A Case Study on the Effects of the Anti-Corruption Strategies of the Malaysian Government on Local Government in the State of Sarawak

Bernt David Brennan
A case study on the effects of the anti-corruption strategies of the Malaysian Government on Local Government in the State of Sarawak
**Forward**

This is a special thank you to the people that helped make this thesis possible. To my supervisor/councillor Dag Ingvar Jacobsen, to all his Patience and good advice. To all my fellow students that have discussed the thesis with me and helped formulate my ideas.

I am great full to all my friends in Sarawak that have, yet again, made another thesis possible. They also are my inspiration making me try to achieve more, as my class mates and school mates from the final year in St. Joseph’s School in Kuching have all done so well in their various fields. To the people of Sarawak that keep me going by the example of their perseverance.

My family has also been a support and help throughout these many years at Agder University College.

To all a debt of gratitude that cannot be repaid by simple worldly means.

Kristiansand, May 2006

B. D. Brennan
List of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2. Theory Chapter .................................................................................................... 4

2.1 Robert Klitgaard’s Theory ................................................................................................. 6

2.2 Kimberly Ann Elliot’s (1997) Theory .............................................................................. 10

2.3 Other Theories ............................................................................................................... 14

Chapter 3 Methods .............................................................................................................. 16

3.1 The Case “The Local Government of Sarawak” ............................................................ 17

3.1.1 Guidelines for a Qualitative Analysis ........................................................................ 18

3.1.2 The Interview ............................................................................................................. 21

3.1.3 The Guided Interview (See appendix 2 for interview guide) .................................... 21

3.1.4 Question Options ...................................................................................................... 23

3.1.5 The Time Frame of Questions ................................................................................ 25

3.1.6 Sequencing Questions ............................................................................................... 25

3.1.7 A short comment on the interviewees ..................................................................... 26

3.1.8 The Interview Questions as used in the interview .................................................... 26

3.1.9 The Qualitative Survey Questionnaires ................................................................... 28
3.1.10 The Quantitative Survey Questionnaires

3.1.11 The Sample

3.1.12 Validity

3.1.13 Reliability

3.1.14 The Strengths of The research Methods

3.1.15 The Weaknesses of The Research Methods

Chapter 4 The Empirical Analysis

4.1 The Identification of /data on the Present Anti-Corruption Strategies of the Malaysian Government

4.1.1 The Anti-Corruption Action Plan For Asia And The Pacific

   1. Pillar I Letter of Undertaking by Public Officials

   2. Pillar II Legislative Measures Against Corruption

   3. Pillar III Increasing Cooperation with NGO’s

4.1.2 Summary of the survey on The Public Perception of Corruption in Malaysia

4.1.3 Anti Corruption Agency of Malaysia

4.1.4 The Data from the Questionnaires and interviewees gives us information on the types of corruption present in Malaysia and the effects of the of the Malaysian Government strategies
4.1.5 The data developed from the Three Interviews/informants that shed light on types of corruption at the Local Government Level in Malaysia and the Effects of the Malaysian Government’s Anti-Corruption Strategies on the corruption at this level .............................. 50

4.1.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 58

4.2 The Answers to the research questions ................................................................. 59

4.2.1 Answer Research Question 1 :“What are the types of anti-corruption corruption policies is the Malaysian Government using?” .............................................................. 59

4.2.2 This part answers the second research question posed “What type’s corruption are present in the state government of Sarawak?” ................................................ 69

4.2.3 Here the survey also shed some light on the third research question “What have been the effects of the anti-corruption policies on the local district government of Sarawak?” ..........71

4.2.4 The Effect of the Anti-Corruption Strategies of the Malaysian Government on the Local District Government of Sarawak ................................................................. 76

Chapter 5 The Analysis .............................................................................................. 79

5.1 Analysis of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Policies (Research Question 1) ............. 79

5.2 Research Question 2 Analysis of the Types and extent of Corruption in Malaysia with Elliot’s Theory ........................................................................................................ 80

5.3 Research Question 3 The Analysis of the Effects of the anti-corruption policies .......... 83

5.4 Suggestions for the improvement of the Anti-Corruption Strategies of the Malaysian Government ................................................................................................................. 82

5.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 84
List of Diagrams

Diagram 2.1 Model of the Variables used to Study the Phenomenon 5

Diagram 2.2 Varieties of Corruption as functions of Political Imbalance (Elliot, Johnston, 1997, 71). 11

Diagram 4.1 Varieties of Corruption as functions of Political Imbalance placing Malaysia in the diagram (Elliot, Johnston, 1997, 71). 70

Bibliography 89

The Internet 90

Appendix 1 A Sarawak District Government’s Organisation Chart

Appendix 2 The Interview Guide

Appendix 3 Qualitative Questionnaire

Appendix 4 Quantitative Questionnaire
Chapter 1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to design a thesis to take a look at the strategies of the Malaysian Government in fighting corruption. The fifth Prime Minister of Malaysia and newly elected (2004), Datuk Abdullah Ahmad Bedawi has declared war on the corruption (Frederik Balfour, 2004). It is important to have a good strategy so that Malaysia can develop even further. It is also a good case for comparison with other countries in the region. As a case Malaysia is interesting because it reflects a lot of the conditions of the countries in the region of South-East Asia. Although they have different languages and government systems they have much in common in terms of challenges and development with respect to corruption.

From reliable raw material supplier to a leading agricultural nation to a leading industrial producer of manufactured goods, this NIC (Newly Industrialised Country) is looking towards the year 2020 when the government has planned that Malaysia will be a fully fledged industrialised country (The National Congress Vision 2020: The Way Forward 29/04/97).

In Malaysia there are four main languages spoken, Malay, English, Chinese and Tamil as well as other Indian languages. Malaysia consists of 13 states and two federal territories and is a constitutional democracy with a federal system. Each state has its own Malay dialects and its own sub-cultures, with some states having their own ethnic languages in addition to the four major languages. The National Language of the country is Bahasa Malaysia (the Malay language) and the main business language of Malaysia is English with Chinese coming second. The state of Sarawak itself has over thirty different languages. Malaysia has four major religions in its midst, Islam, Christianity (with most of its denominations), Buddhism and Hinduism as well as local religions of the indigenous peoples of the country and other lesser religions (BBC Country Profile Malaysia, 2004). This alone is a challenge to negotiate when doing a paper on Malaysia Here we must make the assumption after 47 years of independence of Malaysia (43 years for Sarawak in Malaysia, independent in 1963), the education system has given rise to a Malaysian thinking in running the businesses of the country, that will negate the differences, ethnically and religiously for the purposes of this paper as its peoples have gone through the national school system for over 40 years by now.

The way the state governments’ conduct their business is very similar, having a large part of its administrative practices based in British colonial systems of local government. The states
are presided over by the state government which in turn is presided over by the federal government of Malaysia. The states are all quite autonomous but they have national guidelines to fulfil and usually have very similar structures in place. An example of this are the State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCS’), pay scales for government servants that are that are quite uniform, stipulating travel and subsistence allowances, housing allowances and the like, for each level on the pay scale.

The state of Sarawak is administratively divided up into regions called divisions. To date there are around 8 divisions but the number increases all the time as the state gets more and more developed, requiring more and more decentralisation. Each division is divided into districts presided over by the district office. This is a direct descendent of the British colonial system. These divisions are administered by a Resident in each division (See Appendix 4, for an organisation chart of a division, not from there any of the respondents have worked, to keep them anonymous), who resides over district officers, in their various districts, that are above the administration, administrative officers, accountants and the like as well as the village headmen, for their particular district. It will be in these districts that the survey and study (interviews) will take place to investigate the extent of corruption and the effects of the new drive/policies of the Malaysian Government against corruption.

The title of this thesis is “A case study on the effects of the anti-corruption strategies of the Malaysian Government on Local Government in the State of Sarawak”. The hypothesis here is “The policies/strategies of the Malaysian Government against corruption are having an effect in the State of Sarawak” (Hypothesis H1). This position taken as the media has been presenting the new Prime Minister as very popular amongst all the peoples of Malaysia and that people feel that there should be something done to take care of corrupt practices, which he is trying to do (Bernama, 2004).

The research questions posed here are:

1). “What are the types of anti-corruption corruption policies is the Malaysian Government using?

2). What type’s corruption are present in the state government of Sarawak?
3). What have been the effects of the anti-corruption policies on the local district government of Sarawak?

It is interesting to see the effects of corruption on a developing country and its development strategies. This is also a basis for further study in development strategies and their implementation. It is interesting to find out if it is always true that all corruption always has a depleting effect on resources and creates inefficiencies (Klitgaard, 1991). It is also desirable not to let others set the agenda when a developing nation shall try to reduce corruption. Corruption should be defined and fought in the context (Strand, 2001), culture (Klitgaard, 1991) and its habitus (Swartz, 1997). The others tying to set the agenda might not have the right kind of remedies for that particular society, possibly only for their own society. Another point is that a country should take charge of its own corruption wars to be able to synchronise its efforts with its development strategies, especially for a developing nation. In one country certain acts are corrupt in others it is not, so we may lack a more comprehensive understanding of what is corruption and try to define it more clearly so that more transparent systems can be devised taking in certain variations in say a country’s cultures (Staw, 1995), context (Klitgaard1991), practices (Swartz 1997) and so forth. A gift in one person’s culture can be seen as corruption where as in another person’s it can be acceptable and normal. The problem with a lot of corruption is that it is that which is done in secret to influence some kind of decision, mostly economic, for the gain of a certain party “unfairly” (Klitgaard, 1991).

Taking the local government of the state of Sarawak as a case, for Malaysia, as it is here the survey can and will be carried out simply due to the fact that it is here I can easily get the data necessary. We must necessarily assume that there are not large cultural and local differences between the states, and that they are similar due to a common education system of over 40 years

Theories from various branches of knowledge must be imported to help with the design of the questionnaires and interviews, as well as the analysis of the data collected. Also, to give a theoretical basis to argue the points of the thesis, so we can relate the results of the analysis to some common ground to give us conclusions that may be used in further work.
Chapter 2 Theory Chapter

My interest in this country stems from the 32 years that I lived in Malaysia. My experience in this country gives me the possibility to study this phenomenon, having lived there from a very early age. I have had all my primary and secondary education in this country and had the opportunity to work there in various firms and branches for ten years, after having studied management at college level. This has given me an insight into many aspects of Malaysian life, culture, business, and much more. Having grown up both in a factory environment situated in a village and gone to school in the capital in the state of Sarawak, Kuching, I have been able to learn the national language of the country (Malay) as well as the Malay dialect of Sarawak (both fluently), the unwritten language of Melanau (fluently), a third local language and another widely used one to a lesser extent. I have seen this little backwater of a state situated on the island of Borneo become a bustling agricultural products processing and manufacturing society.

I have always maintained contact with my friends during the process. This has been an extremely interesting process, living the transformation of a society and country and all the coping that the people have had to do. Part of the reason for choosing the personal interview as a method of gathering data is due to my familiarity with the many of the actors in the state administration or those involved in it.

To find out how the anti-corruption policies of the government affect the level of corruption in Malaysia the effects of these policies on the corruption must be studied. We have here a relationship $Y = f(X)$, $Y$ being the dependent variable (corruption in the local government of Sarawak) and $X$ is the independent variable, whereby we have a relationship $X_1, X_2, \ldots X_n$, here considering the anti-corruption strategies/policies of the Malaysian government here the effects of $X$, that is expressed by the model in Diagram 2.1. In the thesis I will only look at the independent variable the anti corruption strategies/policies of the government against the phenomenon of corruption. This relationship means that changes in $X$ will change $Y$ (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2002). Therefore positive changes or better strategies in $X$ will mean that the strategies are having a positive effect on corruption, that is, it will decrease corruption and vice-versa, negative effects will mean worsening corruption or there can be no effects on corruption. This sentence describes $H_1$, the hypothesis. We wish to know the direction in which corruption is heading, is it getting worse or getting better, or has no effect ($H_0$, the null
hypothesis).

The strategies in X are in line with the strategy issues of Klitgaard (1991). Here it is the strategies of the ACA that are of interest. Are they reducing corruption? And so forth. The theories here are to help formulate the questions in the questionnaire and interview, and to give us a structure to guide us in the thesis.

**Diagram 2.1 Model of the Variables used to Study the Phenomenon**

X). Anti-Corruption Policies (Strategies)

Corruption in the local government of Sarawak at the District Council Level

A). Law Enforcement – existing anti-corruption law

- is there a decrease or increase in corruption after the new/policies/drive to prevent corruption in Malaysia

Identification of the types of corruption in Malaysia – used as an explaining factor to understand the functions of the strategies

The theories of Kimberly Ann Elliot (1997) will be used to identify and gauge the extent of the corruption that occurs in Malaysia. This helps us to see the significance of and to understand the strategies in fighting corruption. It has been a limited survey and limited number of personal interviews in this case because of the sensitivity of the information. It was not easy to ask any one at random about these categories of corruption so only a few knowledgeable friends were surveyed.

Robert Klitgaard’s (1991) theories and studies will be used as a comparison to see how the Anti Corruption Agency of Malaysia is fighting corruption, by examining the governments policies and use to analyse the data collected about the results of these policies. His theories will be used to look at the culture of corruption in the local government and the strategy issues arising, that is the effect of the implementation of the policies. Other theories from
management and social sciences will be drawn in when necessary, but the most likely to be used will be commented upon in this chapter. The emphasis here is to see if there is a culture of corruption at the Level of Local Government and to see the cultural acceptance or rejection of corruption on a national level, through the limited surveys.

A qualitative questionnaire was also used and given out to a random sample of individuals, from different levels of education and experiences. This, although larger than the qualitative survey, was also rather limited. The intention here was to be able to use the different data sources to support each other.

2.1 Robert Klitgaard’s Theory

Robert Klitgaard (1991) gives us the theories for setting up anticorruption agencies as well as strategies to combat them. He presents us with Generic Policies for Reducing Corruption, methods of choosing staff for the task, successes in different countries in their fight against corruption and the types of policies that are to be used in the fight against corruption (Klitgaard, 1991). These are therefore comparisons for us when studying the case of the state of Sarawak in Malaysia to ascertain whether there has been any headway in the fight against corruption. The results of the survey can be used to see if there are any similarities between the previously British Colonies. Here we can see if they are similarly successful and compare their ACA’s (Anti-Corruption Agencies) to see if there are any similarities, and also have a brief comparison of their government machineries to see if they are similar. For an in depth study, however, would have to appear in another paper/thesis dealing with these comparisons.


1). Distinguish between “ostensible” (apparent) and strategic issues in fighting corruption.

Ostensible issues, here finding out what will eliminate the corruption. They will be
used in the analysis when suggesting solutions in the discussion in conjunction with the suggestions of the respondents to the interviews, surveys and secondary data. These will be presented in the Empirical Analysis chapter 4 and Analysis in chapter 5. Strategic issues meaning that we find out how to implement these policies that will eliminate corruption. In the analysis we want to find out if the policies/strategies of the ACA are having an effect.

The steps in fighting the ostensible issues of corruption:-

a) The various kinds of costs of corruption must be investigated. Do the socio-economic benefits outweigh the negative effects?

b) List up the different anti-corruption techniques that can be used.

c) We must weigh up the costs of reducing corruption against the benefits of reducing the corruption, with the anti-corruption techniques decided upon.

d) We must choose the most relevant anti-corruption policies and implement them to the point there marginal benefits of reduced corruption are equal to the marginal costs of reducing it.

The strategic issues of fighting corruption (getting the patient to take the medicine/follow the treatment). Here we must ask:-

a) How such policies can be implemented in practice?

b) How allies can be mobilised?

c) How potential resistors can be neutralised or co-opted?

d) How should policy measures be sequenced?

Other questions can be what will happen with the policy makers’ career and what will happen to bureaucratic politics?

2) Cultivate Political Support

We must seek the various beneficiaries of the anti-corruption policies. They must be made aware of the benefits of these activities and enlist them to support these activities as well as to make their political influence be felt by others. All policy reforms depend on political support. If politicians can see or be made to see that their popular support will rise from the visible fighting of corruption, they are more likely to support the
implementation of these anti-corruption policies.

3). Get the public behind corruption efforts

This will be one of the areas of analysis to find out whether there is a culture of corruption in the local government of Sarawak. This is a different perspective than another aspect that will be investigated, that is the view of the culture of the country on corruption.

The support of the public is vital for the success of anti-corruption efforts. We need the peoples’ cooperation in uncovering and prosecuting corrupt actions.

Tactics of getting public support:-

If one can ride a wave of public indignation against corruption one must try to institutionalise this indignation create linkages with legislative branches

a) Publicize findings and have hearings for appropriate committees
b) Convince the public that these efforts are serious. The principle of catching the “big-fish” ought to be applied. Catching these high level perpetrators and prosecuting them is as proof of seriousness.

4). Break the Culture of Corruption in your organisation

This is one of the areas of analysis to see whether there is a culture of corruption in the local government of Sarawak as an indicator of the corruption in Malaysia. This is separate from the opinion of the culture of the country to corruption. Mostly corrupt acts are carried out in secret, with a measure of confidence they will not be reported. Here we can call this a culture of corruption, there not everyone is corrupt but everyone will not be willing to report on the corruption taking place.

To break this culture one has to take two steps (Klitgaard, 1991, 187):-

1). The administrator must upset the climate of confidence and trust that is
necessary for corrupt transactions
2). Cynicism must be combated; words must be backed by action.

