The European Union's development policy: a balancing act between 'a more comprehensive approach' and creeping securitisation

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Abstract

'Security' has become prominent in official EU development discourse in recent years, and references to security concerns are routinely included in policy statements and documents. Our objective in this paper is to determine whether security concerns have had a growing influence over EU development policy and aid allocation. If so, we are interested in whether this trend can properly be understood as ‘securitisation’ in the critical sense that resources are being diverted away from socio-economic development, or whether we should see it as a positive trend towards greater coherence in EU development policy.

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“The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda.”

European Security Strategy 2003:13

1. Introduction
A decade after the release of the European Security Strategy (ESS), its affirmation that development and security policy should work more closely together for the betterment of people in developing countries is still one of its most discussed features. The ESS’ vision of a more comprehensive approach to security and development raises several questions regarding the potential ‘securitisation’ of EU development policy and foreign aid. Is the EU’s approach overly idealistic and uncritical regarding the potential pitfalls of trying to combine security and development policy? Do key concepts that have become prominent since the strategy was launched, such as fragile states and the ‘whole-of-government’ approach, reflect how European policymakers perceive the new reality of international development? Are decisions about the allocation and objectives of the European Commission’s aid budget unduly driven by security concerns? Has the Commission itself used securitisation as a means for increasing its aid budget and its policymaking responsibilities? This paper addresses these questions by discussing how EU policies and aid practices at the interface of security and development have evolved since the turn of the 21st century.

The securitisation of EU policies has been explored in greater depth in the context of justice and home affairs in general and migration, asylum, border control, data protection in particular (see e.g. Neal, 2009; Huysmans, 1998, 2006; Hayes and Bunyan, 2003; Loader, 2002). The concern that EU development policy might also be increasingly ‘securitised’ became more widely expressed as the EU began to articulate a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and deployed military missions to Africa from 2003 as part of its evolving Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Orbie, 2008:4). Some observers have noted parallels between these developments and the ‘global war
on terrorism’ launched following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on
11 September 11, 2001 (Banim, 2008; Hout, 2010). Subsequently, engagement with
‘fragile states’ and post-conflict peacebuilding have become core focal areas for the EU’s
external policy (Blockmans et al 2010:3). With regards to the issue of state fragility,
Hout (2009:16) has argued that the EU’s policy formulation demonstrated "strong
security overtones, and that the EU response fits in with the overall trend of
securitisation of development."

It is clear that ‘security’ has certainly become a prominent feature in official EU
development discourse in recent years, and references to security concerns are
routinely included in policy statements and documents. The European Consensus on
Development, adopted on 20 December 2005 by the EU’s institutional triangle – the
Council, Commission and the Parliament – stated that “[s]ecurity and development are
important and complementary aspects” of EU external action (European Union 2006:7).
But does security’s prominence in discourse and practice really mean that a policy area
ostensibly oriented toward poverty reduction has become more securitised?

Our objective in this paper is to determine whether security concerns have had a
growing influence over EU development policy and aid allocation. If so, we are
interested in whether this trend can properly be understood as ‘securitisation’ in the
critical sense that resources are being diverted away from socio-economic development,
or whether we should see it as a positive trend towards greater coherence in EU
development policy. Our starting point is to ask whose security the policy area is
supposed to serve. In simple terms, we posit that if policymaking and implementation
are driven primarily by concerns about the security of the donor to the detriment of
socio-economic development in partner countries, then the critical perspective of
securitisation is legitimately applicable. If EU development policy were ‘securitised’ in
this way, then we would expect European security interests to dominate the policy
discourse, decision-making and aid allocations across countries. On the other hand, if
security policy in a development context were primarily directed towards protecting
vulnerable people in fragile developing countries and providing a stable environment in
which institutions can be built and development projects can flourish, then a more
positive understanding of policy and aid from the security-development nexus perspective is more appropriate.

EU development policy cannot be completely ring-fenced from security-related policy areas. The gap between the (treaty-based) rhetoric focussing on poverty and reality of development policy has long been bridged by policymakers’ desires to pursue short-term interests – national, institutional and sometimes personal – that have not always coincided with the objective of raising the living standards of ordinary people in developing countries. Geopolitical and local political rivalries, business interests and national foibles have been part of the European development policy story ever since the establishment of aid agencies in the 1960s. The French desire to maintain a close association with its former colonies was at the very origin of European Community development cooperation in 1957. More recently, the need to secure access to raw materials, fight terrorism and prevent illegal migration have all entered the development policy discourse and few observers would argue that these factors do not influence decisions about policy objectives and aid allocation. Moreover, the EU policymaking system, where multiple actors engage and endeavour to push outcomes in their preferred direction, is highly complex. In development policy there are multiple outcomes, generalisations about motives are not always possible, and a nuanced view is needed. Although there is evidence for securitisation of EU development policy, and some of the aid spent by the Commission has ‘security’ rather than ‘development’ objectives, we argue that these trends are part of a general effort to progress toward ‘policy coherence’ rather than full-fledged securitisation of foreign aid. While we argue that securitisation is not the strategic purpose of EU aid, we acknowledge that the EU’s efforts to improve the complementarity of security and development policy involve some risk that securitisation may occur as a consequence, which can in some instances have negative consequences for ‘core’ development objectives.

