The Power of Money: Wealth Effects in Contests

BY

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Abstract

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Keywords: Conflict, contest, rent-seeking, wealth, risk aversion, lobbying, power, redistribution.

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The Power of Money: Wealth Effects in Contests

Abstract

Two wealth effects typically arise in any contest: i) wealth decreases the marginal cost of effort, but also ii) decreases the marginal benefit of winning the contest. In this paper, we introduce three types of strategic contest models depending on whether the first, second, or both wealth effects play a role: namely, a privilege contest, an ability contest, and a rent-seeking contest. Our theoretical analysis reveals that the effects of wealth and wealth inequality are strongly “contest-dependent” and are complex in the sense that they depend on the decisiveness of the contest and on the higher-order derivatives of the utility functions of wealth. Our analysis thus does not support general claims that the rich should lobby more or that low economic growth and wealth inequality should lead to additional conflicts.

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“Pecunia nervus belli.”

1 Introduction

As popularized by Frank and Cook’s (1995) best-selling book “The Winner-Take-All Society” many competitive situations in modern economies take the form of a contest. Examples include political lobbying, research and development, marketing, promotion, status-seeking, and litigation activities (Konrad 2009). In this paper, we are interested in the effect of wealth in contests. In particular, the motivation for our analysis is general questions such as: Do rich people lobby more? Does low economic growth and wealth inequality induce additional conflicts?

The relationship between wealth and power has attracted attention for centuries (Marx 1867, Wright Mills 1956). The conventional wisdom suggests that the rich are more powerful than the poor. Bartels (2005) concludes, for instance, that US senators appear to be considerably more responsive to the opinions of their more affluent constituents. Nevertheless, in contrast, casual observation suggests that low wealth induces greater participation and effort in contest-type situations. People involved in highly predatory and competitive activities, such as thieves or athletes for instance, typically come from poorer segments of society. More corruption is also typically observed in poorer countries (Aidt 2009, Gundlach and Paldam 2009). Some groups (e.g., farmers), although often relatively poor, are well-known to be politically powerful. As a result, redistributive politics almost always goes from the rich to the poor. Poverty has also been found to be a robust factor in explaining violent crime and civil conflicts (Collier and Hoefler 1998, Fajnzylberg, Lederman and Loayza 2002, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Blattman and Miguel 2010). Relatedly, it is often said that redistribution policies favour political

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{This is consistent with the beliefs of some prominent economists. For instance, Anne Krueger (1974), in her pioneering work on rent seeking argues that we can perceive the price system “as a mechanism rewarding the rich and well-connected”. Likewise Jack Hirshleifer (1995) stresses that “the half of the population above the median wealth surely has greater political strength than the half below”. Paul Krugman (2010) similarly observes that “the rich are different from you and me: they have more influence”. Lastly, Daron Acemoglu (2012) declares that “the rise in inequality has created a class of very wealthy citizens who can use their wealth to gain more political power — partly to defend their wealth and partly to further their economic, political, and ideological agendas”.}\]
stability and social peace.

Although these observations concern many disparate issues, they suggest that wealth may have fundamentally different, and perhaps opposing, effects in contests. Economic theory may then help us to think straightforwardly about which basic wealth effects should dominate under particular conditions. Accordingly, what do we know from economic theory about wealth effects in contests? Surprisingly, not much. Indeed the question of the effect of wealth in contests has received little attention in the (otherwise vast) theoretical literature on contests (Tullock 1980, Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007, Konrad 2009, Congleton, Hillman and Konrad 2010). In all likelihood, there is probably a quite simple explanation. Consider, the “workhorse” model in this literature based on a strategic game where each agent has the following payoff function:

$$U_i = w_i - x_i + \Pi_i r,$$

in which $x_i$ is agent $i$’s effort, $r$ is the rent (i.e., the prize) for the contest winner and $\Pi_i$ is the probability of winning the contest. Notice immediately then that individual wealth $w_i$ enters additively in the payoff function (1), and thus has no effect on the agent’s effort (which is then, without loss of generality, usually set to zero in the literature).

The primary objective of this paper is to adapt this basic contest model minimally in order to examine the wealth effects. To do so, we introduce a utility function that displays the familiar property of the decreasing marginal utility of wealth. This allows us to capture the two most basic wealth effects we believe should naturally arise in contests:

- First, wealth can reduce the marginal cost of effort. To illustrate, note that it is marginally less costly for a rich person than a poor person to offer a monetary payment to, e.g., a politician, in order to obtain some privilege. The rich can thus relatively more easily afford costly expenditures in a contest than the poor, other things being equal.

- Second, and in contrast to the first effect, wealth may decrease the marginal benefit of winning a contest. To illustrate, note that it is marginally more beneficial for the poor to obtain the monetary reward associated with victory in a contest. We may thus regard the poor as
being relatively more motivated to exert effort in a contest than the rich, other things being equal.

In this paper, we consider in Section 3 a model in which only the first effect on marginal cost is active, the so-called “privilege contest” model. In this model, effort is monetary, but the rent —i.e., the privilege— is non-monetary and therefore its marginal value is independent of the level of wealth. We then consider in Section 4 a model in which only the second effect on the marginal benefit is active, the so-called “ability contest” model. In this alternative model, rent is monetary but effort —which determines ability— is non-monetary and so the marginal cost of effort is independent of wealth. According to our intuition, the effect of increasing wealth on agent effort is positive in the privilege contest model while it is negative in the ability contest model. We also examine the effect of wealth redistribution in both models, and find that this tends to decrease aggregate effort when the decisiveness of the contest (to be defined precisely in Section 2) is sufficiently low.

We then move to study in Section 5 a model in which the two effects play a simultaneous role, the so-called “rent-seeking contest” model, corresponding to the rent-seeking model with risk aversion (Cornes and Hartley 2012). In this model, we show that under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), the two opposing wealth effects discussed earlier exactly offset each other so that wealth has no effect on the efforts of agents. Moreover, we show that wealth tends to increase effort if more background risk increases risk aversion. This provides a sufficient condition on the utility function (due to Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger 1996), which is stronger than decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), for signing the effect of wealth in the rent-seeking contest model. We also show that under this condition, a rich agent exerts relatively more effort than a poor agent, and that an isolated increase in the wealth of the rich agent always increases that agent’s effort, but reduces the effort of the poor agent.

Finally, in Section 6 we discuss other possible wealth effects identified in the literature (Grossman 1991, Hirshleifer 1991, Skaperdas and Gan 1995, Che and Gale 1997). Section 7 concludes our analysis. In the next section, we define the general set-up of our models and derive some preliminary results.
2 General set-up and preliminary results

In our analysis, we study the effects of several types of wealth changes: namely, an increase in the wealth of a single player, an increase in the wealth of all players, along with an increase in wealth inequality in the form of a mean-preserving spread (MPS) of the distribution of wealth across players. We examine the wealth effects both on each player’s respective effort and on aggregate effort. Moreover, we compare the relative effort of a rich player to that of a poor player within an equilibrium. We first present some preliminary results about the conditions that determine the sign of all these wealth effects in a general class of strategic models. This class includes the three contest models considered in the remainder of the paper.\textsuperscript{2} Theorem 1 below provides a simple single crossing property that will turn out to be instrumental throughout the paper, while Theorem 2 derives a condition for signing the effect of a MPS in wealth. Section 2.2 discusses the assumptions on and properties of the contest success function (CSF).

2.1 Preliminary results

We consider a strategic game with two players, $i = a, b$, in which the only source of heterogeneity is wealth $w_i$. We assume without loss of generality that $a$ is more wealthy than $b$: $w_a \geq w_b$ (with $w_a = w_b$ corresponding to the symmetric situation). It is convenient to denote the best-response functions as $f(x_b, w_a)$ and $g(x_a, w_b)$ for players $a$ and $b$, respectively, where $x_i$ denotes the effort of player $i$. We assume that these best-response functions are single-valued and continuous in their arguments. The effort levels $(x_a, x_b)$ constitute an equilibrium for the game with initial wealth $(w_a, w_b)$ when

\begin{align}
    x_a &= f(g(x_a, w_b), w_a), \\
    x_b &= g(f(x_b, w_a), w_b).
\end{align}

We write $x_a(w_a, w_b)$ and $x_b(w_a, w_b)$ as the equilibrium effort levels for this game and assume the existence of a unique interior equilibrium. Building on

\textsuperscript{2}Our strategic contest models belong to the class of “aggregative games” for which each individuals’ payoffs only depend on their own effort and on the aggregate efforts of all players. It has been shown that aggregative games display special features that make their analysis simpler under some conditions (Bergstrom and Varian 1985, Corchon 1994, Acemoglu and Jensen 2013). Nevertheless, it is not clear how these features are useful for studying systematically the various wealth effects we examine in this paper. In fact, the following preliminary results are fairly general, and not restricted to aggregative games.
the literature (Szidarovszky and Okuguchi 1997, Yamazaki 2009), we discuss in detail these equilibrium properties in the appendix for our three contest models.

We now introduce the following single-crossing property.\(^3\)

**Theorem 1** Suppose that \( \alpha = \beta \implies \theta_\alpha(w_\alpha, w_\beta) > (\theta_\beta(w_\alpha, w_\beta) \iff w_\alpha > w_\beta \implies x_\alpha(w_\alpha, w_\beta) > (\theta_\beta(w_\alpha, w_\beta). \)

This theorem implies that when \( \theta_\alpha(w_\alpha, w_\beta) \mid w_\alpha = w_\beta > \theta_\beta(w_\alpha, w_\beta) \mid w_\alpha = w_\beta, \) player \( \alpha \) exerts more effort than player \( \beta \). Thus, to compare within an equilibrium the relative effort of the rich and poor players, it is sufficient to examine at the symmetric equilibrium how each player comparatively reacts to an increase in the wealth of player \( \alpha \).

We have characterized a property of the equilibrium in an asymmetric game. In addition, we assume in the following that the condition \( 1 - f_1 g_1 \geq 0 \) is always satisfied. Note that this is the case if we assume that the equilibrium is locally stable, or \( |f_1 g_1| < 1 \) (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995, p. 414). We discuss this condition in detail in the appendix for our three contest models.

