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Gender, ethnicity and migration? Explaining aspirations to join the EU in post-independence Kosovo.

Artjoms Ivļevs

University of the West of England¹ and University of Nottingham

Roswitha M. King

Østfold University College² and University of Latvia

Abstract:

We explore the attitudes towards joining the EU in post-independence Kosovo, focussing particularly on the potential role of gender, ethnicity and migration. The study is based on a survey of 1367 respondents carried out in Kosovo four months after it proclaimed independence. The ordered probit analysis reveals that women, people believing that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state and prospective migrants are more likely to support the integration of Kosovo into the European Union. The association between pro-EU sentiment and household size is of inverted U-shape with the peak occurring at seven members per household. The ethnic Serb minority is significantly less likely to support Kosovo membership in the European Union.

Keywords: Kosovo, EU integration, independence, ethnic minorities, migration.

JEL:

¹ Department of Economics, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol BS16 1QY, UK. Tel: +44 117 32 83943, Fax:+44 117 32 82289, E-mail: a.ivlevs@uwe.ac.uk

² *Corresponding author* Department of Economics, Østfold University College, N-1757 Halden, Norway. Tel: +47 69 21 52 64, Fax: +47 69 21 52 02, E-mail: roswitha.m.king@hiof.no

1. Introduction

Kosovo proclaimed independence from Serbia in February 2008. The youngest member in the family of European countries, Kosovo has its aspirations. Like other countries of the Western Balkan region, it is reported as seeing its future in the European Union (Goldirova 2008). According to a 2010 opinion poll, 87 per cent of Kosovans think that Kosovo's membership in the EU would be a good thing, 65 per cent are confident that people in the EU want Kosovo to join the EU and, on average, Kosovans expect that their country will become part of the EU by 2017 (Gallup 2010b).

Since the proclamation of Kosovo's independence, its EU aspirations have become a kind of touch-stone. European political dignitaries visiting Kosovo rarely leave the country without some public statement related to future EU membership intimating that stability in the western Balkans will be cooked up in Brussels – a relatively safe thing to say under the current EU expansion fatigue (SETimes 2010). At the same time, negation of the very existence of the state of Kosovo is competing for attention. Not only Serbia rejects independent statehood of Kosovo, but among the numerous countries withholding recognition are EU member states such as Spain, Greece, Slovakia Cyprus and Romania. Serbia itself has applied for EU membership – with Serbia's non-recognition of independent Kosovo being a major stumbling block (The Economist 2011).

Leaving aside the issue of whether the international community thinks that Kosovo could, would or should become an EU member state, we turn to Kosovans themselves and ask them what they think about future EU membership. We are particularly interested in 'sensitive' and salient (in the case of Kosovo and in a broader Western Balkans context) factors - the potential role of ethnicity, gender and migration related variables in explaining attitudes towards EU membership. This paper is based on a survey of 1367 Kosovans, conducted in June 2008 – four months after Kosovo proclaimed independence. The ordered probit analysis points to significant variability in pro-EU sentiment across a number of dimensions. We find that, compared to ethnic Albanians, the Serb minority is significantly less likely to support integration of Kosovo into the EU. Women have a more pronounced pro-EU sentiment. A strong support for the EU is also expressed by people preparing to emigrate.

Since the beginning of the EU, public attitudes toward the concept and the functioning of the EU, and later also towards its expansion, have been of paramount importance. This is not just a democratic nicety but a necessity owing to the fact that EU legislation is without supranational means of enforcement. Thus public support itself has become an important building block of European integration (Gabel 1998). While the general levels of support for the EU in Kosovo and the Western Balkans – the next in line for EU membership - are well known (see for example Gallup Balkan monitor (2010b)), the contribution of this study consists in uncovering particular reasons for that support. We find an important role played by characteristics that, typically, are not subject to an individual's choice, such as, for example, gender and ethnicity, as well as factors that are subject to individual choice, such as migration intentions, thereby contributing to the large literature on the micro and macro

determinants of attitudes towards the EU. We expect that our results, with some variation, are likely to carry over to the whole Western Balkan region. Hardly elsewhere in Europe are the issues of gender, ethnicity and migration more acute than in these “next generation” EU Member States.

2. Hypotheses.

The relentless organisational development of the EU, its multiple enlargements and referenda have provided grounds for what is now a substantial theoretical and empirical literature explaining public support for the European Project. A number of individual and country level explanations have been advanced and tested empirically. They range from cognitive skills, interest in politics, economic calculation and class partisanship to variables capturing attitudes, perceptions and feeling toward political and economic conditions of a country (see e.g. Gabel 1998; Christin 2006; Caplanova et al. 2004; Garry and Tilley 2009; Loveless 2010; Tucker et al. 2004). While testing whether insights from this literature are valid in the case of Kosovo is an interesting exercise in its own right, in this paper we pay particular attention to the role of gender, ethnicity and migration in shaping attitudes of Kosovans towards joining the EU.

