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Scandinavian perspectives on doping – a comparative policy analysis in relation to the international process of institutionalizing anti-doping

By Ulrik Wagner and Dag V. Hanstad

Abstract

This study investigates why, unlike Sweden, Denmark and Norway have decided to establish independent national anti-doping agencies. Starting off from a new institutional perspective, a qualitative comparative method is applied, and the study outlines variables that enable us to explain the differences and similarities of the two approaches. It is concluded that Sweden differs because doping is regarded as a broader public health issue and thus administratively dealt with in an area not only concerned with sport, while Sweden has a tradition of low political interference in elite sport. Despite various differences, the similar solutions chosen by Denmark and Norway are explained by their focus on doping in elite sport, combined with a high political profile in anti-doping. Although one can argue in favour of sport as an example of a world society culture with a huge institutionalizing impact, this study reveals a space open for national interpretation. Finally, the paper discusses future challenges for the two models analyzed.
Introduction

Since the early 1960s doping has increasingly become part of the agenda of Olympic sports (Houlihan 2002, Dimeo 2007, Waddington and Smith 2009). Parallel with its attempted hegemonic position within the international sport movement, the International Olympic Committee has undertaken various efforts since the early 1970s, with limited success, to combat and reduce doping in elite sport (Todd and Todd 2001). Simultaneously, the Council of Europe has assumed an important function as a policy coordinating body (Houlihan 1999), although politics and the sport movement kept their efforts separate until the late 1990s.

Two major doping incidents in 1998 involving Chinese swimmers and the Festina doping scandal during the Tour de France have had a huge influence on subsequent international anti-doping efforts. A third scandal, although not directly associated with doping, had a catalytic effect as well – the IOC bribery scandal related to the nomination of Salt Lake City as host for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. This series of events accelerated criticism of the lacking anti-doping efforts of the international sport federations in general and the IOC in particular (Hoberman 2001), and mass media attention on this reverse side of sport grew (Møller 2008). Most importantly, the barrier between politics and sport was eliminated as anti-doping measures suddenly became part of a public policy debate (Ferstle 2001, Hanstad, Smith and Waddington 2008, Wagner 2009). In early 1999 the IOC initiated and hosted the first World Conference on Doping in Sport. The final declaration, known as the Lausanne Declaration, urged harmonization of anti-doping rules throughout sport, intensified political responsibility, stricter testing regimes and the setting up of an international anti-doping agency. After a
process of negotiations this resulted in the establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in November 1999. Even though scholars have pointed out that inconsistencies still existed after the founding of WADA and that even today one is able to identify large differences between how countries and national sport federations apply international anti-doping rules (Brissonneau 2008, Hanstad, Skille and Loland 2010), the elaboration of a common set of rules known as the World Anti-Doping Code in 2003 signaled hitherto unseen attempts at integrating and harmonizing international anti-doping efforts in sport as well as in politics. The 2005 adoption by governments of the *International Convention against Doping in Sport* under the aegis of UNESCO enabled subsequent implementation of the code content in national legislation, thus making the code the basis for public policy on doping in sport.

What is interesting from a Scandinavian perspective is how Denmark, Norway and Sweden have reacted differently towards institutionalizing an internationally formulated anti-doping policy. The earliest Scandinavian anti-doping measures were initiated in the 1970s, mainly as a task carried out by the national sport confederations. In June 2003 Anti-Doping Norway was founded as a separate organization. Anti-Doping Denmark had already been introduced in 2000 at an experimental stage as an independent organization and made permanent in 2005 after legal revisions. By contrast, Swedish anti-doping efforts concerning elite sport have remained an integrated task within the national Swedish Sport Confederation [Riksidrottsförbundet] since 1998. Recent signs, however, have shown that the political and the sport administrative bodies in Sweden are aware that a formalized division between organized sport and anti-doping measures might be a way forward. In December 2009 a committee was set up with the purpose of investigating the future organization of anti-doping measures in Sweden (Kulturdepartementet 2009). Among others, its tasks include a discussion of the creation
of an independent national anti-doping organization under the joint responsibility of the state and the Swedish Sport Federation. ‘Independent’ in relation to anti-doping here means the creation of a separate administrative unit with its own executive board. Anti-Doping Denmark (ADD), for instance, is still located in the same buildings as the Danish National Sport Federation and its financing is based on public funding from the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and financial support from various sport federations. While ADD maintains close connections with both the national sport organizations and the national political level, one of its primary aims is to link national and international efforts via co-operation with WADA (ADD 2009).