The rest of this paper discusses in more depth the extent to which EU development policy has become more ‘securitised’ since the beginning of the new millennium. We analyse four potential indicators of securitisation in the European context: (1) discursive practices, (2) institutions, (3) instruments and (4) the allocation of European Commission aid. Our central focus is on the EU policy-making system as an arena where
member states shape policy priorities, and on the Commission as an actor in its own right especially with regard to aid allocation.

2. The security-development nexus: legal foundations, discursive practice and strategic design

The EU has routinely been evoked as a ‘community of law’ and ‘shared’ or ‘common values.’ Since its inception in the early 1950s, the European Community has maintained that peace and development are part of its genetic code and that integration was ultimately aimed at fostering both prosperity and peace by ‘domesticating’ inter-state relations amongst its members, a concept captured by François Duchêne’s (1973) notion of a ‘civilian power Europe’. Over time, the EU’s member states have recognised the added value of addressing international security issues through their common institutions, and the EU has become a 'security actor' with limited (although far from clearly defined) roles. As part of this process, the EU's internal peace and prosperity vision has been adapted for the outside world through the EU’s assertion that security and development are mutually enhancing policy objectives of its external relations. Security is considered a precondition for development – if adequate security provisions are not in place, activities aimed at reducing poverty will most likely fail. Development, in turn, is considered a core component of sustainable conflict resolution (Hadfield and Youngs, 2008). Moreover, the dyad of 'development and security' is in fact a triad. The EU has asserted that its core ‘universal value’ of ‘democratic governance’ is also ‘fundamental for poverty reduction’ (European Union 2006:14) – often in conjunction with the protection of human rights and the rule of law in partner countries, ‘principles [which] underpin all aspects of the internal and external policies of the European Union’ (European Council 2012:1).

The Legal Framework
The external relations of the EU have evolved into a highly complex governance system engaging many different actors and cutting across a wide range of policy areas. It encompasses all of the EU’s policy areas that affect or require cooperation with
countries outside the EU, including trade, environment, fisheries, and development policy. However, the EU's legal framework requires that decisions in these policy areas are taken in accordance with rules and procedures which differ depending on which of the EU's institutional configurations has decision-making competence. Environment and trade policies, for example, are deemed Commission competences, meaning that member states have delegated responsibility to the Commission and have to accept the latter's decisions once legislation has been passed. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty drew up the CFSP as an intergovernmental pillar in the EU's institutional structure, meaning that member states took decisions unanimously through the Council of (foreign) Ministers. To complicate matters further, the Maastricht Treaty made development policy a shared competence of both the Union and its member states. This meant that decisions pertaining to aid programmes financed by the EU budget were taken in accordance with the 'Community' method, whereby the Commission proposes legislation which the Parliament and Council vote on. Member states retained full sovereignty over their bilateral aid programmes.¹

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty aimed at improving the coherence of external policies but has not simplified policymaking procedures or responsibilities (Furness, 2012). The Treaty abolished the pillar structure of the EU, which had maintained a more-or-less clear dividing line between Community and member state competences. The role of the Commission and the European Parliament in development policymaking was enhanced, especially as some regional and thematic programmes are considered 'delegated acts' where the Parliament has the right to veto Commission proposals (Malhère, 2012) Most foreign and security policy decisions are still taken under the 'intergovernmental method', meaning that member states call the tune. These changes do not make George Orwell's observation from 'Animal Farm' any less appropriate: some member states are clearly 'more equal than others.' The 'big three' (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) have more individual sway over CFSP decision-making than smaller EU members, and the Commission usually courts their favour when taking strategic decisions about development policy. When they act collectively the big three set the tone

¹ The European Development Fund (EDF) for the EU’s former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, fell between these two competencies. It is administered by the Commission but is funded separately by member states outside the EU’s budget. Decisions are taken by the EDF Committee consisting of Commission, European External Action Service (EEAS) and member state representatives.
for the Union’s external policy and establish the framework in which the interplay between development and security policy unfolds.