2.1 Gender.

Kosovo, in many respects, is still a traditional, highly patriarchal and conservative society where women’s rights are very limited (UNFPA 2005). It is not uncommon to see, especially in rural areas, illiterate women, girls ‘bartered’ into marriage, women living together in segregated quarters, and mothers giving the best food and care to their sons - leaving their daughters to take care of themselves (Mertus 1999). Domestic violence – physical, psychological and sexual – is a widespread problem across the Western Balkans (Nikolic-Ristanovic and Dokmanovic 2006). Survey evidence suggests that almost a quarter of Kosovo women experienced physical and/or psychological abuse following the end of the war in 1999, with only a small number of cases being reported to the police (HRW 2008, UNFPA 2005, Los Angeles Times 2008). Mertus (1999: p. 174) quotes a school teacher in Kosovo saying that “comparing ourselves to other women’s lives in Europe, we are not living at all.”

Importantly, the gender disadvantage in Kosovo is unlikely to be ethnicity or religion specific. Mertus (1999) finds that both ethnic Albanian and Serbian women, who fight for the rights of women and speak in broader terms about human rights, are considered traitors by their own people. Rapaj (2010) notes that, given the patriarchal nature of Kosovo society, the abuses of women in Kosovo are not related to a particular ethnic group.

In this context, our first hypothesis is that Kosovo women, irrespective of their ethnicity, would be more favourable toward joining the EU than men. Other things equal, women would consider the EU as a liberator/ guarantor of human rights, and would think that it can

only improve their situation. By contrast, men would regard the EU as a threat to their dominant position in the patriarchal society. Such gender gap, if confirmed by econometric analysis, would complement the existing literature that directly or indirectly addresses the differences in female and male support for European integration. For example, using 1978-92 data for a sample of original and later joining Western European EU States, Gabel (1998) finds that females support European integration less than males. Nelsen and Guth (2000) try to explain why in Western European countries women are, on average, less favourable to EU integration than men.³ Among other things, they argue that a larger and more competitive EU may be perceived as a threat to the welfare state and public sector, thereby alienating caregivers and public sector employees, among whom women tend to be overrepresented. Nelsen and Guth (2000) conjecture that women in Scandinavian countries, characterised by the most female-friendly welfare state regimes, have the most to lose from the EU social policies and will view integration more sceptically. On the other hand, women in Southern European countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain), characterised by female overrepresentation in primary care-giving, low-wage and grey market activities, have the least to lose and “perhaps much to gain”, and will view the EU more favourably. More generally this points to a minimum standard in social services (as well as other spheres) required by EU policies and regulations. So whether a country lies above or below this minimum standard threshold may influence attitudes toward EU membership. Within a country such attitudes may, of course, be far from uniform, with people self-selecting, possibly, according to whether they perceive themselves as victims or beneficiaries of the prevailing country-specific status quo.

Thus, besides the human rights argument, the necessity of taking care of children and the elderly in Kosovo could emerge as an additional gender-specific factor affecting attitudes towards joining the EU. In large, often multigenerational families, with many males claimed by the war or working abroad, Kosovo women’s role as caregivers can hardly be overestimated. This, in principle, could produce conflicting effects on the attitudes towards joining the EU. On the one hand, people may think that, with more economic growth, better tax collection and law enforcement, EU membership would lead to a stronger public sector, better social guarantees and financial assistance for families. This would make the caregivers pro-EU. On the other hand, it is people with fewer dependents who are better positioned to take advantage of a more competitive and rich-in-opportunities economy brought about by the EU (Nelsen and Guth 2000). The association between household size and EU support would then be negative. This interesting ambiguity calls out for closer investigation. We summarise our gender-related inquiry in the following two hypotheses:

H1a: Women are more likely to support Kosovo membership in the EU.

³ Nelsen and Guth’s finding that women are less pro-EU than men is based on unconditional sample means. Interestingly, applying multivariate analysis, they find that women on average are more supportive of European integration than men.

H1b: Kosovans from larger households are more likely to support Kosovo membership in the EU.

2.2 Ethnicity

With 92 per cent of the population represented by the ethnic Albanian majority,⁴ Kosovo is not the most ethnically diverse country in the world. However, it was conceived as a multi-ethnic state - its Constitution states that the country shall be multi-ethnic and its flag bears six stars representing Kosovo's six main ethnic groups. Ethnic Serbs are numerically the most important minority, making up 5.3 per cent of the population. Ethnic Bosniaks, Gorani, Roma, Turks, Ashkali, Egyptians and others, together represent the remaining 2.7 per cent.

The Serb minority, which lost its ethnic majority status as Kosovo gained independence from Serbia, is reluctant to recognise the independence of Kosovo and largely associates itself with Serbia. According to an opinion poll carried out in 2009, 80 per cent of Kosovo Serbs agreed that independence of Kosovo turned out to be a "bad thing" and hardly any Serb respondent agreed that it was a "good thing" (Gallup 2010a). Kosovo Serbs, especially those living in the northern regions adjacent to Serbia, boycotted the 2011 Population Census (Balkan Insight 2011) – another form of protest against independent Kosovo.

What would be Kosovo Serbs' attitudes towards the EU? Given that the support among the majority of the EU Member States was instrumental for the recognition of Kosovo's independence, the ethnic Serbs' protest against Kosovo's statehood could project itself into a protest against the EU.⁵ A similar emotional/ideological argument, albeit working in an opposite direction, can be applied to the Kosovo Albanians - they would be more pro-European because most European countries recognised the independent state of Kosovo. Therefore, other things equal, one could expect Kosovo Serbs to be less supportive of EU integration compared to Kosovo Albanians.

