

**Together or apart?
Attitudes towards multi-ethnic state
and ethnically mixed communities
in post-independence Kosovo**

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TOGETHER OR APART? ATTITUDES TOWARDS MULTI-ETHNIC STATE AND ETHNICALLY MIXED COMMUNITIES IN POST-INDEPENDENCE KOSOVO.

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Abstract:

The success of Kosovo as an independent and multi-ethnic state depends crucially on the ability and willingness of different ethnic groups to live and work together. We explore the attitudes towards multi-ethnic state and ethnically mixed living in post-independence Kosovo. The study is based on a survey (face-to-face interviews) of 1367 respondents carried out in Kosovo four months after it proclaimed independence. The ordered and multinomial probit analysis suggests that, compared to the ethnic Albanians, the ethnic Serb minority is less likely, and the non-Serb minorities are more likely, to believe in the viability of Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state and to consider that different ethnicities should live in mixed areas. The elderly, people with higher incomes, students and the unemployed are more likely to report that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state. Females and people from rural areas tend to be more favourably inclined toward different ethnicities in Kosovo living in the same communities. The respondents living in the ethnically mixed and politically troubled northern Kosovo region report more negative attitudes towards Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state, but are less likely to consider that different ethnicities in Kosovo should live in separate communities.

Keywords: Kosovo, post-conflict management, ethnic tolerance, inclusion.

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1. Introduction

If there was one thing that all parties to the Kosovo conflict in the 1990s could agree on it was that the issue of Kosovo was among the most solution-resistant of all the conflicts in the Balkans (Malcolm 1998). What has been more difficult to agree on is whether we were witnessing an ethnic conflict or a political one. Time has moved on since the violent 1990s. Kosovo became an independent state in February 2008. Upon its creation, Kosovo sent a strong signal of being a multi-ethnic state: Kosovo's constitution states that the country shall be a multi-ethnic state and its flag bears six stars representing the six largest ethnic groups.

However, not all is well in the newly independent, multi-ethnic Kosovo. The nation-building process has been by no means completed. National identity still is distracted by feelings of association with either Albania or Serbia. Rapaj (2010) considers this as a serious problem for Kosovo, arguing that there is a connection between weak national identity and external non-recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. There is a high incidence of the term 'ethnic' in the press (Bancroft 2009, Martin 2009). Some still fear, and others hope, that the overwhelmingly ethnic Serb populated north of Kosovo may be sectioned off from the newly independent State (BalkanInsight 2008; The Telegraph 2008). The partition debate and the subsequent action are increasingly likely to be dominated by foreign politics rather than local people's will. For example, if Serbia, which has not recognised its former province as an independent state, pushes too hard for the partition of Kosovo, its own EU integration process may be undermined (The Economist 2011).

Leaving aside political interests, in this study we ask Kosovars themselves about 1) what they think about the viability of their nation as a multi-ethnic state and 2) their attitudes towards ethnically mixed communities. We believe that perceptions, attitudes and expectations do matter. If Kosovars cannot conceive of a functioning multi-ethnic-state then it will not happen. While the converse is not necessarily true, our findings may help understand the prospects for long-term development of Kosovo – the youngest and, arguably, the most fragile state in Europe. In this respect, our study is related to the large literature linking ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity to the economic and social outcomes of a community, region or country. For example, Alesina et al. (2003) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show that ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation are likely to be important determinants of country-level GDP growth, literacy rate, infant mortality, public good provision, extent of corruption and political freedom. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that ethnic and religious polarizations have a negative effect on economic growth via reduced investment and higher incidence on civil wars. Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) find that, keeping the level of ethnic fractionalisation

constant, higher level of ethnic segmentation (the extent to which the different ethnic groups live relatively more apart) is negatively correlated with government quality.

To understand the Kosovars' perceptions of viability and form of a multi-ethnic state, we use an interview survey of 1367 respondents that was conducted in Kosovo in June 2008 – four months after Kosovo proclaimed independence. The survey was designed and commissioned by the authors of this paper to, among other things, pay attention to potential differences in perspectives connected to ethnicity. The econometric analysis of data suggests that, compared to the ethnic Albanian majority, the ethnic Serbs in Kosovo are less likely to believe in the viability of Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state. Furthermore, there is markedly less support among the ethnic Serbs for the concept of ethnically mixed neighbourhoods and communities. These findings give reason for reflection, given Kosovo's (at least official) commitment to being a multi-ethnic state. We also find differences in perspective based on age, gender, income, employment status, rural versus urban residence, and the region of residence.