Implicit differentiation of (2)-(3) gives the effects of isolated increases in wealth:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial x_\alpha}{\partial w_\alpha} &= \frac{f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1}, \\
\frac{\partial x_\beta}{\partial w_\alpha} &= \frac{g_1 f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1}, \\
\frac{\partial x_\alpha}{\partial w_\beta} &= \frac{f_1 g_2}{1 - f_1 g_1}, \\
\frac{\partial x_\beta}{\partial w_\beta} &= \frac{g_2}{1 - f_1 g_1}.
\end{align*}
\]

where the numerical subscripts with \( f \) and \( g \) denote partial derivatives and these functions are all evaluated at equilibrium. Thus, an increase in \( w_\alpha \) increases player \( \alpha \)'s effort if and only if (“iff” hereafter) \( f_2 > 0 \) and increases

\(^3\)All theorems are proven in the appendix.
player’s $b$ effort iff $g_1 f_2 > 0$. The corresponding effects on aggregate effort are
\[
\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} + \frac{\partial x_b}{\partial w_a} = \frac{f_2 (1 + g_1)}{1 - f_1 g_1}, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_b} + \frac{\partial x_b}{\partial w_b} = \frac{g_2 (1 + f_1)}{1 - f_1 g_1}.
\] (8)

In a symmetric equilibrium (SE), $f_i = g_i$ ($i = 1, 2$). In that case, the change in individual effort following a common wealth increase is
\[
\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial w_i} |_{dw_a = dw_b} = \frac{f_2}{1 - f_1}.
\] (9)

Finally, when wealth is redistributed from $b$ to $a$, $dw_a = -dw_b$. Then
\[
\frac{dx_a}{dw_a} |_{dw_a = -dw_b} = \frac{f_2 - f_1 g_2}{1 - f_1 g_1}, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{dx_b}{dw_a} |_{dw_a = -dw_b} = \frac{g_1 f_2 - g_2}{1 - f_1 g_1}.
\]

In a symmetric equilibrium, a wealth transfer from $b$ to $a$ has no first-order effect on aggregate effort since
\[
\frac{dx_a}{dw_a} |_{dw_a = -dw_b} = -\frac{dx_b}{dw_a} |_{dw_a = -dw_b} = \frac{f_2}{1 + f_1}.
\]

The second-order effect of such a MPS in wealth is given by the following theorem.

**Theorem 2** Consider a symmetric equilibrium. Let the stability condition $f_1^2 < 1$ be satisfied. The second-order effect of a MPS in wealth $dw_a = -dw_b$ on aggregate effort $x_a + x_b$ is given by
\[
\frac{(f_2^2 f_{11} - 2(1 + f_1) f_2 f_{12} + (1 + f_1)^2 f_{22})}{(1 + f_1)(1 - f_1^2)}.
\] (10)

The numerator is a quadratic form in the Hessian of $f(\cdot)$. The denominator is positive under the stability condition.

---

4It can be written as $\left[ -f_2 \quad 1 + f_1 \right] \left[ f_{11} \quad f_{12} \right] \left[ f_{12} \quad f_{22} \right] \left[ -f_2 \quad 1 + f_1 \right]$. Moreover, it can be easily checked that this form equals zero under the conditions identified in the theorem in Bergstrom and Varian (1985, p. 717). These conditions ensure that the distribution of agent characteristics has no effect on aggregate effort.
2.2 The contest success function

In standard strategic contest games, the contested rent, \( r \), is indivisible in the sense that the winner takes all. Moreover, the players exert efforts, denoted \( x_i \) \((i = a, b)\) to increase the probability of winning the rent (Nitzan 1994). For any player \( i \), the probability of winning the contest, i.e., the CSF, is denoted \( \Pi_i \equiv \Pi_i(x_a, x_b) \). Very often, we will denote the probability of a winning as \( p(x_a, x_b) \) such that \( \Pi_i = 1 - p(x_a, x_b) \), and the results will be given in terms of restrictions on (the derivatives of) \( p(x_a, x_b) \). It is well known that the CSF plays a key role in strategic contest models, and this will also be the case in our analysis. We discuss here some of its key properties.

We assume throughout that the CSF has the standard logistic form,\(^5\) i.e.,

\[
p(x_a, x_b) = \frac{\Phi(x_a)}{\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b)}
\]

(11)

with \( x_i > 0 \) \((i = a, b)\) and with \( \Phi, \Phi' > 0 \). While this CSF is increasing in its arguments, concavity is only guaranteed for arbitrary effort levels when \( \Phi \) is concave. Therefore, we also assume throughout \( \Phi'' \leq 0 \), but emphasize that several of our results do not rely on this assumption. The properties of a logistic \( p(\cdot) \) are given in the appendix. Here, we draw attention to the important fact that

\[
p_{12} = \frac{\partial^2 p}{\partial x_a \partial x_b} = \frac{(\Phi(x_a) - \Phi(x_b))\Phi'(x_a)\Phi'(x_b)}{(\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b))^3}
\]

(12)

meaning that the marginal productivity of one player’s effort is enhanced by the other player’s effort iff the former exerts additional effort. This helps explain why the strategic models we consider are neither games of strategic complements nor that of strategic substitutes. In fact, as in Acemoglu and Jensen (2013), some interesting features arise in our contest models because the change in the effort of one player will either increase the effort of the other player (when this player wants to “keep up”) or decrease this effort (because this other player “gives up”).

In some parts of the analysis, we further specify the CSF to consider the following power-logistic form (Tullock 1980):

\(^5\)Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) and Konrad (2009) provide discussion of the axiomatic foundations and economic illustrations for this special, but common, class of CSF.
\[ p(x_a, x_b) = \frac{x_a^m}{x_a^m + x_b^m}, \]

where \( m > 0 \) is the “contest-decisiveness” parameter measuring how important relative effort \( \frac{x_a}{x_b} \) is compared to random factors for winning the contest (Hirshleifer 1991). If \( m \to 0 \), each player wins the contest with probability \( \frac{1}{2} \) independently of the levels of effort. Conversely, if \( m \to \infty \), the player with the largest effort almost certainly wins the contest.\(^6\) Note that \( \Phi'' \leq 0 \) is equivalent to \( m \leq 1 \). We now turn to the three types of contest mentioned in the Introduction, starting with the privilege contest.

### 3 The privilege contest model

In the privilege contest model, the rent is non-monetary. Our chief interpretation is that the benefit from winning the contest is only associated with a form of prestige (or “ego-utility”), without any financial counterpart. This model of contest may include, for instance, status-seeking activities or political campaigns or warfare for purely ideological motives.

Denoting the non-monetary benefit of the privilege as \( \rho \), we model the preferences of player \( i \) (= \( a, b \)) with wealth \( w_i \) and exerting effort \( x_i \) as

\[ U_i = u(w_i - x_i) + \Pi_i r. \tag{13} \]

We assume that \( u(\cdot) \) is concave, which ensures that the marginal willingness to pay for the privilege in terms of consumption, \( \frac{\partial u}{\partial w_i} \), is decreasing (along the indifference curve) in consumption.\(^7\) Furthermore, we can express the dependency of this willingness to pay on wealth in terms of the coefficients of absolute risk aversion, \( A_i \equiv \frac{w''(w_i - x_i)}{u(w_i - x_i)} \), and absolute prudence, \( P_i \equiv \frac{w''''(w_i - x_i)^2}{u''(w_i - x_i)^2} \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial}{\partial w_i} \left( \frac{du}{dr} \bigg|_{dU_i=0} \right) &= \frac{\Pi_i}{u_i} A_i, \text{ and } \frac{\partial^2}{\partial w_i^2} \left( \frac{du}{dr} \bigg|_{dU_i=0} \right) &= \frac{\Pi_i}{u_i} A_i (2A_i - P_i). 
\end{align*}
\tag{14}
\]

\(^6\)Hwang (2009) provides an idea about the order of magnitude of \( m \). Using data from battles fought in 17th century Europe and during World War II, he obtains values of \( .704 (.120) \) and \( 3.420 (.678) \), respectively (standard errors in brackets).

\(^7\)As \( \frac{du}{dr} \bigg|_{dU_i=0} = \frac{\Pi_i}{u_i} \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left( \frac{du}{dr} \bigg|_{dU_i=0} \right) \bigg|_{dU_i=0} = \frac{\Pi_i^2}{u_i^2} \frac{d^2 u}{dr^2} < 0. \)
In this model, the key property compared with the subsequent contest models is that the marginal benefit of exerting effort is independent of wealth.

Player $a$’s best response $f(x_b, w_a)$ is defined by the necessary first- and second-order conditions

\begin{align*}
-u'(w_a - f(x_b, w_a)) + p_1(f(x_b, w_a), x_b)r & = 0, \\
u''(w_a - f(x_b, w_a)) + p_{11}(f(x_b, w_a), x_b)r & < 0.
\end{align*}

Simple comparative statics show that

\begin{align*}
f_1 &= -\frac{p_{12}(x_a, x_b)r}{u''(w_a - x_a) + p_{11}(x_a, x_b)r} \quad \text{and} \quad \\
f_2 &= \frac{u''(w_a - x_a)}{u''(w_a - x_a) + p_{11}(x_a, x_b)r} > 0,
\end{align*}

where the inequality follows from the concavity of $u$ and the second-order condition. Therefore player $a$’s best response increases when that player’s wealth increases; i.e., effort is a normal good. The intuition is simple. When wealth increases, the marginal cost of exerting effort decreases (due to decreasing marginal utility) while the marginal benefit is unaffected. Likewise, player $b$’s best response $g(x_a, w_b)$ satisfies the necessary first- and second-order conditions

\begin{align*}
-u'(w_b - g(x_a, w_b)) - p_2(x_a, g(x_a, w_b))r & = 0, \\
u''(w_b - g(x_a, w_b)) - p_{22}(x_a, g(x_a, w_b))r & < 0.
\end{align*}

Differentiating with respect to $x_a$ and $w_b$, we obtain

\begin{align*}
g_1 &= \frac{-p_{12}(x_a, x_b)r}{-u''(w_b - x_b) + p_{22}(x_a, x_b)r}, \\
g_2 &= \frac{-u''(w_b - x_b)}{-u''(w_b - x_b) + p_{22}(x_a, x_b)r} > 0.
\end{align*}

At a symmetric equilibrium, $p_{12} = 0$ (cf. (12)) and therefore $f_1 = g_1 = 0$. Hence, at a symmetric equilibrium

\[ \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} = f_2 > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial x_b}{\partial w_a} = 0, \]

\[ \frac{\partial x_b}{\partial w_b} = f_1 = g_1 = 0. \]
and relying on Theorem 1 we can conclude that $x_a > x_b$ iff $w_a > w_b$. In view of (12), we can also conclude that $p_{12} > 0$. As a result, an isolated increase in the wealth of the poor player, $b$, increases both the equilibrium effort of that player (cf. (7) and $f_2 > 0$) as well as that of the rich player (cf. (6) and $f_1, g_2 > 0$). Hence, total equilibrium efforts also increase. Alternatively, an increase in the wealth of the rich player, $a$, increases that player’s own equilibrium effort (cf. (4) and $f_2 > 0$) but reduces that of the poor player, $b$ (cf. (5) and $g_1 < 0 < f_2$). We know from (8) that this total effect depends on $(1 + g_1)$. Observe now that $1 + g_1 > 0$ iff

$$p_{12}(x_a, x_b) - p_{22}(x_a, x_b) < -u''(w_b - x_b),$$

which, using the first-order condition for player $b$, may be written as

$$\pi(x_a, x_b) \triangleq \frac{p_{12}(x_a, x_b) - p_{22}(x_a, x_b)}{-p_2(x_a, x_b)} < A_b. \quad (15)$$

This inequality indicates that the effect of a unilateral increase in the wealth of the rich player on total effort depends on the properties of the CSF and of the utility function. Note that this inequality is more likely to be satisfied when the elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay for $r$ is large. But under our assumptions on $\Phi$ for the logistic CSF (11), we always have $\pi(x_a, x_b) < 0$ (see the appendix). Therefore the inequality (15) is always satisfied. Under the power-logistic function, the $(m, \frac{\alpha}{\gamma})$ combinations that result in $\pi = 0$ are plotted in Figure 1. Observe that $\pi(x_a, x_b) < 0$ holds for values of $m$ below 1, while only $\pi(x_a, x_b) < A_b$ is required.
We summarize this discussion as follows.

