Does the tax system encourage too much education?\footnote{A previous version of this paper has been presented under the title “Optimal income taxation with endogenous human capital formation”.}

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Abstract

The Nordic countries have dual income taxation, with a proportional tax on capital income and a progressive tax on labour income. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) argue that this asymmetric treatment of the two types of income can be defended on pure efficiency grounds. The progressivity of the labour income tax serves to reduce the private return to human capital investment, thereby offsetting the tendency of a proportional comprehensive income tax to discriminate in favour of such investments. They use a simple overlapping generations model in a small open economy. The consumer faces a trade-off between investments in financial and human capital, and education serves only as a means to shift consumption between periods. The present paper expands this model by including the intrinsic value of education as a motivation behind getting education. I find that the argument in favour of dual income taxation is strengthened. A comprehensive proportional income tax works as a tax subsidy on human capital investments, and it reduces the price of education as a consumption good. This may explain the puzzle why so many choose to get higher education in the Nordic countries, where the wage return to education is modest. By introducing a progressive labour income tax, the total return to education is reduced. Hence the efficiency distortion in the capital market may be partly neutralised.

Keywords: Dual income tax; Optimal income taxation; Human capital investment; Intrinsic value of education.


1 Introduction

In Norway there is an ongoing debate whether or not it is recommendable to have flat labour income taxation. Status quo is dual income taxation, with a proportional tax on capital income...
and a progressive tax on labour income. This should be seen in contrast to a comprehensive income tax, where income is taxed at the same rate independent of source. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) argue that this asymmetric treatment of the two types of income can be defended on pure efficiency grounds. The progressivity of the labour income tax serves to reduce the private return to human capital investment, thereby offsetting the tendency of a proportional comprehensive income tax to discriminate in favour of such investments. They use a simple overlapping generation model of a small open economy. The consumer faces a trade-off between investments in financial and human capital. He seeks to maximise his lifetime consumption, and education is only a means to shift consumption between periods. The cost of getting education is foregone labour income.

If the individual faces a choice between investing in real or human capital, the tax system creates another distortion. Depreciation of real capital is tax deductible, whereas the depreciation of the human capital to zero at death is not. Nerlove et al. (1993) investigate this effect on the accumulation of real contra human capital in society. They find, in contrast to Nielsen and Sørensen, that comprehensive income taxation will discriminate against human capital investments.

Often the individual faces more costs than the time spent on education. Most of these costs, as e.g. tuition and books, are not reduced by a labour income tax. Hence the total costs of education will be reduced less by an income tax than the return to education. As shown by Heckman (1976), this will have a negative effect on the accumulation of human capital.

The possibility to substitute leisure for labour introduces a new distortion caused by the income taxation. Labour income taxation causes decrease in the price of leisure. The consumer will wish to have more leisure and to work less, given that the substitution effect dominates the income effect, and this labour reduction also reduces the total wage return to education. Altogether the individual prefers less education.

In all of these models, the only reason for the individual to get education, is higher expected wages. The Nordic countries, and especially Norway, have small wage differentials. The OECD-countries have over the last decades experienced a rapid growth in the demand for educated labour, mostly due to increased international trade and technological changes. At the same time, there has been an increase in the supply of educated labour. But in most of these countries, the supply effect has been dominated by the demand effect, and the relative wage of educated labour has increased (Farre and Salvanes (1999), Kahn (1998)). Gottschalk (1997) finds that in the U.S. the return to a college degree compared to having only high school was 31% in 1973, while it in 1993 had risen to 53%. This did not happen in Norway. According to Hægeland et al. (1999) the return to education in Norway has been more or less stable during the years between 1980 and 1990. Since the wage return to education is so small, there has to be other and possibly more important motives than higher expected wages behind the individual’s decision to invest in human capital.