All things considered a picture of a country emerges that, while encouraged by recent membership in the IMF and World Bank, still is a country at risk. On which side of risk the country will end up – that still is an open question. How long it would take for the view of the optimists to come true and Kosovo would be just another nice European country – that will, in part, depend on how the currently ill defined ethnic relations develop.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two briefly reviews the history of Kosovo. Section three describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section four presents the model and variables. Section five reports and discusses the results. Conclusions follow in section six.

2. Kosovo: A Brief Post-WWII History

From World War II onward the name Kosovo appeared as the “Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija”, located within Serbia. The degree of autonomy of this region slowly increased up to 1989, especially after the adoption of the new Yugoslav Constitution in 1963. Kosovo's autonomy was further strengthened, both within the Socialist Republic of Serbia, and within the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, following the amendments to the constitution in 1967, 1968 and 1971. The amendments also led to renaming the autonomous region to “Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo”. This situation prevailed until the events of 1989: the end of the autonomy of the provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina and the beginning of noticeable erosion of the Yugoslav federation and its subsequent dissolution. The suspension of autonomy brought forth emotional responses, and in 1991 there was a referendum in which 90% of participants voted for an independent Kosovo. The referendum, however, was conducted without legal authorization.

At that time there were already signs that the Albanian ethnic majority and the Serb minority tended toward living segregated lives. Each ethnic group had its separate arrangements for health care and education. What initially was just a tendency toward segregation increasingly turned into a tendency toward new national identities, political polarisation and conflict; Kostovicova (2005), for example, identifies Kosovo's parallel education systems as an important producer of the nation's symbolic coordinates.

In 1998 the international community began to push for re-establishing autonomy to the Province of Kosovo embedded in what remained from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Serbia and Montenegro. However an agreement between Kosovo Albanians and the political establishment in Belgrade proved to be elusive despite numerous diplomatic attempts at finding a solution.

From March to June 1999 NATO initiated a military action. International police and military established a presence in the Province of Kosovo, following the exit of their Serbian counterparts. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 called for a United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), a United Nations Police Force, UNMIK Police, and international military forces, Kosovo Forces (KFOR), whose task was to administer the province of Kosovo. Later these task forces were joined by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) with its central aim to back up Kosovo authorities in the implementation of the rule of law.

The above described events in Kosovo brought forth population flows, which altered the ethnic composition. Deportation of Serbs and Roma are reported after the installation of the international forces in Kosovo (Djukanovic 2008). A 1981 census reports Kosovo's ethnic population proportions as 77.4% Albanian, 13.2% Serb and 9.3% other ethnicities. A subsequent census of 1991 supplemented by estimates³ of the former Federal Institute of Statistics reports 81.6% Albanians, 9.9% Serbs with other ethnic groups together accounting for 8.5%. For 2005 Kosovo's statistical office estimates a composition of 88% Albanian, 6% Serb and 6% other ethnic groups (Statistical Office of Kosovo 2006). We see that between 1981 and 2005 the proportion of ethnic Albanians has increased from 77% to 88% at the expense of the Serb minority, which declined from 13.2% to 6% as well as other ethnic minorities, whose share declined from 9.3% to 6%. In April 2011 another census was conducted in Kosovo (largely boycotted by the predominantly ethnic Serb populated northern regions of Kosovo) – whose main finding is a significantly lower than expected total population count.

While this historical account points to a troubled past and helps understand some of the origins of persisting difficulties, it is the future that deeply concerns current day Kosovo residents, European policy-makers and observers alike. Current day perceptions, expectations and plans for the future

³ Ethnic Albanians did not participate in the census.

reside inside people's heads. It is, therefore, targeted interviews and interpretation of the information gained that we turn to in the next section.