**Proposition 1** In the privilege contest model with unequal wealth, the rich player exerts more effort than the poor player. An isolated increase in the poor player’s wealth always increases the equilibrium efforts of both players. An isolated increase in the rich player’s wealth has a negative effect on the effort of the poor player, but a positive effect on total efforts.

Figure 2 illustrates these results, representing the best-response functions of players \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). Note that these functions are first increasing and then decreasing, with a maximum at \( x_\alpha = x_\beta \). Point A represents a symmetric equilibrium with uniform low wealth \( (w_\alpha = w_\beta = \underline{w}) \), while point D represents a symmetric equilibrium with uniform high wealth \( (w_\alpha = w_\beta = \bar{w}) \). Point B represents an equilibrium with \( w_\alpha = \hat{w}_\alpha > w_\beta = \underline{w} \), and the move from B to C illustrates the effect of an increase in \( w_\beta \) from \( \underline{w} \) to \( \hat{w}_\beta \). Point E is the result of an increase in \( w_\alpha \) from \( \hat{w}_\alpha \) to \( \bar{w} \). Total efforts increase, despite the fact that the poor exerts less effort than in B.
What happens under uniform wealth growth? With unequal initial wealth, total effort will change with

\[(1 - f_1 g_1)(dx_a + dx_b) = [(1 + g_1) f_2 w_a + (1 + f_1) g_2 w_b] \, d \log w \quad (16)\]

where \(d \log w\) denotes the common growth rate in wealth. Thus, the same sufficient condition for total effort to increase when \(b\) gets richer, ensures that total effort is a normal good. In a symmetric game, \(w_a = w_b\) and therefore \(x_a = x_b\), so that (16) reduces to

\[(dx_a + dx_b) = 2 f_2 w d \log w > 0 \quad (17)\]

This leads to the following result.

**Proposition 2** If (15) holds, a common increase in wealth increases total effort in the privilege contest model. With equal wealth, a common increase in wealth always increases the efforts of both players.

We finally discuss the effects of wealth inequality. From Proposition 1, we observe that decreasing (increasing) inequality in the sense of making the
poor (rich) richer increases total effort. Therefore, there is no systematic relationship between wealth inequality and effort in the privilege contest model. Now we study the effect of more wealth inequality when total wealth is constant. More precisely, we study the effect of a MPS in wealth. We can then invoke Theorem 2. In the Appendix, we prove the following result holds for a power-logistic CSF and involves the coefficients of absolute risk aversion $A$ and prudence $P$ defined at the symmetric equilibrium.

**Theorem 3** In the privilege contest model with a power-logistic CSF, the sign of the quadratic form (10) is positive iff

$$2A(1 - m^2) > P$$

First, note that this inequality may also be written as $2A - P > 2Am^2$. Thus, if the marginal willingness to pay for rent is concave in final wealth (cf. (14)), a small MPS in wealth reduces total effort. When $u$ is quadratic, $P = 0$, and the inequality reduces to $m < 1$. When $u$ is CARA, $A = P$ and the inequality reduces to $m < 2^{-\frac{1}{2}} \simeq .707$. Thus the quadratic and CARA cases illustrate cases where the value of the decisiveness parameter of the CSF determines whether the effect of a MPS in wealth on total effort is positive or negative. If we multiply (18) by $(w - x)$, we may replace $A$ and $P$ by $-u''(w-x)(w-x)$ and $-u'''(w-x)(w-x)$, the coefficients of relative risk aversion and relative prudence, respectively. When $u(\cdot)$ has constant relative-risk aversion (CRRA) denoted by $\rho$, the inequality reduces to $\rho(\frac{1}{2} - m^2) > \frac{1}{2}$. We summarize these findings as follows.

**Proposition 3** In the privilege contest model with a power-logistic CSF, a small MPS in wealth increases total effort iff (18) is positive. Under CARA (resp. quadratic) preferences, this arises iff $m < \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$ (resp. iff $m < 1$). When $u$ has CRRA $\rho$, this takes place iff $\rho(\frac{1}{2} - m^2) > \frac{1}{2}$. If the marginal willingness to pay for the rent is concave in final wealth, this never happens.

These results indicate that a low decisiveness of the CSF is needed for a small MPS in wealth to increase aggregate effort.

### 4 The ability contest model

In the ability contest model, effort is non-monetary. Our principal interpretation is a situation in which players exert physical or mental efforts that
increase their abilities, and thus put them in a better position to win a contest. Competitive sports, but also education filters, are examples of such contests.

In this model, player $i$’s expected utility equals

$$\Pi_i u(w_i + r) + (1 - \Pi_i) u(w_i) - c(x_i),$$

with $c' > 0$ and $c'' \geq 0$. As before, we assume that $u(\cdot)$ is concave, which represents decreasing marginal utility of wealth (or risk aversion). The key property in this contest model is that the marginal cost of exerting effort is independent of wealth.

The best response of player $a$, $f(x_b, w_a)$, is defined by the necessary first- and second-order conditions

$$p_1(f(x_b, w_a), x_b) \Delta u_a - c'(f(x_b, w_a)) = 0,$$

$$p_{11}(f(x_b, w_a), x_b) \Delta u_a - c''(f(x_b, w_a)) < 0,$$

where $\Delta u_i \overset{\text{def}}{=} u(w_i + r) - u(w_i) > 0$ ($i = a, b$), and similar definitions for $\Delta u'_i$ and $\Delta u''_i$. Simple comparative statics show that

$$f_1 = -\frac{p_{12} \Delta u_a}{p_{11} \Delta u_a - c''(x_a)} \quad \text{and} \quad f_2 = -\frac{p_1 \Delta u'_a}{p_{11} \Delta u_a - c''(x_a)} < 0,$$

where the inequality follows from the concavity of $u(\cdot)$ and the second-order condition. Player $a$’s best response is now an inferior good. The intuition is simple. An increase in wealth decreases the marginal benefit of effort, but has no effect on the marginal cost. Similarly, player $b$’s best response $g(x_a, w_b)$ satisfies the necessary first- and second-order conditions

$$-p_2(x_a, g(x_a, w_b)) \Delta u_b - c'(g(x_a, w_b)) = 0,$$

$$-p_{22}(x_a, g(x_a, w_b)) \Delta u_b - c''(g(x_a, w_b)) < 0,$$

and differentiating with respect to $x_a$ and $w_b$ yields

$$g_1 = -\frac{p_{21} \Delta u_b}{p_{22} \Delta u_b + c''(x_b)}, \quad \text{and} \quad g_2 = -\frac{p_2 \Delta u'_b}{p_{22} \Delta u_b + c''(x_b)} < 0.$$
Again, at a symmetric equilibrium, \( p_{12} = 0 \) and therefore \( f_1 = g_1 = 0 \). Hence, at a symmetric equilibrium (cf. (4) and (5))

\[
\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} = f_2 < 0 = \frac{\partial x_b}{\partial w_a},
\]

and Theorem 1 allows us to conclude that \( x_a < x_b \) iff \( w_a > w_b \). Unlike the privilege contest model, the rich player now exerts less effort than the poor player. At such an asymmetric equilibrium, \( p_{12} < 0 \).

An increase in player \( a \)'s wealth reduces that player’s equilibrium effort (cf. (4) and \( f_2 < 0 \)). And because \( p_{12} < 0 \), the equilibrium effort of the poorer player, \( b \), will also fall (cf. (5) and \( f_2 < 0 < g_1 \)): that is, the poorer player’s effort is a strategic complement to that of the richer player. Total equilibrium effort then unambiguously declines (\( \frac{f_2(1+g_1)}{1-f_1g_1} < 0 \)).

Conversely, an isolated increase in the wealth of the poor player, \( b \), reduces that player’s own equilibrium effort, (cf (7) and \( g_2 < 0 \)), but increases the equilibrium effort of the rich player (cf. (6) and \( f_1, g_2 < 0 \)). Without further restrictions, the sign of the effect on total equilibrium effort, \( \frac{g_2(1+f_1)}{1-f_1g_1} \), is then ambiguous. Using the first-order condition for \( a \), we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for \( 1 + f_1 \) to be positive if

\[
\frac{p_{11} - p_{12}}{p_1} < \frac{c''(x_a)}{c'(x_a)}.
\]  

(19)

For the logistic CSF, it results that \( \frac{p_{11} - p_{12}}{p_1} = \pi(x_b, x_a) < 0 \) and we therefore obtain a similar sufficient condition as for the privilege contest model (see the appendix; for the power-logistic CSF, see Figure 1, but with \( \frac{b}{x_a} \) now on the horizontal axis). This leads to the following result.

**Proposition 4** In the ability contest model with unequal wealth, the rich player exerts less effort than the poor player. An isolated increase in the rich player’s wealth always reduces the equilibrium effort of both players. An isolated increase in the poor player’s wealth has a positive effect on the effort of the rich player, but a negative effect on total effort.

Figure 3 depicts the results obtained in this section. It should be remembered that an increase in wealth decreases the best-response functions in the
ability contest model. Thus, point A represents a symmetric equilibrium with low wealth \((w_a = w_b = \overline{w})\), and so the move from A to D illustrates the effect of a common increase in wealth from \(\overline{w}\) to \(\overline{w}'\). Similarly, point B represents an equilibrium with \(w_a = \hat{w}_a > w_b = \overline{w}\), and the move from B to E illustrates the effect of an increase in \(w_a\), resulting in a downward adjustment in both effort levels. The move from B to C on the other hand, represents an increase in \(w_b\) from \(\overline{w}\) to \(\hat{w}_b\), resulting in opposing adjustments in the effort levels of the two players.

![Figure 3. Equilibria in the ability contest model for different wealth combinations.](image)

With initially unequal wealth, general wealth growth affects total effort by (16), with both terms on the rhs negative if (19) holds; total effort is an inferior good. In a symmetric contest, the effect is given by (17) and therefore negative (as \(f_2 < 0\)). The intuition is once again that an increase in wealth lowers the marginal benefit of effort, resulting in lower effort to win the rent.

**Proposition 5** If (19) holds, a common increase in wealth decreases total effort in the ability contest model. With equal wealth, a common increase in wealth always decreases the efforts of both players.
We now discuss the effects of wealth inequality. As in the privilege contest, we first observe that there is no systematic relationship between wealth inequality and effort in the ability contest model. Indeed, decreasing inequality in the sense of making the poor richer, or increasing inequality in the sense of making the rich richer, both decrease total effort. We then examine the effect of a small MPS in wealth. In the appendix, we prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 4** Consider the ability contest model with linear cost of effort. The sign of the quadratic form (10) is positive iff

\[
\frac{\Delta w''}{\Delta w'} - 2m^2 > 0. \tag{20}
\]

With CARA preferences, \(A = -\frac{\Delta w''}{\Delta w} = -\frac{\Delta w'}{\Delta w}\), and the first term becomes 1. With quadratic preferences, \(\frac{\Delta w''}{\Delta w'} = 0\), and the first term vanishes. Under CRRA, it can be shown that the first term of (20) has the following Taylor expansion

\[
\frac{1}{\rho} \left(1 + \frac{1}{12} \left(\frac{r}{w}\right)^2 \right) + O\left(\left(\frac{r}{w}\right)^3\right).
\]

We summarize these results in the following proposition.

