moves of other players and the course of the game and, from the point of view of the individual player, an intertwining network of more and more players functions increasingly as though it had a life of its own.

In summary, the game models, and in particular the more complex models:

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\text{indicate the conditions under which players may slowly begin to encounter a problem: that a game process, which comes about entirely as a result of the interweaving of the individual moves of many players, takes a course which none of the individual players has planned, determined or anticipated.} \quad (1978: 95; \text{original emphasis})
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Having examined the game models in some detail, let us now return to examine the detailed planning for the Lausanne conference carried out by one of the key actors, the IOC.

‘The Best Laid Schemes o’ Mice an’ Men . . .’

As we noted previously, the leadership of the IOC was clearly aware of the growing threat to its status from its critics both within and outside sport and, perhaps particularly, from the growing involvement of governments. It is equally clear, however, that the IOC also saw the Lausanne conference as an opportunity to restore its battered public image and to reassert its authority and status; in this regard, the detailed planning of the conference by the IOC makes it clear that the organization of the conference was designed to stifle criticism of the IOC’s poor record in relation to doping control and to reclaim the leadership of the anti-doping movement within sport. Let us examine some key aspects of this planning.

The World Conference on Doping in Sport was convened by the IOC and was held on the ‘home ground’ of the IOC, Lausanne, where the IOC headquarters are located. The agenda was drawn up exclusively by the IOC, so that, despite the growing tide of criticism of the IOC, no outside organization was able to place on the agenda items which were critical of the IOC. In addition, the IOC drew up, in advance of the conference, a detailed set of regulations which were clearly designed to ensure that all aspects of the conference remained firmly under the control of the IOC and to minimize the opportunities for critics to express opposition to IOC policy.

The regulations stipulated that the conference was to be chaired by the President of the IOC (IOC, 1998a). The organizing committee was appointed by the President. The opening speech was to be given by the IOC President. There were three categories of participants at the conference: delegates, observers and media representatives. All delegates had to be invited by the IOC and only they had the right to address the conference, though the chairman could, \textit{at his own
discretion, invite members of the two other categories of participants to speak during the conference.

The regulations also stipulated that the work of the conference was to be centred on four themes: protecting athletes; legal and political aspects of drug use; prevention; and financial considerations. Four working groups, each with responsibility for one of these themes, had been appointed by the IOC in advance of the conference and the reports and recommendations from these working groups were to constitute the main agenda for the conference. The composition of these working groups made it unlikely that any of them would present recommendations which were critical of the IOC. The four groups were coordinated by the IOC Director General, François Carrard, and each working group was chaired by an IOC Vice-President, who was responsible for setting up the working group and for presenting the group’s report to the conference. Each working group contained members who, at least nominally, represented a variety of different groups: IOC members, members of national Olympic committees, international federations, governments, experts and athletes so that, in theory, they represented not just the IOC but a range of opinions. In reality, however, the four working groups were packed with representatives of the Olympic Movement. For example, the working group on the protection of athletes was chaired by Anita DeFrantz, an IOC Vice-President, and contained four members who were there specifically as IOC members (one of whom, Un Yong Kim, later resigned as an IOC Vice-President, while another, Guy Drut, was subsequently suspended as an IOC member following their separate convictions on criminal corruption charges in their home countries). In addition, there were two representatives from national Olympic committees. The two members of the working group who were there as representatives of international federations were, however, also IOC members, while three of the four athletes’ representatives were also IOC members and the fourth was a member of his national Olympic committee. There was only one government representative. The three other working groups were similarly packed with representatives of the Olympic Movement, thus ensuring that each of these working groups was firmly under IOC control, so that the only reports and recommendations to be brought to conference were those emanating from the IOC itself. And to make sure that this was the case, the regulations also stipulated that ‘No document may be distributed to the participants at the Conference without the prior agreement of the organizing committee’ (IOC, 1998a: 5). The final declaration from the conference was to be drafted by a group appointed, unsurprisingly, by the chairman. On the face of it, any possibilities for organized opposition seemed very limited.

And what were the IOC’s intended outcomes from this conference? The reports from the four IOC working groups are very helpful in this regard. A careful reading of these documents makes it clear that, in convening the conference, the leadership of the IOC had three major aims: to restrict the involvement of outside agencies such as governments, police and other public bodies in the regulation of doping in sport and to reserve this function to sports organizations; to re-establish and enhance the authority of the IOC as the leading regulatory body within sport; and to re-establish and enhance the personal authority of the IOC President, Juan Antonio Samaranch. Let us examine these three aims more closely.
As we noted previously, a major concern of the IOC was the fact that the involvement of the French police and government in exposing widespread drug use in cycling threatened to redefine the control of drugs as an issue to be dealt with by the judicial system, rather than by sporting bodies. Following the intervention of the French police and the growing concern of several governments about drug use in sport, the IOC sought to address the issue of the relationship between sporting bodies and non-sporting public bodies, but to do this in a way which reserved to sporting bodies the exclusive right to control drug use within sport. This was a key function of the working group appointed by the IOC to report on legal and political aspects of doping (IOC, 1998b). In a document headed ‘Proposals for Cooperation between the Olympic Movement and Public Authorities in the Fight Against Doping’, the group sought to define what it saw as the appropriate roles of the Olympic Movement on the one hand, and of public authorities on the other. In this regard, the document proposed reserving to the Olympic Movement all key aspects of the regulation of drug use in sport: the definition of doping; establishing anti-doping regulations; ensuring compliance with those regulations; providing drug testing using laboratories accredited by the IOC; and imposing sanctions on athletes who breached the anti-doping regulations. By contrast, the responsibilities of public authorities were defined in a much more limited way and were largely confined to broader, non-sporting aspects of drug regulation, such as determining the criminal sanctions to be imposed on those convicted of trafficking in doping substances and identifying, taking proceedings against and punishing those infractions ‘to which sports sanctions do not apply’.

The second central aim – to re-establish and enhance the position of the IOC as the leading anti-doping organization within sport – also comes through very clearly from these documents. For example, the IOC working group on ‘Prevention: Ethics, Education and Communication’ (IOC, 1998c) argued that education could play a powerful role in prevention and it left no doubt about which organization should play the lead role in this regard: the educational message, it said, ‘should be managed and developed by the Olympic Movement through the IOC’ and, to reinforce the point, it argued that the ‘Olympic Movement should be the main creator of the message and the manager of the various campaigns’.

Central to the objective of re-establishing the authority of the IOC as the leading anti-doping organization was the proposal to establish a new agency to coordinate the worldwide fight against drug use in sport; significantly, this new agency was initially described in IOC documents as the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Agency (Teetzel, 2004). Key aspects of this proposal were set out in the report of the working party appointed by the IOC to examine the financial aspects of anti-doping work (IOC, 1998d). The report suggested that the proposed new agency should be established as a foundation under Swiss law and that it should be based in the home city of the IOC, Lausanne. It was proposed that the agency would be funded by the IOC, who would allocate an initial amount of $25 million, with a commitment from the IOC to allocate ‘whatever additional resources may be necessary to accomplish its objective of doping-free sport’. The twin aims of re-establishing the authority of the IOC and of its President were brought together in the proposal that the agency should be governed by a council
to be presided over by the IOC President. The council was to consist of three representatives each of the IOC, the international federations (whose representatives could, as in the case of the IOC working parties appointed to report to conference, also be IOC members), the national Olympic committees, and athletes designated by the IOC Athletes Commission. In addition, there were to be three other persons representing sponsors, the pharmaceutical industry and the sporting goods industry, with all of whom, as Hoereman has noted, Samaranch had forged close commercial relationships which formed a key basis of his power within the Olympic Movement. Under this proposal, the three remaining members of the council – and the only three who were likely to have had a significant degree of independence from the IOC – were the three representatives of international governmental organizations, who would almost certainly have found themselves swamped by supporters of Samaranch and the IOC. The involvement of governmental organizations, under these proposals, was to be kept to a minimum; they were to have only three members on an 18-member council and their functions were to be largely confined to the control of trafficking in prohibited substances. Not only was the proposed new body to reserve virtually all anti-doping functions within sport to itself, but it was to take on new powers which the IOC had never before had. Thus, whereas the IOC had previously been responsible only for drug testing at Olympic Games, the new body was to be much more actively involved in the organization of out-of-competition testing all year round. The proposed new agency was to be, in effect, a body set up by the IOC, funded by the IOC, based in the IOC’s home city, packed with representatives of the Olympic Movement and presided over by the IOC President, and with wider powers than the IOC had previously ever had. In the words of IOC Executive Board member, Kevan Gospar of Australia, the proposal was to establish a ‘full-time IOC watchdog’ with greatly expanded powers (Teetzel, 2004: 218). Under this proposal, the authority of the IOC would be not just re-established but greatly enhanced. But as the Scottish poet Robbie Burns long ago observed, ‘The best laid schemes o’ mice an’ men . . .’

‘. . . Gang Aft A-gley’

On the first morning of the Lausanne conference, the IOC’s tight control of proceedings was very much in evidence; indeed, so effective did the IOC’s control of the conference appear that Duncan Mackay, writing in The Guardian (3 February 1999) suggested that for ‘the first two hours the convention resembled the Communist Party conference in the former Soviet Union as a succession of speakers demurred to Samaranch’. But the IOC leadership increasingly lost control of the conference shortly before lunch when a succession of government ministers, led by the then British Sports Minister, Tony Banks, made a series of trenchant criticisms of the IOC, its policies and its president. As Houlihan (1999: 17) has noted, ‘many politicians used their allotted five minutes to lambaste the IOC for its past inaction on the issue of doping, to cast doubt on the sincerity of its stated aims for the conference and to question its moral authority’ to oversee the proposed new anti-doping agency. What was planned as a public
relations triumph for the IOC and its president turned rapidly into a public relations disaster played out before the assembled world’s press. The Guardian (3 February 1999) reported that Banks ‘tore into the International Olympic Committee’. He criticized the IOC for a lack of internal democracy, accountability and honesty and said that the Olympic Movement was ‘soured and sullied’, adding that the ‘British Government expects the IOC to clean up their act’. Banks questioned the ability of the IOC to operate an effective anti-doping policy and argued that the proposed new international anti-doping agency should not be run by the IOC but by an international governmental agency such as the United Nations or the World Health Organization. ‘We support a totally transparent world anti-doping agency’ he said, ‘but the IOC should not be that agency’. Banks’s comments were echoed by Barry McCaffrey, Director of the White House Office of National Drug Policy and a member of President Clinton’s cabinet, who argued that the ‘alleged corruption, lack of accountability, and the failure of leadership have challenged the legitimacy of this institution’ and that ‘these events have tarnished the credibility of the movement’ (New York Times, 3 February 1999). Like Banks, he argued that the proposed new agency should not be overseen by the IOC but that it ‘should be overseen by a separately established . . . agency’ (The Independent, 3 February 1999). Germany’s Interior Minister also joined in what The Guardian (3 February 1999) described as ‘the Samaranch-bashing’, arguing that ‘the IOC cannot discharge the functions which go with its role unless the institution is completely overhauled and its finances are laid open’. As Houlihan (1999: 17) has noted, ‘With hindsight the IOC must have considered the first day a disaster’.

The second day was little better for the IOC leadership, with The Independent (4 February 1999) reporting that the ‘beleaguered International Olympic Committee president . . . faced serious challenges both from outside and within the organization’, while The Guardian (4 February 1999) noted that ‘It was another bad day at the office for Juan Antonio Samaranch’. As on the previous day, criticism of the IOC leadership was not confined to drug-related issues but broadened out to include other aspects of IOC policy, in this case Samaranch’s proposed changes to the way in which the host cities for future Olympic Games should be selected. But there was also renewed criticism of the IOC proposals for the new anti-doping agency and, once again, these were led by Banks. Speaking on behalf of the 15 European sports ministers and with the support of government representatives from the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Norway, Banks said ‘it was their unanimous opinion that we cannot accept the composition of the agency as drafted by the document’, adding that it ‘had become increasingly evident during this conference that the involvement of governments will be crucial if we are to have an effective and acceptable anti-doping policy’ (The Guardian, 4 February 1999). Banks also made it clear that the EU would not agree to have representatives of pharmaceutical companies and sponsors on the agency, and that it would not agree to Samaranch becoming president of the new organization, arguing that ‘the chairing of the independent agency by President Samaranch would compromise it and that is something we would not be happy to accept’ (Daily Telegraph, 5 February 1999).

The formal outcome of the conference was the Lausanne Declaration on
Doping in Sport. The key element of this document was the declared intention to establish what it was now proposed to call the International Anti-Doping Agency – not, as had originally been suggested, an Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Agency – but the major proposals from the IOC working party about its composition and its presidency had all been rejected by the conference and a further key proposal – to locate the new agency in Lausanne – was also to be rejected in the bargaining which took place in the months following the conference. We will examine the post-conference bargaining later but first let us examine the immediate reaction to the conference by the world’s media and the impact of the conference on the standing of the IOC and its President.

Writing in the *New York Times* (3 February 1999), Paul Montgomery noted that the Lausanne conference was ‘originally meant to reassert the International Olympic Committee’s supremacy in fighting the use of illegal drugs in sport’, while in Britain *The Independent* (4 February 1999) noted that the IOC leadership had hoped that the conference would ‘restore its public image following . . . recent scandals over bribery and corruption’. However, observers at the conference were unanimous in the view that, not only had it not restored the image and authority of the IOC, but it had actually had the reverse effect. Press reports throughout the conference repeatedly described both the IOC and its president as ‘beleaguered’ and there was general agreement that the conference had, as the *Daily Mail* (5 February 1999) put it, ‘done nothing to enhance the IOC’s reputation for leadership’. The *New York Times* (2 February 1999) described Samaranch as presiding ‘over a session in which government officials from around the world sharply criticized his organization’, while *The Guardian* (4 February 1999) described Samaranch as ‘fighting for his survival’ and said that the conference’s rejection of several key aspects of the IOC’s proposals ‘was another huge blow to Samaranch’. The following day, *The Guardian* suggested that the ‘most humiliating aspect for Juan Antonio Samaranch . . . was that he was not named as the head of the new agency’ and it added that the conference ‘has not offered Samaranch the platform to re-establish himself as a strong leader’. It concluded that the outcome of the conference was ‘a further blow to the IOC and its beleaguered president’. *The Independent* (5 February 1999) noted that the ‘clear message which the International Olympic Committee hoped to send out from their World Conference on Doping in Sport became one of confusion and uncertainty’. The fact that this had all taken place in the home city of the IOC was not lost on some commentators, with *The Independent* (6 February 1999) pointing out that Barry McCaffrey, who had led the US government’s critique of the IOC, had ‘shaken up’ the IOC ‘on its home turf’.

Post-Lausanne Negotiations and the Establishment of WADA

Details of the organization and structure of what finally emerged as the World Anti-Doping Agency were worked out in negotiations between the IOC, governmental organizations and other interested bodies in the months following the Lausanne Conference. But the barrage of criticism of the IOC at the conference meant that the IOC was forced to concede ground on several key points even
before the conference finished. As early as the second day of the conference, Richard Pound, a Canadian lawyer and IOC Vice-President, ‘acknowledged that the IOC has had to scale back its plans to be at the center of the agency’ (New York Times, 4 February 1999). Pound indicated that governmental organizations ‘would have a much larger role than anticipated’ in IOC plans, adding that it was possible that the new agency might have ‘as much as 50 percent representation from public authorities, whereas before the conference the IOC had anticipated no more than 20 percent’. This was, as the American journalist Paul Montgomery noted, ‘an indication of the increasing inclination of governments to take antidoping enforcement out of the hands of sports bodies’, something to which the IOC had been strongly opposed (New York Times, 4 February 1999).

A second key area on which the IOC was forced to concede ground even before the end of the conference was the question of who would chair the proposed agency. Following the damaging public criticism of Samaranch, Pound conceded, again on the second day of the conference: ‘Even the chairmanship of the council is now to be discussed’ (The Independent, 4 February 1999). Pound added that ‘We have no set view on this’, which was a rather odd statement given that the IOC working group which had been chaired by Pound in advance of the Lausanne conference had specifically recommended that the IOC President should chair the new body. Pound’s comment would seem to imply a clear withdrawal of support from Samaranch and, in this regard, it may not be without significance that it was Pound himself who eventually emerged as the first chair of WADA.

In the months following the Lausanne conference, the governmental organizations made their views on the structure of the proposed new agency known to the IOC. In March 1999, a committee of experts of the European Union met to consider the structure of the proposed agency and their views were considered at a meeting of a committee of the Council of Europe held in Strasbourg on 25 March 1999. The committee, while pledging its support for a new agency, reiterated the demands which had been made by government representatives at the Lausanne conference: that the council of the agency should be ‘composed in such a way as to guarantee the Agency total independence and transparency’, and it demanded that the Council should be composed equally of representatives of governmental organizations and sporting bodies (Council of Europe, 1999). It also proposed that the director of the agency should be elected by the Council. In October, the European Union authorized Viviane Reding, the then Commissioner for Education and Culture, to open discussions with the IOC about the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency. The Commission stated that it favoured the idea of creating a new agency, but it emphasized that ‘important questions remain to be settled regarding its status and its rules of operation. In particular, the Commission would like the Agency to be managed jointly by public authorities and sports organizations’. The Commission also emphasized, as all governmental organizations had repeatedly done, that the agency should be ‘genuinely independent and transparent’ (European Commission, 1999a). Barry McCaffrey, who, as we have noted, had ‘shaken up’ the IOC on its ‘home turf’ in Lausanne, remained critical of several aspects of the proposed agency through the summer and autumn of 1999, not least in his evidence to a US Senate Committee hearing.
in October, when he demanded ‘stronger guarantees that the agency will be independent’ of the IOC and that governmental bodies would be accorded ‘a sufficient role in the policy-making process’ (McCaffrey, 1999).