Methods of upsetting the climate of confidence:-

a) Plant informers in key slots.
b) And or wide ranging periodic rotation of officers
c) Surveillance; including inspectors.
d) Give rewards to those who report corruption.

Methods of overcoming cynicism:-

a) Catching the “big fish”, high ranking officers involved in high scale corruption.
b) Those “big fish” ought to be then “frying” in public with the accompanying announcements of penalty charges.

5). More Positively as well as Negatively

“Tackling corruption often involves harsh measures, and an organization can easily feel besieged, resulting in a decline in performance” (Klitgaard, 1991, 187).

A wise strategy will be therefore include positive incentives as well as penalties, measures to encourage the organisations values and steps to crack the culture of corruption.

6). Link Anti-Corruption Measures to the Organisations Main Mission

Anti-corruption policy must reflect the organisations everyday objectives to be easier to implement.
Methods to make corruption policies easier to implement:-

a) They should interfere minimally with routine activities, operations and management
b) They should be designed to minimise the organisations costs and error rates in doing its usual business
c) The greater the threat of corruption in an organisation is, or can be made to be, to the organisations autonomy

d) Maximise as much as possible the incentives that can be provide to lower-staff to control corruption

Kligaard’s theory will also be a guiding influence as well in the questionnaires and interviews, to facilitate the analysis. Kimberly Ann Elliot’s theories will help to distinguish the types of corruption at the local government level in Sarawak.

2.2 Kimberly Ann Elliot’s (1997) Theory, Varieties of Corruption

Kimberly Ann Elliot (1997) gives us a basis for the classification of a country into the type of corruption it has. Here we can try to ascertain if the country can be classified as having an interest bidding group, elite hegemony, fragmented patronage or are patronage machines. We can also use Elliot’s analysis of the degree of corruption in a country in ascertaining whether it is petty or on a grand scale, of course this can vary from sector to sector. The theory on the opportunities and consequences of corruption can also be used here to see the effects corruption has had on Malaysia. Elliot (1997) has also investigated the international efforts to establish a standard for countries to adhere to on levels of corruption and have a uniformed approach and goals in fighting corruption.

The varieties of corruption can be identified in the categories that Kimberly Ann Elliot (1997) has defined. This will give us a picture of where Malaysia stands compared with other countries. The respondents of the quantitative questionnaire (see Chapter 3) will be able to place Malaysia in the category they think the country is suited.

In the diagram (Diagram 2.2) of varieties of corruption there are four factors influencing the types/categories of corruption. We have the conditions there economic opportunities are greater than the political opportunities and vice versa combined with the factor of elite accessibility and autonomy of the elites. Economic opportunities can be scarce or plentiful making more desirable to pursue political gain or economic gain. When the economic opportunities are larger than political ones the political elites can be vulnerable. Also when economic opportunities are limited, here elites will seek power by political manipulation. The degree to which the power/political elites are accessible or autonomous will also have an
influence on how corruption will develop. For example if interest groups are strong then political elites are vulnerable there accessibility of elites exceeds autonomy and economic

**Diagram 2.2 Varieties of Corruption as functions of Political Imbalance (Elliot, Johnston, 1997, 71).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accessibility of Elites &gt; Autonomy</th>
<th>Autonomy of Elites &gt; Accessibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Opportunities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economical &gt; Political</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A: Interest Group Bidding</td>
<td>B: Elite Hegemony (Risk of Extreme Corruption)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-IAU Hong Kong</td>
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<td>Military Regimes (Nigeria at times)</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>LDP Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political &gt; Economic</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Egs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Pre Fujimori Peru</td>
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<td>Pre Menem Argentina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early civilian regimes in Africa”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C: Fragmented Patronage (Mafiyas) (risk of extreme corruption)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mature Tammany Hall</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td>D: Patronage Machines</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

opportunities are more plentiful than political ones. Here there is a chance that corruption develops, whereby the different groups resort to gifts or bribes etc. Autonomy here is the degree to which the leaders in a country can be influenced or not. Accessibility of the elites is the degree to which ordinary people in a country can get access to their top leaders.
The Four Syndromes

Elliot (1997) calls these varieties of corruption as the four syndromes which she categorises in a diagram (Diagram 2.2).

A: Interest Group Bidding

Here the accessibility of elites exceeds autonomy and economic opportunities are more plentiful than political ones. “Where imbalances are significant, interest groups are strong and political elites are vulnerable” (Elliot, Johnston, 1997, 70). Most resort to economic resources to seek to influence and they represent many interests (Johnston, 1997). This type of corruption is most common in liberal democracies and is seen as a departure procedural fairness and equity. This can be a serious problem but is unlikely to get out of control as bidding is open to many competing interests with relatively narrow agendas. Any deviation can be criticized and as well to publicly expose wrong doers and get support from political elites. The main problem here is that policy making becomes or is perceived as an auction with favourable decisions going to the highest bidder. Preferential access tends to create policy stagnation rather than out of control corruption but can still create considerable resentment amongst those that feel that they are excluded by corrupt processes (Johnston, 1997).

B: Elite Hegemony

Here there are ominous corruption problems. If we have an entrenched political elite facing little political competition, with few meaningful demands for accountability, it will dominate and exploit economic opportunities, manipulating political access in return for further economic gains. Here there are weak boundaries between state and society, public and private interests, and politics administration and are open for elite manipulation.

Manipulation by the elite of political and legal processes makes the forces of reform weak, when they try to oppose the corruption. This sort of corruption may become well organised and systematic coupled with facing little or no opposition and may develop into a hyper corruption spiral. If there are different factions, elite political and
economic factions, in times of transition, they will if intensely competitive, produce extreme corruption, taking as much as they can as quickly as they can. Reform tends to favour the actions of the elite and without substantial opening up of politics, significant scandal or meaningful demands for reform. Many require and would very likely deepen serious political crises.

C: Fragmented Patronage

This resembles an elite hegemony in the dangers of out-of-control corruption especially in states undergoing systematic transformation with weak institutions and weak political leadership. Elites here are not only accessible but also seek power and intense political competition and relatively scarce economic opportunities. Here the political alternatives are plentiful but the economic rewards are relatively scarce. Elites build personal followings and not broad based parties, which are difficult to control as the material rewards are minimal and the political alternatives numerous. In some of these countries sinister forces like the Russian Mafiyas are present.

This is the most politically unstable of the four categories and the danger of extreme corruption is most pronounced. “Elites are politically insecure and thus face temptations toward hand-out-first corruption, but followers also contribute to the danger, their loyalty has to be purchased and repurchased in conflict after conflict, and patronage bidding wars may ensue” (Elliot, Johnston, 1997,73). It will be difficult to establish an orderly competition as long as there is little to gain from being in opposition for its own sake, when the real opportunities lie in the scramble for the spoils.

Corruption issues against ones enemies, and therefore anti-corruption reforms are only used as slogans and therefore law enforcement officials will be just as politically vulnerable as politicians and bureaucrats and neither side can count on support from the other.

D: Patronage Machines

Here we have a well entrenched elite that can manipulate scarce economic rewards to
control political competition in spite of substantial political opportunities being present. This is through the sort of disciplined patronage organisation known in America as Patronage Machines. The patronage wielding elite that emerges gradually eliminates the competing factions, can control government, exploit economic interests, render existing political alternatives economically worthless as well as create a disciplined Patronage Organisation. “Politics remains the path to wealth, but followers can be controlled through monopoly over patronage; they need not be bribed again and again but they make do with petty rewards bearing a large political price” (Elliot, Johnston, 1997, 74). These machines can evolve out of fragmented patronage politics. Although Patronage Machines are not totally harmonious internally, they are unlikely to produce out-of-control corruption. This machine benefits from the continuation of conditions that allow it to operate. They (the actors in power) intend to hold on to power in the long term, and distribute patronage to preserve dominance rather than looting the state.

This does not mean that the corruption involved is not serious or that it does not inflict economic and social damage. In this variety of corruption wealth is diverted into the hands of a few. Here those in power levy a “political tax” on business, investment, and many ordinary jobs, while maintaining the poor in a state of political dependency. The damage inflicted on the political system is most likely to come from the stagnation and postponed change than in the form of a short term crisis or a collapse. The leaders here will sometimes put limited reform in place to create more serious political challenges. Most corruption is likely to stem from marginalised counter-elites without much political influence (Elliot, Johnston, 1997).

These varieties of corruption will be the basis of one of the questions in the Qualitative questionnaire.

2.3 Other Theories

To be able to fully investigate the nature of the Malaysian culture’s attitude to corruption we must see it in the light of culture, context and setting. Strand (2001) discusses Culture and Context which gives different meanings to how phenomena are viewed. The culture that occurs when a group of people socialize, Swartz (1997) argues, gives rise to Habitus (Swartz,
1997) - a way of doing things that has its origins in the culture and context (Strand, 2001 & Klitgaard 1991). This habitus gives creates conscious and unconscious actions (Swartz, 1997). In the Cultural Context (Strand 2001 & Klitgaard 1991), there are specific cultural traits which differentiate the way people do things, country to country (Strand, 2001) and company to company (Staw, 1995). There will, I believe, a difference of opinion in the definition of gifts and bribes, in the Malaysian society, even though almost all societies condemn graft and corruption (Klitgaard 1991). Also when the need arises other theories will be applied.

In Chapter 3 research design methods will be introduced that are to facilitate the writing of the thesis, questionnaires, interviews and handling/analysis of the large amounts of data that have to be processed.
Chapter 3 Methods

This paper is an attempt to devise a study/research design to investigate the strategies of the Malaysian government in combating corruption. To find out what types and degrees of corruption there are. It will also try to find out the effects of the Malaysian Government Policies on this corruption. The Government of Malaysia opened their war on corruption with the arrests at the top, two top executives of two large firms and a minister. This was not expected by many quarters who expected it to start lower down in the ranks (Frederik Balfour in Kuala Lumpur, Business Week on line, March 29, 2004). To assess the effects of the policy properly there must be a collection of data to try to see whether there have been positive or no effects of this policy.

To assess the phenomenon of corruption a survey and or a study must be devised to get feedback from government servants and business professionals, as well as a random sample of people, all in Kuching. The data collection methods in this thesis will be personal interview, here from three respondents, a qualitative questionnaire, from six respondents, and quantitative questionnaire given to a random sample of sixteen people. The interviews will be done with trusted/childhood friends to try to get to a picture of what is happening with corruption in this society, increasing, decreasing or remaining the same, after the Prime Ministers war on corruption (Frederik Balfour, 2004). References to secondary sources are also necessary since some of the information, which can be quite sensitive, is hard to corroborate, trying to compare it with the Empirical Basis, based on documents/secondary sources (Patton, 2002, Nachmias & Nachmias, 2002).

The method of enquiry will be a qualitative research method which is an “attempt to understand the behaviour and institutions by getting to know the persons involved and their values, rituals, symbols, beliefs and emotions” (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2002, 281) as opposed to statistical quantitative analysis. Some of the findings will come from a limited quantitative questionnaire sample used is a random sample of the people of Sarawak. There are also a very limited number of responses to a qualitative questionnaire, limited because of the sensitivity of the questions, thereby using only people with knowledge on the subject and not a random sample. “Qualitative analysis transforms data into findings” (Patton 2002, 432). The final analysis is in the hands of the enquirer and is arrived at if and when the enquirer decides the findings are arrived at. The enquirer acts as a catalyst on the raw data putting it
together in a way that can be understood as a result of a survey on a chosen phenomenon. The analysing of qualitative data can be said to be “finding your story” (Patton 2002, 432). We have a challenge here of making sense of massive amounts of data, unfortunately here we have only a limited amount of data. This raw information must be reduced to useable data, sorting out trivia and looking for significant information. The analyst must develop much of the analysis procedures him or herself and explain what has been done.

2.1 The Case “The Local Government of Sarawak” (See Appendix 1 for Organisation Chart, not the District that the respondents are from)

Using a case analysis means writing a case study a district in Sarawak on the basis of their responses, and using them as a basis for analysis. The case here is a district of Sarawak that is partly in a rural setting and partly in an urban setting, depending on the Division of Sarawak we are in. The setting is quite typical of many parts of Sarawak because of the rapid development in the past few years as the small towns expand and urbanise parts of the district they are in and leave parts of it as a rural area. Hence the interest in whether the respondents in the interviews, have seen any variation in the corruption in a rural or urban setting. This then gives rise to a phenomenon where some districts in a division can be both rural and urban at the same time. The main case here being the local district government of Sarawak, in the chosen area, and the interviews are like “mini cases”/information gathered from the respondents to the interviews. These are like small cases/mini-cases (layers of analysis) within the overall view, which is the case of the corruption in the local government of Sarawak. Thereafter comparing the interviews in a cross-case analysis, to look for common ground or diverging answers on the phenomenon. That is grouping together answers from different people, from common questions, or analysing the different perspectives of central issues (Cross-case or cross-interview are most applicable from the standard open ended interview). By constructing a good interview guide, if carefully conceived, can constitute a descriptive analytical frame work for an analysis. In the thesis the main source of information will be interviews and therefore a cross-case/interview triangulation, “This can mean using several kinds of methods or data, including using both quantitative and qualitative (with a qualitative questionnaire) approaches.” (Patton 2002, 247) can be conducted (Patton 2002). A case study seems to be the natural method to be used to analyse the effect of the corruption strategies of the Malaysian government on corruption in Malaysia. Without going into the mini-cases we might not get the overall picture of the phenomenon. These individual cases extracted from
the individual actors that have experience with corruption in the local government of Sarawak (Patton 2002). Part of the reason for the choice of the data collection method is due to my relationship with some of the actors in the Malaysian government and private sector.

The problem with case studies is that the findings are shaped according to predispositions and biases. As for everyone I also will have to try to overcome or guide my selective perception. My problem is I am very much a part of the culture and have the background in the state that I am using as a case. My early childhood and socialisation was here too, so one must be careful not to see things the way one wants to see them (Patton 2002). My objectivity will be put to the test as it is easy to be subjective under these conditions. There will possibly an unconscious bias (Patton 2002), which is not easy to free oneself from but to the best of my ability I will be objective. The aim here would be to achieve “emphatic neutrality” (Patton 2002, 50), which Patton (2002) describes as a middle ground, there one does not become too involved, which can cloud judgement, and yet not be too distant that might reduce understanding. Patton (2002) is preoccupied here with credibility of the researcher. The researcher must present his findings with balance and fairness. The researcher must not distort data to serve his or her own purposes or biases, and must base his or her analysis on honest, meaningful and credible empirically supported findings (Patton 2002).

3.1.1 Guidelines for a Qualitative Analysis

These are as suggested by Patton (2002), to develop an analytical process for the data which is gathered.

i). Purpose as Context

Purpose guides analysis, and is necessary to allow for the different norms and expectations the analysis is subjected to that will effect the conclusion and how it will be presented. As the basic qualitative research will use social science theory, these theories will have a very strong influence on the resulting analysis. Therefore the analysis must take into consideration whether the theory used is say ethnographic (study of the social order with roots in social practice), heuristic inquiry (focuses on the intense human experiences) or hermeneutics (a theoretical framework for understanding meaning with special attention to purpose or context). In the thesis to be
written the emphasis will be on the intense human experiences, of the inquirer and that of the respondents their experience with corruption at local government level, a heuristic inquiry (Patton 2002).

The audience of the applied qualitative research will also influence the formulation of the analysis. If the recipients of the analysis are scholarly, the analysis will be judged by the standards of basic research. Should the recipients be politicians/policy makers the relevance, clarity, utility and applicability will be the most important criteria for judging the analysis and so forth. Here the recipients will be of the scholarly kind as it is going to be evaluated by examiners from an institute of higher learning (Patton 2002).

In scholarly qualitative research the published literature is aimed at focusing on the particular study of interest. This is usually on the subject that is an ongoing topic of interest to the particular scholarly community. This will therefore influence both the design and the analysis of the study. It is hoped that the research will be useful to say researchers in the field of development studies at HIA and try to put an interesting focus on my research (Patton 2002).

In action research reporting varies a great deal. In this research, the process is often the product and therefore the report will be produced for outside consumption. The rigor, duration and procedures of the analysis will vary depending on the study’s purpose and audience (Patton 2002). In this case for a master degree thesis, at HIA.

Analysis usually begins at the end of the data collection. Under collection/during the course of field work, ideas for the analysis of the data will crop up. We must allow for additional data collection during the course of field work, if it can improve the quality of the data collected and the quality of the analysis. In effect when data collection has formally ended the final analysis begins (Patton 2002).

There are two primary sources the investigator can draw from when organising the analysis (Patton 2002):-

1). “the questions we generated during the conceptual phase and design phases of the
study prior to the field work, and
2). Analytic insights and interpretations that emerged

During the analysis gaps or ambiguities can be found and then interviewees must be
contacted again to clarify and deepen responses or new observations need to make
(Patton 2002). This occurred when it was found that interview question number seven
had not been asked. The question had to be posed later while writing the thesis.

ii). Thick Description

A good description helps the reader to place him or herself in the setting being
described. These “thick descriptions” are rich, detailed and concrete descriptions of
people and places (Patton 2002). Here there cannot be a too detailed description of the
respondents because it can compromise their anonymity, which is undesirable here.
Lack of training and experience has made has given rise to some carelessness, field
notes were not kept, although the responses of the respondents were recorded down.
Labelling and organisation of data was, however, in order.

iii). Organising Data

One must keep an inventory of what data one has. Make sure field notes are complete.
Is the data complete? Is the data properly organised/labelled? Try and have a total
perspective (Patton 2002). In spite of inexperience the data has been organised and
labelled properly.

iv). Protecting Data

Do not leave it lying around so that someone might throw it away or someone steals it.
Make back-up copies of all data putting your master copy away. This original data is
unique, you will never get the same data again – the answers in an interview will never
be recaptured again. Obligations/promises of protection of confidentiality also make it
necessary to take care of data. Keep copies at different locations in case of destruction
or accident. Have a copy for safekeeping, hard-copy and diskette as well as on the PC

20
All transcripts were kept in a safe place, checking and re-checking all the time to ensure that everything is in place. The anonymity of the respondents has also been upheld, in that no one else gained access to the documents or were present during the interviews.