The purpose of this article is thus to compare how the Scandinavian countries have approached anti-doping in sport prior to and after the establishment of WADA. The article will put a particular emphasis on the period following 1998. Our aim is to outline an explanation that seeks to understand how and why these different management approaches to anti-doping have come about. In order to do so, we will briefly outline the contents of the World Anti-Doping Codes (2003 and the 2008 revised version) and UNESCO’s International Convention against Doping in Sport (hereafter the UNESCO Convention), focusing on their recommendations to political as well as sport organizations. We will give a short account of how scholars belonging to a new institutional tradition have tried to explain the institutionalizing impact on national policies as a result of the emergence of a global culture. In our comparative study we will try, after introducing our methodological procedures, to isolate variables that might explain the conditions under which the different managerial approaches to anti-doping have arisen. Finally, we will shortly discuss challenges for future Scandinavian anti-doping management. What is considered beyond the scope of the article, however, is a
discussion or judgment of whether one or the other model implemented is more effective in combating doping.

The World Anti-Doping Code, the UNESCO Convention and political obligations

The World Anti-Doping Code (WADC or the Code), and the UNESCO Convention are core elements in anti-doping policies activity for both the sport movement and national governments. The first version of the Code came into force in 2004 (WADA 2003) and the second in 2009 (WADA 2008). The UNESCO Convention was adopted in 2005. Figure 1 illustrates how the Code and the Convention interact and involve sport organizations and governments.

Figure 1: A modified illustration by Marriott-Lloyd (2007) of how the Code and the Convention interact and involve sport organizations and governments.

The Code is the key policy document in the global effort to combat doping in sport (Houlihan 2007). It provides the framework for harmonized anti-doping policies, rules and regulations within sport organizations. The practical result of the Code is that both international- and national-level athletes are under a common set of rules and regulations and can be tested in and out of competition. More than 600 sport organizations are signatories to the Code. All the signatories have obligations according to Article 20 of the Code (WADA 2008). At the national level national Olympic committees must ensure that their anti-doping policies and rules conform with the Code.
(WADA 2008: 20.4.1); that as a condition of membership or recognition national federations' anti-doping policies and rules are in compliance with the applicable provisions of the Code (WADA 2008: 20.4.2); that they cooperate with their National Anti-Doping Organization (NADO) (WADA 2008: 20.4.4); and that they promote anti-doping education (WADA 2008: 20.4.9). With regard to the roles and obligations of the NADOs it is required that they adopt and implement anti-doping rules and policies which conform with the Code (WADA 2008: 20.5.1); cooperate with other relevant national organizations and agencies and other anti-doping organizations (WADA 2008: 20.5.2); and encourage reciprocal testing between national anti-doping organizations (WADA 2008: 20.5.3).

When governments signed the Copenhagen Declaration in 2003, it was as a moral commitment to the fight against doping but it was not as though they were signing a legally binding document. Governments cannot be direct parties to the Code because it is a non-governmental document that operates in the realm of private or contractual law despite considerable governmental involvement. Only an international convention can create a binding obligation (Marriott-Lloyd 2007). In order to integrate the World Anti-Doping Program into governments’ policies it was transformed into the UNESCO Convention (UNESCO 2005). The Convention provides a legal framework in which all governments can take action against the prevalence and use of drugs. By December 2010, 151 governments had ratified the Convention.¹

In view of the obligations which it imposes on signatories, the UNESCO Convention represents a powerful resource that, at least formally, forces all nations to come into the fold, making it much more difficult for nations that have neglected anti-doping to continue in the same way. Therefore, Houlihan (2007) is correct when he
states that the ratification was a considerable achievement and indicates a substantial level of support from governments.

The institutionalizing impact of world society

Theoretically, we need to apply a theory that grasps what is broadly referred to as globalization and takes into consideration simultaneously the national level and the importance of international organizations. The school referred to as new institutionalism is our point of departure. One basic theoretical assumption is that organizations, rather than acting rationally, often adapt to the institutional settings in order to obtain legitimacy. In this context we embrace the definition of institutionalization put forward by Jepperson (1991, p. 145). An institution, e.g. international anti-doping measures, is a social order or pattern understood as a standardized interaction process that has reached a certain state or property. Thus, institutionalization denotes how this specific order is attained and reproduced in a regular mode.

In their article, Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez (1997) describe how a world culture impacts on nation-state policy. Their opening claim is as follows: “Many features of the contemporary nation-state derive from world-wide models constructed and propagated through global cultural and associational processes” (1997, p. 144-145). This world-society perspective focuses on the assumed enhanced statelessness of current society in which important developments take place beyond the level of the nation state. In a corresponding essay Boli and Thomas (1997) have analyzed the growth in numbers of international non-governmental organizations (henceforth
INGOs) and subsequently emphasized the increasing importance of these INGOs. Although the power balance may remain in favour of the nation state, impetus for action according to Boli and Thomas come from a transnational level. Drawing on these world-society assumptions, we argue that global elite sport, perhaps more than any other sector, reveals a global culture in which the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has assumed a hegemonic position (Tomlinson 2005) since the beginning of the 1980s. The IOC can be characterized as an INGO whose decisions and policies have had a huge impact on how elite sport has been institutionalized at national levels, including effected and encouraged legislation.