Additional motivation for getting an education is the possibility to enjoy the life as a student, to learn new things, and to pursue own interests. Education increases the chances of getting an interesting job. Flexibility between jobs increases through education, and chances are that when unemployed, the individual can easier find a new job. Bishop (1994) found that for most of the OECD-area the larger part of the unemployed in the 1980s had no higher education. The social
status connected to having higher education is a factor not insigniﬁcant for the educational decisions. We cannot rule out that expectations and norms in the society have an inﬂuence on whether or not the young person chooses to get education. In fact, Hægeland et al. (1999) ﬁnd that the parental educational level has a positive inﬂuence on the length of the education their children choose to get. They also ﬁnd that there is a tendency that the children of wealthy parents get an education of a longer duration.

All of these non-wage related motives behind the educational choice, I summarise as the intrinsic value of education. The present paper expands the model of Nielsen and Sørensen by including the intrinsic value of education as a motivation behind getting education. The objectives are to investigate the consequences for the optimal tax proﬁle, and to see if progressive labour income taxation still is defendable on efﬁciency grounds. Education is no longer just an investment object and a means for shifting consumption between periods; it bears a direct utility for the consumer. The intrinsic value of education makes education a kind of consumption good; the individual increases his utility directly through getting education. I study optimal taxes in two cases; ﬁrst in the pure consumption model of Nielsen and Sørensen, and then in the expanded model with intrinsic value of education. Section 2 presents the general framework and analyses consumer behaviour in the two models. In section 3 the optimal tax analysis is carried out for both cases, and the results are compared. Section 4 summarises the results.

2 The Models

2.1 General Assumptions behind the Models

A representative consumer lives for two periods, 1 and 2. Let $T_1$ and $T_2$ be the length of the periods, which need not be equal. The individual devotes a ﬁxed number of hours, $L_i$, to leisure in each period. In the second period, the remaining time is spent working, whereas he may spend some of the time getting an education in the ﬁrst period. The time budget constraints are

\begin{align*}
\text{Period 1} &: \quad T_1 = H_1 + E + L_1; \\
\text{Period 2} &: \quad T_2 = H_2 + L_2;
\end{align*}

with $H_i$ denoting the time he spends working in each period $i$, $E$ is the time spent on education. Individuals leave no bequests and there are no government transfers. Thus, labour is the only source of income. Let $w$ be the real wage, i.e. the basic wage for all workers. $t_1$ is the labour income tax for unskilled labour. First period consumption is given by

\begin{equation}
C_1 = w(1 - t_1)(T_1 - E - L_1) - S;
\end{equation}

$^1$This is the lowest tax rate in a progressive tax system, and it is what Nielsen and Sørensen call $t_1$. The subscripts 1 and 2 denote the two periods of time, and to avoid confusion, we let the subscripts $l$ and $h$ denote the low and high tax rates.
with \( S \) being savings made in the first period. \( r \) is the real interest rate paid on assets held from period 1 to period 2. Savings may be positive or negative, and we assume that there are no liquidity constraints.

Education is another kind of savings. If an individual gets education in the first period, his wage in the second period increases by \( g(E) \). \( g(E) \) is the function representing the return to education, assumed to be increasing and concave in \( E \):

\[
g > 0; \quad g(0) = 1;\]

I.e. the more time he spends on education, the higher will his wage in the next period be. We also assume

\[
g > 1; \quad g'(0) > 0; \quad g''(E) < 0;\]

implying that the individual always gains from getting education. This rules out the possibility that an unskilled worker may get better paid than a skilled worker. The cost of education is foregone labour income in the first period. The consumer does not face any direct costs of education. To be able to analyse the effects of progressive taxation, we introduce a proportional tax \( t_h \) on the additional wage \( [g(E) - 1] \) that the consumer receives in the second period, if he spent some time getting education in the first period. We have a progressive labour income tax if \( t_l < t_h \), and a proportional income tax if \( t_l = t_h \). Capital income, \( r \), faces the proportional, exogenously given tax rate \( \omega \).