*The ‘Security-Development Nexus’ as policy framework*

While the general question of whether EU development and security policy are interdependent is not really debated, the problematic relationship between the two policy areas has challenged observers and policymakers (Dearden, 2011). Several pundits have expressed concern that the problematic relationship between EU security and development might raise the prospect that development goals might be undermined by security interests, either in terms of conflicting objectives (Peter and LoWilla, 2010), differing timelines (Grimm, 2009), or simply because aid money might be diverted away from poverty reduction (Vegro, 2010). Such concerns are far from groundless: influential EU foreign policy scholars have argued that development should contribute to the implementation of a European ‘grand strategy’ that would aim to establish the EU as a global military and economic power (Renard and Biscop, 2009). Furthermore, development aid is regarded by some EU policymakers as an instrument of ‘soft power.’ The EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, released alongside the ESS in December 2003, stated that development was one of the ‘levers’ that the EU could use to pursue the strategy’s objectives (European Council, 2003 b). Certainly, in the EU context the security-development relationship “remains an uneasy mix of mutually enhancing connections” which the EU has never quite managed to master (Youngs, 2007:3). Other observers have welcomed the integration of development policy with the broader EU external agenda, arguing in favour of the ‘developmentalisation’ of EU foreign and security policy (Faust and Messner, 2004; Hadfield, 2007; Furness, 2012).

In the wake of the Millennium Declaration, recognition of the need for comprehensive and coherent policies in global development and security policy came with the Swedish EU Council Presidency of the first half of 2001. The Gothenburg ‘EU Program for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ firmly anchored conflict prevention as one of the core goals of the Union’s external relations and the European Council stressed that it ‘should be integrated in all its relevant aspects, including the European Security and Defence Policy, development cooperation and trade’ (European Council 2001:12). In the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the prevention of ‘state failure’ became an important objective of the EU’s external relations and foreign policy, with serious implications for development and security policy. References to ‘failed states’ started to enter official EU documents after 9/11 (see Banim 2008:3). The 2003 ESS, drafted under the aegis of CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, addressed state failure as “an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability” (European Council 2003 a:4). The ESS heralded a shift from humanitarian concern toward protecting the EU and its citizens and addressed the issue of ‘state failure’ from a far more securitised angle. It also made a clear statement that military instruments may be needed in failed states to restore order (see Banim 2008:5).

Three significant policy initiatives in 2005 brought EU security and development policy closer together. First, the ‘European Consensus on Development’, approved by the European institutions and the member states, focussed on poverty eradication within the context of building a “more stable, peaceful, prosperous, and equitable world”, and committed the Commission to develop a “comprehensive approach to state fragility, conflict, natural disasters and other types of crises” (European Union 2006:4). Second, the Commission proposed that the EU would “treat security and development as complementary agendas, with the common aim of creating a secure environment and of breaking the vicious circle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures” (European Commission 2005:5). Third, the 2005 revision of the 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the EU and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states included anti-terrorist and weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation clauses in the legal framework of the ACP-EU partnership. This has been interpreted as representing an “apparent break from the poverty-reduction policies established in the 2000 CPA” (Hadfield 2007:39).

During the French Presidency in 2008, the Council drew up an ‘Implementation Report’ on the impact of the ESS and subsequently launched measures to address the ‘security and development nexus’. It highlighted its actions in ‘Security Sector Reform’ (SSR) and

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2 More recently, a trend toward convergence in terminology can be observed, with both the development and diplomatic/security community appearing to settle for the somewhat less ideologically fraught label of ‘fragile state,’ although this term remains contested.
'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration' (DDR) as core aspects of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. The report stressed the symbiotic link between security and development and the need for “partnership with the international community and local stakeholders” (European Union 2008:8). Since then, not only has the "security-development nexus" entered the EU’s vocabulary, but the Union has also become more assertive in advocating a comprehensive approach to security and development, especially in Africa.

Regional Strategies: the European Neighbourhood and Africa
EU policy toward its neighbourhood – especially the Middle East and North Africa and to lesser extent Eastern Europe – is arguably more explicitly security-oriented than its policy towards other developing regions. As Joffé (2008) observed, the ill-fated Union for the Mediterranean was intended “to engage Southern states in a securitised view of migration.” Although the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is financed using ODA, it is generally regarded as foreign policy rather than as development cooperation (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005). Prior to the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, EU funding and technical assistance helped maintain political stability in an autocratic region, with the spectre of Islamist terrorism preventing substantial EU support for civil society and democracy movements in the Arab world (Krausch and Youngs 2009). The changes that swept the region led Brussels to “look afresh” at the EU’s relationships with its neighbours, but options for common responses were constrained by the desire of some member states, in particular France and the United Kingdom to take the lead diplomatically and, in the case of Libya, militarily through NATO. Although the EU promised an additional 1 billion Euros for the region, few substantial changes to the overall policy framework were made (European Commission/High Representative 2011).