By now the balance of power had swung decisively against the IOC and, in his own evidence to the US Senate Committee, Pound conceded that governmental agencies and sporting bodies would have equal representation on the agency and that no single organization, including the IOC, would be in a position to control WADA (Pound, 1999). In effect the IOC had been forced to abandon virtually all the key aspects of its original plan to control the new agency. The following month, the European Commission announced that the Commission and the European Union had ‘decided to give their wholehearted commitment to WADA after securing from the IOC all the necessary guarantees concerning the Agency’s independence and powers’ (European Commission, 1999b).

WADA was finally established in November 1999. Whereas the recommendation from the IOC to the Lausanne conference was that the new agency should be funded wholly by the IOC – the report which was prepared for the conference made no mention of the possibility of government funding – WADA has, since 2002, been funded on an equal basis by governments and by the Olympic Movement. Along with this equal funding arrangement, its 36 member Council and its 12 member Executive Committee both have equal representation from governments and from the Olympic Movement. And after a few initial meetings which were held in Lausanne, another key IOC proposal – that the new agency should be based in Lausanne – was also rejected when, at a meeting of the Foundation Board of WADA in August 2001, Montreal was selected as the permanent home of WADA (Sport Canada, 2001).

‘The Best Laid Schemes’ . . . Revisited

As we noted earlier, a careful reading of the documents prepared by the IOC for the Lausanne conference makes it clear that, in convening the conference, the leadership of the IOC had three major aims: to restrict the involvement of outside agencies such as governments, police and other public bodies in the regulation of doping in sport and to reserve this function to sports organizations; to re-establish and enhance the authority of the IOC as the leading anti-doping agency within sport; and to re-establish and enhance the personal authority of the IOC President, Juan Antonio Samaranch. To what extent were these objectives achieved?

In relation to the first objective, it is clear that not only did the IOC not succeed in restricting the involvement of governmental agencies but that, on the contrary, one outcome of the process which the IOC had initiated was actually to institutionalize the role of governments at the very heart of anti-doping policy; the central role of government is clearly expressed in the fact that WADA is funded equally by governments and by the IOC, and that governmental bodies have equal representation with sporting bodies on the WADA Council. As the Daily Mail (5 February 1999) noted, the growing demands for government involvement which were heard at the Lausanne conference ‘opened a Pandora’s box that sport will not be able to shut’, and it is certainly difficult to imagine a
situation in which anti-doping policy in sport will ever again be seen as an area best left to sporting bodies alone. That may be the most enduring legacy of the Lausanne conference.

It is equally clear that the outcome of this process did nothing to re-establish the authority of the IOC in relation to anti-doping policy; indeed, it might be said that it effectively ended the IOC’s policy leadership role in this regard. The leadership of the IOC would undoubtedly have been strengthened if the IOC’s proposals for the new body had been accepted, for these were clearly designed to establish a new body which would be effectively controlled by the IOC and which would have greatly enhanced powers in relation to the control of anti-doping policy. But as we have seen, every key proposal of the IOC concerning the organization of the new body was defeated. What was originally proposed as an Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Agency became the World Anti-Doping Agency. The proposal that the president of the IOC should head the new body was rejected. It was not to be funded exclusively by the IOC, as the IOC had proposed, but jointly by the IOC and governments. Its Council was not to be dominated by Olympic representatives with minority representation from governments, as originally proposed, but both groups were to be equally represented. And it was not to be located in Lausanne, but in Montreal. As we noted earlier, the IOC had, since the 1970s, increasingly assumed the policy leadership role in the anti-doping movement, but in convening the Lausanne conference the IOC triggered a process that resulted in the effective transfer of this leadership role away from the IOC and towards a newly established body on which it was to be represented but which it did not control and which was to have a significant measure of independence from the IOC. And finally, the outcome of the conference did nothing to enhance the battered image of the IOC President; indeed, the refusal to accept the nomination of Samaranch as the president of the new agency was widely seen as a personal humiliation for him. How, then, did a process which was initiated by the IOC and which was designed to re-establish the authority of the IOC and its president have so many outcomes which were the very opposite of those which the IOC had intended? To understand this, it will be helpful to return to Elias’s game models.

The Game Models Revisited

Among Elias’s game models there are two models of multi-person games which are particularly relevant to understanding the changing pattern of relationships between the IOC and governmental organizations and the way in which these changes led to the establishment of WADA. More specifically, the first of Elias’s models approximates to and helps us to understand the longstanding dominance of the IOC in relation to anti-doping policy in the years prior to the Lausanne conference, while the second model approximates to and helps us to understand how the dominance of the IOC was increasingly challenged by governments – most notably and most successfully at the Lausanne conference – leading to the creation of WADA and the loss of the IOC’s leadership role in anti-doping.

In the first of these models, Elias (1978) asks us to imagine a game in which
one player, A, is playing simultaneously against several other players, B, C, D, etc. under the following conditions: A is superior in strength to any single opponent and is playing against each one separately. Thus B, C, D and so on, are not playing jointly but separately, and the only connection between them is the fact that each individual is playing privately against the same equally superior opponent. This is, in effect, not a single game but, rather, a series of games for two people, with each game having its own balance of power and developing in its own way, so that the courses taken by the several games are not directly interdependent. In each of the games, A is considerably more powerful and is able to exert a high degree of control both over his/her opponent and over the course of the game itself. In each of these games, the distribution of power is relatively unequal and stable. In this situation, the only significant limiting factor on A’s power is the number of opponents he/she plays against; the position might, for example, change to A’s disadvantage if the number of independent games A is playing increases markedly, for there is a limit to the span of active relationships independent one from another which A can pursue simultaneously.

Elias contrasts this with another model in which A plays simultaneously against several weaker opponents, not separately but against all of them together. In this situation, A is playing not against a single opponent but against a group of opponents, each of whom, on their own, is weaker than A. However, because B, C, D, etc. have formed a group directed against A, the group as a whole is able much more effectively to challenge the power of A so that the balance of power is much less stable and there is much less certainty about the control of the game and therefore less certainty in predicting the outcome of the game. If groups formed by the weaker players are not internally divided by strong inner tensions that is also a power factor to their advantage (Elias, 1987). Armed with these two models we are in a better position to understand some of the key processes surrounding the Lausanne conference. The key players in these games were, on the one hand, the IOC (player A in Elias’s model) and, on the other, governments and governmental organizations (players B, C, D, etc.).

**Game Models, the IOC and the Establishment of WADA**

For some two decades after anti-doping controls were first introduced in sport, few governments showed much interest in the control of drugs in sport. As Houlihan (2001) has noted, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the number of governments that moved beyond routine condemnation of doping was more than matched by the number of governments that were either passive or – as in the case of governments such as those of East Germany and the Soviet Union, which had state-sponsored doping programmes – actively undermined anti-doping policies. And rather than seeking leadership of the anti-doping movement within sport, those few governments which did express an interest in anti-doping work, together with the Council of Europe, actively encouraged the IOC to adopt a policy leadership role (Houlihan, 2002).

By the late 1980s, a number of national governments were becoming more involved in doping control within their own countries, largely as a response to
major drug scandals. For example, in Australia, a Senate Committee of Inquiry was established in 1987 to examine allegations of drug use at the Australian Institute of Sport, and this led to the establishment by law of the Australian Sports Drug Agency. In Canada, the Dubin Inquiry led to the establishment of the Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport, while in Britain, a report in 1987 from the then Sports Minister, Colin Moynihan and the athlete, Sebastian Coe, led, in 1988, to the establishment of the Doping Control Unit within the British Sports Council (Houlihan, 2002). These initiatives were, however, largely confined to the national level and, although the Council of Europe had expressed an early interest in anti-doping work, there was little evidence of governmental co-operation on an international level. Thus throughout the 1980s, those governments which were becoming more involved in developing anti-doping policies were working largely independently of each other and they did not pose a collective threat to the leadership of the IOC.

This situation began to change in the 1990s and gathered pace towards the end of the decade. Of particular significance in this regard was the development of a series of anti-doping agreements between governments. In 1990, the UK, Canada and Australia signed an agreement, which later became known as the International Anti-Doping Arrangement, and by 1998 – just one year before the Lausanne conference – the agreement had also been signed by New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands. In 1996, the Nordic group of countries concluded an agreement which committed them to harmonization of penalties and doping control procedures, while several other bilateral governmental agreements were also concluded in the 1990s. The Council of Europe also increasingly provided an arena within which activist governments pressed for improved standards of doping controls within member states (Houlihan, 2001).

During the 1990s, therefore, one can see the beginnings of a fundamental change in the nature of the game between the IOC and governmental organizations. In the 1970s and 1980s, most governments were unconcerned about drug use in sport, and the few that were concerned worked largely independently of each other. Although growing evidence of drug use in sport such as that provided to the Australian Senate and to the Dubin Inquiry indicated that IOC policy was largely ineffective in controlling the use of drugs, there was little evidence of inter-governmental co-operation and no single government, on its own, sought to challenge the authority of the IOC. Within this situation, which approximated to Elias’s first model outlined above, the dominance of the IOC as the leading anti-doping organization went largely unchallenged.

In the 1990s, however, there were significant moves by several governments to develop anti-doping agreements on an international level. These agreements not only by-passed the IOC but also constituted, in effect, public recognition by governments both of the ineffectiveness of IOC policy and of the need for governments to work together to introduce more stringent anti-doping controls. As Houlihan (2002: 160) has noted, there was a growing sense of ‘unease among governments and governmental organizations’ which reflected ‘a more general concern with their [the IOC’s] reliance on self-regulation in preference to inviting an independent agency to take responsibility for anti-doping implementation’. This situation began to approximate more closely to Elias’s second model as
governments began to join together and elements of a more organized inter-
governmental challenge to the IOC began to appear.

But although there were signs of a developing alliance between governments,
and a growing recognition in the 1990s of the ineffectiveness of IOC policy, there
was, until the Lausanne conference, no overt collective challenge offered by
governments to the IOC. One probable reason for this is that, although there was
in the 1990s growing inter-governmental contact in relation to anti-doping work,
there was no forum within which governments could collectively meet with, and
challenge, the IOC; as Houlihan (2001) has noted, despite the growth of inter-
governmental agreements and fora in the 1990s there were hardly any meetings
which brought together governmental organizations and sporting bodies on an
international level. That was to be the key role played by the Lausanne confer-
ence.

Lausanne Revisited

As Marx and Engels (1962) noted in The Communist Manifesto, it was the
development of the factory system which, by bringing together large numbers of
workers in one place, created the very conditions favourable to their collective
organization and thereby enabled them to challenge the power of the bourgeoisie.
In much the same way it may be argued that, in convening the Lausanne con-
ference, the IOC gathered together all its critics under one roof, thus creating the
opportunity for a collective inter-governmental challenge to the authority and
leadership of the IOC, with consequences which the IOC had clearly not antici-
pated.

As we have seen, there was some evidence of a growing inter-governmental
challenge to the IOC before the Lausanne conference. However, the conditions
for an effective challenge had not fully existed before the conference. Although
the power position of those governments demanding more effective anti-doping
controls had been strengthened by the demise of Communist governments in
Eastern Europe and their state-sponsored doping programmes, there remained
other obstacles to the development of a more effective challenge to the IOC. For
example, some of the most effective work on an international level had been done
by governmental organizations which either had limited resources and/or a
limited geo-political remit. The Council of Europe, for example, had played an
important role in encouraging European governments to treat doping as an issue
of public policy and not simply as a private matter for sports bodies, but it had
few significant resources beyond its moral authority and its remit did not extend
beyond Europe (Houlihan, 2001). The latter point was particularly significant in
the context of relationships between European and non-European governments,
especially the USA. As we noted earlier, the USA was a particularly strong critic
of the IOC at Lausanne and in the subsequent months, but the US was of course
not part of the Council of Europe and the Lausanne conference provided a unique
opportunity for the most powerful governments in Europe, North America and
Australasia – who also represented some of the most successful Olympic nations
– to come together to challenge the IOC. And of course, this was done not in
private but, humiliatingly for the IOC, in the full glare of worldwide media coverage.

It is not known to what degree there was a collective pre-planned strategy on the part of governments, but there is some evidence to suggest that at least some governments sought to coordinate their attack on the IOC at Lausanne. For example, Hans B. Skaset, who attended the Lausanne conference as a member of the Norwegian Government delegation and who drafted the speech which was delivered by the Norwegian Sports Minister, has indicated that there was contact before the conference between some member governments of the International Anti-Doping Arrangement with a view to coordinating their policy demands at the conference (Skaset, interview with authors, Oslo, 2007). What is clear is that there was a remarkable consistency and unity in the criticisms of the IOC expressed by governments both during and after the Lausanne Conference. In effect it seems that, in convening the Lausanne conference, the IOC unwittingly created the conditions for its own ambush by governmental organizations.

Conclusion

This case study of the Lausanne Conference and the development of WADA has highlighted the complexity of processes of change in large organizations and, in particular, the difficulty of controlling such processes. It has been argued that the complexity of these processes meant that the IOC, despite its planning and preparation for the conference, was unable to control the direction which the conference took with the result that not only did the IOC not achieve any of its three major objectives, but the outcome of the conference actually represented in many respects the very opposite of what the IOC had intended.

In order to understand these processes, we have drawn upon Elias’s game models to illustrate how, as the complexity of a game increases, so it becomes increasingly difficult for any single group of players to retain control of the game process and of the outcomes of the game. It is not difficult to find other examples within the world of sport. For example, in relation to anti-doping policy, Voy (1991) has drawn attention to what he calls a ‘sad paradox’, for the heavy penalties which are imposed on athletes who provide a positive drug test mean that athletes are constrained to pay more attention to the ease with which a drug can be detected, rather than to its safety; as a result, anti-doping regulations which are justified partly in terms of a desire to protect athletes’ health actually constrain athletes towards the use of more dangerous, but less detectable, drugs.

Such unplanned outcomes are, as Elias pointed out, not unusual but, on the contrary, are everyday occurrences in social life. Despite their everyday character, however, very little attention has been paid by sociologists to the analysis of such unplanned outcomes; indeed, Merton (1936, 1949) is the only other sociologist who has attempted systematically to theorize what he called ‘the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action’. Some of the key differences between Elias and Merton have been examined elsewhere (Dopson and Waddington, 1996); in the present context, we might simply note that, as Mennell (1992: 258) has pointed out, Merton focused in particular on what might be
regarded as an oddity of social life, namely, the ‘self-fulfilling prophesy’, while Merton himself acknowledged that he dealt mainly with ‘isolated purposive acts rather than with their integration into a coherent system of action’ (Merton, 1936: 895). By contrast, Elias emphasized the everyday character of such processes and he was not concerned with ‘isolated purposive acts’ but with the complex interweaving of the actions and intentions of large numbers of people and with the unplanned outcomes which this commonly produces. It is hoped that by identifying these unplanned processes, and by drawing upon Elias’s game models to understand them, this article will stimulate further analysis of these important but generally neglected aspects of organizational change.

Finally, our main concern has been to analyse the circumstances surrounding the establishment of WADA and we have not been primarily concerned with the implications of the power struggles at Lausanne for the effectiveness of the new anti-doping organization which finally emerged. However, one brief comment on this may be appropriate. It will be recalled that a key objective of the IOC was to restrict the involvement of outside agencies such as governments and police in the regulation of doping in sport and to reserve this function to sports organizations. In this the IOC was, as we noted, unsuccessful and a comparison of the subsequent activities of sporting and non-sporting bodies in controlling drug use is quite revealing. Since it was established, WADA has pursued a much more vigorous anti-doping policy than the IOC had previously done and, particularly in sports such as cycling, it appears to have been more successful in catching individual athletes who have tested positive. However, while WADA appears to have had some limited success in this regard, the most significant developments appear to have come not as a result of activities by sporting organizations but as a result of the activities of government agencies such as police and customs. Thus, while individual athletes have, from time to time, tested positive in drug tests carried out by WADA and other sporting organizations, government agencies such as police and customs have revealed not individual drug users, but large-scale networks, sometimes running into hundreds of people involved in drug use in sport, as was the case with Operación Puerto in Spain in 2006 or with several recent police operations in Italy (Waddington and Smith, forthcoming). In this regard, it might be said that while WADA policy has not been entirely ineffective, it appears to have been considerably less effective than have other interventions by other, non-sporting organizations. As we noted earlier, it is not possible to imagine a situation in which anti-doping policy will ever again be left entirely to sporting organizations, and this may well be the most significant legacy of the Lausanne conference.

Note

1. We are grateful to Hans B. Skaset for drawing this to our attention and for providing detailed information on the backgrounds of the members of the working groups.


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Paper II
Drug Scandal and Organizational Change within the International Ski Federation: A Figurational Approach

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ABSTRACT This paper explores the process of organizational change within the International Ski Federation (FIS) in relation to the issue of doping. More specifically, the paper examines how the FIS adopted the policy established by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) following a doping scandal in cross-country skiing during the 2001 Nordic World Ski Championship in Lahti, Finland. The qualitative case study reported here draws upon interviews with key actors and the analysis of documents and media text. The paper utilizes a figurational sociological perspective and, in particular, the concept of game models, in order to analyse the roles of different people and organizations in the figuration, and how the increasing interdependency between FIS and WADA and the resulting shift in the balance of power within FIS, led to changes in FIS policy.