According to Meyer et. al. (1997) the growing importance of a world-society culture leads to enhanced isomorphism, which corresponds with notions about how current elite sport models increasingly share similarities (Green and Oakley 2001). ‘Isomorphism’ is the term applied by new institutionalists when one can see that organizations belonging to the same field develop ‘sameness’, i.e. that they turn to similarity in order to gain legitimacy from the institutional settings (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).

We embrace the notion that a world culture impacts on the national level, but with some important modifications inspired by Elias (1978). The nation state still has to be taken seriously in so far as it serves as the unit of practical legislation and use of force. Even though we can observe transnational organizations like the EU or the United Nations, these constructions have not eroded the importance of national level policy making. Instead, we suggest that a world culture has to be understood as dialectically interrelated to a national administrative level that again is interrelated to a lower, intra-personal level. In a similar way, power exists as a balance in the relations between these levels. In some cases, for instance when WADA was initially set up, the balance was
tipped in favour of the transnational level, but in other cases national levels, in particular when more governmental organizations co-operate, they can set the agenda. This figurational approach to anti-doping efforts has been exemplified by other scholars (Hanstad 2008, Hanstad, Smith and Waddington 2008, Wagner 2010).

We can label the World Anti-Doping Agency an INGO. It is created as an interface primarily sport, political and legal forces (Wagner 2009, 2010) but operates on a level beyond the nation state. It has the harmonization of national policies and international sport governing bodies as its explicit goal, and accordingly an observation of subsequent processes of isomorphism might not appear as a huge surprise. Despite this, there are reasons for challenging the perception of isomorphism found in some classical neo-institutional approaches (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Meyer and Rowan 1991). Other new institutionalists have emphasized that organizations do not only copy existing institutionalized expectations in order to gain legitimacy, for instance by introducing the concept of ‘institutional entrepreneur’ (DiMaggio 1988, p. 14). Likewise, Oliver (1991) has pointed to five possible strategies in which an organization can respond to an institutionalization process varying between the poles of acquiescence and manipulation. There are, therefore, contributions which support some extent of organizational agency that are to be seen in connection with our perception of the inter-relatedness between the world society, the national level and the intra-personal level. This distinction is important because it allows us to explain how some outcomes at the national level are not directly conditioned by global institutionalized settings. Thus, power balances condition the level of agency potentials and constraints at a given time.

We will use our comparative findings to discuss how national policies, which are formed in an inter-relationship with a world society, are implemented. We will discuss whether, and if so, how recent Scandinavian anti-doping approaches open up a space for
a ‘national interpretation’ of the international anti-doping institutionalization process and, in this way, our comparative study will add a small-scale theoretical elaboration to its main focus, which is the comparative study per se.

A qualitative and comparative methodological framework

The outcomes we wanted to investigate are clear: We have two case studies (Norway and Denmark) that despite minor differences are similar. In both case studies independent national anti-doping bodies were established. In contrast to these two cases, we have one case study (Sweden) which is different from the two others because Swedish anti-doping efforts in elite sport remain (until early 2011) a task carried out within the existing national sport confederation.

It makes good sense to compare the outcomes found in these three countries. All three countries are founded on a social democratic welfare-state model (Esping-Andersen 1990). This category of welfare state differs from liberal and conservative state models in that it is characterized by a high degree of state intervention in economic market mechanisms, a high level of publicly funded social services, a high level of taxation, and an explicit legacy of a dominant social democratic movement that has impacted on various aspects of social life over the last 50 years (e.g. trade unions, housing movement, cultural institutions). Furthermore, the popular Scandinavian sport movement is characterized by a high percentage of voluntary work, a high rate of participation in sport (among adults as well as children) and, most significantly, by the fact that the sport movement is based on non-profit unions and associations and not on a school system or private commercial enterprises – although this latter sector is growing (see Bergsgaard and Norberg 2010). Thus, selecting these three countries avoids
comparing apples and pears simply because “the cases selected are in fact alike enough to permit comparisons” (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, p. 20).

The outcomes identified make two comparative strategies possible. One is the most similar with different outcome, the other is the most different with similar outcome (henceforth MSDO/MDSO). This research design was originally formulated by Przeworski and Teune (1970). The design is made for comparing small- and intermediate-N (as opposed to large-N statistical studies) by selecting a limited number of independent variables that enable us to explain how variation or similarity occurs. Recent studies have elaborated the initial research design outlined by Przeworski and Teune (Gerring 2001; De Meur, Bursens and Gottscheiner 2006; Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009) and from these we find inspiration for our comparative study.

MSDO/MDSO relies on two logics: MSDO will focus on the identification of the most similar variables. Subsequently we identify dissimilar variables that lead to a different outcome. In this study the MSDO strategy will be applied to explain how Sweden differs from Denmark and Norway. Secondly, the MDSO will highlight the differences between Norway and Denmark and in this way isolate the variables that differ, yet do not seem to be crucial for conditioning the same outcome for these two countries.