With regard to other (non-Serb) ethnic minorities, reports suggest that they are particularly likely to suffer from poverty (UNDP 2004), marginalization and discrimination (Culafic

⁴ Data from the Statistical office of Kosovo. Note that determining population proportions is not an exact science in Kosovo. For example, the population census conducted in early 2011 in Kosovo was largely boycotted by the ethnic Serb dominated northern part of Kosovo – allegedly upon instructions from neighbouring Serbia. Serbia had planned its own census for October 2011, including Kosovo – or at least the ethnic Serb populated parts of Kosovo. Serbia's government does not recognise Kosovo's independence, and insists that Kosovo remains a province of Serbia. The two parallel and partial census results for Kosovo – are unlikely to agree with each other.

⁵ There is, however, a complicating factor. As already mentioned above, Serbia itself has applied for EU membership. Non-recognition of Kosovo is known to be a retarding element for the fulfilment of such aspirations. If support for EU membership grows within Serbia, it may very well spill over to the Serbs residing in Kosovo.

2006). As elsewhere in the Western Balkans, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities tend to be the most disadvantaged (Mueller and Jovanovic 2010; Stevens 2009). According to European Commission (2010), their living conditions and access to education, health care and social protection remain very serious concerns.

How would the non-Serb ethnic minorities view EU membership? Arguably, they could expect the EU to help fight discrimination and be a guarantor of human rights. Or, if the smaller Kosovo minorities doubt that their situation will improve any time soon (with or without EU involvement), they may consider emigration (Stevens 2009) – and then EU membership would make this ‘escape’ option more feasible.

Whatever the case, we would expect the non-Serb minorities to be more pro-EU than other ethnic groups.

Apart from the respondents’ own ethnicity, our survey contains another ethnicity-related question: “Do you think Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state?” with possible answers “Yes”, “Probably yes”, “Probably no” and “No”. The answer to this question is likely to be correlated not only with the respondent’s belief in the Kosovo State as such, but also her openness, levels of tolerance and ability to see beyond existing structures and ways of life. Provided that the EU represents a different institutional framework and a different set of rules/values, we expect that more positive attitudes towards Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state will be positively correlated with a pro-EU sentiment. This point is consistent with Hooghe and Marks (2004) who argue and show that people claiming more *inclusive* national identity are also more supportive of European integration. In a somewhat similar vein, McLaren (2001) finds that the perceived threat of other cultures is an important correlate of the attitudes towards the EU, and Kennedy (2010) shows that people with the strongest acceptance of liberal and participatory norms (support for democracy, political concern, being a political protester) are also more likely to have a “European” supranational identity.

In subsequent sections of this paper we will investigate the following ethnicity-related hypotheses:

H2a: The ethnic Serbs are less likely to support Kosovo’s membership in the EU.

H2b: The non-Serb minorities are more likely to support Kosovo membership in the EU.

H2c: Kosovans believing that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state are more likely to support Kosovo membership in the EU.

2.3 Migration

Kosovo society has been marked by migration. Massive waves of emigration occurred in the late 1960s, the early 1990s and during the 1998-1999 conflict, creating a diaspora of 400,000

(18 per cent of the total population). Remittances have been a major contributor to the well-being of Kosovans; every fifth household in Kosovo receives remittances, which in 2009 represented 11 per cent of GDP (UNDP 2010).

With a 45 per cent unemployment rate, a 73 per cent youth unemployment rate (SOK, 2010), and one of the youngest populations in Europe, emigration potential in Kosovo is not ceasing. The study of Ivlevs and King (2011) finds that four months after the country proclaimed independence, one third of Kosovo Albanians had taken concrete steps in preparation for emigration. A survey conducted in December 2009 (UNDP 2010) reports that 16 per cent of household in Kosovo have specific plans to emigrate in the future.

Would there be a link between migration-related variables and attitudes towards EU membership? First, we hypothesise that EU membership would be particularly welcome to people planning to emigrate. Being part of the EU would result in visa-free travel to wealthy Western European countries - many of them already primary destinations of Kosovan migrants. Visa-free travel would be convenient for people looking for a job abroad, for those working abroad and visiting their families back in Kosovo, and for family members residing in Kosovo and visiting their relatives abroad – it would encourage a transnational existence. In addition, prospective migrants might expect that, sooner or later, EU membership would bring legal, work-permit free employment possibilities, as well as access to social services.

Second, we look at those who stay behind – people who do not have an intention to leave Kosovo but who have family members residing abroad. Looking at their attitudes towards the EU, two conflicting effects could arise. On the one hand, separation from family members, arguably, makes people unhappy, and EU membership could only intensify this feeling (because migrants would be able to find better jobs, stay abroad longer or bring other family members with them). On the other hand, family members abroad may send remittances back home, increasing remittance-receivers' welfare and at least partially offsetting the pain of separation. EU membership could increase this welfare gain via better work opportunities and higher remittances. All things considered, we expect that, among those with family members abroad, remittance-receivers would be more pro-EU than people who do not receive remittances. Below we will test the following two migration-related hypotheses:

H3a: Kosovans preparing to migrate are more likely to support Kosovo membership in the EU

H3b: Among Kosovans with family members abroad, those not receiving remittances are less likely to support Kosovo membership in the EU, compared to remittance receivers.