Introduction
Following a major doping scandal in cross-country skiing during the 2001 Nordic World Ski Championship in Lahti, Finland, the International Ski Federation (FIS) came under strong pressure from the media and from some national ski federations to adopt a more vigorous anti-doping policy. After a cross-country skier from the host country failed an in-competition doping test on the opening day of the competition, substantial out-of-competition testing initiated by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was carried out on the whole of the Finnish team (Laine, 2006). As a result of in-competition and out-of-competition testing, a total of six cross-country skiers were sanctioned for violations of the doping regulations during a championship that was described memorably by Virtapohja (2002) as a “blood-freezing” event. The so-called “Lahti scandal” provided indirect evidence of a lack of...
commitment to tackle drug use within FIS in recent decades, despite clear indications that blood doping was both prevalent (Videman et al., 2000) and highly effective (Berglund & Hemmingsson, 1987). Research has shown that blood doping can provide up to 10% enhancement of performance in endurance events such as cross-country skiing (Berglund & Ekblom, 1991; Birkeland, Stray-Gundersen, & Hemmersbach, 2000).

The “Lahti scandal” was a catalyst for organizational change within FIS. This paper focuses upon these changes and, in particular, on changes in the power balance within the organization and on how FIS adopted WADA’s anti-doping policy. The paper utilizes a figurational sociological perspective and, in particular, the concept of game models, in order to analyse the role of different people and organizations in the figuration, and how this increasing interdependency between FIS and WADA and the resulting shift in the balance of power within FIS led to changes in policy within the organization.

The paper begins by providing a contextual background on doping and anti-doping in cross-country skiing. This is followed by a brief outline of the theoretical perspective employed in the paper, including the concept of figuration and game models, and how they help us to better understand organizational change and the dynamics of power. The research methods are then described and, finally, an analysis of the data as they relate to the process of change within FIS is carried out.

FIS and Doping in Cross-country Skiing

In order to understand some of the key changes which took place within FIS it is important to understand something about FIS itself, the structure of the organization and the place of cross-country skiing within FIS. Founded in 1924 with fourteen member nations, FIS is the “supreme authority in all matters concerning the sport of skiing” (FIS, 2006, §2.1). Currently, FIS comprises 108 national ski associations (FIS, 2007a) representing ten ski disciplines, including six that feature in the Olympic programme.

All the national associations meet at the Congress, the highest decision-making body of FIS, every even year. Between the Congresses, the Council is the supreme authority. The Council consists of the President, four Vice-Presidents and twelve members. As an employee of FIS, the Secretary-General is allowed to contribute to FIS debates but has no voting rights. The President is elected for a four-year term while all other members are elected for two years, but in practice members tend to be re-elected. One of the Vice-Presidents, for example, has been on the Council since 1969. No national association may have more than one member of the Council. The President and the four Vice-Presidents constitute the Executive Board. The Council meets, at the invitation of the President, as often as the business requires which, as a rule, tends to be twice a year (FIS, 1996, 2006).

The Council appoints chairpersons and members to different committees, sub-committees and working groups. These units act in an advisory capacity to the Council and are responsible for technical and other specified activities.
of FIS (1996, 2006). Of special significance for this paper are the Medical Committee and the Cross-country Committee.

Until the 1980s, anti-doping work was a relatively low priority in cross-country skiing at international level and also in the leadership of FIS. As a response to the Olympic Congress in Baden-Baden in 1981, in which doping in sport in general was brought into focus (IOC, 1982), the former secretary general of FIS, Sigge Berman (1961–79), writing in the Olympic Review, acknowledged that: “drug abuse is far from being as topical within the ski sport as in certain other sports”, although he did claim that “the skiing people at their coming congress in May 1983 are preparing to take decisions on all measures necessary to fight doping” (Bergman, 1982, p. 676).

For the two next decades FIS took some initiatives in the fight against doping. In 1988 the Congress approved testing for blood-doping at the Nordic world championships (IOC, 1988) and, from the 1996/97 season, the Council decided to introduce an upper limit on haemoglobin values (Ronsen & Rusko, 2003). Despite the introduction of these measures, few skiers were withdrawn from competitions and/or caught until the 2001 Nordic Ski World Championship in Lahti. The “Lahti scandal” and its aftermath revealed doping as widespread within cross-country skiing. This had been indicated strongly earlier by members of the FIS Medical Committee who, the previous year, had stated in the Scandinavian Journal of Medicine & Science in Sport that “the use of artificial methods to increase Hb mass, and probably also plasma volume, [were] continuing” (Videman et al., 2000, p. 101). In the eyes of some critics of FIS, the scandal also revealed the lack of credibility of FIS in the fight against doping. After the Lahti scandal, three members of the Medical Committee of the FIS co-authored a paper in the Clinical Journal of Sport Medicine, in which they claimed that there was a great temptation for athletes to dope because of “international sport organizations’ ineptitude or unwillingness to deal with this” (Stray-Gundersen, Videman, Pentilla, & Lereim, 2003, p. 133); by writing about cross-country skiing they were clearly implicating FIS in this criticism. Their study showed that 50% of the medal winners in Lahti had highly abnormal haematological profiles, which suggested that doping was widespread in cross-country skiing (Stray-Gundersen et al., 2003). The lack of commitment to deal with doping on the part of those involved in cross-country skiing at that time has been brought into sharp focus recently by the admission of the then race director for cross-country skiing, Bengt Erik Bengtsson, that he had been part of a cover-up of a possible doping case one month prior to the Lahti Championship in 2001. Bengtsson allowed a Finnish skier who had an abnormally high haemoglobin level to participate in the championship in order to avoid bad publicity just prior to the championships. Bengtsson revealed that he had conducted a deal with the skier and her coach which allowed her to start on condition that she did not finish the race (Kristofferson, 2008).

The “Lahti scandal” highlighted the doping problem in cross-country skiing and triggered a chain of processes which eventually gave rise to a more proactive anti-doping policy within FIS. In order to understand these
developments, it is useful to consider Elias’s game models and the wider approach—figurational sociology—of which it is a part.

Figurations, Game Models and Organizational Change

An analysis of complex processes of change, both at intra- and at inter-organizational levels, requires an appreciation of the networks within and beyond particular organizations. It also requires an appreciation of the ways in which power (both the sources of power and unstable power-balances), the development of knowledge (and especially ideologies), group struggles and integration, conflict and co-operation are all aspects of these networks or figurations. Figurational sociology offers an approach that focuses upon such processes (Newton, 2001). During the last decade scholars within organizational studies have paid increasing attention to the work of Elias. Two examples of this are to be found in the special issue of the journal Organization (2001) and the book The civilized organization (van IJrerson, Mastenbroek, Newton, & Smith, 2002). However, as Dopson states, even though there is a growing theoretical literature that considers both the merits and the limitations of an Eliasian approach to policy and organizations, “there is relatively little empirical study that seeks to use the work of Elias in the analysis of current field research data” (Dopson, 2001, p. 516). This paper is intended as a contribution to remedying the shortage of such empirical data.

Dopson argues that, in general, writers in management studies and organizational analysis are not good at thinking about movements in processual terms (Dopson, 2005); in other words, they tend to view organizations statically rather than as the constantly developing and inevitably fluid processes which they inevitably are. Dopson and others suggest that Elias’ game models are useful theoretical tools with which to overcome such tendencies when studying organizations. Dopson (2001, 2005) and Dopson and Waddington (1996) have used game models in order to analyse aspects of organizational change, while other scholars have used the concept in different areas; for example, the planning of the Olympic Games (Lesjø, 1998, 2000), changes in sports rules (Kew, 1990), the development of boxing (Murphy & Sheard, 2006), hooligan behaviour (Williams, Dunning, & Murphy, 1984), sport policy (Hanstad & Skille, 2008) and gender (Treibel, 2001).

Figurationalists reject the possibility that some people or groups of people are omnipotent and others completely powerless; all parties to a relationship—even the weakest—are never wholly powerless. Elias described it like this: “Power is not an amulet possessed by one person and not by another; it is a structural characteristic of human relationship—of all human relationships” (Elias, 1978, p. 74). In this regard, game models were developed in order to achieve a better representation and, thus, understanding of power balances. Elias used the concept of game models in order to demonstrate the relational character of power in simplified form (Elias, 1978, pp. 71–103). With the exception of “primal contests”, most games are
played according to rules. The simplest model comprises two players, in which one player is relatively strong and the other relatively weak. In this situation the stronger player is more or less able to control the game. However, even the weaker player has some degree of control for, in planning his or her own moves, the stronger player has to take the weaker player’s moves into account (Elias, 1978). In other words, in any game, the participants always have, although to considerably varying degrees, some control over each other. In a very simple game of this kind, it is possible to understand the course of the game largely in terms of the goals and plans of the stronger player (Dopson, 2001).

Elias considers a variety of game models from, in increasing order of complexity, multi-person games at one level (e.g. in which one player plays simultaneously against several others, either individually or as a group, or in which two sides each containing several players compete against each other) through to multi-person, multi-level games. In the latter group of game models, the number of players increases and the structure of the game becomes more complex. In particular, in multi-level games, not all the players play directly with each other and moves may be made by specialized functionaries such as leaders, delegates, representatives, committees and governments on an upper tier. In addition there may be more than two sides—indeed there may be many sides—involving in these games. Part of the increased complexity of the game relates to the fact that there are now several different balances of power which have to be taken into account: among the top-tier players; between the top and lower-tier players, and among lower-tier players. The balance of power between the upper-tier and lower-tier players may be relatively unequal, in which case there is a relatively oligarchic game structure, or it may be relatively equal, in which case the game is relatively democratic.

It is these more complex game models which are most useful for shedding light on complex processes in modern societies, such as the processes involved in, for example, planning and implementing sport policy strategies. Elias regards the game models as simplified didactic models, which help us to understand these complex processes more analytically. Game models are also useful to demonstrate that the outcomes of the complex interweaving of the actions of many different players in the game almost certainly will include outcomes which no single player or group of players intended (Elias, 1978) although, as Newton (2001) has noted, Elias did not dismiss the possibility of strategically planned change.

Methods

The key sources of information for this paper were in-depth interviews, document analysis and analysis of media text. Interviews were undertaken with eight key actors in anti-doping work within cross-country skiing at international level from the 1980s until today. The sample included former and current members of the FIS Council, former and current members of the two most relevant FIS Committees (the Cross-country Committee and the
Medical Committee), employees of FIS and WADA. Four European nationalities were represented in the selection. All interviewees were given a guarantee of anonymity. Given the fact that six of the eight were still in their positions, anonymity was guaranteed in order to encourage the participants to speak more freely.

Interviews were carried out between June 2006 and March 2008. Interviews lasted between forty-five and ninety minutes and were tape-recorded. The informants were given the opportunity to read through a transcript of the interview in order to avoid potential misrepresentation. With one informant two interviews were carried out, because new information came to light which necessitated a follow-up interview.

The systematic review of documents included articles in scientific journals, documents relating to trials of sanctioned athletes in the FIS, IOC and Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and minutes and other documents of the FIS before and after the “Lahti scandal”. This textual material provided an invaluable context for framing questions in the interviews and for clarifying crucial points in the process (Silverman, 2001).

The final source of information was media coverage, which was extensive during and after the doping scandal. In order to obtain a systematic selection of this, a database called Retriever was used, which contains all the major national and regional newspapers in Norway. The same database was also used to find historical articles. One Norwegian newspaper, Aftenposten, has electronic articles dating back to 1982. A Google search was conducted to find sources from other nations and languages.

The Findings: The Change Process and its Outcomes

This section utilizes the data in order to analyse how the power-balance changed between different groups within FIS, resulting in the adoption of more vigorous anti-doping policies. In seeking to understand this process it is useful to draw upon Elias’s game models introduced earlier. This will be performed by dividing the process into two phases. First, anti-doping activity in FIS prior to the 2001 scandal is analysed, with a focus on the balance of power between different groups within the Council. The data are then used in order to examine how the game changed. The doping scandal triggered a process in which some groups within FIS increasingly lost their power and ability to control the game, while others gained power and new players entered the game.

Phase 1: FIS Anti-Doping Work Prior to the Scandal

Understanding the composition of the Council, the supreme authority of the FIS between the congresses (FIS, 1996), is crucial to understanding why FIS was relatively passive on anti-doping questions, even though there were strong indications of drug use among cross-country skiers (Videman et al., 2000). Cross-country skiing is just one of six Olympic disciplines within the FIS, and it is strongest in Scandinavia. Council members from Central
Europe and other continents tend to be much more involved in alpine skiing and/or ski jumping. While drug use was common in cross-country skiing there was much less evidence of the use of performance-enhancing drugs in other ski disciplines. It is possible that representatives of these other disciplines may not have known about, or been concerned about, doping in cross-country skiing as long as the status of their own discipline was not affected adversely.

The composition of the FIS Council in terms of nationality may also provide part of the explanation for the Council’s relatively passive position. The doping rules within the FIS in the 1980s were based on proposals from the ski associations in Finland, East Germany and the Soviet Union (Bergman, 1982). This suggests that Council members from these nations had central positions and were able, to a significant degree, to control the anti-doping issue within the Council. We now know that all Olympic sports in East Germany were part of a state-organized doping programme (Ungerleider, 2001; Spitzer, 2006), while Houlihan (2002, p. 149) has noted that in the Soviet Union up to the late 1980s, as in East Germany, “the government actively colluded in the systematic doping of its international athletes”. A TV report in 1989 revealed a document from 1982, signed by two deputy sports ministers, prescribing anabolic steroids for Soviet cross-country skiers (Sovetsky sport, 1989: cited in Riordan, 1993).

During the period 1997–2003, five female athletes in the Russian national team in cross-country skiing were sanctioned for doping offences. The FIS statistics (2007b) also show that several athletes from the former Soviet Union have been sanctioned by FIS. The history of doping in Finnish cross-country skiing includes, in addition to the Lahti case, a doping violation during the 2003 World Championship. The head coach of the Finnish cross-country ski team has also admitted doping collaboration with Russia during the 1990s (Skjærrli, 2008). This suggests that there may have been an institutionalized tolerance of doping in some of the most important national associations represented in the Council at that time, not dissimilar to the tolerance of doping in professional cycling (Waddington, 2000).

On the other hand, some countries were more active in anti-doping work, with the Scandinavian countries, Belgium and France being active in the 1980s (Houlihan, 2002). The Scandinavian countries were involved in cross-country skiing, and by the 1980s there was growing concern among some athletes and coaches about drug use in skiing. For example, during the 1984 winter Olympics in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia, the Norwegian cross-country head coach accused Finnish cross-country skiers publicly of blood doping (Stenberg, 1984). An incident during the 1987 World Championship in Oberstdorf, West Germany, brought the issue to the fore. An American athlete in the Nordic combined discipline (cross-country plus ski jumping) was, under supervision from his coach and doctor, given an illegal transfusion to increase his red blood cell count (Hoberman, 2005). Because there was no test for blood transfusions in sport generally around that time, this was not disclosed during a doping control but was revealed as a consequence of an internal investigation by the United States Ski...
Association several months later, in which the athlete admitted he had used blood doping to prepare for the event (Voy, 1991). Following this incident, the 1988 FIS Congress with an “overwhelming majority approved the carrying out of blood doping tests at the Nordic world championships” (IOC, 1988, p. 384).

Although the doping case in 1987 was an “eye-opener”, in the sense that it attracted attention among the Council members for some months, it did not lead to a real change to increase the involvement in anti-doping. FIS did not initiate more testing and spent hardly any money on anti-doping; but this lax attitude was challenged during the 1990s because of further revelations about doping. In 1996 a former skier at the Italian national cross-country team admitted to the newspaper La Repubblica that he had been blood-doped before and during the 1988 Calgary Olympic Winter Games (Chiusano, 1996). He claimed that his contract with the Italian Ski Association had been terminated later because he refused to use EPO (Madsen, 1996). In 1999 detailed information about EPO use among athletes, including several world-class cross-country skiers, was leaked to the media after Italian police searched the home and office belonging to Francesco Conconi (Capodacqua, 1999), who has been described by Hoberman (2005, p. 237) as the “notorious sports physician” of the University of Ferrari. No athletes were sanctioned for incidents in the past but it strengthened the impression, which the data collected from cross-country skiers (Videman et al., 2000) had indicated, that doping was widespread. In some nations, such as Norway, athletes (Dybendahl Hartz, 1996; Sæther & Odin, 1996) and team doctors (Endsjø, 1996) applied pressure to FIS to improve anti-doping activity.

Within this context, the FIS President was a key player. Until 1998, Marc Hodler was President. He had been elected in 1951 (FIS, 2007c) and had a very strong position within the FIS and, significantly, some of those interviewed for this study suggested that he could have taken a more active role, but chose not to. One interviewee said:

He was a very sensible and competent person. My experience was that he observed most of what happened. I don’t believe that he didn’t know about doping within cross-country skiing. But he was not willing to be a pioneer in this case. Even if he was good in many areas, we thought he was passive here. But after a while he followed. That was the case, he and others came running after us, but they didn’t walk ahead and open doors.

It is worth noting that, in other situations, Hodler was seen as a fearless and outspoken sport executive. It was his statements to the media about bribery within the IOC in relation to the bidding process for the 2002 Winter Olympics at Salt Lake City which initiated the comprehensive reform process within the IOC and, according to Jennings and Sambrool (2000), he became a sort of “Olympic policeman-cum-regulator”. Among other things, Hodler had told the New York Times that IOC members had tried to push the allegations of bribery under the carpet and to put all the
blame on representatives of Salt Lake City (Clarey, 1998). It seems, however, that he was not willing to act as a “policeman” within FIS.