We use period one consumption as numeraire, and set its price to be one. Period 2 consumption is

\[
C_2 = [1 + (1 - t_l)w(T_2 - L_2) + (1 - t_h)w_h[1 - g(E) - 1](T_2 - L_2)] + (1 - t_l)w(T_2 - L_2) + (1 - t_h)w_h[1 - g(E) - 1](T_2 - L_2); \quad (2)
\]

Combining (1) and (2) gives the lifetime budget constraint:

\[
C_1 + pC_2 = w[H_1 + p(T_2 - L_2)] + p[H_2 + p(T_2 - L_2)] + (1 - t_l)w(T_2 - L_2) + (1 - t_h)w_h[1 - g(E) - 1](T_2 - L_2); \quad (3)
\]

By introducing a new notation, we can simplify the representation of consumer behaviour both in the case with and without taxes. Define

\[
w_l = (1 - t_l)w; \quad (4)
\]

which is the marginal after tax real wage for unskilled labour (the net basic wage). The marginal after tax real wage for skilled labour is defined as

\[
w_h = (1 - t_h)w; \quad (5)
\]

Then the net wage return to education is equal to \( w_h[g(E) - 1]H_2 \).
The relative price of period 2 consumption measured in units of consumption in period 1 is defined as
\[ p = \frac{1}{1 + \left(1 + \frac{1}{\lambda} \right) r} \]  
Note that for \( \lambda > 0 \), we have
\[ p > \frac{1}{1 + r} \]
implying that the capital income tax makes future consumption more expensive. i.e. the consumer must give up more consumption in period 1 to achieve a given level of consumption in period 2. This is if he uses the financial market to shift consumption between periods.

I will now investigate how the consumer’s preferences matter in his reaction to different tax levels. To do this, I specify his utility function in two different ways; in the rst he only gets utility from consumption. This is the specification used by Nielsen and Sørensen. In the second, education has an intrinsic value and is therefore included in the utility function.

### 2.2 Model i) - The pure consumption model.

Let the utility function of a representative consumer be
\[ U = U(C_1; C_2); \quad U_1 > 0; \quad U_2 > 0; \]
i.e. utility depends on consumption only. \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \) denote the marginal utility of consumption in period 1 and period 2, respectively. The consumer’s maximisation problem is
\[ \max_{C_1, C_2, E} U(C_1; C_2) \text{ s.t. the budget constraint (3).} \]
The rst order conditions for an interior optimum are:
\[ U_1 = 0; \quad U_2 = 0; \quad \lambda w_l + p w_l g(E) \Pi_2 = 0 \]
\[ \lambda \text{ is the marginal utility of money, assumed strictly positive. (7) and (8) state the usual rst order conditions; that the marginal utilities of consumption equal the marginal costs. Rearranging (9) gives} \]
\[ w_l = p w_l g(E) \Pi_2; \]
\[ ^2 \text{My conditions may differ slightly from the ones of Nielsen and Sørensen. The reason for this is that they normalised time endowment to 1 in each period, whereas I have chosen not to.} \]
The marginal cost of getting education equals the discounted marginal gain. The marginal gain is the present value of the additional income he gets in period 2 by choosing to get one more unit of education in period 1.

From (9) we get the optimal investment condition:

\[(1 - \delta)r = \frac{(1 - \delta)}{1 - \delta} g(E)P_2 - 1; \quad (11)\]

Condition (11) states that in optimum the net marginal rate of return on financial capital investments (the left hand side of (11)) is equal to the net marginal rate of return on human capital investments (the right hand side of (11)). Private returns to the two types of investments differ from their social returns. The social return to investments in financial capital is the real interest rate, \(r\), whereas the private return to these investments is the after tax interest rate, \((1 - \delta)r\). Investments in human capital give a social return of \(g(E)P_2 - 1\), but the private return is reduced by the labour income taxes. If there are no taxes, equation (11) reduces to

\[r = g(E)P_2 - 1\]  \(\quad (12)\]

In this case, the consumer invests in financial and human capital until the social returns on the margin are equal. Here no distortions exist, and so private and social returns are identical. The income taxes create distortions since the social return on the investment differs from the return that the consumer faces when he makes his investment decisions.