3. Data and descriptive statistics

Our empirical analysis is based on data from an interview survey conducted in Kosovo in June 2008. The survey was commissioned by the authors of this paper and carried out by the *Ipsos Strategic Puls* Research Institute (based in Belgrade, Serbia), a regional office of the *Ipsos* Public Opinion Research Company, a worldwide research company with representation in 64 countries. The survey consists of 1367 face-to-face interviews with people aged 18-86.⁴

Among the respondent, 845 identified themselves as ethnic Albanians that speak primarily Albanian with their family members, 482 identified themselves as ethnic Serbs who speak primarily Serbian with family members, and 40 identified themselves as other ethnic minorities (Turkish, Bosnian, Ashkali and Roma etc.; they may speak Albanian, Serbian or other language with family members). Given the limited sample size of the non-Serb minorities, we interpret the results concerning this group with caution. The Serb subsample was boosted (does not reflect the actual size of this ethnic minority is group – 6%) to gain more insight into this newly formed and politically important minority group.

The survey questions encompass various issues such as, migration, and attitudes towards ethnically mixed areas of residence. The main two questions of interest for this study are: 1) “Do you think Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state?” with possible answers “No”, “Probably no”, “Probably yes” and “Yes”; and 2) “Do you think it is better that different ethnic groups live separately or in mixed areas?” with possible answers “Better live separately” and “Better live in mixed areas”. Tables 11.1 and 11.2 show the distribution of answers to the two questions by respondents' ethnicity.

Table 11.1 *Answers to the question “Do you think Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state?” by respondents' ethnicity.*

⁴ Ipsos Strategic Puls follows the standards of the International Statistical Institute (ISI) and the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (ESOMAR) with regard to sample size, data collection and processing and data analysis method. The sampling frame is based on the so-called Polling Station Territories, which represent the approximate size of census units. These base units allow for the most reliable available sample selection, as these units provide the most complete data. The sampling unit hierarchy consists of: Polling Station Territories (920 in the sampling universe), each coming with 10 sampling points; households (420 000 in the sampling universe), and respondents (1 320 000 in the sampling universe). To reduce sampling error the strata are defined by criteria of optimal geographical and cultural uniformity, with the first level strata consisting of regions and the second level strata consisting of urban versus rural settlements. Within this sampling frame the applied type of sample is the three stage random representative stratified sample.

	Whole sample* (n = 1367)	Ethnic Albanians (n = 845)	Ethnic Serbs (n = 482)	Non-Serb minorities (n = 40)
No	8.92 %	5.44 %	66.39 %	2.50 %
Probably no	5.45 %	5.80 %	5.81 %	0.00%
Probably yes	39.77 %	42.96 %	7.68 %	25.00 %
Yes	40.72 %	40.95 %	8.09 %	70.00 %
No answer/don't know	5.14 %	4.85 %	12.03 %	2.50 %

* ethnically weighted data

Table 11.2 Answers to the question “Do you think it is better that different ethnic groups live separately or in mixed areas?”, by respondent’s ethnicity.

	Whole sample* (n = 1367)	Ethnic Albanians (n = 845)	Ethnic Serbs (n = 482)	Non-Serb minorities (n = 40)
Better live separately	22.83 %	20.83 %	69.92 %	5.00 %
Better live in mixed areas	68.54 %	71.48 %	8.92 %	85.00%
No answer/don't know	8.64 %	7.69 %	21.16 %	10.00 %

* ethnically weighted data

Table 11.1 suggests that most ethnic Albanians and non-Serb minorities are confident that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state, while most ethnic Serbs are sceptical about successful co-location of different ethnicities. Table 11.2 points in the same direction: more than 70 % of the ethnic Albanians and non-Serb minorities think that different ethnicities should live together in mixed areas, while 70 % of the ethnic Serbs think that different ethnicities should live separately.

4. The Model

To determine which individual-level characteristics result in more positive attitudes towards multi-ethnic state and ethnically mixed residence we estimate the following models:

Model 1:

Model 2:

where, for individual i , Y_{1i} is a categorical variable capturing attitudes towards a multi-ethnic state, Y_{2i} is a categorical variable capturing attitudes towards ethnically mixed communities, X_i is a vector of individual characteristics, FE is a vector of region-fixed effects, u_i is the error term, and α , β , and γ are the parameters to be estimated.