The contrast between Hodler’s behaviour in these two situations is quite striking but not, perhaps, surprising. Although Hodler was a senior member of the IOC, he had no special responsibility for the finances of the organization; revealing evidence of financial corruption did not therefore implicate him personally in any wrongdoing and, indeed, it was likely that it would earn him a reputation as a campaigner for honesty and integrity within sport, as proved to be the case. However, Hodler’s position within FIS was quite different. He had been President since 1951 and, more than any other single person, had shaped FIS development and policy over the previous four decades; if drug use in skiing had increased, as it certainly had, and if a culture involving the tolerance of drug use had grown up, as appears to have been the case, then these developments had taken place under his presidency. To have opened up a wide-ranging debate about doping in cross-country skiing would not only have been likely to bring a good deal of bad publicity to FIS, but it would almost certainly have implicated Hodler himself, either directly or indirectly, in the previous policy failures of FIS. Given this situation, it is perhaps not surprising that Hodler chose not to make doping a high-profile issue within FIS.

However, Hodler was involved when the FIS congress decided, in 1988, to carry out blood tests during the world championships (IOC, 1988). He also supported the proposal from the FIS Medical Committee to introduce an upper limit on haemoglobin values in the 1996/97 season. Athletes with levels above 185 g/l (men) and 165 g/l (women) were not allowed to take part in the competition (Ronsen & Rusko, 2003). This was not dealt with primarily as a doping issue but a health issue, as in professional cycling (Waddington, 2000), a fact which was emphasized by Hodler’s testimony during the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics when he told the Panel of the Court of Arbitration that the haemoglobin tests were a “pure security test” (Reeb, 2001).

As indicated previously, the haemoglobin levels indicated the probable use of doping (Videman et al., 2000). The FIS Council could and, according to FIS regulations, should have been informed of this by the Chairman of the Medical Committee, but was not. The Chairman was from Austria, a nation several of whose cross-country skiers have been involved in doping. After the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, two Austrian athletes were sanctioned for blood treatments (Leigh-Smith, 2004). The head coach, who was banned by IOC, had been the leading figure in Austrian cross-country for ten years, a decade with huge improvement, which he explained in terms of systematic training (Kirkebøen, 1999). Although there is nothing to suggest that the Chairman of the Medical Committee was part of this doping culture, it is clear from the interviews in this study that he was not engaged actively in anti-doping. A person with a leading position in another committee spoke about his uncertainty in relation to the Chairman of the Medical Committee:
I often talked to the chairman of the Medical Committee with suggestions about possible actions to make the doping controls more effective. It was like talking to a wall. He was gentle and friendly and should consider improvements. But almost nothing was done.

Another interviewee in this study indicated that some members of the Council suspected that it was a “set-up”, in which the Chairman of the Medical Committee did not report findings to the FIS Council even though it was his task. It is evident that many of the members of the FIS Council did not know for many years about the dramatic increase in haemoglobin levels among cross-country skiers.

In addition to this, there was an incident during the 1999 Nordic Ski World Championship in Ramsau, Austria, a championship in which skiers from the host nation were very successful. After the opening day the Chairman of the FIS Medical Committee failed to carry out blood tests in compliance with the FIS rules. During an intense discussion the Chairman of the Cross-country Committee threatened to withdraw from his position if no tests were carried out (Odiin, 1999).

It is apparent that the Medical Committee did not think or operate as a single, coherent unit in relation to doping. Nevertheless, some members pushed for a more active anti-doping policy. As indicated previously, those who wanted FIS to take a more active role did not find a receptive audience within the FIS Council during the 1980s and early 1990s, when they reported the increased haemoglobin levels among skiers; but the Council did agree to set an upper limit on haemoglobin levels in 1997. This was implemented in collaboration with the Chairman of the Cross-country Committee (Hanstad, 1997).

To conclude, during the 1980s and 1990s, the FIS Council had a majority of members who were not involved in cross-country skiing and who had no real interest in taking action against doping. Some key players represented nations with a history of tolerance of doping and the President, for reasons which have been explained, was not keen to be a front-runner in the fight against doping. However, developments during the 1990s indicated that doping was widespread, and this made it increasingly difficult for the Council and the leadership of FIS to ignore doping. The 2001 World Championship was the confirmation that supporters of a more active approach to doping had been waiting for. In the next section the changes following the doping scandal are examined.

Phase 2: Organizational Consequences of the 2001 Crisis

In 1998—that is, three years before the Lahti scandal—FIS elected a new President, Gian Franco Kasper. Kasper was to play an important role in the response by FIS to the doping crisis in 2001 and it is therefore important to understand something of his background. Kasper had been a part of FIS since being recruited by Hodler in 1975. He became Secretary-General in 1978, a position he held for twenty years until he was elected as President in 1998 (FIS, 2008). As Secretary-General he had been, for two
decades, the most important person within FIS, after Hodler, who had recruited him, and throughout his period he had been no more active than had Hodler in the fight against doping. As a newly elected President he announced that he would provide the necessary resources for the fight against doping (Eriksen, 1998), and in 1999 he criticized the IOC for not doing enough and argued that the FIS should intensify anti-doping work (NTB-Reuters, 1999). However, there was little action. Under the presidency of Kasper, the anti-doping budget remained very low [200,000 Swiss Francs (CHF) for the financial year 2000-01] and the number of doping controls did not increase significantly. Not a single athlete was sanctioned for doping during Kasper’s first two years and he cannot be characterized as a front-runner in the fight against doping. However, as Houlihan (1997) has noted, scandals has been a common point of departure in anti-doping activities and it was the Lahti scandal which constrained Kasper to take a more active role.

The process that occurred within the FIS following the 2001 crisis involved many players (or groups of players) in a complex game at several levels. Of particular interest for this paper is the FIS Council, which did not appear as one unit prior to the 2001 scandal but was organized around several sub-groups. As we have seen, some argued for greater involvement in anti-doping work, some neglected the issue and some did not want FIS resources to be used on anti-doping at all. Following the Lahti crisis, the positions and strategies of some of the players in the anti-doping “game” changed. Some members of the FIS Council continued to maintain that doping was not a problem in cross-country skiing except in one country (Finland). These arguments, however, no longer held sway, among other reasons because at this time new players entered the game and those who wanted a greater commitment to anti-doping became more powerful.

Until the crisis, members of the FIS Council had been higher-tier players, but membership of a tier, as Elias has noted, is not permanent. Groups can be promoted or relegated to higher or lower tiers by other groups recombining to increase/decrease the power of themselves or other groups. This was what happened to the members of the Council. Following the public outcry at the “Lahti scandal”, the new President and Secretary General were increasingly constrained to respond to demands for the development of a more vigorous anti-doping policy. However, the nature of Kasper’s response was significant, for it took the form of a much more highly centralized control of anti-doping policy in the hands of the new President and Secretary General. A member of the Council says:

They organized the work on their own and reorganized the anti-doping activity without any influence from others within the FIS. The Council or the Medical Committee was not even asked. I found this solution OK.

No one in the Council criticized the leadership. “We were just told that this was the way it was”, said one source. The FIS found itself in one of its most serious crises ever, but neither the Council nor the Executive Board was
were involved centrally in resolving the issue. There were no extraordinary Council meetings, not even during the World Championships in the middle of the crisis. One reason for this is that hardly any members of the Council were in Lahti during the championship. For most members, the alpine championship is seen as much more interesting. This suggests two things: (i) cross-country skiing has a relatively weak position within the FIS and (ii) the Council has a weak constitution, even though it, according to its 1996 Statutes (§26.1) makes all necessary decisions between the congresses (FIS, 1996). The Statutes also said that the Council “may delegate some of its duties to the President and/or to the Secretary-General (§27.3, p. 15). The Council delegated this duty tacitly to the President and the Secretary General. One interviewee, who has a central position within FIS, says about this:

You have to look at the culture within FIS. The Council is not strong and the President doesn’t even use the Executive committee. During the Marc Hodler presidency he had complete control […] This culture continued with Gian Franco Kasper, who had been a part of the system for decades. For him it was obvious to take control after the Lahti scandal, and the members of the Council felt the same.

As noted above, the decision of the new President, Kasper, to deal with the Lahti crisis in such a highly centralized manner and without reference to the Council was not without significance. While doping crises have often precipitated a period of reform, this has often taken place in rather different ways from that which took place in FIS; more particularly, major doping crises have often precipitated investigations which are open and public, such as the Dubin Commission in Canada following the positive drug test on Ben Johnson at the 1988 Olympic Games (Dubin, 1990), the investigation by the Australian Senate in 1989 following allegations of drug use at the Australian Institute of Sport (Australian Parliament, 1989) or the Lausanne World Conference on Doping in Sport (cf. Houlihan, 2002), convened by the IOC following the drugs scandal in the 1998 Tour de France. There was no such public or open discussion in FIS; indeed, the response was in the completely opposite direction, for Kasper effectively disenfranchised the FIS Council, centralizing the response to the crisis in his own hands and in those of his Secretary-General. How can we best understand this response?

As the interviewee above pointed out, Kasper “had been part of the system for decades”. He had been recruited by Hodler; he had been Hodler’s right-hand man for twenty years and, like Hodler, he was heavily implicated in the long-term failure to address the doping issue, for the increase in doping and in the tolerance of doping had taken place during the period when he and Hodler held the two most powerful offices within FIS. Clearly, Kasper was constrained to do something in response to the crisis; inaction was no longer an option; but by centralizing decision making-powers unto himself and by effectively dispensing with the FIS Council, Kasper could present himself as a reforming leader while effectively avoiding any wider or public debate and thus stifling any
potential criticism about the policy failure during his twenty years as Secretary-General and his three previous years as President. A crisis can provide strong legitimation for centralization, the conventional argument being that a crisis requires speedy action, thereby justifying the bypassing of more conventional, and perhaps slower, decision-making processes. As we have seen from the interview data, members of the FIS Council were quite prepared, within this crisis situation, to delegate their authority to the President, thus ensuring that as few people as possible were involved in the review of policy and that Kasper’s previous years in office as Secretary-General did not become the subject of critical inquiry.

It was in this context that Kasper was able to establish his credentials as an anti-doping campaigner. Thus, after one of the Finnish cross-country skiers had failed a doping test, he told WADA, according to a WADA source in this study, to “take all necessary steps” to find out what was going on.

There may have been some resistance among Council members to a more proactive anti-doping stand, but it had become much more difficult to resist action in light of the “Lahti scandal”. The power balance within the Council changed when the President was constrained by the scandal to throw his weight behind those within the FIS who were demanding a more active anti-doping policy, thus effectively shifting the balance of power within the FIS.

It may also have been the case that, when the extent of doping in cross-country skiing created a major scandal, and perhaps had a “knock-on” effect which threatened the status of skiing in general, Council members involved in other disciplines became much more concerned. Of particular significance may be the fact that, while cross-country skiing had never attracted major commercial sponsors, other disciplines, such as alpine and ski jumping, had concluded lucrative commercial agreements and it may have been that representatives of these disciplines were suddenly concerned that a doping scandal in another discipline may have placed their own lucrative contracts in jeopardy.

It took more than two months before the Council met, in Antwerp, Belgium, for the first time after the scandal. The Council agreed to endorse fully the view of the President. The minutes of the meeting stated that this affair “must serve as a catalyst to accelerate the fight against doping and all efforts must be made to uncover the depth of the problem” (FIS, 2001, p. 1).

To sum up: those within the Council who were opposed to a more vigorous anti-doping policy had been more or less able to control the game until 2001 because of what seems to have been the indirect support of the President. After the “Lahti scandal”, a weak Council and the FIS Statutes allowed the President and the Secretary General to centralize power within FIS and to initiate reforms, but their power was not unlimited. As we noted, continued inaction in the light of the “Lahti crisis” was not an option. Advocates of a more active anti-doping work among the national federations were in a position to engage in a struggle with the leadership if nothing had been done, not least because of the growing influence of an organization which had newly arrived as a second higher-tier player just after, or in the middle of, the crisis: WADA.
WADA’s Role

WADA was a new and powerful international body responsible for anti-doping. It was in several ways a quite different actor from the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which had until 1998 been the leading organization in the fight against doping, as Hoberman has noted, “an effective international anti-doping campaign was never a major priority of the IOC before the 1998 Tour de France scandal” (Hoberman, 2001, p. 242).11

WADA was established in November 1999 to operate as an independent anti-doping body. It was operational with effect from the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney, just six months prior to the “Lahti scandal”. WADA was perceived as an organization with wide-ranging and legitimate authority to lead the fight against doping. According to the Lausanne Declaration (IOC, 1999), WADA had as its mandate to co-ordinate the various anti-doping programmes, including out-of-competition testing. The declaration also stated that the IOC, the international federations and the national Olympic Committees should “maintain their respective competence and responsibility to apply doping rules in accordance with the International Anti-Doping Agency. Consequently, decisions handed down in the first instance [should] be under the exclusive responsibility of the IFs, the NOCs or, during the Olympic Games, the IOC” (IOC, 1999, §5).

When WADA decided to involve itself in the doping issue in cross-country skiing, it affected the power balance significantly within the FIS. More particularly, the involvement of the body with global responsibility for anti-doping policy effectively made it all but impossible for those members of the Council who had opposed a more active anti-doping policy to continue with their opposition. At the first Council meeting after the scandal in Antwerp, not a single member objected to co-operation with WADA. Instead it was stated that “we welcome the developments with WADA, as an independent body, to supervise and eventually take over the organization of anti-doping controls” (FIS, 2001, p. 14.7).

In reality, FIS had no other choice than to welcome the new actor. While some other international federations such as football (FIFA) and cycling (UCI) put up fierce resistance to WADA’s involvement in their sports, they were in a very different position from cross-country skiing. FIFA and the UCI both controlled highly professionalized and highly commercialized sports, and this provided them with their own power-base to resist the incursion of WADA, but cross-country skiing was much less highly professionalized and much less highly commercialized. As a result of the events at Lahti, FIS had finally, in contrast to FIFA and the UCI, accepted that there was a serious doping problem in cross-country skiing. As a consequence, FIS embraced the involvement of WADA with its specialist knowledge and, crucially, its willingness to assist FIS.

Both for the FIS and the WADA it was important to demonstrate WADA’s involvement to clean up the sport. WADA was a new body which
used the scandal both to show its capacity and to gain publicity. FIS, on the other hand, needed greater legitimacy and a tool to improve its efficiency. The doping crisis thus provided each organization with a much-needed opportunity to boost its own legitimacy and credibility, but this could be achieved only if both organizations worked together; in effect, they needed each other. One interviewee, an executive within the WADA system, commented:

My experience was that there was a hundred percent cooperation to clean up within the FIS system. I do not know the federation very well but during this process it seemed to me that Kasper had a strong position. It is obvious that he and the Secretary General receive much more information than members of the Council. This was also the case on the doping situation just after the millennium.

During the championship in Lahti some discussions had taken place between the WADA and the FIS management (the President and the Secretary General) about doping controls, but they also began to discuss how to organize anti-doping work for the future (Thoresen, 2001). FIS needed to organize its work in a more independent manner and took, in co-operation with WADA, some initiatives to appoint an external expert on anti-doping, and also engaged an independent agency to carry out doping controls and start a process to improve the effectiveness of controls. At the meeting in Antwerp, led by the President, the Council took a formal decision that people associated with team or national ski associations should not be involved with anti-doping controls (FIS, 2001, p. 14.7). It also decided later that FIS had to fund the necessary expenditure to clean up cross-country skiing. The budget for anti-doping work increased fivefold from 200,000 CHF for the financial year 2000–01 to 1 million CHF for 2002–03. In the following years it has continued to increase. 12

Despite the significance of WADA’s intervention in the game, WADA was by no means an all-powerful partner in this relationship. In some respects FIS was the proactive partner; for example, immediately after Lahti FIS initiated a meeting with all the international federations who were conducting blood testing. A FIS source says: “There was clearly a need to have development in this area. WADA co-ordinated those meetings and that was a big step to do so.”

Conclusions

This case study of the “Lahti scandal” illustrates the potential of major scandals as catalysts for change. The FIS Council seemed to be a strong actor within the FIS but after the doping scandal in Lahti the Council’s power disintegrated. Under the constraint of a public scandal, some actors—most notably the FIS President—changed their position, which altered the power balance significantly between those who wanted, and those who had resisted, a more active anti-doping policy. In addition a new, particularly powerful actor (WADA) entered the scene. WADA
entered the game as the external power which this issue had lacked before the scandal, because at that time organizations at both national and international levels were not interested in being involved, let alone pushing FIS in a more proactive direction regarding anti-doping.

Those on the FIS Council who had resisted a more pro-active anti-doping policy found their position of relative power was undermined when events “took on a life on their own” and the WADA intervened. In some respects, the situation within cross-country skiing was similar to that in professional cycling (Waddington, 2000). Doping was widespread, and presumably many people within the skiing “family” knew about it but either condoned it or ignored it. The lax controls meant that there were few positive tests, so the widespread practice of doping could be kept as a “family secret”. This cozy arrangement was broken up by the “Lahti scandal”—just as the Festina scandal in the 1998 Tour de France broke up the cozy arrangement in cycling—and this triggered a series of events which—as is common with multi-player games—the “old guard” within FIS was entirely unable to control.

In this paper the immediate change process following Lahti has been analysed, but the change within FIS did not end here. It went into a new phase as FIS sought to improve its efficiency and legitimacy in the fight against doping. This has involved continuing close co-operation between FIS and WADA. The Ski Federation has since drawn upon WADA’s experiences in several ways; for example, during the World Championship in 2003, when an independent observer team from WADA monitored anti-doping activities (WADA, 2003). FIS also appointed a new Chairman of the Medical Committee. The close collaboration between WADA and FIS was underlined by the fact that the FIS President, Kasper, was elected (by the sport movement) to the WADA Executive Committee in 2003, and in 2008 the Secretary General of FIS, Sarah Lewis, was appointed as Chair of WADA’s independent observer team during the Beijing Olympics (WADA, 2008).