Combined with the budget constraint, the first order conditions give us the demand functions:

\[C_1 = C_1(w_l; w_h; p); \quad C_2 = C_2(w_l; w_h; p); \quad E = E(w_l; w_h; p);\]

The indirect utility function is found by substituting these demand functions into the utility function:

\[V(w_l; w_h; p) = U(C_1(w_l; w_h; p); C_2(w_l; w_h; p));\]

Using the envelope theorem, we find the first order derivatives of this function:

\[\frac{\partial V}{\partial w_l} = (H_1 + pP_2); \quad (13)\]
\[\frac{\partial V}{\partial w_h} = -p[g(E)P_2 - 1]P_2;\]

These expressions will be useful later on.

2.3 Model ii) - Intrinsic value of education.

Higher future wages is not the only reason why the consumer chooses to get an education. E.g. the fact that education enables him to get an interesting and challenging job is important. I summarise
the other factors behind the educational decision as the intrinsic value of education. The way I model this, is to include education in the individual's utility function.

Let the utility function be

\[ U = U(C_1; C_2; E); \quad U_1 > 0; \quad U_2 > 0; \quad U_E > 0; \]

\( U_E \) is the marginal utility of education, and it represents the intrinsic value of education. Education now has a kind of consumption value, and we will investigate how this influences the consumer's investment decisions.

The maximisation problem of a representative individual now becomes

\[ \max_{C_1; C_2; E} U(C_1; C_2; E) \quad \text{s.t. the budget constraint (3)}. \]

The first order conditions for an interior optimum are:

\[ U_1 \frac{\partial}{\partial C_1} - \lambda = 0; \quad (14) \]
\[ U_2 \frac{\partial}{\partial C_2} - \lambda p = 0; \quad (15) \]
\[ U_E \frac{\partial}{\partial E} - \lambda \left[ w_1 - p E \frac{\partial}{\partial E} \right] = 0; \quad (16) \]

Manipulating (16) gives the condition for optimal investment behaviour:

\[ (1 \lambda) r = \frac{1}{U_E} \left[ \frac{1}{(1 \lambda) w} \frac{1}{(1 \lambda) t} \left( \frac{b}{t} \right) g(E) \right]; \quad (17) \]

The individual invests in financial and human capital until the marginal return is equal in the two investment alternatives. Compared with the optimal investment condition in the pure consumption model (equation (11)), we have an additional fraction on the right hand side.

\[ \frac{U_E}{(1 \lambda) w}\]

is the consumer's marginal consumption value of education, measured in net labour income. This fraction is clearly positive. It is also smaller than one, which can be shown by investigating (16).

The additional consumption value of education induces the consumer to invest in human capital at a lower wage return than in the pure consumption model. If the consumer is to reduce his educational level, he must be compensated for the direct utility reduction. This means that the interest rate now must be higher to make the consumer give up one unit of human capital and invest in one extra unit of financial capital instead. The consequences for the optimal tax profile are important, and I will treat these thoroughly in section 3.2.

Combined with the budget constraint, the first order conditions give us the demand functions:

\[ C_1 = C_1(w_1; w_h; p); \quad C_2 = C_2(w_1; w_h; p); \quad E = E(w_1; w_h; p); \]
The indirect utility function is found by substituting these demand functions into the utility function:

\[ V(w_l; w_h; p) = U(C_1(w_l; w_h; p); C_2(w_l; w_h; p); E(w_l; w_h; p)) \]

Using the envelope theorem, we find the first order derivatives of the indirect utility function:

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial w_l} = (H_1 + p'T_2);
\]
\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial w_h} = p(g(E))1' T_2;
\]

These are needed for the optimal tax analysis.