**Proposition 6** In the ability contest model, a small MPS in wealth increases total efforts iff (20) is positive. This is never the case with quadratic preferences. Under CARA, this happens iff \(m < \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\). When \(u\) has CRRA \(\rho\), this happens if \(m < \sqrt{\frac{1}{24} \left(12 + \left(\frac{r}{w}\right)^2\right)}\).

Recall that \(m\) measures the decisiveness of the contest. These results suggest that with a sufficiently low contest decisiveness, aggregate effort rises following the introduction of a small wealth inequality. We finally turn to the rent-seeking contest model.

## 5 The rent-seeking contest model

In the rent-seeking contest model, both rent and effort are monetary. This model can then accommodate many contest-type situations including lobbying, marketing, and litigation activities where both the rent and the effort
have a direct monetary counterpart. In this model, player $i$’s expected utility equals

$$
\Pi_i u(w_i + r - x_i) + (1 - \Pi_i) u(w_i - x_i).
$$

(21)

The concavity of $u(\cdot)$ is usually interpreted as risk aversion (Cornes and Hartley 2012), and we retain this interpretation in what follows.

We proceed as before and first characterize the best responses. For player $a$, $f(x_b, w_a)$, is now defined by

$$
p_1(f(x_b, w_a), x_b)\Delta u_a - Eu'_a = 0,
\quad p_{11}(f(x_b, w_a), x_b)\Delta u_a - 2p_1(f(x_b, w_a), x_b)\Delta u'_a + Eu''_a < 0,
$$

where $Eu'_a$ and $Eu''_a$ denote expected marginal utility and its second-order equivalent ($i = a, b$). Simple computations show that

$$
f_1 = -\frac{p_{12}\Delta u_a - p_2\Delta u'_a}{p_{11}\Delta u_a - 2p_1\Delta u'_a + Eu''_a},
\text{ and}
$$

$$
f_2 = -\frac{p_1\Delta u'_a - Eu''_a}{p_{11}\Delta u_a - 2p_1\Delta u'_a + Eu''_a}.
$$

(22)

Unlike the privilege and ability contest models, an increase in wealth has an ambiguous effect on the best-response function. The reason is that additional wealth reduces both the marginal benefit of winning the rent and the (expected) marginal cost of effort.

Similarly, player $b$’s best response $g(x_a, w_b)$ satisfies the necessary first- and second-order conditions

$$
-p_2(x_a, g(x_a, w_b))\Delta u_b - Eu'_b = 0,
\quad -p_{22}(x_a, g(x_a, w_b))\Delta u_b + 2p_2(x_a, g(x_a, w_b))\Delta u'_b + Eu''_b < 0.
$$

Differentiating with respect to $x_a$ and $w_b$, we obtain

$$
g_1 = -\frac{-p_{21}\Delta u_b + p_1\Delta u'_b}{-p_{22}\Delta u_b + 2p_2\Delta u'_b + Eu''_b},
\text{ and}
$$

$$
g_2 = -\frac{-p_2\Delta u'_b - Eu''_b}{-p_{22}\Delta u_b + 2p_2\Delta u'_b + Eu''_b}.
$$

8We observe that the economics literature on contests has traditionally (and often implicitly) assumed that both the rent and the effort are monetary. For instance, an important focus in this literature has concerned the rate of rent dissipation, i.e., $\frac{\Sigma x_a}{x_a}$, which assumes that the rent and the efforts are expressed in the same units, typically a monetary unit.
At a symmetric equilibrium, $p_{12} = 0$, and therefore, $f_1, g_1 < 0$. Hence, at a symmetric equilibrium

$$\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} = \frac{f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial x_b}{\partial w_a} = \frac{g_1 f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1},$$

and we may claim that $\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} \big|_{SE} \geq 0 \geq \frac{\partial x_b}{\partial w_a} \big|_{SE}$ if $f_2 \geq 0$.

Note that the sign of $f_2$ is given by the sign of its numerator, which upon using the first-order condition for $a$ can be written as

$$Ev_a' \left( \frac{\Delta u_a'}{\Delta u_a} - \frac{Ev_a''}{Ev_a'} \right). \quad (23)$$

Let us now define two lotteries: a uniformly distributed lottery $\tilde{z} = U(w_a - x_a, w_a - x_a + r)$ and a binary lottery $\tilde{y} = (w_a - x_a + r, \frac{1}{2}; w_a - x_a, \frac{1}{2})$, so that the term in round brackets can be written as

$$-Ev_a''(\tilde{y}) = -\frac{Ev_a''(\tilde{z})}{Ev_a'(\tilde{y})}.$$

Given the binary lottery ($\tilde{y}$) is a MPS of the uniform lottery ($\tilde{z}$), the sign of $f_2$ is positive (resp. negative) if the MPS of a background risk increases (resp. decreases) the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Let us introduce the following definition.

**Definition 1** Let $\Omega$ be the class of utility functions so that a MPS of a background risk increases absolute risk aversion.

It sounds intuitive that additional background risk should induce greater risk aversion, i.e., $u \in \Omega$. Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) show, however, that the conditions on $u$ so that extra background risk makes an agent more risk averse are complex, involving restrictions on higher-order attitudes towards risk, such as the degree of temperance of $u$, i.e., $-u'''/u''$. A necessary condition for $u \in \Omega$ is that risk aversion increases when a zero-mean background risk is introduced. Gollier and Pratt (1996) called this condition “risk vulnerability” and it is a stronger condition than the familiar DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion).

---

9. $\int_{u_a - x_a}^{u_a + r} u_a'(x) \frac{1}{r} dx = \frac{1}{r} \Delta u_a$ and $\int_{w_a - x_a + r}^{w_a - x_a} u_a''(x) \frac{1}{r} dx = \frac{1}{r} \Delta u_a'$. 

---
For a small rent, a second-order Taylor approximation of the term in the round bracket in (23) helps us understand why DARA is necessary in our problem for wealth to increase effort. Let \( \tau(\rho) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \Delta v_0 \alpha - \Delta v_0 \alpha. \) Then \( \tau(0) = 0, \ t'(0) = 0, \) and \( \tau''(0) \) has the sign of \( P_a - A_a. \) Therefore, DARA ensures that \( \tau''(0) \geq 0. \) The intuition for this result may be given as follows. Investing in a contest is very much like gambling, where one spends money to increase the probability of winning the monetary prize. For the same reason that gambling activities should be reduced under increased risk aversion, efforts in a contest should also be reduced with increasing risk aversion (Treich 2010). By a similar reasoning, an increase in wealth —which reduces risk aversion under DARA— should increase effort in a contest.

We now use these results to compare the efforts of the rich and the poor within an equilibrium. If \( u \in \Omega, \) then \( \frac{\partial r_a}{\partial w_a} > 0 > \frac{\partial r_b}{\partial w_a} \) at a symmetric equilibrium as \( g_1 < 0. \) Hence, Theorem 1 allows us to conclude that for \( u \in \Omega, \) in an asymmetric rent-seeking game \( w_a > w_b \) implies \( x_a > x_b, \) and therefore \( p_{12} > 0. \)

As a result, \( u \in \Omega \) ensures that an isolated increase in \( a \)'s wealth will raise that player’s equilibrium effort level. The equilibrium reaction of the poorer agent, \( b, \) is negative. As before, aggregate effort will increase iff \( 1 + g_1 > 0. \) For the rent-seeking contest model, this condition is equivalent to

\[
\frac{p_{21} - p_{22}}{p_2} + \frac{2p_2 - p_1 \Delta u_b' }{p_2} \Delta u_b + \frac{Eu_b''}{Eu_b'} < 0
\]

\[
\pi(x_a, x_b) + \left(1 + \frac{\Phi'(x_a)\Phi(x_b)}{\Phi(x_a)\Phi'(x_b)}\right) \left(-\frac{\Delta u_a'}{\Delta u_b}\right) < \left[-\left(\frac{Eu_b''}{Eu_b'}\right) - \left(-\frac{\Delta u_b'}{\Delta u_b}\right)\right]
\]

We know that the \( \text{rhs} \) is positive if \( u \in \Omega. \) But as the second \( \text{lhs} \) term is positive, \( \pi(x_a, x_b) < 0 \) is no longer sufficient for \( 1 + g_1 > 0. \)

If the poor person becomes wealthier, that player’s effort changes with \( \frac{p_{12}}{f_1 g_1}, \) which is positive if \( u \in \Omega \) (the reasoning is the same as for \( f_2 \)). The rich agent’s equilibrium effort changes with \( \frac{f_1 g_2}{1 - f_2 g_1}. \) From (22), it transpires that \( f_1 > 0 \) iff \( \frac{p_{12}}{p_2} > -\frac{\Delta u_a'}{\Delta w_a}. \) Since the sign of \( p_{12} \) depends on that of \( x_a - x_b, \) a
necessary condition for \( a \) to increase effort is that \( a \) is sufficiently richer than \( b \). As \( b \)'s wealth approaches that of \( a \), the latter will begin to reduce effort despite the fact that \( b \) is increasing effort. The two effort levels then turn into strategic substitutes. Thus, in the rent-seeking contest model, the nature of the strategic interaction depends on the wealth levels. This possibility of strategic substitutability also blurs the effect of \( w_b \) on aggregate effort. Indeed, a similar argument as above shows that \( 1 + f_1 > 0 \) iff

\[
\frac{p_{11} - p_{12}}{p_1} - \frac{2p_1 - p_2}{p_1} \Delta u'_a + \frac{Eu''_a}{Eu'_a} < 0 
\]

\[
\pi(x_b, x_a) + \left( 1 + \frac{\Phi'(x_b)\Phi(x_a)}{\Phi(x_b)\Phi'(x_a)} \right) \left( -\frac{\Delta u'_a}{\Delta u_a} \right) < \left[ \left( -\frac{Eu''_a}{Eu'_a} \right) - \left( -\frac{\Delta u'_a}{\Delta u_a} \right) \right]. 
\]

Given \( \frac{x_a}{x_b} > 1 \), the first \( lhs \) term is negative (see Figure 1, but with \( \frac{x_a}{x_b} \) now on horizontal axis). The \( rhs \) is positive if \( u \in \Omega \). Once again, the positive second \( lhs \) term blurs the inequality. We summarize these results as follows.

**Proposition 7** Suppose that \( u \in \Omega \). In a rent-seeking contest model with unequal wealth, the rich player exerts more effort than the poor player. An isolated increase in the wealth of the rich player increases that player’s effort, but reduces the poor player’s effort. An isolated increase in the wealth of the poor player increases that player’s effort. With “sufficient wealth inequality”, an isolated increase in the wealth of the poor player also increases the effort of the rich player.