The impact of these new anti-doping programmes on drug use in cross-country skiing is not altogether clear. One recent study, based on an analysis of 7,081 blood samples from 1,074 elite cross-country skiers over the period from 2001 to 2007, found a reduction of haemoglobin levels in 2001–02 from the very high levels recorded in the late 1990s, declining to near-normal population mean values in 2002–03 and 2003–04. Since then there has been an increase in haemoglobin levels, with other changes in blood profiles suggesting that skiers may have changed the manipulations used to elevate haemoglobin levels (Morkeberg, Saltin, Belhage, & Damsgaard, 2008). However, the collaboration between WADA and FIS since 2001 will be the subject of another paper.

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issue of the ESMQ and Professor Ken Green for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Notes

1. The FIS Statutes were last edited in 2006. For the purposes of this paper it is more relevant to refer to the 1996 edition in which the FIS Statutes were in operation during the study period.

2. The FIS decision at the 1983 Congress was: to adapt the FIS doping rules to those of the IOC and other international sports federations (i); to considerably increase the number of unexpected controls at international competitions and during training periods (ii); and to put the necessary funds at the disposal of the FIS Medical Committee for the carrying-out of additional doping tests (iii) (Bergman, 1983, p. 415).

3. Magnar Lundemo, the head coach of the Norwegian cross-country team, told Norwegian journalists that the Finns were involved with blood doping. The claims were treated negatively by the press.

4. According to Videman et al. (2000) the mean values at the 1989 World Championships were 148 g/l for men and 135 g/l for women (reference 156 g/l and 144 g/l). The highest individual values were measured in 1996 (195 g/l for men and 197 g/l for women).

5. The levels are now 170 g/dl for men and 160 g/dl for women.

6. Doping in the Austrian cross-country team was revealed when a homeowner was cleaning the house that had been rented by the team during the Games. She pricked her finger on a needle protruding from a plastic rubbish bag. When she investigated further she found blood bags, tubing with blood residue and vials of vitamins and glucose. Also in the bag was a blood-stained medal certificate (McGrath, 2003).

7. The Austrian cross-country team was also in trouble during the 2006 Torino winter games. Three athletes were sanctioned for violations against the anti-doping rules.

8. Even though the culture continued with a strong President after Kasper succeeded Hodler, there were changes. Kasper was a modern hands-on President working full-time in a professional capacity and installed systems in a number of areas of the administration, such as Finance Director and the accounting system at the FIS Office.


10. The 2001 Alpine Ski World Championship was organized in St Anton, Austria, from 28 January. The closing ceremony was 10 February, five days prior to the opening of the Nordic World Ski Championship.

11. The consequences were that FIS was able to get away with its lax attitude to drugs largely because they enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from outside bodies at this time. FIS was not part of an international collaboration and there were no regulations that committed the parties. The Olympic movement anti-doping code (IOC, 1999), approved during the First World Congress on Doping in Sport in Lausanne in 1999, was a first step but there were no sanctions for non-compliance with the Code. Sanctions came with the WADA Code in 2003.

12. One financial period for the FIS is two years. For 2004–05 the FIS budget on anti-doping was 1,570,000 million CHF (account 1,394,012 million) and for 2006–07 it was 1,695,830 CHF. These figures do not include related costs, such as personnel costs of FIS and costs for legal representatives. (Erb, FIS, Email, 28 November 2007).
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Paper III
Politicians, bureaucrats and a voluntary sports organization – the power play of Norwegian sport policy in the matter of anti-doping

Dag Vidar Hanstad and Eivind Åsrum Skille

The aim of this essay is to understand the tripartite relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the public sector and the leadership in voluntary sport organizations. In so doing, we conducted a case study of a specific incident in the history of sport policy, based on written texts (newspaper articles and books) as well as interviews (personal information) from those involved. With Elias’s game models as the theoretical framework, we analyse the case where the General Director of the Department of Sport Policy (DSP) expressed his personal/political opinion about anti-doping in public, and played the game in two figurations. First, the game was played in the sport figuration, where the General Director’s competitors were the leaders of the voluntary sport organization (the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports, NOC). Second, the game moved up a level and was played in a political figuration, where the General Director’s competitors were the political leadership in the DSP. While the Director General was used to playing one to one, the combination of a union sport figuration and the formal power in the political figuration led to an outcome that no one had intended, namely the resignation of the Director General.

Introduction

The constitutions of western countries are based on democracy and a parliamentary system where elected politicians are superior to bureaucrats in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, much of the power is often allocated inside specific departments. Even in the Scandinavian countries, which are historically dominated by social democratic and egalitarian ideology, the political systems are elitist; the key roles in the decision-making process are played by a limited number of agents. According to Hill’s typologies of Governmental styles, the ‘administrative politics’ model describes a system in which full-time officials are dominant, and where politics are organizational rather than public, and where ministers find themselves involved primarily in expounding views and defending policies generated within their ministry and underlying departments.

Regarding policy making, it has to be taken into consideration that permanent officials are involved in the process. Especially in sectors where expertise is important, issues are pulled out of the general political arena into the more private politics of ‘policy communities’. Since Weber, social scientists have been aware of the significance of the bureaucrats’ expertise and stability. While the political leadership is not necessarily trained or educated within all the topics of their departments, the bureaucrats are the experts. And while the political leaders come and go, the departmental bureaucrats represent continuity. Taken together, these facts open the road for the bureaucrats to develop and execute power on the basis of their knowledge of the field and knowledge of the game. In addition, ‘interest organizations and bureaucracies may have

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The general picture sketched above has its empirical counterpart in the history of Norwegian sport policy, for reasons which will be presented below. This is what Hill refers to as an ‘incrementalistic model’, where decision making is followed by successive limited comparison. While issues such as social security and education vary across political parties’ programmes, and are subject to heated debates at political arenas and in the media, sport politics generate little warmth in the political field or in the media. That fact reinforces the opportunity for the bureaucrats to develop and use power.

The overall aim of this essay is to increase the understanding of the tripartite relationship between political actors, bureaucratic actors and voluntary sport organizations. We will investigate one specific case from the recent history of the Norwegian field of sport policy. It is the story of a state bureaucrat who made his personal political opinion on anti-doping public through the media, and who had to resign as a result. While the case is about sport policy-making processes, and not about anti-doping as such, it is believed that the findings are relevant in a more general sport policy context. But it is also believed that the rather dramatic outcome of the case can be explained – among other reasons presented in more depth below – by the fact that anti-doping is a more heated topic than many other sport policy themes.

Case study research
This essay is based on a single case study. In line with the above-mentioned aim of the essay, the rationale for a single case study and for selecting this particular case was that the approach and the case gave the opportunity to increase knowledge of how the relationship – including the power ratio – between politicians and bureaucrats works, and is influenced by a voluntary sports organization as well as the media.

The case study and the analysis are based on several sources of information. These are first and foremost the newspaper articles covering the incident at the time, and other written material which has been published subsequently. In addition, all those involved (presented below) have been interviewed several times in the years after the case took place in connection with the publication of two books on Norwegian sport. The first author of this article was also the author of one of the books and a co-editor of the other and conducted the above-mentioned interviews.

Many points may be raised with regards to the content and quality of the data. Let us explore two of them. The fact that the incident took place several years ago may play in different directions. We will argue that the distance in time paralleled with the subsequently produced literature about the case will help us validate the data and the description as well as our interpretation of it. When one is unable to follow a process in real time, a viable strategy is to base one’s approach on the written material and to member-check our interpretation with the involved parties.

The other element we will mention is what is usually referred to as internal validity, namely that the empirical story we tell as well as the analysis we make do not have internal discrepancies. It is therefore important to bear in mind, especially in a political case where the participants of the game are still alive (which is good for member checking, though), that the participants may have different experiences of what really happened, and may still have interests in the field of sport policy. In that respect, we have to be aware that we may not get the full picture of all aspects of the case.

Context and case
The Norwegian political system is based on a democratically elected Parliament and a parliamentary system where the Government stems from a majority in the Parliament.
Each member of the Government is a minister for a ministry, and the post of Minister of Culture includes responsibility for sport policy. The Ministry of Culture was divided into four special departments (there are five today), where the Department of Sport Policy (DSP) conducts the state’s sport policy on a day-to-day basis, including the administration of the gambling revenues which makes up the economic basis for the state’s sport policy. The voluntary organization, the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NOC), although it is formally independent and non-governmental, works closely with the public authorities. Thus, the government has a significant influence on its work, not least on financing the administration of the NOC. The fact that the state and public authorities provide many of the facilities for sports, and subsidize the NOC’s organizational work, makes the NOC dependent on the DSP. By contrast, having a monopolist position as the only umbrella organization in the field of sport, the NOC has a direct and significant influence on the state’s sport policy.

The relationship between the state and the voluntary sport organization has a long history. Since 1863, two years after the establishment of the first nationwide sport federation, the sport organization has received subsidies from the state. With the establishment of the State’s Sport Office (the predecessor of the DSP) in 1946, the state’s sport policy was formally institutionalized. The first leader of the office, Rolf Hofmo, was also the vice-president of the confederation of sports, and a tradition of combining roles was established. There are several examples of people who have had central positions on several sides of the table in the field of sport; the two best known are the above-mentioned Hofmo, and the key figure of the case described in this article, Hans B. Skaset. The mixing of roles and changing of sides across the table between public and voluntary sectors has hitherto been (perceived as) unproblematic. It has been described as a family relation, while the sport policy debate takes place inside the family.

Against this background of institutional arrangements, strong leaders of sport policy on any side of the table have been able to have an influence on their special interests. In that respect, the history of Norwegian anti-doping policy and the name of Hans B. Skaset are closely connected.

Norwegian anti-doping policy and Hans B. Skaset

One specific topic of sport politics where there has been a close cooperation between the voluntary sport organization and the government, and where people have changed sides across the table but continued their work, is that of anti-doping. Since Skaset was first elected to the NOC’s board in 1969, anti-doping has been his field. The former track-and-field athlete had become aware of doping when he saw what the throwers achieved – and what they looked like – during the summer Olympics in Mexico (1968). He felt that something was wrong.

In 1971, the NOC decided to fight doping, and two years later Skaset became the head of an internal anti-doping committee. His experience from the organization of track and field – he was the president of the Norwegian Athletics Federation from 1976 to 1983 – gave Skaset the international platform for his later work on anti-doping. During the European Athletics Association (EAA) congress in 1977, Skaset raised the question of anti-doping. He pointed out the lack of a European policy for anti-doping, and received sufficient support for a resolution about the development of national controls. Later, at the 1983 congress, Skaset proposed that European records should not be registered if the winner had not tested negative. After some debate, his proposal received support from the majority of the congress delegates.
There was a marked change in the Norwegian state’s involvement in anti-doping work during the early 1990s, which was directly connected to the fact that one person changed his side of the table (from the voluntary to the public sector of sport policy). Skaset had been the president of the NOC from 1984 to 1990, prior to becoming the Director General of the DSP in 1991. The government supported the long-term goals and strategies of the NOC, based on the key aims: increased level of controls, continual control campaigns, networking both nationally and internationally, and research. In a few years, the government’s subsidies for anti-doping work were greatly increased. And, unlike most state subsidies which are given as general grants, the subsidies for anti-doping work were targeted for that purpose only.

During the 1990s, both the government and the NOC were active in international anti-doping work, sometimes on their own fronts, sometimes together. On the one hand, the Government raised the question of doping in the European Council. According to Verroken and Mottram, Norway was the first country to launch out-of-competition testing (in 1977), and Norway was among the first to fight for unannounced tests and supplying urine samples with blood samples. On the other hand, NOC raised the doping question with other National Olympic Committees, international specific sport federations and National Anti-Doping Organizations (NADOs). In addition, the NOC and the Government worked together in establishing bilateral agreements.

In 1994 the government and the NOC agreed to establish a working group on anti-doping, which was formalized in 1997. The mandate was to make a plan for practical anti-doping work, which was launched in 1999. During this period, Skaset held several key positions. He was the chair of the European Council’s Doping Convention 1990–94: he was a member of the coordinating group for anti-doping in ‘The Memorandum of Understanding’ between Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and Norway 1992–2000; and he chaired the Memorandum 1995–96. The group, named the International Anti-Doping Arrangement (IADA), was an alliance between governments and sport organizations in countries working for standardizing the demands for doping controls in sport.

Looking back at the Norwegian work on anti-doping, it is clear that Skaset played an important role. Rune Andersen, who is now the director for standards and harmonization in the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), worked closely with Skaset when both were in the NOC (Andersen was head of the department for ethics, sports medicine and anti-doping). He describes Skaset thus:

Even now, a long time after we finished our work, I see the value of much of his scepticism with regard to sport leaders’ willingness to do something – or rather – avoid doing something. Skaset felt that too many leaders protected their sports against doping scandals instead of challenging doping. This could be hard to detect, while they simultaneously spoke warmly about the importance of facing the challenge and cleaning up. Now, years later, much of Skaset’s scepticism has been proved right.

Skaset’s involvement contributed to an intentional anti-doping policy in Norway. He pointed out that elite sport was in an ethical twilight zone, and he had the impression that the NOC considered everything acceptable as long as it was not illegal. For example, Skaset did not like NOC’s acceptance of the use of altitude chambers and nutrition supplements. In the end, he challenged the twilight-zone culture, in what could be called the ‘Skaset case’.

The ‘Skaset case’

In the October 2000 issue of the journal ‘Sport Facilities’, Skaset published, in his regular column as General Director of the DSP, an article on his reflections after the summer Olympics in Sydney. The article was titled ‘Elite sport – a dilemma’, and comprised a massive critique of the leadership of the NOC and their handling of the two Norwegian doping cases during the
Olympics. Skaset rhetorically asked whether Norway came out of the Olympics with strengthened identity and self esteem, or whether the position alongside Bulgaria and Romania in ‘The Hall of Shame’ was an ambivalent contribution to the Norwegians’ understanding of themselves as ethically upright people.

When eagerness and incompetence places the country [Norway] in a company which we for 25 years have tried to stay far out of, the time is ready for stating some clear demands: the difference between what is said and what is done cannot be tolerated at this point! If the [sport leaders] do not understand what this means, the state should at least stop its involvement [into sport].

The national newspaper Aftenposten interviewed Skaset and published his views on Friday 28 October 2000. Skaset’s journal article had by then been publicly available for about two weeks. Skaset repeated – in the newspaper – that he could not see any other solution than holding back state subsidies to elite sport if the leadership of the NOC did not take an explicit stand against doping – including its own cases. According to Skaset, this was the only way for the Norwegian state not to be associated with sport’s ethical twilight zones. As long as the NOC leaders protected their own athletes who tested positive in Sydney, Skaset saw it as an indirect acceptance of experiments in the ethical twilight zone. He saw it as analogous to the debate on the case of nutrition supplements during the Atlanta Olympics (1996), and the (Norwegian) debate about the use of altitude chambers. As long as Norway accepted such artificial achievement-enhancing means, it contributed, according to Skaset, to a negative impression of Norway as doping fighters. He emphasized, however, that this was his personal opinion.

The same day (Friday 28 October 2000), Aftenposten also published the response from the NOC president Kjell O. Kran: ‘If it is the official view of the Ministry that Norwegian elite sport exists in a twilight zone between honesty and cheating, I cannot be the highest leader of Norwegian sport’. The NOC president indicated that he would step down if the relationship to the state did not improve after Skaset’s statements. ‘I do not run away from the responsibility which I have taken, but I cannot live with the kind of co-operation which Skaset sketches’.

When the Minister of Culture, Ellen Horn, woke up that morning (Friday 28 October 2000), she was informed – via the media – of Skaset’s threat about stopping state subsidies to elite sport, as well as Kran’s threat about stepping down from his NOC presidency. Later that Friday, Ellen Horn responded in a press note, where she supported Kran, and criticized Skaset. Skaset saw no other option than to leave his position as the Director General; and on Monday morning (31 October 2000), he handed in his resignation.

The Skaset case can be considered as a game played by the bureaucrat (and former NOC president) Hans B. Skaset, the leadership in the voluntary organization NOC, and the political leadership of the Ministry of Culture. In that respect, we will treat the case as a game, and conduct a sociological analysis of it by the application of Elias’ figurational sociology and game models.

**Figurations and game models**

Elias developed figurational sociology with the intention of solving the difficulties associated with traditional sociological theories. He was especially critical of what he regarded as a misleading dichotomy such as, for example, individual–society, and the tendency towards what he called ‘process-reductionism’: that is, when phenomena which are experienced and observed as being dynamic and mutually dependent, are presented in static categories. With regard to the Skaset case, Elias’ theory is apt because we will analyse a process of a power game between identifiable persons, as well as including in the analysis ‘invisible’ power sources such as the media.
Elias considered that social life should be interpreted on the basis of changing relations. Consequently, he held that power should not be conceptualized as something which certain individuals, groups or institutions possess, but ‘simply to use the word “power” is likely to mislead’. Rather, power is constantly fluctuating along the relationships between individuals and social units.

We say that a person possesses great power as if power were a thing he carried about in his pocket. This use of the word is a relic of magi-mythical ideas. Power is not an amulet that is possessed by one person and not by another; it is a structural characteristic of human relationships – of all human relationships.

Elias’s approach recognizes that human action is intentional and directed towards achieving certain goals, and that, in an individualized society such as contemporary Norway, all have their own pattern of intentions and preferences. At the same time, Elias emphasizes that the outcomes of social processes cannot be explained simply in terms of the intentions of individuals. Outcomes which no-one had intended, denominated by Elias ‘blind social processes’, should rather be recognized as a normal result of complex processes involving the interweaving of a large number of actors.