3. Data and descriptive statistics.

To test our hypotheses, we use data from a survey conducted in Kosovo in June 2008. The survey was commissioned by the authors of the paper and carried out by the *Ipsos Strategic Puls* Research Institute (based in Belgrade, Serbia), a regional office of the *Ipsos* Research Company. The survey consisted of 1367 face-to-face interviews with people aged 18-86. Thereof 845 identified themselves as ethnic Albanians and speaking primarily Albanian with their family members, 482 identified themselves as ethnic Serbs and speaking primarily Serbian with family members, and 40 identified themselves as other ethnic minorities (Turkish, Bosnian, Ashkali and Roma; may speak Albanian, Serbian or other language with family members). Given the limited sample size of the non-Serb minorities, we interpret the results concerning this group with caution. The Serb subsample was boosted (does not reflect the actual size of this ethnic minority is group – 6 per cent) to gain more insight into this newly formed and politically important minority group.

The survey questions, which addressed various issues ranging from migration intentions to EU aspirations, were written by the authors of this paper. The main question of interest for this study is: “Do you think Kosovo should join the EU”, with possible answers “Yes”, “Probably yes”, “Probably no” and “No”. The respondents could also answer “don’t know” – which, in following the literature, will be treated as a neutral attitude category. Table 1 reports the breakdown of answers, as well as the average value of a variable “*pro-EU*”, which takes value 1 if the respondent says “No” to Kosovo membership in the EU, 2 - “Probably no”, 3 - “Don’t know”, 4 - “Probably yes” and 5 - “Yes”, across different respondent groups.

The descriptive statistics of table 1 suggest that all groups, except the ethnic Serbs, display a relatively strong pro-EU sentiment. Nevertheless, variation in the attitudes can be observed. Females, respondents from larger households, ethnic Albanians and non-Serb minorities, respondents believing that Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state, those preparing to emigrate and those receiving remittances from abroad tend to be more favourable to Kosovo membership in the EU. Males, ethnic Serbs, respondents from smaller households, those believing that Kosovo cannot work out as a multi-ethnic state, respondents not preparing to emigrate and those having relatives abroad but not receiving remittances tend to be more sceptical towards the EU. On the whole, these unconditional means lend some support to our hypotheses. However, to isolate the partial effects of each variable, we will, in the following, perform multivariate analysis. This is all the more important, given that some of the variables of interest are not entirely independent (neither are they perfectly correlated): e.g., the ethnic Albanians and the non-Serb minorities tend to have larger families; the ethnic Serbs are the most sceptical about Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state; males are more likely to have specific plans about emigration.

Table 1. Should Kosovo join the EU?

	No	Probably no	Don't know	Probably yes	Yes	<i>Pro-EU</i> , mean value
Whole sample	4.48%	0.54%	2.55%	34.36%	58.06%	4.41
Female	3.46%	0.10%	3.60%	36.57%	56.26%	4.42
Male	5.51%	1.00%	1.49%	32.13%	59.88%	4.40
Household size: 1 to 4	9.42%	0.42%	4.10%	32.40%	53.66%	4.20
Household size: 5 to 8	3.46%	0.38%	1.78%	34.97%	59.41%	4.46
Household size: 9 +	0.72%	1.51%	3.43%	34.96%	59.38%	4.51
Ethnic Albanians	0.59%	0.24%	1.30%	37.87%	60.00%	4.56
Ethnic Serbs	63.49%	3.11%	18.46%	4.77%	10.17%	1.95
Non-Serb minorities	2.50%	2.50%	5.00%	12.50%	77.50%	4.60
Multiethnic Kosovo - "No"	20.19%	0.96%	10.74%	23.22%	44.90%	3.71
Multiethnic Kosovo - "Yes"	0.67%	0.44%	0.57%	37.07%	61.25%	4.58
Preparing to emigrate	1.29%	0.10%	0.65%	29.89%	68.07%	4.63
Not preparing to emigrate	5.55%	0.69%	3.19%	35.86%	54.70%	4.33
Receiving remittances	1.65%	0.00%	1.33%	34.02%	63.00%	4.57
Relatives abroad, but no remittances	6.31%	1.03%	4.03%	41.23%	47.40%	4.22

Note: *Ethnically weighted data for all variables except "Ethnic Albanians", "Ethnic Serbs" and "Non-Serb minorities".*

4. Empirical model.

To test our hypotheses and determine which factors affect the willingness to join the EU, we estimate the following model:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Pro-EU} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 * \text{gender} + \alpha_2 * \text{household_size} + \alpha_3 * \text{household_size_squared} + \\
 & \beta_1 * \text{ethnic_Serb} + \beta_2 * \text{non_Serb_minority} + \beta_3 * \text{pro_multi_ethnic_state} + \\
 & \gamma_1 * \text{preparing_to_migrate} + \gamma_2 * \text{no_relatives_abroad} + \\
 & \gamma_3 * \text{relatives_abroad_no_remittances} + \\
 & \delta * (\text{individual level controls}) + \\
 & \zeta * (\text{region fixed effects}) + \\
 & \text{unobserved error term}
 \end{aligned}$$

As mentioned earlier, we allow our dependent variable (*pro-EU*) to take 5 values. Given the qualitative nature of the variable, the model will be estimated with ordered probit. As a

robustness check, we use ordered logit and OLS estimation techniques; the results are consistent with ordered probit and are available upon request.