Africa is becoming more strategically important for Europe for several reasons, such as the high prospect of rapid economic growth over the next twenty years or so, the increased engagement of emerging powers, especially China, and growing recognition in the United States that Africa is a the key arena for international strategic interaction in

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3 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched during the French EU Presidency in 2008. An initiative of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, one of the UfM’s core objectives was to revitalise relations between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours.
the 21st Century. The 2007 Joint Africa-Europe Strategy signalled the beginnings of a shift in the emphasis of EU-African relations from a relationship based on post-colonial poverty reduction toward diplomatic engagement and partnership. This does not mean that European threat perceptions are increasing – rather, it means that emphasis is shifting to ‘beyond aid’ strategies and global public goods, including peace and security. Drug trafficking, illegal migration, hostage taking and piracy in Africa have received a lot of media attention in Europe. However, at the policy level, these concerns are largely overshadowed by the broader objective of increasing the capacity of African states, regional organisations and the African Union to provide security and development to their own populations (Carbone, 2010). Where European threat perceptions are relevant, they are generally in the background, although senior EU officials privately acknowledge that the EU needs to engage cautiously to avoid getting caught up in potentially explosive political situations as alliances in Africa shift.

In 2011 the European Council adopted two strategic frameworks on which discussion with African partners had been difficult because of the emphasis on European security concerns. The EEAS released the EU’s Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel in September 2011 some three years after it was first requested by the 2008 French EU presidency. The Strategy had four key themes: first, that security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated; second, that progress is only possible through closer regional cooperation, which the EU pledged to support; third, that all states in the region would benefit from capacity building in areas of core government activity; and fourth, that the EU has an important role to play both in encouraging economic development and in helping achieve a more secure environment in which the interests of EU citizens and companies were also protected (EEAS, 2011).

The strategy responded to long-standing European concerns about security in the Sahel, where organised crime networks had been able to take advantage of weak state control over desert areas and kidnap Europeans for ransom. In this environment, it had become highly risky for development actors to continue operations, while French energy company AREVA had to institute expensive security measures to protect its operations in Niger. The final draft of the strategy was negotiated following the kidnapping and
murder of two young Frenchmen in Niger’s capital, Niamey, in a gun battle which also killed several Nigerien security officers.

In November 2011, the European Council adopted the EU's Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. The strategy aimed to establish a comprehensive framework for a range of policy proposals to address security and development challenges. It also openly stated Europe’s interests in the region, largely stemming from its geo-strategic importance. The strategy focussed on five priority areas for EU action: building robust and accountable political structures; contributing to conflict resolution and prevention; mitigating security threats emanating from the region; promoting economic growth and supporting regional economic cooperation. Specific goals included tackling piracy and supporting stabilisation in Somalia and peaceful transition in Sudan (European Council, 2011). EU member states generally agreed that the Horn of Africa strategy presented a long-term perspective for European policy in the region and the next step would be to coordinate on its implementation.

Over the past decade the EU has developed its lexicon in order to address the interface of development and security policy in conceptual terms. Security – broadly defined – has acquired a prominent place in all of the policy declarations that lay out the framework of EU cooperation with developing regions. It would, however, be overly simplistic to argue that this means EU development policy has become more ‘securitised’ in the critical, Copenhagen School sense. The security-development nexus has increased in importance to EU development policy in response to the growing recognition that security and development are not separate policy fields to be dealt with by different actors using tailored approaches. Against this backdrop, it is important to grasp how these concepts and approaches are translated into practice through institutions, instruments, missions and aid allocation.

3. Maintaining the delicate balance: Institutions, Instruments and Missions

Institutions
The Lisbon Treaty provided the impetus for an institutional evolution aimed at improving the EU’s ability to respond to a changing global context in which emerging
powers are becoming important players and global public goods issues are becoming major arenas for cooperation and debate. Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that development objectives have to be taken into account by all EU policies that affect developing countries, potentially giving development the role of *primus inter pares* in the EU external policy hierarchy (Furness, 2012). The Lisbon Treaty also reformed the institutional setting through which EU development and security policy are channelled, in particular by creating the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission. Catherine Ashton became *primus inter pares* among the European Commissioners responsible for policies with international implications, including development. The Lisbon Treaty also created the European External Action Service (EEAS) which was given a key role in programming development policy in the institutional reforms which followed the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force in December 2009 (van Seters and Klavert, 2011). The country desks of the former Commission Directorate-General for Development were subsumed into the EEAS, and the remaining Commission policy units were merged with the EuropeAid agency to form the new Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DevCo), responsible to development commissioner Andris Piebalgs. Development and security policy overlap in the new system: the EEAS includes a unit for development policy coordination, while DevCo includes a unit for state fragility and crisis management.