The dependent variable of first model draws on the question “Do you think Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state?” The answers “No”, “Probably no”, “Probably yes” and “Yes” are assigned values

1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. As the non-response/"don't know" rate for this question is relatively low (table 11.1), we exclude the non-respondents and those who answered "don't know" from our analysis.⁵ Given the qualitative and ordered nature of the four answers to the question, we estimate the model with an ordered probit approach.

The dependent variable of the second model draws on the question "Do you think it is better that different ethnic groups live separately or in mixed areas?" With only two pre-set answers and a relatively high non-response/"don't know" rate, especially among the ethnic Serbs, we decide not to exclude the non-respondents. The dependent variable now consists of three categories, which cannot necessarily be ordered, and we estimate the model with multinomial probit.

For both models the set of explanatory variables includes the following individual characteristics: ethnicity (Albanian, Serb, other), age, dummy variables for gender, marital status, having children, six income levels (including non-reported income), three education levels, being a student, being unemployed and living in rural area. In addition, five regional dummies will capture broad region specific effects on attitudes towards multi-ethnic state and ethnic co-location.

5. Results

First, we estimate the models for the full sample. Given that the survey contains an overrepresented sample of ethnic Serbs, we ethnically weight the data to rebalance the three ethnic groups according to the actual ethnic distribution in Kosovo (Kosovo Albanians - 88%, Kosovo Serbs - 6%, other minorities - 6%). Second, we estimate the models separately for the ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs. Due to the low sample size, we do not run regressions for the non-Serb minority group.

5.1 Full sample

Table 11.3 shows the regression results for the whole sample, reporting the marginal effects and the level of significance of the regressors.⁶ In all regressions, standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.

⁵ Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if the non-respondents form a middle category of the ordered answer scale ("No", "Probably no", "Don't know/ No answer", "Probably yes", "Yes"). Note that also excluded from the analysis are pupils (7 respondents) and those regularly residing abroad and being in Kosovo for holidays (5 respondents).

⁶ A full set of results (i.e. ordered and multinomial probit coefficients and standard errors) is available from the authors upon request.

The left panel of table 11.3 reveals the factors affecting the probability of providing positive and negative answers to the question “Do you think Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state?” (Model 1).

Respondents’ ethnicity has a strong effect on their confidence in Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state. The results suggest that, compared to ethnic Albanians and keeping other factors constant, the ethnic Serbs are significantly less likely to answer “yes” to the question “Do you think Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state?” The finding that the Serb minority is less in favour of a multi-ethnic Kosovo could be linked to a conjecture that they do not support the independence of Kosovo in the first place. Backup for this conjecture is provided by the fact that the Assembly of the Union of Serbian Municipalities and Settlements in Kosovo and Metohija has rejected the independent state status of Kosovo. The Assembly considers the ‘entity’ called Kosovo as an ‘inalienable part of Serbia, namely Serbia’s autonomous province’ (Djukanovic 2008, see also Zejneli and Cvekic 2009). In addition, Serbs in the northern part of Kosovo, bordering on Serbia, may want to hold out in the hope that these ethnic Serb dominated regions will one day be annexed by Serbia. After Kosovo declared independence the ethnic Serb dominated enclaves in the north of Kosovo have continued to receive wage payments as well as political directives from Belgrade, and the Serbian Dinar has continued as the principal medium of exchange (Mayr 2008). Finally, the episodes of inter-ethnic clashes, some of which were violent and led to displacement of Kosovo Serbs from their homes (Bancroft 2009, Martin 2009, Flottau 2008), might have undermined the Serbs’ belief that Kosovo can function as a multi-ethnic state.

Interestingly, the non-Serb minorities are more confident in the existence of multi-ethnic Kosovo than the ethnic Albanians. This could be explained as follows: the non-Serb minorities have always seen Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state (or region of Serbia) and have regularly been in contact with other ethnicities. In a sense, Kosovo has never been and can hardly become or be imagined mono-ethnic for them. Alternatively, as described in Djukanovic (2008), the ‘ethnic distance’ between the ethnic Albanian majority and the non-Serb minorities is less than that between ethnic Albanians and Serbs – making coexistence easier.