Having dichotomized the outcome variable (separate anti-doping organization: yes or no), we now turn to the understanding of the outcome by selecting a limited number of condition variables. The MSDO/MDSO model described above is an ideal protocol as it seeks to isolate one determinant variable (De Meur, Bursens and Gottscheiner 2006). In reality the variables are inter-related. Hypothetically, one can imagine that two separate variables that assumingly do not affect an outcome, once brought together, impact on an outcome. This means that we must treat the explanatory effect of one single variable with caution and always view it in a relational perspective.
Rather than isolating one or two variables and treating them as deterministic causalities, we understand variables as conditions we as researchers select in order to understand a case. For the selection of condition variables we operate with three main categories: political, sport organizational and public sphere/mass media. The construction of WADA can mainly be perceived as a partnership or an interrelation between the international sport movement, the political-legislative level and a public sphere in which the mass media play a crucial role (Møller 2008, Wagner 2009). Therefore, we use these triangular categories and for operational purposes we separate them, although we are aware of their interrelatedness. For instance, mass media perceptions of doping are affected by political decisions and likewise mass media coverage of doping in sport can catalyze political new orientations.

The criteria for selecting the condition variables are as follows. Firstly, variables are selected in accordance with our theoretical assumption, based on a new institutional approach to world society. This means we look at how national anti-doping measures are related to international events and organizations. Secondly, variables are chosen on the basis of knowledge provided by the growing amount of academic literature dealing with the organization of anti-doping policy. Thirdly, an element of the authors’ intuition is applied since both of us have been working on the topic of anti-doping for several years. Accordingly, instead of claiming to have eliminated bias, we admit that variable selection as well as interpretation encompasses a constructionist dimension. In order to compare, we limit the number of condition variables, thus reducing complexity and increasing the explanatory power of the selected variables. A large number of condition variables tends to ‘individualize’ cases and make comparative explanations difficult. In so far it is possible, we dichotomize the condition variables as well (e.g. yes/no;
legal/prohibited). This enables us more precisely to point to variables that have a high explanatory impact.

Empirically, we have used existing academic literature on anti-doping policy, various publicly accessible policy and law documents, press releases and information gained from official websites. Since doping became part of a wider public approach due to the 1988 Seoul Ben Johnson-affair and subsequent efforts conducted by the Council of Europe (Houlihan, 1999; 2002) our time frame range from 1988 and forward, but with particular emphasis on the period after 1998. The selected empirical sources cover various sub-domains of the three main categories and enable us to outline several condition variables belonging to each category. Academic literature is mainly derived from peer-reviewed journals covering sociology, management and policy analysis of sport and doping. Law and policy documents are accessed via the official websites of governing bodies. Like this our purpose is to underpin and specify significant differences and similarities between the three case studies. The condition variables are presented in detail in the next section. Thus, our intention is not to provide detailed insights and micro-perspectives on Scandinavian anti-doping management. Instead, on the basis of the selected empirical sources, we provide a general comparable overview.

**Selected condition variables**

All-in-all we have chosen 18 condition variables (hereafter ‘cvar’) belonging to the three categories (see Table 1). One condition variable (cvar1) is not dichotomized, but we believe it is of importance to locate the political department (ministry) that deals with anti-doping and/or sport because one can observe a variation throughout Europe (e.g. in Germany it is located in the Federal Ministry of the Interior while in France the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports is responsible). The impact of INGO key figures is
also taken into consideration, including: the long-standing commitment of the Council of Europe (CoE), (Houlihan 1999, 2002), the formal composition of the WADC and subsequent formal support for the 2005 UNESCO Convention (Hanstad, Skille and Loland 2010, Houlihan 2007, Wagner 2009). However, anti-doping legislation existed prior to the emergence of WADA. In the 1960s and 1970s some countries had already created laws that formally prohibited doping (Houlihan, 2002), and current debates occasionally pivot upon the question of prohibition. It is also interesting to see how the question of anti-doping has shifted from being a peripheral political issue to a topic of political and emotional importance (Ferstle 2001). Here, we distinguish between the political profile before (cvar5) and after (cvar6) the Festina scandal because this event created a hitherto unseen momentum for the international struggle against doping in sport. The latter two variables seek to expose a more active extrovert commitment to anti-doping than those represented by ‘symbolic’ support for international agreements and conventions. Scholars have pointed to the growing problems of coupling anti-doping measures in elite sport with efforts to combat the recreational/fitness-based use of drugs (Christiansen 2009, 2011). We therefore find it important to investigate whether the political focus on the fitness sector/popular use of doping-related drugs existed prior to the establishment of WADA in 1999 (cvar7). Finally, a condition variable focuses on how in the period immediately after the 1998 scandal political authorities reacted to the formal decision of creating WADA in late 1999 (cvar8), which was prompted by an immediate demand for political action and perceptions akin to moral panic following the scandal (Møller 2008).