The EEAS has been interpreted as a means of legitimising the EU’s foreign and security policy by bringing it closer to development policy (Anderson and Williams 2011). On the other hand the decision to include a development role in the EEAS’ mandate led some observers, particularly in the Brussels NGO community, to express concerns about a post-Lisbon Treaty drift toward securitisation of development policy (Phillips 2010). Such concerns were probably not eased by Commissioner Piebalgs’ assurances that both he and High Representative Ashton do not believe the EEAS will weaken the EU’s focus on development (Piebalgs, 2010). Nevertheless, since the EEAS’ roll-out, development appears to have held its own within the Brussels beltway. The 2011 Commission Communication on the future of EU development policy, grandly titled ‘Agenda for Change,’ was prepared by the DevCo policy unit A1 with minimal involvement from EEAS officials, while in late 2011 senior DevCo officials coordinated the Commission’s
proposals for the entire external relations component of the EU’s 2014 - 2020 multiannual budget.

Institutional measures to better integrate security and development have also taken place at the implementation level through the post-Lisbon Treaty reforms to the EU’s delegations in developing countries. The Treaty boosted the diplomatic role of the delegations by making them representations of the whole EU rather than just the Commission. As Commission delegations they were responsible for implementing Community programmes and were an important source of country expertise. Their primarily technocratic role has become more political as they have assumed greater responsibilities for managing relations with partner governments (Schulz 2010). It has been suggested that there is potential to enhance the role of delegations not only in terms of representation but also operationally if there is sufficient commitment to invest in their capacities (Gourlay, 2012). This process appears to be underway in some cases. Since the EEAS’ launch more than 100 seconded national diplomats have been sent to reinforce political sections in the EU delegations. At the EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa the political, peace and security and economic development sections work closely together, and the head of delegation ensures that their work is coordinated.

**Instruments**

The EU has four main financial instruments that it uses to fund activities at the interface of peace and security policy, mostly in developing countries (see table 1). These arrangements are quite flexible with three ‘standing’ instruments – the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the African Peace Facility (APF) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy Instrument (CFSP) – plus the ad-hoc Athena instrument which funds the common costs of EU military operations. The choice of instrument depends on the political context of a crisis, the constellation of actors in Europe pushing for a given activity, and the decision about what kinds of means – civilian, European military, third-country military or combinations thereof – are best suited to the case at hand.

**Table 1: EU instruments for funding peacebuilding operations**

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4 The CFSP and Athena instruments are explicitly for defending European security and diplomatic interests and are not eligible to be counted as official development assistance (ODA).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>APF</th>
<th>IFS</th>
<th>CFSP</th>
<th>Athena</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Financing AU-led peacebuilding in Africa, creating conditions for development</td>
<td>Financing measures establishing conditions for implementing development policy</td>
<td>Financing operational costs of CFSP except military costs</td>
<td>Financing common costs of military operations under CFSP/CSDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors financed</td>
<td>Military/Civilian</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA-eligible</td>
<td>No⁵</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Furness (2011)

**The Instrument for Stability (IfS)**

The Instrument for Stability is both a budget line and a legal bridge-builder between the development and security policy areas. Since its inception in 2006 the IfS has pursued two main objectives: firstly, to equip the EU with the legal capacity and, second, to provide the EU with the necessary financial means to get involved with rapidly unfolding crisis situations (see Gänzle 2009; 2012). For the period 2007-2013, the lion’s share of the IfS budget – around 73 per cent or EUR 1,505 million – is reserved for immediate crisis response (the so-called short-term component). This does not signal the intention of EU policymakers to focus on short-term security issues at the expense of development. Rather, once initiatives financed by the IfS have done their job, longer term programmes financed by the EU’s geographical development instruments are meant to take over. Secondly, the IfS regulation transposed, for the first time in EU history, the obligation for EU institutions to ensure external policy coherence from “constitutional” (EU Treaty-based) law into “normal” (“secondary”) legislation (Hoffmeister, 2008). In fact, the IfS was introduced as opportunity for Commission and Council to gather experience in closer cooperation in the grey zone between foreign and development policies prior to the Lisbon Treaty. While legally remaining an instrument

⁵ EU member states declare their total EDF contributions as ODA, but the Commission does not include the APF in the ODA it reports to the OECD-DAC.
decided upon by the Commission (and the EEAS since 2010), close coordination with EU member states, notably in the EU’s Political and Security Committee but also in the geographic working groups, has made the IfS politically responsive.

The Instrument for Stability creates the capacity for an early and sustained reaction bridging immediate crisis response and development policy. In principle, the IfS brings down the EU’s ‘reaction time’ for responding to crisis situations to approximately eight weeks and can provide funding for measures lasting up to 18 months. At the same time, it is not a one-size-fits-all instrument, as a report commissioned by the UK’s Department for International Development confirmed: The “governance and decision-making systems [of the IfS] appear to be effective and strongly linked to the high-level decision-making processes. (…) The IfS headquarter-level governance structure also appears to enable strategic decision-making, including its handling of highly sensitive political issues and the management of risks associated with working in volatile environments. Monthly briefings with the EU Political and Security Committee ensure Member States are always updated and increases [sic] coordination with EU partners” (Garassi 2010:13).