To better understand the complex interweaving of the actions of large numbers of people, and of planned and unplanned processes, Elias developed the concept of game models. As Dopson and Waddington noted:

the game models are useful precisely because they demonstrate that the outcomes of the complex interweaving of the actions of different players in the game, even where these actions are more or less consciously directed towards the attainment of certain goals, may include – in the case of complex games almost certainly will include – outcomes which no single player or group of players intended.

The simplest model comprises two players, and applies in virtually all aspects of social life. Regarding power in such games, a point is that, even though one player is assumed to be weak, s/he always has some power that the stronger player must pay consideration to. In other words, with regards to power in game models, it is more about a dynamic power ratio than an absolute condition. Normally, there are several players in the game. This can occur as a single-level game where one player plays against several others either individually or as a group, or a group plays against other groups, or as a two- or multi-level game. This last implies that several of the players do not play directly against each other, and the game is, in fact, quite difficult to follow. However, like Elias, we regard the game models as simplified didactic models, which will help us follow the complex process described above more analytically. In what follows, we will first identify the figurations in which Skaset participated; second, we will analyze the game of each figuration; and last, we will look into how the different figurations influenced each other, and how this relationship was significant in contributing to the outcome of the case, namely that Skaset resigned.

**Skaset’s figurations**

As mentioned above, there has been – as long as sport organizations have existed in Norway – a close relationship between voluntary sport and the state. In that respect, there are different opinions about whether Skaset’s time as Director General of the DSP led to stronger or weaker ties between the DSP and the NOC. Roger Ingebrigtsen, the State Secretary (a political position, the second in command after the minister) in the Ministry of Culture at the time, holds that Skaset was first and foremost the sport organization’s man within bureaucracy. According to Ingebrigtsen, the formula for creating a unique, autonomous and arbitrary Director General of a department is as follows: find a leading figure from the field (of sport) with broad experience and
knowledge; put him in a department where the economic resources are not part of the national budget negotiations of Parliament (in other words, it is out of conventional political control); and surround him with people who will allow themselves to be manipulated.

He has been the boss for just about everyone on the other side of the table. And he serves ministers of culture who without exceptions have been excellent ministers for culture, but who have had little or no experience from the field of sport. If you want to make a Sir Humphrey of bureaucracy, this is the recipe.42

Before moving on to the identification of Skaset’s figurations, let us recall and underscore the many roles of Skaset. He was a former president of the Norwegian Athletics Federation and of the NOC when he entered the chair as Director General in 1991.43 However, Skaset maintains that his loyalty was always to the state,44 though the state loyalty did not weaken his ties to (at least some) people within the NOC. Against this background we have identified two figurations of the game of the Skaset case. First, there was a ‘sport figuration’ and second, there was a ‘political figuration’, each of which will be presented in an ideal typical manner.

The sport figuration comprised, in addition to Skaset, the NOC president (Kjell O. Kran), the head of the elite sport department of the NOC (Bjørge Stensbøl) and the secretary general of the NOC (Ivar Egeberg).

The president, Kjell O. Kran, was a newcomer to the field of sport. He came to the NOC in 1999 after a long career in business, with positions as administrative director and board chairman of major Norwegian enterprises on his CV. He was used to powerful positions and to making decisions; but he soon realized that being the NOC president did not equal being the most powerful position in Norwegian sport. Kran was frustrated by the system whereby the revenues from the Norwegian Betting Association (Norsk Tipping A/S) were administrated by the DSP, which he felt had too detailed control of the NOC. This led to many confrontations with the Director General of the DSP, namely Skaset.

The head of elite sport department of the NOC, Bjørge Stensbøl, was – if anyone could be – Skaset’s wonder-boy in the sport organization. Therefore, it was striking that Skaset held Stensbøl responsible for the way the Norwegian delegation to Sydney handled the situation when two Norwegian athletes tested positive for doping.

The secretary general of the NOC, Ivar Egeberg, had, like Skaset, swapped roles between the public sector and the voluntary sport organization. After having been the secretary general of the Norwegian Football Association from 1988 to 1996, Egeberg was head-hunted for the job as the State Secretary by the (then) Minister of Culture (Anne Enger Lahnstein) in 1997. His relationship with Skaset became more strained during Egeberg’s time as the State Secretary, and did not improve when Egeberg become the secretary general of the NOC in 1998.

The second figuration refers to Skaset’s relationship to the political leadership in the Ministry of Culture, and was made up by the Minister, Ellen Horn and the State Secretary, Roger Ingebrigtsen, as well as Skaset.

The Minister of Culture, Ellen Horn, was the fifth minister in a row who had a major interest in culture and less competence in sport. In that respect, she had to trust the bureaucrats of the DSP when it came to issues of sport policy. This situation was apparently un-problematical for Horn, as it had been for her predecessors.45 Moreover, for Horn the challenge was reinforced by the fact that she did not have any political experience. Because of that – the lack of political competence combined with the economic independence of the DSP – the road was open for the top bureaucrat to exercise political power.

The State Secretary, Roger Ingebrigtsen, arrived at the Ministry in early 2000. He had previously been a political adviser (a political position in a ministry, third in command, after the minister and the state secretary) in the Ministry of Regional Development and Labour (1992–96). That Ministry is known for officiating in accordance with the principle of a division
of labour between politicians and bureaucrats: the politicians make decisions, and the bureaucrats administrate and implement the policy. Ingebrigtsen must have been shocked by the conditions in the Ministry of Culture, and especially with regard to the political freedom of the Director General of the DSP. For the first time in Norwegian history, the Director General of the DSP, a superior (a politician) put up resistance against the proposals of the bureaucrats of the DSP.

Skaset and Ingebrigtsen had several confrontations during the preceding months of Skaset’s journal article on the Sydney Olympics and the following Skaset case. Let us give two examples, one general and one more sport specific. The first stems from a reform in the public sector, aimed at simplifying the routines for making plans at the municipal level of public administration. During the work with the reform, the State Secretary involved cooperation from the DSP, but Ingebrigtsen felt that Skaset sabotaged the whole project. Without going into details, the point is underscored by two citations from the participants themselves. The situation peaked when Skaset in his regular column in the journal ‘Sport Facilities’ posed the question: ‘Are simplifications the same as improvements?’ Ingebrigtsen has later commented on that episode: ‘I did not like this. In a meeting with Skaset I said that he had to accept the Government as a superior organ for his work.’

The second example illustrates the power game between the State Secretary and the Director General with regard to the above mentioned economy of the DSP. While Skaset was on vacation, Ingebrigtsen had a meeting with the NOC leadership about an application for extra subsidies. Ingebrigtsen, together with Skaset, had decided to give the NOC three million (NOK). But a few days later, while Ingebrigtsen was on vacation, a new meeting took place between Skaset and the NOC leadership. In the second meeting, Skaset proposed giving the NOC six million (NOK). The State Secretary reacted strongly when he heard this, and according to Ingebrigtsen, he had never experienced a civil servant act with such ‘unchecked power’. Ingebrigtsen perceived this as an infringement, and as a misuse of position which was only too visible.

The power game

The Skaset case has been the subject of many reporters’ and scientists’ work, and their approaches have varied. One angle of attack has been to treat the case as a debate about the sport’s twilight zone with regard to doping. Another approach has been to consider the NOC’s autonomy and its relationship to the state. Yet another way of treating the case has been to discuss the division of roles between politicians and bureaucrats, or, more specifically, the autonomy of departments within a ministry. Common for all approaches is – of course – the eagerness to explain the mechanisms that lead to the outcome (that Skaset resigned). According to Bergsgard and Rommetvedt, Skaset’s journal article was perceived as too strong, because the sport policy field had gone through a process of normalization compared to other political areas. To use a sport metaphor, the goalposts had moved, therefore some of the players missed the goal. Like Bergsgard and Rommetvedt, we argue that Skaset ‘missed’ because the situation had changed, compared to the game of sport policy that Skaset had been used to playing for decades. However, we do not suggest that the changes referred to the sport policy system as such, but rather that players, who usually played alone, worked as a team this time.

Elias’s game models are, as mentioned, models of competitions, which may vary with regard to the number of players and the number of levels. To analyse the Skaset case, we will first consider the game as a multi-person game on one level, and then as a multi-person game on two levels. The latter equals the two figurations in which Skaset was involved.

Hans B. Skaset had gained a unique position as Director General, with a twofold power basis. On the one hand he had the sport-specific knowledge which the minister needed, and therefore
he took part in sport-related policy making. On the other hand, he was responsible for implementing the sport policy and for administrating the economic resources to sport. Skaset’s use of power is seen in the increased use of goal-targeted subsidies during his time in the DSP. As Goksøyr and his colleagues note:

The Department of Sport Policy want goal-targeting and to some extent pre-targeting as a possible sanction if the NOC considers spending the subsidies in an inappropriate way. Just as Hofmo in his time was vacillating on the subject of the gambling revenues, also Skaset’s pet subjects are visible in the budget. The anti-doping work, for example, received NOK 7.1 million in the 1995 budget and in addition the doping laboratory at Aker Hospital received NOK 2 million.\textsuperscript{52}

Skaset was relatively powerful within the sport figuration, and he had rarely met coordinated resistance. In Elias’ terminology, Skaset usually played one-to-one, against competitors who were not strong enough to beat him alone. Skaset was known for a strategy of building alliances with some of those involved, while being critical to others.\textsuperscript{53} Skaset kept his superior position in relation to the NOC leadership when Kran took over the NOC presidency in 1999. But at the same time, Kran built a strong power base by giving the secretary general (Ivar Egeberg) and the head of the elite sport department (Bjørge Stensbøl) enormous trust. Their response was their strong loyalty, and the three became a powerful group who received major support inside the NOC system, and who in the media was christened ‘the three musketeers’.\textsuperscript{54} In that respect the game had changed, because when Skaset threatened the NOC with cutting the state’s subsidies to elite sport, the NOC played the game with one voice.

However, a voluntary organization does not have the formal power to remove a state bureaucrat. (And the NOC representatives probably never intended to, either. See below.) The NOC representatives made a strategic decision after Skaset’s article and the interview with him in the newspaper. Instead of attacking Skaset, they confronted the political leadership of the Ministry, Skaset’s superiors. The Minister had to make a choice between the Director General of the DSP and the NOC leadership (that is all the three musketeers: the president, Kran, the head of the elite sport department, Stensbøl, and the secretary general, Egeberg), who would all leave if the Minister did not take their side. In addition, the NOC president was supported by his own board, of which two members, it should be remembered, were political party fellows of Minister Ellen Horn (the Labour party). In sum, the Director General was on the defensive.

Skaset could probably have continued in his position if the game had terminated after the criticism from NOC president Kran. It had happened before that a minister had supported Skaset after he had been critical towards the NOC. For example, during a national sports conference arranged by the DSP in 1997, Skaset criticized the NOC president at the time (Arne Myhrvold), who had a reputation for travelling more than being available for Norwegian sport, with these words: ‘Do not leave all values behind alongside the roads on the way to an airport and take-off’.\textsuperscript{55} This had not been cleared with the Minister (Turid Birkeland), but she has commented – many years later – that Skaset’s words would have been problematic if she had not agreed with him.\textsuperscript{56}

Minister Ellen Horn did not stand up for Skaset, nor did she support his threat against elite sport. At this point, the game moved up to a new level, with Skaset and the political leadership in the ministry as the players. The players on the level below (the sport figuration) were no longer directly involved in the game, though they had given the premises for the continuation of it. The same day as the newspaper published the interview with Skaset (Friday 28 October 2000), he was confronted by Minister Ellen Horn with reference to the case which she only knew from the media. The minister was flustered, and told Skaset that he should have come to her with his criticism of the NOC, instead of going to the media.\textsuperscript{57}

Skaset could have avoided further problems through an apology, but he did not regret any of the contents of his article or anything he had said in the newspaper interview. He told the
Minister that everything had been done intentionally. What happened during the rest of that day is unclear due to different explanations in subsequent interviews with the participating players. The Minister (Ellen Horn) and the State Secretary (Roger Ingebrigtsen) assert that they tried to find formulations which were also acceptable for Skaset. Skaset, on the contrary, claims that there was never any attempt at reconciliation. He felt that the Minister wanted him out of office. (The Minister has denied that in subsequent interviews.) The episodes presented above indicate that the other political leader in this figuration, the State Secretary, wanted to see Skaset leave. Ingebrigtsen may have foreseen that Skaset could not continue when these lines were included in the Ministry’s press note: ‘The Minister of Culture, Ellen Horn, has complete trust in the way the NOC president Kjell O. Kran and the NOC leadership have handled the doping cases. The press statements by the Director General of the DSP, Hans B. Skaset are very unhelpful.’ On Monday morning, the first working day after the newspaper article, Skaset resigned.

Concluding discussion
The Skaset case is characterized by several unintended outcomes, which are often the result of the development of long-term human figurations. Although individuals are intentional in their actions, the outcome of human behaviour is often unforeseen. Elias called it ‘blind social processes’ because the players of a game never fully control other players’ intentions and actions. In the Skaset case there were several examples of such processes. The NOC leadership never intended to remove Skaset from his position, but they wanted to put him in line with regard to how far a state bureaucrat could go when commenting on and intervening in internal issues of the NOC. Subsequently gathered information indicates that if the head of the elite sport department of the NOC (Stensbøl) had realized that Skaset’s resignation was a possible outcome, he would probably have advised the president of the NOC (Kran) not to express himself in the strong way that he did.

With Skaset out of the office, the NOC leadership expected that the DSP would delegate more responsibility regarding the governing of the gambling revenues of the NOC. That did not happen. On the one hand the new Director General of the DSP has kept a lower profile with regard to media and public debate than did Skaset. On the other hand, the NOC leadership found the new Director General as at least as hard to cooperate with as was Skaset. While Skaset could, after negotiations, meet the demands of the sport organization, it was perceived as more difficult to negotiate with the new leadership of the DSP. Even the NOC president (Kran) has later recalled the Skaset period as a good one for the NOC (personal correspondence).

If we return to the Skaset case, it is questionable whether Skaset himself could imagine that his statements about the twilight zones in Norwegian elite sport would turn out to be the beginning-of-the-end of his career in the DSP. Some people have claimed that his actions were not only intentional but also strategic, and that Skaset wanted to write himself into the history books. Among these was the former Minister of Culture (Anne Enger Lahnstein), who was Skaset’s superior 1997–99. She contended: ‘Here he placed himself on the map in a powerful case before he left.’ Skaset has denied this interpretation in several subsequent interviews. In 2002, less than two years after he left the DSP, he said:

I did not think that way when I wrote the article in ‘Sport Facilities’ although I was aware of the importance of the subject. I did not want to leave the position as the Director General of the DSP, but felt it urgent to stand up for what I thought was right. I have probably always worked that way.

After another three years, in his own festschrift to his 70th birthday, Skaset says in an interview that it is unfortunate that his career ended the way it did. He would have enjoyed working till he was 70, and he would have used the last years of his career to develop future sport
In his application to resign, addressed to Minister Ellen Horn, Skaset maintained that he had to leave ‘because the Minister did not approve his assessment of the NOC leadership’s relationship to the phenomenon of nutrition supplement and the scientific activity related to the central elite sport program, and he therefore asked to leave office immediately’.64

All in all, the Skaset case does not reveal a planned retreat. Skaset had not foreseen the consequences of his article. Skaset knew the players of the game well, and had played them out, one by one, for many years. So, the question is: what went wrong this time? In that respect it is important to emphasize the role of the media. Without the newspaper as a (as the term points to) ‘mediating’ player between the other players in the different figurations, Skaset’s opinions would not have become an ‘item’. Paradoxically, the original article by Skaset had been publicly available for several weeks when the newspaper (Aftenposten) published the content of Skaset’s article and the interviews with Skaset and the NOC leaders. As outlined above, the leadership of the NOC appeared unified and, without allies in the Ministry, Skaset was alone. In a game with one player against two cooperating coalitions, not even the ‘grand old man’ of Norwegian sport policy was strong enough.

The power game is analyzed with the game models of Elias.65 It is tempting to draw some alternative scenarios if the perspective of Elias had been applied by the players of the game described above. It is mentioned above that an approach from Stensboel to Kran, whom he probably would be able to influence, would have resulted in a different outcome. Another scenario which may have led to another outcome is that Minister Ellen Horn, the only one with the formal power to actually do something about Skaset, might make another decision. In that respect, one major characteristic of the Skaset case was the speed of it. Minister Ellen Horn has later said about that Friday 28 October 2000 that: ‘Afterwards it is possible to say that we should have taken more time. If we had let the weekend go, the case might probably have had another outcome. But we felt that there had to come a reaction that Friday’.66

Horn – and Skaset – could have moved clear of the situation if they had known about the principles of the sociology of Elias. If they had achieved some distance to the object of study, or in this case to the heated debate about twilight zones and power in Norwegian sport, the decisions might have been more considered. But, as for that, we will never know.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

1 Hill, Policy Process.
2 Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.
3 Hill, Policy Process. The other styles are: ‘ideological politics’ which relates to the model of representative Government, where politicians instruct the bureaucrats; and ‘bargaining politics’ where political outcomes are seen to depend upon inputs of resources and external power forces.
4 Hill, Understanding Social Policy.
5 Ibid., 119–20.
6 Weber, Economy and Society.
7 Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 111.
8 Hill, Policy Process. Incrementalism is based on critics of the rational model, with listing of alternatives, analysis of consequences (of each alternative), and decisions according to the elected politicians (and thereby the voters’) values.
9 Stake, ‘Case Studies’.
10 Hanstad, ‘Skaset, vil ha idretten bort fra gråsoner’; Hanstad, ‘Sjøkkert Kran vurderer stillingen’.
Hanstad, *Seier’n er vår, men hvem har æren?*; Hanstad and Goksøyr, *Fred er ei det beste*.