2.4 The production sector.

The domestic sector produces one good, which is a perfect substitute for the foreign good. The price of the foreign good is exogenously given and normalised to 1. Hence the price of the domestic good also has to be 1. The industry has a standard neoclassical production function of the form

\[ Z = F(K; N); \]

where \( Z \) is the amount produced, \( K \) is the total amount of capital in the industry, and \( N \) is total effective labour input. The production function is linear and homogenous of degree one, so that

\[ Z = N f(k); \quad \text{with } k = \frac{K}{N}; \]

In steady-state, when work effort is constant over time, the total effective labour input is given by

\[ N = (T_1 + E + L_1) + g(E)(T_2 + L_2); \]

At each point in time there are two generations living in the economy. \((T_1; E; L_1)\) is the work effort of the young generation, who also invests in education during the period. The old generation offers \( g(E)(T_2; L_2) \) effective units of labour.

The industry demands of capital and labour are given by

\[ f^0(k) = r; \quad f(k) = r k = w; \]

with \( k \) being the capital intensity in the industry (capital per unit effective labour input), and \( w \) the real wage per unit of effective labour. From this we see that domestic capital intensity and the real wage are given by the international interest rate, implying that domestic pre tax factor prices remain unaffected by changes in the domestic tax rates. Therefore saving and labour supply will only need one period to fully adapt to new tax rates.
2.5 The public sector.

The public sector offers goods and services, and it has an exogenous level of expenditure. Public expenditure is financed through an exogenously given tax on financial income (τ), a labor income tax (t), and by issuing debts (D). The government wishes to carry through a tax reform to introduce Pareto efficient labor income tax rates. Tax rates are chosen so as to maximise the welfare of the current young generation and all future generations, without reducing the welfare of the current old generation.

To give all generations the same utility gain from the reform, the government must adjust its burden of debt and keep this new level of debt constant through all future periods. In each period there are two generations, from which the government receives taxes. With the superscript "0" denoting pre-reform variables, the government budget constraint for the reform period becomes

$$t_0^T w_{T1} + t_0^H w(g(E)^0) + 1 \frac{\partial T}{\partial T} + \frac{\partial rS}{\partial T} + t_1 w(T_1, E) + C_1 + D = G;$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)$$

where $p = p^0$, $D^0 = 0$, and $S^0 = (1 + t^0) w_{T1} + C^0$:

In the next period, all living individuals have fully adapted to the new tax rates. The government may therefore, without problems, tax everybody according to the new Pareto-optimal tax rates. In this period, the governmental budget constraint is

$$t_1 w(T_1, E) + t_1 w_{T1} + t_H w(g(E)) + 1 \frac{\partial T}{\partial T} + \frac{\partial rS}{\partial T} = G + rD;$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)$$

where $S = (1 + t^0) w(T_1, E) + C_1$; $C_1$ is the savings of the old generation in the previous period.

By substituting for $D$ from (19) into (20) and manipulating, we find the public budget constraint:

$$(1 + r)(w_i w_i) + (w_h w_i) + (w_h w_h) g(E) = (1 + r) G + rR = 0;$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)$$

where $R = t_0^T w_{T2} + t_0^H w(g(E)^0) + 1 \frac{\partial T}{\partial T} + \frac{\partial rS}{\partial T}$ is a constant.

3 Optimal tax analysis.

Taxes are chosen so as to maximise the welfare of the inhabitants at the least efficiency loss. Analytically, we maximise the consumer’s indirect utility function with respect to the net wages $w_i$ and $w_h$ subject to the public budget constraint.