Furthermore, the Peace-building Partnership, which has been set up as part of the IfS, provides NGOs with the opportunity to have a stake in the policy-shaping process, thus adding to the instrument’s profile. It is envisaged that the Peace-building Partnership is an initial step toward a fully-fledged European Agency dealing with peace-building – thus adding substance to the EU’s ‘civilian power’ (self-)image and providing a structure that would oversee the potential creep of securitisation in development policy. The Partnership has funded capacity-building in the UN and the African Union (AU), and it supported the international dialogue on peacebuilding and state-building organised by the OECD-DAC in 2009 and 2010. In addition, the Partnership has funded training for civilians deployed in ESDP missions. However, at € 7 million per year, the Partnership is small and its resources are thinly spread (Gourlay, 2009: 91).

*The African Peace Facility (APF)*

The APF was created by an EU Council Decision in 2003 after a request from the AU for predictable funds to support peace and security in Africa. As well as operations, the
instrument supports the structures of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the AU’s Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, the Continental Early Warning System and response mechanisms at the regional level. The APF has supported several peace support operations since 2004, including in Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic and the Comoros. Since 2004 some € 740 million have been channelled through the instrument. The APF can be topped up through voluntary member state contributions, as in the case of the AMIS Sudan mission where eight EU members allocated an extra € 36 million.

The APF’s added value, effectiveness and potential have been confirmed by independent evaluations contracted by the Commission (Mackie et al, 2006) and the European Parliament (Vines and Middleton, 2008). The AU and EU Commissions are enthusiastic about continuing the APF cooperation and improving the instrument’s flexibility and efficiency. The APF is an innovative instrument in that it is partly used to pay the expenses of AU soldiers in the field, although ammunition, weapons, soldiers’ salaries and military training are explicitly ineligible. This is widely considered to be an essential component of the shared AU/EU strategy for peace and security. However, this innovation creates legal difficulties for the EU, since the EU Treaties do not allow the community budget to finance activities with military or defence implications. For this reason, the pragmatic decision was taken to finance the APF from the EDF, which is funded directly by member states and has different rules.

The fact that the APF is funded by the EDF can be interpreted as a clear instance of securitisation in that development aid has been diverted to fund peacekeeping operations (Del Biondo et al, 2012: 135). The Commission acknowledges this and it does not include the APF in the ODA figures it declares to the OECD.6 Thus far, the numbers have been small, but the securitisation problem has the potential to become more acute unless the thorny legal issues around the APF’s financing are resolved. Should demand for the APF grow as the APSA develops, EU member states may find it necessary to establish a separate fund if they want to continue to finance African-led PSOs through the EU (Furness 2011).

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6 EU member states declare their total EDF contributions as ODA, but the Commission does not declare the APF as ODA.
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Missions

Although the EU's civilian and military missions are officially part of the CSDP, their operation at the interface of development and security policy and their centrality to the EU’s development objectives in fragile countries provides a potential entry point for securitisation. The CSDP has variously been described as an expression of the EU's evolving strategic culture (Biava et al, 2011) and as an underwhelming indicator of the EU’s 'small power' status (Toje, 2011). The shortcomings of the missions themselves - especially the difficulties of coordinating military and civilian actors - have been widely noted. Responsibility for these problems has been attributed not only to actors on the ground but also to an absence of geo-strategic vision on the part of EU policymakers (Youngs, 2011).

Somalia

Somalia’s troubles are not only a challenge for Europe but also for the UN, the AU, East African governments, China, India and other trading nations that use the Suez Canal route between Europe and Asia. Piracy off the coast of Somalia became a major international issue following several high-profile hijackings, most notably that of the super-tanker Sirius Star, which was released in January 2009 after the payment of a ransom estimated at $3 million. Only one month later, the European anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR)-Atalanta, reached full operational capacity. Atalanta is part of a bigger mission aimed at protecting maritime trade routes which includes ships from China, NATO and other partners.

The Atalanta operation is defined explicitly in terms of Europe’s security interests, but it is nevertheless able to claim some successes with a view to humanitarian objectives. It escorted dozens of vessels carrying UN World Food Programme aid to ports in Somalia. The mission reported some success: according to the BBC, there were 25 successful hijacks in 2011 compared with 47 in 2010. Nevertheless, the hijacking of commercial shipping could not be fully prevented. The greatest challenge lay in addressing the conflict in Somalia itself – as former AU Commission President Jean Ping said, “Pirates were not born in the ocean and they don’t live there. They come from Somalia. If you want sustainable peace you have to go where they come from, which is on the land”
(Ping 2010). The European Council meeting on Somalia held in July 2010 concluded that a comprehensive approach was needed to resolving Somalia’s problems, but the EU – like the wider international community – was unable to do more than support the AU’s efforts to protect the beleaguered Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu through funding the AMISOM mission and providing training to Somali security forces in Uganda.