Next, we find that, other things equal, older respondents are more likely to consider that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state. This may be because older generations might have pre-conflict memories when different ethnicities lived in relative peace; hence they believe that successful ethnic co-location can exist in principle. By contrast, lives of younger generations have been marked by war and inter-ethnic conflict during their formative years, making it harder for them to accept, or even imagine, the idea that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state. In addition older people (i.e. pensioners) do no longer compete on the labour market and may be less likely to run for public office – exposing them less to situations where potential ethnic discrimination is known to ignite conflict. By

contrast young people who want to build their careers are highly sensitive to what they may perceive as ethno-economic discrimination.

People with higher incomes are more likely to think that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state. The entrepreneurs and the highly skilled – which tend to have higher incomes – may believe or hope that a state with harmonious ethnic relations would only benefit their physical and/or human capital (e.g. boost sales of their business) in a larger ethnically mixed market.

Concerning the level of schooling, we find that respondents with finished secondary education are more likely to think that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state than the respondents with only primary education. Interestingly, there is no statistical difference between those with primary and higher education. However, the current students are significantly more likely to say “yes” to a multi-ethnic Kosovo. This is encouraging - given that the current students may be the future elite of the country.

Other things equal, the unemployed are also more likely to believe that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state. This may be because the unemployed tend to spend more time at home among family and friends, and less time in situations on the job where they may be exposed to discriminatory or demeaning treatment based on ethnicity. Or it may be the expectation that one relatively larger ethnically mixed labor market would provide better chances for a job than many very small ethnically segmented labor markets. It should be understood that the unemployed in Kosovo form an unusually large proportion of the population. Around 45% of the population are unemployed and youth unemployment is listed at 76% (World Bank 2008, UNDP 2006).

The right panel of table 11.3 reports the results of the second model, where the dependent variable is based on the question “Do you think different ethnicities in Kosovo should live separately or in mixed areas?”

As in the first model, we find that respondent’s ethnicity has a strong effect on the answers – in this case, attitudes towards ethnic co-location. Compared to the ethnic Albanians and keeping other factors constant, the ethnic Serbs are less likely to consider different ethnicities in Kosovo should live together and more likely to consider that different ethnicities should live separately (as well as not to have an opinion on the question). On the contrary, the non-Serb minorities are less likely to believe that different ethnicities should live separately.

Among the other correlates, males are more likely than females to think that different ethnicities in Kosovo should live separately and less likely to abstain from providing an answer to the question. Possibly males have, in their work environments for example, encountered more conflict situations than females. Or haunting war-time experiences as soldiers may make them pessimistic toward ethnic co-location.

Compared to respondents with primary education and keeping other factors constant, respondents with tertiary education appear less likely to support ethnic segregation.

Interestingly, people living in rural areas are more supportive of different ethnicities living in mixed areas and less likely to favour living separately. This could be explained by a conjecture that ethnic integration in rural areas is more profound. Alternatively, people in rural areas with relatively low population density may have been less exposed to politicians fomenting ethnic conflict.

Table 11.3 Attitudes towards multi-ethnic state and ethnically mixed habitats, whole sample, marginal effects.