The CARA utility function satisfies the conditions for \( \Omega \) “just” (since background risk has no effect on absolute risk aversion under CARA). Hence, it provides a boundary case where \( f_2 = 0 \) and \( g_2 = 0 \), which is easily checked as both \( -\frac{\Delta u'_a}{\Delta u_a} \) and \( -\frac{Eu''_a}{Eu'_a} \) equal the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The quadratic utility function provides another case where \( f_2 = 0 \) and \( g_2 = 0 \).\(^{10}\)

In both cases, aggregate effort is unaffected by an isolated increase in wealth.

With a common increase in wealth, aggregate efforts change with \( 2f_2 \). Hence, \( u \in \Omega \) ensures that uniform growth in wealth will increase the representative agent’s effort. We summarize this discussion as follows.

\(^{10}\)Observe that \( E\tilde{z} = E\tilde{y} = w_a - x_a + \frac{1}{2}r \). If \( u(w) = w - \frac{\beta}{2}w^2 \), then \( -\frac{Eu''(\tilde{y})}{Eu'_y(\tilde{y})} = -\frac{Eu''(\tilde{z})}{Eu'_y(\tilde{z})} = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta(w_a - x_a + \frac{1}{2}r)} \).
Proposition 8 If \( u \) is CARA or quadratic, an isolated and therefore a common increase in wealth leaves equilibrium efforts unaffected in the rent-seeking contest model. In a symmetric rent-seeking contest model, a common increase in wealth increases equilibrium efforts under \( u \in \Omega \).

Figure 4 illustrates the different wealth effects occurring under \( u \in \Omega \). Point A is a symmetric equilibrium where \( w_a = \underline{w} = w_b \). A common increase in wealth moves the equilibrium to D. Point B is an asymmetric equilibrium with \( w_a = \hat{w}_a > w_b = \underline{w} \). The move from B to E is then because of an increase in \( w_a \) from \( \hat{w}_a \) to \( \underline{w} \): \( x_a \) increases, but \( x_b \) falls. Conversely, the move from B to C is because of an increase in \( w_b \) from \( \underline{w} \) to \( \hat{w}_b \). While raising \( x_b \), this leads to a fall in \( x_a \), illustrating the abovementioned ambiguity when wealth, and thus effort, are sufficiently close.

We finally discuss the effect of wealth inequality on aggregate effort in the rent-seeking contest model. For the reason discussed earlier, there is no effect of wealth distribution across players under CARA or quadratic utility. The following theorem is proven in the appendix.
Theorem 5 Consider the rent-seeking contest model. The sign of the quadratic form (10) is positive if

\[ p_{11}^2p_1T_1 + 4p_{11}p_2^2T_2 + (3p_{112} - p_{111})p_3^2T_3 + 4p_3^2T_4 < 0 \]  

(25)

where

\[ T_1 = \frac{Eu''}{Eu} \left( \frac{Eu''}{Eu} - 2 \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \right) - \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \left( \frac{\Delta u''}{\Delta u} - 2 \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \right), \]

\[ T_2 = \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \left[ \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \left( \frac{Eu''}{Eu} - \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \right) - \frac{Eu''}{Eu} \left( \frac{Eu''}{Eu} - \frac{\Delta u''}{\Delta u} \right) \right], \]

\[ T_3 = \left( \frac{Eu''}{Eu} - \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \right)^2, \]

\[ T_4 = \left( \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \right)^2 \left[ \frac{\Delta u''}{\Delta u} \left( \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} - \frac{Eu''}{Eu} \right) + \frac{Eu''}{Eu} \left( \frac{Eu''}{Eu} - \frac{\Delta u''}{\Delta u} \right) \right]. \]

With CARA preferences, all ratios in \( T_1, T_2, T_3, \) and \( T_4 \) coincide with \(-\lambda\), and therefore the four terms equal zero. The same is true for quadratic preferences, \( u(y) = y - \frac{\lambda}{2}y^2 \). In the appendix, we prove the following theorem.

Theorem 6 With CRRA preferences and small \( \frac{\lambda}{w} \), the inequality (25) is violated.

We can therefore summarize our findings as follows.

Proposition 9 Consider the rent-seeking contest model. Under CARA and quadratic preferences, a MPS in wealth does not affect aggregate effort. Under CRRA preferences, when the stake of the contest, \( \frac{\lambda}{w} \), is small, a small MPS in wealth reduces aggregate effort.

None of the preferences considered in Proposition 9 (i.e., quadratic, CARA, and CRRA) result in larger aggregate efforts. At the same time, these three types of preferences share a non-negative third derivative of \( u(\cdot) \) (“prudence”). This suggests that a negative third derivative (“imprudence”) may be a necessary condition for a MPS in wealth to raise aggregate effort. This conjecture is supported by the following example.

\[ 11 \text{In that case, } \Delta u = \Delta y(1 - \beta Ey), \Delta u' = -\beta \Delta y, \Delta u'' = 0, Eu' = 1 - \beta Ey, Eu'' = -\beta, Eu''' = 0, \text{ where } \Delta y = y \text{ and } Ey = w - x + \frac{1}{\beta}r. \text{ Then } \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} = \frac{Eu''}{Eu} = -\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta Ey} \text{ and } \frac{\Delta u''}{\Delta u} = \frac{Eu'''}{Eu''} = 0. \text{ Once again, all four terms vanish.} \]
Example 1 Suppose that $u(y) = y - \frac{\beta}{2}y^2 + \frac{\gamma}{3}y^3$ with $\beta = \frac{1}{15}$ and $\gamma \leq \frac{2}{1000}$, such that $u''(y) < 0$ for all $y < 15$. Then for a rent-seeking contest model with $w = 10, r = 1, m = 1$, and for $\gamma \in [-.002, 0]$, a MPS in wealth results in higher aggregate efforts, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Results for cubic preferences.\(^a\)

<table>
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<th>$x^*$</th>
<th>$SOC$</th>
<th>$qf$</th>
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</table>

\(^a\)The columns respectively provide the values of the “prudence coefficient” $\gamma$, the equilibrium effort ($x^*$), the value of the second-order condition ($SOC$), and the value of the lhs of (25) ($qf$).

6 Other wealth effects

A few studies have discussed the effect of wealth in strategic models of contests. These effects differ significantly from those considered in this analysis. In this section, we present a short summary of these other wealth effects studied in the literature.

But first let us briefly discuss the issue of redistributive politics (as mentioned in the Introduction). Redistributive politics may be interpreted as a contest where $r$ is a transfer from the loser to the winner. One may think that this transfer could introduce a new wealth effect in our different models. That is not the case as our three contest models can accommodate this interpretation, given a basic change in notation.\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\)The change in notation can be defined as follows. In the privilege contest model, let $U_i = u(w_i - x_i) + \Pi_i r + (1 - \Pi_i)(-r) = u(w_i - x_i) + \Pi_i r_0$ with $r_0 = 2r$ and a renormalisation. In the ability contest model, let $U_i = \Pi_i[u(w_i + r) - u(w_i - r)] - c(x_i) =
Che and Gale (1997) examine the effect of budget constraints in a basic contest model as in (1). They show that each agent’s equilibrium effort is a weakly-increasing function of the agent’s budget constraint, and that the presence of budget constraints lowers aggregate effort. Therefore, if one naturally assumes that a wealthier agent is less budget-constrained, wealth has a positive effect on effort.¹³ The effect of a budget constraint can be interpreted as an extreme utility curvature of \( u \) at zero. However, in Che and Gale (1998), as the utility function is otherwise linear, there are no wealth effects when wealth changes occur within the bounds of unconstrained efforts, i.e., using our notation, when \( x_i < w_i \). Moreover, Che and Gale’s (1998) model does not capture the effect that wealthier agents may have a lower marginal benefit of obtaining rent.

Hirshleifer (1991) studies the so-called “paradox of power”. In its weak form, this paradox states that the final distribution of wealth will have less dispersion than the initial distribution of wealth. In its strong form, it states that there should be equal initial and final distributions of wealth. Hirshleifer (1991) considers a two-player contest model in which the payoff of agent \( a \) is, using our notation, written as follows:

\[
U_a = p(x_a, x_b)[(w_a - x_a)^{1/s} + (w_b - x_b)^{1/s}]^s,
\]

where the quantity within the bracket is interpreted as the aggregate production in the economy with \( s \geq 1 \) a “complementarity index” parameter in the production functions of the two agents (and where \( U_b \) is defined analogously). It is easy to see that when \( s = 1 \) then the model is symmetric; efforts are thus equal, implying that the strong paradox of power holds, i.e., \( w_a/w_b = U_a/U_b \).

Hirshleifer (1991) then presents numerical examples for various values of \( s \) and the decisiveness parameter \( m \) for which the paradox of power in its weak form does, or does not, hold. The key difference to our model is that in Hirshleifer’s (1991) model, the rent, i.e., aggregate production, is endogenous and increases with wealth. As a result, the rich player always exerts (weakly) more effort than the poor player as the marginal utility of exerting effort is (weakly) lower. In fact, the ability contest model we introduced displays a

\[
\Pi_i[u(w_0 + r_0) - u(w_0)] - c(x_i) \quad \text{with} \quad w_0 = w - r.
\]

In the rent-seeking contest model, let \( U_i = \Pi_i u(w + r - x_i) + (1 - \Pi_i)u(w - r - x_i) = \Pi_i u(w_0 + r_0 - x_i) + (1 - \Pi_i)u(w_0 - x_i) \).

¹³Note, however, that in an all-pay auction, the introduction of budget constraints may surprisingly increase effort (Che and Gale 1998).
much stronger form of the paradox of power compared to Hirshleifer’s (1991) model. Indeed, in the ability contest model, the poor player always exerts strictly greater effort, in absolute terms, than the rich player.

A related model is the “winner take all with limited liability” model introduced in Skaperdas and Gan (1995). Essentially, using our notation again, the agent’s payoff in this model writes as follows

$$U_i = \Pi_i u(w_i - x_i).$$

An interpretation of this model is that the loser “dies” and obtains utility $u(0) = 0$. Although Skaperdas and Gan (1995) are uninterested in the effect of wealth (but study that of risk aversion), it is easy to understand that wealth has a positive effect in this model. The intuition is that the two effects we have identified go in the same direction in Skaperdas and Gan’s (1995) model. Wealth decreases the marginal cost of effort (as usual), but wealth also increases the marginal benefit of effort. Indeed, this last effect simply means that it “pays off” more to be alive when wealthier. It is also possible to show that a rich player always exerts more effort than the poor in the two-player version of Skaperdas and Gan’s (1995) model.

Finally, we discuss Grossman’s (1991) model of insurrections. Grossman (1991) considers a general equilibrium model in which agents choose how to devote their time between production, soldiering (for the government) and insurrection. This implies that income (generated by production) and conflict expenditures are endogenously determined in equilibrium. Grossman (1991) is especially interested in how the equilibrium depends on the exogenous CSF properties. Typically, the more favourable to a successful insurrection is the parameter in the CSF, the larger is the fraction of time devoted to insurrection as opposed to production. As a result, there is an equilibrium associating low wealth and high conflict expenditures. A key insight from this model is that participation in soldiering increases with the opportunity cost of fighting. In a contest model, this effect could be somehow captured.