**Chad**

The EUFOR mission to Chad lasted eighteen months from late 2007 until early 2009. The mission involved around 3,700 troops from 23 EU member states, although the majority of the soldiers (more than 2000) were French. The mission’s mandate was to protect civilians and UN personnel and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and it carried out these tasks with reasonable success. It was, however, criticised for failing to resolve factors behind the conflicts in Chad, Darfur and the Central African Republic, even though it was not mandated to perform a long-term conflict resolution role (Helly, 2010). Although the mission was more about providing security to people whose government was neither able nor willing to protect them than about European security interests, it was not well enough resourced to have a significant development impact. Most EU member states were reluctant to commit major resources to the mission with the outcome that it was seriously undermanned and underequipped – indeed, as one commentator argued in the wake of the mission, the absence of European security interests in Chad and the Central African Republic was one of the reasons why the mission struggled to make a lasting impact on the region (Seibert 2010).

**Guinea-Bissau**

Much of the attention paid by Europeans to Guinea-Bissau has focussed on the country’s role as an important transit-point for drug trafficking. Concerns about drugs and organised crime were central factors behind the EU mission to Guinea-Bissau which ended in September 2010. The aim of the mission was to provide assistance and advice to the reform of the country’s security sector so that it could implement the National Security Sector Reform Strategy. Particular emphasis was given to finalising basic legislation underpinning the new security structures in the sectors of defence, police and justice. The mission received criticism from some quarters, mostly because its central
Objective of reducing the involvement of high-level officials in the international drug trade was largely unrealised. The decision to end the mission was taken after political instability and lack of respect for the rule of law made it impossible for the EU to deploy a follow-up mission, as was originally planned. In the wake of the mission, the EU scaled back development assistance to the country, a decision which has been described as a “serious tactical error” which weakened reform-minded leaders but not the military officers who profit from organised crime (Bello, 2012).

4. Aid allocation
The European Commission provided development aid to 143 countries in 2010. Inevitably such a global engagement is driven by varying constellations of interests and priorities across partners and regions. Security - in both its 'hard' and 'soft' dimensions - is certainly a major factor in shaping the pattern of Commission aid allocations. Table 2 shows that Turkey is the biggest recipient of Commission aid, and although it is hardly a security threat per se, it is certainly an important geo-strategic partner for Europe. In the Palestinian (PAA) case the Commission pays a large proportion of the public sector salaries, an important element in maintaining stability that serves Israel's security interests as well as Europe's. Afghanistan became the epitome of a ‘failed state' that posed a security threat to the West after 9/11. The country started to receive large amounts of aid from the Commission aid following the NATO invasion in late 2001. Closer to home, the Commission’s aid budget to Georgia was quadrupled following its short war with Russia in 2008.

Table 2: Top 20 EC aid recipients, 2003, 2006 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>2003 (€ mill.)</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>2006 (€ mill.)</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>2009 (€ mill.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>PAA</td>
<td>395</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>246</td>
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<td>136</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>232</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAA</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>PAA</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>215</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>168</td>
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<td>207</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herz</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD-DAC aid statistics

Security is, however, by no means the only factor in determining aid allocations. Egypt and Morocco are large neighbouring countries from which Europeans perceive different kinds of security threats, but these countries also have high rates of poverty. Similarly, while Ethiopia has an important strategic role in East Africa and has some characteristics of a fragile state it has climbed the Commission aid table due to relative stability and rapid economic growth, a process which many donors want to be part of. Sudan has a high place on the table because it receives a lot of humanitarian assistance, mostly for refugees from the conflict in the Darfur region. Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are large but poor countries where there are many security/development linkages, but where poverty reduction and the security of local populations are also strong motivating factors.

Figure 1: Increases in Commission ODA to ‘security and development’ partners

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7 These figures are for Sudan and South Sudan prior to the latter's independence in July 2011.
Figure 1 shows that aid to partner countries that are important security and development partners, albeit in differing ways, has increased along with overall increases in Commission ODA between 2000 and 2010. As Figure 1 indicates, much of the total increase in aid can be accounted for by increases to the neighbourhood, three key security-relevant countries (Iraq and Afghanistan - in which EU member states fought wars in the period and Pakistan, the country closely intertwined with the Afghanistan war), and nine fragile states in Africa.8 However, as discussed above, these increases cannot solely be attributed to security concerns. Perhaps more importantly for the securitisation debate, increases in aid to key 'security relevant partners' do not appear to have come at the expense of aid to other countries.