### 3.1.2 The Interview

The type of survey will be field interviews, without taped conversations as this is such a sensitive subject. The criterion for choice of respondents for the personal interviews is as follows:

1. Accessibility – this is a touchy that required me to interview childhood friends and school mates.

2. Knowledge - the interviewees must have worked/or have experience with/in the Sarawak district government level, that being the reason for me choosing those respondents for the interviews.

3. Experts/trained professions – respondents of the personal interview must have some form of formal educational background, my respondents have a formal educational background of at least a bachelors degree.

### 3.1.3 The Guided Interview (See appendix 2 for interview guide)

“The quality of the information obtained during an interview is largely dependant on the interviewer” (Patton 2002, 341). The questions have as best possible to be asked in the same way to get similar responses and an attempt has been made to pick up on any other factors that crop up, although some trivia was picked up too in the course of the interviews, due to a lack of training.

The interview questions will have an element of Klitgaard’s (1991) strategy issues and cultural of corruption perspective baked into the questions. They will also be guided by Elliot’s (1997) categories and types of corruption theory.
The interview here was a standardised open-ended interview. The questions were carefully worded before the interviewing takes place. The study used a fully structured interview instrument where the questions are completely specified. An effort was made to ensure that each interviewee got asked the same questions, in the same way and order. The data collected with this type of interview are still open-ended where by the respondents use their own words, thoughts and insights when answering the questions. The questions asked were the same for all respondents thus having to be carefully thought out beforehand (Patton 2002).

Since there might only be one chance to interview some of the interviewees so a highly focused, well thought out, questions guide was meat to keep the priorities of the interview in sight. To minimise interviewer effects, probes can be placed in the interview in appropriate places. “Quite simply, a probe is a follow-up question used to go deeper into the interviewee’s responses” (Patton 2002, 372). Not many probes were used as the required answers were quite obvious in the interview. It is easier to locate and compare the respondents’ answers with a standardised open-ended interview and thus making it a bit quicker to organise questions and answers that are similar (Patton 2002) and a comparison is done here of these answers that will come in the Chapter 4.

Patton (2002) gives four reasons to use standardised open-ended interviews (Patton 2002, 346):-

1). The exact instrument used in the evaluation is available for inspection by those who will use the findings in the study.

2). Variation among the interviewees can be minimized when a number of different interviewers must be used.

3). The interview is highly focused so that interviewee time is used efficiently.

4). Analysis is facilitated by making responses easy to find and compute.
3.1.4 Question Options

Open ended questions are those which are not followed by any sort of fixed choice. These are questions which are not followed by any specified choice which gives the respondent to answer the question in full (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2002). The emphasis here is to get to the thoughts of the individual and not to direct the respondent in any “desired direction”. These questions are usually applied to qualitative surveys. The interview will be preceded by the respondent answering a brief qualitative questionnaire to bring the respondent in the correct frame of mind for the interview (Patton 2002). The respondents of the interviews are also part of the qualitative questionnaire sample.

There are six kinds of questions that can be asked. By distinguishing these types’ questions the interviewer is forced to be clear about what he or she is asking. This in turn helps the interviewee to respond appropriately (Patton 2002, 347). The questions are:-

1). Experience and behaviour questions

These are questions about what the person has or has not done. In this case the appropriate questions would be if he or she has experienced/witnessed corruption. Not to ask if they have been involved in it. This would only be possible on an anonymous questionnaire (Patton 2002, 347). This was the case with the respondents of the interviews, which is they were asked what experience they had with corruption.

2). Opinion and Value Questions

Here we would like to understand the cognitive and interpretive processes of people. We can ask about their opinions, judgements and values. In this case an appropriate question was posed to the respondents of the interview and questionnaire, “Do you think that corruption is a bad thing and should be eradicated?” or “What is your opinion about corruption?” (Patton 2002, 347).

3). Feeling Questions
Here we distinguish emotional centres of the brain from the cognitive areas. Here we aim at eliciting emotions, responses from their feelings from experiences. “What do you feel about corruption in your country?” Here we are looking for adjective responses which indicate that the respondent is happy about the phenomenon, anxious about it, afraid of it, intimidated by it or confident about it and the like (Patton 2002, 347). This was also a question in the interviews and questionnaires.

4). Knowledge Questions

These are questions that try to extract the respondent’s factual information, we want to find out what the respondent knows. They were asked here: What types of corruption are present in the district government of Sarawak? Which officers are most corrupt or take the biggest bribes? (Patton 2002, 347). Again it should be emphasized that the respondents to both interviews and qualitative questionnaires had knowledge about corruption.

5). Sensory Questions

Here we wish to investigate the sensory apparatus of the respondent. We want to know what the respondent has seen touched and smelled. We can ask questions like: Did see the payment made to the District officer? Or: Have you seen officers receive payments or other types of bribes? (Patton 2002, 347). This question was considered too controversial by me so it was dropped, but it is obvious that they may have had some contact with it since they are familiar with that level of government.

6). Background/Demographic Questions

The answers to these questions are intended to help the interviewer to locate the respondents in relation to each other. The questions here are about the age, education, occupation and the like that are standard background questions,
about the respondents, that allow us to identify the characteristics of those being interviewed. We want to see here if there is any variation in the responses from respondents for certain age groups, or those with a certain level of education. There might be a consistency in some of the answers for those with similar backgrounds (Patton 2002, 347). This was not asked directly during the interview, because their qualifications were known, but in the qualitative questionnaire and the quantitative questionnaire, their have been asked their educational backgrounds.

3.1.5 The Time Frame of Questions

Here questions can be asked in the past present and future tense. It is appropriate here to ask questions about a specific point in time. Also we can ask about conditions before and after a certain event. Here we can for example ask: Has corruption increased or decreased after the implementation of the anti-corruption policies? The questions in the interview were asked about the conditions first before the new policies and then after the new policies.

3.1.6 Sequencing Questions

“No recipe for sequencing questions can or should exist, but the matrix of questions suggests some possibilities” (Patton 2002, 352). In this case the situation calls for corruption theory which is taken from Klitgaard (1991) and Elliot (1997). Their theories will be used to “build up” the questioning. Before the interview commenced the respondent will be given a short qualitative questionnaire. This put the respondent in the frame of mind to be able to answer interview questions on corruption by giving an orientation into the things that Klitgaard (1991) and Elliot (1997) are examining. The respondents have been given an experience or an activity that has been described to them so that their feelings and opinions can be extracted. Here we can use probes or specific questions after the questionnaire and the respondents should know roughly what we are asking about (Patton 2002). Again there was limited use of these types of questions.
3.1.7 A short comment on the interviewees

One of the interviewees had been an SAO and a DO, in Sarawak, one is an officer in a semi-government body and the third one a successful businessman. The latter two have had experience/dealings with district offices in Sarawak. The candidates were not aware each other being interviewed on this topic. Also it is doubtful that they are familiar with each other.

The interviews went on very well without hint of fear or stress. The venues for the interviews were chosen by the interviewees. One interview was done in a coffee shop, one at the place of business of one of the respondents and the last one at the home of that respondent. All these venues were familiar to me and I have frequented them before over the years. The interviews took about an hour to an hour and a half to complete.

All the respondents were highly educated, with a minimum of a Bachelors Degree. Before the interview they were asked to fill out a qualitative questionnaire. To get their minds to focus on the subject I wanted to investigate. They were then asked about the conditions existing before the new drive and then after.

3.1.8 The Interview Questions as used in the interview

The Interview questions will be presented here. They will be the guide for the cases that follow as the cases progress from question one to question seven.

Question one deals with the types and size of corruption before and after the new drive/new policies of the Malaysian government. "What have been the most prevalent forms of corruption at the levels of District Officer (DO), Senior Administrative Officer Level, Administrative Officer Level, Lower levels (Chief Clerks, Clerks and others).

The aim of question 2 is to find out the susceptibility of the various levels of government servants to carry out corrupt acts. It asks “Which of the above are most prone to corruption (or are all equally prone depending on the person in question
“Whether they all are equally prone to corruption or are equally corrupt”. There is another question posed as a follow up in question 2, which is “What do you think is the reason for this (corruption)”, can it be, for example, too low wages, greed, low morals or a misunderstanding of what corruption is, etc.

In question three the aim is to investigate the extent/seriousness of corruption in the areas of tenders, supply to the district councils. That is “Is corruption more serious in certain areas”. In tenders, for say maintenance jobs and transport service and for supply of goods and services without tenders.

Question 4 seeks to investigate if the private sector is the driving force of the corruption or trying to manipulate the government servants at a later date with their gifts. “Does the private sector exert pressure on the local government staff to try to get them to accept bribes to be able to manipulate them without bribes later?”

Question 5 is trying to ascertain that only the private sector is the corruptor or that the government servants are the initiative takers or whether both sectors have a share in the blame. “Do you think the private sector has been the motor in driving corruption in local districts?”

Question 6 attempts to see the effect that the corruption has had on the development of the local districts. To find out if the presence of this corruption has been beneficial of detrimental to the development. “Have these practices helped to promote the development of the local districts or have they hindered development and wasted public funds?”

Question 7 is an attempt to see if there is a relationship between culture perspectives, context and habitus are an influencing factor on what is acceptable or what corruption is. In addition to this it might be possible to find the possible remedies to corruption as seen by the people who live in the society being studied. “In a Malaysian context, what gifts, dinners or trips etc. should be considered acceptable and open, that can be given by a supplier, contractor or any other transaction which gives rise to a principal-agent relationship, i.e. the local government being the principal and the private sector being the agent.
3.1.9 The Qualitative Survey Questionnaires

The qualitative questionnaires were given to three others besides the three interviewees’ government servants, private sector employees, professionals etc.). This gave a total of six qualitative forms. The qualitative questions were used to place Malaysia in the categories as defined by Elliot (1997). They also identified what types of corruption were to be found in Malaysia.

This questionnaire could not be distributed at random because the questions were more sensitive than the quantitative questionnaire. The people asked had to be those with privileged knowledge and known to the interviewer so that they knew that their answers would not be misused. They were highly educated ranging from diploma holders to master degree graduates. This is a low number of respondents but they had to be selected from people who knew about the phenomenon of corruption and were able to answer difficult and very theoretically based questions.

That which was common for all was that they were pleased to have contributed. Good responses were received the relationship to the respondents, as they know that the interviewer does not have a hidden agenda.

3.1.10 The Quantitative Survey Questionnaires

The sample consisted of sixteen persons all of whom were chosen as they were encountered. These responses will be a support to the data collected by the qualitative questionnaires and the interviews. These forms were distributed randomly because the questions were of a general nature and were not so sensitive. The sample chosen was also very varied, students, professionals, old and young etc. Most of the respondents knew the distributor of the questionnaires but it was not planned out before hand that he or she was going to respond to the questionnaire. This data is used to add detail and depth to the study. The results will add credibility to the answers of the interviewees. This data can be analysed manually or by using a statistical analysis (Patton, 1990) with a statistical analysis program, in this case SPSS (in this case because of the limited number of responses the computer analysis will be dropped). “The quantitative data identify the areas of focus, the qualitative data give substance to those areas of
focus (Patton, 193, 1990). This data is a supplement to the qualitative data in this thesis.

3.1.11 The Sample

When it comes to the sample of the qualitative study there are no rules for the size of this type of sampling (Patton, 1990). The choice of respondents must be those that we can get the most information out of (Ryen, 2002), as is the case with my friends. Also when this information is hard to verify we can compare the interviews and have a “cross-case” or “cross-interview” analysis (Patton, 1990). There will, however, not be many interviewees because of the sensitive nature of the information coupled with a limited amount of time. Only those friends that can be comfortable with talking about the subject to the interviewer are chosen. In this case it will have to be childhood friends, who are now professionals or government officers, who know they can trust me not to go around telling about the sensitive information they gave me. They know that the interviewer also knows the context (Patton, 1990 & Staw, 1995) in which he is operating in, that is their culture. It is clear that culture (Patton, 1990 & Staw, 1995) decides what a group of people does and how they do it that is their “Habitus” (Swartz.1997). It was a strategy of the methods to be able to pick out a few that could answer “correctly” on the questions asked that the respondents were chosen. Had a random sample with a larger population been then accurate answers might not be obtained of the actual situation because of mistrust or insincerity.

3.1.12 Validity

“Am I measuring that which I want to measure?” (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002, 165). If the questions do not extract what is desired then our findings may be flawed (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002). In this case the study and surveys’ have been able to get the answers to the research questions were looking for with the questions that were devised.

Content validity

i). Face Validity – is concerned with the extent to which the researcher believes
that his instrument is appropriate (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002) – posing questions people who have worked in the local government of Sarawak in for many years should know what goes on there

ii). Sampling validity – do the statements, questions or indicators of the content of the instrument adequately represent the property being measured? (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2002). The employees of the Sarawak district government should fulfil this criterion.

3.1.13 Reliability

This is concerned with the measuring instrument, that it contains variable errors. That is the errors occur inconsistently from observation to observation for each attempt to measure a given unit. So because the measurement in social sciences is mainly indirect the measurements made will vary more greatly than when physical variables are measured (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002). The study and the surveys’ must minimise the effect here by the use of an interview guide and standardised qualitative questionnaire.

There are both advantages and disadvantages to the personal interview and some of these are taken up by Nachmias & Nachmias (2002). This is especially true in relation to the phenomenon that is to investigated. Although there is also a limited qualitative questionnaire, the information gathered from the interview should be richer and give us even more information. There have cropped up things from the interview that were never thought of, some more relevant than others. The actual level of government being studied was probably too low to be able to properly register incidences of grand corruption.

3.1.14 The Strengths of The research Methods of this Thesis

The qualitative approach here is desirable as it would be difficult to get sufficient or credible data with a purely quantitative approach. Here we can get the experiences of those who have first hand knowledge of the phenomenon. We do not go out and take a random sample of people and probably get an insufficient number that have the correct
knowledge to answer the questionnaires accurately, with a quantitative approach, as was the case since only sixteen responses were obtained. In addition to this given the limited time of the study, it was not possible to collect a satisfactory number of responses on a large scale, to be used as a sample of the population.

Due to the nature and sensitivity of the subject, and given time, the sample was not as large as could be desired. The total number of respondents of the interview was three. This has made the amount of data relatively small. This makes the analysis basis a bit limited. The respondents were all known to the interviewer and in that respect one might say the urge to please might be a damaging factor to the data also. They were, however, all well educated and experienced professionals and they have experience with research in their own studies so they will have had some degree of professionalism when answering the questions. In addition to this they are familiar with the local government of Sarawak, not only in their district but also in many parts of Sarawak. This is the strength that will be referred to if asked about the credibility and validity of my small sample. Firstly if the respondents were not known to by the interviewee it would not be able to ask the questions above. In any case if the respondents were willing to answer the questions. Again had they not known the interviewer maybe they could suspect a hidden agenda and they would not answer accurately at all.

It can be politically wise to use a personal interview because potential problems of legitimacy and credibility, when presenting the results of the survey to those who are going to use or are interested in the findings. When many interviewers are involved it will guide to know exactly what to ask and what not to ask. This reduces the problem of attacks later about questions that were not asked or asked in the wrong way. This allows us to know the limitations of the data in advance and give us time to discuss it in advance. Here we are trying to get a holistic (trying to understand the data as a whole) world view of a group of people. When we collect the same information from each individual “poses no credibility problem when each person is understood as a unique informant with a unique perspective” (Patton 2002, 347).

The personal interview allows great flexibility in the questioning process, and the greater the flexibility, the less structured the interview. In this case we have to
introduce some uniformity so that we can compare the answers of the interviewees (cross-interview comparisons) (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002). This is important when we have difficulties corroborating the data collected.

We can control the interview situation which is a major advantage of the personal interview, it gives the researcher greater control over the interviewing situation, than with other interview methods. We can ensure that the respondents answer the questions in the appropriate sequence or they answer certain questions before they are asked subsequent questions and we can also agree on an appropriate venue for the interview to get the most out of it (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002).

Collection of supplementary information in this case background information about the respondents’ personal characteristics and their environment that can help the researcher in interpreting the results. The information here will give us an insight into the repose of different age groups, gender, public servants or private sector workers and their number of years of work experience. This is useful my limited quantitative survey to show that sample was random and that all sorts were presented with the quantitative questionnaire and not just one group to relate it to the perceptions of the interviewees and the specific respondents of the qualitative survey. One can also get spontaneous reaction/information, over that which is expected, that can be used in the data analysis stage (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002).

The experience gained from the previous thesis has made it easier to carry out this study and survey even better, the last survey also being in Malaysia. This time around there is the added advantage of having studied the courses of Methods and Statistics and Evaluating and Qualitative Methods.

Having grown up with the respondents or having gone to school with some of them should make me less threatening, seen in another light the respondents feel threatened and not get the honest answers needed from the respondents.