14 This model has been influential in the conflict literature and has been used as a benchmark to understand the relationship between wealth and conflict (Azam 2006, Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel 2009, Besley and Persson 2012). However, this model is significantly different from the standard Tullock (1980) contest model and the few extensions studied in our analysis. We thus merely present some key insights of the Grossman (1991)’s model, and attempt to relate them to the results we obtain.
by allowing the cost of effort, $c(x_i)$ using our notation, to depend directly on wealth $w_i$. This dependence could reflect that the marginal cost of conscription is higher in rich countries. This effect may then counteract the other possible positive effect of wealth on conflict. To see this, consider the following payoff function

$$U_i = \Pi_i f(w_i) - c(x_i, w_i).$$

Then wealth has a positive effect, both on the marginal benefit of effort, through $f$ when $f' > 0$ (as in Hirshleifer 1991 and Skaperdas and Gan 1995), and also on the marginal cost of effort, through $c$ when $\partial c/\partial w_i > 0$. However, it is unclear which effect prevails. For instance, taking $f$ and $c$ linear in $w_i$, then the two effects cancel each other out. This point has been observed, and extensively discussed, in Fearon (2007).

7 Discussion and conclusion

Archetypes of contests are usually found in warfare. The old Latin saying (often attributed to Cicero) “pecunia nervus belli” (i.e., money is the sinews of war) suggests that wealth plays an instrumental role in warfare. However, there exist elements of contests in many economic activities, and one may wonder if and under what conditions wealth is also instrumental in those activities. In this paper, we inquire about the effect of wealth in economic models of contests. The simplest conclusion we can offer is that there does not exist an unambiguous relationship between wealth and efforts in any contest. Most significantly, we have seen that this relationship is strongly “contest-dependent”. Therefore, there is no theoretical support to argue generally without qualification that the rich should be expected to lobby more, nor that low economic growth and inequality increase conflict.

The more precise answer is that wealth effects critically depend on the nature of the rent and of the type of efforts exerted in a contest. It depends in particular on whether the rent and/or efforts can be expressed in monetary terms. We have especially stressed the importance of the property of decreasing marginal utility of wealth. This property plays a fundamental role in our analysis through two basic effects. First, wealth decreases the marginal cost of monetary effort. Second, wealth decreases the marginal benefit of winning monetary rent. The first effect tends to increase efforts in a contest, as we
have shown in the “privilege contest” model. The second effect tends to decrease efforts, as we have shown in the “ability contest” model. Therefore, the disparate effects of wealth in contests that we colloquially discussed in the introduction may well reflect these two fundamentally opposing forces that our models identify.

However, these basic effects go in an opposite direction when both the rent and efforts are monetary. Therefore the total effect of wealth is complex and potentially limited, as we have shown in our “rent-seeking contest” model. In the special, but common, case of a CARA utility function, the two effects exactly offset each other, and wealth therefore has no impact on effort. Moreover, we have shown that wealth increases effort in the rent-seeking contest model under the assumption on the utility function that more background risk increases risk aversion. This assumption involves higher-order derivatives of the utility function, and is stronger than DARA. All of these results are summarized in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Summary of wealth effects in the privilege, ability, and rent-seeking contest models under $w_a \geq w_b$.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contest models:</th>
<th>Privilege</th>
<th>Ability</th>
<th>Rent-seeking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rich vs poor</td>
<td>$x_a - x_b$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolated increase in $w_a$</td>
<td>$\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a}$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial x_b}$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial (x_a + x_b)}$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolated increase in $w_b$</td>
<td>$\frac{\partial x_b}{\partial w_b}$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\frac{\partial x_b}{\partial x_a}$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\frac{\partial x_b}{\partial (x_a + x_b)}$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common increase</td>
<td>$\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial u_a</td>
<td>u_a = w_b}$</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial</td>
<td>u_a = w_b}$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\frac{\partial x_b}{\partial (x_a + x_b)</td>
<td>u_b = w_b}$</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Small” MPS in wealth</td>
<td>$\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial u_a</td>
<td>u_a = w_b}$</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aSymbols + and − indicate the sign of the effects mathematically described in the second column. Symbol ? indicates that this sign is indeterminate (but may be determinate under more restrictive assumptions on the CSF and/or the utility function, cf. results in the paper). In the rent-seeking contest model, we assume $u \in \Omega$ (cf. Definition 1).

We have also studied the effects of wealth inequality. These effects are the
most complex and indeterminate in general. To illustrate, take the privilege
contest model. In this model, an isolated increase in wealth always increases
aggregate effort. Therefore, a decrease in inequality (through an increase in
the wealth of the poor) or an increase in inequality (through an increase in
the wealth of the rich) both increase aggregate effort. Thus, wealth redis-
tribution, i.e., transferring money from the rich to the poor, combines the
first effect and the opposite of the second effect (for a fixed total wealth).
It thus essentially involves two opposing effects, and it is difficult to sign
the effect of such a MPS in wealth without further restricting the functional
form. In fact, we have shown in our three contest models that the effect
of a MPS in wealth depends on the property of the CSF, as well as on the
higher-order derivatives of the utility functions of wealth. Interestingly, these
results stand in sharp contrast with the neutrality result concerning the effect
of wealth redistribution in the celebrated private provision of public goods
model (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986). An implication of our analysis
is that the consequences of a wealth redistribution policy in terms of political
stability and social peace are by no means obvious.

To conclude, let us add that there exist some natural extensions to our
results. To start with, one may wish to consider other CSFs, an arbitrary
number of players, other dimensions of heterogeneity (e.g., on the cost or
value of rent), and to assume that the rent itself depends on wealth. One
may also want to explore welfare effects. This could be interesting in that
an increase in the wealth of one or more players need not have an a priori
positive effect on overall welfare despite increasing utility. This is because
of the strategic effects that may serve to increase overall effort. However, a
general study of welfare effects in contest models must also explicitly discuss
to which extent efforts are socially (un)productive. Finally, it could also be
interesting to explore the dynamic effects: wealth affects conflict, which in
turn affects wealth, and so on. Such a dynamic analysis would permit a
better understanding of the relationship between power and money.
8 References


Fearon J.D. and D.D. Laitin, 2003, Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war, American Political Science Review 97, 75–90.


9 Appendix

9.1 Power-logistic contest success functions

In this appendix, we display the properties of the (power-)logistic CSF used to derive our results. Let

\[ p(x_a, x_b) = \frac{\Phi(x_a)}{\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b)}, \]

where \( \Phi \) is strictly positive, strictly increasing, and concave. The derivatives of \( p(x_a, x_b) \) are as follows

\[ p_1 = \frac{\Phi'(x_a)\Phi(x_b)}{(\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b))^2} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad p_2 = -\frac{\Phi(x_a)\Phi'(x_b)}{(\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b))^2} < 0, \]

\[ p_{12} = \frac{(\Phi(x_a) - \Phi(x_b))\Phi'(x_a)\Phi'(x_b)}{(\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b))^3} > 0 \quad \text{iff} \quad x_a > x_b, \]

\[ p_{11} = \frac{\Phi(x_b)\Phi''(x_a)(\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b)) - 2\Phi'(x_a)^2}{(\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b))^3} < 0, \]

\[ p_{22} = -\frac{\Phi(x_a)(\Phi''(x_b)(\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b)) - 2\Phi'(x_b)^2)}{(\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b))^3} > 0. \]

Moreover, we have

\[ \pi(x_a, x_b) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \frac{p_{12} - p_{22}}{-p_2} = \frac{\Phi(x_a)^2\Phi''(x_b) - \Phi(x_b)\Phi'(x_a)\Phi'(x_b) + \Phi(x_a)[\Phi'(x_a)\Phi'(x_b) - 2\Phi'(x_b)^2 + \Phi(x_b)\Phi''(x_b)]}{\Phi(x_a)(\Phi(x_a) + \Phi(x_b))\Phi'(x_b)} \]

which is strictly negative under \( x_a \geq x_b \) and \( \Phi'' \leq 0 \). Similarly, \( \frac{p_{11} - p_{12}}{p_1} = \pi(x_b, x_a) \) is strictly positive under \( x_a \leq x_b \) and \( \Phi'' \leq 0 \).

The power-logistic CSF for player \( a \) is given by

\[ p(x_a, x_b) = \frac{x_a^m}{x_a^m + x_b^m} \]

where \( m > 0 \). The derivatives of \( p(x_a, x_b) \) are (where \( \overset{\text{SE}}{=} \) denotes evaluation
at $x_a = x_b = x$

\[ p_1 = \frac{m}{x_a} \Pi_a \Pi_b \stackrel{SE}{=} \frac{1}{4} m > 0 \text{ and } p_2 = -\frac{m}{x_b} \Pi_a \Pi_b \stackrel{SE}{=} -\frac{1}{4} m < 0, \]

\[ p_{12} = \frac{m^2}{x_a x_b} \Pi_a \Pi_b (\Pi_a - \Pi_b) > 0 \text{ iff } x_a > x_b, \text{ and } \stackrel{SE}{=} 0 \]

\[ p_{11} = \frac{m}{x_a^2} P_a P_b [-1 + m(P_a - P_b)] \stackrel{SE}{=} -\frac{1}{4} m \]

\[ p_{22} = \frac{m}{x_b^2} \Pi_a \Pi_b [1 - m(\Pi_a - \Pi_b)] \stackrel{SE}{=} -\frac{1}{4} m \]

\[ p_{111} = \frac{2m}{x_a^3} \Pi_a \Pi_b - \frac{m^2}{x_a^2} \Pi_a \Pi_b^2 + \frac{m^2}{x_a^3} \Pi_a^2 \Pi_b - \frac{m^2}{x_a^3} \Pi_a \Pi_b (\Pi_b - \Pi_a) \]

\[ + \frac{m^2}{x_a^3} \Pi_a \Pi_b [-1 + m(\Pi_a - \Pi_b)] (\Pi_b - \Pi_a) - \frac{2m^3}{x_a^3} \Pi_a^2 \Pi_b^2 \]

\[ \stackrel{SE}{=} \frac{1}{2} m - \frac{1}{8} m^3 \]

\[ p_{122} = \frac{m}{x_a} p_{22} (\Pi_b - \Pi_a) - 2 \frac{m^3}{x_a x_b} \Pi_a^2 \Pi_b^2 \]

\[ \stackrel{SE}{=} -\frac{1}{8} m^3 \]

\[ p_{112} = \frac{m}{x_a} \left( p_{12} - p_2 \frac{1}{x_b} \right) (\Pi_b - \Pi_a) + 2 \frac{m^3}{x_a x_b} \Pi_a^2 \Pi_b^2 \]

\[ \stackrel{SE}{=} \frac{1}{8} m^3 \]

For future reference, we also note that

\[ 3p_{112} - p_{111} \stackrel{SE}{=} \frac{1}{2} m (m^2 - 1). \]

### 9.2 Existence and uniqueness in asymmetric contests

This section builds on the literature on contests to identify conditions ensuring the existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium in the privilege, ability, and rent-seeking contest models.

**Proposition 10** There exists a unique equilibrium:

i) in the privilege contest model, if 

\[ \frac{-u''(w-x)}{u'(w-x)} > \Phi''(x), \]

ii) in the ability contest model, if 

\[ \frac{\epsilon'(x)}{\Phi'(x)} > \Phi''(x); \]

iii) in the rent-seeking contest model, if $u(\cdot)$ has non-increasing absolute risk aversion and $\Phi''(x) < 0$. 