3.1 Optimal taxes in model i) - The pure consumption model.

The governmental maximisation problem now is

$$\max_{w_i, w_h} V (w_i, w_h; p) \quad \text{s.t. the public budget constraint (21)}$$
From the corresponding Lagrange-function, we find the first order conditions:

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial w_l} + 1 \left( \frac{H_2}{H_1} (1 + r)H_1 + (1 + r)(w_i w_l)^{H_2/H_1} \frac{H_2}{H_1} + (w_i w_h)\frac{H_2}{H_1} \right) = 0; \quad (22)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial w_h} + 1 \left( \frac{H_2}{H_1} + (1 + r)(w_i w_l)^{H_2/H_1} \frac{H_2}{H_1} \right) = 0; \quad (23)
\]

Tedious manipulations, using equations (13), (22), and (23), give the condition for optimal tax policy:

\[
(H_1 + pH_2) \frac{g(E)}{H_1} w_i (1 + (1 + r)\frac{\theta}{1 + (1 + r)}) \frac{1}{1 + (1 + r)} = 0 \quad (24)
\]

An increase in the net wage for skilled labour increases the return to education, inducing the individual to invest more in human capital. An increase in the net wage for unskilled labour increases the cost of investing in human capital, as measured by foregone labour income. This causes the individual to reduce his investment in human capital.

The first bracket of (24) is accordingly positive. For equation (24) to hold, the second bracket on the left hand side must be zero.

With no tax on capital income, \(\theta = 0\), the Pareto-optimal labour income tax rates are given by \(t_l = t_h\), i.e. a proportional labour income tax. A proportional labour income tax does not influence the investment decision of the consumer. It is thus a neutral tax on human capital investments. Combined with zero taxation of nancial income, the social return on both kinds of investments equal the private return. The tax does not create any distortions in the capital market.

If there is a positive tax on nancial income, \(\theta > 0\), the optimal income tax rates are given by \(t_l < t_h\), so that we have a progressive labour income tax. The progressive labour income tax reduces the wage return to human capital investments, and thereby reduces some of the distortions that would arise with a proportional labour income tax. If both the labour income tax and the tax on capital income are proportional, \(t_l = t_h\), the optimal investment condition (11) reduces to

\[
(1 + (1 + r)) \frac{\theta}{1 + (1 + r)} = 0 \quad (25)
\]

Here we have no actual taxation of the returns to human capital investments. This is because the return to the investment faces the same tax rate as the cost, measured in foregone labour income in the first period\(^3\). Return to nancial investments on the other hand, faces a positive tax rate \(\theta\). This causes distortions in the investment market in favour of human capital. We see from the above

\(^3\)Sandmo (1979) shows the neutrality of a cash flow tax.
equation that the consumer will invest in human capital at a lower rate of return than in the case with no taxes. Since education has a diminishing rate of return, this means that he invests more in human capital than he would have done if there were no taxes. This overinvestment in human capital is counteracted by a progressive labour income tax, reducing the return to education.

The next step is to investigate the optimal tax rates in the situation where education has an intrinsic value.

3.2 Optimal taxes in model ii) - with intrinsic value of education.

The government’s maximisation problem is

\[ \max_{w_l; w_h} V(w_l; w_h; p) \quad \text{s.t. the public budget constraint (21)} \]

The first order conditions in this case are the same as conditions (22) and (23) of model i). Inserting equation (18) into the first order conditions and manipulating, we find the condition for optimal tax rates when education has an intrinsic value:

\[ \mu \left( 1 + p \frac{\partial C_1}{\partial Y} \right) \frac{U_E}{w_i} + \mu \frac{1}{w_h} \Rightarrow \frac{1}{w_h} - \mu \Rightarrow 0 \]

(26)

In the case of no tax on capital income, \( \xi = 0 \), equation (26) reduces to:

\[ \frac{U_E}{w_i} + \mu \frac{1}{w_h} + \frac{1}{w_h} = 0 \]

I.e.\(^4\)

\[ t_h > t_l \]