	<i>Model 1: Do you think Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state?</i>				<i>Model 2: Do you think it is better that different ethnic groups live separately or in mixed areas?</i>			
	<i>Ordered probit</i>				<i>Multinomial probit</i>			
	No	Probably no	Probably yes	Yes	Separately	In mixed areas	Do not know	
Ethnicity								
<i>Albanian</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
<i>Serb</i>	0.670***	0.059***	-0.284***	-0.445***	0.656***	-0.680***	0.025	
<i>Non-Serb minority</i>	-0.060***	-0.049***	-0.216***	0.325***	-0.170***	0.114*	0.056	
Age/10	-0.011***	-0.007**	-0.016***	0.034***	0.000	-0.010	0.009	
Male	0.013	0.008	0.020	-0.041	0.085***	-0.046	-0.039**	
Married	0.013	0.008	0.018	-0.039	0.086	-0.081	-0.005	
Has child(ren)	0.002	0.001	0.003	-0.006	-0.063*	0.037	0.026	
Income								
<i>No income</i>	0.012	0.007	0.016	-0.035	-0.059	0.031	0.028	
<i>< 50 EUR</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
<i>50-150 EUR</i>	-0.016	-0.010	-0.027	0.053	-0.060	0.012	0.048	
<i>150-300 EUR</i>	-0.033**	-0.023**	-0.068*	0.124*	0.020	-0.061	0.042	
<i>>300 EUR</i>	-0.045***	-0.034**	-0.124*	0.204**	-0.048	-0.010	0.058	
<i>Income non reported</i>	-0.060***	-0.049***	-0.218***	0.327***	-0.012	-0.134	0.146**	
Education								
<i>Primary</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
<i>Secondary</i>	-0.024*	-0.015*	-0.036*	0.074*	-0.058	0.066	-0.008	
<i>Tertiary</i>	-0.021	-0.014	-0.038	0.073	-0.106***	0.081	0.025	
Student	-0.041***	-0.030***	-0.097**	0.168**	-0.029	0.043	-0.014	
Unemployed	-0.038***	-0.026***	-0.079***	0.143***	-0.062	0.037	0.024	
Lives in rural area	-0.016	-0.010	-0.023	0.048	-0.053*	0.062*	-0.009	
Region								
<i>South-east</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
<i>South-west</i>	0.004	0.002	0.005	-0.011	-0.077*	0.053	0.023	
<i>Central</i>	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	0.009	0.006	-0.076	0.069*	
<i>North</i>	0.068**	0.037***	0.054***	-0.159***	-0.088**	-0.047	0.136**	
<i>North-west</i>	0.050**	0.028**	0.050***	-0.128***	0.183***	-0.132**	-0.051*	
	Number of observations: 1253; pseudo R ² = 0.109; Chi ² = 445.9; prob > Chi ² = 0.000				Number of observations: 1351; Chi ² = 550.0; prob > Chi ² = 0.000			

Notes: Robust standard errors used to calculate regressors' level of significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.2 Ethnic Albanians

Table 11.4 reports the results of the two models estimated for the ethnic Albanian sub-sample. The findings are broadly in line with those for the whole sample, which is not surprising given that the ethnic Albanians constitute the majority of the whole (ethnically weighted) sample. The ethnic Albanians, who believe that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state, are more likely to be older, wealthier, unemployed, students, secondary educated and living in rural areas. In contrast, those ethnic Albanians living in north and north-western regions of Kosovo are less confident in Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state. This is an interesting result given that the northern municipalities tend to be ethnically mixed and in many cases Serb dominated, while the north-western municipalities tend to be ethnically homogenous and Albanian dominated. So, both the exposure and the lack of exposure to the ethnic minority result in more negative attitudes towards Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state.

A different picture emerges if we look at the attitudes towards ethnically mixed living areas. While the ethnic Albanian respondents from the north-western part of Kosovo are more likely to report that different ethnicities in Kosovo should live separately, the ethnic Albanians from northern Kosovo are less likely to be in favour of ethnic segmentation. So, even if co-location with the ethnic minority may generate negative attitudes towards the multi-ethnic state (as suggested by the results of Model 1), it does not necessarily (on a more practical level) result in more negative attitudes towards ethnically mixed areas.

Table 11.4 Attitudes towards multi-ethnic state and ethnically mixed habitats, ethnic Albanians, marginal effects.