The advantages of using secondary data stem mainly from methodical reasons. If this data is reliable and accurate it provides opportunities for replication. Research findings gain more credibility if they appear in a number of studies. Historical data allows the
researcher to compare similar data collected in the present, they are essentially doing a follow up of the original research. The secondary data analysis can also improve the measurement by expanding the scope of the independent variables being used in the operationalisation of concepts. Another advantage is that by using secondary data we can increase the sample size, its representativeness as well as the number of observations that can give us more complete generalisations. The last advantage here is that secondary data can be used for triangulation (corroborating data by comparing others findings) thus increasing the validity of the research findings we obtained with our primary data. The economic reasons for using secondary data are that it is much cheaper to use existing data than to collect new data (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002).

This is the design for thesis which is believed will give the best results. With the implementation of this plan it is hoped to have completed the thesis by the spring of 2006.

3.1.15 The Weaknesses of The Research Methods of this Thesis

The personal interview is costly, here in the respect that it costs to travel to Malaysia and requires time to interview the respondents. This is definitely the problem with this survey and is therefore done in conjunction with a holiday trip (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002). This is the only way the research can be done by timing this particular research to coincide with my holiday trip, which also has delayed the writing of the thesis.

The very flexibility that is the chief advantage of interviews leaves room for the interviewer’s personal influence and bias (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002). The interviewer effect can also influence the answers given by the respondent, positively or negatively, encourage one or the other type of response, consciously or unconsciously. This interviewer effect can also cause the respondents to try too hard to please the interviewer. It was felt, however, that there was no real problem with this as the interviewer was also familiar with the venues that they chose.

Another weakness of this form of interviewing is that we are not able to peruse topics that crop up when the interview was written. It also restricts the extent to which we
can inquire into individual differences and circumstances (Patton 2002). There were, however, not very large or many discrepancies in the responses of the interviewees.

Often the interviewer knows all or many of the potential respondents, which leaves little room for anonymity. In this study, however, it is the objective of the interview to use known subjects, to get reliable answers. If the respondents were strangers they would feel intimidated to answer questions about corruption (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002).

The challenge for me here is to weave the theories about corruption with the social science theories mentioned above to try to get a picture of what is actually happening in a different culture and context (Strand 2001 & Klitgaard 1991) challenges will be the validity of the actors in the measuring instrument, the interview, is kept to a maximum so that the reliability of my findings are as uniform as possible.

There are three problems when using secondary data. The first one is that there is that the researcher only approximates data that he or she would like to use for testing the hypothesis. There is a gap between the primary data the data the researcher collects personally and the data others have collected for other purposes. The second problem in using secondary data is that we might not have access to the data. With large volumes of data available in data archives, it can be difficult to find the data of interest with the variables the researcher wishes to study. Sometimes even the original investigator holds back the data he or she has collected. The third problem with secondary data is when the researcher has insufficient information on how the data was collected. We need to know how the data was collected to be able to determine the potential biases, errors or problems with internal or external validity (Nachmias & Nachmias 2002).

In Chapter 4 the empirical basis and the data collected will be processed and the findings presented. This chapter will also contain the answers to the research questions as supplied by the data collected by the interviews, qualitative questionnaires and quantitative questionnaires.
Chapter 4 Empirical Analysis

This Chapter should give the answers to the three research questions by using theory to identify the types of policies, types of corruption and the effects of the policies on the corruption that is present at the local government level.

Chapter 4 is divided into two sections, the first introducing the empirical basis and the second section gives the answers to the research questions. The secondary sources will be examined here, which are the documents below as well as the primary data. The primary data is that which has been collected by the sixteen quantitative questionnaires, the six qualitative questionnaires and the three interviews.

In the first section the types of anti-corruption strategies and policies the Malaysian Government to be identifies from the secondary sources we have identified below. The Empirical Basis her is a background to the Malaysian Government’s Anti-Corruption Policies and the Anti-Corruption Agency of Malaysia (ACA). This should give an insight into that we wish to investigate with the first research question: What are the types of anti-corruption corruption policies is the Malaysian Government using?

In the first part of this section the anti-corruption strategies and policies will be presented in the Malaysian Governments implementation project of the OECD Anti-Corruption Plan action plan against corruption as set out in their three pillars of action. This to present the present anti-corruption strategies of the Malaysian Government. A Summary of the survey on The Public Perception of Corruption in Malaysia that is Pillar III will follow the above. This survey is important because it can help to corroborate the findings of this thesis from parts of the data collected. The second part will be a brief examination of the Anti-Corruption Agency of Malaysia, based on its internet home page. This is the organisation trusted with the enforcing of the anti-corruption strategies of the Malaysian Government.

In the third part the anti-corruption strategies and policies will be examined with KLitgaard’s theory (1991) in the Malaysian Governments implementation project of the OECD Anti-Corruption Plan action plan against corruption as set out in their three pillars of action. This to find out the types
In the fourth part of the chapter the types of corruption will be identified with Elliot’s (1997) theory will be used to categorise the types of and extent of corruption in Malaysia. With this we can investigate the second research question: What types of corruption are present in the state government of Sarawak? This data will be extracted from the qualitative survey and the interviews.

Then the comparison of interviews will be presented. This is to find out what effects the anti-corruption policy of the Malaysian Government has had on the corruption on the local government level. This to facilitate the answering of the third research question: What have been the effects of the anti-corruption policies on the local district government of Sarawak?

The second section of the chapter will be looking at the answers to the three research questions that have been exposed/suggested by the findings of the surveys’ and interviews. This will be followed by a brief conclusion.

4.1 The Identification of data on the Present Anti-Corruption Strategies of the Malaysian Government

The following is taken from the OECD website Anti Corruption Action Plan for Asia and The Pacific. It outlines the policies and strategies of the Malaysian Government. It also gives the comments of the OECD on the various pillars of implementation. We will use the findings of the survey carried out by the ACA and the National University of Malaysia (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM)) as empirical basis for research. The ACA and UKM have carried out a survey on the perception of the Malaysian society towards corruption, the sample being 7,000 Malaysians (Anti Corruption Plan for Asia and the Pacific).

4.1.1 The Anti-Corruption Action Plan For Asia And The Pacific

The Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific is the Initiative's main instrument. It defines the participating countries' objectives in build sustainable legal and institutional frameworks to fight corruption. The Implementation Plan, an integral part of the Action Plan, determines the approach to put these goals into practice.

The Action Plan has been agreed upon at the 3 rd annual ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption
Conference for Asia Pacific in December 2000. Today, 25 countries of the region have formally endorsed the Action Plan and committed to its goals. Each of these countries has assigned a contact person to coordinate the reform process under the Plan and to participate in the Initiative's Steering Group meetings.

At the end of 2003, the first implementation cycle has ended. Most countries have accomplished the reform projects they had planned, and have assessed their implementation. The second implementation cycle has been launched at the Steering Group's fifth meeting in July 2004.” (© OECD Anti-Corruption Division, 2004, updated 02 March 2006, Front Page)

The above plan was conceived by the nations that met in Manila Conference in October 1999 and subsequently at the Seoul Conference in December 2000. It has been conceived to combat what is considered to be a widespread phenomenon that undermines good governance, erodes the rule of law, dampens economic growth as well as efforts to reduce poverty and distorts competitive business conditions. Acknowledgement of the problem is an important first step to tackling the problem and therefore all the countries had to come with a statement of endorsement for the plan.

To meet these objectives the participating governments in the region will undertake concrete steps by following three pillars of action that will be supported by the ABD, OECD as well as the other donor organisations and countries. The three pillars are;

Pillar 1 - Developing effective and transparent systems for public service
Pillar 2 – Strengthening Anti-Bribery Actions and Promoting Integrity in Business Operations
Pillar 3 – Supporting Active Public Involvement
(© OECD Anti-Corruption Division, 2004, updated 02 March 2006, Front Page)

This is the criteria that the Malaysian implementation project has followed.

1. Pillar I Letter of Undertaking by Public Officials

1) The summary

This pillar is the action to make all the civil servants of Malaysia sign a letter
of undertaking. The aim of this pillar is “To ensure the ethical and administrative codes of conduct in the public and private sectors are applied and adhered to” (OECD Anti-Corruption Division 2004, 1 http://www1.oecd.org/daf/asiacom/AP/Malaysia.htm). The implementing authority is the Public Service Department (PSD) of Malaysia. The contact person is the Director General of the above said department. The intention is that all the government employees, who include members of the administration are to sign this document, there are some 950,000 of them. There is an effort here to gain both political and public support for the measures. That is by getting the declarations of the government servants that they are behind the efforts of the government in their efforts to fight corruption. This also indicates that the government makes it its main mission to eradicate corruption in the civil service. This mass signature taking also gives rise to awareness that there is a campaign against corruption (Klitgaard, 1991).

2. Conceptual Framework

To begin with it was also made compulsory for the lecturers and undergraduates to sign the document so that they would not poison the minds of the students against the government. Eventually it was necessary to extend the practice to all the government employees. This project is part of a broader reform effort by the government to create awareness amongst the government employees to carry out heir duties in a professional manner. This coincides with Klitgaard’s (1991) second and third strategy of creating anti-corruption policies, cultivating political and public support from their policies.

3: Project Details

3.1 Objectives of the project

The target date to get the 950,000 government the servants to sign the letter of intention was March 30 2002. Failure to do so would result in disciplinary action in accordance with the Public Officers (Conduct and
Discipline) Regulations 1993. This to emphasize the importance of the government servants carrying out their duties professionally.

Here we have elements of the strategies from Klitgaard (1991), implicit to break the culture of corruption in the civil service. Her there are enforcement measures to get the government servants to comply with the governments efforts to fight corruption.

3.2 Main components of the project

The violations stipulated in this agreement are; abetting the countries enemies, leaking government secrets, belittling government policies and actions, misusing government vehicles and doing personal/family business during office hours. Not going on leave when the services of the government servants are needed, neglecting to report offences committed by subordinates, getting into heavy debts, delaying issuing of licences, and verbally abusing the public when they seek counter service.

Public duties of the government servants must not take second place behind their private interest and must not conduct their private interests so that they conflict with their public duties, they must not conduct themselves in a way that will bring the public services in disrepute and not to resort to insubordinate acts or act in such a manner that they can be suspected of being insubordinate.

We have here a strategy to create a culture against corruption, to define what is acceptable and not acceptable when conducting their duties. These restrictions give a guideline in the strategies of Klitgaard (1991), to break the culture of corruption.

3.3 Results/Expected outcomes
To avoid that people will feel left out by the government and rulers that lead them and the system they live in, the government must ensure that people has the opportunity to prosper economically. Here there are elements of setting and context (Strand, 2001). Also ensure that the society feels confident that they can voice their grievances without fearing prosecution. Her we have elements of implementing anti-corruption strategies in practice (Klitgaard, 1991). This can only be done if the country has an efficient and credible civil service.

4. Action Plan

The ACA has undertaken major steps to supplement the government project as follows: (According to Klitgaard (1991), this is an ostensible issue/strategy issue in his first strategy of creating anti-corruption policies)
In section 8 of the Anti-Corruption Act 1997, it provides that:

“It shall be the duty of the Director General and the officers of the Agency to -

(This can be construed to be the missionary statement of ACA as in Klitgaard’s 6th strategy of creating anti-corruption policies.)

a). receive any report of the commission of an offence under this Act and investigate such reports as the Director General or officers consider practicable.

b). detect and investigate

i). Any suspected offence under this act
ii). Any suspected attempt to commit any offence under this Act; and
iii). Any suspected conspiracy to commit any offence under this Act

c). examine the practices, system and procedures of public bodies in order to facilitate the discovery of offences under this Act and to secure the revision of
such practices, systems or procedures as in the opinion of the Director General may be conductive to corruption,

d). instruct, advise and assist any person, on the latter’s request, on ways to in which corruption may be eliminated by such person;

e). advise heads of public bodies of any changes in practices, systems or procedures compatible the effective discharge of he duties of the public bodies as the Director General thinks necessary to reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of corruption;

f). educate the public against corruption; and

g). enlist and foster public support in combating corruption.

These steps here are an effort to be able to break the culture of corruption (Klitgaard, 1991). It gives the climate of trust needed to allow whistle blowers to be able report the corrupt activities of civil servants without fear of reprisals or exposure and given rewards for their actions.

To provide the necessary logistic and mechanism to implement the above laws, the Anti Corruption Agency Malaysia has taken the following steps:
The Communication & Education Division of the Anti Corruption Agency (ACA) Malaysia is responsible for educating the public about the evils of corruption besides enlisting and harnessing support of the ACA as prescribed by section 8 of the Anti Corruption Act 1997.

The objective and role of the Communication & Education Division is to:
Establish a corruption-free society by promoting public awareness of the ACA’s efforts through mass-media and educational institutions, emphasising on in-depth preventive measures against corruption through personal contact with the public.
- Disseminate information on evils of corruption with the view of instilling abhorrence towards the scourge in the minds of the general public.
- Establish a cordial relationship with the public so as to increase public
confidence and support in the fight against corruption.
- Examine the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies so as to enable the identification of areas within the system, which are prone and vulnerable to corrupt practices or abuse of power.

- Submit, upon analysing the input, of proposals and recommendations on methods of fortifying these inherent weak points against corruption and thereby close all opportunities and avenues of corruption and misuse of power in the public body.

These actions here coincide with the strategic issues of Klitgaard. They are also in line with the notions of getting political and public support.

Assessment by the Steering Group

The Steering Group noted Malaysia’s efforts to have an efficient and credible civil service. However, the group raised concerns as to possible conflicts between the content of the letter and the principle of freedom of speech. The representative from Malaysia replied that there was no conflict between the content of the "Letter of Undertaking" and the principle of freedom of speech. The Steering Group requested Malaysia to report to the next Steering Group Meeting on the application of the letter’s content, the enforcement of disciplinary actions against violations of the agreement, and on follow up work undertaken by the Integrity Committees of the Malaysian civil service. (2nd Action Plan Steering Group Meeting, Manila, 27-28 May 2002)

There are issues here of democracy and the protection of the individuals rights. It is a trade-off between obedience and the right of the individual to voice his/her opinions. There is also the issue her that progressively going over to democracy is better as it is impossible to switch over from authoritarian rule at the “flip of a switch”. The largest trade-off here is that of having a controlled and orderly “conversion” to democracy or a radical violent and anarchistic change over a shorter period of time. There is also an issue here of the culture
which the strategies are to be implemented. Here there is an Asian tradition for a collective way of doing things and this might mean that the right of society as a whole take priority over the individuals rights. Here we find allowances for different cultures (Strand 2001 ard Klitgaard, 1991) and their habitus (Swartz, 1997).

2. Pillar II Legislative Measures Against Corruption

1). The Summary

The government wishes to adopt a more proactive approach to enforce strategy as well as enhance efforts of tracing and receiving of proceeds of corruption by keeping this legislation under review all the time to be able to further improve it and increase deterrence.

The implementing authority is the Anti-Corruption Agency of Malaysia, with its Director General as the contact person. The office of the Attorney General is also responsible for this implementation, the Attorney General being the contact person. We have here ostensible issues (Klitgaard, 1991) in fighting corruption, deciding on who will lead the charge in Malaysia’s war on corruption. In addition to this, this pillar allows for the reviewing of legislation from time to time to improve its effect.

2. The Constitutional Framework

A new law was enacted by the Malaysian Government to strengthen this new drive against corruption. The Ant-Corruption Act (Act 575) was passed by the Malaysian parliament in 1997 and came into force 8 th January 1998. This replaced the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1982.

To prevent culprits from escaping investigation and getting away with the money from corruption abroad, the Malaysian Parliament has passed an Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 that came into force on 15 th January 2002. On top of this the Parliament has scheduled to table the Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters bill in March 2002. These two new laws are to be enacted to conform to international standard and guidelines. Here also there are the practical aspects of fighting corruption (Klitgaard, 1991) in the country.

3. Project Details

The details of the legislation are presented here.

3.1 Objectives of the project

The Anti-Money Laundering Act 2001 is designed to curb the laundering of money internationally. It is to prevent money laundering and for the detection and prosecution of money laundering. It also gives power to seize and confiscate property derived from money laundering.

The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Legislation Matters Bill opens for mutual assistance in criminal matters between Malaysia and other countries. Here we have an important strategic issue (Klitgaard, 1991), that allows for the mobilisation of allies in the fight against corruption by getting assistance of other countries to hunt down ill-gotten gains from Malaysia.

3.2 The Main components of the project

The aim of the Anti-Money Laundering Act is to protect the informers from prosecution and civil liability. It also makes it obligatory for financial institutions to report to the relevant authority any financial transaction exceeding a specific amount and any suspicious transactions. It also gives investigating and powers to seize and forfeit the property of anyone suspected of committing a money laundering offence. The strategic issue here is in identifying the possible ways that the perpetrators can evade detection (Klitgaard, 1991) by “financial acrobatics”.

44
The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill gives powers to give assistance in international criminal matters to trace, recover or confiscate property where there is a serious offence committed or where there is a foreign serious offence committed. It also provides assistance for the location of or identifying of witnesses and suspects. In addition it gives powers for the service of process and enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders. As above this legislation allows for various ways of dealing with offences that have a connection with other countries.

3.3 Results/Expected outcomes

The result that is intended with the three laws above is that the Anti-Corruption Agency will achieve its goal of reducing corruption. The reason is that if this is the case there will be benefits to the nation. The notion of corruption wasting resources and retarding development is obviously used here.