The first condition variable (cvar9) in the sport organization category that we believe can be of importance is whether a country has one or two major national sport confederations (Bergsgaard and Norberg 2010). Furthermore, we believe it is important
to include whether ‘high-risk doping sports’ (e.g. road cycling, track-and-field athletics, Nordic skiing or weightlifting) have provided top results for any of the countries compared and have subsequently had an impact on national policy. Important anti-doping personalities from the sport movement are taken into consideration (cvar11), drawing on the classical works of Max Weber, who uses charisma as one ideal type for legitimacy and accordingly perceives charismatic leadership as an ideal type for organizations (Clegg, Courpasson and Philips 2006). It is a way of integrating the possibility that the intra-personal level can affect the national organization level. The formal support for the WADC (cvar12) and the organizational commitment to anti-doping initiatives before 1998 are of importance as they reveal whether sport organizations merely ‘invented’ anti-doping as a means of claiming legitimacy once the scandals of 1998 occurred (cvar14).

The first condition variable belonging to public sphere/mass media is whether national sport icons have been involved in drug scandals/abuse or not (cvar15). Studies by Blackwell (1991) and Carstairs (2003) indicate a close connection between sport stars and national perceptions of doping. In addition, we take the role of mass media doping revelations into consideration because critical mass media coverage can have an impact on subsequent anti-doping policy (cvar16). Various scholars (Hamqvist 2009, Møller 2008) have pointed to the importance of the mass media in relation to doping scandals in particular and to the impact of scandals on subsequent institutionalization. Hosting huge mega-events has become an integrated and increasingly important part of modern Olympic sports (Preuss, 2004). For example, hosting big events such as IOC and WADA conferences on the doping topic is assumed to have a potential impact on the public sphere and subsequent organizational institutionalization (cvar17). Finally, public awareness and the mass media exhibition of ‘doping-hunters’ are assumed to
have an influence on how anti-doping measures are institutionalized (cvar18). In contrast to cvar11, this variable does not only include personalities with a background in the sport movement, although there might be an overlap.

**Methodological limitations**

The variables are dichotomized, which seems to be an accepted method (among others, e.g. applying scales) within the comparative methodological literature (Ragin, 1987; Gerring, 2001). This, however, might lead to simplifications of otherwise complex issues, for instance by isolating singular facts at the expense of the dynamics conditioned by interrelations. In addition, we have accepted bias as an integrated aspect of our analysis. We base our analysis on a constructivist perception, which means that we accept contingency as an inherent part of scientific selection. On the one hand, by making the condition variable selection process as transparent as possible, we aim at embedding the selections in our theoretical framework and in relation to existing literature. On the other hand, other condition variables could have been selected. We are also aware that some variables differ significantly in character of others. For instance, some seem rather ‘factual’ while others rely to a much greater degree upon our interpretation, for instance whether a country has a high anti-doping profile or not.

As part of our results from comparing two countries with a similar outcome, we end up with values termed ‘split values’. These are variables where two countries with a similar outcome (i.e. Denmark and Norway) differ in value, one of them sharing a value with the country representing the different outcome (Sweden). This points to the weakness of our method because it does not take the relational perspective into consideration. One might easily imagine a situation where a split value under specific
relational circumstances co-conditions other values leading to the similar outcome. Such relational combinations are difficult to represent in this kind of study.

Results

Outlining Scandinavian similarities and differences in ways of organizing anti-doping measures

In Table 1 we have drawn up the results when we look at the condition variables listed above. We have inserted the values pertaining to the 18 condition variables.

Table 1

In some cases there are no significant differences between the three Scandinavian countries. Prior to the establishment of WADA all three of them (cvar2) endorsed the Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention ETS No. 135, adopted in 1989 in the wake of the Ben Johnson Olympic scandal in 1988 (CoE 2004a; 2004b; 2004c). In a similar way, all three countries were among the first at the political level to formally accept the World Anti-Doping Code through their endorsement of the 2003 Copenhagen Declaration and subsequently by acknowledging the 2005 UNESCO Convention (cvar3). All three countries are part of the International Anti-Doping Arrangement (IADA, established in 1991), where Norway was one of the pioneers while Sweden and Denmark joined in 1998 and 2000 respectively. One can characterize IADA as a WADA precursor on a multi-lateral government level.

In the sport organization category all three countries have provided world class results in sports that are historically closely connected to doping cultures: Danish road
cycling in the 1990s, while both Norway and Sweden have been the leading countries in Nordic skiing disciplines; and to some extent track-and-field athletes from these three countries have been part of the world elite (cvar10). Sport federations of the three countries have been committed to international anti-doping initiatives, primarily those promoted by the International Olympic Committee prior to the 1999 establishment of WADA (cvar14); subsequently they have supported the WADC as well (cvar13).