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We follow the proof of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997). They show that there always exists a unique equilibrium when the form of the payoff function for each player \( i \) can be written as follows:

\[
U_i = \frac{y_i}{\sum_j y_j} - g_i(y_i) \text{ with } g'_i > 0 \text{ and } g''_i > 0.
\]

In the privilege contest model, we obtain this form of the payoff function under the following change in variable \( g_i(y_i) = -u(w_i - \Phi^{-1}(y_i))/r \). Then it is immediate that \( g'_i > 0 \), and that \( g''_i > 0 \) iff \( \frac{-u''(w-x)}{u'(w-x)} > \Phi''(x) \).

In the ability contest model, we obtain the above form of the payoff function under the following change in variable \( g_i(y_i) = c(\Phi^{-1}(y_i)/(u(w_i+r) - u(w_i))) \). Then it is immediate that \( g'_i > 0 \), and that \( g''_i > 0 \) iff \( \frac{c'(x)}{c(x)} > \Phi''(x) \).

Therefore, under \( u'' < 0 \) and \( c'' > 0 \), note that the conditions i) and ii) hold as soon as \( \Phi \) is concave.

Finally, Yamazaki (2009) proves that there always exists a unique equilibrium in the rent-seeking contest model under non-increasing absolute risk aversion and \( \Phi \) concave.

### 9.3 The condition \( 1 - f_1g_1 > 0 \) and the stability condition

Throughout our analysis, we have assumed that the condition \( 1 - f_1g_1 > 0 \) is satisfied. We first show that this is always the case in the privilege and ability contest models, and then resort to a stability condition which ensures that is the case as well in the rent-seeking contest model.

In the privilege contest model, we have \( g_1 = \frac{p_{12}(x_a-x_b)r}{u'(w_u-x_u) - p_{21}(x_a-x_b)r} \) and \( f_1 = \frac{-p_{12}(x_a-x_b)r}{u'(w_u-x_u) - p_{21}(x_a-x_b)r} \) so that \( f_1 \) and \( g_1 \) have opposite signs. This implies \( f_1g_1 < 0 \) and the condition is satisfied.

Similarly, in the ability contest model, we have that \( g_1 = \frac{-p_{22}(x_a-x_b)}{p_{21}(x_a-x_b)} \) and \( f_1 = \frac{p_{22}(x_a-x_b)}{p_{21}(x_a-x_b)} \), which also have opposite signs so that \( f_1g_1 < 0 \) and the condition is also satisfied.

In the rent-seeking contest model, \( f_1 \) and \( g_1 \) need not have opposite signs, and the condition \( 1 - f_1g_1 > 0 \) is not necessarily verified. We thus impose a stability condition, i.e., \( |f_1g_1| < 1 \), which ensures that the condition \( 1 - f_1g_1 > 0 \) is indeed satisfied. See Nti (1997) for a discussion of a related stability condition and of similar assumptions made in the literature on strategic contest models.

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9.4 Proof of Theorems 1 and 2

Proof of Theorem 1
We need to prove that (i) \( x_a = x_b \implies \frac{\partial x_a(w_a, w_b)}{\partial w_a} > \frac{\partial x_b(w_a, w_b)}{\partial w_a} \), then (ii) \( w_a > w_b \implies x_a(w_a, w_b) > x_b(w_a, w_b) \). Since \( x_a(w_a, w_b) = x_b(w_b, w_b) \) (i.e., the unique equilibrium is the symmetric equilibrium), it follows from (i) that

\[
\frac{\partial x_a(w_a, w_b)}{\partial w_a} \Big|_{w_a=w_b} > \frac{\partial x_b(w_a, w_b)}{\partial w_a} \Big|_{w_a=w_b}.
\]

If for some \( w_a > w_b \), we have \( x_a(w_a, w_b) \leq x_b(w_a, w_b) \) this implies, due to the continuity of best responses, that there exists \( w_c \in (w_a, w_b) \), such that \( x_a(w_c, w_b) = x_b(w_c, w_b) \) and

\[
\frac{\partial x_a(w_a, w_b)}{\partial w_a} \Big|_{w_a=w_c} \leq \frac{\partial x_b(w_a, w_b)}{\partial w_a} \Big|_{w_a=w_c},
\]

contradicting (i). Hence, we must have (ii) \( x_a(w_a, w_b) > x_b(w_a, w_b) \). The case with reverse inequalities can be proved in an analogous fashion. This proves Theorem 1.

Proof of Theorem 2
For a symmetric equilibrium,

\[
x_a = f(f(x_a, w_b), w_a) \quad \text{and} \quad x_b = f(f(x_b, w_a), w_b).
\]

These expressions may be solved for the reduced form expressions for equilibrium effort:

\[
x_a = F(w_a, w_b) \quad \text{and} \quad x_b = F(w_b, w_a).
\]

Theorem 2 is now proven with the help of two lemmas.

Lemma 1 A small redistribution in wealth \( dw_a = -dw_b = t \) increases aggregate effort \( x_a + x_b \) iff \( F_{11} - 2F_{12} + F_{22} \) evaluated at \((w, w)\) is positive.

Proof of Lemma 1
Starting from an equal wealth distribution \((w, w)\), the new effort level for player \( a \) following a transfer \( t \) from \( b \) to \( a \) is then

\[
x_a(w+t, w-t) = F(w+t, w-t) \simeq F(w, w) + (F_1 - F_2)t + \frac{1}{2}(F_{11} - 2F_{12} + F_{22})t^2.
\]

where \( F_i \) means the partial w.r.t. the \( i \)th argument and all derivatives are evaluated at \((w, w)\). Likewise, the new effort level for player \( b \) is approximately

\[
x_b(w+t, w-t) = F(w-t, w+t) \simeq F(w, w) - (F_1 - F_2)t + \frac{1}{2}(F_{11} - 2F_{12} + F_{22})t^2.
\]

Hence, aggregate equilibrium efforts are equal to

\[
x_a(w+t, w-t) + x_b(w+t, w-t) \simeq 2F(w, w) + (F_{11} - 2F_{12} + F_{22})t^2.
\]
Lemma 2 At a symmetric equilibrium,

\[ F_{11} - 2F_{12} + F_{22} = \frac{(f_2)^2 f_{11} - 2(1 + f_1)f_2f_{12} + (1 + f_1)^2 f_{22}}{(1 + f_1)(1 - f_1^2)}, \]

where \( f_i (f_{ij}) \) denotes the first- (second-)order partial w.r.t. arguments \( i (ij) \).

Proof of Lemma 2

Let \( f(x_b, w_b) \) be the best-response function for agent \( a \), and \( g(x_a, w_b) \) be the best-response function for agent \( b \). Then

\[ x_a = f(g(x_a, w_b), w_a). \]

Implicit differentiation then gives

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{dx_a}{dw_a} &= f_1(x_a, w_a) + f_2 dw_a + f_1 g_2 dw_b \\
F_1 &= \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} = \frac{f_2(g(x_a, w_b), w_a)}{1 - f_1(g(x_a, w_b), w_a)g_1(x_a, w_b)} \\
F_2 &= \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_b} = \frac{f_1(g(x_a, w_b), w_a)g_2(x_a, w_b)}{1 - f_1(g(x_a, w_b), w_a)g_1(x_a, w_b)}
\end{align*}
\]

Differentiating one more time gives

\[
\begin{align*}
F_{11} &= \frac{1}{1 - f_1 g_1} \left\{ f_{21} g_1 \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} + f_{22} \\
&+ \frac{f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} \left[ \left( f_{11} g_1 \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} + f_{12} \right) g_1 + f_1 g_{11} \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} \right] \right\} \\
&= \frac{1}{1 - f_1 g_1} \left\{ f_{21} g_1 \frac{f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} + f_{22} \\
&+ \frac{f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} \left[ \left( f_{11} g_1 \frac{f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} + f_{12} \right) g_1 + f_1 g_{11} \frac{f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} \right] \right\}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
F_{12} &= \frac{1}{1 - f_1 g_1} \left\{ f_{21} \left( g_1 \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_b} + g_2 \right) \\
&+ \frac{f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} \left[ f_{11} \left( g_1 \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_b} + g_2 \right) g_1 + f_1 \left( g_{11} \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_b} + g_{12} \right) \right] \right\} \\
&= \frac{1}{1 - f_1 g_1} \left\{ f_{21} \left( g_1 \frac{f_1 g_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} + g_2 \right) \\
&+ \frac{f_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} \left[ f_{11} \left( g_1 \frac{f_1 g_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} + g_2 \right) g_1 + f_1 \left( g_{11} \frac{f_1 g_2}{1 - f_1 g_1} + g_{12} \right) \right] \right\}
\end{align*}
\]
At a symmetric equilibrium, $f_{12} = f_{21} = g_{21} = g_{12}$, $f_1 = g_1$, $f_2 = g_2$, and $f_{22} = g_{22}$. Then, using the above expressions, it can be shown that

$$F_{11} - 2F_{12} + F_{22} = \frac{(f_2)^2 f_{11} - 2(1 + f_1)f_2f_{12} + (1 + f_1)^2 f_{22}}{(1 + f_1)(1 - f_1^2)}.$$ 

The numerator is a quadratic form in the Hessian of the best-response function $f(x_2, w_1)$:

$$\begin{bmatrix} -f_2 & 1 + f_1 \\ f_{11} & f_{12} \\ f_{12} & f_{22} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} -f_2 \\ 1 + f_1 \end{bmatrix}.$$ 

The denominator will be positive under the stability assumption: $|f_1g_1| = |f_1^2| = f_1^2 < 1 \implies |f_1| < 1$.

The proof of Theorem 2 then follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2.