4). Scope/Duration

The investigators and prosecutors will be given the benefit of specialised training, mainly in accounting and information systems at the local and international level. This is to help them get better at detecting and stopping corruption. It is also intended that the bilateral cooperation between Malaysia and other countries, enhancing their mechanisms of mutual legal assistance in criminal and corruption matters. The Mutual Assistance in Criminal matters bill is expected to come into force by August 2002.

More skills will help break down the culture of corruption by being able to identify the various methods that the offenders use to hide their embezzled fortunes. The improvements of the mechanisms to facilitate the using of allies in the international movement of proceeds derived from corruption are all strategic issues (Klitgaard, 1991).
5). Required inputs and budget

To achieve the objectives of this pillar outside assistance will be required. This assistance will be in the form of input and training in a specialised subject for the investigators and prosecutors that will be enforcing the laws.

Assessment of the Steering Group

The additional effort of the Malaysian government to prevent and combat money laundering and the improvement of bilateral cooperation in criminal matters has been acknowledged by the Steering Group. They also encouraged Malaysia to have continuous cooperation with the Asia Pacific Group in preventing and combating money laundering and they will follow on the enforcement of the new laws.

3. Pillar III Increasing Cooperation with NGO’s

1). The Summary

The project carries the title “Perception of the Malaysian Society Towards Corruption”, carried out in a national survey, to be able to get a better perception of the public opinion on corruption in Malaysia. The implementing institutions are the ACA, with the Director General in as the contact person and the National University of Malaysia (UKM) as the consultant. The final report of this survey expected to be completed by September 2002. A budget of US$ 100,000 has been allocated with a sample of 7,000 people. This survey seems to be aimed at gauging the perception of the countries people towards corruption and possibly the extent of the culture of corruption in the society (Klitgaard, 1991). The survey will be assessed later on and used as a control for the survey carried out for this paper to see if there is a similar conclusion to the finds or not.

2). Contextual Framework
The Anti-Corruption Agency of Malaysia initiated this survey, to be conducted by a local university (UKM). This survey aims to acquire a clearer understanding of the society’s perception of corruption.

3). Project Details

3.1 Objectives of the project

The survey is designed to assist the Government to measure the rate of corruption as well as to analyse the major forms and causes of corruption in Malaysia. The purpose of this survey is to facilitate the development of an effective anti-corruption strategy. This has to do with the strategic issues (Klitgaard, 1991), to find out what corruption there is and how to combat it.

3.2 Main components of the project

The aim of the national corruption perception survey is to trace and identify the factors that influence the society’s perception of the rate and forms of corruption in Malaysia. This appears to be an effort to identify the acceptance or rejection levels of the society towards corruption (the culture of corruption) and to identify the strategic issues of how to fight corruption (Klitgaard, 1991).

3.3 Results/Expected outcomes

The aim of the project is to gain a better understanding of the society’s perception of corruption and how the Malaysian society gets information about corruption. On top of this the Government expects to be able to measure the rate and analyse the causes of corruption in Malaysia and to identify necessary counter measures, also as an effort to identify ostensible issues (Klitgaard, 1991).

Assessment by the Steering Group

The efforts of Malaysia to raise the awareness of the society about corruption in society and to take into account the views of the civil society for the development of
coherent policies has been welcomed by The Steering Group. The consideration of the views of civil society here will reflect the context and setting (Strand, 2001) they see the problem of corruption as well as reflecting the habitus (Swartz, 1997) that has evolved in the society. The survey was also useful in dispelling any existing myths about corruption and to identify the key problems related to corruption. The Steering Group encouraged the publishing of the survey because by doing so the general public are able to gain knowledge about the perceived problems.

4.1.2 Summary of The Survey on The Public Perception of Corruption in Malaysia

This is the first study of its kind in Malaysia to investigate the perception of the people of Malaysia towards corruption. In addition to try to assess the level of corruption in various sectors, identify attitudes, values, readiness and willingness of the Malaysian people to fight corruption. It is also meant as a basis to formulate plans to fight corruption and to push forward an anti-corruption agenda.

The survey set as a target for itself to adhere to a number of factors to ensure the success of the survey in contributing to reforms in fighting corruption. For example it sets forth clear and realizable objectives, a good theoretical framework, operationalisable definitions of key concepts and the like. To achieve success the coordination and support from agencies such as the ACA as well as strong political support from the government are all extremely critical in ensuring the success of the reform process to follow.

The survey was conducted from October 2001 until March 2002, using a set of structured questionnaires with both closed and open-ended questions. The aim was to capture the attitudes, values, knowledge and experience of corruption as well as the willingness and readiness to fight corruption. There were a specific number of identified agencies and companies identified as targets for the survey. The survey also the qualitative method of in-depth interviews to enrich the survey data as well as focus group discussions. Secondary data on socioeconomic, demographic and other variables was also obtained.

The sampling method was a quota stratification multi-stage sampling method. This was to take into consideration important variables like ethnicity, gender age, area of residence (urban-rural), as well as the areas where the targeted respondents originated from. To meet the
objectives of the study only those aged 21 and above were used as respondents in the study. The target sample was 7,000 but in reality the actual surveyed sample was larger than this. The sample covered a wide spectrum of professions in the private sector and the public sector. Respondents from the political parties were taken from both government and opposition parties and the sample from the NGO’s was taken from the major NGO’s in the country.

The research team consisted of a group of over 200 people. Two senior development sociologists, two criminologists and one psychologist who was an expert on methodology and statistical analysis. It also employed two graduate students as research assistants and four field supervisors that were also graduate students the rest were 280 trained enumerators that were university students.

This survey is a very good basis to compare the data collected by my limited survey in Malaysia in July 2005. The findings here will either support or disprove my findings because it is such a large sample, covering people of all walks of life and professions. The data here can be compared to my interviews and questionnaires, to see whether there is any correlation to this data.

As such the Survey On The Opinion of Malaysians on corruption has such a large sample its findings are more accurate and therefore a better basis for investigating the phenomenon. This can strengthen or weaken hypothesis of this thesis.

I might add that while I was conducting my survey I was unaware of the survey on the Perception of the Malaysian Society Towards Corruption. My survey was carried out in July 2005, but I only gained knowledge of the national survey in March 2006.

4.1.3 The Anti Corruption Agency of Malaysia

The Anti-Corruption Agency of Malaysia (ACA) is a must as a reference for this paper because it has done a lot of studies regarding corruption in Malaysia. It is therefore a secondary source for the thesis, as it it sure to have also studied the phenomenon being investigated by this thesis.

The ACA began its formal operations on 1st October 1967. But with the passing of the
National Bureau of Investigation Act, 1973, it was legally named as The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The change of name was necessary in line with the widening of its scope. The NBI did not only confine itself to the investigation of corruption cases but also to cases of national interest, for example, syndicated gambling, smuggling; serious criminal breach of trust, organised fraud etc. However, the name NBI was reverted to ACA when the Anti-Corruption Agency Act, 1982 was passed by Parliament on 13th May, 1982. The reason for the reversion was to reflect the actual function of this agency, that is, as an agency whose main function is the prevention of corruption.” (ACA of Malaysia Home Page, 2005).

"The Anti-Corruption Agency of Malaysia derives its power from the Anti-Corruption Act, 1997" (ACA of Malaysia Home Page, 2005). These powers are anchored in the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 22, 1970, the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Registration of Criminals and Undesirable Persons Act, 1969. Today the ACA is directly responsible to the Prime Minister of Malaysia (ACA of Malaysia Home Page, 2005). The ACA was created a federal body and therefore fights corruption in the whole country, in each and every state.

4.1.4 The data from the questionnaires and the interviews gives us information on the types of corruption that are present in Malaysia and the effects of the Malaysian Governments Anti-corruption Policies

The main research data comes from the sixteen quantitative questionnaires, six qualitative questionnaires and the three interviews. The purpose was to have three interviews is to do a cross-comparison. To add to the data, a qualitative and a quantitative questionnaire were distributed. The quantitative data is to be used to support the information in the interviews well as some more qualitative data from the qualitative questionnaires.

The empirical data collected from the various sources will be compared and analysed.

4.1.5 The data developed from the Three Interviews/informants that shed light on types of corruption at the Local Government Level in Malaysia and the Effects of the Malaysian Government’s Anti-Corruption Strategies on the corruption at this level

The raw data from the interviews has been written out into to make them more readable and
make it easier to compare them (Patton, 1990). It is an attempt to give a thicker description (Patton, 1990) to give clarity and to be understood by other readers. These give information for the case which is the Study of Corruption at the Local Government Level in Sarawak. The interviews are those undergone with the three professionals who had a minimum of a bachelors degree and had a either worked in the local government or were familiar with the district government operations. One of the respondents was a high government servant that has been Administrative Officer, Senior Administrative Officer and Assistant District Officer and also District Officer. Another was a senior management level semi-government officer and the last one was a successful business man working in the district were the case was set.

j) Data from Interview 1

In general the respondent says that the higher the rank of the officer the higher the tips, when they occur. In general the cultural thinking on corruption is too stringent. People look down on all gifts to people in government. The findings of the study here revealed that the occurrence of grand corruption at this level of government is very unlikely as the value of the tenders, contracts are not very high.

Corruption at the District Officer (DO) level is of the petty kind as the amounts are not that large. The respondent talks about “tea money” or “Kopi “O”” (translated as coffee without sugar) as referred to locally, small amounts of money being paid to these officers. Speed money is paid at the rate of 1 – 2 % of the project, supply or tender. It seems that in any case the corruption is not really widespread or prevalent. When it comes to extortion is not present because people would complain.

At the Senior Administrative Officer Level there is even less corruption and it is petty. The corruption is mainly on the supply of goods, from small scale suppliers. Again there is not a large amount of corruption either. This is because this is consistent with the officer being at a very low level of the local government.

At the level of Administrative Officer the corruption is even less. Here the corruption is at a minimum, less than above again.
At the lower levels (Chief Clerks, Clerks and others), corruption seems to be nearly non-existent. Here it is limited to very small amounts at the Chief Clerk level.

The respondent says it takes time for the government policy to take effect and as yet has not really taken effect in this sector. That is the result of the new drive/new policies of the Malaysian government have not effected corruption levels here as yet. The court system is weak, however, given time it will make the new policies felt here too. An interesting observation here is that women are less corrupt than men, in fact they do not seem to solicit bribes at all.

The size of corruption depends on their level of power. The respondent says that if an officer has attained a super scale A pay scale (around M$ 3,000 to $ 4,000 around USD 800 – USD 1,000) with the government service the motive is greed.

At the District Officer level there are three main reasons for corruption, low wages, giver wants to maintain a good relationship with the DO and it is a part of the culture of sharing in the Malaysian society.

As for the Senior Administrative Officer, low wages are the main reason for the acceptance of corruption. This is also the reason why the Administrative Officer will take bribes when he does. The lower levels (Chief Clerks, Clerks and others), have also the reason of low wages.

Again the respondent insists that the government servants do not take many bribes at this level (no indication given about levels higher up). In general religious convictions restrict corruption. Most districts are small and therefore the people know each other.

The types of methods used to secure contracts with the private sector also give rise to more or less corruption. Negotiated tenders are vulnerable in their implementation stages by under declaring. Open tenders are not prone to these types of corruption. Maintenance tenders are also vulnerable by the misuse of variation orders, adding unnecessary work. The supply of transport services are also vulnerable to corruption, here the deviation can be over claiming transport miles.
The supply of goods and services without tenders are also vulnerable. When supplying, there can be short deliveries, say supply 8 books instead of 10, and or mark up of price.

N.B. The corruption to be found here is still petty at these levels. It is a small community and people will talk if it gets too obvious. This is due to the size of the districts. The businesses pressure the local government to get influence. They do this by buying influence to be able to get contracts. Bribing to be able to manipulate the government staff later. The businessmen give gifts that make the government officer feel bound because of cultural norms and cultural politeness. Both the private and government sectors are responsible for the corruption that occurs, when it occurs. They all have a role in it.

In the case of the contribution of this corruption to the development of the local districts the answer here is both yes and no. Yes because the development goes a bit faster but at the expense of quality. No because it is suboptimal, reducing quality and some leakages and wastage occurs.

ii) Data from Interview 2

The respondent is of the opinion her that all entertainment is looked down upon. A meal given by a supplier at the time of presentation by the supplier is unacceptable, even though it is relevant during the presentation of the supply of work or service. He does say, however that corruption occurs. He is not in agreement with the statement “America is the lonely Boy Scout” against corruption, Americans also pay bribes in their business dealings.

In the case of grand corruption the amounts do not permit corruption on the grand scale, although at one level he thinks it occurs, even though it is scarce.

Regarding corruption at the District Officer (DO) level grand corruption is deemed to be none or seldom occurs. Where there have been cases of this type of corruption at this level the new policies have reduced it, in the rural and urban areas. The occurrence of this type of corruption has been more prevalent in the urban areas than in the rural areas.
Petty corruption also occurs on a smaller scale in rural areas and occurs somewhat more in urban areas. This type of corruption appears to be quite minor in both areas. There has been no effect so far on these corrupt occurrences as a result of the new anti-corruption policies.

Speed money follows the same trend as above by being more widespread and more prevalent in the urban areas than in the rural areas, but still is not so serious in both areas. So far there does not seem to a reduction in this type of corruption as a result of the new anti-corruption policies.

There is very little or seldom any type of extortion.

Grand corruption at this level Senior Administrative Officer (SAO) level occurs only in the instances there is a single supplier. Petty corruption and speed money also occur here as with the DO level. The amount of corruption here is not so great and less than that at the DO level. There seems to be not effect on the corruption here as a result of the new policies. At this level there are no instances of extortion.

Corruption at the Administrative Officer (AO) level and at the Chief Clerk, Clerk and lower levels, is even less than the previous level. The corruption here is minimal and the amounts involved are minimal.

All the different levels of government officers are equally prone to corruption at their various amounts or types.

The District Officer is prone to corruption because of greed, low morals, low wages, and/or misunderstanding of what corruption is. The reasons for corruption at the Senior Administrative Officer level and the Administrative Officer level same as above. At the lower levels (Chief Clerks, Clerks etc) can have the same reasons as above but the biggest reason is low income.

Regarding tenders for supply tenders there is seldom corruption for open tenders and this is true for before and after the tender is won. In the case of maintenance jobs, they are more susceptible, with tenders/contracts being given to the friends of the officer in
question. When it comes to transport services they are also susceptible and end up with the “friends” of the issuing officers. For the supply of goods and services without tenders, these are the most prone to corruption, they are given to friends and relatives

The respondent is of the opinion that the private sector does not exert pressure on the government staff to get them to accept bribes. The businessmen “get in” via their connections, implying voluntary recruitment to the businessmen’s willingness to pay bribes.

The private sector has been the motor driving corruption in the local districts, because they are ready to give, rather than they are requested to give. The above implies that they are both responsible for that corruption which exists as there is a willingness on both sides to go into corrupt deals.

Yes these practices have helped promote development because they have ensured smooth implementation of projects. The respondent here implies a positive effect of the corruption, being a contributor to the development of the country, a kind of greasing of the wheels of development.

In general there is a conception that all types of gifts, tips, dinners and other entertainment are theoretically unacceptable. The respondent indicates, however, that in practice the application of the law is flexible enough. Dinners and so forth are frowned upon, but if it is in conjunction with the completion of a project then it is acceptable but there will not be any publicity around it. Family day outings for the government staff can be funded by private sector companies and although are not given publicity they are accepted. When contractors want to present their work, say in other districts, the committees, engineers etc. can go to the sites of these companies activities sponsored by the company in question, that wants to prove that it can do the job or supply. This acceptance of entertainment and sponsoring here is in a Malaysian context and seems to use the logic that if the trip or dinner is connected to the working out of the project details and to the qualifying of contractors for works to be done, it is acceptable but not to make a big fuss out of it. If the dinner/entertainment, trip or whatever has no connection with any specific project/supply then the incident is deemed to be bribery and then can be reported.
The respondent says that western ideas are not acceptable for everything, proceedings are carried out in a local context and the west cannot think that it has the right solutions for everything. Malaysia has cast its own die that it is to use in its way forward.

iii) Data from Interview 3

The respondent was eager to point out a generation gap to me. His generation, the new guard, wants to implement change as soon as possible, where as the old guard was more cautious and slower to institute change. The older generation has a problem to adopt new approaches and therefore prefer to continue old practices. This has lead to problems synchronising efforts of change because of this difference of pace. This makes achieving goals together difficult. I assume here that he refers also to the corruption strategies and how too implement them. He did not elaborate on this and at the time I did not realise that I did not ask about this.

The definition of corruption, in his opinion is too stringent. Lunches are looked down upon as well as gifts. This entertainment therefore goes on discretely. He describes women, however, as more honest and law abiding. I got the impression that it was in all instances and not just at the level being studied. The new generation (i.e. men and women) has been groomed not to accept corruption.

At the District Officer (DO) Level, the study of grand corruption is not really applicable. This is because the value of the projects and supplies are not that great, due to their limited authority. This holds true for both urban and rural districts. The effects of the policies of the government here have been minimal.

The payment of speed money occurs but is not prevalent. The new anti-corruption drive does not have any effect here either.

Extortion is usually only used when the supplier does not complete his delivery or does not deliver, a no cure no pay system. Here the respondent means that it is only used as a deterrent if the supplier of the goods or service does not deliver that which is expected. The policies seem to be irrelevant here.
There is some corruption at the Senior Administrative Officer level, but is limited. The corruption here is mostly petty although speed money is also paid. Again extortion seems non existent. The case is the same for both rural and urban areas, the same amounts of corruption, if any, are the same. The anti-corruption drive has not had any effect on the corruption here, in the urban or rural areas.