8 Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan.
EU member states set the parameters within which the Commission operates and influence decisions about aid allocations. The Commission is sometimes seen as a ‘donor of last resort’ by member states keen to maintain the visibility of bilateral programmes in more stable countries, while avoiding potential failures. As a result, the Commission’s role in fragile and post-conflict countries, where security concerns are high on the agenda, government capacities are lacking, institutions are weak and poverty reduction is difficult, has grown. Security is clearly a priority in such cases, and the risks posed by ‘state failure’ to Europe are sometimes used to explain decisions to intervene. Nevertheless the objectives and conduct of fragile state interventions are more often focussed on improving the security of local populations and helping local authorities build capacity and legitimacy as a necessary condition of sustainable development.

5. Conclusions

In conclusion, we return to the questions that we posed at the outset. First, regarding the extent to which ‘securitisation’ has changed the way the donor organisation thinks about foreign aid, it is clear from policy documents, institutional changes and instruments that security and development have become more closely interrelated in the EU’s international engagement since 2000. Whether ‘securitisation’ has been a causal factor in this is less clear. One driving factor has been the evolution of the EU itself as an international actor, particularly in the security field. Whereas the international engagement of the 20th Century EU was limited to trade and development, supranational competences have been extended into ‘high politics’ since the Maastricht Treaty. The bureaucratic changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty have formalised a process that was already underway. Perhaps ironically, this may work against the securitisation critique. One of the reasons why development has been a core part of the EU’s global engagement for much longer than security has been is that the EU’s large member states have regarded security policy as a sovereign, rather than a supranational, field. Member state under-investment in the CSFP and CSDP indicates a certain reluctance to change this view, particularly in Paris and London.
However, this does not mean that the critical view of securitisation is invalid with regard to the EU. There are certainly cases where EU security interests come first, with potentially negative consequences for development – such as operation Atalanta – and others where European security concerns are an important driver of increases in aid, such as in Afghanistan. In Africa, perceived threats to Europe provide a backdrop to policy decisions in some instances, and are sometimes cited as public justifications for specific interventions, such as in the case of Guinea-Bissau. The EU is a large actor with a global reach, and it is also a complex policymaking system where many actors can influence policy on specific issues. Given this construction, it is no surprise that different policy programmes and specific actions can be driven by differing constellations of motives.

Second, the EU has certainly used key concepts, such as fragile states and whole-of-government approaches, to reflect new perspectives on aid allocation and effectiveness. The EU is by no means alone in this – its policy positions on engagement with fragile and post-conflict countries are in line with those of the rest of the OECD donor community. The EU’s engagement with post-conflict and fragile countries is (mostly) directed more toward conflict prevention and establishing the conditions in which socio-economic development can take place, than toward securing Europe in the first instance. The two instruments with which the EU explicitly pursues activities at the nexus of security and development policy – the IfS and the APF – are heavily weighted toward assisting partner countries in the provision of human security as a precondition for development.

Thirdly, it is difficult to argue with any certainty that securitisation – whether critically or positively conceived – has modified the distribution of aid, including through higher aid flows to new priority countries. Although there are parallels between EU aid allocations and countries that are important for security reasons, there are many causal factors. Threat perception may explain large aid allocations to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and path dependency or solidarity with NATO partners may also play a role in influencing decisions. In the EU neighbourhood, proximity has complex implications and considerations of regional stability and security threats are usually on the agenda. However in all of these countries poverty is still a major problem and decisions to
allocate resources cannot always be reduced to considerations of whether the partner represents a security risk to Europe, to its neighbours or to itself.

There is little evidence that the Commission has been able to use security concerns to mobilise additional resources. Arguments in favour of increasing the size of the EU’s aid budget have tended to focus on meeting Europe’s Monterrey commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on ODA (Maxwell, 2011). The Lisbon Treaty expressly focuses the EU’s aid on poverty reduction, and the debate over the use of EDF funds for the APF illustrates restrictions on the uses of EU aid that nation-states do not face to the same extent. Public statements from EU development policymakers do not usually emphasise the security dimension, even though the EU is active in more fragile states than most national development agencies. This does not mean that Commission officials are unaware of the traction that security-related justifications for aid can have. They are often keen to stress the potential for addressing security and development challenges at the EU level, where member states can pool resources and deploy a range of instruments across the entire peacekeeping-peacebuilding-statebuilding process. However this does not add up to an instrumentalisation of foreign aid for the purposes of pursuing primarily security goals, and nor has it provided a new justification and means for non-development actors to use aid for other purposes.

To the extent that the European Commission has promoted and enacted the securitization of foreign aid, this has been, on balance, an effort to improve the coherence of security and development policy at the EU level. The Commission (and more recently the EEAS) have exhibited a pragmatic approach to the security-development nexus. At the policy level, recognition that while development and security are interdependent, measures to pursue them may be counterproductive has led to efforts to improve the coherence of policy frameworks and the creation of tailored instruments, especially the IfS and the APF. This process has had a positive influence on the EU’s effectiveness and reputation as a development actor, especially in Africa.
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