The set of explanatory variables is determined by the hypotheses formulated in the previous section. For gender-related variables, we include a dummy for ‘female’, as well as a household size variable and, to test for possible non-linearities, its squared term.⁶ For ethnicity-related variables, we include Serb and non-Serb minority dummies, with ethnic Albanians serving as the reference group. The attitudes towards Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state are captured by a variable constructed from the answers to the question “Do you think Kosovo can work out as a multi-ethnic state?” The variable takes value 1 if the respondent answers “No”, 2 if “Probably no”, 3 if “Don’t know”, 4 is “Probably yes” and 5 if “Yes”.

Migration and remittances related variables are captured by several dummies. First, we include a dummy for respondents who have taken concrete steps to realise their emigration intentions. This variable is constructed using two questions: 1) “How high is the probability that you will go to work and live outside of Kosovo within the next year?” - with a pre-set list of answers: “very low”, “rather low”, “rather high” and “very high”; and 2) those respondents who said that their probability of emigration is “rather high” or “very high” were asked a second question: “What have you done to pursue your intention to move outside of Kosovo?” - without a pre-set list of answers. The respondents who reported having taken a concrete action were assigned a value of 1,⁷ those who said they have done nothing as well as those who answered “very low” or “rather low” to the first question were assigned a value of 0.

Second, our survey asked respondents whether they have family members abroad and whether these family members send remittances back home. From these questions we constructed two dummy variables: first, for family members living abroad and sending remittances back home; second, for family members living abroad but not sending remittances. We leave the remittance receivers as a reference category, against which we compare people with no relatives abroad, and those with relatives abroad but not receiving remittances.

⁶ Ideally, we would have used variable(s) capturing the share of dependent children and dependent elderly in a household. Our database contains information on the number of children. We have experimented with variations of this variable (number of children, proportion of children in a household, their square terms) in our model, but the results were less significant and less conclusive than when we use the household size variable.

Unfortunately, we have no information on the dependent elderly in a household.

⁷ Out of these respondents, 43.9% said they have collected information about the opportunities for work abroad, 36.3% said that they have contacted their relatives and friends abroad, and 5.6% said that they have also done one of the following: talked to the potential employer abroad, received a jobs offer from abroad, bought or booked travel ticket, received a work permit or concluded an agreement with an agency. 40.7% of respondents reported having done nothing.

The set of individual level control variables includes age, three education categories and six income categories (including non-reported income), as well as dummies for being a student, being unemployed, and living in a rural area. We have information on the respondents' marital status and children, but have decided not to include variables capturing them, as the household size variable is likely to capture at least some of this information.⁸ Finally, to account for possible region specific influences, we include five district dummies: for North, Centre, South-West, North-West and South-East of Kosovo.

5. Results

We estimate the model for the whole sample, and separately for males and females and the two largest ethnic groups – Albanians and Serbs. Given that the survey contains an overrepresented sample of ethnic Serb respondents (in the whole sample and in the gender specific estimations) we apply an ethnic weight, which rebalances the three groups (Albanians, Serbs, the non-Serb minorities) in accordance with the reported ethnic distribution in Kosovo. Excluded from our analysis are pupils (7 respondents), and people regularly residing abroad and being in Kosovo for holidays (5 respondents).

Table 2 reports the estimated ordered probit coefficients. We discuss the results in relation to the three variable groups – gender, ethnicity and migration – as well as briefly comment on other correlates of EU support.

⁸ The inclusion of the marital status and children dummies as additional variables does not qualitatively affect our main results.

Table 2. Correlates of the attitudes towards joining the EU.