At the levels of Administrative Officers (AO), Chief Clerks and Clerks is similar except that the corrupt payments are decreasing in amount and frequency. Petty corruption is most prevalent here but it is limited to small amounts. This also has to do with decreasing authority and power. Here the conditions are the same for the urban and rural areas and the new drive of the government does not have much effect here.

The officers in the local government are equally prone at the different levels, to some form of corruption or other in the event that it occurs.

The District Officer, because of the status of a DO creates social pressures (a cultural aspect), they need to show their status and this costs. There might not be enough compensation in their salaries to satisfy certain expectations from the public, these can be say too low allowances for the feast after the fasting month (in the case of Muslims) or Chinese New Year in the case of practicing Chinese of their traditions and culture.

The SAO’s and the AO’s have a similar social pressure but at a lower level and costs although some what less. For the lower levels, Chief Clerks, Clerks and others, the reason for trying to get corruption monies are too low wages.

With tenders the seriousness of corruption depends on the amount. For large contracts businessmen will allocate more entertainment/lobbying money. It also depends on the business practice of established companies. This is also true for tenders to supply, tenders for maintenance jobs and for transport tenders.

In the case of supply of goods and services without tenders it is the same as for the above it depends on the amounts involved. Larger amounts will lead to larger bribes when they occur.
The actors in the private sector can be influenced by the public sector actors if they get involved in the private sector. The private sector will therefore exert pressure to manipulate the system and the law. This is something practiced by the private sector. The private sector has in a way been a driving factor in the corruption in the local districts. Pressure to get the contracts by the private sector on the district office make both contribute to this problem.

Trust between the two parties, not necessarily other motives, e.g. the contractor doing the job and the district office, deal with each other on the basis that the contractor delivers that which is requested. These good experiences with the contractor and confidence in them handling the job. The district office does not dare let others do the job because of the good relationship with the contractor or contractors. This is another type of situation, where this arises it is not really corruption but a two way arrangement to satisfy each parties needs. Although there might be cases where the private sector buys its first contract to show that it is reliable.

The effects of these practices have helped to promote the development of the local districts when the supplier/contractor is efficient. They waste public funds when the contractor/supplier is inefficient. The corruption affects the quality of the development but not the speed/rate. Everything is based on allocation, used properly or not, i.e. max use for the public sector.

4.1.6 Conclusion

The main problems with my findings are that there is a relatively small amount of data to analyse. The number of people surveyed was small as well the number of interviews being only three. The practical running of the local government is also not a day to day event that people in general are exposed to and if asked people at large would not really know what to ask anyway. So by talking to people who were familiar with this level of government gives a better picture of the events taking place in the District Government of Sarawak. Apart from the sample being a bit small the method of interviewing people that had local knowledge and knowledge of the running of the local government in Sarawak was the best way to get the necessary data.
The interviews indicate that the anti-corruption policies of the Malaysian Government do not have any effects on corruption at the local government level. The corruption they identified here, however, was of the petty kind, speed money and the like. The respondents expressed the opinion that this level of government did not make it possible to talk of grand corruption, because of the relatively low level of the values of tenders, supplies, contracts etc.

4.2 The Answers to the research questions

In this section the answers to the research questions are taken out of the findings, using corruption theory to help us find these answers in the secondary and primary data.

4.2.1 Answer Research Question 1: “What are the types of anti-corruption corruption policies is the Malaysian Government using?”

Here I will try to extract the strategies and anti-corruption methods that the Malaysian Government is using. They will be put in to the various parts of Klitgaards Theory (1991) to see how they measure up to it. This section answers the first research question

The Malaysian Government has committed itself to the action plan at the 3rd annual ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Conference for Asia and the Pacific in December 2000. It has outlined this in the Tree Pillars in Chapter 3. In the following all the factors corresponding to Klitgaard’s (1991) theory will be placed under its headings and sub-headings, to try to see to what extent this strategy/drive against corruption is a good one.

1). Distinguish between “ostensible” (apparent) and strategic issues in fighting corruption.

Ostensible issues, here finding out what will eliminate the corruption. They will be used in the analysis when suggesting solutions in the discussion in conjunction with the suggestions of the respondents to the interviews and surveys. These will be presented in the methods chapter 4 and their findings in chapter 5.

Strategic issues meaning that we find out how to implement these policies that will
eliminate corruption. In the analysis we want to find out if the policies/strategies of the ACA are having an effect.

The steps in fighting the ostensible issues of corruption:-

a). The various kinds of costs of corruption must be investigated. Do the socio-economic benefits outweigh the negative effects?

Under Pillar II

The training of staff requires that external assistance is required to provide input and training because the subject is so specialised. This knowledge is very beneficial to the society.

b). List up the different anti-corruption techniques that can be used.

Under Pillar I

“To ensure that the ethical and administrative codes of conduct in the public and private sectors are applied and adhered to effectively” (Anti-Corruption Plan For Asia And The Pacific, Pillar I, 2002-2003).

Under the action plan:

The ACA will investigate any reports from the commission under the Anti-Corruption Act 1997. It must also detect and investigate any suspected offence under the act, any suspected attempt to commit any offence under the act and any suspected conspiracy to commit any offence under this act.

Instruct and advise and assist any person, on the latter’s request, on ways in which corruption may be eliminated by that person

Educate the public against corruption, emphasising in-depth preventive measures against corruption through personal contact with the public.

Examination of the practices and systems of public bodies to be able to identify areas within the system that are prone and vulnerable to corrupt practices and abuse of
power, and their solutions. Make recommendations to eliminate the weaknesses and thereby eliminate the opportunities and avenues of corruption and misuse of power.

Under Pillar II

The Government wishes to use a proactive approach to enforce their strategies as well as to enhance the efforts of tracing of corruption and finding recipients of corruption. Enactment of laws to prevent money laundering of embezzled funds. The government of Malaysia wishes to create a climate of cooperation, between Malaysia and other countries, in the tracing of embezzled funds.

Under Pillar III

The list of anti-corruption techniques and sequence of implementation can be formulated by studying the results of the Survey of the Perception of the Malaysian Society Towards Corruption.

c). We must weigh up the costs of reducing corruption against the benefits of reducing the corruption, with the anti-corruption techniques decided upon.

For me it was hard to find any strategy that fitted into this category.

d). We must choose the most relevant anti-corruption policies and implement them to the point there marginal benefits of reduced corruption are equal to the marginal costs of reducing it.

Under Pillar III

The survey aims to identify the types of corruption in the Malaysian society, measure its rate as well as identify measures to fight and prevent it.

The strategic issues of fighting corruption (getting the patient to take the medicine/follow the treatment). Here we must ask:-
a). How such policies can be implemented in practice?

Under Pillar I

The ACA will investigate any reports from the commission under the Anti-Corruption Act 1997. It must also detect and investigate any suspected offence under the act, any suspected attempt to commit any offence under the act and any suspected conspiracy to commit any offence under this act. Advise heads of bodies of any changes in practices, systems or procedures designed to increase the effectiveness of the public bodies in the way they carry out their duties to reduce the likelihood of corruptions, as the Director General sees fit.

Under Pillar II

By keeping this legislation under review at all times so as to be able to improve it and increase deterrence The Director General is directly responsible for this implementation.

A new Law was enacted by the Malaysian Government to strengthen its drive against corruption, the Anti-Corruption Act Act (575) passed by the Malaysian Parliament On January 1998, to prevent culprits from getting away with money from corruption abroad. Then the Parliament enacted an Anti-Money Laundering Act on 15 th January 2002.

The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill (2002) gives powers to give assistance in international criminal matters to trace, recover or confiscate where there is a serious offence committed locally or internationally.

This is in effect increasing the scope of the fight against corruption by including the money-laundering and confiscation of illegitimate proceeds.

b). How allies can be mobilised?

Under Pillar I
Enlist public support in combating corruption.

Under Pillar II

*Here the Government aims to improve the cooperation between Malaysia and other countries in the mechanisms’ which deal with the matters of mutual assistance in criminal matters and corruption matters.*

c). How potential resistors can be neutralised or co-opted?

Under Pillar I

*Examine the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies so to enable the identification of areas within the system, which are prone and vulnerable to corrupt practices and abuse of power. Submit upon analysing the input, of proposals and recommendations on methods of fortifying these inherent weak points against corruption and thereby close all opportunities and avenues of corruption and misuse of power in a public body.*

Under Pillar III

*The methods for this can be investigated from the findings from the Survey of the Perception of the Malaysian Society Towards Corruption.*

d). How should policy measures be sequenced?

Under Pillar III

*This can be done by looking at the results of the Survey of the Perception of the Malaysian Society Towards Corruption.*

Other questions can be what will happen with the policy makers’ career and what will happen to bureaucratic politics?
Under Pillar I

*Failure to familiarise and sign the document is punishable with disciplinary action according to the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993.*

2). **Cultivate Political Support**

Under Pillar I

*The government of Malaysia has made it compulsory for all government servants to sign a letter of undertaking after they have familiarised themselves with the problems of corruption. The aim here is to get political support for their policies. This awareness campaign is on a large scale and includes 950,000 signatories to the document. At first it was only compulsory for the lecturers and undergraduates to sign the Letter of Undertaking but in the end all the government servants were required to sign it.*

*Educate the public against corruption, enlist and foster public support in combating corruption. The communication and Education Division of the ACA is responsible for educating the public about the evils of corruption as well as enlisting and harnessing support for the ACA.*

Under Pillar III

*Form the Survey of the Perception of the Malaysian Society Towards Corruption, the Malaysian government can get an idea of how far the public supports an anti-corruption drive. The survey made the public even more aware about the problem of corruption.*

3). **Get the public behind corruption efforts**

Under Pillar I
The aim of the letter of declaration was also to get public support for the policies, by making it widely known what the government wanted to do and how. The aim of the government is to establish a good relationship with the public so that the public will have more confidence and thus support in the fight against corruption.

Tactics of getting public support:
If one can ride a wave of public indignation against corruption one must try to institutionalise this indignation create linkages with legislative branches

a). Publicize findings and have hearings for appropriate committees

*The report on the Survey on the Opinion of Malaysians on Corruption was made public.*

b). Convince the public that these efforts are serious. The principle of catching the “big-fish” ought to be applied. Catching these high level perpetrators and prosecuting them is as proof of seriousness.

*In media articles, not mentioned in the pillars, there have been announcements of catching “big fish” the ex-Chief Minister of Selangor and two top executives in government companies (Balfour, 2004). These arrests were obviously meant to prove the seriousness of the government in fighting corruption. Also in 2004 the number of investigations and arrests had increased significantly and exceeded the investigations and arrests in 2003 only in the first eight months of 2004.*

4). Break the Culture of Corruption in your organisation

Under Pillar I

*The effect of the Letter of Undertaking is also an effort to reduce the culture of corruption by building awareness. This could be called a strategy against a culture of corruption because the government servants are made aware of what is not acceptable.*
To break this culture one has to take two steps (Klitgaard, 1991, 187):-

1. The administrator must upset the climate of confidence and trust that is necessary for corrupt transactions

Under Pillar I

*Violations are listed out in the letter of declaration, for example abetting the Country’s enemies, misusing government vehicles, doing personal family business during office hours etc.*

2). Cynicism must be combated; words must be backed by action.

Methods of upsetting the climate of confidence:-

*Here there is no mention on how this might be tackled.*

a). Plant informers in key slots.

b). And or wide ranging periodic rotation of officers

c). Surveillance; including inspectors.

d). Give rewards to those who report corruption.

Methods of overcoming cynicism:-

a). Catching the “big fish”, high ranking officers involved in high scale corruption.

*The arrests of the ex-Chief Minister and two executive officers in the government plus others undergoing investigation.*

b). Those “big fish” ought to be then “frying” in public with the accompanying announcements of penalty charges.

No *information on the outcomes has been acquired by this study.*
5). More Positively as well as Negatively

Under Pillar I

*Pillar one also aims at avoiding that people feel left out by the government and probably not view the anti-corruption drive as positive. The people are also made to feel that they have a voice in the process without having a fear of prosecution.*

“Tackling corruption often involves harsh measures, and an organization can easily feel besieged, resulting in a decline in performance” (Klitgaard, 1991, 187).

A wise strategy will therefore include positive incentives as well as penalties, measures to encourage the organisations values and steps to crack the culture of corruption.

6). Link Anti-Corruption Measures to the Organisations Main Mission

Anti-corruption policy must reflect the organisations everyday objectives to be easier to implement.

The missionary statement of the ACA is as follows

“ACA MISSION

To combat corruption and the abuse of power through concerted and continuous efforts whereby:

All the principle government agencies and institutions are totally committed in the enforcement of the laws and regulations fairly and firmly to ensure sovereignty of the law is upheld and the public and the nation's interests are protected; and all levels of political, administrative, corporate, non-governmental and religious leadership are involved in the efforts to instil and internalise noble values so that a sense of abhorrence towards corrupt elements in the Malaysian community is intensified.” (ACA Home page 2006).
The mission statement of the ACA seems to indicate that it will not tolerate corruption at any level and type of organisation and combat it through “concerted and continous efforts”. This gives a clear idea of what the ACA aims to achieve, that is the eradication of corruption, which is its everyday mission.

Methods to make corruption policies easier to implement:-

a). They should interfere minimally with routine activities, operations and management

The respondents to the quantitative questionnaire seem to indicate that the policies have not hindered business in their business. The interviewees have not said anything to indicate this either.

b). They should be designed to minimise the organisations costs and error rates in doing its usual business

There is no information on this although if the above is true than there should not be any detrimental effects for businesses.

c). The greater the threat of corruption in an organisation is, or can be made to be, to the organisations autonomy

No information on this.

d). Maximise as much as possible the incentives that can be provide to lower-staff to control corruption

Under Pillar II

The new legislation, The Anti-Laundering Act 2001, provides protection to “whistle blowers” from persecution and civil liability from reporting financial transactions exceeding a specified amount or any suspicious transactions. This gives an incentive to report any suspicious dealings, without fear of legal reprisals.
4.2.2 This part answers the second research question posed “What type’s of corruption are present in the state government of Sarawak?”

This questionnaire was used in an attempt to place the corruption that occurs in Malaysia in the categories that have been formulated by Elliot (1997). Here the state level corruption was used as a basis for the responses. The survey here is a bit imprecise in that it aims to find out the general types of corruption in Sarawak with a sample of Sarawakians, but in practice it has become an assessment of corruption in the whole of Malaysia. The categories of corruption were presented in the theories chapter (Chapter 3). Unfortunately the sample was quite small numbering only six. There are, however, also indications of similar answers in the interviews on the subject of types of corruption.

The responses here are limited because of the very sensitive nature of the survey questions. However, there should be sufficient answers here to be able to make some conclusions on the types of corruption that is to be found in Malaysia. The respondents were quite diverse and did not have any knowledge of each others answers. They do, however, point in a specific direction in the respect of the types of corruption there are and their opinions about it as well as their views on what should be done about it. They also express their opinions on how the government is coping with the problem. This information coupled with that of the information collected by the quantitative questionnaires and the interviews should give a picture of what the research question wants to find out. The answers seem to indicate specific meanings in the population of the State of Sarawak.

As shown in Diagram 5.1 most of the respondents to the qualitative questionnaire indicated that Malaysia fell into the category B of in Elliot’s (1997) classification theory. Since the majority of the respondents place Malaysia in the category C, maybe it is on the brink of extreme corruption.

Although the respondents place Malaysia in category B, the indications are not that the country is in this category. All indications from the answers of the respondents are that the
Diagram 4.1 Varieties of Corruption as functions of Political Imbalance placing Malaysia in the diagram (Elliott, Johnston, 1997, 71).

Balance of Opportunities
Economical > Political (more economic opportunities than political)

- Malaysia placed here by two respondents
  - A: Interest Group Bidding (different groups competing with each other)
    - Egs.
    - United States
    - United Kingdom
    - Germany

- Political > Economic (more political opportunities than economic)

  - C: Fragmented Patronage (Mafiyas) (risk of extreme corruption) Similar to Elite Hegemony
    - Egs.
    - Russia
    - Pre Fujimori Peru
    - Pre Menem Argentina
    - Early civilian regimes in Africa

Autonomy of Elites >
Accessibility (Elites have less power)

- Malaysia placed here by three respondents
  - B: Elite Hegemony (Power held by elites) (Risk of Extreme Corruption)
    - Egs.
    - China
    - Pre-IAU Hong Kong
    - Military Regimes (Nigeria at times)
    - South Korea
    - LDP Japan

- Malaysia placed here by two of the respondents
  - Egs.
    - Mature Tammany Hall
    - Indonesia
    - Mexico
  - D: Patronage Machines (One group dominating all the power and hindering other groups in getting any share of that power)

Corruption present is petty as yet but does not really indicate where it seems to be going. Seeing that there is only a small amount of petty corruption this would indicate that the category D is more suited to the country according to their answers after categorising the country (the questions on the questionnaire after the categorising question). This is because the characteristic of a Patronage Machine is that it does not take large bribes to keep the loyalty of the followers. A well entrenched elite can manipulate scarce economic rewards to control political competition even where there are significant political opportunities, but here we are talking about a country with relatively large wealth, but it can probably be manipulated
in the same way because a type of disciplined patronage organisation has been developed (Elliot, 1997).