Before 1996, there were two organizations, with separate boards. In 1996, the Norwegian Confederation of Sports and the Norwegian Olympic Committee fused into the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports, abbreviated to NOC. In this essay, we treat the predecessors of the NOC and the NOC as one, although some formulations in the text may be imprecise. See notes 17, 21 and 43.

KKD, *Hovedfordeling 2006*.

Goksøyr, Anderson and Asdal, *Kropp, kultur og tippekamp*.


Gilberg, Breivik and Loland, ‘Anti-doping in Sport’.

To be precise, Skaset was elected for the board of the Norwegian Confederation of Sports. See note 12.

Hanstad, ‘Mannen med de dramatiske avgangene’.

Tjørnhom, *Dopingkontroll i Norge*.

Hanstad, ‘Mannen med de dramatiske avgangene’.

Hulikjøven speaking, Skaset was president of the Norwegian Confederation of Sports (which included being the head of the Olympic Committee during the Olympics). See note 12.

Verroken and Mottram, ‘Doping Control in Sport’.

Andersen, ‘Antidopingarbeidet nasjonalt og internasjonalt’.


Hanstad, ‘Mannen med de dramatiske avgangene’. The Norwegian anti-doping work today is carried out in an independent foundation established in 2003. In this way it ensures that control and prosecution processes for doping cases are organized independent of the NOC or the state.

Andersen, ‘Antidopingarbeidet nasjonalt og internasjonalt’, 149.

Skaset, ‘Eliteidrett – ett dilemma’.

Ibid.

Ibid., 24, our translation.

Hanstad, ‘Skaset, vil ha idretten bort fra gråsoner’.


Ibid.

KKD, *Horn har tillit til idrettspresidenten*.

Hanstad, ‘Skaset føler seg dolket av Horn’.

Elias, *What is Sociology?*

Goudsblom, *Sociology in the Balance*.

Dopson, ‘The Diffusion of Medical Innovations’.


Ibid.


Ingebritsens, ‘Statsforvaltningens Sir Humphrey’, 93.

See note 21.

Hanstad, ‘Mannen med de dramatiske avgangene’.

Hanstad and Goksøyr, *Fred er ei det beste*. Åse Kleveland, Turid Birkeland, Anne Enger Lahnstein and Åslaug Haga, all former ministers of culture, point out, subsequently, that Skaset was clear in his analyses and suggestions.


Hanstad, *Seier’n er vår, men hvem har æren?*, 43.

Ibid.


Bergsgård & Rommetvedt, ‘Når idrett og politikk kolliderer’.


Halkjelsvik, ‘Tapte maktkampen fordi ledertroen Kran, Egeberg og Stensbøl truet med å gå av’.

Hanstad, ‘Skasets selvskudd’.

Ibid.

Hanstad, ‘Ja vel, fru statsråd’, *Intervju*.

Hanstad, *Seier’n er vår, men hvem har æren?*
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KKD Anti-dopingarbeid i Norge [Anti-doping in Norway]. Oslo: Kultur og kirkedepartementet [Ministry of Cultural and Church Affairs], 1999.


——. *Avskjed* [Dismissal]. Oslo: Kultur og kirkedepartementet [Ministry of Cultural and Church Affairs], 2000.


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Paper IV
Elite athletes’ duty to provide information on their whereabouts: Justifiable anti-doping work or an indefensible surveillance regime?

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Abstract
In this article, we explain and reflect critically upon the athlete whereabouts reporting system in top-level sports initiated by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). This system makes it compulsory for athletes who are in a registered testing pool in their national and/or international federation to submit information about their whereabouts. In this way, athletes are required to be available for a no advance notice doping test throughout the year. If an athlete provides incorrect information or cannot be found when a no advance notice test is supposed to be taken (a missed test), he or she may be given a warning. In most sports and national anti-doping regulations, three such warnings within 18 months may be regarded as a violation of the doping regulations and may lead to exclusion from sport for between 3 months and 2 years. The system is controversial. In this article, we examine the key objections to the system and, more specifically, objections connected to ideas of justice and athletes’ autonomy and right to self-determination. The argument will be a practical ethical one informed by a survey on attitudes towards the whereabouts system carried out among 236 athletes belonging to the registered testing pool in Norway.

We conclude that if the basic principles of anti-doping work are accepted, WADA’s whereabouts reporting system represents nothing other than an efficient extension of this work.

Keywords: Anti-doping, elite athletes, whereabouts reporting system, surveillance

Introduction
The struggle against doping has intensified over the last decade. Anti-doping organizations are constantly in pursuit of more effective tests and test regimes. Surveillance of top-level athletes is also becoming tighter and more effective. In 2003, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) adopted a new compulsory reporting system that requires elite athletes in targeted groups to provide information on their whereabouts all year around, including home address, place and time of training, training camp, and plans to travel. The goal is that all athletes should be available for unannounced testing both within and outside of the competition season. The WADA premise is that the system will detect more doping rule violators and deter athletes from doping. In parts of the sporting community and among the general public, however, the system is controversial for several reasons. It presents a practical challenge for many athletes, and it raises fundamental questions relating to athlete privacy, autonomy, and right to self-determination.

In this article, we examine whether this system is justifiable and a necessary part of anti-doping work, or whether it represents a surveillance system that cannot be defended on principled grounds. Before turning to the principled discussion, we describe the background of the compulsory whereabouts system in more detail, and list some of the main objections to the system with the help of results from a survey on attitudes towards the whereabouts system carried out among 236 athletes belonging to the registered testing pool in Norway. We conclude that if the basic principles of anti-doping work are accepted, WADA’s whereabouts reporting system represents nothing other than an efficient extension of this work.

Doping controls – a background
The first doping controls were implemented in the 1960s following several suspicious deaths in sports, including for example those during the summer Olympics in Rome 1960 and the Tour de France 1967 (Verroken & Mottram, 2005). The justification for controls by the International Olympic Committee...
D. V. Hanstad & S. Loland

in Lausanne in 1999. At this conference, the IOC

anch, brought about an invitation to sport and public

and in particular of President Juan Antonio Samar-

(Waddington, 2000). Massive criticism of the IOC,

could not manage the doping problems on its own

and the general public as just more proof that sport

France cycle race. The doping regimes, revealed the

'doping scandal

in 1999 was, among other things, a result of

where the athletes are. The establishment of WADA

interdicts are administered (Stray-Gundersen, Vide-

improves oxygen transportation and endurance. It

production of red blood cells and consequently

poietin (EPO), a substance that stimulates the

10% (Berglund & Ekblom, 1991; Birkeland, Stray-

enhance performance in endurance sports by up to

For instance, traditional blood-doping, which can

there are still many challenges facing the authorities.

in the 1970s (Todd & Todd, 2001). Eight

substance, anabolic steroids, were used for the first

time in the 1970s (Todd & Todd, 2001). Eight

athletes were disqualified for using anabolic steroids

during the Summer Olympics in Montreal in 1976,

but Robert Voy, former medical chief of the Amer-

can Olympic Committee, has pointed out that
doping tests were not very effective before 1983

because the technology was primitive and unreliable.

According to Voy, the war against doping was

conducted with unloaded weapons (Voy, 1991).

The situation is somewhat different today. The

number of tests has doubled from 90,000 to 180,000

over the last decade (Mottram, 2005; WADA,

2003a), the intention of the control itself is to reveal

those who are perceived to cheat, but the tests are also

intended to deter athletes from doping and constitute

one element of several preventive measures in anti-

doping work.

In the 1970s and 1980s, doping tests were

unsystematic and not very reliable (Waddington,

2000; Houlihan, 2002; Verroken & Mottram,

2005). Tests to reveal the most common doping

substance, anabolic steroids, were used for the first

time in the 1970s (Todd & Todd, 2001). Eight

athletes were disqualified for using anabolic steroids

during the Summer Olympics in Montreal in 1976,

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those who are perceived to cheat, but the tests are also

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one element of several preventive measures in anti-

doping work. Yet in spite of these developments,

there are still many challenges facing the authorities.

For instance, traditional blood-doping, which can

enhance performance in endurance sports by up to

10% (Berglund & Ekblom, 1991; Birkeland, Stray-

Gundersen, & Hemmersbach, 2000), is difficult to

trace. The same can be said of the use of erythro-

poietin (EPO), a substance that stimulates the

production of red blood cells and consequently

improves oxygen transportation and endurance. It

is also impossible to trace more than a few days after

it has been administered (Stray-Gundersen, Vide-

man, Pentilla, & Lereim, 2003).

The anti-doping movement strives for policies and

testing regimes in which doping controls can be

carried out at any time and in any place. To carry out

such tests, the doping control officers must know

where the athletes are. The establishment of WADA

in 1999 was, among other things, a result of “the
doping scandal” before and during the 1998 Tour de

France cycle race. The doping regimes, revealed the

French police and customs, were seen by politicians

and the general public as just more proof that sport
could not manage the doping problems on its own
(Waddington, 2000). Massive criticism of the IOC,

and in particular of President Juan Antonio Samar-

anch, brought about an invitation to sport and public

authorities to a world conference on doping in sport

in Lausanne in 1999. At this conference, the IOC

suffered scathing critique from representatives from

several governments and it became increasingly clear

that there was a requirement for an anti-doping

organization that was independent of sport organiza-

tions (Hanstad, Smith & Waddington, 2008). The

WADA was given primary responsibility for anti-
doping work globally, as well as for the development

and coordination of anti-doping work nationally and

in various sports (Houlihan, 2002). The ratification

of a World Anti-Doping Programme in 2003 in-

creased the harmonization and standardization

through three main elements: the Code, Interna-
tional Standards, and Models of Best Practice. The

Code is the fundamental and universal document

upon which the World Anti-Doping Programme is

based. International Standards are different tech-
nical and operational areas within the programme,

which is developed by the signatories and govern-
ments and approved by WADA. Models of Best

Practice are providing state of the art solutions in

different areas of anti-doping and are recommended

by WADA (WADA, 2003a).

Whereabouts information

According to The Code (article 5.1.1), international

and national sports federations have to establish a

Registered Testing Pool of elite athletes and carry

out in-competition and out-of-competition testing

(WADA, 2003a). In International Standards

(WADA, 2003b) and Models of Best Practice

(WADA, 2004), WADA leaves it to the individual

anti-doping organization to define procedures and

systems for “collecting, maintaining and monitoring

sufficient whereabouts information to ensure that

sample collection can be planned and conducted at

no advance notice for all athletes in the registered

testing pool” (WADA, 2003b, art. 4.4.1, p. 13).

As a minimum, WADA demands that the anti-
doping organizations collect the following athlete

information: (i) name, (ii) sport/discipline, (iii)

home address, (iv) contact telephone numbers, (v)

training times and venues, (vi) training camps, (vii)

travel plans, (viii) competition schedule, and (ix)

disability if applicable, including the requirement for

third-party involvement in notification. (WADA,

2003b, art. 4.4.2, p. 13)

An earlier study (Hanstad & Loland, 2005) has

shown that there are great variations between anti-
doping organizations in the way the system is

implemented. Among such differences are the cri-

tera for selecting athletes to registered testing pools,

details of the information the athletes submit,

procedures when this information is to be changed,

and requirements to be available for testing. In the

United States, the athletes in the testing pool have to

be available for testing practically 24 h a day, in the
United Kingdom availability is set to one hour 5 days a week (Monday to Friday), while Norwegian athletes have to make themselves available for testing one hour a day all year round (Antidoping Norge, 2006). There are sanctions attached to non-compliance with these requirements. The current Code (2003 version) states that “the period of ineligibility shall be at a minimum 3 months and at a maximum 2 years in accordance with the rules established by the Anti-Doping Organization whose test was missed or whereabouts requirement was violated” (WADA, 2003a, art. 10.4.3, p. 29). More specific definitions of violation are defined in the Guidelines for Athlete Whereabouts Information (WADA, 2004). Article 6.4 stipulates that an athlete with three warnings for “failure to provide accurate whereabouts information in a rolling period of 18 months or a combination of failure to provide whereabouts information and missed tests, may be subject to an anti-doping rule violation” (WADA, 2004b, art. 6.4, p. 10). Criteria have been established for each of the three warnings that vary between the different anti-doping organizations (until the revision of the Code by 1 January 2009). In Norway, the athlete automatically receives an SMS text message after 3 days of not submitting any information. After 4 days without any information, a warning letter that the athlete has to reply to is sent out. Lack of response or an explanation that is not credible will result in one warning.

Some countries have implemented the whereabouts system and the first sanctions have been imposed. As of August 2004, 27 July and 12 August 2004 and a failure to provide whereabouts information had not been the subject of much media attention. This changed during the Tour de France. It was revealed by a Danish TV station (DR) that the Danish cyclist Michael Rasmussen had received two warnings from both his international federation (the International Cycling Union) and his national anti-doping agency (Anti-Doping Denmark). According to his own team Rabobank, Rasmussen had not been honest about his whereabouts before the race. As the man in the yellow jersey, he was sacked by Rabobank after the 16th stage (Wyatt, 2007). One year later, he was sanctioned by the Monaco Cycling Federation for a period of 2 years for a combination of failure to provide whereabouts information and missed tests (Ferdinand, 2008). The case is under appeal by the rider.

However, a Google search and a number of English language newspapers yielded a limited number of hits on athlete reactions. One reason for the lack of attention might be that the system is generally accepted, which is suggested by statements from, among others, the Athletes’ Committee within WADA (WADA, 2006b). However, another explanation might be that the system is new and that the consequences for the athletes have only been revealed in a few countries in which the system is fully implemented. In Norway, several athletes, among them Olympic champions such as Kjetil André Aamodt and Lasse Kjus (alpine skiing) and Gunn-Rita Dahle Flesjå (mountain biking), have expressed strong criticism of the system (Lund, 2004a,b, NTR, 2006). Their argument is that the system is unfair because only a few countries in the world have implemented it and many athletes can train and compete without the stress of constantly submitting information. A second argument is that it is a violation of individual privacy, autonomy, and right to self-determination.

To explore the extent to which these views are representative or not, a survey was carried out among elite athletes on attitudes towards current anti-doping work in general, and the compulsory whereabouts reporting system in particular. In the autumn of 2006, 236 of the 292 athletes belonging to the registered testing pool of Anti-Doping Norway (ADN) responded to a questionnaire (response rate 80.8%). The sample constituted Norway’s most successful athletes within their disciplines. Explanations for the high response rate may be that the invitation to take part in the survey was sent by email from the Chief Executive officer of ADN, who introduced it as a survey carried out by the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, and that the chair of the Athletes Committee and head coaches in special sport federations motivated the athletes to participate in the survey. In addition, three reminders were sent. The necessary approval was received from the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. In this article, we launch a practical argument on the challenges to a justification of the whereabouts
system. A full report on the empirical study will be presented in a separate article.

The general impression is that elite athletes have trust in and support anti-doping work. Hardly anyone believes that whereabouts information is treated in an irresponsible way or is abused. Athletes’ trust is approximately on the same level as the general population’s trust in the use of personal information in the public health system (Ravlum, 2005). But when athletes are asked about the justification of the whereabouts system, they report considerable scepticism and raise a number of objections, in particular that the system is not implemented for all athletes and therefore is unfair, and that the system requires information about their whereabouts every day, all year around, which is seen as an intrusion and violation of individual privacy.

The WADA dismisses the criticism and claims that the system is the price athletes have to pay for a clean and just sport (Sundbo, 2006). WADA’s Director for Standards and Harmonization, Rune Andersen, has commented:

We fully understand that it can be a burden for athletes to submit as detailed information as the compulsory reporting system requires. At the same time athletes have to ask themselves what they see as an acceptable price to pay in order to stop those athletes that are using drugs. Does this price include the willingness to be tested any time and anywhere? Are they willing to inform where they are so that effective tests can be carried out? WADA considers this an acceptable and justifiable price to pay in order to compete on a level playing field (research interview, June 2007).

This view is that athletes who choose to engage in elite sports must accept the rules of the activity. The WADA view is that if this is considered unreasonable, in principle every athlete is free to withdraw. This, however, is not a justification of the whereabouts system as morally sound. There is a need to take a closer and more systematic look at these arguments.

Justice and fairness

Top-level sport involves intense competition where small margins often have a decisive outcome. There is a fundamental premise in such competition that no-one should have an exclusive advantage. The ideal of equal opportunity for performance is strong. Sport should be fair. Another aspect of discussions on justice and fairness has to do with the relationship between performance and reward and rule violation and penalties (Loland, 2002). Violation of the reporting system is given equal status to doping offences. Is this reasonable? One athlete clearly felt that this was not the case. He reported:

That athletes can risk exclusion because of this system, is reprehensible. If you are caught using drugs or in any other way bring disrepute to sport, then reactions should follow. Not because some of us are absent-minded and forget to report changes in our daily plan.

Another athlete reported:

You have to separate between “oversights” of updating whereabouts information and actual doping cases. I have received written warnings for forgetting to update twice, and felt, after I received the letter, almost like a doping sinner.

The WADA unambiguously rejects such arguments. Compulsory reporting makes it easier to control every elite athlete and, in particular, those who are under suspicion. According to WADA’s regulations, so-called target testing should be undertaken in line with article 5.1.3 (WADA, 2003a). For athletes who take drugs it has become much more difficult to hide, and WADA argues that the system has been introduced to protect clean athletes.

One problem that concerns some athletes is that some nations run stricter anti-doping programmes than others. This is, however, not a new phenomenon. The whereabouts system is implemented in only a minority of the 205 national Olympic Committees and of the 35 international federations included in the Olympic programme. And among those nations and federations, there are great variations in requirements and guidelines (Hanstad & Loland, 2005). In the survey one respondent reported:

Athletes must compete on equal terms. Anti-doping work should be a tool to secure just that, fair competition. The athlete information system must be put into effect with all athletes independent of nationality. It is particularly de-motivating when those nations that statistically are worse when it comes to doping sentences are not subject to those procedures that were meant to be universal.