Dependent variable: <i>Pro EU</i> ("Should Kosovo join the EU?": 1 = "No", ..., 5 = "Yes"); Ordered probit coefficients					
	Whole sample	Male	Female	Ethnic Albanians	Ethnic Serb
Gender related variables					
<i>Female</i>	0.207**	.	.	0.242**	0.211*
<i>Household size</i>	0.144**	0.151	0.159**	0.189**	0.017
<i>Household size²</i>	-0.010***	-0.011	-0.010**	-0.012***	-0.007
Ethnicity related variables					
<i>Ethnic Albanian</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	-	-
<i>Ethnic Serb</i>	-2.379***	-2.249***	-2.577***	.	.
<i>Non-Serb Minority</i>	0.313	0.419	0.309	.	.
<i>In favour of multiethnic state</i>	0.231***	0.262***	0.203***	0.172***	0.381***
Migration related variables					
<i>Preparing to migrate</i>	0.323***	0.371***	0.295	0.380***	0.131
<i>No relatives abroad</i>	0.081	0.066	0.088	0.077	0.211
<i>Remittance receivers</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
<i>Relatives abroad, but no remit.</i>	-0.208*	-0.318**	-0.077	-0.241*	0.252*
Socio-demographics controls					
<i>Age/10</i>	0.091**	0.163***	0.017	0.078*	0.008
<i>Income</i>					
<i>No income</i>	-0.064	-0.280	-0.050	-0.116	0.503
<i>< 50 EUR</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
<i>50-150 EUR</i>	0.249*	0.275	0.362	0.213	0.550
<i>150-300 EUR</i>	0.293*	0.507**	0.030	0.361*	0.570
<i>>300 EUR</i>	0.381	0.549*	0.216	0.585**	0.642
<i>Income non reported</i>	1.055***	1.127***	1.034***	1.317***	0.716*
<i>Education</i>					
<i>Primary</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
<i>Secondary</i>	0.225**	0.293*	0.161	0.212*	0.038
<i>Tertiary</i>	0.360**	0.347	0.464*	0.313*	0.046
<i>Currently student</i>	0.003	0.249	-0.078	-0.040	-0.236
<i>Unemployed</i>	0.120	0.438**	-0.141	0.148	0.206
<i>Lives in rural area</i>	-0.176**	-0.105	-0.250**	-0.259***	0.198
Regional controls					
<i>South-East</i>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
<i>South-West</i>	0.227	0.422**	0.094	0.181	.
<i>Central</i>	0.211*	0.464***	-0.028	0.234*	-0.047
<i>North</i>	0.472***	0.791***	0.240	0.464***	0.288
<i>North-West</i>	0.137	0.469**	-0.109	0.201	.
Observations	1351	681	670	838	473
Chi ²	764.3	416.1	369.8	117.3	101.4
Prob > Chi ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R ²	0.195	0.220	0.190	0.090	0.102

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.1 Gender

The dummy coefficient for ‘female’ is positive and significant at 5 per cent for the whole sample, which supports our hypothesis that women in Kosovo are more likely to support the country’s membership in the EU than men. Importantly, the female variable is positive for both ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs, although significant at only 10 per cent for the latter. This provides support for the conjecture that the gender disadvantage in Kosovo is not ethnicity-specific.

The household size also emerges as an important determinant of pro-EU sentiment. For the whole sample, both the household size variable and its squared term are statistically significant. The household size coefficient is positive and its squared term coefficient is negative, implying an inverted U-shape relationship between the household size and favourable attitudes towards joining the EU. Other things equal, support for the EU increases with household size for relatively small households, peaks at about 7 members per household and decreases thereafter.⁹ This might support the hypothesis that, at least up to a certain point, Kosovans associate the EU with direct or indirect financial support for families. However, beyond a certain household size the ‘opportunities channel’, whereby more family members to care for makes it more difficult to reap the benefits of a more competitive EU economy, may dominate.

Further support for the household size as a determinant of EU preference comes from the finding that the two household size variables are significant only in the female specification. As women are more likely to be care givers than men, the support for mechanisms linking household size to EU support is found exactly in the female subsample.

5.2 Ethnicity

Compared to the ethnic Albanians and keeping other factors constant, the ethnic Serbs are less favourable to Kosovo membership in the EU. The result is statistically significant at 1 per cent and holds for the whole sample, as well as female and male specifications. The result conforms to the descriptive statistics and supports the hypothesis that the ethnic Serbs are more opposed to the EU membership than the ethnic Albanians. The results, however, fail to provide support for the hypothesis that the non-Serb minorities are more pro-EU than the ethnic Albanians: the non-Serb minority dummy is positive, but statistically insignificant.

One of our strongest results is that, other factors held constant, people with more favourable attitudes towards Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state are also more supportive of Kosovo membership in the EU. The result is significant at 0.1 per cent in all specifications, and

⁹ Note that about 22 per cent of respondents in our survey have report having 8 or more members in their household.

mirrors the finding of Hooghe and Marks (2004) that people with more inclusive national identity are also more supportive of EU integration.

5.3 Migration

The results support our hypothesis that Kosovans' willingness to go working abroad is positively correlated with pro-EU sentiment. The coefficient of having taken specific action towards emigration is positive and significant at 1% for the whole sample. We also notice that this result is largely driven by the effect of emigration intentions in the male and the ethnic Albanian subsamples. This is not surprising given that men and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are on average more migration-prone than women and ethnic Serbs (Ivlevs and King 2011).

Some support is also obtained for the remittance-related hypotheses. First, compared to remittance receivers, people with family members abroad but not receiving remittances are less likely to favour Kosovo membership in the EU. This would support the idea of the pain of separation being exacerbated by new opportunities expected to come with EU membership. The estimated coefficient, however, is only moderately significant and changes sign from negative to positive in the ethnic Serbs subsample. Second, we find no statistical difference in the attitudes towards EU membership between the remittance receivers and people with no relatives abroad. This would support the interpretation that, for remittance receivers, EU membership brings about both more pain of separation and more remittances - with the effects cancelling each other out.