Contrary to the corresponding results in model i), we find that even with no taxation of capital income, it is optimal with progressive labour income taxation. The intuition behind this can be understood by considering the consumer’s optimal investment condition, equation (17):

\[ (1 - \xi) r = \frac{1}{1 - \left( t_l t_i \right) w_i} \frac{1}{1 - t_i} \frac{t_h}{t_i} \frac{g(E)}{Y^2} \cdot 1 \]

Due to the additional direct utility return to education, a proportional labour income tax is no longer neutral; it discriminates between the two investment alternatives in favour of human capital

\[ \frac{U_k}{w_i} + \mu \frac{1}{w_h} + \mu \frac{1}{w_h} = 0 \Rightarrow \frac{1}{1 - t_i} t_i = \frac{t_h}{t_i} \frac{U_k}{w_i} \Rightarrow 1 = \frac{1}{1 - t_i} t_i = \frac{1}{1 - t_i} t_i \]

(11 12 13 14 =)

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investments. To see this clearly, let $\zeta = 0$, and $t_h = t_i > 0$ in equation (17), and compare this with the situation with no taxes at all, $\zeta = t_h = t_i = 0$. In the first case the consumer’s marginal consumption value of education is larger than in the second:

$$\frac{U_E}{(1 + t_i)w} > \frac{U_E}{w}.$$  

I.e.

$$\frac{1}{1 + (1 + t_i)w} > \frac{1}{1 + w}.$$  

In both cases, the right hand side of (17) must equal the real interest rate $r$: Hence the marginal return to education has to vary, in order for the equality to hold:

$$[g'(E)]_{t_i > 0} < [g'(E)]_{t_i = 0};$$  

I.e.

$$[E]_{t_i > 0} > [E]_{t_i = 0};$$

The tax on labour income creates price distortions in favour of human capital investments, and the consumer chooses to get more education than in the case with no taxes.

The reason for the distortion in favour of investments in human capital is that only the wage return to education is reduced through the income tax; the direct utility return remains unchanged. This implies that the total tax rate on return from human capital investments decreases, compared with the pure consumption model. But the alternative cost of investing in human capital, given by the net basic wage, is the same in the two cases. Put differently, a proportional labour income tax works as a tax subsidy on human capital investments, still creating distortions in the capital market. The tax makes education cheaper. Return to financial investments must be higher in the case with labour income tax in order to shift investments between financial and human capital. A progressive labour income tax reduces the wage return to education, and hence the total return. The consumer chooses to invest in financial capital at a lower interest rate than in the case with proportional labour income tax. The progressive labour income tax reduces the distortions in the capital market, and we get a solution closer to the optimum.

With positive tax on capital income, $\zeta > 0$, it is analytically more complicated to characterise the optimal tax rates on labour income. From the optimal tax condition (26), we get

$$\mu \rho r \frac{\partial C_1}{\partial t_i} + \frac{t_h}{1 + t_i} \frac{U_E}{w} + \frac{1 + t_i}{1 + t_h} w = \frac{1 + r}{1 + (1 + \zeta)r};$$  

We know that

$$\frac{1 + r}{1 + (1 + \zeta)r} > 1;$$  

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implying that the left hand side of (27) is positive and greater than one. Consumption is assumed to be a normal good in both periods. The marginal propensity to consume is therefore between 0 and 1;

$$0 < \frac{\varphi C}{\varphi Y} < 1.$$ 

A reasonable value of the marginal propensity to consume is 0.5, which will be used throughout the analysis.

The capital income tax lies within the interval

$$0.6 \leq t \leq 1:$$

We may assume that it is no larger than 0.5, since, in an open economy, capital flows out of the country if tax rates are too high. In the following analysis, we let $t = 0.28$, which is the tax rate on capital income in Norway.