This hardly provides a strong argument for anti-doping organizations with rigorous programmes to reduce the quality of their work. Some Nordic and Northern European countries, as well as Canada and Australia, have had thorough and systematic anti-doping work for decades and are considered to be models of best practice (Houlihan, 2002). This gives international prestige and provides elite sports with
socio-cultural legitimacy. To claim that strong anti-doping nations should become more lenient with their doping regulations because others are more lax, has a parallel in the argument that corruption in international business is acceptable since some of the competitors are corrupt and may gain advantages from it. Although it is true that inequalities in the implementation of rules are unfair, this is obviously not a strong argument against the whereabouts system in principle.

The view that violations of the whereabouts system should not be considered a doping violation is also problematic. To refuse to be tested, or to deliberately avoid testing, has been considered a doping offence for a long time and is the established practice. However, it is problematic that sanctions do not seem to correspond with athletes’ practice. However, it is problematic that sanctions do not seem to correspond with athletes’ sense of justice. When confronted with the statement that three warnings within 18 months should lead to a possible doping conviction, most athletes completely rejected this.

Such replies suggest that athletes may be governed more by emotion than reason. A couple of examples can illustrate the apparent need of some kind of whereabouts system for anti-doping to be efficient. Before the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City in 2002, the cross-country skier Johann Mühlegg made himself unavailable to doping control for a long period of time by training in secret places, as well as by entering into agreement with hotel hosts who made sure doping inspectors did not come close to him. If compulsory reporting had been in place at that time, this would not have been possible, and the Olympic cross-country competitions would not have ended as a farce. A parallel can be found in the incident with the Greek sprinters Katerina Thanou and Kostas Kenteris a year and a half later. Their last warning came when they allegedly decided to go on a motorcycle ride just before the opening of the Summer Olympics in Athens 2004. It appears that they tried to escape after being summoned for a doping test. The compulsory reporting system had, however, been introduced by this time, and even though there was no positive test, the two were penalized because they did not make themselves available for testing (IAAF, 2006).

Another athlete called it an encroachment and considered the system an infringement on their right to move freely and live a spontaneous life. In the Norwegian study, one out of four athletes responded that the joy of elite sport is reduced by anti-doping surveillance and measures such as this one. One athlete went further and claimed that after the new restrictions it will be a relief to quit. And every fourth athlete strongly supported the claim that this was a “Big Brother system”. Such a perception is strengthened by the system not only affecting the individual’s life as an athlete, but also their whole lives, as athletes are monitored all year round, also in leisure and holidays. In an interview with the newspaper Expressen, the Swedish Olympic heptathlon champion, Carolina Klüft, said that the system is turning her into a nervous wreck: “it is bloody uncomfortable to know that my sloppiness and my spontaneity can make me equivalent to someone who uses drugs” (Roos, 2006). Half jokingly, she suggested having a data chip implanted into her body so that the doping controllers could monitor her at all times.

The reactions to the compulsory reporting system as unacceptable surveillance and infringements on privacy and autonomy seem more cogent than the criticism about justice. Athlete frustrations are understandable. The life of a high-profile athlete is one of intense pressure, characterized by routines from morning to evening. They are part of a team where each individual athlete has to relate to the support system that can consist of coaches, managers,
physiotherapists, masseurs, nutritional experts, psychologists, and technologists. Furthermore, the media and sponsors require their attention. Athletes’ quest for some privacy in their spare time is not unreasonable. But a different kind of surveillance brings forth two significant differences from everyday surveillance of individuals: first, athletes themselves have to submit all the information about where they are, day surveillance that might be cited in support of the whereabouts system. First, athletes themselves have compulsory reporting as even more problematic than voluntary practice in this fundamental sense is a violation but have to meet the demands of compulsory reporting just because they might violate the rules. This is without doubt unusual. Our survey results also indicate that some athletes see the compulsory reporting as even more problematic than the surveillance of everyday life. But the comparison brings forth two significant differences from everyday surveillance that might be cited in support of the whereabouts system. First, athletes themselves have to submit all the information about where they are, and second, violation of the regulations is followed by clearly defined consequences. This can hardly be described as a Big Brother-system where the athletes are being watched covertly. The whereabouts system is clearly detectable and open, and all athletes know the consequences of violation. There is a difference here between the criminal being electronically monitored as well, since athletes can withdraw from the surveillance. The point argued by, among others, Rune Andersen of the WADA, of sport as a voluntary practice in this fundamental sense is a relevant one.

On these grounds, it is difficult to claim that the system involves any violations of the athletes’ autonomy and right to self-determination. Quite the opposite consequences. Constant surveillance brings far more subtle, disciplining, and “normalizing” processes that more effectively than ever reduce the individual’s opportunity for autonomy and right to self-determination.

As such, it is a paradox that a study from 2005 shows that the Norwegian population in general is hardly worried about abuse of personal information of this kind (Ravlik, 2005). This may be due to limited knowledge of how extensive this control actually is, but it may also reflect the fact that everyday surveillance of individuals takes a passive form (Fornyings- og administrasjonsdepartementet, 2006).

The reactions are stronger where the surveillance is obvious or where it demands an active contribution from the person under surveillance. One example is electronic “tagging” of prisoners. In some countries, prisoners can serve their sentence in their home by carrying an electronic ankle bracelet that makes it possible to track all movement. In Norway, draft legislation proposes that violent stalkers can be equipped with electronic devices that give an alarm if the person approaches a potential victim (Justis- og politidepartementet, 2006). Another example is compulsory reporting, which demands an active contribution from the person being watched. There are, in particular, two groups who have such obligations: some convicted felons who are to be controlled before or after serving their sentence, and elite athletes.

Initially, athletes have committed no crime or rule violation but have to meet the demands of compulsory whereabouts reporting just because they might violate the rules. This is without doubt unusual. Our survey results also indicate that some athletes see the compulsory reporting as even more problematic than the surveillance of everyday life. But the comparison brings forth two significant differences from everyday surveillance that might be cited in support of the whereabouts system. First, athletes themselves have to submit all the information about where they are, and second, violation of the regulations is followed by clearly defined consequences. This can hardly be described as a Big Brother-system where the athletes are being watched covertly. The whereabouts system is clearly detectable and open, and all athletes know the consequences of violation. There is a difference here between the criminal being electronically monitored as well, since athletes can withdraw from the surveillance. The point argued by, among others, Rune Andersen of the WADA, of sport as a voluntary practice in this fundamental sense is a relevant one.

On these grounds, it is difficult to claim that the system involves any violations of the athletes’ autonomy and right to self-determination. Quite the
opposite: compulsory reporting of whereabouts will make the anti-doping work more effective. If anti-doping work in general protects the athletes’ autonomy and right to self-determination, the whereabouts system will strengthen these values.

Concluding comments

We began by asking whether WADA’s compulsory reporting system can be defended on moral grounds. Our answer is conditionally affirmative. The arguments against the WADA system do not seem powerful enough to reject it. Everyday surveillance of individuals is far more extensive, it is concealed, and also more problematic. The WADA system is described in detail both when it comes to its contents and consequences, and it requires active participation from the person being watched. Hence, the system does not seem to involve undue violations either on principles of justice or on the grounds of athletes’ autonomy and right to self-determination.

However, our acceptance of the compulsory reporting system is conditional. The practical costs for the athletes should be a concern for the anti-doping organizations. It is important that the system can easily be complied with and that the system are completely reliable. Furthermore, principled objections against the system have a more universal relevance that has to be taken seriously. Questions of justice, autonomy, and right to self-determination are first and foremost challenging when it comes to anti-doping work in general. Several scholars, among them Brown (1990), Black and Pape (1997), and Tamburrini (2000), hold the view that the actual idea of anti-doping among grown-up athletes violates such principles and are deeply problematic. They argue that the idea behind competitive sport is precisely the athletes and teams take responsibility for their own development and achievements. The use of drugs in elite sport is a professional risk just like hard training and risk of injuries in hard competition. Thus, the doping rules are seen as paternalistic and cannot be defended because they reduce the athlete’s status as a free and responsible moral agent.

Such a discussion is more challenging than many anti-doping organizations tend to believe, but fall outside of the frameworks of our discussions here. Given that we accept the principal and moral basis of anti-doping work, the compulsory reporting system constitutes nothing more than a logical and effective extension of its methods. To use the earlier metaphor of Voy, WADA is gradually moving from doing anti-doping work with unarmed weapons to shooting with live ammunition.

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References


APPENDIX: Summary in Norwegian

Antidoping i idrett. En studie av den politiske utviklingen siden 1998

Målet med denne studien er å analysere utviklingen i antidopingarbeidet siden dopingskandalen under sykkelrittet Tour de France i 1998. Som en følge av skandalen ble det en betydelig økning i antallet enheter som tok del i antidopingarbeidet. Dette kan karakteriseres som et nettverk, eller figurasjon, der enhetene er å finne på ulike nivåer; fra de globale organisasjoner, via aktører på internasjonalt og nasjonalt nivå, og ned til den individuelle utøver. Denne avhandlingen ser nærmere på et utvalg av de mest sentrale enhetene i internasjonal antidopingpolitikk og ikke minst relasjonene mellom disse. Spesiell vekt legges på maktrelasjonene i en studie der hovedproblemstilling lyder:

_Hvordan kan utviklingen i antidopingpolitikken siden 1998 bli forstått?_

Figurasjonssosiologi, også omkalt som prosess-sosiologi, utgjør i hovedsak det teoretiske rammeverket. Norbert Elias (1897-1990) utviklet et studieobjekt som knyttet seg til mennesker i samhandling, bundet sammen i gjensidig avhengighet. For ham var det like meningsløst å belyse individuelle handlinger med basis i isolerte individer (homo clausus) uten samfunn, som det var å behandle samfunn uten individer.

Avhengighetsforholdene dannet grunnlaget for maktfornhold, som etter Elias’ oppfatning var å anse som stadig skiftende maktabalanser som endret seg gjennom prosesser og sosiale endringer. Han brukte ulike spillpregede modeller (game models) for å beskrive dette.

Hovedstudien er bygget opp med fire case studier. Disse er knyttet til de fire nivåene nevnt innledningsvis; det globale (artikkel 1), det internasjonale (artikkel 2), det nasjonale (artikkel 3) og så det jeg har kalt den individuelle utøverens nivå (artikkel 4). Her er det viktig å poengtere at nivåene ikke er statiske skiller. Aktører og individ
beveger seg mellom de ulike nivåene, noe som fremgår i avhandlingens overordnede diskusjon der elementer fra de ulike artiklene danner grunnlag for å se hvordan enhetene på de forskjellige nivåene står i gjensidig avhengighetsforhold til hverandre.

Dette er de fire artiklene som danner grunnlaget for avhandlingen:

Artikkel 1 gransker forhold knyttet til etableringen av Verdens Antidopingbyrå (World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA) i forlengelse av Verdenskonferansen om doping som ble organisert av Den internasjonale olympiske komité (IOC) i Lausanne i februar 1999. Mer spesifikt benyttes Elias’ spillpregede modeller for å analysere (i) hvordan IOC forsøkte å styre endringsprosessen slik at posisjonen som verdens ledende antidopingorganisasjon skulle forsterkes, men (ii) hvordan IOC ikke evnet å styre denne prosessen. Resultatet var i stedet at IOCs rolle som verdens ledende antidopingorganisasjon ble svekket. Lederskapet havnet hos en ny organisasjon som hadde en vesentlig grad av uavhengighet fra IOC.

Artikkel 2 gransker organisasjonsendringer knyttet til antidoping i Det internasjonale skiforbundet (FIS). Mer konkret går artikkelen inn på hvordan FIS sluttet seg til politikken etablert av WADA som følge av en dopingskandale under VM på ski nordiske grener i finske Lahti i 2001 der seks langrennsløpere fra vertslandet ble tatt. Rollene til ulike mennesker og organisasjoner (eller organisasjonsenheter) i figurasjonen er analysert, og den viser at maktbalansen forskjøv seg innen FIS som følge av 'Lahti-skandalen’. Dette innebar blant annet økt gjensidig avhengighet til WADA, noe som førte til endring i FIS’ politikk på antidopingområdet.

Artikkel 3 ser nærmere på politiske utfordringer knyttet til utviklingen av antidopingpolitikk på nasjonalt nivå. Nærmere bestemt handler denne artikkelen om forholdet mellom politikere og byråkrater i offentlig sektor og ledere innen frivillige idrettsorganisasjoner – enheter som står sentralt i antidopingarbeidet på nasjonalt nivå etter etableringen av WADA. Her analyseres saken da ekspedisjonssjefen i Kultur- og kirkedepartements idrettsavdeling uttrykte offentlig sin personlige mening om Idrettsforbundets antidopingpolitikk i kjølvannet av at to norske utøvere var tatt for dopingbruk rett før eller under sommerlekene i Sydney i 2000. Han ga blant annet uttrykk for at statlig støtte til Idrettsforbundet måtte vurderes hvis det ikke ble ryddet
opp. Saken håndteres i forhold til to figuraser joner ekspedisjonssjefen var en del av. Først ser vi på 'sportsfigurasjonen' som ekspedisjonssjefen tidligere hadde kontrollert ved å opptre mot enkeltindivider, men som nå fremsto samlet og dermed sterkere. Deretter flyttet spillet seg ett nivå opp til en politisk figurasjon. Gjennom en kombinasjon av et samlet lederskap i Idrettsforbundet og det formelle maktabapparatet i den politiske figurasjonen førte prosessen til et utfall ingen hadde forutsett; at ekspedisjonssjefen gikk av.

**Artikkel 4** forklarer og reflekterer kritisk meldepliktsystemet (whereabouts information) som alle eliteidrettsutøvere skal være del av i følge WADAs regelverk. Systemet gjør det obligatorisk for utøvere tilhørende en prioriteret utøverliste (registered testing pool) i sitt internasjonale forbund og/eller nasjonale antidopingorganisasjon. På den måten må de gjøre seg tilgjengelig for uanmeldte dopingkontroller året rundt. Systemet er kontroversielt. I artikkelen belyses noen av innvendingene til systemet, og spesielt forhold knyttet til rettferdighet og utøvernes autonomi og rett til selvbestemmelse. Diskusjonen er praktisk-etisk og bygger på en spørreundersøkelse utført blant 236 utøvere som tilhørte den prioriterte utøverlisten til Antidoping Norge.

I tillegg til å presentere de fire publiserte artiklene enkeltvis, består denne avhandlingen av en innledningsdel der prosesser og aktiviteter på de ulike nivåer bindes sammen før å vise hvordan ulike enheter står i et gjensidig avhengighetsforhold. Studien viser at antallet organisasjoner som er en del av hva jeg definerer som antidopingfigurasjonen, har økt i løpet av det siste tiåret. På globalt nivå har etableringen av WADA og involveringen fra offentlige myndigheter ført til hva som kan se ut til å være en mer effektiv kamp mot doping. Involveringen fra myndigheter har inkludert økt finansiell støtte til arbeidet både på globalt, internasjonalt og nasjonalt nivå, samt et rettslig rammeverk for å takle forekomst og bruk av doping. Siden 1998 er noen av de største dopingskandalene, som BALCO i USA og Operación Puerto blitt avdekket av politiet.

Likevel kan det spørres om representanter fra offentlige myndigheter har kunnskapen som trengs, eller om de fremstår (spesielt innen WADA-systemet) som de reneste ‘gisler’ for idrettsbevegelsen. De aller fleste som representerer det offentlige i
WADAs styrende organer, Foundation Board og Executice Committee, er medlemmer for bare en kort periode, mens idrettslederne sitter i årevis. Forfatterens gjennomgang av deltagerlisten for møtene i Foundation Board (38 medlemmer) i mai 2006, 2007 og 2008 viste at bare to medlemmer fra myndighetene hadde vært med på alle, mens det tilsvarende tallet fra idrettsbevegelsen var 10. 11 av idrettsbevegelsen 19 medlemmer i Foundation Board har sittet der siden 2002. Dette gir disse medlemmene en helt annen kunnskap og ekspertise enn sine 'likeverdige' partnere fra myndighetssiden.

Innenfor idrettsbevegelsen ser det ut til å være et generelt inntrykk at kvaliteten på antidopingarbeidet har økt. Det er likevel mange internasjonale forbund, nasjonale olympiske komiteer og nasjonale antidopingorganisasjoner som ikke oppfyller kravene i Verdens antidopingkode. Blant de internasjonale forbundene har noen av de sterkeste rent kommersielt vist motstand mot å implementere et harmonisert sett av regler. Det samme kan sies om noen av verdens sterkeste idrettsnasjoner.

Dette innebærer en betydelig utfordring i kjernen av antidopingarbeidet som, ifølge WADA, er å beskytte rene utøveres rett til å delta i en dopingfri idrett og dermed fremme helse, rettferdighet og likhet; det vi kan kalle 'the spirit of sport'. Selv om flere utøvere enn før er del av et fungerende antidopingssystem, finner utøvere det urettferdig at antidopingarbeidet ikke er fullstendig harmonisert. Utøvere mener også at noen av virkemidlene som tas i bruk i den stadig ekspanderende antidopingaktiviteten har negative konsekvenser for 'rene' utøvere. Meldepliktssystemet synes å ha fremskaffet resultater som trolig ikke var planlagt eller ventet av WADA.

På bakgrunn av de fire case studiene er det et håp at denne avhandlingen gir en bedre forståelse av rollene til de ulike aktørene i antidopingfigurasjonen ved å rette oppmerksomheten på den økende gjensidige avhengigheten som er utviklet siden 1998.
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