5.4 Other variables explaining the EU support

In this subsection, we briefly comment on other statistically significant correlates of support for EU membership. First, we find that the age variable is positive and significant, especially for males. This finding could be explained by a conjecture that older Kosovans associate the EU with different forms of social and financial assistance (e.g. higher pensions), while younger people think of the EU as a more competitive environment. In addition, older people may have the welfare of their children or grandchildren in mind (positive externality) and perceive EU membership as something that will give their descendants expanded and improved opportunities on the European labour market – a plausible conjecture, given Kosovo's extremely high unemployment rate. This could reflect both altruistic sentiment as well as the perception that the best old age insurance is to have children or grandchildren abroad, who send remittances. The finding of a positive effect of age upon attitude toward the EU comes against a mixed backdrop in the literature: Gabel (1998) finds a positive relationship between age and pro-EU sentiment in the Western European countries, while Tucker et al. (2002) find a negative relationship, and Caplanova et al. (2004) obtain an insignificant effect in the Eastern European block.

Second, higher levels of education and income tend to be positively correlated with supporting Kosovo membership in the EU. This result largely conforms to the literature (Caplanova et al. 2004; Gabel 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Loveless 2010) and is typically explained by the utilitarian/ economic calculus/ self-interest approach suggesting that people with higher capital resources – both human and financial – are better positioned to reap benefits from the liberalisation of capital, goods and labour markets brought about by EU integration (Gabel 1998).

Third, Kosovans living in rural areas, and in particular females and ethnic Albanians, are more likely to be opposed to Kosovo's membership in the EU. This finding is in compliance with the literature looking at support for European integration in the original EU member states (Gabel 1998) and the Eastern European countries (Caplanova et al. 2004; Tucker et al. 2004). This, again, can be explained by self-interest, as rural residents, many of whom are farmers, would associate the liberalised European market with more competition.

Finally, some variation in EU support is coming from the regional dummies. The residents of northern Kosovo are particularly likely to favour Kosovo joining the EU. This region, populated largely but not exclusively by ethnic Serbs, has witnessed serious inter-ethnic clashes, as well as refusal to acknowledge Kosovo as an independent State. The coefficient appears to be driven by the ethnic Albanian subsample (it is positive but insignificant in the ethnic Serb subsample). Could it be that the ethnic Albanians living in northern Kosovo hope that the EU would bring peace and order to this most troubled part of the newly independent state? After all, resolution of border disputes and related territorial issues are a pre-condition for EU membership.

6. Conclusion and discussion.

This paper explores attitudes toward joining the EU in post-independence Kosovo. Ethnicity, gender and migration intentions emerge as important determinants of whether people think that EU membership would be a desirable thing or not.

Compared to the ethnic Albanian majority, the ethnic Serbs in Kosovo are less favourable toward the prospect of Kosovo becoming a member of the EU. Our analysis, however, does not provide support for the hypothesis that the non-Serb minorities have a more pro-EU attitude than the ethnic Albanian majority.

One noteworthy result – and numerically our strongest result – is that those with more favourable attitudes towards Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state are also more supportive of Kosovo membership in the EU. This is reminiscent of the notion, found in the literature, that people with more inclusive national identity are also more supportive of EU integration.

Women in Kosovo are shown to be more likely to support the country's membership in the EU than men. Interestingly this finding goes across ethnicities and provides support for the conjecture that the gender disadvantage in Kosovo is not ethnicity-specific.

Household size also turns out to be an important determinant of pro-EU sentiment. The relation between household size and support for EU membership brings with it an interesting 'tipping point'. Support for the EU increases with household size for relatively small households, until it peaks at households with 7 members, and decreases thereafter – pointing to a trade-off dynamic. A possible interpretation is that two competing factors are at play: the prospect of EU financial support (directly or indirectly) for large families and the prospect of benefiting (via higher wages) from a more competitive EU-connected economy. We could call it, for short, a rent seeking motive versus an entrepreneurial motive. For relatively smaller households the rent seeking motive dominates, while beyond the tipping point the entrepreneurial motive (in a negative sense) dominates. For household sizes below the tipping point, Kosovans associate more family members with more EU financial assistance. However, once the household size goes beyond that point more family members to care for makes it more difficult to benefit from a more competitive EU economy, and at the margin the net effect of household size on pro-EU sentiment becomes negative.

Furthermore, the link between household size and EU support is driven by the female subsample. This invites the interpretation that it is the role of females as principal family caregivers that underlies this finding.

Pro-EU sentiment is also demonstrated by people with intentions to 'escape' from Kosovo. The results support our hypothesis that Kosovans' willingness to go working abroad and/or action taken in preparation for emigration is positively correlated with pro-EU sentiment. This result is driven by the male subsample, as well as by the ethnic Albanian subsample.

Moderate support is also obtained for the importance of remittances in augmenting positive attitudes toward the EU.

One of the limitations of this study lies in the fact that we are taking a 'snapshot' of attitudes toward EU membership at a particular point in time. It would be interesting to survey attitudes repeatedly over time and follow trends in attitudes. In addition, it would, of course, be desirable to expand this type of study to include the other successor states to the Yugoslav Federation, in order to determine whether our Kosovo findings are typical for the whole Western Balkans or whether there is significant variation among the individual states. This is left for future research.