All three countries have been affected to varying degrees by doping incidents (cvar15): Before and during the 2000 Summer Olympics two Norwegian athletes, the wrestler Fritz Aanes and the weightlifter Stian Grimseth, tested positive. Former gold-winning Russian athlete, Ludmila Engqvist, later competing for Sweden, was tested positive in 2002 as she tried a spectacular comeback in the winter bobsleigh competition. Finally, and most notably, professional road-cycling riders such as Bjarne Riis, Brian Holm and Jesper Skibby of the Golden Danish Era have been accused of, and later admitted, EPO-doping. A final condition variable in common is that in all three countries publicly known ‘doping-hunters’ exist (cvar18), i.e. persons mainly with a political and/or medical background. Physicians such as Bengt Saltin and Rasmus Damsgaard played important roles as specialists in the Danish mass media and also in the initial efforts to create Anti-Doping Denmark in 2000 (Kulturministeriet 1999). In Sweden Arne Ljungqvist, besides being a leading sport personality (IAAF and later IOC), also had the role as a public anti-doping figure due to his profession as a medical professor at the Karolinska Institutet (Sandberg, Olinder and Berglund 2004). In Norway, Rune Andersen, today Director of WADA Standard and Harmonization and Hans B. Skaset have had similar double positions as a representatives from the sport movement and as a key figures within the sport-political scene (Hanstad and Goksøyr 2005).
These similarities in all three Scandinavian countries might very well explain some key features of anti-doping efforts, for instance that one can regard the Scandinavian efforts as leading within the global anti-doping regime under construction compared to other countries in the world. Simultaneously, it might be argued that these conditions are found in and shared by other, non-Scandinavian countries, although our analysis does not extend to other countries. What these condition variables do not explain is why Norway and Denmark have chosen more or less the same solution, while Sweden has chosen another.

**Differences between countries adopting independent and non-independent anti-doping organizations - Denmark and Norway versus Sweden**

To understand how Sweden is distinct from Denmark and Norway, we apply the *MSDO* strategy. We leave out those condition variables which are common to all three countries and focus on the variables in which Sweden differs from values shared by Denmark and Norway. Some values are split and may, for instance, be shared by Sweden and Norway but not by Denmark. We do not consider these split values to be irrelevant, but on their own they do not seem to be decisive for a specific outcome, but in relation to other, ‘stronger’ variables may very well contribute to a certain outcome.

*Insert Table 2 here*

The most striking difference is that Swedish anti-doping measures are overseen by two different government departments. Doping considered as a problem of the broader society is the responsibility of the department of Health and Social Affairs, where other drug-related issues are also found, e.g. alcohol, tobacco and narcotics. Laws on doping
are the domain of this department. Sport is an issue belonging to the Swedish Ministry of Culture, and issues on doping in sport are located here. The Swedish Sport Confederation receives its funding, including funding for its anti-doping measures, from this department as well. (cvar 1). In Denmark and Norway both sport and anti-doping is dealt with by the same administrative unit – the Ministry of Culture. Most probably, this is connected to a much earlier Swedish focus on a broader popular/fitness sector use of doping substances as a matter beyond sport (cvar7). Prior to the Festina scandal a comprehensive Swedish political report drew urgent attention to the popular use of anabolic steroids and specific body cultures (SOU 1996, p. 126). As early as 1991, when Sweden initiated its law prohibiting some doping substances, the neologism ‘dopning’ was introduced in contradistinction to the word doping, which was considered closely connected to sport and thus not taking in a wider societal perspective (see also Sandberg, Olinder and Berglund 2004, p. 140-163). In addition, and as recommended (SOU, 1996, p. 126), the use of doping substances was criminalized by Swedish law in 1999 (cvar4). In contrast to Denmark and Norway, Sweden’s political profile in fighting doping in elite sport during the early phase of WADA’s establishment, was significantly downplayed at the political and governmental level (cvar6). Denmark hosted the 2003 Copenhagen World Conference leading to the World Anti-Doping Code, and Norway, which had already hosted the third IOC Permanent World Conference on Anti-Doping in Bergen as early as 1991, hosted the second meeting of the International Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport (IICGADS) in 2000, as well as hosting the Secretariat of Association of National Anti-Doping Organizations (ANADOs) from 2003 to 2006. Unlike Denmark and Norway, Sweden has not been the host of similar major anti-doping events (cvar17), although they hosted the WADA Foundation Board meeting in December 2009 and
conducted unsuccessful preparations in order to become the hosting city (Stockholm) of the WADA headquarters. Finally, one can see how elite sport in general is organized in the three countries. Cvar 12 needs some clarification. In Denmark, Team Denmark is a separate, autonomous unit responsible for elite sport and constituted by legal acts pertaining to elite sport. In Norway elite sport is embedded in the Olympic Top Sports Program (Olympiatoppen) that, although formally operating as part of and is accountable to the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederations of Sports (NIF), has a high degree of autonomy (Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen 2006). We argue that the Olympic Top Sports Program functions to a large extent as a relatively autonomous unit within the NIF, but with less direct political interference than in Denmark. In Sweden elite sport is organized by the sport federations in collaboration with the Swedish Olympic Committee (SOK), but with financial support for talented and elite athletes provided by the national confederation, Riksidrottsförbundet. Thus, a significantly lower degree of political interference in elite sport management occur in Swedish sport. Both in Norway and in Denmark the organization of elite sport has been, to varying degrees, a topic for political debates and solutions.