By investigating the expression $pr$, we find that

$$pr = \frac{r}{1 + (1 - t)r} < 1 \quad \text{if} \quad r < \frac{1}{t} = 3.57;$$

a condition quite likely to be fulfilled. Estimating the real interest rate is difficult, since we have not specified the length of the periods. It is a good approximation to say that the annual real interest rate is 5%, summing up to 165% over a period of twenty years. (Here we include the compound interest.) Assuming that the individual only has a time span of 20 years when choosing how much to invest in human capital, the above condition is met. In the following $r = 1.65$, i.e. a real interest rate of 16.5%:

With these values, the first term in the brackets of equation (27) becomes

$$pr \varphi C \varphi Y = \frac{r}{1 + (1 - t)r} \varphi C \varphi Y = \frac{1.65 \varphi 0.28}{1 + (1 - 0.28) \varphi 1.65} \varphi 0 = 0.106:$$

If the expression in the brackets of (27) is to be positive, the surtax $t_h$ must not exceed a critical value. This threshold value of $t_h$ is:

$$\frac{t_h}{1 - t} < 0.106 \quad \Rightarrow \quad t_h < 0.096:$$

I.e. $t_h$ must not exceed 9.6%, which is substantially below the current marginal rate of income tax. Therefore the expression in brackets of (27) is negative.

We have stated that the marginal consumption value of education measured in net labour income is positive,

$$\frac{U_e}{w} > 0:
As long as $t_h > 0.096$, the first term on the left hand side of (27) is negative. To make the equality in (27) hold, the following must be true:

$$\frac{1}{1} \frac{t_i}{t_h} = \frac{1 + r}{1 + (1 - \frac{1}{\zeta})r} + \frac{\mu}{1} \frac{t_h}{1} \frac{\partial}{\partial Y} \frac{\partial}{\partial Y} \frac{U_E}{U_E} > \frac{1 + r}{1 + (1 - \frac{1}{\zeta})r} > 1:$$

(28)

i.e.

$t_i < t_h$:

As expected, it is optimal with progressive labour income taxation when there is a tax on capital income. The analysis is purely qualitative, so we cannot conclude about the optimal degree of progressivity. Intuitively, labour income taxation should be more progressive when capital income is taxed, than when it is not.

This follows from the fact that the distortions in the investment market increases when tax on capital income is introduced, which favours human capital investments. From (28) we see that the surtax must be substantially higher than the basic labour income tax in order to fulfill the equation.

These results can be shown to hold for other values of the real interest rate and of the marginal propensity to consume.

4 Concluding remarks.

OECD proposes in its 1997 country report for Norway that the educational profile in Norway corresponds badly with the estimated future demand for labour. They suggest that there will be a future excess of people with theoretical knowledge, and a lack of people with vocational skills. Try (2000) shows that over the last years, there has been a clear development in Norway towards a concentration on fields of study with a modest wage return. This indicates that the intrinsic value is an important factor in the educational choice. Also, over the last decades, we have seen a development towards a less progressive labour income tax. A comprehensive proportional income tax ($t_i = t_h = \zeta$) could possibly increase this trend of choosing fields of study with a modest wage return. The proportional labour income tax reduces the price of education as a consumption good, and could induce the individual to consume more than in the case with no taxes. This provides an efficiency argument in favour of progressive labour income taxation.

In a world with tax on capital income, a progressive tax on labour income is the second best solution. It minimises the efficiency distortions in the capital market. When education has an intrinsic value, it can be seen as a good for which the consumer is willing to pay. The efficiency argument in favour of a progressive labour income tax is then strengthened. The consumer chooses
to invest in human capital at a lower rate of return than if education was considered only as an investment. A comprehensive proportional income tax makes the consumption of education even cheaper, which from an efficiency point of view leads to further overinvestment in human capital. The need for a progressive labour income tax to correct for these distortions increases accordingly.

I have used the simplest model possible, and it is worth noting that I cannot say anything about the levels of these tax rates beyond their progressivity. Neither does this analysis consider distributional issues, or possible positive external effects of education.

By generalising the wage return function to education to make the return depend on total amount of human capital in the society, we could study the external effects of education. An individual’s return to education depends not only on his own choices, but also on the educational decisions of the other individuals living in the society.

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