It is a bit unclear here as to the effect of the government policies on the corruption that exists. All the respondents condemn all forms of corruption and indicate their wish that something should be done with it.

The respondents here are not randomly selected but they are selected for their knowledge and their insight into the working of the Malaysian government.

When asked about the reasons for corruption in the reasonably wealthy country Malaysia there was a unanimous answer. The main answer pointed to greed of the individuals taking the bribes. This practice is considered very bad by the respondents.

The question asked to find out what could be done to eradicate corruption in Malaysia was also quite unanimous. The respondents say that the government has reacted with a clamp down but some would like to see a more stringent enforcing of the regulations. They also indicate that the dissemination of information to make the public aware of the problem is necessary.

On the subject of voluntary bribes the respondents were also quite unanimous. They characterise the corruption in Malaysia as petty. There seems to be no indication that corruption is endemic despite the presence of the petty corruption that is to be found.

On the subject of extortion the verdict is that it is not present to any great extent. There are only threats to the contractor if there are signs that he is not going to finish the work or will fail to meet deadlines.

All the respondents do not accept that any kinds of corruption should be acceptable. This seems to reinforce Kligaard’s (1991) notion that all societies condemn corruption. One respondent specifically states that no form of bribes should be acceptable. One of the interviewees seems to think that at times the use of speed money is not detrimental.
Respondents of the qualitative survey, including three of the interviewees feel that the Malaysian Government Policies are having an effect. They feel that the government has been able to reduce corruption with its present policies. This is because the qualitative questionnaire takes a more general view of corruption and no the corruption on a local level. Some however indicate that they wish the government cracked down even harder.

The types of Corruption as identified by the interviewees

The result of this survey shows the same tendency as for the interviews. There is not a perception of large scale corruption although the place of Malaysia in Elliot’s (1997) categories would indicate otherwise. There is no indication here either of culture of corruption (Klitgaard, 1991) present in Malaysia. The respondents are all against corruption in its various forms. It is noteworthy here that the questionnaire enquired about corruption in Malaysia in general and not just at the District Office level.

At the DO level the main corruption seems to be tea money/coffee money and small kickbacks from projects and contracts of around 1 % to 2 %. This seems to be minimal and therefore not indicating a culture of corruption (Klitgaard, 1991). The only threats of non-payment were made in case of non-delivery or forfeit. There seems to be also little danger of extreme corruption (Elliot, 1997) at this level of the Malaysian Government.

The corruption is not only petty but is also described as being minimal at this level. Therefore it could be questioned if the survey would have had better results at a higher level in the administration. That is in uncovering more corruption and/or the grand corruption that exists in Malaysia.

As regards the level of SAO & AO, the answers are similar for DO, that their corruption is petty and of smaller amounts where it occurs. There has been no change at these levels as a result of the new policies/new drives against corruption. This level also does not exhibit a culture of corruption (Klitgaard, 1991).

At the level Chief Clerks, Clerks and others the respondents are agreed that there is minor or no corruption. Here too an absence of a culture of corruption (Klitgaard, 1997) This has also
been my impression with my dealing with this level of government.

There is no evidence here that there is grand or rampant corruption (Elliot, 1997) or evidence of a culture of corruption (Klitgaard, 1991). Examples of the areas where the petty corruption occurs is as below:

The three respondents seem to be quite in agreement, for negotiated tenders the tendency seems to be clear, that the risk of bribes is greater. However, if they are open they are less vulnerable to corrupt practices. Larger tenders will mean that the companies involved will use more entertainment on the larger projects.

Tenders for maintenance jobs are also vulnerable to bribes. Here one of respondent says the tenders are given too friends, another says that unnecessary work is added when variation orders are added to the tenders for maintenance jobs.

The supply of goods and services to the local districts can also be prone to corrupt acts, depending also on amounts, the three respondents being in agreement here. They can be given to friends and relatives says one of the respondents, this is nepotism (it can be understood as a type of corruption unless there are practical reasons that there are no other suppliers or it occurs in a very small district etc.) and another says that there can be a mark up of price or a short supply in the quantity agreed upon. This respondent goes further to say that if it is too obvious the community will talk as these districts are not so very big.

There is no evidence here of grand corruption (Elliot, 1997) either in this area of the local district government dealings. There is no real evidence of a culture (Klitgaard, 1991) of corruption either.

As to the perpetrators of the corruption it seems to be equally shared by the government servants and the businessmen in the districts. It can seem, however, that it is the private sector that is most willing to give bribes to gain influence.

4.2.3 Here the survey also shed some light on the third research question “What have been the effects of the anti-corruption policies on the local district government of Sarawak?”
These results of the quantitative questionnaire reflect on Klitgaard’s (1991), theories on the formulating of good anti-corruption policies. The result of the survey has gone a long way to indicating whether the anti-corruption policies of the Malaysian government and the strategies of the ACA are having an effect. Although this contradicts the result of the interviews, where the respondents say that there has been no effect of these strategies at the district office level. The questionnaires here are on a general level so it might mean that the effects are visible at the state and national levels, and their effects at the local government level are not discernable to the average person in the street.

They also indicate that the numbers of convictions that have been carried out by the government have increased.

The responses to the questionnaires are as follows:

1). The new approach/renewed anti-corruption drive by the government has increased prosecutions and exposed corrupt government officials: 81 % agree.

<table>
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<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of respondents</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of sample</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>31 %</td>
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*This is the desire of the government to achieve with this new plan. The number of increasing convictions means the governments strategies are having an effect but on corruption at higher levels of*

Businesses seem not to have suffered any disadvantages from the new strategies of the government either.

2). These anti-corruption strategies has hampered business in carrying out their business.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither-nor</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>No. of respondents</td>
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<td>10</td>
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In this case 74% disagreed that business were hampered in their activities. These are in line with the strategic issues of Klitgaard (1991).

*On the issue of whether businesses have it easier after the implementation of these policies, the respondents seem a bit unsure but the majority seem to think that the business climate is better after the new policies.*

3). These anti-corruption policies has made it easier to do business.

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<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither-nor</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of sample</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*When it comes to whether corruption had decreased after the new drive 31% of the respondents were a bit unsure.*

*However, a sizeable number 44% thought that it had reduced corruption.*

4). There is less corruption after the new strategies/enforced strategies in the government’s anti-corruption drive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither-nor</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of respond.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of sample</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
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</table>

*They were surer that corruption had not increased, with a response of 56%*

5). Corruption has increased after the new strategies/enforced strategies.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither-nor</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of respond.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of sample</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What they were overwhelmingly in agreement over was whether corruption was a bad practice or not 12 % agreed and 75 % strongly agreed.

This is common for all the two surveys’ and the interviews. Therefore this reinforces the notion that there is no culture of corruption (Kliigaard, 1991) in Malaysia.

6) How do you view corruption!

 Corruption is a bad practice and must be eradicated from society.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither-nor</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of respond.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of sample</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>75 %</td>
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</table>

According to this survey the Anti- Strategies of the Malaysian Government have been a success. This indicated by questions 1, 3and 5. Corruption has been reduced and convictions have increased, that is the aim of the new drive against corruption.

The interviews’, however, indicate that there has been no effect on corruption at the local district council level. The respondents to the interviews are almost unanimous in their conviction.

4.2.4 The Effect of the Anti-Corruption Strategies of the Malaysian Government on the Local District Government of Sarawak

The results of the two surveys’ seem to give support to a lot of the findings in the interviews.

Each question will be taken individually and the comments will follow placing the comparison in the preceding theory. The purpose here is to find common ground or disagreement, as well as to investigate further the answers they have given. This section answers the third research question “What have been the effects of the anti-corruption policies
on the local district government of Sarawak?” These responses will also indicate the types of corruption to be found at this level of government. In addition to this we should be able to ascertain whether there is a culture of corruption at this level of government.

The three respondents have quite similar answers for the interview questions. The survey would suggest that the occurrence of corruption is greater in the urban areas. In addition to this the in the urban areas the corruption is more frequent. The main problem with this survey seemed to be that the three respondents meant that the level being investigated was probably too low to be able to register the real problem corruption that is going on. The three were unanimous in the verdict that the corruption could not be carried out on a grand scale as the size of the projects, amounts of the contracts and the authority of the actors was a bit limited. Therefore no grand corruption (Elliot, 1997) has been exposed here. Also then the anti-corruption strategies are not relevant here as they seem to be more aimed at higher levels, whether or not this is the intention.

An interesting observation made by all the three respondents was that women were more honest than men. This could indicate that women are less prone to a culture of corruption than men. The result here being that the corruption amongst women is even less than that for men. Therefore the strategies against corruption will not have much effect on a group that are not very corrupt to begin with. It might be a solution to have more women in administrative posts to reduce corruption if this is the case. This could be a possible solution at higher levels of administration too, in reducing the amount of corruption just by having more women in top jobs (n.b. Malaysia has quite a high proportion of women employees already in the government, the government is a good employer providing good maternity leave systems and career opportunities).

There can be an argument that the effects of the anti-corruption policies are not desirable since the speed money reduces red tape and therefore aids development by speeding it up. Some wastages and leakages occur, but this can be a trade-off if one is to meet development planning (Klitgaard, 1991) targets, or to ensure smooth implementation of projects.

The respondents here are in a way in agreement with Klitgaard (1991) that the use of say grease money can help development. Klitgaard’s (1991), notion of speed money reducing government red tape, however, seems to be seen as a positive effect if I have understood the
first part answers of question 6. The respondents are, however, a bit sceptical as to the final result of a project using petty corruption to make development progress faster. It seems that the respondents agree that the corruption does facilitate some of the development.

We have clearly here a potential for corruption as the factor of low wages (Klitgaard, 1991, Quah 1999) increases the need for supplementing incomes. The opportunity for corruption (Elliot, 1997) is greatly increased with these lower wages. Therefore there is a risk here that if the wages of the administrative staff in the local government sector of Sarawak are not increased, corruption will be on the rise. This should then reflect the total picture in Malaysia. That would indicate that it is not enough just to clamp down on corruption with good anti-corruption strategies but also with reviews of pay scales.
Chapter 5 The Analysis

The results of the quantitative survey, qualitative survey and interviews will be presented here and they will be examined with Klitgaard’s (1991) and Elliot’s (1997) theory and it will be possible to compare the data to the larger sample of the survey on Public Opinion on Corruption in Malaysia. Other documentation is from the mass Malaysian media and those academic sources that are available on the subject.

Although there is not a very large amount of data it should be possible to analyse the results with the corruption theories used. There is, however, a large enough amount of data from the survey on The Public Perception of Corruption in Malaysia that can be used to strengthen or weaken my findings.

The anti-corruption policies of Malaysia here will be examined for their place in Klitgaard’s (1991) theory. It will be an attempt to find out if the strategies are good or bad/adequate for the purpose they have been designed, as well as to find out if the ACA is a body which can do the job of fighting corruption or not, this will give us insight into the implications for research question 1. From Elliot’s (1997) theory we can get an insight into the types and extent of corruption and here an effort will be made to say something about what the surveys seem to indicate about this. Research question 2 is highlighted here to tell us whether there is a big problem here or not. Research question 3 was to enquire if the new drive/policies had any effect on the corruption at the local government level in Sarawak, the result was that there was no effect. Below will be an attempt to shed some light on this result.

5.1 Research Question 1: Analysis of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Policies

The Pillars marking the actions against corruption seem to take into account strategic and ostensible issues (Klitgaard, 1991) as well as address the factors of dissemination of information and awareness, coupled with measures to combat cultures’ of corruption, as well as to foster a positive outlook towards the war on corruption (Klitgaard, 1991). There are, however, gaps in the strategies in that the strategies do not seem to cover the whole scope of Klitgaard’s theory (1991). The Malaysian Government has formulated a number of policies but do not seem to be as comprehensive as Klitgaard’s (1991) theory would indicate.
The ACA is an independent body and is directly under the Prime Minister of Malaysia, not being part or subservient to any other department, which is supposed to be one of the keys to success in other countries’ drives against corruption (Klitgaard, 1991 and Quah, 1999). Malaysia seems to have found Mr. Clean (Klitgaard, 1991) in the Director General of the ACA, Y. Bhg. Dato' Zulkipli bin Mat Noor. His immediate superior Datuk Abdullah Ahmad Bedawi is also a Mr. Clean (Klitgaard, 1991), which is one of Klitgaard’s (1991) criteria to ensure a possible success of an anti-corruption policy. This fight against corruption, however, cannot be won be these two alone the ACA must act with them and in cooperation with the people of the country.

5.2 Research Question 2: Analysis of the Types and extent of Corruption in Malaysia with Elliot’s Theory

This quantitative survey result seems to contrast so much with the findings of the interviews. In the interviews there are no effects of the strategies of the Malaysian Government against corruption. The answers to the quantitative questionnaires which are more general in nature seem to indicate that corruption at higher levels is being reduced and that it is the strategies of the government that have taken effect.

The respondents of the qualitative questionnaire indicate that there is some corruption as categorised by Elliot (1997), but they say it is mostly petty. Therefore the responses to the qualitative questionnaires reflect the same type of corruption as the interviewees. They say that here is no grand corruption, although the interviewees mean that if it exists the local government level is at a too low level to register it. The difference here is that the government has been able to combat that corruption which occurs at higher levels. What all the respondents are in agreement about is that the corruption in Malaysia is mostly petty and it does not seem to be a big problem. In the qualitative survey the only suggestion they have is that the government go even harder out against corruption than they do now:

*I believe the government of Malaysia should enforce the existing laws even more.*

There could be a danger, however, that Malaysia could plunge into one of the undesirable categories of Elliot (1997) that is the transition from petty corruption to grand corruption, if action is not taken now. The reason is that the respondents to the quantitative questionnaire
have indicated that Malaysia comes into the category of either Elite Hegemony (Diagram 5.1), which indicates a danger of extreme corruption. If, however, as some indicate, and the indicators point as discussed above, that Malaysia falls into the category Patronage Machines (Diagram 5.1), then we can get social and political stagnation. The political elites may not be interested in looting the country in this category but rather keep power on keeping their power.

Also the ACA must be good enforcers not to let the corruption get out of hand at higher levels, as the placement of Malaysia in the categories of corruption (Elliot, 1997) seems to suggest it could do in the future. The government must make a more comprehensive policy that encompasses more of Klitgaard’s (1991) types of anti-corruption policies. There elements of Klitgaard’s theory (1991) to fight corruption that are not covered by the Malaysian government’s strategy. The most glaring absence is the strategy of:

Methods of upsetting the climate of confidence:-

*Here there is no mention on how this might be tackled.*

a). Plant informers in key slots.
b). And or wide ranging periodic rotation of officers
c). Surveillance; including inspectors.
d). Give rewards to those who report corruption.

At least there is no mention of it or indication as to whether they use these strategies in their pillars or the home page of the ACA.

There was one thing all the respondents in all of the interviews and surveys’ were in unanimous agreement and that was that corruption was unacceptable and must be eradicated. The one respondent wrote in response to the question about the types of corruption that might be permissible that:

*In my opinion it should not be practised.*

None of the other respondents wished to write anything about what corruption should be acceptable, meaning most likely that they all agree that no corruption should be tolerated.
They all marked the answer for that no corruption should be tolerated.

5.3 Research Question 3: The Analysis of the Effects of the anti-corruption policies

It is clear from the interviews that the respondents mean that there is no effect of the new policies at the local level of government in Malaysia.

*These policies have had no effect on the district office level in Sarawak*

We have, however, a quantitative questionnaire that tells us that the respondents here perceive that the government policies are having and effect on corruption. They seem quite pleased with the efforts of the government. The majority of this random sample (however small) believes that convictions are on the rise and that the government is doing a good job because they believe that corruption is decreasing and that convictions and arrests of perpetrators has increased. This could be at higher levels of the government administration and not anything to do with the local government levels, as there was no specified level of government in the quantitative questionnaire.

One of the interviewees says that the government policies take time to take effect, as though to indicate they have not reached the level of the local district administrations.

*Takes time for the government policy to take effect, that the new drive will eventually have an effect.*

This could indicate that it takes quite some time for the inertia of the bureaucratic machinery to implement the strategies at this level.

5.4 Suggestions for the improvement of the Anti-Corruption Strategies of the Malaysian Government

To strengthen the anti-corruption policies we could introduce the anti-corruption policies to the local government as the Indonesian government did in one of its regencies, with positive results.
There are some successes in the Regency of Sleman, on the island of Java in Indonesia, in fighting corruption (Suripto, 2004) which should be applicable to Malaysia because they share a similar cultural heritage. The medicine here was to introduce transparency in the local government of Sleman. The recipe (taken from Suripto, 2004) here was as follows:-

1). Allow free access to local government documents on web sites, open archives and the like on the transactions of the local government.
2). Make someone accountable for the various projects that the local government carries out. This responsibility was to the people and parliament of Sleman.

The actors in the local government were also made accountable for the following (Suripto, 2004):-

1). Given answerability for their actions.

2). Sanctions were administered where justification was inadequate.

3). Have the ability to cancel a mandate.

4). Public scrutiny of government actions.