Our conclusion is, therefore, that the reason why Sweden differs from Denmark and Norway, despite many similarities, stems from its earlier focus on doping [dopning] as a popular/fitness problem concerning public health. This means that the issue is not dealt with politically in the same administrative unit as sport, and so anti-doping is not closely associated with elite sport. Formally, though, doping is prohibited. Of utmost importance is the Swedish tradition of rare political intervention in elite sport matters. This results in a more autonomous organization of elite sports. Like this, in the period since 1998, Swedish anti-doping measures in elite sport have so far been mainly
administered by the sport organizations themselves. Thus, until recently, there has been no political reason for creating an independent national anti-doping organization.

**Similarities between countries adopting independent anti-doping organizations - Denmark versus Norway**

To understand how the outcome is similar in Denmark and Norway despite various differences, we apply the *MDSO* strategy. By using this strategy we intend to isolate those factors that have a significant impact on the construction of independent national anti-doping agencies in the two countries compared.

**Insert Table 3 here**

In Table 3 we have summarized the common variables shared by Denmark and Norway, but not by Sweden. Thus, we have excluded condition variables 2, 3, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15 and 18. We assume that these variables, shared by all three countries, do not contain any explanatory force when we go on to explore why two countries end up adopting a similar model.

According to our results the administrative location of anti-doping measures within the Ministry of Culture, thus integrated with other sport topics, seems to have a high explanatory force (*cvar1*). In contradistinction to criminalization by law, the creation of a new, autonomous NADO can be seen as the solution to the doping issue in sport adopted by both Denmark and Norway (*cvar4*), and this symbol-loaded solution seems to be compatible with a high political profile (*cvar6*). We even interpret this political anti-doping commitment as opposed to a political focus on public health issues in the initial phase (*cvar7*), although we are aware that over the last five years growing
political and legislative emphasis has been placed on the health-related popular/fitness use of doping substances. Having a specific organization (unit) deal with a particular issue (anti-doping) shares similarities with ways of dealing with elite sport in Denmark and Norway, where full or quasi-independent elite sport organizations were created during the 1980s (cvar 12). Hosting huge anti-doping events simply underpins the perception of anti-doping as a high profile area in these two countries (cvar 17).

On the other hand, major differences between Norway and Denmark are here ascribed minor explanatory significance. Although Norway had a high political anti-doping profile prior to 1998, it assumingly did not impact on how national anti-doping was institutionalized afterwards (cvar5). That two major national sport federations are found in Denmark\textsuperscript{iii} seems to have no effect (cvar9). The outward show of important anti-doping profiles within the sport movement has a minor impact (cvar 11). Finally, differences in mass-media revelations (cvar16) seem unable to explain why a similar outcome emerges.

Our conclusion is, therefore, that the administrative location, lacking criminalization of doping, compensated for by a high political anti-doping profile after 1998, but without a focus on popular/fitness use prior to 1998, leads to the solution of creating an independent anti-doping organization. This is consistent with the way elite sport was organized in these two countries in the 1980s and how anti-doping became part of hosting international doping events.

**Discussion: How to understand the conditions leading to independent and non-independent anti-doping organizations**
We have now outlined similarities and differences by applying 18 condition variables. The next step is to discuss how we can understand the way anti-doping efforts have been approached in Scandinavia drawing on new institutional elaborations deliberations on a world society.

The transformation of the IOC from a philanthropic society into a global enterprise promoting a brand suitable for political, mass-media and commercial interests is without question one of the most crucial developments in increasingly globalized world of sports. In this way, the growth of a world sport society has been catalyzed by change within and by the new vanguard position of the IOC in this period, supported by the emergence of new and expanding forms of mass media (television broadcasting and, more recently, the internet). These considerations point to the importance of a transnational level which has had a significant impact on national-level policy making. An example of this is how during the 1980s Scandinavian countries changed their perception of the role of elite sport in a welfare state context from being a non-issue to an issue of legitimate political interest.