	<i>Model 1: Do you think Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state?</i>				<i>Model 2: Do you think it is better that different ethnic groups live separately or in mixed areas?</i>			
	<i>Ordered probit</i>				<i>Multinomial probit</i>			
	No	Probably no	Probably yes	Yes	Separately	In mixed areas	Do not know	
Age/10	-0.008**	-0.006**	-0.016**	0.030**	0.000	-0.010	0.009	
Male	0.008	0.006	0.017	-0.032	0.082**	-0.042	-0.040**	
Married	0.005	0.004	0.010	-0.019	0.067	-0.068	0.000	
Has child(ren)	0.007	0.005	0.014	-0.026	-0.060	0.019	0.040	
Income								
<i>No income</i>	0.011	0.008	0.021	-0.040	-0.050	0.027	0.023	
<i>< 50 EUR</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
<i>50-150 EUR</i>	-0.008	-0.006	-0.018	0.031	-0.049	0.009	0.040	
<i>150-300 EUR</i>	-0.024**	-0.021*	-0.070	0.116*	0.039	-0.064	0.024	
<i>>300 EUR</i>	-0.039***	-0.038***	-0.164*	0.241**	-0.089	0.022	0.067	
<i>Income non reported</i>	-0.050***	-0.052***	-0.278***	0.380***	-0.026	-0.129	0.156**	
Education								
<i>Primary</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
<i>Secondary</i>	-0.019*	-0.015*	-0.041*	0.075*	-0.052	0.055	-0.003	
<i>Tertiary</i>	-0.012	-0.010	-0.030	0.052	-0.098**	0.069	0.029	
Student	-0.027**	-0.024*	-0.082	0.133*	-0.020	0.031	-0.011	
Unemployed	-0.030***	-0.027***	-0.091**	0.148***	-0.056	0.025	0.031	
Lives in rural area	-0.015*	-0.012*	-0.032*	0.059*	-0.045	0.062*	-0.017	
Region								
<i>South-east</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
<i>South-west</i>	0.007	0.006	0.014	-0.027	-0.047	0.012	0.035	
<i>Central</i>	0.004	0.003	0.008	-0.015	0.040	-0.094*	0.054	
<i>North</i>	0.079***	0.050***	0.075***	-0.204***	-0.112***	-0.021	0.132**	
<i>North-west</i>	0.050***	0.035***	0.070***	-0.156***	0.203***	-0.149**	-0.054**	
	Number of observations: 797; pseudo R ² = 0.0448; Chi ² = 68.88; prob > Chi ² = 0.000				Number of observations: 838; Chi ² = 119.5; prob > Chi ² = 0.000			

Notes: Robust standard errors used to calculate regressors' level of significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.3 Ethnic Serbs

Table 11.5 reports the results of the two models for the ethnic Serb subsample. Compared to the ethnic Albanian subsample, we obtain less significant predictors of the attitudes towards multi-ethnic state and ethnically mixed areas in the case of the ethnic Serbs, which could partly be explained by lower ethnic Serb subsample size. The results of Model 1 suggest that people reporting that they have no income and those refusing to report their income are less likely to believe in Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state. In contrast to the case of ethnic Albanians the ethnic Serbs living in rural areas are less likely to think that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state. Unsurprisingly, the ethnic Serb attitudes towards a multi-ethnic state are also more negative in the northern Kosovo municipalities – the Serb-

dominated region refusing to accept the new Kosovo authorities and/or accept the new Kosovo statehood.

The results for Model 2, reported in the right panel of table 11.5, suggest that for the ethnic Serbs the probability of favouring ethnic segmentation decreases with age, which again could be explained by conjecture that the elderly could remember ‘good old’ times when different ethnicities in Kosovo lived in the same localities in relative peace. Less favourable toward separate ethnic living are also those ethnic Serbs living in Central Kosovo municipalities. Contrary to the results for ethnic Albanians, the ethnic Serbs with relatively high incomes are less supportive of ethnically mixed areas.

Table 11.5 Attitudes towards multi-ethnic state and ethnically mixed communities; ethnic Serbs, marginal effects.

	<i>Model 1: Do you think Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state?</i>				<i>Model 2: Do you think it is better that different ethnic groups live separately or in mixed areas?</i>			
	<i>Ordered probit</i>				<i>Multinomial probit</i>			
	No	Probably no	Probably yes	Yes	Separately	In mixed areas	Do not know	
Age/10	-0.028	0.005	0.009	0.014	-0.032*	-0.004	0.036**	
Male	0.026	-0.005	-0.009	-0.013	0.012	0.014	-0.026	
Married	-0.027	0.005	0.009	0.013	0.011	-0.017	0.006	
Has child(ren)	0.007	-0.001	-0.002	-0.004	-0.010	0.036	-0.026	
Income								
<i>No income</i>	0.192**	-0.040**	-0.066**	-0.087**	0.027	-0.067	0.039	
<i>< 50 EUR</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
<i>50-150 EUR</i>	0.117	-0.024	-0.040	-0.053	0.049	-0.102***	0.053	
<i>150-300 EUR</i>	0.088	-0.017	-0.030	-0.041	0.094	-0.091**	-0.003	
<i>> 300 EUR</i>	0.086	-0.017	-0.029	-0.040	0.126	-0.079**	-0.047	
<i>Income non reported</i>	0.154*	-0.032	-0.053*	-0.068**	0.210**	-0.103***	-0.108	
Education								
<i>Primary</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
<i>Secondary</i>	-0.006	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.082	0.057	-0.140**	
<i>Tertiary</i>	0.004	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.010	0.070	-0.080	
Student	-0.125	0.019	0.038	0.067	0.068	-0.029	-0.039	
Unemployed	-0.048	0.008	0.015	0.024	-0.045	-0.049	0.095	
Lives in rural area	0.137**	-0.022***	-0.043**	-0.072**	-0.007	-0.033	0.041	
Region								
<i>South-east</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
<i>South-west</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<i>Central</i>	0.049	-0.009	-0.016	-0.023	-0.316***	0.045	0.272***	
<i>North</i>	0.103*	-0.018*	-0.034	-0.051*	-0.051	0.016	0.035	
<i>North-west</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Number of observations: 417; pseudo R ² = 0.0241; Chi ² = 17.69; prob > Chi ² = 0.342				Number of observations: 473; Chi ² = 80.61; prob > Chi ² = 0.000			