5). Citizen participation in the designing programs/projects
   - holding public meetings
   - having consultation forums
   - getting feedback from the public

The methods above gave a reduction in the corruption in the above said regency, with improved transparency. The contention is here that if these strategies work here they should be able to work in Malaysia, possibly with some modifications. As I mentioned in the introduction the countries of the region share similar conditions. Malaysia like Indonesia share a common language, similar religious mix, similar cultural traits (Swartz, 1997, Klitgaard, 1991, Strand, 2001). They have a similar habitus (Swartz, 1997), that is of a Malay dominated culture and ways of doing things. The “medicine” here must be such that it will match the cultural norms of say extreme shame when some wrong doing is published in the
media or made known in the local area. At any rate the exposure and punishment ought to reflect this with a basis in the culture and context (Strand, 2001) of the society. That is if the punishment is legitimate in the local eyes of the society both exposure and punishment will have its desired effect of justice and prevention (Klitgaard, 1991).

The use of Klitgaard’s strategy to upset the climate of confidence of the perpetrators to reward informants could be used if it is not part of their strategies and rotate officers. This would be an attempt to make the policy more positive than negative (Klitgaard, 1991).

5.5 Conclusion

At a practical level the policy can reduce the corruption at specific level as the research seems to indicate. Here there seems to be no effect at the local government level, but it has reduced top level corruption, by large amounts. The “big fish” are being “fried” while the other ones in the middle and lower level seem to be able to get away with petty corruption. We can assume here that the effect of this policy is the same all over Malaysia as in Sarawak, our case study. So that the same action to remedy the problems of lower level corruption is required all over the country.

At a theoretical level the findings are not completely in line with Klitgaard’s theory (1991). It is also possible that the sensitive nature of the issue makes it difficult to get detailed answers relating to the phenomenon.

The rejection of corruption above seems to reinforce the notion that all societies do not accept corruption (Klitgaard, 1991). The national survey on corruption also had a high percentage (86.8 %) against corruption that is the giving of bribes, which seems to support some of the findings of this thesis, in the thesis’ limited survey 87 % meant that corruption should be eradicated from society. 85.1 % did not give or receive bribes, which also seems to support the notion that there is not a wide spread culture of corruption in Malaysia.

The reason that there was no effect on corruption at the local government level could be that the survey was conducted at a level of government administration there the policies are not effective. That is they are more effective at frying the “big fish” than taking care of the petty corruption, in the respect that it exists. Either that or if it is really as minor as the survey
would have it to be, the ACA probably wants rather to take care of the “big fish” first and not divert resources and time from this part of their anti-corruption drive. It could be an idea to review the policies to see if they can be modified or added on to, to be able to take into account any corruption at the lowest level of the government administration. It could be also that the corruption here is so petty that it is not really worth the effort of the ACA.

There could be a misjudgement here of the level of government which the survey should have been carried out. It would probably have been better to have made a survey at a higher level of the government administration. The survey could have been carried out at the state level by taking a look at the senior and higher ranking officers in the Sarawak Government say of department heads, which can make decisions at the state level for large projects. A survey could also be carried out at the ministry level there the really big projects and tenders are given out.

There are concerning indicators at the district government level, there all the interviewees indicate that the salaries of the civil servants is too low. Here there is the potential for corruption in the future as too low salaries make it more tempting to grab opportunities of accepting bribes (Klitgaard, 1991 and Quah 1999). There seems to be a job to be done here in revising the pay scales for the local government servants of Malaysia. Although an individual can in theory never “earn enough”, there is a minimum one can live in a given country based on the cost of living of that country. At times the assumption that they are “used” to such a level of income in certain countries is wrong and their wage systems have been inherited and are bogged down in an outdated colonial model. Taking Singapore as an example that has tackled not only corruption but reduced the temptation for civil servants to take bribes, not only by punishment and good retirement benefits (Klitgaard, 1991). On the upper end of the government civil servants of Singapore, the Cabinet Ministers, salaries are pegged to those of CEO’s in the largest multinational firms in the world (Wei 1999; 18). The Singapore Prime Ministers Pay is several times that of the United States President. As Ex-Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew said “it’s a simple choice. Pay political leaders the top salaries that they deserve and get, honest clean government or underpay them and risk the Third World disease of corruption” (Linda Lim and Aaron Stern, 2002). This is an argument to pay civil servants at least a decent wage to be able to reduce the temptation of corruption and make enforcement even more legitimate since they would not need to supplement their incomes. Noor Alam Siddiquee (2005) says “…Malaysia has a lot to learn from the Singapore experience....
Singapore has emerged as one of the corruption-free societies, due mainly to the strict enforcement of anti-corruption laws, the policy of paying public servants, and the successful anticorruption ethos throughout the civil service.” (Siddiquee, 2005, 126)

Malaysia seems to have another disadvantage in that it comprises a large number of ethnicities, cultures and languages. Some studies suggest that these types of countries have the odds stacked against them. There is also the element of the countries having a Protestant tradition being the least corrupt, and Malaysia is not of this tradition, it has an Islamic government and a whole range of other traditions. In addition to this Malaysia might not have the amount of democratisation and development of the above named countries as well as not being a developing nation (Treisman, 2000).

On the other hand Malaysia has a rigorous growing economy and growing at around 5 % a year and its GDP has increased ten-fold fro 1970 and is predicted to expand to fourteen-fold by 2005 (Quah, 1999). It is possible to grow its way out of corruption. Malaysia is also a former British colony and it has aspects of British Common law which allow for a judiciary that is more able to handle corruption in a country (Treisman, 2002). In addition to this the British had a reputation for being clean in their administrations, although Singapore and Hong Kong (Klitgaard, 1991 and Quah 1999) exhibited tendencies of British corruption that had to be contained and eliminated (Quah, 1999). This common law system has allowed for countries to incorporate some of their local traditions and customs in the law (Treisman, 2000), which makes it more effective in handling the people in the country that have their own culture (Klitgaard, 1991, Strand, 2001 and Swartz, 1997) and habitus (Swartz, 1997). The findings of Suripto are very interesting in this case. These findings offer a proven solution to problems especially at the local government level.

Therefore it is paramount here to have ones own agenda and methods in fighting corruption and not simply “adopt”, others’ methods that might not be effective in fighting the corruption in a particular setting (Strand,2002), culture (Klitgaard, 1991 and Swartz 1997). Developing nations must not be pressured into strategies that do not suit their development strategies (Klitgaard, 1991).The policies must be thought out so as not to stifle development, as there are indications that the payments made to reduce government red tape are beneficial (Klitgaard, 1991), which the respondents of the interviews have indicated also. There is, however, an ethical and moral dilemma of say allowing speed money, it could be difficult to
draw a line against corruption when some types are allowed thus making it possible to eventually justify other forms. For example the prioritising of local suppliers and contractors has to do with building local firms up to be able to develop skills, as a form for development strategy (Klitgaard, 1991), that will eventually allow them to participate in proper open tenders which include companies from countries that have highly developed skills.

Malaysia shares the same type of anti-corruption agency set up as the countries of Singapore and Hong Kong that have been very successful in combating corruption (Klitgaard, 1991 and Quah, 1999). The ACA is reports directly to the Prime Minister and is independent of any other government agency. If Malaysia can harness the ACA’s methods in the same way there should be a good chance that the Malaysian Government will succeed in its fight against corruption. There is a link here between the previous British Colonies (Quah, 1999 and Treisman, 2000) in the way their government administrations are developed, although it does not hold true for all the former British Colonies as the ACA for example India (Quah, 1999).

There seems to be a wide support in the society for this anti-corruption drive as 80% are willing to help eradicate corruption, 84.4% are ready to give information on corruption, 81.3% are ready to witness in court and 81.8% are ready to be informants of the ACA (Public Opinion Survey and Anti-Corruption Reform in Malaysia, 2002). This means that the Malaysian Government has wide support to fight corruption amongst its people.

In spite of all the negative factors attributed to such a country by certain researchers, the way forward does not seem to be all bleak for Malaysia. Had the research here uncovered excessive corruption and a culture of corruption in all levels of the civil service then it would nearly be a lost cause. What the research has uncovered here, in line with the Survey on Public Opinion on Corruption in Malaysia, is that there is only petty corruption at all levels from the middle to the bottom and that no one endorses this corruption that exists. All these factors should mean that Malaysia can control and eliminate its corruption if it modifies and enlarges its anti-corruption policies and enforces them even stricter.

Finally the research on the district of Sarawak in question has given the answers to the three research questions, in spite of the small amount of data. The types of strategies, although not as comprehensive as Klitgaard’s, have been identified. The results seem to be corroborated by The Survey on The Public Perception of Corruption in Malaysia, which indicated the same
tendencies to the people in the larger sample to the respondents to the surveys’ and the interviews of this paper. The types and extent of corruption have been identifies, petty on all counts although the ACA has been arresting and charging high ranking officials. These results too seem to be to an extent corroborated by The Survey on The Public Perception of Corruption in Malaysia. The effects of the new policies have not been felt at the local level of government in Malaysia, which is at the lowest level of administration in Malaysia.
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The Anti Corruption Agency of Malaysia’s Home Page

ANTI-CORRUPTION ONLINE © OECD Anti-Corruption Division, 2004 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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Bernama: “No Backing Down In Fight Against Corruption, Says Abdullah”

Public Opinion Survey and Anti-Corruption Reform in Malaysia

The National Congress Vision 2020: The Way Forward 29/04/97

90
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
The Interview Guide for the Thesis for the MPA program of Agder University College

Personal interview guide to find out which corruption problems there are in the local government of Sarawak, the level of government investigated is the local district governments. The questions here wish to investigate the effects of the Malaysian governments new drive/renewed enforcement of corruption strategies on corruption in Malaysia.

This is an interview of government servants in the management level at the district government level of the Sarawak civil service. The questions focus on the corruption that takes place at this level, before and after the new drive to clamp down on corruption.

1). What have been the most prevalent forms of corruption at the level of :-

i). District Officer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale of Corruption:</th>
<th>Before new strategies/enforcement</th>
<th>After (Increase/Decrease)</th>
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<tr>
<td>a). Grand Corruption</td>
<td>Rural Areas</td>
<td>Urban Areas</td>
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<td>b). Petty</td>
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<td>c). Speed Money</td>
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<td>d). Extortion</td>
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ii). Senior Administrative Officer

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<td>a). Grand Corruption</td>
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<td>c). Speed Money</td>
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<td>d). Extortion</td>
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iii). Administrative Officer

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<th>Scale of Corruption:</th>
<th>Before new strategies/enforcement</th>
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<td>b). Petty</td>
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<td>c). Speed Money</td>
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<td>d). Extortion</td>
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iv). Lower Levels (Chief Clerks, Clerks, etc.)

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<tr>
<th>Scale of Corruption:</th>
<th>Before new strategies/enforcement</th>
<th>After (Increase/Decrease)</th>
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<td>a). Grand Corruption</td>
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<td>b). Petty</td>
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<td>c). Speed Money</td>
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<td>d). Extortion</td>
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</table>
2). Which of the above are most prone to corruption (or are all equally prone depending on the person I question):-

What do you think is the reason for this (e.g. Too low wages, greed, low morals, a misunderstanding of what corruption is etc.)

i). District Officer

ii). Senior Administrative Officer

ii). Administrative Officer

iv). Lower Levels (Chief Clerk, Clerk etc.)

3). Is corruption more serious in certain areas:–

i). tenders  - for tenders

        - for maintenance jobs

        - for transport services

ii). Supply of goods and services without tenders
4). Does the private sector exert a pressure on the local government staff to try to get them too accept bribes to be able to manipulate them without bribes later?

5). Do you think the private sector has been the motor in driving corruption in th local districts?

6). Have these practices helped to promote the development of the local districts or have they hindered development and wasted public funds?

If yes, how?

If no, how?
7). In a Malaysian context what gifts dinners’ trips or tips etc. should be acceptable and open, that can be given by a supplier, contractor or any other transaction which gives rise to a principal-agent relationship, i.e. the local government being the principal and the private sector being the agent.
Questionnaire for Master Degree Thesis on the Success of the anti-corruption policies of the Prime Minister of Malaysia (Qualitative)

For the information of the respondent this is a survey to try to assess the result of the anti-corruption efforts of the Malaysian Government. To get an insight into this phenomenon it is necessary to carry out a qualitative survey of a sample of Malaysian professionals and government staff. This in conjunction with my Master Degree thesis MPA (Master in Public Administration). (This information is only for the use of course purposes of my thesis at the Agder University College and will be anonymous). There are no marks or coding on the questionnaires and cannot be traced back to their respondent. The following questions are based on the corruption theory in Robert Klitgaard’s Book (1991), Controlling Corruption and Kimberly Ann Elliot’s theories from her book “Corruption and the Global Economy”(1997). This will be a guide in the analysis of the corruption policies that have been implemented by the Malaysian Government.

This questionnaire uses open ended questions to collect data for a qualitative analysis.
Thank you in advance.

Please set in an x in the box following the question for the response most appropriate to you.

Please put an X in the box with the appropriate answer.
(Example Age 27 -. 32  X )

First, please answer the background questions

Age  18 - 22  23 - 27  28 – 32  33 – 37  38 - 42
43 -47  48 – 52  Over 52

Gender: Male  Female  Married  Single

Previous Education ______________ Work experience (eg. 1 year/10 years) ______ (only number of years necessary for both here)

Private Sector  Government Servant  Semi-Government Sector
Survey Questions

1). Why do you think corruption occurs in Malaysia which is a relatively wealthy country and has a much fairer distribution of wealth than other countries in the region.
(Answer in about 10 words)

2) What do you think can be done to reduce or eradicate corruption in Malaysia.
(Answer in about 10 words)
3). Varieties of corruption as a function of political imbalance.

**Varieties of Corruption as functions of Political Imbalance (Elliot, Johnston, 1997, 71).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accessibility of Elites</th>
<th>Autonomy of Elites</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy (Elites have less power)</td>
<td>Accessibility (Elites have more power)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Balance of Opportunities</th>
<th>A: Interest Group Bidding (different groups competing with each other)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economical &gt; Political (more economic opportunities than political)</td>
<td>Egs. United States United Kingdom Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B: Elite Hegemony (Power held by elites) (Risk of Extreme Corruption)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egs. China Pre-IAU Hong Kong Military Regimes (Nigeria at times) South Korea LDP Japan</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political &gt; Economic (more political opportunities than economic)</th>
<th>Egs. Russia Pre Fujimori Peru Pre Menem Argentina Early civilian regimes in Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C: Fragmented Patronage (Mafiyas) (risk of extreme corruption) Similar to Elite Hegemony</td>
<td>Egs. Mature Tammany Hall Indonesia Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Patronage Machines (One group dominating all teh power and hindering other groups in getting any share of that power)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Where do you place Malaysia
A). Interest group bidding [ ]
B). Elite hegemony (risk of extreme corruption) [ ]
C). Fragmented patronage (risk of extreme corruption) [ ]
D). Patronage Machines [ ]
4). Analysing the consequences of corruption, what type of corruption is prevalent in Malaysia

i). Voluntary bribes

   Petty
   ▲
   A). Speed Money □
   B). Grease Money □
   C). Bribes (small) □
   D). Bribes (medium sized) □
   E). Bribes (large) □
   ▼
   Grand

ii). Extortion

   Petty
   ▲
   A). Forced to pay for licences □
   B). Threats of fines if bribe is not paid □
   C). Threat of audit if bribe is not paid □
   D). Treat to stop project if licence is not paid □
   ▼
   Grand
5). What types of corruption should be permissible:

i). Speed Money (to evade government red tape)

ii). Grease Money (to get something done faster)

iii). Bribes:  
   Small
   Medium
   Big

iv). None

v). Other (specify)  
(10 Words)
Questionnaire for Master Degree Thesis on the Success of the anti-corruption policies of the Prime Minister of Malaysia (Quantitative)

For the information of the respondent this is a survey to try to asses the result of the anti-corruption efforts of the Malaysian Government. To get an insight into this phenomenon it is necessary to carry out a quantitative survey of a sample of Malaysian professionals and government staff. This in conjunction with my Master Degree thesis MPA (Master in Public Administration). (This information is only for the use of course purposes of my thesis at the Agder University College and will be anonymous). There are no marks or coding on the questionnaires and cannot be traced back to their respondent. The following questions are based on the corruption theory in Robert Klitgaard’s Book (1991), Controlling Corruption and Kimberly Ann Elliot’s theories from her book “Corruption and the Global Economy”(1997). This will be a guide in the analysis of the corruption policies that have been implemented by the Malaysian Government.

This questionnaire uses closed ended questions to collect data for a quantitative analysis.
Thank you in advance.

Please set in an x in the box following the question for the response most appropriate to you.

Please put an X in the box with the appropriate answer.
(Example Age 27 -. 32  X)

First, please answer the background questions

Age  18 - 22  □  23 - 27  □  28 – 32  □  33 – 37  □  38 - 42  □
43 -47  □  48 – 52  □  Over 53  □

Gender: Male □ Female □ Married □ Single □

Previous Education _____________ Work experience (eg. 1 year/10 years) _______ (only number of years necessary for both here)

Private Sector □ Government Servant □ Semi-Government Sector □
The following are the survey questions:

N.B: **Neither-nor** indicates no impression or no experience to that effect.

1). The new approach/renewed anti-corruption drive by the government has increased prosecutions and exposed corrupt government officials.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither-nor</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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2). These anti-corruption strategies have hampered business in carrying out their business.

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<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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<th>Neither-nor</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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3). These anti-corruption policies has made it easier to do business.

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<th>Agree</th>
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4). There is less corruption after the new strategies/enforced strategies in the governments anti-corruption drive.

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<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</table>
5) Corruption has increased after the new strategies/enforced strategies.

<table>
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<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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6). How do you view corruption?
Corruption is a bad practice that must be eradicated from society.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Agree</th>
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