The findings of this paper, on a more general level, point to groups of people in Kosovo, whose attitude toward the EU is shaped by whether they see themselves as winners or losers of such an integration process - be it real or imagined. Among those who currently perceive themselves as relatively disadvantaged in Kosovo, the conditionality that comes with EU membership and the required minimum standards and regulations are likely to be seen as guarantors of an improvement over the status quo. Conversely, relatively privileged groups

may fear that EU membership will erode their privileged position. Both sentiments point to a perception of the EU as a provider and enforcer of social justice – and that may be a good thing.

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APPENDIX 1

Summary statistics

	Ethnic Albanians (n=838)		Ethnic Serbs (n=473)		Min	Max
	Mean	Standard deviation	Mean	Standard deviation		
Age/10	43.156	18.434	38.218	16.754	18	86
Male	0.488	0.500	0.522	0.500	0	1
Married	0.745	0.436	0.596	0.491	0	1
Has child(-ren)	0.875	0.331	0.526	0.500	0	1
Income						
<i>No income</i>	0.333	0.472	0.245	0.431	0	1
<i>< 50 EUR</i>	0.249	0.433	0.032	0.175	0	1
<i>50-150 EUR</i>	0.162	0.369	0.190	0.393	0	1
<i>150-300 EUR</i>	0.141	0.348	0.209	0.407	0	1
<i>>300 EUR</i>	0.053	0.223	0.167	0.373	0	1
<i>Income non reported</i>	0.062	0.241	0.156	0.364	0	1
Education						
<i>Primary</i>	0.396	0.489	0.140	0.347	0	1
<i>Secondary</i>	0.468	0.499	0.693	0.462	0	1
<i>Tertiary</i>	0.136	0.343	0.167	0.373	0	1
Student	0.111	0.314	0.169	0.375	0	1
Unemployed	0.168	0.374	0.203	0.403	0	1
Lives in rural area	0.499	0.500	0.658	0.475	0	1
District						
<i>South-East</i>	0.132	0.339	0.201	0.401	0	1
<i>South-West</i>	0.185	0.389	-	-	0	1
<i>Central</i>	0.354	0.479	0.268	0.444	0	1
<i>North</i>	0.124	0.330	0.531	0.500	0	1
<i>North-West</i>	0.204	0.403	-	-	0	1

APPENDIX 2

Survey design and data collection.

Methodology

Sample universe	Population of Kosovo 18+; Census figures 1981, estimated results of Census 1991, estimated population dynamics, and census figures of refugees and IDPs from 2000, 2002 and 2005.		
Sampling frame	Polling stations territory (approximate size of census units) within strata defined by regions and type of settlements (urban and rural) Polling stations territories enables the most reliable sample selection, due to the fact that for these units the most complete data are available		
Type of sample	Three stage random representative stratified sample		
Definition and number of PSU, SSU, TSU, and sampling points	<p><u>PSU – Polling station territory</u> <i>Definition:</i> Polling stations territories are defined by street(s) name(s) and dwelling numbers; each polling station territory comprises approximately 300 households, with exception of the settlements with less than 300 HH which are defined as one unite. <i>Number of PSUs in sample universe:</i> 920</p> <p><u>SSU - Household</u> <i>Definition:</i> One household comprises people living in the same apartment and sharing the expenditure for food <i>Number of SSUs in sample universe:</i> 420 000.</p> <p><u>TSU – Respondent</u> <i>Definition:</i> Member of the HH , 18+ <i>Number of TSUs in sample universe:</i> 1,320 000</p> <p><u>Sampling points</u> Approximately 10 sampling points per one PSU</p>		
Stratification, purpose and method	Sub sample	First level strata:	Second level strata:
	Ethnic Albanians	3 regions	urban and rural settlements
	Ethnic Serbs	2 regions	
Purpose: Optimization of the sample plan, and reducing the sampling error Method: The strata are defined by criteria of optimal geographical and cultural uniformity			
Selection procedure of PSU, SSU, and respondent	<p><u>PSU</u> <i>Type of sampling of the PSU:</i> Polling station territory chosen with probability proportional to size (PPS); <i>method of selection:</i> Cumulative (Lachirie method)</p> <p><u>SSU</u> <i>Type of sampling of the SSU:</i> Sample random sampling without replacement; <i>method of selection:</i> Random walk - Random choice of the starting point</p> <p><u>TSU – Respondent</u> <i>Type of sampling of respondent:</i> Sample random sampling without replacement; <i>method of selection:</i> Kish scheme</p>		
Sample size	1300 completed questionnaires (minimum) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • at least 800 residents age 18 and over among ethnic Albanians and • at least 500 residents age 18 and over among ethnic Serbs 		
Sampling error	Margin error: 2.78 Sub samples margin error: n=800 +/- 3.65; n=500 =/- 4,68		

APPENDIX 3

About Ipsos Strategic Puls

The survey was conducted by *Ipsos Strategic Puls* (formerly known as *Strategic Marketing*) - a private and independent research company whose major fields of activity include various types of marketing and public opinion research, based in Belgrade, Serbia. The company began operating in 1997 and since then has become one of the leading and well-known research suppliers in the Central Balkan region, present in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. In 2009, it became part of IPSOS, a worldwide research company present in 64 countries. *Ipsos Strategic Puls* adheres to the standards of ISI (International Statistical Institute) and ESOMAR (European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research) concerning sample design, data collection and processing, and data analysis methods.

www.ipsos.com

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