One can argue that the efforts of the IOC, despite the questions one can raise concerning its half-hearted commitment to anti-doping (Hoberman 2001), have been of importance to the ways in which national sport federations and other international sport federations have reacted towards the problem. In a similar way, the efforts of defining an international anti-doping policy by the Council of Europe (Houlihan 1999) have emerged from a transnational level. In drawing up the contents of important policy papers such as the WADC, these INGOs have had much more influence than, for example, individual nation states (Wagner 2010). Through the implementation of the UNESCO Convention and through the commitment of state policy to endorsing the 2007 revised version of the WADC, isomorphism has been the final goal. Despite this
and the fact that the whole WADA process aims at global harmonization (similarity), it still does not fully explain why a country like Sweden differs from Denmark and Norway. Here, we believe that understanding national-level contexts plays a crucial role. For many years Sweden has regarded doping as not being limited to the world of elite sport but has placed the question within the broader context of public health policy related to alcohol, narcotics and tobacco. Most recently this policy has been explicitly termed “ANLD policy” (Socialdepartementet 2010). Denmark, known as an advocate of a more liberal policy towards alcohol and drugs, has only recently started to perceive doping as being also a matter of public health. Amendments to Danish doping law have made testing in the commercial fitness sector possible, but of utmost importance is the fact that it is done with reference to the WADA list of prohibited substances and conducted by the national anti-doping organization. In this way, and critically examined by scholars (Christiansen 2009, 2011), the rationale behind fighting doping in elite sport is blindly transferred to the adjacent area of fitness and body modulation.

Despite our theoretical modifications, the new institutional notion of world society impact contributes increased knowledge about the importance of international non-governmental organizations and decisions made at the transnational level. When it comes to national responses to this institutionalization process, the state and government organizations might challenge this process by trying to set their own national agenda, for instance through a process of manipulation by which organizations challenge institutional prescriptions (Oliver 1991). At the national level the globalized culture of elite sport is blended with national discourses and integrated into domestic power struggles. As anti-doping becomes a high-profile area, for instance as seen in Denmark, additional efforts that enable politicians in power to maintain and reproduce this profile lead to formalized efforts based on myth and ceremonial acts (Meyer and
Rowan 1991), rather than initiatives that seek to understand the content, context and cultural significance of popular/fitness doping. The sudden focus on fitness sector doping on the basis of the WADC can be interpreted as an example of chasing legitimacy at the expense of rationality. We suggest, therefore, that explaining current Scandinavian anti-doping regimes as a mere result of a world society culture is only plausible if one takes the possibility of ‘national interpretation’ seriously into consideration. Here, we might say that isomorphism occurs as similarity at the national level rather than similarity provoked by world society (Campbell 2010); that is to say, Swedish anti-doping policy shares similarities with how Swedish elite sport is organized.

**Conclusion**

Our conclusion is that contemporary Scandinavian efforts to institutionalize anti-doping measures can largely be explained as driven forward by the emergence of a world sport culture. Important INGOs play a significant role in how anti-doping efforts are subsequently institutionalized at a national level. However, this process is not merely a top-down process because anti-doping perceptions are contextualized at the national level, thus allowing room for national interpretation. A further, very decisive aspect, therefore, is the relation between national and global sport cultures. Anti-doping in elite sport has a more autonomous status in Sweden, as compared to Denmark and Norway. This also explains how and why anti-doping is managed differently.

We suggest that the early perception of anti-doping as a matter also involving the fitness/popular sport sector, the location of anti-doping both in the Department of Health and in the Department of Culture, early criminalization, keeping a low political
profile on doping and elite sport, and a tradition of not interfering in elite sport matters explains why Sweden has not yet set up a separate, independent national anti-doping agency. By contrast, locating anti-doping together with sport issues, discussing but not implementing the criminalization of doping, and still keeping anti-doping as a high political profile area initially separate from fitness/popular sport and in conjunction with a tradition of political interference in elite sport matters, explains how separate national anti-doping organizations have been established in Denmark and Norway.

Accordingly, two major challenges for Scandinavian anti-doping efforts can be outlined. While separate anti-doping organizations are created throughout the world, it might seem strange that one of the leading countries has kept a model in which the organization responsible for elite sport is simultaneously the body in charge of controlling and conducting anti-doping measures. Besides seeming irrational, it risks weakening the legitimacy of organized sport per se. As mentioned at the beginning of the article, Sweden is currently discussing its future anti-doping arrangements, a discussion which will most likely lead to the establishment of a new, independent anti-doping organization.

Denmark and, to some extent, Norway are facing a different challenge. Basing the emphasis of the recent struggle against popular/fitness doping on the WADA rules while simultaneously imposing the task of testing on the national anti-doping organization may very well be an example of mixing two irreconcilable agendas. The legislative shift may be interpreted as an example of political organizations aiming at legitimacy (‘a government that acts’) rather than as a rational act. The future challenge, then, is to differentiate between doping in elite sport and the use of doping substances
among fitness users and in certain body cultures. In this respect, Sweden seems to take the lead.

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References


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i http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=31037&language=E#1

ii These papers were first published in 1983 and 1977 respectively. Their basic claim was that organizational isomorphism was the result of organizations pursuing the legitimacy provided by their institutional surroundings rather than heading for rationalized solutions.

iii DIF (Sport Confederation of Denmark) organizes elite sport, including the national Olympic committee, and DGI (Danish Gymnastics and Sport Associations) caters non-competitive sports, gymnastics and movement cultures.