### 9.5 Proofs of Theorems 3, 4, and 5

For all three models, we can say that the first- and second-order conditions for agent $a$ are given by

$$h(x_a, w_a, x_b) = 0,$$

$$h_1(x_a, w_a, x_b) < 0.$$ 

Hence, the optimal responses to $dw_a$ and $dx_b$ are given by

$$\frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} = -\frac{h_2}{h_1} \text{ and } \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial x_b} = -\frac{h_3}{h_1}.$$
The second-order responses are then given by

\[
\frac{\partial^2 x_a}{\partial w_a^2} = \frac{\partial (-\frac{h_2}{h_1})}{\partial w_a} + \frac{\partial (-\frac{h_2}{h_1})}{\partial x_a} \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} \\
= -\left(\frac{1}{h_1}\right) \left[ h_{22} - 2 \frac{h_2}{h_1} h_{12} + \left(\frac{h_2}{h_1}\right)^2 h_{11} \right] \quad (26)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 x_a}{\partial w_a \partial x_b} = \frac{\partial (-\frac{h_2}{h_1})}{\partial x_b} + \frac{\partial (-\frac{h_2}{h_1})}{\partial x_a} \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial w_a} \\
= -\left(\frac{1}{h_1}\right) \left[ h_{23} - \frac{h_2}{h_1} h_{13} - \frac{h_3}{h_1} h_{21} + \frac{h_2 h_3}{h_1 h_1} h_{11} \right] \quad (27)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 x_a}{\partial x_b^2} = \frac{\partial (-\frac{h_2}{h_1})}{\partial x_b} + \frac{\partial (-\frac{h_2}{h_1})}{\partial x_a} \frac{\partial x_a}{\partial x_b} \\
= -\left(\frac{1}{h_1}\right) \left[ h_{33} - \frac{h_3}{h_1} h_{13} + \left(\frac{h_3}{h_1}\right)^2 h_{11} \right] \quad (28)
\]

Proof of Theorem 3

For the privilege contest model, we have the following \( h \)-functions:

\[
h = -u'(w_a - x_a) + p_1 r = 0
\]

\[
h_1 = u''(w_a - x_a) + p_{11} r < 0
\]

\[
h_2 = -u''', h_3 = p_{12} r \geq 0,
\]

\[
h_{11} = -p_{111} r - u''', h_{12} = u''', h_{13} = p_{112} r,
\]

\[
h_{22} = -u''', h_{23} = 0, h_{33} = p_{122} r.
\]

With the help of (27)-(29), the partials of \( f(x_b, w_a) \) can then be computed

\[
f_{11} = \left(-\frac{r}{h_1^2}\right) \left(-u''' p_{111}^2 r + (u'')^2 p_{111}\right),
\]

\[
f_{22} = \left(-\frac{r}{h_1^2}\right) p_{123} h_1^2,
\]

\[
f_{12} = \left(-\frac{r}{h_1^2}\right) u'' p_{112} (u'' + p_{11} r).
\]

Given \( h_3 = 0 \), we obtain that \( f_1 = 0 \) and \( 1 + f_1 = 1 \). Applying Theorem 2 then obtains that the sign of the quadratic form (10) is given by the sign of

\[
A (p_{111} - 3 p_{112}) - P \frac{p_{111}^2}{p_1^1},
\]

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where \( A \overset{\text{def}}{=} -\frac{w''(w-x)}{w(w-x)} \) and \( P \overset{\text{def}}{=} -\frac{w'''(w-x)}{w'(w-x)} \). Making use of the expressions for the \( p \)-derivatives gives

\[
A \frac{1}{2} \frac{m}{x_3} (1 - m^2) - P \frac{1}{4} \frac{m}{x_3}.
\]

This proves Theorem 3.

**Proof of Theorem 4**

For the ability contest model, we obtain the following expressions for the \( h \) function

\[
h = \frac{\partial p}{\partial x_a} \Delta u_a [u(w_a + r) - u(w_a)] - c'_a = 0
\]

\[
h_1 = \frac{\partial^2 p}{\partial x_a^2} \Delta u_a - c''_a < 0
\]

\[
h_2 = \frac{\partial p}{\partial x_a} \Delta u'_a, \quad h_3 = \frac{\partial^2 p}{\partial x_a \partial x_b} \Delta u_a \overset{\text{SE}}{=} 0
\]

\[
h_{11} = \frac{\partial^3 p}{\partial x_a^3} \Delta u_a - c'''_a, \quad h_{12} = \frac{\partial^2 p}{\partial x_a^2} \Delta u'_a
\]

\[
h_{13} = \frac{\partial^3 p}{\partial x_a^2 \partial x_b} \Delta u_a, \quad h_{22} = \frac{\partial p}{\partial x_a} \Delta u''_a
\]

\[
h_{23} = \frac{\partial^2 p}{\partial x_a \partial x_b} \Delta u'_a \overset{\text{SE}}{=} 0, \quad h_{33} = \frac{\partial^3 p}{\partial x_a \partial x_b^2} \Delta u_a
\]

where \( \Delta u_a \overset{\text{def}}{=} [u(w_a + r) - u(w_a)] \). Assuming that \( c''_a = c'''_a = 0 \), and making use of (27)-(29), we obtain the following curvatures for the best-response function:

\[
f_{22} = \left( -\frac{1}{h_3} \right) (p_1 \Delta u''_a h_1^2 - 2p_1 p_{11}(\Delta u'_a)^2 h_1 + p_1^2 p_{111} \Delta u'_a \Delta u_a),
\]

\[
f_{11} = \left( -\frac{1}{h_3} \right) p_{122} \Delta u_a h_1^2;
\]

\[
f_{12} = \left( -\frac{1}{h_3} \right) (-p_{112} p_1 \Delta u'_a \Delta u_a h_1).
\]

Given \( h_3 = 0, f_1 = 0 \) and \( 1 + f_1 = 1 \), application of Theorem 1 gives that
the sign of the quadratic form (10) is given by the sign of

\[ \frac{(p_{11} - 3p_{12}) p_1}{p_{11}^2} - \frac{\Delta u_a''}{\Delta u_a} - 2 \frac{\Delta u_a'}{\Delta u_a}. \]

Under the power-logistic probability function, the lhs reduces to \(2(1 - m^2)\). This proves Theorem 4.

**Proof of Theorem 5**

For the rent-seeking contest model, the \(h\)-functions are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
  h &= p_1 \Delta u_a - E u_a' = 0, \\
  h_1 &= p_{11} \Delta u_a - 2p_1 \Delta u_a' + E u_a'' < 0, \\
  h_2 &= p_1 \Delta u_a' - E u_a'', \\
  h_3 &= p_{12} \Delta u_a - p_2 \Delta u_a' = p_{11} \Delta u_a' \\
  h_{11} &= p_{111} \Delta u_a - 3p_{11} \Delta u_a' + 3p_1 \Delta u_a'' - E u_a''' \\
  h_{12} &= p_{11} \Delta u_a' - 2p_1 \Delta u_a'' + E u_a'' \\
  h_{13} &= p_{112} \Delta u_a - 2p_{12} \Delta u_a' + p_2 \Delta u_a'' = p_{112} \Delta u_a - p_1 \Delta u_a'' \\
  h_{22} &= p_1 \Delta u_a'' - E u_a'', \\
  h_{23} &= p_{12} \Delta u_a' - p_2 \Delta u_a'' \\
  h_{33} &= p_{122} \Delta u_a - p_{22} \Delta u_a' = -p_{112} \Delta u_a + p_{11} \Delta u_a'
\end{align*}
\]

where \(\Delta u_a \overset{\text{def}}{=} u(w_a + r - x_a) - u(w_a - x_a)\). With the help of these derivatives and expressions (27)-(29), the curvatures \(f_{11}, f_{12}, \text{and} f_{22}\) for \(a\)'s best-response function are computed. Using Theorem 2, and simple, but tedious, factorization, it can be shown (the Maple files are available from the authors upon request) that the sign of the quadratic form \(F_{11} - 2F_{12} + F_{22}\) can be written as

\[
\frac{1}{G} \left[ p_{11}^2 p_1 T_1 + 4p_{11} p_1^2 T_2 + (3p_{112} - p_{111}) p_1^2 T_3 + 4p_1^3 T_4 \right], \tag{30}
\]
where

\[ T_1 = \frac{E u''}{E u'} \left( \frac{E u''}{E u'} - 2 \frac{\Delta u'}{E u'} - \frac{\Delta u'}{E u'} \right) - \frac{\Delta u'}{E u'} \left( \frac{\Delta u''}{E u'} - 2 \frac{\Delta u''}{E u'} \right), \]

\[ T_2 = \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \left[ \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \left( \frac{E u''}{E u'} - \frac{\Delta u'}{E u'} \right) - \frac{E u''}{E u'} \left( \frac{E u''}{E u'} - \frac{\Delta u''}{E u'} \right) \right], \]

\[ T_3 = \left( \frac{E u''}{E u'} - \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \right)^2, \]

\[ T_4 = \left( \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \right)^2 \left[ \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} \left( \frac{\Delta u''}{\Delta u} - \frac{E u''}{E u'} \right) + \frac{E u''}{E u'} \left( \frac{E u''}{E u'} - \frac{\Delta u''}{\Delta u} \right) \right], \]

and

\[ G = \left( p_{11} - p_1 \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} + p_1 \frac{E u''}{E u'} \right) \left( p_{11} - 3p_1 \frac{\Delta u'}{\Delta u} + p_1 \frac{E u''}{E u'} \right)^2. \]

Note that \( G \) is negative given the term in the first round brackets can be written as \( \frac{h_1}{\Delta u} + \frac{\partial p_a(x_a, x_b)}{\partial x_a} \Delta u \) and both \( h_1 \) and \( \Delta u \) are negative because of the second-order condition and risk aversion, respectively. This proves Theorem 5.

### 9.6 Proof of Theorem 6

The first-order condition for \( x \) is given by \( h(x_a, w_a, x_b) = 0 \), where

\[
\begin{align*}
    h(x_a, w_a, x_b) &= \frac{\partial p_a(x_a, x_b)}{\partial x_a} \left[ u(w_a + r - x_a) - u(w_a + r - x_a) \right] \\
    &\quad - \left[ p(x_a, x_b) u(w_a + r - x_a) + (1 - p(x_a, x_b)) u(w_a - x_a) \right].
\end{align*}
\]

At a symmetric equilibrium \( (x = x_a = x_b) \), \( \frac{\partial p_a(x_a, x_b)}{\partial x_a} = \frac{1}{4} \frac{m}{x} \) and \( p_a(x, x) = \frac{1}{2} \).

Using for \( u(y) \) the CRRA form, \( u(y) = \frac{y^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} \), and taking a Taylor expansion of degree 2 around \( r = 0 \), results in

\[
    h(x, w, x) \approx (w-x)^{-\rho} \left[ -1 + \left( \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\rho}{w-x} \right) r - \left( \frac{1}{8} \frac{\rho}{w-x} + \frac{1}{4} \frac{\rho(1+\rho)}{(w-x)^2} \right) r^2 \right]
\]

Equating the rhs to zero and solving for \( x \) gives three roots, with the real solution being \( \frac{1}{4} mr + O(r^3) \) (in fact \( \frac{1}{4} mr \) is the solution to the case of quadratic preferences). Replacing \( x \) by \( \frac{1}{4} mr \), the obtained expressions for \( T_1, T_2, T_3, \) and...

\[ \text{44} \]
$T_4$ are then Taylor-approximated around $r = 0$:

\[
T_1 = \frac{1}{2} \rho (1 + \rho) w^4 r^2 + O(r^3), \\
T_2 = \frac{1}{3} \rho^2 (1 + \rho) w^5 r^2 + O(r^3), \\
T_3 = O(r^3), \text{ and} \\
T_4 = \frac{2}{3} \rho^3 (1 + \rho) w^6 r^2 + O(r^3).
\]

Next, the coefficients with $T_1$, $T_2$, and $T_4$ are computed using the earlier derived expressions for the probability function and its derivatives, and evaluating them at $x = \frac{1}{4} mr$. Finally, the numerator of (30) is computed. Up to a negative proportionality factor, it is equivalent to

\[
1 - \frac{2}{3} \left( \rho m \frac{r}{w} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \rho m \frac{r}{w} \right)^2.
\]

The expression has no real roots and is always positive. Hence, for CRRA preferences and a rent that is small w.r.t. the initial wealth $w$, a small MPS in wealth reduces aggregate effort. This proves Theorem 6.
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