Notes: Robust standard errors used to calculate regressors' level of significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

6. Conclusion and discussion

This paper explores attitudes toward multi-ethnic state and ethnically mixed communities in post-independence Kosovo. Ethnicity emerges as an important determinant of whether people think that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state or not. Ethnicity also plays a role in whether people think that Kosovars should live in ethnically mixed areas or in ethnically homogenous enclaves. Compared to the ethnic Albanian majority, the ethnic Serbs in Kosovo are less likely to believe in the viability of Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state. Furthermore, again in comparison to the ethnic Albanian majority, there is less support among the ethnic Serbs for the concept of ethnically mixed neighbourhoods and communities. By contrast, the non-Serb minorities are significantly more likely (relative to the Albanian majority), to have the attitude that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state. We also find differences in perspective based on age, gender, income, education, employment status, and rural versus urban residence.

All things considered, a picture emerges that raises concern about serious unresolved ethnic issues that threaten to be a retarding element to nation-building in this young and fragile state.

One of the limitations of this research lies in the fact that we are taking a restricted number of attitudes toward ethnic co-location at a particular point in time. In order to see, whether progress is being made (or not) in matters of ethnic relations, attitudes should be surveyed repeatedly over time. Furthermore it would be interesting to analyze why respondents have arrived at their particular positive or negative attitudes and/or expectations – whether it is based on personal experience, experience of family and friends, or whether is derived from the press or from statements of politicians or other officials. In addition, it may be fruitful to expand this type of study to include the other successor states to the Yugoslav Federation, some of which also display significant ethnic minorities. This is left for future research.

The persisting relevance of our findings, particularly with regard to Kosovo's northern (predominantly ethnic Serb populated) regions recently received confirmation from incidents during the April 2011 census in Kosovo. Influenced by politicians in neighbouring Serbia, the ethnic Serb population in Kosovo's northern regions (bordering on Serbia) largely boycotted the census. (Sofalia 2011, Radio Free Europe 2011, Barlovac 2011, Collaku 2011). The term 'census theft' was in circulation alleging intent on the part of Kosovo's authorities to make the world believe that fewer Serbs live in Kosovo than is the case (Barlovac 2011) – indicating that politics had entered the census process.

Perhaps a metric for progress in Kosovo is to track whether or when a census has come more within the domain of demographers and statisticians than that of politicians. While this may seem to require a great deal of patience there are forces external to ex-Yugoslavia that may help accelerate such a process. Such forces have already been at work in the form of externally imposed *conditionality*. The

very existence of an independent state of Kosovo was conditional on a multi-ethnic nature of such a state. This ‘trade-off’ was the subject of lengthy talks with international negotiators under the auspices of the UN and European institutions.

The new face of conditionality has announced itself in the form of Serbia’s (and other successor states of the former Yugoslavia) desire to join the EU. A country wishing to join the EU is required to demonstrate that it is in compliance with an array of minimum standards – including such as concern ethnic relations, border disputes, etc. The EU’s carrot-and-stick approach has been shown to work relatively well with previous waves of EU aspirants. And perhaps it will restore attention toward the original reason for the very creation of the EU that seems to have faded from memory: it was not about economics but about peace.

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